ML20244B585
| ML20244B585 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/18/1989 |
| From: | Burnett R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244B588 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906130181 | |
| Download: ML20244B585 (2) | |
Text
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Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, NRR FROM:
Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS
SUBJECT:
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF LICENSEE SHORT-TERM CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR VEHICLE BOMB THREAT In support of current Comission-directed efforts to devblop an NRC contingency plan for vehicle bomb threats, the following infomation is provided.
The threshold for recommending that a licensee or licensees implement short-tem (within twelve hours) contingency plans for a vehicle bomb threat could be achieved in several ways, either independently or in combination. Twelve hours has been identified as a reasonable balance between threat or need and time to respond with short-tem contingency plan measures. Actual implementation would be expected to occur incrementally, ranging from almost imediate augmentation of the security force to the more time consuming deployment of impediments to vehicle access.
Each of the several ways in which the threshold could be reached that would require contingency actions identified in a licensee's short-tem plan are discussed below.
THRESHOLD BASED ON SPECIFIC THREAT ASSESSMENT BY N9C INFORMATION ASSESSMENT TEAM (IAT)
Licensee contingency plans could be implemented based on an IAT assessment that a threat is credib'le. As you know, the NRC established the IAT in 1976 for the express purpose of assessing, in a timely manner, all reported threats against licensees. The team, composed of NRR, NMSS, and regional representatives, as well as the NRC Incident Response Center's Emergency Officer, evaluates the credibility and seriousness of the threat. Regardless of the source, once the threat is reported the IAT would employ a number of resources during its assessment that, depending on the nature of the threat, could include secure communications and infomation exchange with Intelligence Community members and the NRC/ DOE Credibility Assessment Team. Based on its determination, the IAT recomends a course of action to NRC management which could include implementation of licensee contingency plans and activation of the NRC Incident Response Center.
The determination that a threat is credible will be based on the assessment of several factors which indicate threat credibility. These factors are the technical capability, the operational capability, and the behaviorial profile of the adversary, as revealed in the reported threat. More specifically, the IAT reviews all available data regarding the adversary's personnel and material resources, operational capability, motivation, and planning. Confidence in the 8906/30/2/
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.l JAN 2 s sagg assessment will be established by the extent, completeness, and source of infor-mation regarding each factor. Having assessed the threat and made its recomen-dation, the IAT would continue to assess additional infomation as it became available and support the NRC decisien-making process.
THRESHOLD BASED ON GENERAL THREAT CONSIDERATIONS As necessary, the Intelligence Connunity may issue an advisory concerning general threat-related conditions. An advisory concerning general, but credible, information of a vehicle bomb threat related to domestic nuclear or energy-related facilities could represent the threshold for directing licensees to implement short-term contingency plans. *In addition, NRC has established femal and infomal working relationships with other Federal agencies and routinely receives threat-related information from these agencies. Credible information received from another agency concerning possible vehicle bomb targeting of domestic nuclear facilities also could represent a threshold for taking near term contingency action.
In either instance
- i.e. Intelligence Comunity advisory or credible information from another agency, the IAT would act on the infomation and make its recommendation to NRC management.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR MODIFYING'THE NRC DESIGN BASIS THREAT Please note that the above discussion is directed only at the threshold for implementing licensee short-term contingency plans. Regarding circumstances that would warrant a modification to the NRC design basis threat for radiological sabotage, they might be identified when the short-term threshold is achieved or they might be identified as part of the staff's ongoing examination of terrorism.
As you know, NMSS staff conducts a continuing review of the foreign and domestic threat environments to identify adversary characteristics that might warrant a change to the design basis threat. The results of this on-going sctivity, as well as Intelligence Comunity estimates or national policy direction, could require NRC to modify the design basis threat and to amend current safeguards implementing regulations. Such deliberations also would depend on the Intelligent Community assessment of credibility, probability of occurrence domestically, perceived targeting orientation (nuclear, energy, hardened targets, public impact) and timeframe of probable occurrence.
The point-of-contact for the above matter is John Davidson, x-20465.
Robert F. Burnett, Director Division of Safeguards and Transportation, NMSS 89 i
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JS ezek FM aglia DCr'utchfield FGillespie miossburg The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, Chairman Grimes Subecmmittee on General Oversight 6n and Investigations Committee on Interior and Insular' Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am responding to your letter of December 13, 1988, nuclear safety issues your Subcommittee has raiseo during theconcerning 100th Congress.
The Commission appreciates your comments about our responsiveness to your requests.
I can assure you that we will continue to meet our responsibilities to keep the Congress informed and that we take our responsibilities very seriously.
Of the four issues that remain of concern to you and other members of the Subcommittee, two (fitness for duty and terrorism) are being actively pursued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) through either formal rulemaking or the preliminary development of regulatory requirements.
On January 9,1989, the Commission l
informed you of our recent actions to implement the recommenda-tions of'the NRC Office of Investigations Organization Review Group and our reasons for retaining the existing reporting relationship for the Office cf Investigations (01) through the e
Office of the Executive Director for Operations (EDO).
With respect to the backfit rule, the Commission believes that both the lengthy administrative record compiled during the course of our rulemaking and the General Accounting Office's report entitled
" Nuclear Regulation Process for Backfitting Changes in Nuclear Plants Has Improved," dated December 24, 1985, confirm the existence of the discipline and management problems within NRC that the rule was designed to address.
Moreover, the' Commission does not agree that the backfit rule prevents the NRC from imposing needed safety improvements.
I have enclosed our detailed comments on each of these issues for your information.
Underlying these issues is the Subcommittee's broader concern about tht appropriate relationship between NRC and the industry we regulate.
We have discussed this subject with the Subcommittee and exchanged correspondence with you on it on several occasions.
I know that the Commission and the Subcommittee share the same Originated: EDO:Blaha "hTIN 01%
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