ML20238A653
| ML20238A653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-062, OL-5-I-SC-62, NUDOCS 8708310160 | |
| Download: ML20238A653 (72) | |
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e i ASSESSMENT l e e 9999999995G599999999999999999999S 3h>Isk Exercise of the New York State and Westchester, Putnam, Rockland and Orange Counties Radiological Emergency Plans for INDIAN P0 INT NUU. EAR GENERATING STATION M AY 2 7,19 8 2 Federal Emergency Managemen.t Agency Region 2 FRANK P. PETRONE 26 FEDERAL PLAZA Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278 hbR DO K l2
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1 4 i - 1-l j IABLE OF CONTENTS b Page I. INTRODUCTION. I 1. FEMA Responsibilities-1 2. Exercise Event. 2 3. Exercise Objective. 2 4. Participating State and Local Organizations. 4 'l 6 ) 5. Exercise Critique. c. 6. RAC Evaluation Objectives 6 7. Federal Observer Team. 6 1 8. Evaluation Criteria. 8 l 9. Remedial Action Procedures. 8 10. Review and Approval Procedures. 9 II. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
'10 1. Overview. 10 2. Swamary: State Activities. 11 f 3. Summary: Indian Point Emergency Operating Facility... 12 4 Summary: Westchester County. 13 .] .5. Summary: Rockland County. 14 6. Summary: Or ang e Coun ty. 15 7. Summary: Putnam County. 17. l III. EXERCISE SCENARIO. 20 IV. EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 21 1. State. 21 2. Emergency Operating Facility. 24 3. Westchester County. 27 4 Rockland County. 39 5. Orange County. 48 ] 6. Putnam County. 56 ] 7 Du t che s s Count y. 67 j V. CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES. 68 j 1. Schedule for Correcting Significant Deficiencies. 68 1 I I j I (
l g. I. INTRODUCTION 1. FEMA Responsibilities On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency ] Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all of f-site nuclear planning anti res ponse. FEMA's immediate basic res possibilities in Fixed Nuclear Fac ility .1 Radiological Emergency Plannir.g iaclude: 1. Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and j review and evaluation of state and local government j emerget.:y plans for adequacy. ] 2. Determining whether the plana can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions. f I 3. Coordinating the activitics of other involved Federal j and volunteer agencies: l 1 - Nuclear Regulatory Commi'ssion (NRC) - Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - Department of Energy (DOE) - Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) j - Department of Transportation (DOT) l - Department of Agriculture (USDA) J l - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) - Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Re pre sen ta t iv e s of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. l l Tormal submission of emergency plans to the ' RAC by the states and l involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by evaluation of those plans and an exercise and critique. A public meeting is held to l acquaint the citizenry with the content s o f the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans. 1 This report is an evaluation of the first joint exercise at the Indian Point site, which involved participation' by state, local, and Indian Po in t 3 personnel to decennine whether the radiological emergency plans can be Unit impl ement ed. _____.___________.._____.m_-_.__m
r 2 2. Exercise _ Event ~ A rad iological emergency exercise was c onduc ted on Ma rc h 3,
- 1982, between the hours of 6:00 a.m.
(EST) and approximately 5:00 p.m. to assess the adequacy of rad iologic al emergency r e s ponse plans for New York State, Westchester County, Rockland County, Orange County, and Putnam C1unty, and to test the state and local capabilities to protect the pub lic in the event of a rad iologic al emergency involving the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station (IPNPS), operated by the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) and located near Buchanan, New York. 3. Exercise Objective The of f-site exercise obj ec tive was to demonstrate the r es ponse and capability of the state and local governments according to existing plans, and to demonstrate the emergency response capabilities that would be brought into play in the event of a radiological emergency at the IPNPS-3 that a f fected of f-site areas. The key state and local support c apab ilit ie s, as presented in the radiological emergency response plans that were to be tested, include: The adequacy and capability of implementation of the New e York State', Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam counties and the Indian Point radiological emergency plans. The capability of tne state, counties, and Indian Point e to notify and activate emergency response personnel, The capability of the counties and the state to alert e and notify the affected permanent and transient po pul a-tion within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) of an incident at the Indian Point site and to provide follow up information as required via sirens and the emergency broadcast system (EBS). The capability of the normal and back up emergency com-4 e =unications among We stchester, Rockland, Orange, and l Putnam counties, the state, and Indian Potat, includ ing the radiological emergency communications system (RECS) hot line. The adequacy of the staf fing and activation, as appro-e priate, of emergency response f ac ilit ies, and the adequacy of space and habitability for management of radiological emergency at: _~_. - -. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
r 7 l 3 Indian Point 3 Control Room (CR) Indian Point 3 Technical Support Center (TSC) Indian Point 3 Operational Support Center (OSC) Indian Point Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) ODP Southern District EOC Westchester County EOC Rockland County EOC Orange County EOC Putnam County EOC Emergency News Center The adequacy and competency o f the state, Westchester, e Rockland, Orange, and Putnam counties, and Indian Point 3 l staf f to opercte the emergency response facilities. The ability of key emergency personnel at Indian Point e and at all levels of government to initiate and coordinate J timely and effective decisions with respect to a radio-logical emergency. The ability of Indian Point 3 staf f to activate the spe-e cial news center in conjunction with state and county agencies and to provide for periodic release of public information and for runor control, The counties' ability to deploy radiological field moni-e cors and to receive and assess meteorological and radio-logical data from both county and utility field teams in accordance with their respective radiological emergency plans, ~ The ability of Indian Point 3 and the state to calculate e ^ dose projections, compare projections to protective action guides (PACS) and recanmend appropriate prctective actions. The capability of the emergency response organizations for e the state and Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam j counties to make decisions and to Unplement appropriate j protective action options. These options include sheltering, (simulated) evacuacion of on-site and of f-site areas, l informing the public on the development of the accident, identification of and provision for special populations, j activation of reception and congregate care facilities, and control of ingestion exposure. The capability of o f f-site energency response personnel to e implement access control procedures. The ability of Indian Point and Westchester, Ro ckl and, l e Orange, and Putnam counties to coordinate, control, and j deploy radiological monitoring teams via the respective field communications systems. Methods for radiation exposure control, including dis-tribution of dosimeters and maic.tenance of individual worker exposure records.
u a 4 Ability to use decontamination facilities and to limit e exposure of emergency workers. Capability for providing medical support to radiation e casualties. Capability for bnplenenting procedures for (simulated) e reentry, d amage assessment, and recovery. 4 Participating State and Local Facilities and Organizations The principal operating area for the exercise was the plune expo sure emergency planning zone around the Indian Point site, approximately a 10-mile radius around the power plant. Organizations and facilities that were desig-nated to participate in the exercise are listed below; during the exercise r me of the organizations may have had minimal involvement. New York State Facilities EOCs Albany, New York Office of Disaster Preparedness Southern District Poughkeepsie, New York Personnel Monitoring Hawthorne, New York Centers Monroe, New York County Facilities EOCs Westchester County, White Plains, New York Rockland County, Pomona, New York Orange County, Coshen, New York Putnam County, Carmel, New York Dutchess County,* Poughkeepsie, New York Re c ept ion / Cong reg ate We stchester County Care Centers Rockland County Orange County Dutchess County Hospitals We stchester County l o Peekskill Hospital i Orange County o Cornwall Hospital o Middletown Hospital
- Dutchess County EOC was ac t iv ated to prov id e support to the plume exposure EPZ counties, such as rec e pt ion / cong reg ate care centers, monitoring and decontamination of " evacuees," and traf fic control.
_m.____.__-_____
~_ .--q 5 Indian Point Facilities J Indian Point EOF Buchanan, New York I Emergency News Center Verplanck, New York New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission Department of Health DMNA/Of fice of Disaster Preparedness Department of Transportation Division of State Police Department of Agriculture Markets Department of Environmental Conservation' i I State Energy Office Department of Social Services Department of State, Fire Prevention and Control I Department of Education Of fice of General Services Department of Labor Department of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Department of Mental Health Department of Correction Department of Criminal Justice Thruway Authority Counties Westches ter, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam County Executive Civil De fense Director Commissioner of Public Safety Commissioner of Health Commissioner of Hospitals Commissioner of Public Works Director, Department of Transportation Commissioner of Social Services Fire Coordinator Public Information Of ficer Radiological Health Specialist Sheriff Volunteer Ambulance Disaster Coordinator Superintendent of Highways Private Agencies and Volunteers l American Red Cross l RACES (Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service) Conrail ~ MTA (Metropolitan Transit Authority) Amtrak l Bus Companies l l l l l
,7 n e 6 l 5. Exercise Critique A preliminary oral critique ~of the ' March 3 exercise was conducted at 11:00 a.m., March 6,1982, at Cortland Civic Center, New York. 6. RAC Evaluation Objectives General objectives of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for the operational phase of the plans were to observe and evaluate the' exercise, focusing on the een functional areas ' listed and briefly described below. These can functional areas include approximately 75 specific criteria taken directly from Section 'II of NUREG-0654-FEMA REP-1, Rev.' 1, which is' the basic j planning do;ument on which the state and local plans, and also the criteria for observing and evaluating the exercise, are based. Functional areas: Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources. o Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff. e Emergency Operations Management. e Public Alerting and Notification, e e Public and Media Relations. e Accident Assessment. e Acti.ons tb Protect the Public. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures, e Recovery and Reentry Operations. e Relevance of the Exercise Experience. e 7. Federal Observer Team A 50-member of f-site Federal Observer Team was established by the FEMA Region II RAC Chairman for observing the response at Indian Point. Ob s e rv e r s'- included: l l l-l l J
i 7 Observer Agency Location / Func t ion F. Petrone FEMA (Regional Director) Oversight Re sponsibility R. Kowieski FEMA (RAC Chairman) Oversight Re sponsibility S. McIntosh FEMA State EOC/ Team Leader N. Steinlauf FEMA State EOC J. Feldman EPA State EOC/ Accident Assessment M. Adler DOE ' State EOC/P.I.O. J. Johnson FEMA S. District EOC/ Team Leader W. Pierson FEMA Indian Point EOF / Team Leader B. Bores NRC Indian Point EOF J. Harrison NOAA Indian Point EOF l M. Jackson FEMA News Media Center /P.I.O. L. Dillon FEMA News Media Center /P.I.O. S. Class FEMA Westchester ECC/ Advisor C. Connolly FEMA Westchester EOC/ Team Leader i R. Bernacki FDA Westchester EOC/ Accident Assesment J. Kelly FEMA Westchester EOC/ Communications K. Lawrence FEMA Westchester EOC/P.I.O. D. Tinsman DOT,USCG Westchester Co./ Evacuation J. Bravo FEMA Westchester Co./ Evacuation F. Fishman FEMA Westchester Co./ Evacuation G. Rod rigue z FEMA Westchester Co./ Congregate Care W. Gasper ANL* Westchester Co./ Radiological Monitoring J. Keller INEL** Westchester Co./ Radiological Monitoring R. Jones FEMA Westchester Co./ Medical P. McIncire FEMA Putnam EOC/ Advisor T. Maynard FEMA Puenam EOC/ Team Leader I K. Cant DOE Putnam EOC/ Accident As sessment H. Rand FEMA Putnam EOC/P.I.O. T. Hollid ay FEMA Putnam EOC/ Communications J. O'Sullivan FEMA Putnam Co./ Evacuation M. Kaplan ANL* Putnam Co./ Evacuation C. Nichols INEL** Putnam Co./ Radiological Monitoring J. Bratis ANL* Putnam Co./ Radiological Monitoring { J. Picciano FEMA Rockland EOC/ Team Leader 1 M. Goodkind ANL* Rockland EOC/ Accident Assessment ) R. Garelik FEMA Rockland EOC/ Communications G. Seiden feld TEMA Rockland EOC/P.I.O. P. Lutz DOT,USCG Rockland Co./ Evacuation R. Hellriegel FEMA Rockland Co./ Evacuation C. Malina US DA Rockland Co./ Congregate Care /PMC R. Skinner INEL** Rockland Co./ Radiological Monitoring J. Tatar ANL* Orange Co./ Radiological Monitoring R. Revnolds FEMA Orange Co./ Team Leader E. Levine ANL* Orange Co./ Accident As sessment A. Davis FEMA Orange Co./ Communications C. Carlton FEMA Orange Co./P.I.O. R. Fish DOE Orange Co./ Evacuation
8 Lo cat ion /Func t ion Agency Ob server Orange Co./ Evacuation Orange Co./ Radiological Monitoring P. Weberg FEMA L. Ho f fman INEL** Orange Co./ Radiological Monitoring L. Lewis ANL* to FEMA)
- Argonne National Laboratory (under contract
- Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (under contract to FEMA) utility's contractor personnel and In addition to the Federal Observer Team, visitors observed the exercise.
8. Evaluation Criteria Major functions witnessed by federal observers were evaluated in accordance with the following scheme: no deficiencies noted, no Capability outstanding: o bnprovements necessary. Capability good: only minor deficiencies noted. e deficiencies noted that Ibnit Capability acceptable: e e f fective per formances, Capability weak: significant deficiencies noted. e Capability lacking: response called for but not e d emonstr ated. 9. Remedial Action Procedures Provided under Part IV of this report are evaluations and rec emmend a-These evaluations and recommendations are based tions for remedial actions. on the applicable planning standards ( from which the state and local plans forth in Section II of NUREG-0654 were developed) and evaluation criteria set Other recommendations are suggested that are not keyed to FEMA RIP-1, Rev. 1. NUREG-0634, but which could Unprove operations. In this report, recommendations are pr e sented and are kayed to the State and local jurisdictions should submit to state and local jurisdictions. they have taken and a schedule FEM.A a description o f r.he corrective measures for the ones to be und er t a ke n. If r emedial actions cannot be instituted immed iately, then a detailed schedule for implementing remedial actions must be provided to FEMA, including dates for completion.
9 The Regional Director'of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FDIA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Su ppo r t, Washington, D.C., that the deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan. 10. Review and Approval Procedures A state that seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan 'and annexes ~ submits an application for review and. approval to the ' FEMA Regional Director-of the region in which the state is located. The, application, in the form of a ' letter from the Governor, or such other state of ficial as the Governor may designate, is to contain one copy of the completed state plan with an indica-tion that deficiencies have been corrected. Upon receipt' of a state plan, the Regional Director initiates ' the review process as described la 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123 Tue sd ay, June 24, 1980. (Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness).. Af ter the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and the FEMA Regional staff have completed. their review, including the evaluation of the supporting exercise and the public meeting required in proposed 44 CFR Part 350, che fFEMA Regional Director'will-issue a report to FEMA Headquarters regarding the state ' and local government pl an s, procedures, and preparedness capabilities. This' report will consist of a summary of the overall findings and determinations in respect - to the pro-cedures, training, resources, staffing levels, qualifications, and equipment availab ility. The FEMA Associate Director is to conduct-such review of. this r epo rt as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies. 4 4 L_.__.-
i. 10-II. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
A joint exercise of the emergency preparedness. plans fo r the Indian Point site was held on March 3, 1982. The off-site exercise was observed by a a team of 50 federal _ observers, who reported their findings to ' the. Federal ' Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).. Participating in the exercica -tre the owner of Indian Point Unit 3, ; Power Authority o f the St ate o f New York (PASNY), officials and agencies of the State of New York, and the counties of -Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Putnam, and Dutchess. Emergency response facilitics ob' served by FEMA included: the Indian Point Emergency Operations Facility (EOF); e the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Albany; e the state EOC in the of fice of Disaster Preparedness, e Southern District; e the Westchester County EOC; the Rockland County EOC; e -e the Orange County EOC; e the Putnsa County EOC; e the Dutchess County EOC; and the Emergency News Center in Verplanck. a The Dutchess County EOC also chose to participate in the exercise, although l it is not within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Evaluators also observed procedures at personnel monitoring centers, at reception /congreg ate care centers, and at hospitals where simulated ac c i-dent victims were created. l Over 50 state, local, and private agencies and departments participated in the exercise. 1. Overview During the review of the exercise, each of the ten functional araas described in section I.6 were evaluated for the state operations and each of the four municipal counties' operations (except Dutchess). At the state level,. all observed functions were carried out well; only minor deficiencies were noted. Among the four counties, nine functional areas were evaluated 1
j U as we ak.. These deficiencies, po sitive areas ' of performance, and correc-tive recommendations are detailed in ~ the summarie's provided below and' in' the - I following pages. J Several concerns were identified during the exercise that influenced the evaluation of that element.. Some of these concerns' are identified below. ~ The primary ceans for alerting the. populace.co a. serious e radiological emergency will-be a system of sirens. This ~ system' is now beingl installed and' is to be tested by the. licensees. The existing sirens were activated during1 the exercise, but some of.che units did not sound or: were inaudible to local. residents. The backup system of noti-i- fication' by sound trucks '(police / fire trucks equipped with ] j. public address. systems) was not used. q 4 Rockland County's police, fire and volunteer ambulance { e corps-initially chose not to participate in the exercise, j claiming that inadequate training - had' been provided. During the exercise these groups participated, but to a minimal ] extent, thereby reducing the training benefit of the exercise and the ability to' fully evaluate the county's preparedne s s. The effectiveness of the existing radiological. public ~ educa-( e [ tion progran should be strengthened. Currently, public - education on radiological emergency procedures relies on 6 distribution of pamphlets to residents.. Concern remains i as to the level of public awareness and response..These concerns include the public's understanding of the ' concept and geogra'phical boundaries of planning zones. Also, the level.of awareness of the non English-speaking residents l living in the area should be analyzed.. ) 2. Summary: State Activities Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources. Facil itie s and I J resources in the state EOCs in Albany and Poughkeepsie were good. Displays l vere well placed and promptly upd at ed. Some additional plotting.of dose c calculations is recommended. The communications between state and local, j accident assessment teans we re weak. In ternal communications and public information arrangements were good. .i Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. All mobilization activities functioned well.
12 Emergency Ooerations Management. Man ag ement of the response organiza-tion was well demonstrated. Increased flow o f in formation in both direc t. ions between agencies and decision-makers would be beneficial. Public and Media Relations. At the state EOC in Albany, press f ac ili-ties and media briefings were good. At the Joint Media Center, the state PIO staf f demonstrated good capability. Accident Assessment. Accident assessment capabilities were good. However, the state did not demonstrate their own independent field monitoring capab ility. Some additional computational aids would be of value. Recovery and Reentry. Short-term and long-term recovery and reentry procedures appeared to be good. Relevance of the Exercise. Participants felt that the exercise was beneficial for training and experience. Use of simulated meteorology and the rapid pace of scenario events detracted somewhat from the realism of the exercise. 3. Su= mary: Indian Point Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) Emerzenev Ooerations Facilities and Resources. ' Th e EOF in Buchanan had acceptable capabilities ; however, space was Ibnited and inconveniently arranged. Internal and external commun ic ation systems could be improved. Alerting and Mobilization of O f ficials and Staf f. Staf fing and notifi-cation was acceptable. Additional feedback from the state and counties to the EOF would be o f benefit. Emergenev Operations Management. Man ag ement of the r e s po nse wcs good for state representatives and acceptable for the county representatives. Mo re involvement of the state and county in decision making is recommended. Accident Assessment. Capabilities in this area were acceptable. Computing capability for rapid response is recommended. Improvement is needed in use of monitoring data. Relevance of the Exoerience. The exercise was felt to be beneficial to the participants.
h i 13 l l 4 S uc:marv: Westchester County Emergencv Operations Facilities and Resources. The f ac ilitie s at I the Westchester County EOC were good overall. The wo rking space was small but adequate because of the l ayo ut. Commun ic at ion, internal and external, was good. Backup RACES communication capability was demonstrated. Displays and maps were well organized and security was good. Alerting and Mobilization of O f ficials and Staff. Westchester Coun t y demonstrated a good capability for alerting and mobilizing officials and staff in a timely manner. This resulted from good communications and from adequate procedures and backup personnel. The capability for 24-hour alerting and 24 hour a day operation was good. There is some concern over the av ail-j ability of enough personnel to adequately staf f the reception centers if an ) actual emergency started on a weekend. Emergency Operations Management. Emergency operations management, headed by the County Executive, was very good, and demonstrated well-defined leadership at several levels. Th e staff was kept well informed through periodic briefings by the leaders. Public Alerting and Notification. Pub lic alerting and notification actions were weak, due primarily to the unsatisfactory per formance of the siren system. Lack of understanding by some of the populace of the meaning of the sirens; lack of knowledge of the emergency response planning areas (ERPA); l and lack of adequate notification of transients were observed. The procedures j for broadcasting EBS messages were very good; EBS messages were well vricten and timely. Ac:ivation of EBS station and issuance of first EBS message were l excellent.' ) Public and Media Relations. The public and media relation actions were acceptable, however, pub lic education programs and rumor control procedures i need imp r ov em en t. Public education pa=phlets were mailed and received by race payers, but apparently were not ef fective, because the pub lic as a whole seemed to have a general lack of knowledge of radiological emergency prepared- ] ness. People who do not pay utility bills directly, such as some tenants, may not have rec eiv ed the pamphlets. Emergency information was not po s t ed, nor was it printed in the telephone bock. Accident Assessment. Accident as se s sme nt. capabilities were ev alua ted I as acceptable but some deficiencies are noted. The radiological as se s sment l
14 instrumentation was good, except that the instrument used for measuring rad iciodine should be equipped with a silver-containing air filter. Pro-cedures for quickly mea sur ing contamination in liquid samples are needed. Projected dose calculations were good, and field monitoring teams were well trained and capable. The ability to recommend protective actions based on the protective action guidelines was well demonstrated. Actions to Protect the Public. Overall, the Westchester County person-nel demonstrated an acceptable capability to protect the public by implement-ing protective measures. Improvements are needed in the details of the procedures fo r relocating resid ent s who do not hav e pr iv ate vehicles, in protecting mobility-impaired perans, and in dealing with po tential imped i-ments to evacuation. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control. Mo st of the health, medic al, and exposure control capabilities were weak. The 24-hour capability to determine exposures of emergency workers was weak because of instrumentation i j problems, while decontamination procedures were weak primarily because of a l l l lack of adequate waste disposal, especially for liquid wastes. Control of access to evacuated areas was good, and maintenance of dose records was good. Action levels that require decontamination procedures were well i established. Recovery and Reentry Operations. Simulated reentry operations made it appear that the capability to recover and reenter exists. l Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience. Participants felt that the exercise was a good learning exyn unce. l i 5. Su=marv: Rockland County Emergency Oeerations Facilities and Resources. The f acilitie s at the Rockland County EOC vere weak. Significant deficiencies were noted relating to external and internal communications, leadership in the EOC, and space a l lo t tment. Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f. The capability for 11erting and mobilization of staf f from the EOC was weak. De ficiencie s were noted related to the lack of telephone lines and staf f to perform initial calling. Backup staff was also lacking. Overall improv ement in communica-tions is needed.
a 15 Emergency Operations Management. Organizational control, le ad ership, and decision making were acceptable. However, e f fec tiv e management of the EOC by one individual was not. demonstrated. More familiarity is-needed with response procedures. Public Alerting and Notification. Initial notification of the public wa s we ak, primarily because of siren system malfunction. Activation of the EBS station and issuance of the first EBS message were well coordinated. EBS messages were professionally coordinated, cleared, and issued. Public and Media Relations. Media capabilities were acceptable. However, public. awareness of a public education brochure wa s low. Rumor control needs to be strengthened. There may be a need to translate 'the brochure in order to reach non-English-speaking individuals. Accident Assessment. Accident assessment capabilities were weak. Poor I communication systems contributed to problems in this area.. Field monitoring teams need more training with their instruments. The role of the county representative at the EOF needs to be better defined. Actions to Protect the Publi_c_. Capabilities for protection of the public were good. Evacuation and decontamination were well demonstrated. Health. Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. These activities were well demonstrated. Facilities were good and well staf fed. Recovery and Reentry Operations. The capability of the EOC for recov-ery and reentry was good, as demonstrated by simulation. Ac tivities in the field were not observed, due to the shortness of the scenario. Relevance of the Experience. Lack of involvement by some local agen-cies reduced the effectiveness of the exercise. The inclusion of a simulated wind shift in the scenario was good, but the county's computer analysis system was not used during the exercise. The exercise id en t i fied areas that would benefit from additional-training and better equipnent. 6. S ummarv: orange County Emergenev Oeerations Facilities and Resources. The facilities at the Orange County Emergency Operating Center (EOC) were evaluated as acceptable, j i 1 i
i i l 16 Some deficiencies were noted, particularly with the commun ic a t ion system linking Orange County with the other counties. In te rnal commun ic a tions systems could also be improved. Maps and displays were generally good. Acceptable security was provided. Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff. The overall capa-bility fo r alerting and mobilization was evaluated as we a k, based u po n ' a d e ficiency in the ke y element of 14-hour shift change c apab il it y. Backup personnel did not demonstrate sufficient knowledge in all essential areas. The remaining elements in this category we r e in general ad equa te ly demon-strated, although poor commun ic at ions between agencies in the EOC led to difficulties in establishing a-cess control points. i Emergency Oeerations Management. Organizational control, leadership, decision making and support by officials we re ac ce ptab le. Pe r fo rmanc e was a f fec ted by internal commun ic a tions in the EOC, which d epended upon hand-carrying messages between rooms in the facility. Briefing of agencies was { sporadic and written updates were not always available. Reception centers, congregate care facilities, and the decontamination center were well staf fed and organized. Public Alerting and Notification. Public alerting and notification were weak, due primarily to the unsatis f ac tory per formance o f t he siren system. The EBS war 1ctivated in a timely manner. The first EBS message was coordinated with the siren sounding. Procedures for issuing EBS messages were good. 1 Public and Media Relations. The capability for dealing with the med ia wa s good. Rumor control needs to be strengthened. Pub lic educ a t ion programs also should be strengthened. Accident Assessment. Ca pab il it ie s for ac c id en t a s s e s sm e n t were rated as acceptable. De fic iencie s noted included the failur e of the field monitoring teams to carry ful1 instrumentation. Actions to Protect the Public. Means for sheltering or evacuating the public were evaluated as good. All observed f acilities were well staf fed. Lack of data on r ad ic io d ine levels in the field were believed to affect decisions for public protection.
l 1 \\ 1 17 Health, Medical, and Exoosure Control Measures. Procedures for medical treat =ent and exposure control were ev alua ted as acceptable. De ficiencie s noted includ ed the lack of provision for d is po sal of contaminated wastes. ) Hospital personnel need additional training. Permanent dose recording instru-ments were not available for emergency workers. ) Recoverv and Reentry. Recovery and reentry procedures were evaluated j as weak. The significant deficiency related to the lack of full simulation l by participants. Relevance of the Experience. Th e exercise seemed to provide an acceptable level of experience. One d rawb ack noted was that some response teams were not fully tested, while others were tested on skills that we re considered routine. l l l 7. Summarv: Putnam County Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources. The working space in j the Putnam County EOC was cramped, which resulted in some minor discomfort to the staff. The overall functioning of the EOC was good in spite of the small I size, because the management was good. Commun ic at ion systems were good, and had good backup. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff. Putnam County i demonstrated an acceptable capability for alerting and mobilizing officials and staff. The procedures used would have been ef fective at any time during the day or night, and resulted in a prompt and timely activation of the EOC and field monitoring teams. A capability for continuous operations 24 hours per day was well demonstrated by executing a shift change and by exhibiting liset of backup personnel. This shift change revealed that two key people, the CD Director and the radiological defense (RADEF) officer, do not hav e adequate backup. An emergency generator was not available in the event of j power failure. j l l Energencv Oeerations Management. The management of the Putnam County EOC was very good and was well supported by elected of ficials. Many specific organiz2tions had well-defined roles and demonstrated good pe r f o rm an c e. 1,eadership was excellent and support by the RACES organization was excellent. I l l
I I la I Public Alerting and Notification. Pub lic alerting and notification were weak, due primarily to the un sa t is f ac to ry pe r fo rmanc e o f t he siren s, stem. Ac t iv a t ion of the EBS station and issuance of first E3S message v were good. Other ESS messages we re cleared and issued on a timely basis. j Some route alerting by police and fire vehicles was simulated but no PA announcements we re made. De ficiencies were noted in the ability to notify the transient po pul at ion. 1 Public and Media Relations. Th e c apab il it y for pub lic and medta relations in Putnam County was acceptable overall. Public education brochures ) we - s mailed to the public, and pub lic training courses we re giv en by the fire department and RACES personnel. Nevertheless, there appears to be a need l for additional education to help the public understand protective actions and j I ERPA cones. The PIO o f ficer had good access to all information, and prepared 1 l timely and appropriate releases. There was no evid ence of a coordinated 1 e f fort to identify and control rumors. Accident Assessment. Ac cid ent as sessment *capab ilities were evaluated as acceptable; however, some deficiencies were noted. Initial projections of radiological exposure were made independently in a timely manner and confirmed the utility projections. Field mon,oring teams were promptly d eployed, and i l were very competent. The instrumentation for whole body gamma ray was good. However, there was no capab ilit y for measuring rad io iod ine. Silver-load ed filters are needed to provide capability for measuring radioiodine. Actions to Protect the Public. Putnam County d emons t r at ed a good capability to protect the pub l ic. Roadblocks we re set up promptly. Orders were given in a timely manner for the actions to simulate sheltering and then evacuation. A bus load of students was evacuated (in ac tuality) to the congregate care center in Dutchess County. Th i s wa s we ll done. The congre-gate care centers were well located, well staf fed, and well equipped. The ir procedures were good; however, the radiation monitoring personnel could bene fit from additional training. Health. Medical, and Excesure Control. Ov e r al l, the health, med ic al, and exposure control actions were acceptable, with the exception of the pr oc edur e s for ul tima t e dis po sal of contaminated liquids. Direct read ing
19 l dosimeters supplied to emerg ency wo rker s had appropriate ranges and sensi-t iv it ie s. Re ad ing s were made and r ec o rd ed frequently, and the results reported by radio to the EOC. No permanent-record dosimeters were provided. Procedures for approval of exposure of emergency workers in excess of protec-tion action guides need to be clarified. Ac t ion levels for decontamination procedures were known. Recovery and Reenerv Operations. Reentry operations were demonstrated by simulation only. An acceptable capability for reentry and recovery appears to exist. Relevance of the Exercise Experience. There was un an imous ag reeme nt very beneficial to the part ic ipan t s, all o f whom took that the exercise was the exercise very seriously and per fo rmed as if the powe r plant accid ent actually occurred. i 1 ) i i 1
y 20-III. EXEECISE SCENARIO The scenario pr ov id ed a simulated series of events on-site that resulted in all four classes of energency conditions being declared. In turn, i these conditions. triggered of f-site response ac tions (or simulations). An overview of the sequence of emergency cond it ions, maj or events, and their approximate tbnes of occurrence is sunmarized below. EVENT TIME (EST) ] Notification of unusual event 735 Notification of alert 8 15 District Of fice begins staffing 830 Notification of site-area emergency 906 counties activate all emergency workers 9 15 Activate emergency news center. 920 Notice to Brewster congregate care center 1002 Sirens activated 1012 EBS message aired 10 15 General emergency declared 1025 Reactor shuts down automatically 1030 Brewster congregate care center functional 1030 j Sheltering of selected ERPAS ordered 1055 State emergency declared - 1134 j EBS message of general emergency 1150 J Evacuation ordered for ERPA 16,18 1153 Evacuation ordered for ERPA 1, 2, 7, 8 & 44 1200 i Wind shift 1215 i ] Sheltering ordered for ERPA 24, 26, 45, 46 1215 Downgrade to site area emergency 1509 q Simulate elapse of 3 days Lnplenent. recovery procedures 1558 Exercise terminated 1615 Ihe timetable of exercise ev ent s was for the most part withheld fr om of f-site participants. However, the exercise date and the general cine of the j first exercise ev en t was known, since demonstrations of response functions using volunteers require some advance administ rativ e preparations, s uch as-t ime o f f fr om wo rk, e tc. i i i i e i e
21 IV. EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMF.NDATIONS 1. State Emergenev Ooerations Facilities and Resources EOC facilities at Albany and at t h a. Southern District in Poughkeepsie were good, with only minor de ficiencie s. Displays were well placed and frequently updated; however, additional caps are needed in the Albany EOC to show data such as populations in emergency response planning areas (ERPAs) and the location of county field sampling points. Th e commun ic a tions between state and local accident a s se s sment teams were weak. Internal commun ic at ions were gccd. Public in fo rmation arrange-ments were also good. l l Re commend at ions : l Communications systems between the state EOCs and other l e l EOCs should be improved. (Re ference FL' REC-0654, II.F.) l Additional maps for displaying populations within ERFAs e and field sampling locations should be provided in the Albany EOC. (Re ference NUREC-0654, J 10.a) i 1 Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff The procedures and actions for alerting and mobilization of of 0icials l and staf f were good. State EOCs were promptly staf fed, and 24-hour response capability was demonstrated. RACES operators in Albany were well prepared for l pr ov id in g assistance in notifying emergency personnel. At the Southern District, computerized calling of emergency workers was a good feature. Emergenev Oeerations Manatiennt Organization, lead er ship, and decision making were good at the ICCs. Procedures and authority for requesting federal assistance were also good. However, it appeared that there was not enough feedback to agency represer.ca-tives from the decision makers.
22 Re commend at ion: State support agencies should be given more involvement e in the exercise. Public Alerting and Notification nese functions were not observed at the state EOCs. Public and Media Relations At the' Albany EOC press facilities, media briefings, and news releases vere good. ne media spokesperson performed very well; however, some. press questions regarding. dose rates were not answered immed iate ly. At Joint Media Center, state PIOS and staf f demonstrated a high level.of ability. ne state is committed to coordinating a joint n umber system for support o f rumor control during an actual emergency. A review of county EBS messages and news releases indicates that in a limited number of instances information in news releases more properly should have been contained in EBS messages. Bis occurrence could adversely e f fect overall PIO operations. Re commendations: In conjunction with county PIOS, criteria should be e developed to determine what type of information will be issued via EBS and what type via news releases. Procedures for quickly activating rumor-control e telephone ntsnbers and procedures should be formalized. Accident Assessmenc Ac cid ent asseasment procedures were good overall. Mo re pl ot t ing and display of dose calculation and field data would be beneficial for. decision making pur po se s, ne state did not demonstrate their ~ own independent field monitoring capability. Be field data reported by the county were not suf-ficient for confirmation of dose projections. 1.ack of computing capability slowed dose calculations; however, procedures for calculating doses were 1 adequate.
i g .i Recommendation: Additional calculating equipment should be considered to e expedite d ~t calculations. e The sese may wish to consider its own field monitoring capabilsty which would allow the state to make an'inde-pendent accident assessment. l Actions to Protect the Public Sheltering and evacuacion procedures cere not observed at the state 1 .f EOCs. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures These activities were not observed at the state EOCs. Recovery and Reentry. Short-range recovery and reentry procedures appeared to be adequate. It was more dif ficult to assera the value of the longer-range planning descri-bed by the state. Co nsideration has been given to long-term environmental ef fects. i i Relevance of the Exercise Experience Participants felt that the exercise was beneficial for training and for gaining more familiarity with the emergency plan. The use o f simulated meteorology reduced the - realism of the exercise. Some participants also felt I the rapid pace of events in the scenario was not realistic. It was also noted that winter-time exercises greatly reduced the role of agricultural agencies. .j 1 t l.-
24 2. Emergenev Oeerating Facility (EOF) Emergenev Operations Facility and Resources The Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) in Buchanan, New York, was evaluated as accept =M e, with deficiencies noted that wo uld limit e f fec tiv e l performance. Space allotted to the EOF was considered insuf fic ient, and the two-lev al structure was inconvenient. The communications system in the dOF also needed improvemen t. . Backup telephone lines are need ed for the state and I counties. De audible intercom system was felt to be detrimental to opera-tions. In ternal commun ic a t ions need to be improved to reduce reliance on hand-written messages. Although the REC line to the EOCs allowed good con-tact, little feedback was observed from the EOCs to the EOF. l Displays and status updates were adequate but little information was J displayed on state and county actions. i Re commend at ions : More space is needed for effective display of information in e the ~.0F, and a single-floor area would ease communications. I The communications system needs improvement, and backup l e telephone lines should bt-nailable (Re ference NUREG-0634, I1.F) l Alerting and Mobilization uf Of ficials and Staff 1 Staffing, 24-hour response capability, and alerting capability were evaluated as acceptable, with deficiencies listed below thac limited ef fective pe r fo rmanc e. Be state and county responses were acceptable. Feedback of in fo rma tion from the state and counties to the EOF was insufficient. Information on the state's evacuation ef forts in response to the utility recom=endations was delayed. Backup staf f capability was adequately demonstrated.
25 Recommendation: e Improvement is needed in the flow of information back to the EOF from state and local response organizations. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II. F) Emergency Oeerations Management The organization, leadership, and dec ision-making capabilities were evaluated as good for the state with some minor deficiencies, t.nd acceptable for the counties, vich deficiencies noted that limited ef fective performance. More definition of the county representatives' roles at the EOF was needed. l l Good briefiags were held by the utilit" director. Ut ility functions we re per forud very smoothly. II Closer contact was needed between engineering staff at the EOF and at the technical support center to ensure timely and accurate information ex-l change. Also, state and county repre.sentatives should have been made aware of 1 the basis for RECS messages. l l Re commend at ions : The role of county representatives at the EOF needs e better definition. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.B.6) I Public Alerting and Notification 1 These activities were not observed at the EOF. Public and Media Relations These ac t iv it ie s were not ob serv ed at the EOF other than that the utility public information officer functioned well in providing information to the media center. f Accident Assessment Accident a s s e s sment capabilities were evaluated as acceptable, with deficiencies noted that limited ef fective performance. Com=unication of field monitoring data to the EOF was erratic. i i 1 l l 1 I 1 .-.____-___-_a
26 l Scace repr esent a t iv e s at the EOF communicated their dose calculations y well to the state EOCs; however, integrated dose e s t ima te s were-performed by f the utility only. Rec ommend ation: Response time for analyzing. changes in dose calculation e parameters should be shortened. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8) Actions to Protect the Public These activities were.not observed at the EOF. Health, Medical, and Excesure Control Measures These activities were not observed at the EOF. Recoverv and Reentrv Operations These activities were not observed at the EOF. Relevance of the Exercise Exeerience The exercise was felt to be of benefit to the participants.
i I 27 l l 3. Vestchester County 4 Emereenev Ooerations k Overall, the f ac il itie s, resources, s ;.a c e, internal communications, displays, sad security we re good, and only minor deficiencies were noted. The Westchester County emergency operating center (EOC) is locatcd in l l the County office Building, 148 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York. The location in the sub-basement area pt ovides excellent protection and security for the emergency workers. The small working space in the EOC was adequate because it was divided into four work areas. Separate rooms are provided for radio communications, for the accid ent a s se s sment function, and for management personnel. The fourth room was the large outer room. This contained work tables for the many agency participants and provides wall space to display maps, status boards, etc. Some of the observers considered this outer main room to be too crowded. One thought that the noise level was too high. All four of these rooms were well lighted and well ventilated. The overall per fo rmanc e of the several communications systems was good. A dedicated executive hot line was used between state and local govern-1 l ments, with the exception of Orange County. The Orange County executive hot { line was not functioning because of e quipment problems. Backups for the i system were a radio network, the commercial telephone, and the RACES systems. ] l Th e bulk of the communications from the EOC was sent by commercial celephone (notification, transmitting orders to county workers, etc.). Excess commercial telephone line capacity was demonstrated to be available. Eackup y for these calls relied heavily on the RACES system. The RACES organization provided a superb communications support. Co==unications with federal agencies was adequate. l l i
t 28 A need fo r better commun ic at ions between the ' nuclear facility and i Westchester 50C was id en t ified. The plant data on release rates, meteorolo-gical conditions, etc., were not always complete. Some data bypassed the county representative et the EOF. i Internal commun ic a tions within the EOC were_ good. For example, messages were promptly logged and. d is t r ib ut ed to the proper personnel; plant status, release data, and monitoring data were displayed and updated on a status board; and periodic briefings ke pt the entire staf f well in fo rmed. l Displays and maps in the EOC were well organized in general; however, i the population distribu ion map was available at the EOF instead of in the EOC. Some clarification is needed on who has the responsibility for posting information on the displays. The security was very good because two policemen were stationed at the only entrance to the EOC. The location of the security check point - 1 caused some inconvenience, since adequate coilet facilities were not available l inside the secured area. Recommend a t io ns : The arrangement of cables and the locations for each emergency e worker in the EOC should be reviewed in order to minimize the impact of the small space on the operation of the EOC. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.H.3) A dedicated line between the EOF and the EOC should be a installed to improve ccumunications. (Re ference E' REG-0654, 'l II.F.1.d) Orange County EOC executive hot line should be made opera-e tional to that all the county EOCs can communicate with each other readily (e.g., Orange with Westchester). (Re fe renc e l WREG-0 6 54, II. F.1.d ) A population distribution map should be displayed in the EOC. e (Re ference EREG-0654, II.J.10.b) i Sackup com=unications systems and procedures should be i e reviewed to reduce dependence on the commercial telephone l system, since this may be overloaded in a real emergency. (Re ference WREG-0654, II.F.1.e) l e It is recommended that workers in the EOC wear identification badges that give their names, their organizations (e.g., Red Cross, ccc.) and their functions, in order to expedite the flow o f messages and orders. (Re ference WREG-0654, II.H.3) l i l 1 i t
29' Alertine and Mobilization Westchester County demonstrated a very good capability for alerting emergency workers, with only minor deficiencies noted. Most of the EOC staff had two-way radios to receive the emergency calls. Telephone lists of backup personnel were available. Manning of the EOC was very prompt, and the arrival of each staff member was recorded on a special display board. A county representative was alerted and dispatched to the utility's EOF in a timely manner. The field radiological monitoring teams were alerted s.nd dispatched by radio from the police department headquarters. Th e y we r e d eployed promptly. Th e several procedures for alerting and mobilizing the emergency workers were ef fectively demonstrated. These procedures would have functioned I at any time during the day or night because of the backup methods of communi-c a t io n. A detailed write-up of these alerting and mobilization procedures l should be included in the emergency plan document. l A good capability for staf fing the EOC 24 hours a day was demonstrated by performing a shif t change at the EOC. This was accomplished very smoothly. A 24-hour c apab il it y for staffing the field monitoring teams was not de=on- ) strated; however, each field team knew its backup personnel. l The Social Services staff at the EOC noted a potential shortage of l personnel for staffing all of the reception centers to the level required in ] l an actual emergency, should the emergency start on a weekend. i Re commend at ions : l l More detailed alerting and mobilization procedures should l e j be included in the written plan. (Re ference NlTREG-0654, l II.E.2, H.4) l l Emergenev Operations Management Emergency operations management at the Westchester EOC was very l good, with only minor deficiencies noted. The org anization, control, leader-ship, and support by elected officials was good. It was quite ev id ent that many spec t iic organizations had been given r e,l e s in the overall emergency response.
- h e y kn ew their roles and r e s po n-sibilities and participated ef fectively in the exercise.
l
30 1.eadership was we ll defined 'at several l ev e l s'. The - County Executive l cook an active role, and was clearly in charge of the EOC. Ind iv id u a l organizations ( e.g., Health, Red Cross) each had their own representative. in charge'of that function. Accident assessment was well staffed and strongly led. The staf f was kept up to date by periodic brie fings by the Co un t y - Ex ec u t iv e and by periodic reports by'the leaders' o f each participating-organization. The EOC used the emergency classifications used by the utility. Public Alert'and Notification Some of the actions taken for public alerting and notification' were q acceptable. Those that were weak ' and in need. of sub st antial improvement 'l include pe r f o rm anc e of the siren system and the ability to notify the-transient po pul ation. The We stchester EOC received the notice 'of a site area emergency and verified it. A message for the EBS was prepared by the Westchester PIO in the Joint Media Center, and was coordinated with the other county and state PI0s in the EOC. The siren' system was then ac tivated. some observers heard the sirens very well, some heard them to be weak, and some did not hear 'them at all. No route-alerting activity was reported. L The EBS message followed the sirent by three minutes and wa's promptly broadcast by the radio statious. The E3S messages listed by number the Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPA) that were af fected by the simul ated tmergency. Sample checks by observers indicated 'a lack of public understand-ing of the ERPA zones. A check of the schools indic ated that the majority of them had been ~ notified. However, Lakeland School District. was netified but did not con-tact the school districts they were assigned to in f o rm.. There was no means l established to verify whether school districts were contacted. I Mo s t of the residents had r ec e iv ed pamphlet s. d ist ributed by the utility. Three of the motels and one nursing home visited by an observer were not aware of the pamphlets, while others had rec e iv ed.. chem. Th e r e wa s a lack o f knowledge of procedures for notifying the transients, especially those in business establishments. l
l i 31 A review o f county EBS messages and news releases indicated that i ) in i limited number o f cases information in news releases more p r o pe,r l y l should have been cont.a ined in EBS messages. All of ficial emergency public in fo rma t ion pertaining to,eb l ic safety should be broadcast on ISS. Th e public has been advised tha. E3S is the sole source for o f ficial emergency public in fo rma t ion. l Recommend at ions : l Test measurements of sound levels should be made throughout ] e the 10-mile EP3. Modification and/oi additions should then i ~ be made until the system meets the notification requirements. l (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.E.6, J.10.F) l Route-alerting procedures and messages should be developed l e co supplement the siren system, especially in those areas l of low siren-sound levels. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.E.6, j J.10.c) Intense ef forts should be made to make the public aware of o l the meaning of the siren signals. (Re ference NUREC-0654, II.G.1) A very complete educational campaigu regarding ERPAs should e be Unplemented that includes distribution of detailed maps showing these areas. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10. a, G.1) l Criteria should be developed, in conjunction with the state e and the other counties, to determine the type o f information to be issued via EBS and the type to be issued via news j releases. l l l Public and Media Relations l l Overall, public and media relations were acceptabic, with some defi-1 ciencies noted. Public education programs need improv ement. Pub lic in f o rm a t io n pamphlets were cailed to residents recently. Questions asked the pub lic by FEMA observers during the exercise confirred a general lack of understanding of evacuation zones. The We stchester County public information o f ficer had access to all of the information available at the EOC and the ECF. The information released was t imely and concise. Westchester County was re sponsib le for coordinating all E35 messages from the other counties. Th e Jo in t Me d ia Facility (JMF) was the point of contact with the press. Th e JMF d id not have ad eoua te space or equipment, including maps and l
32 charts. Its location, about one mile SSW of the plant, is of some concern, since under certain wind conditions it might be in a contaminated zone poten-tially requiring evacuation. The alternative JMF location is in White Plains, and might not be conveniently reached und er certain cond it ions, for similar reasons. Br ie fing s in the media center were not always announced, and not all impo r tant briefings were attended by the Pios. Fo r example, when PASNY announced the site area emergency at 9 :20 a.m., only the utility was present, and at the 11:26 a.m. briefing only PASNY and Westchester County were pr esent. A coll-free in fo rma tio n number was listed in the PASNY brochure fo r rtm ar control. Two phone numbers were also available in Westchester County for referring rumor inquiries to appropriate personnel. Re commend at ions : Additional public education is needed so that the public e will understand the locations of the areas that are to take protective actions, and will know how to carry out the i protective actions. Consideration should be given to f ascertain whether a significant number of peeple did not receive the pamphlets. If this is the case, additional distribution should be made. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10. a, G.1 ) A new location for the JMF, with adequate space and equip-e ment, that is outside the 10-mile EPI, should be established. (Re ference NUREG-0634, II.G.3.a) County PICS should attend all major media briefings, e i i Accident Assersment Ac c id ent assessment c apabilit ie s were ev alua ted as acceptable, with some deficiencies noted. Methods for measuring radiciodine need to be j improved, and procedures for quickly determining contamination levels in liquid samples need to be addressed. Re l e a s e rates and meteorological cata measured at the plant were t used by the Westchester County accident a s se s sm en t personnel to make initial projections of the radiological exposures expected. The **e stchester EOC had excellent maps and an extensive set of transparent overlays to help determine f f these projections. Th e ab ility to calculate projected doses rapidly was de=enstrated. l l
33 Field monitoring teams were dispatched promptly by the RADEF o f ficer, with commun ic a t ion prov id ed by the polic e r ad io. Data from the field teams were transmitted to the EOC by radio in a timely manner. The field monitoring equipment for measuring whole-body gamma-ray ex po s ur e races was excellent, and covered a wide range of potential exposure rates. Monitoring equipment for measuring rad ic iod ine was in ad equa t e, due to the use of a charcoal filter medium in the air sampling equipment, which limited its functional utility. This filter collects the noble gases as well as iod ine. Therefore, the readings do not meet the requirements of NlTREG-0 634. The use of a silver zeolite filter instead of charcoal greatly l reduces the collection of the noble gases. The number of read ing s that the field teams could make was limited primarily by tr avel time from one sample po int to another. Nevertheless, if the sampling teams were very e f ficiently deployed, it appears that data could be obtained in a short t ime, so that the BOC could make an early independent assessment. The ac c id ent assessment room in the EOC was the central collection po in t fo r field samples. Sample media were begged, labeled, and returned to the EOC when the field teams reported back near the end of the exercise. The accid ent as se s sment personnel in the EOC d emonst r a ted that they could calculate gmtma dose rates and doses from iodine from the data trans-l mitted from the field temss. They also d emon s t r a t ed an abilicy to recommend I pro t e c t iv e actions based on the pro tec t iv e action guides. These recommended l actions verified the state recommendations. Rec ommend a t ions : s Silver zeolice filters should be used in the air sampling equi; cent that is used for measuring radiolodine. NOTE: Charcoal filters may be used during drills and exercises, but the silver zeolite filters must be in the instrument l kits ready for use in an actual emergency. (Re ferenc e NL*R EG-0 634, II.I.9) ~'he sequence of sample points used (routes driven by the e monitoring teams) should be carefully chosen to give the maximum amount of data for use in making the early in-j d epe nd ent a s s e s sm en t. (Re fe renc e N1,* REG-0654, II.I.8) i I 1 i l
,,.,,w-34 '
i The number of samples needed for an independent. early. e a s se s sment, and the possible hinderances to fast deployment ~ o f the field monitoring teams, should be reviewed to assess the possible need for additional field monitoring teams. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8) Procedures should be developed for obtaining the field data e measured by the utility's field monitoring team in a timely manner. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8) Actions to Protect the Public Overall, the We sc he s ter County personnel demonstrated an ' acceptable capability. to protect the public by. implementing _ protective measures. Some deficiencies-were noted that limited ef fective performance.- Improvements are needed in the areas ' of relocating the po pulac e, protecting the mob ilit y-impaired, and dealing with potential impediments to evacuation. Police personnel staf fed all but one of the traffic control point s called for in the exercise. Traffic control point "F" wa s staffed by city police approximately 40 minutes after the sirens were sounded. Traffic control. point "E" was staf fed by the State Police I hour and 30 minutes after the sirens were sounded. Traf fic control point "G" was not staf fed during the time that the observer waited at the location. No' explanation for these delays was discovered. Police ' personnel indicated that there may be a lack of enough trained police to staf f all of the.traf fic control points in addition to other duties. Capabilities that were not : demonstrated, nor called for by the scenario, but which may be associated with general vehicular evacuation,- include capabilities to handle auto accidents, breakdowns, severe road ' condi-tions, and supply of gasoline. Bus transportatie,n is extensive in Westchester County, and is a'n l important part of the evacuation plan, espacially. for school children and 'for -l people without priv ate aut omob iles. Six bus -companies participated in the 1 drill. Five of these had radios in their buses while one depended on periodic celephone calls to the dispatcher. A total of six evacuation routes were run with the buses. Several problems sur fac ed during the evacuation tests. Be t ter maps and/or in s t ruc t ion s would exped it e the evacuation by bus to the reception centers. The use of fixed stops and uncertain times to pick up passengers j 2hould be reevaluated, especially for those routes that use ' narrow, hilly i
35 roads. The lack of radio dispatch on some buses may delay the use of those buses once evacuation has been ordered. There is a need for more substantial plans for bus suppo rt -- i.e., memoranda.of understanding with bus companies. Evacua t io n capabilities fo r the mob ilit y-impaired, e spec ially those l instutionally confined, we re not adequately demonstrated. One bus had a plat fo rm for loading a wheel chair, but the relatively long load time and the I lack of a radio restricted its usefulness. Reception centers we'r e located well out side of the 10' mile EPZ. At the-John Jay High School reception center, the facilities were good; the procedures were good; the supplies and equipment were good; the' staffing was good; and a capability for 24-hour operation was' simulated by identifying backup personnel. The radiation monitoring and decontamination personnel had acceptable instrumentation, but questioning indicated that additional training is needed. Monitoring and decontamination actions would be expedited ' by additional training in the characteristics of radiation, in methods of measur-ing radiation, in procedures for surveying, and in action levels that require decontamination procedures. One bus we i routed to the Harrison High School. vhich was not desig-nated as a reception center for this exercise. Questioning of the ' school staf f revealed that they were not aware that their school had been designated as a reception center in the county plan. The School Superintendent's Of fice at Peekskill and at Croton demon-strated an ability to protect the school, children by ' implementing emergency procedures in a timely manner. l Recoceend at ions : e Proced res for staf fing traf fic control points is a timely manner need to be reviewed and strengthened. (Re ferenc e NUREG-0654, II.J.10.j) Procedures for dealing with impediments to evacuation need to ~ e be developed and exercised. These impediments include auto accidents, auto breakdowns, severe road conditions, and the unavailability of gasoline when needed. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.k) 4
- _ = 36 All buses used for evacuation should be equipped with radios e for dispatching. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J 10.g) Suses used for evacuation should be supplied better maps and e instructions concerning the routes and the location of the i reception centers. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a, J.10.g) Procedures and equipmeni for the evacuation of the mobility-- e impaired need to be improved. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.d) Additional training is needed for the reception center per-e sonnel who do radiation surveying and decontamination. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.12) Health, Medical, and Exoosure Control Most of the measures for health, medical, and exposure control were weak, and significant deficiencies were noted. The 24-hour capability for deter nining exposures of emergency workers was weak bucause of instrumentation problems. The decontamination procedures were also weak, primarily because o f a lack of adequate waste disposal, especially for liquid wastes. The policy of the Department of Health of the State of New York is that no potassium iodide will be distributed. The control of access to ev acua t ed areas was good. Simulated road-blocks were manned in a timely manner by personnel who understood their function. 1 Exposure of emergency workers was monitored by self-reading dostmaters. ) Most of these instruments had a range of 0-200 Rem, and were not sufficiently sensitive for accurately measuring the allowable exposures. Exposure of 1 Rem j is required to be re ported to the ECC. No permanent-record devices ~ ( e.g., film badge, TLD) were provided. Emergency workers were provided with a dose-record card on which they recorded dosimeter readings frequently. In addition, field survey workers were required to report their dosimeter readings periodically to the EOC by :adio. Ac t ion levels that require decontamination procedures were'well established and were posted. Ihe action level was 0.1 Rem /hr.
o 37 Transportation of a r ad io log ic al accident v ic t im from the plant l co a hospital was well demonstrated. Th e transport wa s t imely and the procedures were designed to l imit the spread of contamination and to make the decontamination of equipment easier to accomplish. On ar r iv al, the hospital staf f demonstrated good procedures for caring for the patient. { Decontamination procedures at the State Police Troop K Headquarters l were adequate. However, the liquid contaminated wastes generated by the decontamination were not properly disposed of. Th e solid contaminated wastes (e.g., clothing) were collected for ultimate disposal. Some of the monitoring equi;: ment was in need of recalibration. 1 i Re c ommend at ions : I Mo re sensitive self-read ing dosimeters (e.g., 0-200 mrem, e 0-20 Rem) should be provided to emergency workers. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.a) e Permanent record dosimeters (e.g., film badge, TLDs) should be provided to emergency workers. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.a) Methods for permanently disposing of contaminated liquid l e and solid wastes need to be developed for the decontamina-l tion centers. (Re ferences NURIG-0654, II. K. 5.b ) Monitoring equipment should be recalibrates periodically e according to the schedules set forth in the plan (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.H.10) i Recoverv and Reentry Oeerations Reentry operations were demonstrated in simulation only, but it I appested that the capability to recover and reenter exists. Th e county radiation monitoring teams were kept in the field until the l simulated radiation levels d iminished to near background. The ac c id en t a s s e s sment team reviewed the exposure data before r ecommend ing the beginning o f reentry. Re e n t r y processes were f ac ilit a ted by the simulated reversal of numerous protective and mobilization actions. Th e congregate-care center had a good understanding of plans to assist in the reentrv. I 1 I
38 Rec ommend a t ion: Future exercise scenarios should provide more time for a e detailed reentry activity. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.M.1) Relevance of the Exercise Experience Participants felt the exercise encour ag ed them to become more familiar with the plan, helped point out deficiencies (which will lead to resolution of identified problems), was a good learning experience, and provided training for their primary and backup teams. Th e scenario was considered very timely and of benefit to most participants.
39 '4 Rockland County Emergency Oeerations Facilities and Resource The facilities of the Rockl and County EOC ' we re evaluated as we ak ; significant deficiencies were noted, as described in the following paragraphs. The Rockland County Emergency Operating Center (EOC) is located Lin the Fire Training Center in Pomona, New York. Space provided for the center was adequate for accommodating all participating organizations. However, the space - allotted for the ac c id ent assessment room was cramped, which severely limited the number of people who could participate in these activities; The arrang ement s for maps and for display of infomation were also adequate, although updating of some displays of information on the status. of 2 1 the situation was not frequent enough. ] External communications wre the weakest aspect o f the EOC. Ac t iv-icies in the accident assessment room were hampered by a lack of telephones, a poorly-functioning RECS line system, and insufficient support staff. A conference celephone in the command room provided an impo rtant communication link, but it did not include the utility or the EOF. Contact between the EOF and the Rockland EOC was established through an open telephone line, leaving only one other telephone in the accident assessment room fer receipt of in forma t ion. This telephone was needed to receive information that could not be received over the RECS line speaker phone. The State Police field communi-cation was also not effective for transmittal of messages between the basa and - the unit s. Initial internal commun ic at ion between the command recta, the accident a s se s sment room, and the general operating room was ~ weak, but impr ovement was noted as the day progressed. The of ficial message board was not updated with sufficient fr equenc y. Good security measures were used at the entrance.to the EOC, but the slowness in getting the system set up caused the room to remain closed until after 9:00 a.m., more than half an hour after the site area emergency.. Some security problems developed within the EOC during the day due to the large nu=ber of press and =edia representatives allowed in the roem; however, FDiA believes that this would not be allowed in an actual incident.
l 40 Rockland Co un ty demonstrated a good capability to - contact ' federal response organizations; however, it was noted that the Coast Guard and rail-road were contacted independently by all four counties and.the utility,. resulting in confused messages. Recommend ations: Substantial improvement is needed in equipment and pro-e cedures for external communication. The RECS line system needs to be made more reliable. Staff support is needed to relieve principals from phoning tasks. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.F.1.b) Consideration should be given to allotting more space to the e accident assessment room. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.H.3) A procedure is needed for keeping the operations-room staf f e better informed. It is sugFested that the operation log be updated frequently and circulated to provide a chrono-logical record of activities. The plan should be revised to coordinate contact between e the counties, the Coast Guard, the railroad, and other agencies where multiple contacting may also occur. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II F.1.c). Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff The capability for alerting and mobilization of staff from the EOC was evaluated as weak. Significant deficiencies were noted, as described in the following paragraphs. Ac tiv ation of the EOC was rather slow, and there was confusion in setting up security. While the laitial response was adequate, 24-hour c apability was not demonstrated for most functions. Fo r the radiological assessment o f fic er, backup would need to be provid ed by the state district o f fice. Insufficient staff was available fo r alerting and mobiliza tion of -emergency response personnel. There were weaknesses in communications due to j insufficient telephone lines and pe r sonnel to staff them. The police we r e l only able to communicate within their own county, resulting in lack of coordi-1 nation with other counties, j i l Dispatch of a representative to the EOF was achieved in a timely i manner. j i I i
41 I Recommendations: I Additional consideration should be.given to staf fing of e critical positions.by backup personnel. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.A.1.e). j .1 e More ef fective methMs are needed for initial call-out to emergency personnel. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.E.2). I Emergencv Operations Management Organizational control, leadership, support by officials, and decision making were evaluated as acceptable, with deficiencies noted that limited ef fective performance, as noted below. Command and control capabilities were lacking. Ef fective management of the emergency response by one individual was not demonstrated..In some-situations, key participants were not notified of changes in the status of the l situation. In the main operating room, verification of events came well after the command room received its information. Briefing sessions were infrequent. However, when held they were very good, and their use became more ef fective as the day progressed. Participants in the exercise had adequate wr it ten procedures, but j training in their use appeared. limited.
- Prompting by state controllers l
occurred on a number o f occasions, limiting the ability o f observers to evaluate personnel capabilities. l ~he County Executive was involved in ' the decision process. There was, i however, some dispute over decision making, e.g., between the sherif f and the S t ci t e Po lic e. Some local of ficials initially declined to participate in the exercise, citing a lack of previous training, but did participate to a limited degree. 1 In th( field, po lic e, the Sherif f, Fire Department personnel, and bus l-d rivers were ef fec tively managed. The State Police set up one road block j only. Th e bus company personnel were well ' trained, but should have r ad io s, i Re commend a tions : l More ef fective sanagement of the EOC is needed to ensure efficient operation. (Re ference Nt* REG-0654 II.A.l.d) Emergency staff would benefit from more f amiliarity with e the response procedures. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.A.l.b)
42 Public Alerting and Notification Means for public notification were ev aluated as we ak. Significant deficiencies were noted, as described below. The E35 system was used e f f ec tiv ely. EBS messages we r e concise and t ime l y. However, other aspects of alerting and notification were weak. Problems noted were as follows: a. The siren system was not fully functional, and no backup notification system was evident other than telephone contact to facilities such as nursing homes, b. Members of the public calling some of the emergency center telephone numbers were told that no information was av ail ab le. A check of six local schools indicatd that none had been c. called b,- emergency personnel. d. Although a brochure had been distributed to those living within 10 miles of the plant, members of the public who were interviewed were enaware of any instructions. Th e brochure may also be inef fective for informing the numerous Hispanic residents living within the EPZ. A review of county E3S messages and news releases indicated e. that in a limited number of instances information in news releases more properly should have been contained in EBS messages. All of ficial public information pertaining to public safety should be broadcast on EBS. The public had been advised that EBS i s the sole source for of ficial emergency public in fo rma t z en. Re commend ations : The ef festiveness of the initial public notification system e needs to be tested to determine whether the siren system will be suf ficient or wnether a backup notification system is needed. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.6.) Rumor control methods need to be strengthened. (Reference e NUREC-0654, II.G.2.G.). The public education program should be reviewed to determine e whether efforts are needed to knprove it s e f fec tiveness. (Re ference NCREG-0 654, II.G.2.) Criteria should be developed in conjunction with the state e and other counties to determine what type s o f in formation will be broadcast over EBS and what type will be issued in news releases.
_1.J 43 Public and Media Relations were evaluated as acceptable. De ficienc ie s that Media capabilities would limit ef fective performance are noted below. l The public i'n fo rma tion activities we re well coordinated between the 1 county EOC and the Media Center.- It should be noted that We stchester County responsible for coordinating all ESS messages from the ocier counties. was Although an information brochure had been distributed to the public two ] weeks before the exercise, awareness of it was low. No provisions were made l i for non English-speaking restdents in the area. 4 The Rockland County public information 'o f ficer' had access. to all of the in formation available at the EOC and the ECT. The information released was timely and concise. The Joint Media Facility (JMF) was the point of contact with the press. It s _ location,. about one mile SSW of the pl an t, is-of some concern, since under certain wind conditions it might be in a contaminated zone. The alternative JMF location in White Plains might not be conveniently reached under certain conditions, for similar ' reasons. There was not adequate space or equipment, inc.luding maps and charts. ] i 1 There was no evid enc e of coordinated arrangements to id entify and i control rumors. i i Re c ommend ations : Additional public education is needed so that the public e will understand the boundaries of the areas that are to take protective actions, and know how to carry out - the protective actions. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a, c.1) A new location for the JMF, with adequate space and equip-e ment, that is out side the 10-mile EFZ, should be established. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.G.3.a) Procedures should be developed for identifying rumors and e for dealing with them. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.4.c) Accident Assesament Accident assessment c apab ilitie s were evaluated a s we a k. Significant deficiencies were noted, as described below. l _-___-_-_-.----__-__w
44 The poor coc:munications system in the accident assessment room contri-buted to problems in this area. One field monitoring team was unable to communicate by radio. The field data were telephoned to the EOC, which relayed the data to the EOF. Due to inappropriate equipment, the EOF had to call the EOCs individually to repeat RECS line messages. A consistent dose assessment methodology had been previously established between state and county assessment teams; however, slowness in the communication system lessened the effectiveness of dose estimate comparisons. Vonitoring equipment for measuring radiciodine was inadequate due to the use cf a charcoal filter medium in the. sampling equipment, which limited its functional utility. This filter collects the noble gases as well as iodine, and therefore the readings do not meet the requirements of NUREG-0654. The use of silver zeolite filter instead of charcoal greatly reduces the collection of the noble gases. The field personnel did not demonstrate adequate familiarity with the field instrumentation. Communication with the central data collection point was dif ficult. Keports of radiation measurements at zero or background were sometimes not passed on to the other assessment centers. One monitoring team remained at one sampling point all morning and at a recond point all after-noon, so that their plume-tracking ability was not well demonstrated. Moni-toring teams effectively measured and recorded their individual exposures; however, use of TLDs for dose recording would have been easier. The role of the county representative at the EOF was not well defined. Inforsstion he received from the county was not passed on to the ECF.
- Also, the county represancative was bypassed by information flowing from the utility hotline.
Recoc:me nda tions : Silver zeolice filters should be used in the air sampling e equipment that is used for measuring radiciodine. NOTE: Ciarcoal filters may be used during drilis and exercises, but the silver zeolite filters must be in the instrument kits ready for use in an actual emergency. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.I.9) An improved cecmunications system is needed to suport e assessment activities and timely use of field data. (Re ference N1? REG-0654, II.F.1.d) l
O 45 Additional training of field teams would be beneficial e to increase their f amiliarity with equipnent and pro-cedures. Re s po n s ib il it ie s for field radioiodir.e j ) measurements should be clearly defined. ( Re fer enc e NUREC-0654, II.I.8,9) The duties of the county representative at the EOF ) e should be more clearly defined. (Re ference NUREG- ) 0654, II.C.2.a) l l Actions to Protect the Public 1 Capabilities in the EOC for protection of the public were evaluated as l i good. Only minor deficiencies were noted. j l Ac tions to protect the public were generally very good. Evacuation ) planning and execution were demonstrated without any major problems. Co ng r e-l l l gate-care centers pe r formed in an excellent manner. The Rockland County Psychiatric Center was well staf fed, large, and an excellent facility for mass care. However, the staf f would bene fit from on-the-job training. The personnel monitoring centers were well sta f fed, and employees followed established guidelines. However, workers who were monitoring for rad io ac t ive cont amin at ion need better training to pr ev ent the spread l of contamination to clean areas. Bus d riv e r s in the evacuation routes were well brie fed, but should be equipped with radios so that they could request aeditional help if necessary and obtain upd a te s on plant etacus. Bus dispatchers had good communication l inks to the EOC. Backup personnel were available. Ambulance and helicopter j evacuation were well demonstrated. Re c om=end a t ions : Although actions to protect the public were well demon-e strated, participation in regular exercises or drills is recommended to further beprove task performance. (Re f er ence KUREG-0654, II.N) All buses used for evacuation should be equipped with radios e for dispatching. (Re fe rence NUREG-0654, II.J.10.g) Health. Medical, and Exsosure Control Measures Health and medical measures were ev alua t ed as good; only minor defi-ciencies were noted.
46 The Rockland County Psychiatric Center provided excellent facilities, suppliet, and equipment. Additional training could improve operation of the center. Exposure of emergency workers was monitored by self-reading dosimeters. Field workers we re trained in their use and recorded. dosimeter readings at 15-minute in te rval s. However, no permanent-record devices (e.g., film badge, TLD) were provided. Procedures for ob taining appropriate authority for Decontamination level emergency exposure-of workers were well demonstrated. guidelines were well displayed. Good decontamination facilities were avail-able. Food contamination monitoring was carried out at the EOC. State police simulated control of evacuated - areas by setting up one roadblock, a less extensive response chan called for in the scenario. Re c ommend ations : On-the-job training would make procedures flow more e smoothly at the congregate care centers. Use of TLDs or film badges should be bnplemented for e recording of doses. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.3.a.) Recoverv and Reenerv Ooerations The capability of the EOC for recovery and rentry operations was eval-uated.as geod; only minor deficiencies were noted. Simulation of recovery and reentry was well carried out at the EOC. F.ach agency was given specific re s ponsib ilit ie s. No field si=ul at ions we r e observed, due partly to the short duration of the exercise. Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience The exercise was felt to be of benefit to county participants.. Limited involvement by the local police, fire departments, and ambulance tear.s reduced the effectiveness of the exercise. Re pr e sent ativ es fren these depar tmen t s the EOC and gained some experience wi th emergency operations. were present at The local police reported that training and involvement of the police prior to the drill had been inadequate to allow effective participation.
47 The sc enar io' s use of a wind shift contributed to the exercise by allowing more ex tensive decision making. However, the c oun t y' s computer analysis system was not used during the exercise to analyze meteorological data. The exercise demonstrated that better communication systems are needed in the EOC and that there is a need for betrer integration and training of local agencies. During the exercise, prompting occurred by state observers and co n-trollers to a degree that affected the ability of federal observers to make evaluations. In most cases it appeared that the prompting was probably superfluous to completion of the activity. the congregate care centers and in evacuation areas the exercise was At felt to be of benefit in training. Re commend ations : Future nercises should include more extensive partici-e pation by police, sheriff, fire, and ambulance services. Training needs in these areas should be identified. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II. B.9) Use of actual meteorological data should be considered for e least a portion of the exercise to allow more realistic at response from the accident as se s sment teams and to provide additional training benefit.. Local agencies need more training and greater involvement in e the emergency plan to ensure ef fective response (Reference NUREG-0654, II.C.4). Nonparticipant must be instructed to refrain from parti-cipating in exereise accivities. ~ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
48 5. Orange county gergency Operations Facilities and Resources The facilities of the Orange County emergency operating center (EOC) were ev aluated as acceptable overall, although some deficiencies were noted. l The most significant deficiency occured in tha area of communications. This and other deficiencies are further described below. The Orange County EOC is located in the County Covernment Center, Coshen, New York. This facility was somewhat cramped, but provided adequate working space for accommodating all participating organizations. The facility was partitioned to reduce internal traf fic flow. Separate rooms were used for - ac c id ent assessment and for decision making by the county executive. Incoming communic at ions - were dis persed between the communic ations room, County Executive's room, and the accident assessment room. On occasion the limited number of telephone lines and radio facilities hampered opera-tions. A breakdown occurred in the execut ive ho t-line whic h links the counties, temporarily isolating Orange County from the other counties. Field measurement data were received in the commun ic ations roors because of radia-tion shielding of the accident a s se s sment room. Participating field workers, including bus drivers, policemen, and ambulance drivers-, had separate radios. l The RACES personnel participated in the exercise, but were not ob se rv ed. Internal communications were accomplished informally, as needed by the various re pr e sent a t iv e s. Communication relay depended upon hand-carrying of messages between rooms. Pe riod ic situation repo rt s were not prepared. The principal situation board was not always current.and occasionally showed conflicting infor=ation, and =essage logs were not widely available. Ma ps and displays we r e av ailab le and well laid out, however, some personnel were not f amiliar with the annotation used on the maps. Ruiation dose maps we re centrally located on the table in the dose as se s sment room. Sampling points and relocation centers-vere well marked on maps. Security was adequate, provided by Sherif f's Deputies in and out sid e o f the IOC. A personnel checklist was utilized and identification was j checked. l l
I' (, 49 3\\ Re commend'at ions : I q. The. Orange County ECC should' make the executive hot line e operational to facilitate the information flow between coun t ie s. Additional' telephone lines or' equivalent systems should-e be-provided in the EOC to serve as an additional backup for dedicated phones. (Re ferenc e NUREG-0654,. II. F.1.b ) The plan for internal' communications and dissemination e of infor-nation within-the EOC should be ~ improved to increase efficiency and coordination. Radiological field monitoring data should be transmitted directly~ into the. ac cid ent assessment room. EOC workers should be' familiarized with displays. e Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f l The overall. capability for continuous 24-hour emergency response operations was evaluated as weak because of inadequate training of relie f personnel. All personnel were contacted.and mobilized promptly. Each responding organization po sse ssed ad equa te staff and quickly established operational r ead ine s s. Backup capabilities were simulated or demonstrated. However, a serious concern is the proficiency. of the relief personnel. An example of this was noted with the backup county RADEF officer, who was not fully trained in the calculation of dose races nor experienced in the' use of 'allL equipment - resources. In general, the backup staff was not as proficient as the primary participants. Radiological monitoring teams ar rived promptly and we re. very l e f ficient. These teams checked through the EOC and were dispatched within an exclusive of traffic hour of arr ival. Emergency response organizations,, .j control, demonstrated the ability for prompt notification. ' This was evidenced at tem reception / congregate-care center and the decontamination center. Each of these organizations had ad equa te communications equipment for alerting response personnel. Difficulties were encoun te r ed in establishing access control ~ points, due to poor interagency commun ic at ion in the ECC. Af ter notification, the: j Sheriff and State Polic e responded promptly. A delay occurred in the ' ambu-lance tr ans po rt of a "v ic t im" to the hospital. The accid ent occurred at 12:15 psm. and the patient arrived at the hospital.at 1:08 p.m., without communication by two-way radio between the ambulance and hospital. l e ____._._m
50 Recommendations: Provide more comprehensive training for key backup ~ e personnel. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.A.4) e Establish a schedule for additional drills in order to develop more familiarity and ef ficiency with procedures and resources. Provide additional training and resources for' communica-e tion with field support pe r sonnel. Emergency Operations Management Emergency o perat ion's management inc lud ing. organizational. control, leadership, decision making, a'nd support' by o f fici'als wa s evaluated- -as acceptable, with some deficiencies noted that limited effective performance. These are noted below. Participants within the main EOC o perations room were adequately organized. The EOC floor plan div id ed 'ac tivities among'several rooms: c ommun ic a t io n s, accident assessment, and county executive o f fice. This required the County Director to divid e his. t ime - among the ' various rooms. Operations were on occasion hindered by we ak information flow. Internal communication required hand-carried messages between the - rooms.. There is a need fo r greater cocanunication between EOC leaders and ' agency participants. Brie fing of these repr esent a t ive s were s po r ad ic. Written situation updates were not always available. Command and control capabilities were evident. All participants knew who was in. charge. The County CD Director assumed operational control : of the EOC. The County Executive responded promptly and' clearly exercised his decision-making authority. In his. absence his deputy was present and in c o tt t r o l. The RADEF o f ficer was fully responsible and' involved with the direction and execution of all radiological and associated - activities. ; 11is instructions to field monitoring teams were clear, and the teams were ef fec-tively deployed. Emergency response org aniza tio ns,. includ ing the reception center, congregate care, social services, Red Cross, decontamination center, fire department and state personnel monitoring center were well organized', properly staf fed and directed. Excellent leadership Was noted at the c ongreg ate-Car e I l
a. 51-center and the. decontamination center. At.the reception center, four staff l members were present, a'1though it was unclear who'was in charge. All organi-zations understand their assignments. Written. procedures we r e followed. Recommendation:
- e. The divided floor ' plan within the EOC requires that i
ef fective communication flow and procedures be i established to ensure efficient management. d Public Alerting and Notification Me ans for al?-ting and notification of the public were evaluated as. acceptable, with deficiencies noted that limit ' ef fective - performance. The plan ' for initial public notification included sounding of sirens-and use of the emergency broadcast system (EBS). Th e first EBS. message was -{ b road cast by WABC. and local radio stations.- The siren system, however, was apparently not fully functional at all locations, and sirens were no't heard at some indoor locations. Alternative notification by helicopter was simulated. Transient accommodations such as motels were adeq'uately informed of the - alerting procedures. A review of county EBS messages and news releases indicated that in a limited number of instances in forma tion in news releases more properly should have been contained in EBS messages. All official emergency public in forma tion pertaining to public safety should be b road cas t on EBS. The public has been advised that EBS is the sole source for official emergency public information. Re c ommend at ions : More extensive backup systems should be considered for e locations where sirens fail to function or where they may be inaudible to those indoors. Use of bullhorns or route alerting should be considered. (Re ference NUREG-0 65!*, II.E.6) Criteria should be developed in conjunction with the e state and other counties to determine what type o f info:uation will be aired over EBS and what type will be issued in news releases.
52 Public and Media Relations The publication and coordination o f releases o f in formation were acceptable with deficiencies noted that Ibnit e f f ec tiv e pe r fo r-evaluated as mance. Public in fo rma t ion ac t iv it ie s we r e well coordinated between the EOC and the county PIO at the Joint Media Center. Co pie s of EBS messages and press releases were not distributed in the EOC, and runor control procedures were not ob served. Westchester County was responsible for coordination of all EBS messages fran other counties. was the point of contact with the Th e Jo in t Media Facility (JMF) press. Its location about one mile SSW o f the pl ant is o f some concern since under certain wind conditions it might be in a contaminated zone. The alternate JMF location is in Wh it e Plains and might not be conveniently reached under certain conditions for similar reasons. There was not adequate space or equipment, including maps and charts at the center. Briefings in the media center were not always announced, and not all impo r tant briefings we re attended by the PIOS; for ex am pl e, when PASNY announced the site area emergency at 0920 hours, only the utility was present, and at the 1126 hours briefing only PASNY and Westchester County were present. Recommend ations : Emergency workers in the EOC should be kept better l e informed of the information being released to the public, Press briefings should be announced in advance so that e PIOS can attend. I Additional public education is needed so that the public e will understand the locations o f the areas that are to take protective actions and will know how to carry out the pro-tective actiens. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a. G.l') A new location for the JMF with adequate space and equipment i I that is outside the 10 mile EPZ should be found. (Re f erence f e NUREG-0654, II.G.3.a) l Procedures should be reviewed for identifying rumors and e for dealing with them. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.4.c) 9 -L
l i 53 l 1 Accident Assessment Capabilities fo r pe r fo rming ac c id en t assessment were rated as accept-able, with de fic ienc ie s noted that limit e f f e c t iv e pe r fo manc e, as noted below. A separate room in the EOC was provided for accident a s se s sm en t. Staff operations were ad e qua te ly organized and directed. Mo nitoring teams were well traiced and mobile, but did not carry instrumentation such as high-range instruments, although additional equipment was available at the EOC. Monitoring equiement for measuring radiciodine was inadequate due to the i use of a charcoal filter medium in the air sampling equipment, which limited its functional ut il it y. This filter collects the noble gases as we l l as iodine, and therefore the readings do not meet the requirements of NUREG-0654. The use of a silver zeolice filter instead of charcoal greatly reduces the 1 1 collection of the noble gases. Prompt re po r t ing of whole-body gamma field l 1 measurements to the EOC was observed. Good capability for airborne monitoring was demonstrated by deployment of a Civil Air Patrol airplane. Re c ommend at ions. I Field teams should demonstrate familiarity with instruments e having response ranges that might be needed during an l actual event. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8) Silver zeolite filters should be used in the air sampiing e equipment that is used for measuring radiciodine. NOTE: Charcoal filters may be used during drills and exercises but the silver zeolite filters must be in the instrument I kits ready for use in an actual emergency. (Re f erenc e NUREC-0654, II.I.9) Actions to Protect the Public Means for sheltering, evacuation of the public, r eception and care, and transportation were ev alua t ed as good, with only minor de fic iencie s neced. All ob s e rv ed facilities were well org an ized, well st af fed, and efficiently operated. While traffic control at reception centers was suf fic ient for the exercise, no special provisions for the mob ilit y-impair ed wa s ob se rved. Th e ev acua tio n bus route was well d ir ec t ed, and a medical drill was very well executed. l l 1
I i 1 54 It was felt that the lack of accurate means for radiciodine measurement might a f fect the decisions to evacuate or shelter. Rec ommend at ions : Means for obtaining prompt and accurate field measurements e of radiciodine should be specified to provide guidance on protective action d.acisions. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.9) Provisions for care of the handicapped sbould be considered e at the reception centers. Health. Medical, and Exoosure Control Measures Health, medical, and exposure co:. trol measures were evaluated as acceptable, with deficiencies noted that l imit e f fective performance. County procedures for contaminant monitoring of all employees active in the EPZ vere closely followed. Screening of evacuees and vehicles was also well demonstrated; however, means for final disposal of contaminated solids and liquids were not established. While po cke t dosimeters we re e f f ec tiv ely used for personal monitoring, permanent-recording in s t r um e n t s were not available. Sufficient acaf f was av ailable to avoid exposures in excess of protective a ' ion guides. Recommend at ions : Disposal methods for contaminated materials should be I developed, Permanent-recording devices (e.g., n.Ds or film badges) e should be considered for emergency workers. (Re ference j I WREG-0 654, II.K.3.a) Additional training is needed at local hospitals on e radiation monitoring. Recoverv and Reentrv Operations Recovery and reentry operations we r e ev alua ted as we ak, with s ig ni fi-cant deficiencies noted. This evaluation was based primarily on the lack of f ull simulation. 3e operations officer conducted a concise general briefing for ex e rc ise participants; this was followed closely by termination of the i
5 5,. + .q exercise. Although participants appeared to understand their roles,-no actions were simulated before the EOC was closed. s Recommend at ion: e Impo rt an t recovery and reentry procedures'should be ef fectively demonstrated to ensure capabilities and to provide training. (Re ference Nt! REG-0654, II.M.1) Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience Observers felt that the exercise pr'ov id ed an acceptable level of experience. While participants at the fixed f acilitie s felt the experience ) . was beneficial, the field teams varied -in their evaluations. The monitoring t emas we re enthusiastic and gained valued experience. Access control per-j sonnel, however, felt that their ac tivities were routine. The scenario was good in that it called for participation of all counties in the EPZ; however, c more extensive use could have been made o f monitoring ' teams by having them take more readings and samples. Re c ommend at ion : e improvement in the exercise experience could be gained by having activities designed to thoroughly test teams with complex duties (such as field monitoring teams) while minimizing activities that are routine for other partici-pants. 1 j i 1 F -_--____._._______m.
56 .6. Putnam County Emergency Ooerations Overall, the emergency operating center (EOC) had good-f ac ilit ie s, resources, internal communications, displays and security. However, some minor deficiencies were noted and are described below. This EOC is located in the County Of fice Building, on Main Street, Carmel, New York. The -EOC was.very small, and had a cramped working space that was es-pecially noticed in the radiological assessment area and in the communications-area. The overall func tioning of the EOC was good in spite of the small size, because the management was excellent.. Amenities such as lighting, ventilation, and display space were good. However, a conveniently located. drinking fountain would be a welcome addition. Several primary and backup communic a t ions ' sys t ems provided a good performance. The primary system between the nuclear facility, the. state, and the local governments was a dedicated ho t-line telephone, the Radiological Emergency Commun ic ations System (RECS). Backup systems included a special radio network, the commercial telephone, and the RACES-system. The executive hot line functioned very well until it failed near the end of the exercise. The backup radio was-then adequately utilized. The primary communication between the EOC and the agencies and or-ganizations that provided the local res ponse was via commercial telephone. This consisted of many telephone lines and in st rument s that provid ed good pe r fo rmanc e. The backup RACES system was excellently equipped, and was manned by very competent operators. Communication with the buses used for ev acua tion was by radio. This channel was adequate, but in two instances messages were delayed un til the channel was cleared. Communications with federal agencies was adequate. Commun ic a t io n s within the EOC were excellent as a result o f the ' following procedures: messages'were quickly verified and logged before they were distributed within the EOC; the data cese rteing the pl ant status and the radioisotope release rates were posted on a status board and promptly updated; and che staf f was kept well informed by periodic briefir.gs.
1 I 57 I A small im p r ov eme n t in the functioning of tiie EOC could be made by synchronizing all of the clocks. Information was well displayed at all key locations in the EOC, and was e f fectively utilized in making decisions _and in carrying them out. Th e displays consisted of a status board and several maps. The in f o rma t io n posted on the status board was easily read from a distance. The map thr.t showed ev acuation routes was good; however, it could be made more legible from a distance. An excellent map showed the location of the plume and the locations of the radiation monitoring stations, and gav e the field sampling data. Security was adequate except for the initial 15 minutes after activat-ing the EOC. During this initial time, the access was uncontrolled. After a security officer was assigned to the entrance, and after he had been instructed, security was adequate. A sign-in procedure was required in addition to name tags. Not all workers were required to show identification, but this is because many of the workers were known to the security of ficer, i Recommend ations : I The Orange County EOC should be added to the hot-line j e network so that all of the county EOCs can readily communicate with each other, e.g., Putnam with Orange. (Re ference NITREG-0654, II.F.1.d) 4 1 The arrangement of tables and the locations for each e emergency worker in the EOC should be reviewed to mini-mize the ef fects of the small space on the operations. (Re ference NtTREG-0654, II.H.3). Procedures for security should be reviewed. (Re ferenc e e N1, REG-0 654, II.H.3) Alerting and Mobilization Putnam County demonstrated an ac c e pt ab le capability to re s pond to an emergency that starts at any t ime during the day or night. However, some deficiencies were noted that limit ef fective performance. The alert notice from the utility to the State Police was relayed to the County Sherif f's Of fice. This of fice, which is staffed 24 hours per day, demonstrated e f f ec t iv e call-out proc edur es for alerting county officials or
58 their alternates. Home telephone numbers, home addresses, and some radio call systems were available to facilitate notification. The county officials reported promptly and ac t iv a t e d the EOC in a timely mander. Procedures for notification of emergency response organiza-tions and p<arsonnel were excellent. Mobilization was timely, vich some I personnel reporting within lf minutes. All were on duty in about 30 minutes. Alerting of the radiation monitoring field teams was accomplished by radio soon after the EOC was activated. Most of the alerting was done with telephones, but radio backup was available. The RACES personnel provided excellent su p po rt. The EOC verified messages (e.g., Alert, Site Area Emergency, etc.) from the EOF and the utility, both by repetition at the time of notification i i and by call-b':k shortly a f ter receipt of the message. Putnam - County was dependent on, a Westchester representative at the EOF for much of the radio-logical data needed for accident assessment at the Putnam EOC. A capability tu continue operations 24 hours per day was demonstrated-at the EOC by a shift change at 130,0 hours, and by exhibiting a list of backup personnel. This revealed that two of the key people, the CD Director and the RADEF Officer, do not have adequate backups. Power for the communications equipment used for alerting depended ' on a battery in case of power failure. This battery had only an 8-hour capacity. Recommendations: e Alternates for the CD Director and RADEF Officer should be trained as soon as possible. (Re ference NUREG- ] 0654, II.A.4). An emergency power generator should be considered for use during a power failure. (Reference NUREC-0654, II.A.4, F.1.d). Monitoring teams should be dispatched to the field at e the earliest pos sible time, so that they are in position to provide data for an independent early assessment of j the emergency. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.H.4, 1.8). j e Procedures for transmitting meteorological data, plant emissions data, and data obtained by the utility field monitoring teams from the utility and EOF to the EOC should be reviewed and strengthened. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.F.1.d, I.8). 1 L__________.___.___._.__
59 Emergencv Ooerations Management ne c=crgency operations management was good, with only minor deficien-cies noted, n e organization, control, and leader ship, as well as the support by elected of ficials, were gcod. Many specific organizations had roles in the response o f Pu t n am County to the exercise scenario. It was clear that these organizations l understood their res ponsioilitie s and knew how to impl ement specific provt-sions in the emergency plan. The operations of ficer consulted procedures and f checklists frequently. Leadership was excellent. The Civil De fense Direct.or was clearly in charge of the EOC, and was supported by the County Executive. De CD Director, the County Executive, and the RADEF Of ficer conferred fr equently, contacted other EOCs and the state, and reached impo rtant d ec '.s ions quickly. The RADEF Officer was clearly responsible for the accident assessment
- function, He directed the field teams, analyzed the data, and brie fed the health officer and other EOC officials.
He used the ut ilit y's emergency j classifications. The RACES organization was assigned to field monitoring, and provided i excellent support. l The Civil Defense Director, the County Executive and the leaders of the I supporting ceganizations gave periodic reports to keep the workers in the EOC up to date. The more important items were posted periodically, Public Alert and Notification Some of the actions taken for pub lic alerting and notification were acceptable. B ose that we re weak and in need of substantial improv emen t include pe r f o rm an c e of the siren system and the ab il it y to notify the transient po pul at ion. At the notice of 9 Site Area Emergency, the Putnam County EOC coordin-ated the ac t iv ation of the siren system with the release of the first EBS message. Some of the sirens failed to sound. Others sounded but we re no t loud enough in s areas. In ad d it ion, interviews with the pub lic revealed that many had not heard the siren or did nct know what they meant or that they l l _________a
3 60- + h should ' listen to the EBS for instructions. Those interviewed also did not know the meaning.of the' Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPA) or the boundaries for the ERPAs. The EBS messages were written, cleared, and broadcast (in simulation) in a timely manner. No TV monitor was available in.the EOC to check the EBS messages on the TV. Route alerting ' by police and fire trucks - equipped with~ PA systems is the backup for the siren system.. The adequacy o f the backup system was not demonstrated. A few route alerts were simulated, but no PA announcements 'were made. Checks wi th.. mo t el operators revealed that the ~ sirens had not been heard. No evidence of ' notification of the transient population was : found. A review of county EBS messages and news releases indicated that in a limited number of instances information in ' news releases more properly i should have been contained in EBS messages. All official emergency public informa tion pertaining to public safety should be broadcast ~ on - EBS. The public has been advised that EBS is the sole source for official emergency public information. l l Recommendations: 1 Test measurements of sound level should be made through-e out the 10-mile EPZ. Modifications and/ c' additions should then be made until the system meets the notifi-cation requirements. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.6, J.10.c). Route-alerting messages and procedures should be devel-e oped to supplement the siren system, especially in those-areas of low siren sound level. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.6, J.10.c). Criteria should be developed in conjunction with the e state and other counties to determine what type of E. formation will be aired over EBS and what type will be issued in news releases. Intense ef forts should be made. to make the public ~ aware e of the meaning of the siren signals. (Reference NURIG-0654, II.G.1). e' A simpler alternative to the ERPA :ene designations should be developed, or a very complete educational campaign'that includes distribution of maps showing these areas should' be conducted. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a, G.1)'.
a 61 Public and Media Relations Overall, the pub lic and media re? ations actions '.e r e accepta le, but some deficiencies were noted. Public education programs and rumo r control procedures need improvements. Pub lic education brochures were mailed to the pub lic a. short time before the exercise. These brochures listed a toll-free telephone number 'that the public could call to get more in fo rma t ion. In addition, training courses for the public were given regularly by the Fire Department and RACES person-net. They were assisted by Putnam County department he ad s. Nevertheless, it l appears that additional educ ation is need ed to help the public understand i actions that are to be taken in the event of an emergency. No posted notices i and no information in the telephone book were found. I The Putnam County Public Information Of ficer (PIO) at the EOC was in charge of releases to the media. These were tr ansmit t ed to the Joint Media Center after they had been approved by the County Executive. The PIO had access to all participants in the EOC, including the County Executive, and to all in fo rmation there. It should be noted that Westchester County was in I charg e of coordinating all EBS messages from the several counties. The Putnam j l l County PIO staff at the Joint Media Center effectively coordinated EBS and news release issuance. l 1 was the point of contact with the The Joint Me d ia Facility (JMF) press. Its location about one mile SSW o f the plant is of some concern l I since under certain wind conditions it might be in a contaminated zone. The al t e rnat ive JMF location is in White Plains and might not be conveniently reached under certain conditions for similar ceasons. There was not adequate space or equipment, including maps and charts at the center. 3riefings in the Media Center were not always announced, and not all impo rt ant b rie fings were attended by the PI0s; for ex 2mple, when PASNY announced the site area emergency at 9 : 20 a.m., only the utilit.y was present, and at the 11:26 briefing only PASNY and Westchester Co un ty we r e present. l l
62 Rec ommend ations : Additional public education is needed so that the public e will understand the locations of the areas that are to take the protective actions and will know how to carry out the protective actions. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a. G.1). Procedures should be developed for identifying rumors e and for dealing with them. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.G.4.c). A new locction for the JMF, with adequate space and equip-e ment that is outside the 10-mile EPZ should be found. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.G.3.a) All major press briefings should be announced in advance e so that Plos can attend. Accident Assessment Accident assessment capabilities were e raluated as acceptable, but some deficiencies were noted. A problem in the mechc4 for determining radioiodine should be corrected, and procedures for quickly determining contamination levels in liquid samples need to be addressed. Initial projections o f the radiological exposures were made fr om release rate ud meteorological data measured at the power plant. The Putnam County EOC had excellent maps and transparent overlays to use for this pur-pose. These initial projections wre used be fo re field sample data were available. Field monitoring teams were deployed promptly by the RADEF Of ficer in the EOC. This was possible because of the excellent support provided by the RACES personnel, who also provided communic at ions for tran smis sion of the field data to the EOC. The monitoring equi pment for measuring whol e-b ody g amma-ray expo s ur e races was excellent. Monitoring equi pmen t fo r measuring radiciodine was inadequate, due to the use of a charcoal filter in the air sampling equipment. This filter also collects the noble gases, so that the readings do not meet the requirement of NUREG-0654. The use of a silver zaolite filter in place of the charcoal greatly reduces the collaccion of the noble gases.
63 The number of readings that the field teams could make was limited primarily by travel time fr om one sampl e po in t to another. Nevertheless, if the sampling teams were very ef ficiently deeloyed, data could be obtained in a short enough time for the ECC to make an early independent a s s e s sne n t. No liquid samples were analyzed in the field; however, liquid. and solid samples from the field were delivered to the central collection point at the EOC. No field measurements o f radiation levels were obtained from the utility through the EOF; however, some boundary dose projections were obtained. Reccomendations: e Silver zeolice filters should be used in the air samp-l ling equipment that is used for measuring radiciodine. Charcoal filters may be used during drills and exercises but the silver zeolite filter should be in the instrument kits ready for use in an actual emergency. (Re fe rence l NUREG-0654, II.I.9). The sequence of sample points used (routes driven by e I monitoring teams) should be carefully chosen to give the maximum amount of data for use in making the early l independent a s s e s sm ent. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8). Procedures should be developed for obtaining the field e data measured by the utility's field monitoring teams. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8). The number of samples needed for an independent early e assessment, and the possible hinderances to fast deploy-1 ment of the field monitoring teams should be reviewed in order to assess the possible need for additional j field monitoring teams. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.I.8). i Actions to Protect the Public I Putn am County officials demonstrated a good capab ility to take the actions necessary to protect the put .c, and only minor deficiencies we re 1 noted. l l Simulated roadblocks were set up promptly, and most pe rsonnel und er-stood their func tions at each site. Orders we r e given in a timely manner for the various actions that were required to simulate sheltering and then evacuation. A bus-load of students was evacuated to the congregate-care center in Dut c he s s Coun t y. This demonstrated evacuation was very good. 1 l
~ 64 l The locations of the congregate-care centers in Brewster and Dutchess counties are well outside the 10-mile EPZ. They are located in schools where large gymnasiums, cafeterias, and monitoring and decontamination facili-ties were provid ed. In one case, the Vasser Hospital cooperated to pr ovid e medical care if required. The procedures for processing evacue e s at the congregate-eare centers were good. Health care, decontamination, and monitoring were adequate; however, the monitoring personnel could benefit from additional training. The facilities at the congregate-care centers we re good. An early shortage of equi;rnent needed for long-term operation was relieved by the arrival of a Red Cross truck filled with equi;rnent (e.g., cots, blankets, etc.). The staf fing at the congregate-care centers was excellent and includ ed personnel from County Health, from the Police, from Civil Defense, from RADEF and from the Red Cross. The number of personnel was ample. Rec ommend ations : Additional training for those workers performing radi-e acion monitoring and decontamination procedures is recommended. (Re ference NUREC-0654, II.J.12 ), Procedures for dealing with impediments to evacuation e need to be developed and exercised. These impediments include auto accidents, auto breakdowns, severe road l conditions and the unavailability of gasoline when I needed. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.k). ) Health. Medical, and Exoosure Control overall, the health, medical, and exposure control actions were accept-l able, with some exceptions. The procedures for ultimate disposal of liquid and solid wastes needs to be addressed. l The policy of the Department of Health of the State of New York is that ) no potassium iodide will be distributed to the general population. The control of access to ev ac ua ted areas was good. Ro adblocks were manned, and the personnel at the roadblocks understood their function. l l
65 Emergency wo rke r s were pr ov id ed with do s ime te r s to measure ex po s ur e. Two instruments o f the direct r ead ing type were pr ov id ed (0-20 Rem and 0-200 Rem). Ihe se were read frequently (e.g., 15-minute in t e rv al s ) and the r e ad ing s recorded on a card. Th e EOC called the field teams to obtain dosimeter read ing s for logging. No permanent-record dosi=ecers (e.g.,
- TLDs, film badges) were provided.
Emergency worker exposure in excess of the 20 Rem ibnit was not exper-ienced; however, questions revealed that the approval of the County Executive was needed before this limit could be exceeded. The CD Dtrector thought that his approval was necessary. Ev id enc e for the existence of action levels for determining the need for decontamination was not ob se rv ed at the personnel monitoring center; however, the workers stated that they existed and knew the counting rates that corresponded. Personnel decontamination procedures at the personnel monitoring center were demonstrated and were adequate. Decontamination procedures for equipment and supplies were not demonstrated. Mo re training in these procedures is needed. Proper procedures for ul t ima te disposal of conteninated articles (e.g., clothing) needs to be addressed. Rec ommend at ions : e Procedures should be clarified so that all personnel know which individual (e.g., the County Executive) can approve emergency workers receiving a radiation exposure in excess o f the PAGs. (Re ference NUREG-0654, II.K.4), Additional training is needed so that personnel monitoring e workers will be more familiar with the action levels for decontamination actions. ( Re ference NUREG-0654, II.J.12). Training in methods for decontamination of equipnent and e supplies should be given to P.M.C. workers. (Re ference NUREC-0654, II.K.5.5). Methods for permanent disposal of contaminated articles (e.g., liquids, clothing) should be addressed. ( Re fcrence NCREG-0654 I!.K.5.b). Pe rmanent-record dosimeters ( e.g., TLDs, film badges) e should be provided. (Re ference NUREC-0 654, II.K.3.a). 1 4
66 Recoverv and Reentry Reentry operations were pe r fo rmed in simulation only. An acceptable capability for reentry and recovery appears to exist. The county radiation monitoring teams continued to function during the recovery phase. They wo rked closer and closer to the plume, un t il the simulated readings decreased to background af ter a few days (simulated). This was hard to evaluate because the controller left before the conclusion of the l exercise. The accid ent assessment team reviewed the ex po sur e data before 1 making a recommendation. Pr ior to termination of the exercise, the County Ex ecut iv e ap po inted a commission to plan and implement recovery over a 30-day period. Recommendations: Future exercise scenarios should provide more tizre for a e detailed reentry activity. (Reference NUREG-0654, 11.M.1). Relevance of the Exercise Experience There was un animous agreement among the federal waluators that the exercise was very beneficial to che par tic ipan t s, all of whom took the exer-cise very seriously and pe r fo rmed as if the powe r plant ac c id ent actually occurred. Volun teer s (nongevernment personnel) are especially commended. 'A il e the scenario was a good test of emergency r es pons e capabilities of coun ty personnel, it did not (and perhaps was not intended to) address issues of public awareness and public reaction to an emergency.
4 .e i g 7. Dutchess County Because Dutchess County is not ~ located' wi. thin the 10-mile EPt, it was not required to-demonstrate its ' emergency preparedness c a pe.b il it y.
- However, since Dutchess - County could receive a large number of. ev acuees..during an -
actual accident, - the c oun t y, : on its own - initiative, d ecid ed to.. par t ic ipa te - fully in the exercise. The evaluations by federal observers of the Dutchess County activities are noted.below. The emergency operations center (EOC) had adequate space and equipment. The fac ility - wa s fully staf fed, including. participation by' the Count'y Execu-t iv e. Security was excellent. The Putnan Ccunty Department o'f Social Service demonstrated compliance with the plan by notifying its counterpart agency in Dutchess co expect evacuees from specific sectors. The county had some initial dif ficulty contacting the media center to coordinate public in fo rma tion. Some telephone utsnbers were also ' inaccurate. Overall, the exercise was considered to be good as a' training ex pe r- - ience for the county. ) 4 ) i 1
~ oe % a 68 V. CORRECTIVE ACTION FCR DEFICIENCIES 1. SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES State and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the corr ec e tv e measures they have taken or in tend to take, If r emed ial actions cannot be instituted immed ia te ly, then a detailed pl an for scheduling and implementing remedial ac t ions must be provid ed wh ich include a time frame (dates) for completion. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Su p po r t, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies noted in the exercise have been reported and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan. I >}}