ML20238B331
| ML20238B331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1987 |
| From: | Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NT-87-0382, NT-87-382, NUDOCS 8709010172 | |
| Download: ML20238B331 (4) | |
Text
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Alabama' Power Company NT 87-0382
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600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400
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Telephone 205 250-1035 R. P. Mcdonald Alabama Power Senior Wee President the southe 9 electric system August 25, 1987 Docket No. 50-348
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Docket No. 50-364 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
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SUBJECT:
J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection of June 11 - July 10, 1987 RE:
Report Number 50-348/87-14 50-364/87-14
Dear Sir:
This letter refers to the violation cited in the subject inspection reports which state:
"During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on June 11 - July 10, 1987, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
k The violation involved failure to perform adequate inspection and testing.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the_ violation is cited below:
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, criterion X requires that a program for inspection of activities affecting quality shall be established and executed to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XI requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that systenVcomponents which have undergone-modification will be completed to assure satisfactory performances. Test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.
1 Contrary to the above, a post maintenance and design change inspection program was not adequate to demonstrate that systens and components had been installed in accordance with instructions, procedures, and drawings in that the control room fire dampers on train "A" and train
'_'B" were found to be electrically inoperable
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l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 25, 1987 Page 2 I
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beginning on February 18, 1981 to June 1987. Electrical links were found open in certain electrical junction boxes; two electrical jumpers were installed in one terminal box, and the electrical L
installation to the SRD's was incomplete.
l This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I)."
Admission or Denial The above violations occurred as described in the subject reports.
Reason for Violation The violation was caused by personnel error in that a decision was made not to perform a functional test since a functional test would have been destructive to the smoke release devices (SRD's).
Corrective Action Taken and Results Achieved Electrical problems associated with these dampers such as open links, incorrect wiring, and incorrect SRD installation have been resolved. A subsequent functional test demonstrated that the SRD circuit design is inadequate in that the voltage supplied to the SRD's is too high, which can result in shorting the power source following actuation. An engineering evaluation has determined that the SRD circuits on the control room fire dampers are not required. The SRD's have been removed from service under administrative control, and a design change request has been submitted to delete these circuits.
All other fire damper SRD actuation circuits in safety related structures were inspected for installation problems similar to those found with the control room fire dampers (i.e., open links, incorrect wiring, etc.) and no similar problems were identified. All fire damper SRD actuation circuits in safety related structures not routinely tested in accordance with surveillance procedures have been functionally tested.
Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further violation Prior to the identification of this problem but subsequent to the installation of these components, formalized instructions were developed and implemented which define when post-modification functional tests are to be conducted.
If these instructions had been developed and implemented prior to 1982, this event would probably have been prevented.
This event has been discussed with approprate personnel emphasizing the 4
need for complete testing.
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 25, 1987 Page 3 Date of Full Compliance December 31, 1987 Affirmation I affirm that this response is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. The information contained in this letter is not considered to be of a proprietary nature.
Yours very t y,
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y R. P. Mcdonald RPM:emb cc:
Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford l
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