ML20238C387

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License Change Application 9 for Amend to License NPF-36, Changing Definition of & Some Footnotes Referring to Core Alteration
ML20238C387
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/04/1987
From: Leonard J
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20238C330 List:
References
NUDOCS 8709100073
Download: ML20238C387 (6)
v • d • e


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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY {

Operatlng License NPF-36

. Docket 50-322 License Change _ Application l

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This License Change Application' requests' modification to j Operating License NPF-36 for the Shorehan Nuclear Power Station '

to change the definition of Core Alteration and some footnotes referring to Core Alteration.

The request and supporting documentation is contained in Attachment 1 to this License Change Application. {

l Long Island Lighting Company 1 By

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n Leonard, Jr. .

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resident - Nuclear Operations Subscribedandsworntobeforemethis[thdayofSeptember 1987.

kl r- ) E - 404 Notsry Public of New'Y rk l ' llNDA A. CEATry WOTARY PLOUC.J' tate of New York f4.4816267 Qualk! in S#d Couuty Commisuon i spnes March 30,15ff My Commission Expires: /9[?n t Jo,/7P P' l l

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F Attachment 1 To License Change Application 9 1.0' DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Change Technical Specification Section 1.0, definition 1.7,

" Core Alteration", on'page 1-2, the footnotes to Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements on pages-3/4 1-1,.1-2, 1-6, 9-3, 9-7, and Action Statements on page 3/4-3-4. . Copies!of these pages are attached. These pages have been revised to include the requested revisions which are marked with revision bars.

2.0 , REASON FOR CHA_NGE This revision is necessary to avoid:

- Halting SIU4 surveillance which are required- to be f conducted weekly per 3/4.9.2, while.under Core 1 Alteration conditions (operating condition 5).and there is either A) A loss of secondary. containment, B) A loss of control room air conditioning, C) A loss of LPCI motor generator sets, or D) A loss of A.C. or D.C. power

- .The interruption of the replacement of TIp's while under operating condition 5 and there is either A) A loss of secondary containment B) A loss of control room air conditioning, C) A loss of LPCI motor generator sets, or D) A' loss of A.C. or D.C. power

- The requirement for a reactivity anomaly check during start-up after operating condition 5 during which there were no core alterations but for the movement o f S RM ' s , IRM's, TIP's or control rods in their drive mechanisms.

3.0 B, ASIS FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS FINDING These changes are justified according to the basic requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c). There is no Significant l

Hazard Consideration for reasons listed below:

l Q1: Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

A1: These changes do not involve a significant increase in j '

the probability or consequences of an accident

! previously evaluated because:

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Attachment I l Fage 2 )

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l Chapter 15 of the USAR was reviewed and no accidents I' related to the normal movement of core instruments

( S RM ' s , IRM's, TIP's)'during Core Alteration conditions were found. The normal movement of core instruments can cause a very small and insignificant perturbation in Core reactivity, but will not cause any of.the following:

1. - Decrease in core coolant temperature
2. Increase in reactor pressure
3. Decrease in reactor coolant flow rate j
4. Reactivity and power distribution anomalies
5. Increase in reactor coolant inventory
6. Decrease in reactor coolant inventory One accident related to.the norma.' movement of control rods (i e., in their dris system and returning to the fully irserted position) during Core Alteration ~ conditions is analyzed in Chapter 15 of j the USAR (Section 15.1.13), and is found to not cause any of the following:
1. Decrease in core coolant temperature

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2. Increase in reactor pressure j
3. Decrease in reactor coolant flow rate
4. Reactivity and power distribution anomalies
5. Increase in reactor coolant inventory J
6. Decrease in reactor coolant inventory l 1

02: Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?  ;

A2: The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

There is only an insignificant perturbation of reactivity involved in the normal movement of core l instruments during Core Alteration conditions, and i this movement is performed in the safety frame of LILCO's Station Procedures (Ref. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and  ;

5.4). l

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The normal movement of control rods (i.e., in their drive mechanisms), which returns them to their fully inserted position, during Core Alteration condition, l does not affect the reactivity worth of any core ]

component, and is performed in the safety frame of .

LILCO's Station Procedures (Ref. 5.5 and 5.6).

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  • 1 l Attachment 1 l Page 3 1

03: Does the change involve a significant reduction in l margin of safety?

A3: The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because:

The Technical Specifications were reviewed for all

' Core Alteration' applications with respect to the new definition and the new footnotes. No Technical Specification limits were found to be exceeded and no limiting safety system settings were changed.

In the Technical Specifications whenever the phrase

' Core Alteratio;' is used, the proposed change l results in one of the following cases:

1 CASE A The footnoted exceptions become part of the Core Alteration definition. The change is only editorial and does not change the requirements.

CASE B The change in the ' Core Alteration' definition and in the footnotes require analysis of their impact on the se.fety of the affected operations as follows:

Normal movement of in-core instruments are performed in the safety frame of LILCO's station procedures (Ref. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). These procedures ensure that the movement of instrumentation is done in accordance with safety considerations (i.e.,

preserving the identification of subcriticality and measuring neutron flux), and therefore preserve the margin of safety. The structure of the Source Range Monitors (SRM), the Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) , and the Transversing In-ccre Probes (TIP) is such that these detectors are moved axially in dry tubes within the core. Their movement does not change the water (moderator) content of the core. It does, however, cause a small perturbation in the local neutron density (by the introduction of a trace amount of fissile material). This perturbation is of no reactivity consequence in either the local range or the full core.

. Attachment 1 g Page 4?

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The purpose of reactivity. anomaly. surveillance-following a core alterationLis to demonstrate that 1the activities conducted during'the. Core Alteration-didlnot'significantly change core reactivity in~

unanticipated ways (i.e., the altered core operates as predicted). The reactivity worth of the core is affected by changes in fuel loading; (such -as fissile and-burnable absorber material content'and distribution) and'its operating history.(thermal hydraulics characteristics and fuel depletion), as twell as by the' geometry of the core-and-the-reactivity worth of its' structural components. .The reactivity worth of an individual control rod is affected by changes in absorber content (through depletion orzleakage), and geometry. The control rod density necessary for criticality at any given power / flow condition depends on the reactivity worth of the core and'of.every individual control ~ rod. The normal movement of control rods.(i.e., in their drive mechanisms) which returns them to their fully inserted position, does not. affect the reactivity worth of any core component nor their geometrical arrangement. Furthermore, the normal movement of

-control. rods during core alteration conditions is done in the safety frame on LILCO's Station Procedures (Ref. 5.5 and 5.6).

.For the above reasons the proposed changes will not cause an offsite dose in excess of that established in the USAR.

4.0 TIMING OF CHANGE Since this is only a change for the sake of consistency, LILCO requests that it become effective upon issuance.

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 SP23.601.01 ' Source Range Monitoring System'-

Provides detailed instructions to the station operating L

-personnel for the proper operations of the Source Range .

Monitoring (SRM) system.

5.2 SP23.602.01 ' Intermediate Range Monitoring System' Provides detailed instructions to the Station Operating personnel for the proper operation of the Intermediate Range Monitoring (IRM) system. )

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Attachment 1 Page 5 5.3 SP45.605.01 'TIP Detector Replacement' Covers the removal, disposal and replacement of a TIP detector.

5.4 SP56.605.01 ' Traversing In-core Probe (TIP)

Covers the proper operation of the TIP system.

5.5 SP58.005.01 ' Core Loading and Fuel Movement Planning' q Delineates the procedure for fuel loading, including criticality check through control rod movement, during full core loading and partial refueling.

5.6 SP47.106.01 'CRD Friction Testing' Provides instruction and restrictions for the movement of control rods during CRD tests.

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