ML20245C327
| ML20245C327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1989 |
| From: | Hunger G PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906260135 | |
| Download: ML20245C327 (2) | |
Text
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l PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COM PANY -
i 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 1
PHILADELPHIA PA.19101
<2tu s4i4ooo June 19, 1989 l
Docket Nos. 50-352 i
50-353 j
License No. NPF-39 Construction Permit No. CPPR-107 1
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555'
SUBJECT:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Withdrawal of Request for. Exemption from 10 CFR 50.44
REFERENCES:
- 1) Letter, G. A. Hunger, Jr. (PECo) to USNRC dated May 23, 1989 i
- 2) Telecon between J. E. Price and C. W. Wiedersum (PECo) and W. R. Butler (USNRC), dated June 14, 1989 Gentlemen:
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As discussed in the June 14, 1989 telephone conversation (Reference 2), Philadelphia Electric Company is hereby withdrawing the i
request for exemption from 10 CPR 50.44 (c)(3)(ii)(B) submitted in our May 23, 1989 letter (Reference 1).
The basis for this withdrawal is that the hydrogen recombiner design effectively satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 (c)(3)(ii)(B) by compliance with other design bases to provide for greater recombiner reliability.
3 The existing design to power the hydrogen recombiner-containment isolation valves from the same electrical division of their associated recombiner is acceptable for the following reasons.
1)
The valves are all normally closed and are not required to be opened to permit recombinor operation until approximately 39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) (Reference Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 6.2.5.3).
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2)
The reconbiner system contains two 100% redundant subsystems and is designed as a closed system outside containment as described in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.3.
3)
A failure of only one electrical power division wi):
Lisable f
the recombiner subsystem.
If diverse power supplies were provided, a failure in either of the power supplies would disable the recombiner subsystem.
System reliability is discussed in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.1.3.2.3.
We conclude that the existing design effectively satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)(ii)(B) by compliance with other i
design bases (i.e., to maximize recombiner reliability and ensure that containment isolation capability criteria are satisfied), and therefore an exemption from 10 CPR 50.44(c)(3)(ii)(B) is not required.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please I
contact us.
Very truly yours, I
i fo a
G. A. Hunger, Jr.
Director l
l Licensing Section l
Nuclear Support Division l
l cc:
W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. J. Kenny, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, LGS i
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