ML20238D676
| ML20238D676 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1987 |
| From: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238D659 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-540 NUDOCS 8709110317 | |
| Download: ML20238D676 (3) | |
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' UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j-
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KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 j
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. August 10, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Thcmas E. Murley, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
William T. Russell, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY 2 OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND RECOMMENDATION FOR, A FULL POWER POWER LICENSE.
Region I recommends issuing a full power license for Beaver Valley Unit 2 based upon acceptable performance of precritical evolutions, initial criticality. (on-August 4, 1987), and low power physics testing.
This is an updated recommendation based upon NRC inspections since the briefing of the Commissioners on July 8,1987.
The principal input is from our around-the-clock inspection coverage from July 31 to August 7, 1987.
l Licensee operations have been deliberate and well controlled.
Activity prerequi-sites have been properly completed.
Operators and test personnel have communicated effectively.
Control room noise and the presence of unnecessary personnel have 1
I been minimized.
The operators have shown good understanding 'of systems' status
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and configurations.
They have also exhibited good. knowledge of system interactions, alarm conditions and responses, system setpoints, and working knowledge of the computer terminals in the control room.
Shif t turnovers and briefings have been -
l accurate and informative.
Log and record keeping have been complete, with good descriptions of items such as gaseous waste system leakage.
Night orders.have been effective in communicating appropriate information to backshift personnel.. Some inconsistencies in system status boards were identified by the licensee' and cor-rected.
The importance of status board accuracy was re-emphasized to the' operators, l
and the status boards have been generally accurate.
All licensee personnel ob-l served have performed professionally.
Licensee management, the onsite safety committee, and the joint test group have been effectively involved in activities.
Good management control and planning and j
excellent dissemination of information have been evident in the morning and after-noon daily meetings.
Task responsibilities have been clearly assigned and tracked.
The startup pace has been slow and methodical, with schedules given secondary pri-ority.
The startup program has thus far been almost error. free and no unacceptable test results have been identified.
j Licensee QA has focused primarily on administrative aspects. QC inspections have been evident and adequate.
As has been the case at Unit 1, the licensee plans to increase QA surveillance of operating activities.
Since issuance of the low power license on May 28, 1987, thirteen potentially re--
portable events (LERs) have been identified.
Although several of these involve persnnnel performance, interfaces, or communications, no recurrent problems and no significant safety issues were identified.
Overall, plant material condition is good.
Some pressurizer safety valve leakage i
was identified on July 21, one day after the plant reached normal operating pres-Af ter cycling the valves, identified and unidentified primary system leakage sure.
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Thomas E. Murley 2
AUG 10 1987 is well within regulatory limits.
There are numerous lighted control room annunci-ators, with many of these for normal conditions such as high tank levels or due to narrow setpoint range.
Operators were knowledgeable of the associated condi-tions, and the information available to the operators is considered adequate.
The licensee has a program for reducing unnecessary annunciations.
We found instances of open junction boxes, unsecured equipment carts, improperly stowed gas bottles, etc.
The licensee has responded promptly to resolve this concern.
Our more recent checks have found no similar problems.
The Unit 2 maintenance and surveillance programs are the same as those for Unit 1 and are being implemented properly.
Adequate pre planning, support, and super-visory oversight have been evident.
Operators have shown awareness of maintenance /
surveillance configurations, their significance, and the basis for the activity.
The delay between anticipated initial criticality on August 1, 1987 and actual criticality on August 4,1987 was due in part to time required to complete un-planned work, testing, and required checkouts.
This included identifying and re-placing faulty rupture disks in the waste gas system and correcting software and hardware problems with the plant computer and two in-core detector drives. The resolution of these matters was well-organized, thorough, and conducted without undue schedular pressure.
The overall delay is not considered unusual.
NRC inspection also included review of prerequisites for and observation of the approach to criticality.
Low power testing observed included determining the upper flux limit for zero power physics tests, reactivity computer checkout, source and intermediate range power monitor overlap, measurement of isothermal temperature coefficient and rod bank worths, and initial full core flux mapping. Completion of many prerequisites for future testing was also accomplished by the licensee.
NRC checks of key safety-related emergency core cooling and auxiliary feedwater valves found them positioned as required.
Licensee procedures for controlling valve positioning and verification are adequate and plant operators were found knowledgeable of the system for assuring proper valve alignment.
There were two manual trips from low power on August 7 and 10, 1987.
In each event the same four control rods dropped into the core and the operators tripped the reactor.
Operator performance and equipment response to these events were in accordance with plant procedure.
The first event occurred when the licensee started to move rods to raise reactor power.
Based on similar past experience at Unit 1 and other Westinghouse plants, the licensee suspected that the circuit card associated with movable gripper coils for the effected rods was the likely source of the problem.
Since they did not have equipment on site to test the card, they elected to replace it.
This initially appeared to have resolved the problem in that the licensee was able to move the effected rods.
Following the second event and after exter.sive troubleshooting and rod exercising, the licensee identified an intermittent malfunctioning silicon rectifier as the apparent cause of both events.
They
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AUG 10 W i
Thomas E. Murley 3
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l subsequently _ reproduced the event in the B bank by jumpering this. rectifier 1
into the circuit..The overall approach to problem resolution for these dropped rod events was reasonable considering the intermittent character of l
The rectifier has been replaced ~and the plant is starting up to perform in plant radiation surveys and other activities which' are prerequisites for testing at higher power levels.
All low power physics testing has been satisfactorily completed.
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William T. Russell Regional Administrator cc:
V. Stello, E00 L
J. Taylor, DEDR0 R. Starostecki, NRR H. Thompson, NMSS F. Miraglia, NRR S. Varga, NRR B. Boger, NRR J. Stolz, NRR P. Tam, NRR W. Kane, RI W. Johnston, RI T. Martin, RI E. Wenzinger, RI L. Tripp, RI J. Beall, RI u
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