ML20238F879
| ML20238F879 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/09/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8709160406 | |
| Download: ML20238F879 (95) | |
Text
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2G \\A_
P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Title:
Briefing on Performance of Sandia Containment Tests Location: Washington, D. C.
I Date:
Wednesday, September 9, 1987 i
Pages:
1 - 62 Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921
,(j Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 8709160406 0709ti j
PDR 10CFR ppg PT9.7
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D I SCLA I M ER 2
3 4
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This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on s
9/09/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may cor.tain
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12 inaccuracies.
-g 13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript i
17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No I
18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authori=e.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 BRIEFING ON PERFORMANCE OF SANDIA CONTAINMENT TESTS 5
6 PUBLIC MEETING 7
8 i
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 1717 H Street, Northwest 11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Wednesday, September 9, 1987 14 15 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 2:00 p.m.,
the Honorable LANDO W.
ZECH, Chairman of 17 the Commission, presiding.
18 19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
20 LANDO W.
- ZECH, Chairman of the Commission 21 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 22 KENNETH CARR, Member of the Commission 23 KENNETH C. ROGERS, Member of the Commission 24 25
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STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
,m 2
3 S.
CHILK 4
W. VON RIESEMANN 5
G. ARLOTTO 6
J.
TAYLOR l
7 E.
BECKJORD 1
8 T. MURLEY 9
W.
PARLER 10 11 12 13
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1 15 l
16 a
17 l
18 19 l
20 21 22 23 24 i
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1 PROCEEDINGS
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CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
3 Commissioner Roberts,-who is on overseas travel, will 4
not be with us this afternoon.
5 Today the Commission will be briefed by the office of 6
Nuclear Regulatory Research and also by the Sandia National 7
Laboratories on the results of recent containment model tests.
8 The testing of this 1:6 scale reinforced concrete 9
containment model is a major part of an integral research 10 program to assess the ability of analytical models to predict 11 the ultimate failure of reactor containments from the high 12 pressures and temperatures associated with severe accidents.
13 It is my understanding that this model was designed 14 and built in a similar manner to an actual containment 15 building.
16 The program, titled "The Containment Integrity 17 Research Program," involves extensive cooperation, both 18 domestic and international.
19 This is an information briefing today and no 20 Commission vote is expected.
21 Do any of my fellow commissioners have any opening 22 comments?
23
[No response.]
24 If not, Mr. Taylor, will you begin, please?
25 MR. TAYLOR:
Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
)
4 1
I would like to begin by introducing those who are at O
2 the table today.
On my far left is Mr. Walter A. Von 3
Riesemann, from Sandia Laboratories; Guy Arlotto, from our 4
Office of Research; Eric Beckjord, the Director of the Office 5
of Research; and Tom Murley, from the Office of Nuclear Reactor 6
Regulation, the Director of that office.
7 As you outlined, sir, this is a briefing by Research 8
on a very interesting piece of research, an actual model, and 9
rather attractive to people like myself because it is almost 10 the real hardware and sort of the hands on type of research 11 that has some very interesting results.
12 This program was initiated back in 1979, prior to the 13 accident at TMI, and it has been going on a number of years.
f 14 The actual containment model was completed last year, and this 15 is an NRC funded research program, but, as you pointed out, of 16 considerable international interest.
\\
17 The important milestone that you will hear about
.18 today was the high pressure test, which was completed just at
^l i
19 the end of July.
And I think it is important to point out,as I 20 am sure Mr. Arlotto will emphasize, some of the analysis of the 4
21 post test condition in the containment is still going on.
22 With that outline, I will turn to Eric Beckjord and 23 ask him to introduce the principal speakers.
24 MR. BECKJORD:
Mr. Chairman, there are a couple of 25 points I wanted to emphasize that you are going to be hearing l
4 5
1 about.
I s
2 First of all, that this 1:6 scale model represents to 3
the fullest extent possible an actual reactor containment 4
building in design and construction.
5 Secondly, the failure, which was the purpose of the 6
test, to find out at what point failure would occur -- it 7
occurred within the predicted range of between three and four 8
times desigt. pressure, and it also failed at a containment 9
penetration, as had been predicted.
10 The mode of failure, which is liner tearing and 11 leakage through cracks in the concrete, are favorable from a 12 safety point of view.
They indicate that the typical failure 13 of this type of structure is non-catastrophic and a leak before 14 a break.
15 Finally, the test results and the preliminary 16 conclusions, I think, broadly speaking, are very favorable with 17 respect to the design margin between the design pressure of 18 these structures and the failure pressure.
19 Further careful study is needed before final 20 conclusions are drawn, and you will hear about that.
21 Finally, I would like to commend Mr. Arlotto and his
\\staffintheDivisionofEngineeringforthejobofplanning 22 f
I 23
'and managing this project, which I think is an excellent g
24 example of an important research project well carried out.
1 I
25 want to commend him, and I also want to commend Mr. Von i
I I
i
6 Riesemann and Sandia Laboratories for the job that -- it was 1
em
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2 very well executed and I think they deserve credit.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I would just second that 4
comment.
I think this is an example of a research program that 5
was goal oriented and mission oriented.
We knew what we were 6
seeking to learn and designed a good experiment to learn it.
7 And I had the opportunity, as did the Chairman and perhaps some B
other members of the Commission, to see the apparatus, so to 9
speak, before you destroyed it.
And I think that represents 10 the kind of efforts that, as an agency charged with goal 11 oriented, mission oriented research, by and large, we should be 12 emphasizing.
13
(
So, I want to second your comments, Eric.
I agree 14 with you.
15 MR. TAYLOR:
We will now ask Mr. Arlotto to give the 16 detailed briefing.
17 MR. ARLOTTO:
Can I have slide No.
1, please?
18
[ Slide.]
19 Mr. Chairman, about a year ago I came and I briefed 20 the Commission on the research in the engineering intensive 21 areas.
At that time I pointed out that this research was 22 almost exclusively hardware oriented and directed mostly toward 23 prevention of accidents.
24 However, one program, as I discussed, was our 25 containment program.
And the safety issue is simply stated
7 1
here.
?
2 Most PRAs show that risk is very heavily related to 3
how, whethei the containment would leak, would catastrophically 4
break, and when, early or late, containment failure would occur 5
has a very profound effect on the risk associated with 6
accidents.
7 Next slide, please.
8 (Slide.]
9 Our research, as you know, is to develop knowledge so 10 that you decision-makers can be better informed based on the 11 best technology, so that we can exercise the most responsible 12 regulation we can.
13 I feel that this is a key element not only in our i
l 14 research program, but it should be the key element for all I
15 research.
16 To do this and the engineering research associated 17 with containment, we had to look at containment as a system.
la So, our program really consists of four elementsa l
10 You are only going to hear about one piece of one element l
20 today.
But it is really four elements.
21 If you visualize containment as a system, Mr.
22 Chairman, you will note that we have electrical penetrations, 23 usually made of epoxy glass; we have mechanical penetrations, l
24 such as equipment hatches or personnel locks; and we have 25 valves which penetrate the containment; and, of course, we have l
1
)
8 1
the structure.
m 2
So, it is really a system.
People who visualize 3
containment as a static object are really misrepresenting this 4
complex structure.
5 In order to do this well, we have separate effects 6
tests going on in each of these areas, to look at valves, how 7
they would behave under severe accident conditions; to look at i
B the electrical penetrations, which we have essentially 9
completed and found that they hold even under relatively high j
l 10 temperatures or pressures; and to look at this integrated 11 structural model that has some of these integrated in it.
12 As I discussed last year, we did some tests on very 13 small steel models, a 1:32 scale, and from that we learned a 14 couple of significant things.
15 The first one was that the stiffeners in the model we 16 could actually smear, which was thought to be the proper way to 17 handle it, smear the area along the whole area of the 18 containment cylinder itself, and indeed that would actually 19 represent a way in which we could calculate the design 20 pressures.
21 The second one is that we also learned that the so-i i
22 called area replacement rule, in which we take the area out for l
23 our penetration through the containment and place it around
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24 that particular high stress razor, also worka because these 25 steel models, in essence, blew up, indicating that ths strength i
c.
9 in the area of the penetrations was as strong ar the rest of 1
l 2
the model.
3 And the bottom line to the steel, as I reported also 4
last year, was a 1:8 scale model which actually destroyed 5
itself catastrophically /, going intd;blices.
And probably, when 6
you went out to Sandia, you saw parts of those pieces lying on 7
the desert out there.
But it was at a relatively high l
8 pressure, four and a half times design pressure, before that 9
model destroyed.
1 10 So, today I am here to talk about a little different 11 thing, which is the reinforced concrete model, which is a 1:6 12 scale model.
And I hope that you will keep in mind that you 13 should view this briefing, Pir. Chairman, as sort of a quick 14 look report.
We are just beginning to digest data, and as I 15
.get into my briefing you will see that we have a lot of data to 16 digest.
17 Basically, as you stated in the.beginning, it must be 18 clearly understood, because of our limitations of funding and i
19 what we can do, we are basically here to try to validate 20 methodologies so that it could be applied to a broad class of 21 containments.
We cannot develop a statistical sample of 22 blowing up hundreds or thousands of these to prove our point.
23 Next slide, please.
i 24
[ Slide.)
25 Some of you have seen, as Commissioner Bernthal has
10 1
already stated, have seen the particular site in which the (3'
2 containment sits.
But I thought that for those who have not, 3
to give an idea, it sits out in the middle of essentially 4
nowhere in the New Mexico desert.
5 The actual bunker which controls the test is nearly a 6
half mile -- I think it is 2,200 feet away.
And that 7
particular issue was needed for safety purposes.
8 I thought also -- the people who have seen
.L.t, 1
9 perhaps some of the things I will say will recalibr' ate you on 10 where we are.
11 Next slide, please.
12
[ Slide.]
13 This is a schematic of the model, and I want to make i
14 clear that this is no laboratory model, Mr. Chairman, as you 15 well know.
It is 37 feet high, it is 23 feet in diameter, the 16 thickness of concrete varies between 7 and nearly 10 inches, we 17 have a 1/16th inch liner on the inside, the base mat is over 3 18 feet thick, and we have several hatches that are feet in 19 diameter.
20 So, this is no small model.
This is fairly 21 representative.
22 Now, a great deal of thought had to go into this size i
23 of the model.
We couldn't have a model so small that the reinforcing bar ended up being chicken wire.
24 And so, the 25 selection of the model was very important to the credibility.
I
11 1
The research itself was at risk by the selection of
.O 2
this model, and there were three specific parameters that were 3
very heavily governing.
4 The first was rebar.
We looked at the reinforcing l
5 bar and couldn't go much below a half inch.
If we wanted to j
6 have rebar that was real and had the indentations and the 7
deformations in it, we couldn't go much below a half inch.
8 The second thing was that the liner, going much below 9
a 16th of an inch gave us problems because we had to specially 10 roll the steel in order to do that.
11 And the third thing was the aggregate.
We had to i
12 have 3/8 inch aggregate.
Now, we needed that, because 13 otherwise anything much smaller, it would have more responded i
14 like mortar rather than cement.
15 So, the credit to Sandia and the people who i
16 interacted with them, we spent a great deal of time in trying i
17 to have a model that made sense and that we could really feel 18 was representative of what we were trying to do.
4 19 Next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.)
21 I thought you might like to just get a quick look at 22 a typical dry PWR and the model.
As you can see, it is 1:6 23 scale all the way, except for the base mat.
And the reason why 24 the base mat is not scaled, Mr. Chairman, is principally 25 because the dead load that would normally obtain in a real
12 1
containment just isn't there.
The heavy reactor vessel, et O
2 cetera.
3 And so, our experimentalist advised that in order to 4
have the same ratio of horizontal load as pressure became 5
evident inside the containment to the vertical load, which was 6
a dead load, they preferred to have this particular combination 7
so that that ratio would be approximately the same at a very important junction, which you will see later, that was heavily l
8 9
thought to be the place it may fail.
10 The key point I want to make here is something that 11 several people have made already, which is, this is a code 12 designed vessel.
We did not make this as a laboratory vessel,.
13 It was made essentially to ASME Section III, Division
)
14 2, which is a concrete / steel code.
And the only reason we have i
15
" equivalent" on the right is that many of the containments 16 being old, the code just wasn't there.
But they generally use 17 the same rules that we have available for the code.
But this 18 was a code vessel.
We didn't want it at perfection, we wanted
^
19 it to be similar to what we actually had out there.
i 20 Next slide, please.
21
[ Slide.]
22 Just to give you a quick idea, the reinforcing bar 23 and the instrumentation lines going into it, this was about a 24 quarter complete.
l 25 Next slide, please.
13 1
[ Slide.)
)
, e~.
2 This one shows the reinforcing bars around a 3
I would like to point out that the reinforcing 4
spacing is generally between 4 and 8 inches, and I have pointed 5
out already, the size is a half inch, and there are 28 tons of 6
steel in this particular model, and 126 cubic yards of 7
concrete, which is approximately 256 tons of concrete.
And 8
there are eight layers, eight layers of reinforcing bars.
l 9
There are two vertical, four horizontal, and then the diagonal l
10 are really for seismic loads but they are always in 11 containments and we wanted to make this representative.
12 Next slide, please.
13
[ Slide.)
i i
l 14 The next slide I want to show for a couple of 1
15 reasons.
First of all, this penetration you see here is the
)
16 place just to the right of that penetration from where you are 17 looking at it, is where the major tear occurred inside on the 18 liner.
19 The second thing I would point out is that this 20 superstructure, the way this containment was actually built is 21 that the liner is placed on the inside and actually forms, 22 actually is the concrete form for pouring the concrete into it.
23 And this superstructure actually had braces to hold the liner in place so the concrete could be poured, and then it ended up 24 25 being a useful piece of equipment inside to set on floors and i
___ a
14 1
to use for ladders, which you may not -- when you were up and
{
.m 2
down the ladders, you may not have seen in it in this 3
particular light, but that was part of its use.
4 And so, this was a very interesting way that they 5
designed to construct, they designed to construct this 6
particular containment model.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is that -- I guess I have 8
never seen a plant when they were actually pouring the concrete 9
for the containment.
Is that characteristic of the -- it is 10 not?
11 MR. ARLOTTO:
No, I don't think so.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Of the procedure that is 13 used?
\\
14 MR. ARLOTTO:
I don't think so.
I don't think they l
15 use the liner as the form.
16 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, they do use the liner as a 17 form, but the backup structure was -- well, as Mr. Arlotto 18 said, two purposes.
One is later on for any instrumentation 19 level, for access, and secondly, to provide support so the 20 concrete would not crush in the liner during fabrication.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
But the liner is 22 normally used as a form for pouring.
I didn't know that.
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
Okay.
Next slide, please.
24
[ Slide.)
25 This is just a picture of the completed model.
15 1
Next slide, please.
s 2
[ Slide.]
3 And this is the model and also, as you see on the top 4
of it, it has a superstructure, and this was principally there 5
for safety purposes in case something blew up.
And on top of 6
this was placed a blasting mat for further protection.
And, of 7
course, the superstructure ended up being used for all sort of 8
things like to hold cameras, and as a sun shield in order to 9
better control the temperature inside the model.
10 Next slide, please.
11
[ Slide.]
12 I put this one up principally again to make the point 13 that we had real designers and constructors involved with this 14 model, Stone & Webster, United Engineers & Constructors, and 15 Chicago Bridge & Iron, all people who are heavily involved with 16 the actual design and construction of containments, again the 17 idea being this is not a laboratory, this is a real model that 18 was representative of what we had cut there.
19 Next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.)
21 This I would like to dwell a little bit on because 22 this, I thought, was key, was a big key to the credibility of 23 this entire program.
24 From the beginning, we recognized that this was going 25 to be a highly visible program and that credibility was going
16 1
to be the key to the research.
p.
2 We set up this panel in order to help us plan the 3
program from the beginning.
This panel was put in place in 4
July of 1983.
They were instrumental in helping us determine 5
the size of the model, what instrumentation and the test 6
program, and also to keep in perspective what was trying to be 7
done.
8 In order to do this, we had to have a lot of 1
9 specialists in this particular peer review panel, and I would 10 like to just touch on a few of them, Mr. Chairman.
11 Mr. Ahl, from CB&I, he is really a specialist in 12 liners and hatches.
13 Mr. Baker, from Southwest Research Institute, was 14 very good in testing, and particularly safety associated with 15 testing, as well as similitude.
Southwest is forever doing 16 experiments in which they have to relate small scale stuff to 17 larger scale stuff.
i 18 Mr. Brown, coming down a little bit, Mr. Brown is 19 actually the Chairman of the ANSI Committee of 56-8, which is 20 trying to develop a standard on containment leakage testing.
21 In fact, we actually use it within the regulatory process.
22 To give perspective to the whole thing, we have got i
23 to use severe accidents, including your introductory remarks.
24 Rich Denning is from Battelle.
He is not a structural guy at 25 all.
I doubt if he is even an engineer.
But he is an
I 17 1
excellent analyst and he understands severe accidents, to keep
(~h
/
2 these other guys in perspective of what our overall objectives 3
and how the work they were going to do fit into this program.
4 And Mr. Stevenson, on the other side, was really our 5
code man.
He is heavily involved with both the ASME and the 6
ACI, the American Concrete Institute, code development.
7 Mr. Ucciferro, similarly, is Chairman of the American 8
Society for Civil Engineers' Committee on Nuclear Structures 9
and Materials.
10 Professor White, from Cornell, and Professor Sozen, 11 from University of Illinois, are sort of gurus in the entire 12 structural community, particularly associated with concrete and 13 modeling.
7 14 So, we had a very high level group of people helping 15 us plan -- and incidentally, they are also committed to help us 16 understand and put in perspective the analysis.
17 But being a regulatory and believing in defense in 18 depth, this was not sufficient.
What we did was we set up an 19 internal review group and we had quarterly meetings with people 20 from NRR -- some of them are right behind me -- people from all 21 the laboratories involved, from Sandia, from Argonne and from 22 Battelle, as well as the Research and the NRR people, to be 23 sure each knew what the other was trying to do and how we were 24 going to get there, again getting feedback.
25 We then also had interactions with IDCOR.
At one
18 4
1 time we had two meetings, and at that meeting actually some
/O 2
public interest group attended, in which we then again exposed 3
our program in containment to them.
4 We have had several meeting with the ACRS, 5
particularly the structural engineering group under Dr. Seiss, 6
the last one being in January of this year.
7 And the other thing which I thought was extremely 8
important, we have had three international workshops on 9
containment, one by Sandia, with a fourth one being planned.
10 And only a couple of weeks ago, both Dr. Von 11 Riesemann and Dr. Costello from my staff were at the SMRT 12 conference -- that stands for Structural Mechanics and Reactor 13 Technology -- in Luzerne, Switzerland, in which we presented 14 five papers on this subject, hot off the press of these kinds 15 of information.
16 So, we have made a very strong attempt to expece our information out there to the real world and seek and get 17 18 feedback as we went.
19 Next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.]
I 21 In order to assure, again, credibility and because we 22 i
were trying to validate methodology, we thought one of the ways 23 to do it was to have pre-test predictions.
And I think that 24 some of the things we did in our international interactions i
25 help encourage this.
i
19 1
As you can see, six of the pre-test predictors are m.
2 from outside the United States.
And these people were given a 3
certain amount of information and they had to predict when and how the containment would fail and how the general response 4
5 would be, and they were given specific locations.
And these 6
predictions, of course, vere in and they were actually 7
published, grossly published.
8 And I will come back to give you an idea of -- not by 9
name, but what the scorecard looked like at the end.
But we 10 felt that rtis was a key element in order to give some more 11 credibility.
And obviously, we will be looking to see which 12 methodology was closer to being on target as we go forward with 13 evaluating all the data.
14 Next slide, pler. 79 15
[ Slide.]
16 of almost equal importance with the peer review group 17 was the instrumentation.
There was no question, we had only la one shot, and we had better do a darn good job of instrumenting 19 this particular model and knowing where it was.
20 I think any of you who have seen it -- I was most 21 impressed with the instrumentation.
22 As you can see, we had instrumentation to measure 23 elongation of the reinforcing bar, we had instrumentation at 24 all kinds of directions to measure strains on the liner, we had 25 instrumentation to measure containment growth, concrete
20 1
temperature, concrete strains, containment atmospheres, the em 2
containment atmosphere pressure and temperature.
3 In addition, we also had some acoustic emission, 4
which isn't even here, where we tried to hear leaks, where they 5
were coming from, which turned out to be a very useful little 6
tool as we began to pressurize this particular containment.
7 And obviously, we had a considerable amount of B
cameras, both in terms of motion pictures and still cameras, 9
from which we got a significant amount of photos, Mr. Chcirman.
10 i
Next slide, please.
11 (Slide.)
12 I put up this slide to show you, except for that 13 false start because of some connectors on some of the c
14 transducers, the fact is that this is the kind of loads a real 13 containment might be subjected'to.
16 First, the containment is tested for the structural 17 integrity test at 115 percent of its design pressure.
18 Then later, after that, it is tested for its leak 19 tightness.
You will note again, the leakage is 0.14 percent 20 per day, which is really right in the range of a real 21 containment.
That is what we strive for, somewhere in 0.1, 22 0.2.
Most of our tech specs are in that range for an 23 integrated leakage rate test.
24 And then, hopefully, the last thing is the actual 25 test we performed here and we are discussing today, which we
- - -_ 1
21 1
hope will never obtain on a real containment, but the fact is
.m,'
2 that these two other loads are what a real containment would 3
have seen if and when it was subject to the final test in an 4
accident.
5 Next slide, please.
1 6
[ Slide.]
7 This is just to show that as the test progressed we 8
went from larger Deltas of pressure, 10 psig, and we got down 9
to 5 and then got down to 2 or 3 in the end.
And overall, the 10 test took about a day and a quarter to perform.
11 Next slide, please.
12
[ Slide.]
13 With the termination being in the evening of the 14 following day at 145 psig, and we essentially declared that it 15 was failure when the leak became large enough so that the 16 pressurization system could not keep up with the leak.
17 So, therefore, we then declared the test to be i
18 terminated at that point.
19 Next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.)
21.
As the next slide will show at the very bottom, we 22 had a pressurization system that could produce approximately 23 4,000 standard cubic feet per minute, and the leak was greater 24 than that when we terminated.
25 This, I think, is interesting from the point of view
22 I
that you will note how quickly things increased, the pressure A
2 increased.
It was only approximately 13 percent per day at 3
140, but at 145 it was 352 percent per day, an increase of 4
about 20 times.
5 So, it is an indication that when tears actually do 6
obtain in such thin liners and there is a yielding, apparently, in the rebar which makes it difficult to distribute the forces, 7
8 then you could see that things really can increase rather 9
rapidly and a containment may go from the point of view of 10 increased leakage, not failure, in a relatively short time.
11 Next slide, please.
12
[ Slide.]
13 I thought that it would be interesting to point out 14 what we sort of thought were some of the important points of l
15 interest, as Sandia saw them.
16 The first thing was they began to see some leakage at I
17 about 125 coming from Hatch A.
At this particular moment, 18 unless Dr. Von Riesemann corrects ma, we really are not sure 1
19 whether or not that leak was coming through the hatch or i
20 through the liner near the hatch.
I think that will have to 21 bear additional investigation.
22 He nods his head, indicating that that still is the 23 latest information.
I 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You said Hatch A, I think.
Did you 25 mean Hatch B?
23 1
MR. ARLOTTO:
I a'm sorry, Hatch B.
Right, Hatch B.
/
i 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
The slide says B.
3 MR. ARLOTTO:
I am very sorry, yes.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
The slide is correct, then?
5 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes.
Thank you.
Hatch B.
6 The second thing is that it turned out that leakage 7
was noted from the vicinity of Hatch B at about 138 --
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Hatch A?
9 MR. ARLOTTO:
Hatch A at approximately 138, and this 10 turned out to be the place where the liner tore and the maximum 11 leakage actually obtained.
12 And we then saw an ovalization in the vicinity of 13 Hatch A in the horizontal direction, which is not surprising 14 since the hoop stress is essentially twice the vertical 15 stresses.
And so, that was what actually -- we did see some 16 ovalization, which I will show you a picture of.
17 And we then began to see the cracks in the concrete 18 actually becoming wider.
]
i 19 Some pictures.
20 Next slide, please.
21 (Slide.)
22 This is the actual picture of the major tear that 23 ended up being the majority of the 352 percent per day.
It was right along that penetration I showed you earlier, on the right 24 25 side.
Obviously, this is from the inside, so it appears on the D
r 34 1
left.
,3 2
Next slide, please.
3
[ Slide.]
4 This is the hoop ovalization.
You can actually see 5
the seal material from where the very stiff hatch did not give 6
as much and was not distorted as much as the containment wall, 7
particularly the liner, and actually showing some of the seal 3
material being exposed.
)
9 Next slide, please.
10
[ Slide.)
11 This is just a picture of some of the kind of 12 cracking that obtained, that we could see from the outside.
13 Next slide, please.
I 14
[ Slide.]
15 okay.
Here we are on the post-test inspection.
Of i
16 cdir:c, again I want to repeat what I said, the inspection is 17 still ongoing.
l 18 We have noted that there were several small tears or 19 holes in the liner.
20 As already stated, at approximately 9:00 and 3:00, in 1
21 the horizontal direction there were positions exposed in the 22 hatch, as I just showed you on that particular picture.
23 But the concrete was still intact, even in the 24 vicinity of where that major tear occurred.
25 The wall does seem to be delaminated.
There appears
25 1
to be some delamination of the concrete in that area, and there 13 '
2 seems to be some distress at the base mat.
And it will become 3
evident why I keep hitting at the base mat cylinder junction as 4
I talk about the pretest predictions.
l 5
Next slide, please.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Hold on just a second.
When 7
you say there were a number of small tears or holes in the l
l 8
liner, I take it that those would all have been at --
9 MR. ARLOTTO:
One slide, let me go one slide.
Can I 10 go to the next slide?
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
12 MR. ARLOTTO:
Next slide, please.
i 13 (Slide.)
14 This is it.
This is a stretchout of the liner, and 15 you can see that there were either small' tears or small holes, 16 and as you can see, just about every one that we have noted so 17 far is in a high stress area.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
That was my question.
19 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir.
Okay.
Thank you for giving 20 me the opportunity to show the slide.
21 This is very key.
This is an important comrent.
And 22 again, it didn't actually occur, as I indicated earlier, where 23 the area replacement rule -- it actually occurred close to 24 where it was stiffened, but where the actual linar was in its 25 normal state.
That is, its thin state.
26 1
Okay.
Next slide, please.
,R i
)
2 COMMISSIONER CARR:
But near the weld?
3 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, but outside.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
But outside the heat affected 5
zone?
a 6
MR. ARLOTTO:
Outside the heat affected zone, yes, 7
sir.
8 COMMISSIONER CARR:
And these welds are all stressed 9
with heat.
i 10 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, they are not.
They are not 11 done in practice, either.
We tried to follow conventional 12 standards.
But they were all x-ray checked.
13
[ Slide.]
14 MR. ARLOTTO:
Okay.
This is the pretest predictors.
15 Here is what it looks like.
We had ten, and as you can see, 16 three predicted it would fail at between 120 and 140, et 17 cetera.
18 I think it is interesting to note, looking closely at 19 it, that if you consider the mean being 145, five of the ten, 20 five of the ten were within 10 percent of that 145.
Five of i
I 21 them were between 130 and 160.
I think that gives us some 22 general confidence that the structural engineers, not being 23 one, maybe do know something about what they are doing.
24 I think that was interesting to point out, that 25 between -- half of them, five of the ten actually predicted,
27 1
were within plus or minus 10 percent, t3/
2 As you can see, one predicted between 140 and 150.
3 That particular group that predicted that actually predicted a 4
tear, a tear at the cylinder at the base mat.
5 Now, again, note that six of the ten, six of the te7 6
actually thought that the failure was going to occur at the 7
junction of the cylinder to base mat, and probably the reason B
for that is, that is a very complex area, tnere is large 9
uncertainty, and there is a relatively high stress.
10 I think it was more the fact that they weren't sure, l
11 as much as anything else, of why so many prodicted it would be 12 in that area.
And that is why on several of the previous 13 slides I continually pointed out the fact that we were looking 14 hard in that area for the stress and whether or not that was 15 close to failure, since so many of the experts, literally in t
16 the world, thought that failure would obtair. in that juncture.
I 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let's see, now.
The slide 18 where you indicated the actual failure modes, are you saying 19 that none of these people predicted that the failures would 20 predominate, then, around these streso pointa of batches and 21 penetrations?
l l
22 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, the way we -- well, that is i
23 unfair, I have really been unfair.
The place where failure cf rebar is really. where you 25 would probably see failuro near the perotracion, because wh&t
{
l l
bC
i 28 l
I we say, the structural guys say, failure of rebar means that S
2 the reinforcing bar actually stretches, goes beyond yield, 3
thereby allowing the liner to go into tension, causing the 4
tears.
5 Dr. Von Riesemann, do you want to add anything to 6
that?
7 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Maybe I could just add a few 8
words, that the people -- well, the report is rather thick.
It is some 600 pages total, which gives the pretest analyses.
9 And 10 they gave their indications of where failure might occur and 11 what likelihood and what sequence they might occur.
12 For example, the group that did 14') to 150 psi, they 13 picked this failure point as the first likely.
But then they 14 said, if not here, around the other penetrations, and they 15 listed them.
So, they were very close to that.
16 Also, a lot of the pcople did axi-symmetric analyses.
17 The costs, if you will -- well, they were not given money to 18 perform the calculations.
So, they did simplified, if you 19 will, analyses.
20 And they are meeting with us in November, and we will I
21 now do some post-test analyses to see just where to improve 22 things.
I 23 MR. ARLOTTO:
I would like to observe that in 24 committing to pretest predictions, Mr. Chairman, these people 25 also committed to post-test evaluation.
So, wo are going to 1
i I
I
29 1
get an international insight into this data and how they
'b 2
believe -- I am sure there will be some posturing regarding their methodology and why, but we are getting a great deal of 3
information from, again, across a broad international spectrum, 4
5 which I think is key to acceptance of key safety research.
6 Next slide, please.
7
[ Slide.]
8 Okay.
Some of the conclusions.
These have been 9
sprinkled throughout the discussion.
10 The failure appeared to occur at about 145 psig, 11 which was in a reasonable range of the predictions.
As we see, 12 it was obvious that it was at the liner.
The liner tore at 13 that particular place.
I 14 The pretest predictors have not been fully evaluated, 15 so we are not absolutely -- we are not sure which methodology 16 really was tra6 king what was happening to that model as we 17 increased the pressure, and we would like to take a hard look 18 at that.
19 i
And as Mr. Beckjord pointed out at the very 20 beginning, the failure occurred between three and four times 21 design pressure, which is generally where you would look for 22 ultimate strength of these kinds of materials.
]
j 23 Next slide, please.
24
[ Slide.]
25 This is as far as I will go.
The scientist in me l
________________U
30 1
says I shouldn't be going this far, the engineer in me says we
,-m, 5
2 have got to draw some sort of insights.
3 Because of the slide I showed you on the many places 4
of degradation, I think that I am willing to go and say that we 5
think that there is a good probability that this containment 6
would leak before it would break, because of the fact that 7
there was distress in many places, if it didn't tear at this 8
particular place, it probably would have torn someplace else.
9 In other words, the uniqueness of possibly bad 10 workmanship or something associated with welding or other 11 particular conditions, QA, I think that the fact that there j
12 were several places of distress in that liner gives me -- puts i
13 me as far as I will go out on a limb to say that I think this 14 type of containment will -- if a containment in the real world is up to par sith this one, will probably leak before it will 15 16 break.
I 17 Those conditions are, one, the containment is similar i
1 18 to the model, and I think that we have done a pretty good job 19 in doing that; and the second is that the industry assures us l
20 that as these things age, that there is not a weak link that is l
21 obtaining that this thing wouldn't apply to.
22 So, those are the conditions where I think that, yes, 23 indeed, Dr. Murley and his people may take some comfort that i
24 this is real.
25 The second thing, I think, that we have done with i
l
31
~
1 this is, we have given some real hard data to our people q
involved with determining risks and doing PRAs that is real, 2
3 and they can now begin to get a real insight into the way these 4
containments have a reasonable chance of failing and when they 5
may fail.
6 Next slide, please.
7 (Slide.)
8 My last slide is really to say the things we are 9
trying to answer as we go forward with this particular -- to 10 bring this to a successful conclusion.
11 We want to look at what actually quantitatively 12 happened during the test.
of course, this will bear heavily on 13 what methodology really was the one that was really good.
14 The second thing is, which brings us to the next one, 15 which is the predictive model, which is most promising, and 16 why.
17 The third thing is, would the failure mode of a full 18 size containment be similar.
And I have just gone through that 19 logic.
We took so much time in developing this model in terms 20 of trying very hard to make it real, in terms of what we 21 actually have out there.
We think it is true.
However, we 22 think we had better give it a second look.
23 In addition, some of the things I pointed out at the 24 beginning, Mr. Chairman, are separate effects tests on ceiling 25 materials and on particularly our penetrations.
If we were
- a
'4 i
32 i
1 looking at bigger penetrations than we are looking at that might have distortive loads, we want to be sure, we want to 2
3 reflect that, to be sure that indeed this is what really is 4
going to happen in a real containment.
5 And, of course, we do not want to put blinders on, 6
were there other potential failure modes that were close.
Was 7
it close to coming apart someplace?
We want to take a hard B
look at that, and I think we owe it to everyone to do that.
9 And lastly, from an economic as well as a scientific 10 viewpoint, is there something else we can do with this model?
11 Should we destructively examine everything?
Is there something 12 else we can do before we really say we are finished?
13 That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my briefing.
This was 14 an information briefing.
And I certainly hope I hrve been 15 informative.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You have been.
A very fine briefing.
17 Do the Sandia folks have anything you would like to 18 add?
~
19 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I really have no additional 20 comments, except to say we enjoyed the excellent working 21 conditions with the NRC, and through their excellent staff and 22 the Sandians, the program has worked very well.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
24 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Thank you.
25 MR. TAYLOR:
Tom Murley has something.
I 33 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Oh, fine.
2 MR. MURLEY:
Is this an appropriate-time?
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Yes.
You are still on.
Thank you, 4
Tom.
Go right ahead.
5 MR. MURLEY:
Okay.
I think it is important to kind 6
of give a regulatory view of how we view the test.
7 It was an important test and it was well done and 3
well run.
There are so many different containment designs that 9
we have in this country that you can't take the one test and 10 draw any sweeping conclusions.
And so, we are not doing that.
11 It is hard to quantify the importance or even specify 12 precisely what the regulatory impact is going to be.
- Clearly, 13 the researchers have a lot more analysis to do, to find out, 14 wring all the data from this test.
15 Nonetheless, I think it is going to profoundly affect 16 our thinking.
17 I spent many years in the research program back 10 18 years ago, 15 years ago.
Historically, there has been a 19 tendency on the part of the regulatory staff to deny that we
(
20 need research, because that it human nature, I think.
That is, 21 we don't want to imply that we need research for our decisions.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There has been?
23
[ Laughter.)
24 MR. MURLEY:
And we don't want to have to get stuck 25 explaining something if a test goes awry.
And so, there has
34 1
been that problem.
'Q
/
2 We faced it on the LOFT, which was the large 1/5th 3
scale test reactor out in Idaho in the early 1970s.
There the 4
dominant safety issue was emergency core cooling systems and j
5 whether they would work even if called upon.
6 As you know, the Commission put out a rule in, I 7
think, 1973 or 1974 and they told the staff to go out and do 8
the research, that you need to confirm the margins.
And that 9
was done, just like -- it was a disciplined approach, just like t
10 has been done in the containment here, a series of separate
\\
11 effects tests leading up to a large scale demonstration.
12 And in LOFT, which as I said was a 55 megawatt, 1/5th 13 physical scale, we did a bunch of tests, seven large LOCAs, 14 nine small LOCAs, two ATWS tests, loss of feedwater test, and a i
15 dozen other transients.
And that showed us that these were 16 pretty rugged machines, as long as they are operated properly.
17 There was much more margin in the equipment than we thought.
i 18 And to finish the analogy, today ECCS is hardly a
~
19 regulatory issue.
We know what the margins are and VG dehl j
20 with it.
l 21 So, how is this test then going to affect our i
22 thinking?
And I have to kind of put in the context that we are 23 in today.
24 I will have to remind you that after the Chernobyl 25 accident there was an enormous interest in containments, and we
35 1
acknowledged that there could be containment failures.
In
.]
2 fact, in some cases it was likely in a large core melt 3
accident.
4 And what has happened is, in the public mind they i
5 have equated failure of containment to no containment, and they 6
have -- and I happened to talk when I was in Region I with many 7
people, and they viewed then a containment failure as i
8 equivalent almost to Chernobyl, which it is not.
9 And this test, then, as much as anything, I think, 10 helps put in perspective what a containment can do, even if it 11 does fail.
12 First of all, it goes to a very high pressure.
The 13 integrity is held together for a long period of time, so that 14 you have got time for plate out, for decay of the fission 15 productions, and for emergency actions which we know.
There 16 wasn't a sudden catastrophic failure.
17 And so, the absence of any big surprises in a test la like this is, in itself, a good research result.
19 And even with the failure point the way it was, it 20 still provides a tortuous path for fission products to get out.
21 So, it is not a sudden release of a large volume of fission 22 products in such an accident.
It almost provides a filtering 23 path itself.
24 So, I draw a lot of comfort from the test, quite 25 frankly.
And as I said, you can't quantify that, but for a
36 1
regulator, I think it is important.
2 So, those are my concerns.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Very good.
Thank you very much.
4 Mr. Taylor, any other comments?
5 MR. TAYLOR:
No, sir.
That concludes the staff i
6 presentation.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Any questions at this 8
time from my fellow commissioners?
Commissioner Bernthal.
l l
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am also quite interested in 10 what we might be able to do with that thing before you consign 11 it to the junk heap.
It was quite a substantial investment to j
12 begin with.
~}
13 The key element, it seems to me, that is not covered 14 in this series of experiments is probably one of lower 15 probability, and that is rapid pressurization, not to say 16 explosion.
You didn't do it that way, for obvious reasons.
17 A slow hydrogen burn, what is the canonical number, 18 many tens of milliseconds or something like that, I guess, is 19 one scenario, which is not an explosion per se but would be 20 similar, I guess, to what we think happened and did not fail, 21 happened at TMI and did not fail the containment because it was I
22 still somewhat below design pressure even.
23 And, of course, then there is the outside chance 24 always that you would have an actual explosive mixture and a
.)
25 true explosion.
37 1
Do you have any thoughts, first of all, on how different the scenario might be for a rapid burn and/or an 2
3 explosion, probably in that order?
4 And then secondly, my question is why we could not 5
still do that kind of experiment?
Because it would seem to me, 6
just on the face of it, that it won't be -- it will fail before 7
you would expect it to have failed, had you not damaged the 8
containment, to be sure, but nevertheless I think the colleague 9
to my left would agree that the nature of explosions is quite 10 different from what you did.
And I am not sure that you 11 couldn't still get some very valuable results.
I l
12 Do you want to comment on that?
13 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, as far as the rapid burn, j
14 probably I think that the rapid burn of hyerogen probably still 15 would be probably static.
16 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
If you have a deflagration, if 17 you will, of hydrogen and the rise time is, say, on the order 18 of tens of milliseconds, as far as the containment is concerned 19 it is still a static load.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
I guess I can accept 21 that.
There is some transition point, I guess.
{
i 22 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
If you get on the order of a 23 shorter millisecond period, then that becomes a dynamic load 24 for the containment.
l 25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All right.
That is the i
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
i
's 38 1
1 question, then.
2 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
So, we in essence answered the 3
first part of your question.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
5 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
That for rapid burn, yes, we have i
6 the information on hand.
i 7
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And I don't remember the 8
numbers, but is the rapid hydrogen burn scenario pretty much i
j 9
covered by tens of millisecond rise times?
10 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL; All right.
12 MR. MURLEY:
Now, Commissioner, I asked that same 13 question and asked it with regard to the TMI burn, and the 14 answer I got was that that was essentially a static condition.
15 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
That Was a static loading 16 condition, as far as the containment is concerned.
Again, a 17 lot of people spoke of that as a spike.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
19 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
A pressure spike.
And really, 20 again, on a curve of many hours it looks like a spike.
But 21 expand the scale, it is quite a long period of loading.
22 Now, the next question is really tied in, the two of 23 them, with detonation, if you will, the very short rise time, 24 and what we do with the containment.
25 We are not destroying the containment at the moment.
s.-
1 39 1
We are looking at it very carefully, dissecting, if you will, n
2 piece by piece and looking at it.
3 There are some buckles, if you noticed in one of the 4
viewgraphs, throughout the containment.
That was caused when 5
the unloading occurred.
The concrete came back on the liner 6
and caused some buckles.
7 We would have to do some analysis -- well, we are l
going to have the peer review committee and will be talking 8
with the NRC -- of whether we should possibly reload it, either 9
10 statically or dynamically.
That is not clear yet.
I 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All right.
So, there is the 12 possibility, at least, that that experiment could be worth 13 doing.
(
14 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
With some caution, though, that 15 if we do that experiment, that we know how to interpret the 16 results and we should do that almost ahead of time because, as 17 you said, the structure is degraded.
1 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Exactly.
19 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
And so the strength might be 20 less.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Right.
Now, as an expert, 22 maybe you can explain to me briefly what differences you would 23 expect to observe in the case of an explosion, as opposed to 24 static loading of the type you have done?
25 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Well, there are two differences
-W
40 I
that I can think of.
One is that the detonation might not be ey
(,/
2 axi-symmetric.
Static loading always is axi-symmetric in 3
containment.
Detonation might focus, if you will, on certain 4
areas first.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Good point.
6 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Secondly, a dynamic load of that 7
nature would not be able to relieve itself as rapidly.
So, in 8
this case we went up to 145 psi.
We had the tear and the 9
pressure relieved itself.
10 Now, with a dynamic load, it might go on so fast, it 11 might carry the tear, if you will, further, or the damage 12 further.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
So, you would then assume 14 that a catastrophic failure would be more likely under those j
i 15 circumstances, I suppose.
16 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I didn't quite say that.
I have 17 to be a little careful on that.
I am not sure yet.
It would la depend, obviously, on the magnitude of the dynamic load, where 19 it is occurring, and quite a few variables.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Other things being equal, if it were a symmetrical detonation -- and I agree it is unlikely 21 22 to be -- but suppose that it were.
Would you expect then that 23 the containment would withstand similar impact, the force that it would withstand would be similar to what you obse-ed in the 24 25 static case, less or greater?
Or how does it work?
41 1
MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes, to all the above, (D
, _. /
2 unfortunately.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
4 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
It depends on the pulse duration, 5
if you will, of the dynamic load.
If it is on a certain length 6
of time, the simplified analysis for a linear system would 7
indicate twice the response.
In other words, the dynamic load 8
would cause twice the deflection.
)
9 Now, if the load is on briefly enough, a shorter 10 duration, it is less of the static response.
So, that is why I 11 say yes to the above.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
Well, I look forward 13 to the decision on what you might do that would further 14 enlighten us for that other case.
15 I also was curious about -- and this would fall in 16 the category of static loading -- I was curious about the 17 i
scenario that people are inclined to worry about somewhat 18 today, and that scenario is one of liner attack by molten core 19 material with a gradual pressurization.
But let's assume liner
{
20 attack, failure of the liner itself considerably before perhaps i
21 the concrete had significant degradation.
22 What would you have expected to happen in that i
23 circumstance?
Would you still have expected the concrete 24 essentially to have withstood the pressures, the loadings that i
25 you observed?
Can you draw any conclusion on that scenario i
l l
l 42 I
from these data?
O.,
2 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Well, from the test, we cannoc.
1 3
But it depends on the depth of concrete over the liner.
There 4
is a wearing cost, if you will, quite a depth.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Another way to ask the 6
question is, how important was the liner, I guess, in this 7
experiment?
8 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I think it was essential.
9 COMMISSIONER CARR:
What would be the difference in 10 the liner attack and the hole that you developed?
If the liner 11 was attacked and started to have a hole in it somewhere, it 12 looks like it would be the same thing that you had.
t
('.].
13 MR. VON RIESEMAW:
It would be in a different 14 location, obviously, and it would take some length of time for 15 the core to erode, if you will, work its way through the 16 concrete. 'So, there would be also a time delay.
It would be a 17 horse race, in a way.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It being?
19 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Between the liner failing, say, 20 for the core, molten core, or the pressure.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Oh, okay.
But let's assume i
22 that the liner has been failed, that pressure is trailing liner i
23 failure.
You have lost the integrity of the~ liner.
What would 24 you expect to see, then?
Would you simply expect'something 2 5 like you see at these weak points in the liner right now, j
1
43 1
except maybe sooner?
Would that be the kind of thing?
Or is iLi 2
it just not possible tc speculate on that?
3 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I guess I am not ready to 4
speculate at this point.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
6 MR. ARLOTTO:
You are speaking about if the liner had 7
failed due to the melt of the core?
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Yes, exactly.
You have eaten 9
a hole in the liner.
Does that just introduce another weak
(
10 point where you still would have substantial containment I
11 capability?
Or does that somehow drastically alter the 12 expected result?
j w
13 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Well, if I understand this 14 properly, there are holes in the liner as a pressure path, 1S right, so the pressure will decrease.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Yes.
17 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
So, the other areas of the liner 18 will not be stressed, challenge.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
True.
20 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
So, that would be, essentially, 21 your only leak path.
22 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, but that is on the assumption that 23 there was significant cracking in the concrete in the vicinity 24 of where the liner failed.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
That is not an easy
44 1
question.
O 2
MR. ARLOTTO:
I am hesitant about speculating too 3
much on that one.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Did it matter much that this 5
entire containment apparatus that you built was above grade, 6
rather than characteristically below, partially below grade?
7 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, at least in my mind I don't 8
think that was any significance.
We could take into account in 9
the analysis any of the pressures induced by the soil, if you 10 will, on the base mat.
But this was not done just for 11 measurements effect in the test.
12 Again, the purpose of the test, in a way, is to 13 provide benchmark data to validate the computer codes, and 14 therefore, now we have a different case, we can analyze that 15 one.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
One last technical question.
17 I think you said that temperature effects were not taken into 18 consideration here, the heating of the containment which could 19 occur in an accident scenario, but that that influenced the 20 outcome -- that would have influenced the outcome 21 conservatively.
22 Now, there are two ways to interpret that statement, 23 but I gather you think that it wouldn't have made it any worse 24 than it was.
25 I don't understand that.
I would have thought that
45 increased temperature would mean weakening of the plastic --
1
(
2 materials subject to plastic deformation.
3 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Let me first explain why we did 4
not introduce the temperature.
We discussed that at length, 5
again.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I understand why you 7
didn't do that.
8 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
It complicates the test to no 9
end.
l 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sure.
11 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
But if there was a thermal load 12 on the inside, it would produce a compressive load on the s
13 liner, prestress, if you will, loading inward, in essence.
It l
e
(
2 14 is trying to stretch out, it can't, so it has a compressive l
l 15 load.
l 16 Now, the pressure load is' introducing a. tensile load, l
17 which is negative of that.
So, actually you get a little help 18 in the beginning.
19 Now, we are going to do some further analysis in this 20 area, you know.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTEAL:
So, the thermal expansion 22 works against the --
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
The liner actually comes out of a 24 prestressed membrane.
However, on the other side is, as you go 25 up in temperature, the actual strength of the material sj
1 1
I 46 1
ganerally comes down.
However, these temperatures, it is not
!..,/
2 very much.
3 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
For a PWR, it won't be that much.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
What was the temperature?
5 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
It was about 85 degrees 6
Fahrenheit, and we kept it constant during the test.
7 COMMISSIONER CARR:
i Or you tried to keep it constant, 8
because I would have thought you would have heated it up by 9
just compressing it.
10 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes.
Well, we did slightly.
11
'There were slight increases, but there was enough cooling then 12 with time, it cooled back down again.
~
13
- k. N)
The reason for a constant temperature or close to it 14 was for the integrated leak rate measurements.
It simplifies 15 it.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I just would make one 17 comment, and give someone else some cracks here.
But I wish 18 that there had been more than whatever it was, ten experts in 19 this predictive process, because I am intrigued to observe that i
i 20 the outcome of the test shows once again that the extremes 21 generally aren't correct when you get a large enough group of 22 experts predicting almost anything.
And Eric knows what I am 23 driving at here.
24 This just contributes further to my skepticism about s
1 25 not the validity of some kind of Delphi process, but the way we l
l
~.
47 1
have done it in NUREG 1150.
2 Whether you are predicting the price of oil or what 3
the economy is going to do or the CO2 effect, you almost can 4
name it, it seems like if it isn't just pure guesswork, when 5
you get panels of experts carrying out some at least partially 6
analytical process, the truth usually lies somewhere far 7
between the extremes.
And once again, that showed itself to be 8
the case here.
9 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Well, Mr. Arlotto was pressed for 10 time and also the fact that the results haven't been fully 11 digested.
He just gave a spot, if you will, snapshot of the 12 results, giving pressure only.
13 If you look at the curves now, say of deflection, of 14 the predictions versus the experimental result, I think you l
15 would be very well pleased.
We are, to date.
They are in nice 16 agreement, up until the very end, mind you.
But in the lower 17 pressure regions, there is good agreement.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But then, finally, that 19 failure point becomes a rather subjective assessment based, to 20 be sure, on engineering expertise, but the truth lay somewhere 21 in the middle and that very often seems to'be the case.
22 That is all I have right now.
Nice job.
Very 23 worthwhile set of experiments.
I i
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr.
25 COMMISSIONER CARR:
The internal structure, how was l
l 5
48 1
it set in there?
Was it attached to the liner at all?
em
/
2 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
It penetrated the liner only at 3
the pole, if you will, the dead center of the base nat.
It was 4
supported there.
5 COMMISSIONER CARR:
So, it didn't touch the outer?
6 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, it was completely separate of 7
that, for obvious reasons.
8 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Okay.
What kind of steel was 9
this?
Mild steel?
10 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
The liner or the --
11 COMMISSIONER CARR:
The liner.
12 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
The liner is normally a 5/16th 13 g
steel, but it was not available in that thickness, so we got a 14 4/14th steel, mild steel.
It matched the ductility and the 15 yield of the 5/16th, and the welds were also checked, you know, 16 before the model was built.
17 COMMISSIONER CARR:
In the area of the penetrations 18 where you removed the metal and built it up on the outside, did
~
19 you build only up that much?
Or did you taper it off and build 20 further than that?
21 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, in essence, you put an insert 22 plate in where the opening is, but then you taper down to the 23 thickness and weld it there, and that is what was done.
24 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Okay.
I heard all your 25 statements about the tears being outside the heat affected
49 1
zone, but when I look at these penetrations, all seven that
)
2 failed right near the penetration, and the other three didn't, 3
something about the penetrations caused the problem.
4 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes, there is a -- the thickened 5
section is 3/16th of an inch thick on the one tear, and the 6
liners are a 16th of an inch thick.
So, there is quite a 7
discontinuity in thickness, even though it is tapered.
1 8
And we haven't destructively, you know, torn --
9 COMMISSIONER CARR:
So, you are going to look at 10 those three that didn't fail?
11 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
We are going to look at them very 12 closely, yes.
13 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Okay.
Because there has got to 14 be something we did.
15 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Well, I think it is the stress 16 concentration, I think we will find out.
j l
17 COMMISSIONER CARR:
So, would you suggest we do 18 stress relieve them?
19 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
No, stress concentration not due 20 to the welding, but due to the shape of the cutout.
21 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Well, can you relieve that?
22 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
We can change the shape of it.
23 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Okay.
That is all I have.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Rogers.
25 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
What did you look at in terms
J 50 1
of the time dependent, the frequencies of signals coming off G
2 your transducers, and so on and so forth?
What was the band width of your instrumentation for this kind of experiment?
3 4
MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I am not sure, do you mean the i
i 5
sampling rate or the --
I 6
COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
No, no.
You are looking at 7
signals coming from, you know --
8 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes.
l j!
9 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
There is a dynamic range of 10 information that is coming off here.
11 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
These are static.
What we did is I
12 we put on the pressure increment, we watched then the strain 13 change with time, and when it stabilized, then we took our i
,I 14 readings.
i l
15 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Yes, but there is noise coming i
16 out of that system, too.
17 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I guess I don't really follow the 18 question.
19 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Well, the's transducers that 20 you are using, some of them are producing time dependent 21 signals that come back, not just --
1 1
22 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Not really time dependent.
They 23 are change in electrical current, the strain gage, due to 24 elongation, say, 25 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Well, I guess what it really l
l
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
i l
51 1
boils down to is, do you have any information, time dependent (3
')
2 information, coming out from your instrumentation that wou3d give you some information on what the acoustic noise is in that 3
4 system?
S MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Okay.
We do have acoustic 6
emission systems.
We did have that all recorded.
7 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
You do?
8 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes.
We haven't digested that 9
yet.
10 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
And what is the dynamic range 11 of your instrumentation on that?
12 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
I cannot answer that one at the 13 moment.
(
s
~
14 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Well, I wonder if that can't 15 throw a little light on this leak before break business.
16 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Yes, I think it can.
17 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Because you have signatures la coming off, you have acoustic signatures coming off of, you 19 know, various structures in there, and they may be able to give 20 you a little clue on just exactly what is happening as that 21 break takes place.
22 MR. VON RIESEMANN:
For example, in the beginning, 23 you know, and each time you put an incremental load on, the l
24 concrete is cracking, there is all sorts of noise.
You can 25 pick that up.
j
52 i
1 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Yes.
.D
\\ l 2
MR. VON RIESEMANN:
Then later on, due to the change in signal, you could tell it was in fact a leak.
We have all 3
4 that data, but it has not been digested yet.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Now that you have completed the 6
experiments on the steel and the reinforced concrete 7
containment model, do you see a need or do you intend to do any 1
8 tests on prestressed concrete models?
l 9
MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, the prestressed area, Mr.
10 Chairman, is the place we have got to do something.
Right now, 11 we are going to try to digest what we got from the reinforced 12 to see what is directly applicable to the prestressed.
~ '
13 We would expect, and we are not committing, we are 14 not committing to a need for a model test at this time, but we 15 do think at the very least we ought to do some separate effects 16 tests, particularly on tendons and connectors.
17 In addition, as you know, now that the board of 18 inquiry at the U.K. has permitted to building a Sizewell B, 19 they are considering doing a test on a prestressed concrete 20 containment.
We are involved with them, and hopefully we may 21 actually work with them on that.
22 If they do that, we would like to join it.
- However, 23 their present plans call for them having a test without a 24 liner.
I would be very concerned about joining a program in 25 which they are testing the containment without a liner, simply
53 1
because that is where our failure obtained.
G 5
.j 2
And according to my associates, this was discussed at 3
length at Luzerne on the SMRT conference a couple of weeks ago, 4
and maybe due to the general agreement in the international 5
community, the people in the U.K. might feel that perhape they 6
ought to reconsider and do it with a liner.
7 If they do, we would certainly go in partners, save 8
money, and get what we want.
They are thinking somewhere 9
between a loth and an 8th scale model.
10 And so, yes, we know we have got to do something.
We 11
~
want to be careful how we spend our money, and we do not want 12 to commit to large scale tests if we can combine what we have 13 learned on this large scale tests with separate effects tests.
14 We want to do that.
We almost certainly will have to do some 15 separate effects tests, but we don't preclude the need for a 16 model test.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good.
Well, I think -- go ahead.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTEAL:
Let me just ask about that, 19 then.
It gets back to this liner question again.
Why would 20 they propose to do a test without a liner?
If they feel for 21 some reason, apparently, that the liner is not the critical 22 element --
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, I think that -- my associates l
24 will chine in, I am sure, but as we understand it, the NII,
{
'I 25 which is the NRC at the U.K., requires them to demonstrate the l
l 1
R I
I 54 1
structural integrity of the containment, the prestressed 2
concrete containment.
And so, the CEGB, which is the utility, 3
in essence, has designed an experiment to show structural l
4 integrity.
They are not required to show leak tightness.
So, 5
they feel that they could show structural integrity without a 6
liner.
7 I think they are subjecting themssives to a potential B
toothache that the world doesn't need, because in my judgment, if that concrete cracks and we begin to leak, who is going to 9
I lo tell me where failure really obtains.
Somebody says 10 percent 11 per day, that is failure.
12 So, I would be very concerned about being party to 1
13 that unless somebody -- it just bothers me a great deal, and
- )
14 hopefully we can work with them and actually, if necessary, I 15 wculdn't mind contributing funds to help them put a liner in 16 there.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Well, I would strongly 18 encourage that we cooperate, if possible on that.
There are a
~
19 lot of prestressed concrete containments.
20 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, I think it is a very important 22 issue.
I 23 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir, we do, too.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And I hope you will pursue that.
You 25 have certainly got some valuable information from the tests
55 1
that you described hera today, Anc I think there la another
.s 2
part of the issue here to pursue, and I au pleased to see that 3
you are already involved in it.
4 It just seemt, to me ttat it is a very important 5
conclusion to reach, that in a containment such as we a.ee j
i 6
taking about here toda; that it wouJd leak under pressure like I
7 this prior to any kind of catastrophic failure; That is a 8
very, very important conclusion.to come to.
9 How confident ara you that we can draw that 10 conclusion?
\\
{
11 MR. ARLOTTO:
We).1, I think that I have hedged no' I
12 much as I can, and I think that I wi'.1 ctill conti.nue to be:1ge.
l l
13 Until we take a hard 3r look it Tae condition of the concrete 14 and that rebar, I am not willing,to go any further to say that.
l 15 Because of the significant distress in that liner, I am i
16 inclined to think that it will leak befora it will break, but I 17 am going to hedge sufficiently to cay that I want to still look 18 at the structural members beforn I say I an completely 19 confident, Mr. Chairman.
Thar. is as far as I will go.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I lite that answer.
I think it:is a 21 good conservative nagirearing ans,;er that tells you that you 22 are not quite ready to draw that conclusion, but you have got 23 some more analysis ta do.
And I frink that is very 24 appropriate.
25 Maybe you can tell na, what else do you think you
56 1
need to do, other than this analysis, on this particular issue m
2 to understand the containment pressure issue any better?
Are 3
there any other things that we should be doing?
4 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, I think I go back to my general introductory remarks in the beginning about the fact that 5
6 containment is a system and we have got to look at it in toto.
7 I think that the first thing at hand is the analysis 8
of these 1,200 pieces of data that we have and how they relate 9
to the methodology, because that was our key element, to 10 benchmark or validate the methodology.
11 The second thing, because the liner was key, I think 12 that in speaking with Dr. Von Riesemann, there is a need to em 13 take a hard look at liner analysis and maybe even do some 14 separate effects tests on the liner, some of the things that i
15 Commissioner Carr has raised.
16 The next thing I think we have got to understand or I
17 look hard at is the aging of some of the materials, la particularly the non-metallics that we are using for seals.
We 19 want to continue that to get a handle on, are we going to have l
20 a problem down the road.
21 The next thing I think I would like to take a look at 22 is the penetration response.
We looked at -- these 23 penetrations are relatively small in this containment, compared 24 to what we are seeing, and I would like to get a better idea, 25 given distortion, particularly twisting moments, which we are
57 1
doing some experiments on, separate effects, and to be sure m
2 that we look at the penetrations to be sure that we haven't 3
missed something by this integrated test.
4 The next one I think is very key and we have begun to 5
look at it.
We want to apply some of this methodology to a 6
real plant.
7 j
We have made some inroads with TVA to look at 8
Sequoyah, to apply our steel containment methodology, and we 9
are working with Mr. Taylor and Mr. Keppler to see if we can 10 get cooperation so that the people at Sandia could have 11 walkdowns, get the data, get the drawings, to actually apply 12 the methodology to a real plant, have we got everything, do we 13 know, and do they have the information that we would have to t
14 have in our hands to say, indeed, this containment might 15 respond similarly to the model we tested.
16 I am hopeful, but we will have to take a look at 17 effects of seismic input.
I am hopeful that this will not be a 18 major issue.
However, we know the Japanese are doing some 19 shaker tests on some 1/3rd scale containment, and we might be l
20 able to work with them and, again, control costs and get some 21 insights.
22 But I personally am not as concerned about seismic i
23 threatened containment, but I don't think we can let that rock 24 not at least be overturned.
a 25 And the last one is the one we just discussed, which l
1 l
58 1
is the prestressed concrete, and I think I have outlined where-3 2
I think we have got to go there.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
One last question on filtered vents.
4 How do you think your test might have application to our 5
ongoing study of the potential use of filtered vents?
6 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, that is a little bit out of my 7
field.
However, I think that if we could, as Dr. Murley well 8
pointed out, if we could feel comfortable -- going back to your first question -- that indeed these containments, particularly 9
10 concrete containments, will leak before they will break, that 11 the tortuous path of fission products to get from point A to 12 point B, meaning the public, may be sufficient for us to say 13
(
maybe filtered vents and making a positive determination to 14 open the containment at a particular time may not be -- may go 15 away.
16 I am not sure, but I do think that this puts some 17 light, again, to put some information into the hands of the 18 regulators as another piece of information and maybe making a 19 more informed decision on whether or not that is the way to go.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I think it is a very important part 21 of the information that we are all seeking and looking for, and i
22 certainly it has some significant application to a judgment 23 regarding filtered vents.
I am sure that that does need a lot 24 more study, too.
But I bring it up because it is such an j
25 obvious issue that is currently being reviewed very carefully i
s 59 1
by NRR, I know, and other parts of our staff.
2 But Research is making a contribution to that by this 3
model test, and I am sure as you get into more analysis, it 4
will perhaps shed some light and make that issue become a 5
little clearer to us.
6 Well, any other questions from my fellow 7
commissioners?
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I just want to make a 9
comment, again, stressing the point that I mentioned earlier, 10 that the more I think about it, the more it seems to me that 11 you want to look very, very carefully at whether you can learn 12 something about the detonation case.
13 It even strikes me that seismic damage and the 14 cracking and whatnot, the damage you might see in the case of a 15 seismic event, isn't going to be like what you have, but there 16 might be some damage, and therefore I would think there might 17 be something that can be learned further for a fairly small 18 investment.
19 And finally, I would just make the comment and 20 compliment you that it seems to me this is the kind of thing 21 that we ought to be looking for in this business.
We can spend literally hundreds of millions of dollars nibbling away at the 22 23 edges and nLver really doing the expensive, well-designed, difficult experiment but one that gives you answers.
24 25 There is too often a tendency to do that, I think in
60 1
part because there is often a tendency for large Federal m
2 agencies, or smaller ones for that matter, to be concerned lest 3
an expensive, big experiment somehow not work out the way it 4
should.
And that is understandable.
5 But if you can't get the answers any other way, then 6
I would encourage and stress that we should design this sort of 7
experiment, go to the Congress and tell them we need the money.
8 That is all I have to say.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, let me thank the Office of 10 Research and the Sandia National Laboratories very much for not 11 only an informative briefing but also for a very, very valuable 12 test that will make significant contributions to our efforts to 13 provide safety features for our nuclear power plants.
14 I think it should be noted that the nuclear reactor 15 containments were originally designed to handle the pressures 16 and temperatures resulting from a large, great loss of coolant t
l 17 accident, and not necessarily from a severe accident resulting I
18 from a large scale core melt.
But I believe what we have heard 19 here today, it certainly has to be very interesting to at least 20 note that the structures that we are talking about were 21 designed with a rather significant margin, it would appear, and 22 that at least some look like they may even contain the loads 23 resulting from a core melt accident.
24 So, those are things we have got to look at more 25 carefully, but I think it is a very significant test and I j
s 61 i
think one that we can all take some encouragement from, to know
{
1
.]
2 that we have made our designs very conservative and perhaps 3
there are more margins than we realize.
4 It is tests, as Commissioner Bernthal points out, 5
real tests like this that do give us data that we can at least 6
put more confidence in.
7 I think that this is an extremely important program 8
that does contribute to our evaluation of severe accidents and 9
I believe that the staff and Sandia are to be comm aded for an 10 excellent program and a real contribution, again, to what would 11 appear to be a significant step towards better understanding 12 containments and perhaps being able to increase the safety 13 margins that we already have.
14 So, I commend you for a fine briefing and an 15 excellent test.
We look forward to your continuing analysis 16 and follow-through, because we recognize that this is somewhat 17 of a preliminary assessment.
But there is such great interest l
18 in this on the part of the Commission that we decided to ask 19 you to come up fairly promptly after you had a short analysis 20 period.
But we will be interested later, as you perhaps have a 21 chance to get into further analysis, to see if you draw any 22 different conclusions or if the conclusions you have already J
23 drawn can be reinforced.
It would be very valuable 24 information.
25 So, thank you very much.
62 We stand adjourned.
2
[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)
3 4
5 6
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2 1
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE i
3 1
1 4
This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
l 6
7 TITLE OF MEETING: Briefing on Performance of Sanida Containment Test-8 PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Wednesday, September 9, 1987 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken
{
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17
_ _ _ _ _1_'.:-_ _ _ _ _, _ __ _ _l1-
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Marilynn Nations 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
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[
l TRANSMITTAL. T0:
Document Control Desk, 016 Phillips g
f ADVANCED COPY TO:
The Public Document Room 9,/N/87 b
DATE:
[
FROM:
SECY Correspondence & Records Branch i:
i
?
Attached are copies of a Commission meeting transcript and related meeting i
document (s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and placement in the Public Document Room. No other distribution is requested or g
n required.
Meeting
Title:
M Nt_s 4bswN-M J
dW
[hv we, f
Meeting Date:
9/9/77 Open N
Closed l
C E
Item Description *:
Copies Advanced DCS 5
to PDR Copy E;
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2l hc
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1
&J/A cu-cph g/
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R 3.
% 1 E2l 4.
aM 1
3:
6.
- PDR is advanced one copy of each document, two of each SECY paper.
C&R Branch files the original transcript, with attachments, withcut SECY
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__3