ML20238B672
| ML20238B672 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/12/1987 |
| From: | ABB IMPELL CORP. (FORMERLY IMPELL CORP.) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 0630-031-NY-017, 630-31-NY-17, OL-5-I-SC-087, OL-5-I-SC-87, NUDOCS 8709010342 | |
| Download: ML20238B672 (14) | |
Text
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O October 31, 1986 7
0630-031-NY-017 F'
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FROM:
SUBJECT:
Drill Report fJ2r,Sectember lb, Sentember 11 And October h Lij,5, fJir, LIE,Q Backcroundr As part of the quarterly Emergency Preparedness drill program, drills were held on September 10, September 17 and October 1,
1986 to test the response of the Local Emergency
Response
Organization's (LERO) to a simulated emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS).
The purpose of the drills was to exercise LERO's ability to implement the Offsite Radiological Emergency
Response
Plan Implementing Ptocedures (OPIP's) and to train new personnel to improve their ability to respond to an emergency, make appropriate recommendations to the public and implement those recommendations.
All sections of LERO participated in the drills with the exception of the Emergency News Center on September 17, LERO Relocation Center and Family Tracking on September 10.
The facilities which did participate included the Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC),
the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF),
Patchogue Staging Area (PSA),
Port Jefferson Staging Area (PJSA) and Riverhead Staging Area (RSA).
Due to the revisions being made in the plan, the Relocation Center was not tested at all.
Only 1/3 of the field personnel were exercised during each of the three drills. All field workers performed their normal emergency duties with the exception of the bus drivers who were involved in a
special training session to familiarize them with all bus yards and transfer points.
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario 7A Revision 0
(objectives attached) was used for all three drills.
shift 3
participated on September 10 and 17, and Shift 2 participated on October 1.
Shift 3 had not drilled as a team since late in 1985, and Shift 2
was last drilled in June 1986.
The purpose of drilling Shift 3
on two consecutive weeks was to allow the participants to use the first week as a learning process, and to allow the new members of the organization to become f amiliar with their new positions; and the second week would be conducted as a more normal " hands off" drill.
All LERO members were pre-staged,
'i.e.
told to report to i
their work locations at preassigned time, rather than exercise the normal notification and call out procedures.
To vary the scenario seen by Shift 3 personnel the EOC staff was told to report at 9:30 AM on September 17, rather than 8:00 AM.
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were' addition the ; type and;1ocation of the traffic. impediments
. changed for - the September 17 drill.
7 to the Offsite Radiological Emergency
Response
. Revision and and Procedures was'in effect at the time of the drills Plan all persons were tested to that revision.
Specific objectives to demonstrate the response to this revision were as follows:
o Demonstrate the. ability to assess the effect of road evacuation traffic and develop ' and impediments upon implement timely response actions.- These actions may include rerouting and the broadcast of an associated EBS message, as necessary.
Demonstrate the ability to pre-assign Traffic Guides to o
. Traffic Control Posts within the two mile-EPZ an to dispatch the Traffic Guides in an expeditious manner at the appropriate time.
drivers Continue the bus driver training to ensure bus o
are familiar with all bus yards and transfer points.
Reinforce the concepts of dosimetry and KI.
o Scenario obiectivent Attached Below is a
summary of the major comments generated by the Observer /Conrollers during the series of drills.
September 12A 1111 Emergency Ooerations Center' l.
The EOC was staffed and activated within 45 minutes of the time the players were told to report.
This is a very good response.
All personnel were actively helping to set up the facility.
The Coordinator of Public Information was participating 2.in his first drill, as were many of the people on his staff.
As such the controller assigned to that area'was forced to walk the players through their procedures.
The messages for the traffic impediments were slow in being EBS generated. The wording was ambiguous and not concise.
3.
One EBS message out of approximately 7 was broadcast without the sounding of the sirens.
Better coordination is needed between the Director of Local
Response
and the Coordinator of Public Information.
t_Several_.commug),qgtionsproblemsoccurredduringtheday 4
were attended 06 and were repaired; the TSO. in the Ts(ut^L. but the dedicated line between the EOC pukA4p information-mesa, and y SA and the-gd Qs ot PSA and PJSA.
The staff was able Ls~ws 4Jl. 3.4uG t
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i to make use of the backup systems available.
5.
The Radiation Health Coordinator (RHC) ordered the ingestion of KI prior to performing.the. calculations necessary for the technical justification. This omission was pointed out at the post drill critique.
6.
Security was not observed to. perform accountability checks of the EOC and a sweep of the facility to check.for improper or non-existant identifications.
What security did-do was have each person sign out as they left the facility and sign back in as they returned, however this procedure was not strictly adhered to.
7.
The dose assessment staff in the'EOC had difficulties in obtaining data from the dos'e assessment staff in thel EOF.
Only one (1) Part II RECS message was recieved during the drill. In addition, the lines of communication for technical data was almost non-existant. This matter was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group snd will be an item for furthur discussion and training.
8.
Response
to the traffic impediments _was generally good.
The Traffic Engineer was instrumental in developing rerouting schemes and there was good lines of communication among all groups in the EOC relative to the problems.
)
- 9. There was approximately a 1/2 hour delay at the Road Crew j
communicator's desk in getting the message transmitted to respond to one of the road' impediments.
It was stressed during the critique the importance of transmitting messages in a timely manner.
10.
The use of message forms needs to be improved.
It was observed that many people are using scraps of paper to transmit messages and therefore the appropriate 1 copies are not being distributed, or that messages are being written on scraps of paper and then being incorrectly transcribed on the message forms.
i
(
Emercency Worker Decontamination Facility i
1.
The normal Brentwood Security was not prepared for the arrival of the e'mergency workers from the fiel.d and the workers were given different directions upon their arrival at'Brentwood.
In addition, the direction given the workers at the staging areas, was not ccrrect and the workers did not report to the correct gate.
The Emergency Preparedness group is' aware of-the problems and has ensured that Brentwood will be aware of the arrival of the emergency 1
. orkers in future drills, and has revised the maps from the w
765728
t; I
e staging areas to the to the EWDF.
2.
The personnel reporting to establish the EUDF were not familiar with their jobs, and took no action until prompted by the controller.
3.
The personnel were unfamiliar with the location of the storage rooms for EWDF equipment.
The equipment checklist l
was not used per the procedure.
The correct setup of the l
facility was demonstrated by the controller.
?
4.
No check sources were available testing the survey instruments; several of the instruments had more than one calibration sticker with conflicting
'information; one instrument's cable and detector failed due to a short; two instruments went into continuous alarm; one instrument was completely dead.
All equipment problems and shortages were l
brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and have been corrected.
(
Patchocue Stacine h 1.
Due to the lack of experience of the participants, the j
set up of the facility was slow and undirected.
No priority t
was given to the activation activities. The establishment of
'=
security and issuing of badges was also slow.
These issues 1
were discussed during the post drill critique.
2.
Briefings conducted by staging area management were not very frequent.
This led to a lack of information regarding the emergency withing the staging area.
The need to periodically conduct staff meeting and the need to keep the emergency workers informed of the status of the emergency was emphasized at the critique.
3.
Due to the problem mentioned earlier concerning communications, personnel dispatched into the field were provided telephone numbers during the briefings. This showed good foresight on the part of the Lead Traffic Guide.
4.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides from the Staging Area was done in an efficient and timely manner.
The Traffic Guides necessary for the two mile evacuation were preassigned and were issued their equipment.
Upo.n the order to
- evacuate, they were dispatched and the average time to arrive at their posts was approximately 30 minutes.
- 5. In all cases the Traffic Guides who were questioned were knowledgeable in their individual tasks relative to traffic guidance, however of the 9 Traffic Guides questioned most of them were not aware of the maximum allowable dose, and the M511N 7657E9
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proper procedures governing the use of KI.
This will continue to be stressed in all future training.
6.
The performance of the emergency field workers relative to the traffic impediment was satisfactory.
They communicated the situation properly to the Staging Area and responded well to the direction of the Staging Area.
Egit; Jef ferson Stacinc &Ltg 1.
Due to a turbine maintenance outage at Port Jefferson, the turbine floor was not available for the drill.
As a
result temporary arrangements had to be made to accomodate the large number of participants. A tent was erected outside the Staging Area.
This additional problem compounded the lack of experience of the drill team and as a result the controllers provided direction to the participants.
This situation existed during the September 17 and October 1
drills.
2, The Traffic Guides for the two-mile evacuation were preassigned and were standing by prior to the evacuation order.
Once the message to evacuate was recieved from the
~
EOC, they were dispatched within minutes.
1
- 3. The response to the traffic impediment at Traffic Control Post
- 45 was very slow.
There were repeated requests from the Traffic Guide as to the status of the road crew.
The Road Crew never did arrive.
Riverhead Stacinc Anga 1.
Similar to the other Stgaing Areas, the personnel at Riverhead were slow to activate the facility.
The controllers had to prompt and train the personnel during the drill as to their duties.
2.
Several P.A.
announcements were made during the
- day, however no staff briefings were conducted by the Staging Area Coordinator.
It was pointed out during the critique that it is important to keep key coordinators apprised of emergency conditions on a regular basis.
3.
The packets for the deaf notifications were missing from Riverhead and as a result this portion of the drill was not able to be demonstrated.
This was pointed out to the Emergency Preparedness group and has been corrected.
4.
The dispatch of the Route Spotters was delayed because the message from the EOC took 20 minutes to go from the Administrative Support Staff to the Lead Traffic Guide.
The 765730 0
a t
Importance of ~ prompt handling of messages was. stressed at the post drill critique.
5.
The Road Crews which were dispatched from Riverhead arrived at their locations in a timely manner.
They had a
~
good general knowledge of road-clearing procedures, and maintained good communications with the EOC ani other road.
crews.
6.
Two Road Crews questioned were not aware of the proper procedures rogarding the use of dosimatry and maximum exposure allowances. They were alsoLnot properly informed to take their KI tablets.
Septemb1r 1 1984 Emeroency Ooerations ffatir 1.
The partic.ipants were prestaged so that notification was not. demonstrated.
The setup and activation of the facility from the time the participants were told to. arrive was approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The activation of the facility was orderly and we11' coordinated.
2.
The Command and Control of the EOC was handled well by the Director and the Manager.
- 3. The Coordinator of Public Information did a very good job in working with the Director in issuing EBS messages.
The CPI anticipated well and there was no delay in issuing the messages.
4.
The EBS message which was issued for the traffic impediment gave too specific information relative to' the new. traffic directions and rerouting.
The messages should I
have been more general and should only have instructed the evacuees to follow the directions of the Traffic Guides.
l This was pointed out at the post drill critique.
I 5.
The Radiation Health Coordinator did an excellent job in performing dose projections and assisting the Director in making the proper protective action recommendations.
The I
posting of the DOE / RAP team field data was a little slow and this was pointed out to the REC.
1 l
6.
The overall response to the traffic impediment was good.
Improvement could be made in generating the rerouting i
information and arriving at new evacuation time estimates.
1 7.
Information flow from the Staging Area to the EOC needs improvement.
At times messages were left on the IN(PR @
765731 3
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communicators desk for 10 to 15 minutes before it was transmitted to the proper individual in the EOC. In addition the flow from the EOC to the Staging Area could also be improved.
The message indicating that an Alert had been
'deciated was sent at 1038.
The announcement was made at 1014.
8.
At times when the key coordinators were at-staff
- meetings, their phones would go unanswered.
It was pointed out at the critique that a11' phones should be monitored and answered if the person is not at his desk.
9.
The Special Facilities group performed well in carrying out their duties. All procedures were followed.
Emercency Worker Decontamination Facility 1.
The set up of the EWDF was done in an efficient manner and quickly. The Decon. Leaders took charge of the personnel arriving and began assigning tasks.
The status of the emergency was known to the staff by periodic briefings.
2.
Several pieces of equipment had conflicting calibration stickers on them.
This was pointed out to the Emergency Preparedness group for resolution.
3.
There were several pieces of faulty equipment which were not recognized by the participants and were used to monitor the emergency workers. The equipment problem was pointed out the Emergency Preparedness group and the error in not checking the equipment properly was pointed out to the participants at the post drill critique.
Patchocue Stacine &g,,g,g 1.
In general, command and control of the facility was very good.
The staging Area Coordinator made good use of the personnel available to him.
- 2. The documentation of messages in the. Staging Area was not done on the standard message form.
Many messages were being written on blank pieces of paper and then later transcribed on the message form.
This caused delays in delivering the message to the appropriate party and caused transcription errors and erroneous information being transmitted.
The proper use of the approved message forms was reiterated at the post drill critique.
3.
The reassigning of Traffic Guides for the two mile evacuation was done in a timely manner.
IN(PJ14@
765732
4.
The Traffic Guides which were observed demonstrated adequate knowledge in their duties and responsibilities and also were knowledgeable in proper radiation and exposure control.
2,qrt Jefferson Stacing 4 Iga 1.
The set-up and activation of the facility went very smoothly and was better organized that the drill on September 10 with the same crew.
2.
The command and control of the facility by the Staging Area Coordinator was very good.
He utilized the P.A. system effectively for general announcements and conducted briefings with his key coordinators as the need arose.
3.
The reassignment of the Traffic Guides for a two mile evacuation was done promptly.
The Lead Traffic Guides performed properly and knew their procedures well.
4.
Response to the traffic impediments by the field workers was very good.
The information flow to the staging area was timely and accurate. The Road Crew arrived within 17 minutes of the request for help from the scene of the accident at Oakland Ave. and Rte. 25A.
Riverhead Stacino Area 1.
The setup and activation of the facility proceeded smoothly and was accomplished in a timely manner.
2.
The conduct of operations within the Staging Area were r;uch improved over the previous week.
Briefings were better conducted and were more complete.
Communications between staging area personnel were improved.
- 3. The distribution of dosimetry was observed to be not well controlled. Emergency workers were arriving at the briefings near the completion of the session and were not afforded the benefit of a
complete briefing.
A better coordinated dosimetry briefing and issuing session was pointed out at the post drill critique.
4.
The response by the Road Crew to the traffic impediment was timely. He arrived within 10 minutes of being requested.
There was a problem however in the area of communications; several of the vehicles which are used for the road crew simulation do not have cigarette lighter receptacles for the radio power supply. This however is only of a concern during a drill when actual road crew vehicles are not used.
765733 i
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5.
The Traffic Guides which were observed performed satisfactorily.
Each arrived at his location in a timely manner and were knowledgeable in their procedures.
They periodically updated the EOC of traffic conditions.
The redirection of traffic following the traffic impediment was handled well.
The Traffic Guides were-observed to periodically check their dosimetry-per the procedure.
6.
The performance of the Route Spotter was very -good.
He j
was familiar with his procedures and was in contact with the EOC.
His response to the simulated accident was prompt. He was observed to check his Josimetry periodically and was knowledgeable as to as to maximum exposure allowances.
October 14,, 1101 Emergency Doerations Center 1.
The participants.were prestaged.
The facility was fully staffed and set-up within 45 minutes of the time the participants were told to report.
- 2. Only 2 general staff meetings were held by the Manager of I
Local Response.'Several more general announcements were made to the EOC floor.
It was pointed out at the critique that the info rmation flow to the staff either through staff meetings or general status meetings could be improved.
3.
The distribution of RECS messages to the EOC staff was very slow.
This was due to the number of copies being distributed.
It was pointed out at the critique that the distribution should be reduced to expedite that process.
4.
The broadcast of the EBS messages was well coordinated with the sounding of the sirens and all messages were aired within 15 minutes of the decision to do so.
l l
5.
The handling of the traffic impediments in the EOC was
^
done very well. All persons concerned exhibited a high level of concern and urgency.
There was good coordination among l
all groups. The Traffic Engineer however, had to be prompted to develop revised evacuation time estimates based upon the rerouted traffic.
The information flow into the public information office could have been improved so.that they would have information immediately available to them to generate the EBS messages.
These shortcomings were pointed out during the post drill critique.
6.
The information flow between the EOF and the EOC in the dose assessment area was very good.
Both organizations were comparing data and field team deployment was well 1
765734 i
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coordinated.
'7. The information flew from the EOC to the Staging Area was slow and as a result the field personnel were working with information and data that was up to 30 minutes old.
The rapid and accurate transmission of information to the field was emphasized during the critique.
8.
The generation of EBS Messages, Press ~ P.sleases and Summary Sheets by the Public Information Staff in the EOC was very good.
However the information flow from the EOC to the ENC was poor.
Due to a malfunction of the TSO, 'and no alternate means of transmitting information to the ENC explored, the LERO Spokesperson in the ENC was not in " sync" with the SNPS Spokesperson during press briefings and press conferences.
It was pointed out during the critique that it it is imperative that both organizations represented at the News Center have the sama information in the same time frame.
Erergency Worker Decontamination Pacility 1.
There were several pieces of equipment which were u sed during the dri?.1 which were not functioning properly or were used improperly; bad or dead batteries, broken connectors, wrong probe, open vs. closed window etc. The proper use and checking of the equipment was stressed, at the critique.
Equipment deficiencies were reported to the Emergency Preparedness group for resolution.
2.
The status of the emergency was not regularly announced i
to the EWDF staff. The importance of timely information flow was pointed out during the critique.
3.
The controller conducted several contamination scenarios which were presented to the participants for their resolution.
In one-instance the contamination was not found due to poor monitoring techniques, in another the monitoring personnel cross-contaminated the area by improper controls.
These discrepancies were pointed out to the personnel during the critique.
Patchocue Stacina M,ga 1.
Briefings given by the coordinators to the Staging Area personnel were few in number and not specific enough.
Dosimetry information was not repeated during the briefings to the field workers. During the critique it was pointed out that the staff must be kept up to date with respect to the status of the emergency and this-is done by frequent and timely briefings.
It was also pointed out that dosimetry th1PEQ@
765735
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and exposure control procedures and criteria should be repeated as often as possible.
2.
The Lead Traffic Guides needed guidance to perform their function and implement their procedures. This was due to the fact that they were relatively new to the position.
3.
The message concerning~the failed sirens was transmitted to the Staging Area by the EOC at 9:48 A.M. It was not until 10:25 A.M.
that the Route Alert Drivers were dispatched. At the post drill critique it-was stressed that message q
handling must be expedited especially when. the Bispatch ~ of i
field personnel.is involved.
4.
The issuing of dosimetry and the dosimetry briefings got off to a slow start.
However as the drill progressed, the dosimetry briefings improved as the personnel gained experience.
5.
Information for transmittal was frequently given to the communicator verbally instead of written. The use of written.
messages and the procedure governing the handling of messages was discussed at the post drill critique.
6.
Of the 5 Traffic Guides questioned, all were unclear as to the maximum allowable doses.
7.
The Route Spotter questioned in the field was knowledgeable in his job function and was knowledgeable in dosimetry and exposure control.
8.
The Route Alert Drivers questioned were knowledgeable in j
their job function and were knowledgeable in dosimetry and exposure control.
F, git Jefferson Stacina &I,gg 1.
Many personnel at the facility were new to LERO and were l
participating in their first drill.
As such the more 4
experienced personnel had to perform many of the tasks which otherwise could have been delegated. This detracted from the success of the drill.
2.
The message'to dispatch the preassigned traffic guides arrived in the staging Area at 1245. This was approximately 13 minutes after the information relative to the evacuation protective action recommendation was known to the evacuation group in the EOC.
This time could be reduced.
The traffic guides were dispatched from the Staging Area slower than previously due to ccnfusion arrising when three seperate dispatch messages arrived in the Staging Area within a few IMP 318 765736
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minutes of each other.
There was also-confusion relative to the
, procedure for one-way traffic flow.
The briefing of the players and the issuing of dosimetry 3.
by the Dosimetry Record Keepers was good. The briefings were The DRK's displayed a good knowledge of clear and' concise.
their procedures.
- 4..
Several prompts were issued by the Communications controller to the Staging Area Coordinator to issue updates to the EOC relative to facility status and to request _ status reports from the EOC.
During the post drill critique it was stressed that the information flow is a "tko-way street":and that the lines of communication must continually be open.
Riverhead Stacina Ag,gg to the situation at Port Jefferson many of the 1.
Similar to their position and had to be walked i
were new players through their jobs either by more experienced people or by the controllers.
to dispatch the bus drivers following the
- 2.. The message recommendation by the EOC to do so was very late getting to the Staging Area.
It.was not until 1:30 L.M.
that.this information was available in the Staging Area and only af ter requested it from the EOC.
Another Bus ' Dispatcher the recieved in the Staging Area at 1:40.P.M. indicated message that a
release had occured at 12:35 P.M.
The bus drivers were dispatched into the plume without prior knowledge.
At in the critique it was pointed out that this type of delay transmission and working with information which is message very old can have negative results as was demonstrated in this case.
3.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides for the 2
mile evacuation was done promptly following the instructions to do so by the EOC.
Summary The concept of conducting drills on consecutive weeks with the same team proved to be beneficial especially in the Staging Ar e as. - Shift 3
personnel were better able to
- cope, with the emergency on September 17 than they were on September 10.
Shift 2 on October 1, did not perform as well overall primarily due to the fact that they had not drilled since June.
The assessment of the response to the special objectives itemized in the
" Background" section of this report is as follows:
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o The ability of the EOC staff to recognize and to plan to counteract impediments to traffic were develop a
generally good.
Communications within the EOC relative to the impediment and the cooperation of the various groups involved were good'.
The use of the Traffic Engineer proved
-to be very valuable in developing recommendations.for alternate evacuation routes, however more emphasis should be placed on_ rapidly generating new evacuation time-estimates, even if they are first order approximations, so that'a.more informed decision can be made.
In addition more emphasis needs be placed on the roll of the Public Information group.
EBS messages need to be. streamlined concerning the impediment information and what the general public need know.
The flow of information into the Public Information Office needs to be improved-so that the ~ messages can be generated in more expeditious manner.
The. response of the Staging Area to traffic impediments was also generally good.
The flow of information within the Staging Area and between the Staging Area and the field needs to be improved.
There is considerable delay caused by the handling of messages.
The response of the field forces I
I to the impediment was good.
Generally, most'of the field personnel were knowledgeable in their procedures and would have been able to handle the situation in the field without too much difficulty.
The procedure to pre-assign Traffic Guides for the ' tan) o
[
mile evacuation was demonstrated very well. The staff at the staging Areas knew the procedures and were able to carry them out.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides to the field once the order to do so was recieved from the EOC was
~
generally good.
Some improvement could be attained in the area of establishing one-way traffic flow per the procedures. Once dispatched, the Traffic Guides were able to locate their positions and establish the post in a
reasonable amount of time.
o The continuation of the bus driver training did occur during this drill series. The results of that training is included in a seperate report.
The concepts of dosimetry and KI were reinforced by the ocontrollers and the players during the briefings held by the Dosimetry Record Keepers.
- However, when questioned in the field by controllers, responses still showed a lack of understanding by some of the players. Continued education in this area is needed.
One of the major areas of concern during this drill series continues to be the communications between the EOC and the Staging Areas.
Long delays in getting information to the Staging IN(P,EJd) 765738 t
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Areas were experienced throughout the drills.
Much more emphasis needs be placed on communications, both in accuracy and timeliness.
Delays in the response by the Staging Areas chn be traced back to delays in transmitting information or instructions by the E OC.
The information flow from the EOC to the ENC also proved to be major deficiency noted in one particular drill.
It appears that the common denominator in communications delays is the EOC, and emphasis must be placed in training that f acility.
The information available to the staff at a
particular
- facility, i.e.
the EOC of the Staging Area is a function of how
- well, how often and how accurate the staff briefings are. One of the major reasons for a lack of available accurate information was the lack of proper staff briefings.
During future training sessions this area o'f communication will be stressed.
Another area of communications that has been a problem in the past, and is still a problem with certain shifts, is the communications link between the EOC and the EOF in the area of dose assessment.
The exchange of information from the EOF to the EOC needs to be improved.
This will continue to be examined in future drills where the EOF and the EOC are both participating.
t ru.
765739
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