ML20244A428
| ML20244A428 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1989 |
| From: | Cockfield D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906120009 | |
| Download: ML20244A428 (3) | |
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-w seericca,m n -E David W. Cockfield Vice President, Nuclear 1.
l June 5, 1989' Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control-Desk Washington DC 20555
Dear Sir:
Response to Inspection Finding As requested by Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report No. 89-02, dated May 5, 1989, attached please find a discussion of Portland General Electric company's actions to improve the adequacy of the access control facility.
Sincerely.
Attachment c:
- r. John B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. William T. Dixon State of Oregon Department of Energy I
Mr. R. C. Barr NRC Resident Inspector Trojan Nuclear Plant i
8906120009 890605 J
{DR ADOCK0500g4 gj 121 SW Samon Street Portiand, Oregon 97204 g
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Trojin' Nucl02r PIEnt D cument Crntrol'D33k
" A Docket 50-344.
Attachment License NPF-1 June 5, 1989 m.
'Page 1 of 2 RESPONSE TO INSPECTION REPORT NO. 89-02 AsLthe' result'of a special Safeguards Team inspection' conducted on.
March 29 through April 5, 1989, the following' concern was identified:
"A large number of personnel'are processed'throanh an extremely small search area, creating conditions which are barely meeting minimum requirements.
The proper segregation of individuals awaiting a hands-on search from others cleared for access was noted as being nearly' impossible to achieve. This observation has also been a significant finding of the Regulatory Effectiveness
-Review. Team which visited the facility in November of 1986."
Portland General' Electric Company (PCE) acknowledges the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concern regarding the adequacy of the size of the current access control facility (guardhouse). A three-phase approach has been developed and initiated to ensure that access control requirements are reliably maintained in_the current facility and to develop improvements to the facility such that employees can be processed in an efficient and' secure manner.
phase I (Immediate)
Security Department procedures and policies have been revised to compensate for the limited space available in the guardhouse.
The following changes have been instituted and are providing for improved access control.
-1.
Unless a high level of need is identified and prior Plant General Manager approval ^is obtained, visitors to the Plant are no longer being processed through the guardhouse and allowed access to the Plant
.between 0600-0730 during major maintenance autages, and 0700-0815 during non-outage periods. This reduces the number of personnel requiring' hands-on searches and other manpower-intensive processing
'during periods of heavy ingress traffic.
2.
The officer stationed at the beginning of the detection equipment (explosive and metal detectors and x-ray machines) lines has been charged with the responsibility of assuring that the number of personnel entering the lines is maintained such that congestion in the search and badge assignment areas is minimized.
If unavoidable, congestion of personnel awaiting processing is to occur upstream of the detection equipment rather than on the Protected Area side, j
3.
All personnel anticipated to require a hands-on search (i.e., visitors, L
personnel whose background investigation is in progress, and personnel L
identified for random search) are processed through the southern-most operating detection equipment line. Thus, personnel to be searched a
' ' Trajtn NuclGCr Plcnt Document Cdntrol Dssk
- Dockst 50-344 Attachment License NPF-1 June 5, 1989
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Page 2 of 2 will exit this line into the search area in the southeast corner of the guardhouse. Personnel exiting other detection lines who require-a hands-on search (e.g., due to detection equipment alarms) are physically escorted to the search area by a security officer or security supervisor. Personnel awaiting a hands-on search are detained in a detection equipment line ti.at is not operational.
Processing in this manner aids in assuring that personnel requiring a search (hands-on or by processing through the detection equipment) do not mingle with those personnel who have completed the search process.
Phare II (Short-Term)
An evaluation of the current guardhouse will be conducted to identify cost-effective and timely modifications or additional administrative controls that can be implemented to further enhance the access control process.
Recommendations for possible changes and an implementation schedule will be issued by December 31,-1989.
Phase III (Lonr,-Term)
Long-term facility plans include the construction of an additional access control facility. While this facility is still in the conceptual phase and has not yet been authorized, the Nuclear Security Manager recently visited the Diablo Canyon and San Onofre Plants to tour their access control
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facilities and discuss access control problems they have experienced.
Information describing the new Washington Nuclear Plant-2 access control facility has also been obtained. Experience with the current guardhouse and consultation with other licensees and the NRC will be utilized in the development of a new facility.
Until a new facility can be provided, PGE will implement controls to ensure that the access control program meets or exceeds all regulatory require-ments and ensures that personnel are processed in an efficient and secure manner at all times.
PGN/mr 3135W.0589 l
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