ML20238A556
| ML20238A556 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1987 |
| From: | HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-A-021, OL-5-A-21, NUDOCS 8708310125 | |
| Download: ML20238A556 (44) | |
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To rw 21 eu UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
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LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 21 Hunton & Wuliams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 April 6,1987 l
8708310125 070526 PDR ADOCK 0500 2
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of
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)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
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Unit 1)
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LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 21 l
l Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 April 6,1987
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LILCO. April 6,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
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LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 21 i
l 1.
Q.
Please state your name and business address.
A.
My name is Charles A. Daverio. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. P.O. Box 628, Wading River, New York 11792.
2.
Q.
What are your professional qualifications relating to Contention EX 21?
A.
I am the Assistant Department Manager of the Nuclear Operations Support Department for the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO). My profession-al qualifications have been offered into evidence as part of the document entitled Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Con-tentions." My familiarity with the issues dealt with in Contention EX 21 stems from my work in developing and implementing the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan (the "LILCO Plan") for Shoreham, from my participation as Lead Controller dur-ing the February 13 Exercise, and from my involvement in the preparation of the Exercise scenario. In addition, through my work as an emergency planner I am familiar with the applicable FEM A and NRC regulations and
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guidelines.
u- _ _________ ______ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - -. - _ _ -. _ _
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3.
Q.
Please summarize the issues raised by Contention EX 21.
I I
A.
Contention EX 21 alleges that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its conclusions that certain objectives were met or partly met during the Exercise since the
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samples observed by FEMA were assertedly too small to permit generaliza-l tions about LERO's performance.
Specifically, Interveners allege that (1) FEMA's evaluation of three of the 60 route alert drivers was too small a l
sample [EX 21.A ]; (2) FEMA's evaluation of eight of 333 general population I
bus drivers was too small a sample (EX 21.B];(3) FEMA's evaluation of two j
l school buses reporting to Snoreham-Wading River High School and one bus
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reporting to Ridge Elementary School was insufficient (EX 21.C ];
(4) FEMA's evaluation of one ambulance and one ambulette driver was in-
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sufficient [EX 21.D]; (5) FEMA's evaluation of 32 of 165 traffic guides was too small a sample (EX 21.E]; (6) the number of impediments simulated during the Exercise was insufficient to reflect the number that would occur during an actual emergency (EX 21.F]; and (7) the two congregate care f a-cilities involved in the Exercise were not part of the Plan and were not a large enough sample for FEMA to have observed (EX 15.L.16.N 22.K,32].
In addition, at various points in the Contention, Interveners allege that even with regard to the samples observed by FEMA, LERO's assertedly poor performance prevents FEMA from making affirmative findings on the per-l tinent exercise objectives.
The admitted portions of Contention EX 21 are set out in their en-tirety in Attachment A to this testimony.
l 4.
Q.
Could you briefly describe the scope of this testimony?
A.
This testimony will primarily focus on the sufficiency of the data used by j
FEM A to reach the conclusions challenged by Interveners in the subparts of Contention EX 21 and in the subsumed provisions of Contentions EX 15.L.
I 16.N. 22.K and 32. In particulur, the testimony will address the Conten-tion's recurring theme that the samples observed by FEMA were "too small" to serve as the basis for meaningful conclusions about LERO's performance during the February 13 Exercise. The testimony will also address Interve-nors' claims that, even with regard to the samples observed by FEMA, the quality of LERO's performance prevented FEMA trom making affirmative findings on Exercise objectives. In most cascs, these discussions of LERO's performance will be abbreviated, and will refer to testimony on other Exer-I cise contentions, since the factual merits of Interveners' claims have been previously treated.
5.
Q.
Please summarize your testimony on Contention EX 21.
A.
In Contention EX 21, Interveners have attempted to discredit FEMA's eval-uation of the February 13 Exercise by defining narrowly the relevant points 1
of observation for a given emergency response function and then arguing that the sample size chosen by FEMA for that isolated portion was "too small." Had Interveners focused instead on FEMA's review of the entire emergency response function, as they should have, then it would have been clear that FEMA conducted a detailed review of the performance of the LERO organization and that Interveners' claims are meritiess.
The February 13 Exercise presented an unprecedentedly comprehen-sive test of an offsite emergency organization's stdlity to implement its emergency plan. Not only did LERO mobilize and exercise all personnel in
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decisionmaking and ::upervisory positions, but it also mobilized and exer-cised virtually all of its field workers. (In a few instances, non-LILCO or-ganizations that provide emergency response assistance did not mobilize a full complement of emergency workers, but a full complement of LILCO LERO field workers was mobilized.)
FEMA graded LERO's performance using 38 evaluators.
These evaluators were present at all times in the major facilities provided by the LILCO Plan, including the EOC, the Port Jefferson. Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas, the ENC, the Brookhaven Area Office and the Reception Center. In addition, FEMA evaluators were present at appropri-ate times in the Exercise at the System Service Operator (SSO) offices, the EWDF, schools in the EPZ and congregate care centers. Finally, FEM A evaluators also graded, without prior notice, the performance of rardomly selected Traffic Guides Bus Drivers, Route Alert Drivers, Route Spotters, Road Crews, Ambulance /Ambulette Drivers and field monitoring personnel l
I as they performed their field duties.
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Interveners' criticism of FEMA's evaluation of the February 13 Exer-l cise focuses almost entirely on this last group of observations. In my view, given the comprehensive context of FEMA's observation of the overall Ex-ercise. FEMA's use of random samples to review this last group of activities is appropriate and the size of the samples chosen by FEMA was adequate to draw meaningful conclusions about LERO's performance.
6.
Q.
In your opinian, was the February 13 Exercise an adequate demonstration of LERO's capabilities to enable FEMA to draw meaningful conclusions about inose capabilities?
A.
Yes. The Exercise was designed to demonstrate virtually every aspect of LERO's ability to implement the LILCO Pian. As I stated in the previous answer, during the February 13 Exercise, LERO notified and mobilized a full complement of LILCO personnel. In addition, personnel f rom the Red f
Cross, the Department of Energy (Brookhaven Area Office), the Coast Guard, the Shoreham-Wading River School District and ambu-lance /ambulette companies participated with LERO in demonstrating the implementation of the Plan. All Exercise participants implemented all as-pects of their procedures, except those that would have had an impact on the public, regardless of whether FEMA actually chose to observe the spe-cific event.
In this respect, the Shoreham Exercise departed measurably from other offsite exercises of which I am aware. At other exercises in which l
State and local governments are the players, the only resources typically l
activated are those that FEM A indicates in advance that it is going to ob-serve.
For example, FEMA may indicate that it will observe five bus l
l routes. In response, the local government, will mobilize five bus drivers with five buses, and no other drivers or vehicles will participate regardless 1
of the number specified in the emergency plan. Thus, FEMA will observe dosimetry briefings, dispatching activities and actual running of the bus routes for only that sample group. It will judge whether total mobilization i
and operation of the emergency organization can be accomplished based on what that sample group accomplishes. Nor can the selection process be as random, or as free from advance notice to actual participants, as is the case when all resources are mcbilized and exercised.
During the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA indicated that it wanted to ob-serve eight general population buses. Rather than mobilize only that group of drivers, LERO chose to mobilize all Bus Drivers and have them all run
-G-their assigned bus routes; of these, eight were selected at random and with-out notice by FEM A to be observed. (The eight Bus Drivers picked up actu-al buses from bus yards and drove them; the others, who were not selected by FEMA for evaluation, ran their routes in their own personal vehicles.)
This provided FEMA with a far bette and more realistic opportunity than is typically afforded to judge whether the logistics of the plan being exer-cised could be implemented, since it could observe the rsotification and mo-bilization of the entire corps of LERO Bus Drivers and could select a com-pletely random group for individual field observation. The same is true for all LERO field positions. In addition, since LERO mobilized the full com-plement of field workers. FEMA was able to obserie whether the staging areas could operate smoothly and efficiently in light of the interfacing of the various field worker groups and the occasional need to make priority decisions among groups in the dispatching W.' fi11d workers. Thus, in my i
view, the Shoreham Exercise provided FEMA more than an ample opportu-nity to judge the implementability of the LILCO Plan.
I 7.
Q.
Contention EX 21 contends in its various subparts that the sample size of emergency resources observed by FEMA at the Shoreham Exercise was "too small," and that thus insufficient data were gathered to support FEMA's conclusions with respect to the Exercise objectives specified in the J
subparts. Do you agree with this conclusion?
A.
No. The contention criticizes the conclusions reached by FEMA on numer-ous areas of emergency response evaluated during the Exercise, on the basis that the samples observed were insufficient in size to provide the l
basis for a conclusion. However, the contention is flawed systendcally in at least three ways, which will be illustrated issue by issue in the course of this testimony.
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First, while alleging that the samples observed by FEMA were too small, neither the contention nor its amplification in discovery yield any insight into what Interveners would consider adequate samples, nor even how they would apply accepted statistical methods to determine what would have consituted sufficient samples.
Second and more fundamentally, the contention misperceives the role of field sampling in evaluation of overall institutional competence in any given response area. It claims to criticize the basis for FEMA's conclu-sions about the response capability of an ernergency organization in several substantial areas. Each of these areas involves a broad spectrum of sub-activities, from initial information gathering and evaluation, to decision-making capabilities, to a series of physical responses from initial call-out and mobilization through final field activity. Assessment of the adequacy I
l of any of these areas requires evaluation, not always quantitative and cer-tainly not always statistical, of the entire spectrum of subactivities. Each l
of these subactivities was in f act observed by FEMA and formed a part of its overall conclusion on the acceptability of the organization's perfor-i mance in the area. Yet the contention fails totally to account for this 1
spectrum of observed activity, focusing instead on the final field spot check as though it were all that were observed or all that existed to ob-serve. Since organizational competence in a given area obviously encom-passes the entire scope of activity and not merely its field spot-check man-ifestation, the contention's arbitrary and unjustified restriction of its focus renders its entire premise suspect. See LILCO's Testimony on Contention EX 50 at 10-14 (The organization is the appropriate unit of analysis).
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Finally, the nature of the Fampling done of the chosen field activi-ties by FEM A, as the expert agency, in other exercises is indicative of what is felt by that expert agency to be necessary to render valid judgments on other nuclear power plants. The contention, however. pays no attention to this experience. /However. as is demonstrated in the testimony, the size of t.,syk -
lthe samples taken at Shoreham were consistent with or larger than thosegl0A i
e 38 other exercises evaluated by LILCOg Thus, to the extent that sam-pie size is even a meaningful index, the samples taken at Shoreham are comistent with those taken at other licensed f acilities.
Finally, there is no regulatory guidance on the required intensity of observation of the resources deployed to meet exercise objectives. See Deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 31-33 (Attach-l ment C). Obviously, to observe all bus routes., traffic control points, route alert zones, etcetera, specified in the LILCO Plan would be physically im-possible for FEM A. Moreover, there is certainly no FEM A requirement that 1
a sample size be " statistically significant." Id. at 33. Nor has FEMA fol-4 I
lowed, in f act, a practice of using statistically significant samples. The
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1 NRC Staff has traditionally deferred to FEMA in deciding the sample sizes appropriate to verify the implementation of exercise objectives. I_d. at 33.
j It should be encugh, given the comprehensive nature of FEMA's overall ex-ercise evaluation process, that, in FEMA's expert judgment, a sample size is a suf ficient " spot check" to ensure that the exercise objectives are carried out effectively.
l 8.
Q.
In Contention EX 21.A. Interveners allege that the Exercise f ailed to yield sufficient information to draw conclusions about LERO's ability to provide i
prompt backup notification to the public in the event of a siren failure.
Specifically, Interveners allege that FEM A's observation of three of the 60 route alert drivers was too small a sample to justify its conclusions that ob-jectives Field 5, SA 9 and EOC 15 were met or partly met. Do you agree?
_ )
A.
No. In the first place. Contention EX 21.A misportrays FEM A's review of the backup notification process. The process of praviding alternative noti-i fication in the event of a siren failure begins in the EOC where Public Information personnel contact Marketing Evaluations and ask them to con-duct a telephone survey to identify which sirens may have failed to acti-vate, and the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator contacts the Riverhead Electric Service Section to obtain a list of sirens that do Ie have electrical feed. Onca Marketing Evaluations or the Riverhead Elec-tric Service Section identifies the f ailed sirens, the Special Facilities Evac-uation Coordinator, using OPIP 3.3.4, then determines the Staging Areas to j
which the failed sirens are assigned and directs those Staging Areas to dis-patch Route Alert Drivers to the affected areas.
i At the Staging Areas, Route Alert Drivers are mobilized at an Alert classification, issled dosimetry and given public address systems to mount on their vehicles. Upon receipt of route alert assignments from the EOC, the Lead Traffic Guide designates Route Alert Drivers for the failed siren areas and dispatches them. The Route Alert Drivers, using maps, then drive slowly through the failed siren area informing residents to listen to the EBS station for emergency information.
Contention EX 21.A focuses only on FEMA's review of the last of these actions. It fails to acknowledge that FEMA observed all of the pre-ceding steps in the backup notification process save Marketing Evaluations.
(Indeed, participation of this organization could not even have been realis-tically obtained, given the absence of siren soundings for reasons discussed in LILCO's Testimnny on Contentions EX 15 and 16.) Thus, even assuming that objectives SA 9 (which involves "the ability to dispatch to and direct
i emergency workers in the field") and EOC 15 (which judges the capability to provide both an alert signal and information to the population within the i
EPZ) apply to the backup notification process, the adequacy of FEMA's observation turns on its observation of the entire cycle of the process, not just the number of routes observed. And in f act, FEMA observed a_ll EOC and staging area activities related to these objectives.
Even with regard to the narrow sub-issue of FEMA's observation of Route Alert Drivers actually driving their assigned routes I believe that the sample of Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA was sufficient to en-I sure that the component of objective Field 9 that relates to this field func-tion was met. The activities to be demonstrated -- namely, driving f rom ki the staging area to the assigned siren coverage area and then, following a f
map, driving up and down the roads in that area at speeds of five miles per hour -- did not require FEMA to have observed all 60 route alert drivers.
Essentially, the backup notification aspects focused on by Interveners require the Route Alert Driver to be able to drive his car and read a map.
These are not unusual activities that require extensive observation to judge if they can be performed.
l In addition, Route Alert Drivers are needed only if there are f ailed sirens. It is not unreasonable to assume that even in a real emergency only three sirens would Iall, and only three Route Alert Drivers would need to be dispatched.
Finally, as LILCO has already testified on Contention EX 34, cackup notification for the siren system is not required by NUREG-0654. Conse-quently, provisions for backup notification are not essential elements of an emergency plan and a limited demonstration of that function cannot l
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- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ constitute a flaw in the LILCO Plan or prohibit a finding of reasonable as-surance.
9.
Q.
In Contention EX 21.A. Interveners also allege that FEMA's conclusions re-garding backup public alerting are invalid given FEMA's finding that the time taken to brief, deploy and drive the three routes was excessive. Do you agree?
A.
No.
As LILCO has previously testified on Contention EX 34, the route alerting process need not be completed within any specific time frame.
The Licensing Board in the prior plan litigation has already held that the route alert driver function is not required by the regulations or the l
guidelines and that, "a fortiori, no standard time limit need be met." Par-tial Initial Decision, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 759 (1985) ("PID"), af f'd, ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,143 (1986).
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- 10. Q.
Has FEMA generally observed a larger sample of route alert drivers 1 other exercises?
A.
No. FEMA witnesses have testified that in FEMA Region II exercises one siren failure is normally posed for each jurisdiction. FEMA Testimony at T
141. In the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA treated each staging area as a sepa-rate jurisdiction and hence imposed three siren f ailures.
LILCO has also reviewed 38 FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment Reports. A list of those reports by facility and exercise date is included as Attachment B to this testimony. Of these 38 exercises,12 did not test the s
N route alerting function at all. Ten reports were sufficiently specific to determine the number of Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA. The re-l l
sults are as f ollows.
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I.
- of drivers q of exercises
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1 4
j 2
1 J
3 1
4 1
5 1
6 or more 2
Thus, FEMA's observation of three Route Alert Drivers during th 3
February 13 Exercise is consistent with its practice at other exercises.
- 11. Q.
In Contention EX 21.B. Interveners allege that FEMA's observation of eight general population bus drivers was too small a sample to permit generaliza-tions about LERO's overall bus operations. Do you agree?
A.
No.
Again, Interveners have incorrectly portrayed FEMA's review of LERO's ability to provide bus services for the transportation-dependent portion of the EPZ by f ailing to recognize the scope of FEMA's observation.
Bus operations begin in the EOC where Transpec tation Support Group per-sonnel must initially contact each of the twenty bus yards under contract to LERO to determine bus availability. Then, depending on the prestaging or evacuation order, the EOC Bus Coordinators determine the number of buses required at each Transfer Point, and from which bus yards these vehicles should be obtained to minimize travel times from Staging Areas.
Once this matching process is complete, dispatch instructions are sent to the Staging Areas.
Bus Drivers are mobilized at the Site Area Emergency classification t
and issued dosimetry as they arrive at the Staging Areas. Af ter dispatch instruction; are received from the EOC, Bus Dispatchers at the Staging Areas assemble and brief the Bus Drivers and provide them with informa-j tional packets which designate the particular bus yard and transfer point to J
I which they are assigned. The Bus Drivers then leave the Staging Area.
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. travel to their assigned bus yard, pick up their bus and proceed to their as-signed transfer point. At the transfer point, Transfer Point Coordinators assign the Bus Drivers specific routes and dispatch them in accord with their bus schedule. Once *he Bus Drivers have completed their assigned route, they proceed to the Reception Center with their evacuees.
Contention EX 21.B focuses solely, and improperly, on the last stage of the entire cycle - on the field activities of Bus Drivers. As a result, it neglects FEM A's review of the overall functioning of LERO's bus organiza-tion. The contention fails to acknowledge that during the Exercise, FEMA evaluators in the EOC observed the Transportation Support Group carry out all of its assigned functions. At the Staging Areas, FEMA evaluators ob-served the entire complement of Bus Drivers (505 drivers) mobilize in re-I I
sponse to the call-out, per procedure, of all Bus Drivers to carry out an evacuation of the entire EPZ. (The roster of Bus Drivers, and the call-out l
l lists, contain a large reserve (150% staffing) to ensure the rapid availability of the 333 drivers needed to drive all routes for a full evacuation of the EPZ.) FEMA observed 333 of these drivers obtain their dosimetry, receive their job briefings and be dispatched into the field.
FEMA evaluators accompanied eight randomly selected Bus Drivers from the Staging Areas to bus yards and then to transfer points. At four different transfer points, these FEMA evaluators observed transfer point operations including the as-l signment of buses to particular routes and their ultimate dispatch to the Reception Center. The FEMA evaluators traveled on buses on their as-signed routes within the EPZ and on their trips to the Reception Center.
Thus, FEMA evaluated every stage in the bus transportation process and had ample information to draw conclusions about that process.
The 1
. contention f ails to recognize the sweep of FEMA's evaluation process or its significance in FEMA's ability to draw overall findings about the bus-evacuation function.
With regard to FEMA having accompanied eight Bus Drivers on their field assignments. I believe that this sample was sufficient to draw mean-ingful conclusions about this activity. Since all LERO Bus Drivers are licensed bus drivers in the State of New York for which they must pass a practical and written licensing test, FEMA's observational purpose in ac-companying these drivers was to see it they could travel to bas yards and transfer points, receive a bus route and follow it in an accurate and timely manner, travel from the transfer point to the Reception Center, and whether they understood their radiological protection measures. These are straightforward tasks that do not require the observation of every bus driv-er to draw conclusions.
- 12. Q.
In Contention EX 21.B. Interveners also argue that inadequate perfor-mances by various Patchogue Bus Drivers preclude FEMA from drawing generalizations about LERO's ability to conduct bus operations. Do you agree with this conclusion?
A.
No. FEMA's concern about bus operations at the Patchogue Staging Area can be traced primarily to the fact that one of the Bus Drivers observed by FEMA proceeded to the wrong bus yard and another, af ter obtaining a bus from the correct bus yard, proceeded to the wrong transfer point. While LERO's performance could have been better in each instance, these events do not prevent valid conclusions from being drawn about LERO's demon-stration of bus operations.
It is useful to review briefly each event. In the case of the driver who went to the wrong bus yard, this driver had the resourcefulness, to
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_ rent a bus at that yard using his own credit card. Later, when he realized that he was at the wrong bus yard, he asked the FEMA evaluator for guid-ance and, af ter receiving none, returned the bus and proceeded to the cor-rect yard. See Attachment D.
Obviously, it was only his attempt to con-form to every detail of the Exercise that caused any delay in his arrival at the correct transfer pcint, and had it been a real emergency, he would have accomplished his primary objective of obtaining a bus in a timely manner when he rented a bus at the original bus yard and would not have been con-cerned about whether the bus came from the designated bus yard.
The Bus Driver who reported to the wrong transfer point was given an evacuation route to run by the Transfer Point Coordinator at that trans-fer point. Thus, he would have been able to provide timely assistance in an actual emergency. The LERO bus transportation plan has enough flexibility and excess capacity (see PID, 21 NRC at 820) to accommodate this error.
Even if a transfer point is short a bus, the buses can either be assigned to run extra routes or buses can be moved from one transfer point to another.
Thus, neither of these events indicates that LERO's bus operations cannot be performed.
- 13. Q.
Has FEMA generally oi] served a larger sample of bus drivers in of r exer-7 cises?
k A.
No. Of the 38 exercise reports reviewed by LILCO, twenty either did not run any buses or else the report was silent on the issue. In those exercises where buses were run and their number could be determined from the i
FEM A report, the following breakdown results:
p e of buses
= of exercises 1-3 12 Y
4-8 4
9-15 2
3 I
A Thus the 8 buses FEMA observed during the Shoreham Exercise was above f IQ norm.
- 14. Q.
In Contentjon EX 21.C. Interveners allege that FEMA's failure to observe LERO's ability to ef fect an early dismissal of schools and its " limited" ob-servation of two school buses reporting to Shoreham-Wading River High l
School and one bus reporting to Ridge Elementary School was too small and
" irrelevant" a sample to justify its conclusions about the implementation of school evacuation plans (Field 16, EOC 20) or the early dismissals of schools (Field 15). Do you agree?
A.
No. FEM A's observation of schools activities was more than sufficient. As LILCO has testified on Contentions EX 15 and 16, schools in the EPZ do not rely on LERO for assistance in an early dismissal or evacuation. Under the LILCO Plan, school children ara evacuated primarily using the school buses used normally to take them home each day and in emergencies pursuant to the schools' own early dismissal plans. As a back-up, LERO can provide additional buses to aid school evacuation if requested to do so by school of-ficials.
In the PID, the Board found that the written school emergency plans required by New York State, coupled with LILCO's planning ef forts, provide adequate assurance that school children will be protected in an emergency.
P!D. 21 NRC at 858. Thus, the allegation that a larger sample size of buses should have been observed by FEMA in order for it to conclude that school children will be evacuated in an emergency school evacuation is simply erroneous, since FEMA was merely observing either ordinary school re-sources or a back-up capability by LERO.
For the same reason, Interveners' focus on delay in the bus dis-patched to the Ridge Elementary School is a red herring. The Ridge free play message was again, designed to test the back-up capabihty of LERO, not the primary method of evacuation using the buses contracted for by
_ schools. Even if one assumes for the sake of argument that the response to the Ridge free play message was somehow inadequate (LILCO disagrees with this assumption, as is explained in detail in LILCO's Testimony on Contention 50, pp. 46-48, Att. B), or that FEMA should have observed a larger sample size of buses, the identification of such alleged inadequacies in a back-up capability cannot denote a fundamental flaw in the Plan, since it sheds no light on whether the primary capability is adequate. In any event, the delay in dispatching the bus to the Ridge School was not so gteat that the children waiting for that bus would not have lef t the EPZ within the evacuation time estimate provided in the Plan. Thus, this support ac-tivity was performed in a timely manner.
- 15. Q.
Has FEMA generally observed a larger sample of resources for schools in other exercises?
A.
No. Of the 38 exercises reviewed by LILCO,12 provided insufficient detail to determine if schools were-part of the exercise or not. The remaining exercises evaluated school evacuation but most did not run any buses. Data from the nine that did run buses indicate:
- of buses
- of exercises 1
5 2
2 3 or more 2
Thus, FEM A's review of the two buses dispatched to the Shoreham-Wading River School District plus one bus provided on a free play basis by LERO constituted a larger than normal sample.
- 16. Q.
In Contention EX 21.D Interveners allege that no valid generalizations re-garding ambulance operations or LERO's ability to evacuate institution-alized, mobility-impaired individuals from the EPZ can be drawn from FEMA's observance of one ambulance and one ambulette driver. Do you agree?
_ A.
No. Again Contention EX 21.D improperly limits its attention to a single aspect of LERO's demonstration of its ability to evacuate institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals. At the Site Area or General Emergency, the Ambulance Coordinator in the EOC contacts the ambulance companies to determine how many ambulances are available for emergency service and to direct them to dispatch all available vehicles to the EWDF. OPIP 3.6.5.
Upon their arrival at the EWDF, Ambulance /Ambulette Drivers are issued i
dosimetry, briefed and directed either proceed to a health care facility or to pick up homebound evacuees based on a priority system. Following the pickup, the driver takes the evacuees to designated reception centers or hospitals. When each assignment is completed, the drivers return to the 1
EWDF for further dispatching.
Contention EX 21.D addresses only FEMA's review of the pickup pro-cess. It ignores the fact that FEMA evaluators observed all the coordi-nation activities in the EOC as well as the availability of personnel and resources to effect the dispatch of ambulance personnel from the EWDF.
In addition, it falls to note that during the February 13 Exercise, LERO notified and mobilized six ambulances and six ambulettes and that FEMA evaluators observed the briefing and dispatch of all of these drivers.
With regard to FEMA's observation of Ambulance /Ambulette Drivers actually driving their routes, I believe that the random sauple observed by FEMA was sufficient to draw conclusions about this emergency function.
The pickup function is nothing more than ambulance and ambulette drivers doing their normal, everyday job. Accordingly, there is no real reason for FEMA to even grade this function. Indeed, since 10 CFR Part 50, App. E expressly indicates that public activities should not be affected by a FEMA
- exercise, it is appropriate that only a small number of ambulances and ambulettes be used in an exercise so that the vast majority remain avail-able to respond to real emergencies.
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- 17. Q.
How does FEMA's sample of ambulances at the Shoreham Exercise compatD with other exercises?
A.
Of the 38 FEMA Exercise Assessment Reports reviewed by LILCO, only 20 indicated that embulances/ambulettes were demonstrated at all. The num-ber of ambulances demonstrated in those exercises was as follows:
- of vehicles
- of exercises i
1 11 2
7 3 or more 2
LERO's mobilization and dispatch of 12 ambulance /ambulettes, of which two were accompanied on their routes by FEMA evaluators, is significantly greater than the usual sample observed by FEMA.
- 18. Q.
In Contention EX 21.E. Interveners contend that FEMA's review was inade-quate to justify generalizations about LERO's ability to provide traffic guid-ance during an emergency since it did not ooserve a large enough sample of traffic guides or actually observe traffic direction. Do you ar,ree with this conclusion?
A.
No. Once again, the contention mischaracterizes FEMA's review of the traffic guidance function. At a Site Area Emergency, Traffic Guides are notified and told to report to the Staging Areas, where they receive dosimetry upon their arrival. See LILCO's Testimony on Contention EX 40.
At where they receive dosimetry upon their arrival. When an evacuation recommendation is given to the public, the Traffic Control Point Coordinator in the EOC instructs the Staging Areas to dispatch the appro-priate Traffic Guides into the field. Af ter the Staging Area receives dis-patch instructions from the EOC. the Lead Traffic Guides brief and
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - I dispatch the Traffic Guides based on the priority manning lists contained in OPIP 3.6.3.
Following dispatch, Ole Traffic Guides pick up radios, cones i
and other equipment necessary to implement their assigned traffic control strategy. They roen proceed to their traffic control points. During the Exercise,165 Traffic Guides were 1. f act dispatched into the field to man j
all 130 traf fic control posts in the EPZ.
Contention EX 2LE is silent on the fact that FEMA evaluators ob-served the decisienmaking activities in the EOC or that other FEMA evaluators at the Staging Areas observed the mobilization and dispatch of all 165 Traffic Guides, and instead limits its attention to the number of Traffic Guides (32) whord FEMA evaluators questioned at their-field posi-tions about their field duties.
I believe FEMA conducted a thorough revtew of the traffic guidance function and the ability of LERO '.o implement that function. In addition to reviewing all activities througr, the dispatch of Traffic Guides to the field, FEMA also reviewed a random selection of 32 of 165 traffic guides in the field. Interveners have offered no reason why this sample provides an insufficient basis for FEMA's cone'iusion that Traffic Guides performed well generally.
Moreover, Interveners' allegations that FEMA should have reviewed actual traffic direction by LERO Traffic Guides ignores the earlier exten-sive trsining litigation. There, the Board concluded:
the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the job of traffic guides is not so complex that it cannot be learned within the time allocated in Dr. Babb's training program. The Board finds no substantial evidence in support of the Suffolk County claim that the jobs can-no* be performed properly without extensive experi-ence.
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PID,21 NRC at 749-50. Interveners fail to exp:ain how ir. light oi this con-l clusion FEMNs f ailure to observe Traffic Guides actually directing traffic l
could have led to the discovery of a flaw in the LILCO Plan.
Interveners' allegations also ignore the fact that an exercise should not affect the public. Demonstration of actual traffic guidance on public roadways would have had a direct effect on the public and would have exposed the Traffic Guides to possible legal prosecution, since Interveners maintain that LERO Traffic Guides are not legally empowered to direct traffic.
- 19. Q.
Interveners also allege, given FEMA's findings that Riverhead Traffic Guides were late in arriving at their posts, that some Traffic Guides did not know the location of the Reception Center and that radio communications may have been difficult from the Port Jefferson Staging Area, that FEMA could not have drawn conclusions about objectives Field 6 and 11, SA 9 and EOC 16 and 19. Do you agree?
A.
No. In the firrt place, the t'Iree examples contained in subpart E all relate to field activities, not to decision-making or directional activities con-ducted in the EOC and Staging Areas. Thus, the cited examples have no bearing on objectives SA 9, EOC 16 and 19.
With regard to field operations, the cited examples do not preclude a finding of reasonable assurance. The claim that Riverhead Traffic Guides were late in arriving at their posts is duplicative of issues already raised in Contention EX 40..B and addressed by LILCO's testimony on that issue. In short, the Riverhead Traffic Guides were mobilized in a timely manner. As LILCO has testified on Contention EX 50, the fact that some Traffic Guides did not know the location of the Reception Center is not an important f ac-tor since the primary purpose of Traffic Guides is to expedite ine flow of evacuation traffic, not to answer drivers' questions. Indeed, EBS messages
- and other public information would clearly indicate the location of the Reception Center and Traffic Guides are trained to direct inquiring motor-ists to tune to EBS stations. Finally, the fact that radio communications may, at times, have been " difficult" from the Port Jefferson Staging Area does not mean that communication was impossible or that the " difficulties" resulted in an inability to implement the LILCO Plan. See LILCO's Testi-many on Contention EX 50, pp. 49-50, Att. B.
Thus, Interveners' alleged problems do not establish flaws in the LILCO Plan.
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- 20. Q.
lias FEMA generally observed a larger sample of Traffic Guides in other7 exercises?
A.
No. Of the 38 exercises reviewed by LILCO, only 24 contained sufficient information to determine how many traffic control points were either acti-vated or observed. These reports show that:
- of TCPs
- of exercises 1-3 9
4-8 11 A
9 & greater 4
j Since LERO activated 130 traffic control points (manned by 165 Traffic Guides) and FEM A observed 27 of these (manned by 32 Traffic Guides) the sample reviewed by FEMA during the Shoreham Exercise was clearly much larger than any of the samples observed in other exercises.
- 21. Q.
In Contention EX 21.F Interveners challenge the number of impediments simulated during the Exercise as insufficient to reflect the number that would occur during an actual emergency. Interveners also question LERO's ability to respond to two hypothetical accidents. Do you agree that the Ex-ercise was flawed because it did not respond to a sufficiently large number of accidents or that LERO's response to the hypothetical accidents was in-adequate?
A.
No. In my view, this contention raises no issues not previosly addressed in the titigation of Contention EX 41. There, LILCO witnesses explained that
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the number of impediments posed by FEMA during the Exercise was consis-tent with expected acci. dent rates, and if anything was an overtesting of LERO's response capabilities, given the unusual severity of the two impedi-ments. The adequacy of LERO's response and FEMA's observation of that response have also been discussed in complete detall in LILCO's testimony on Contention EX 41 and, for brevity, I will not repeat it here.
- 22. Q.
Was the number of impediments injected into the Febrony 13 Exercise ty -
ical of those posed in other exercises?
}
A.
Of the 38 exercise assessments reviewed by LILCO, only 13 exercised road impediments and two of those had no field response. Of the 11 that had a field response, the following number of impediments were imposed:
- of impediments
- of exercises
, 1 3
%h 2
4 3 or more 4
t Thus, the imposition of two impediments during the Shoreham Exercise was
>)
consistent with FEMA's practice at other ovacch.
- 23. Q.
In Contention EX 15.L 16.N. 22.K and 32, Interveners allege that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that (1) the two facilities involved in the Exercise are not identified in the Plan as congregate care centers, and were not a large enough sample for FEMA to have observed; (2) there are, in f act, no congregate care f acilities identified in the Plan: and (3) there are no agreements to use congregate care facilities in the Plan. Do you agree?
A.
No. Again, as FEMA witnesses have testified, the number of congregate care centers evaluated during the February 13 Exercise was consistent with the number observed at other exercises. FEM A Testimony at 157.
Interveners' complaint that the two congregate care centers used during the Exercise were not in the Plan elevates form over substance.
The Red Cross keeps a list of centers and supporting agreements in its own
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ - ___ - _________ files, and the failure to copy that list into the Plan can hardly be viewed as a flaw in the Plan. In fact, the two congregate care centers activated dur-ing the February 13 Exercise were both on the list of Red Cross centers.
There is no reason to doubt that the Red Cross will be able to operate con-gregate care centers in a real emergency. The Licensing Board approved the Red Cross's standards for selecting congregate care centers and di-rected the NRC Staff to ensure that the existing agreements for such cen-ters are up-to-date. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO will be able to coordinate with the Red Cross during a real emergency.
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ATTACHMENT A 1
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Attachment A Contention EX 21. (Subpart L of EX 15, subpart N of EX 16, subpart K of EX 22, and EX 32 constitute an additional basis of EX 21 relating to congregate care centers].
FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its conclusion that certain exercise objectives identified in subparts A-F below were met or were partly met during the ex-ercise in that even with respect to the events and activities which FEMA did observe, the samples which FEMA reviewed were much too small to permit valid generalizations or to support FEM A's conclusions concerning these objectives. Therefore, FEMA's con-clusions on such objectives cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The LILCO Plan is, therefore, fundamental flawed.
EX 21.A.
Under the LILCO Plan, 60 Route Alert Drivers are expected to be j
available to drive through the EPZ to notify the public of an emergency in the event of siren f ailure. See Plan, Fig. 2,2.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att.1. Specifically, a total of 20 Route Alert Drivers are to be available at each of the Port Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to drive 33, 26 and 30 routes, respectively. See Plan, Fig.
2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 3. During the exercise, however, only three Route Alert Drivers (one from each Staging Area) were dispatched by LILCO and observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74: s_ee also FEMA Report at 20. Based solely on these observa-tions, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 56, 57, 62, 64, 72 and 74. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with re-spect to all Route Alert Drivers, or I,ILCO's ability to notify the public in the entire EPZ.
I Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found that the time necessary to brief, deploy, and drive even one route (i.e_., assuming only one failed siren for each Staging Area) was excessive. FEMA Report at 57,64 and
- 74. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with re-i spect to the three Route Alert Drivers it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect j
to objectives FIELD 5. SA 9, and EOC 15 are without basis and invalid. The exercise re-suits concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.B.
According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the transit-dependent population requires 333 LILCO bus drivers to retrieve 333 buses from 20 bus company locations, and to make 377 bus trips (using 236 buses) over 43 separate routes within the EPZ, plus 97 trips to Nassau Coliseum. S_e_e OPIP 3.6.4; App. A at IV-74a thru -165d.
According to the Plan,108 bus drivers are required to make 169 bus trips from the two transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson Staging Area,100 bus driv-ers are required to make 139 bus trips from the five transfer points under the jurisdic-tion of the Riverhead Staging Area, and 125 bus drivers are required to make 166 bus trips from the tour transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Patchogue Staging Area. S_ee OFIP 3.6.4, A tt.11; cl. Plan, Fig. 2.1.1.
During the exercise, FEMA observed only two bus drivers from each of the Riverheao and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 38,74. Af ter retrieving a bus from the assigned bus company yard, they each drove one EPZ route, then re-turned to their assigned transfer point and proceeded to the Nassau Coliseum. Based solely on its observation of two bus drivers making one run each, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 9 was met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58 and 74. In addition, FEMA observed four bus drivers from the Patchogue
1
< Staging Area attempt to retrieve buses and drive bus routes. FEMA Report at 64-65.
FEMA concluded, on the basis of those drivers' inability to pick up buses or to drive routes properly or in a timely manner, that objective FIELD 9 was not met at the Patchogue Staging Area.
I_d.
Nonetheless, based upon its observations of eight drivers making a total of eight bus runs, at least three of which were judged unsatWf actory b-FEMA, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met. FEMA Report at 34.
In light of the small sampling of bus drivers reviewed by FEMA, and FEMA's con-clusions regarding the entire sample of bus drivers reviewed at the Patchogue Staging Area FEMA's conclusions as to objective FIELD 9 for Port Jefferson and Riverhcad, and ao to EOC 16 for the entire EPZ, are without basis and invalid, and f ail to justify FEMA's generalizations about all LILCO bus drivers under the LILCO Plan. The exer-cise results concerning those objectives thus preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.C. Eleven school districts (with 33 schools), one BOCES supervisory dis-trict, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings located within the EPZ. In addition, there are seven school districts with no school buildings within the EPZ but whose district boundaries include residences within the EPZ (ig., with chil-dren who live in the EPZ); and, there are three parochial schools and one BOCES super-vi. wry district with buildings located just br yond the EPZ boundary. See OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3; c_f. App. A at IV-169 thru -171. Dut" Ag the exercise, FEMA observed two buses report to one school (Shoreham-Wading Ri' er High School), where two bus drivers al-legedly received maps and instructions. FEMA Report at 43. FEMA was not able to ob-serve the organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools, however. FEMA Report at 38. FEMA also observed one bus, driven by a LILCO employee, arrive at the Ridge Elementary School (almost three hours af ter it had been " requested" in a free play message 1. FEMA Report at 38.
Neither of the two Shoreham-Wading River buses observed by FEMA drove any early dismissal or evacuation routes or transported any children, nor had either of the bus drivers received any training or information concerning any plans for protecting or evacuating school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. See FEMA Report at 44-45. The free play message " requesting" a bus to Ridge Elementary School was in-jected by FEMA at 10:30: however, a bus driver was not dispatched to pick up a bus until 40 minutes af ter the request was received by Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA Re-port at 66. The bus did not arrive at the school until 1:23 (FEMA Report at 38) and, ac-cording to LILCO, even as late as 4:23. It had not arrived at the Reception Center. The bus did not transport any children, and neither the driver, the FEM A evaluator', nor any other exercise player, had any contact with any officials from the Ridge School or the Longwood School District. The FEMA evaluator merely observed the bus arrive at and leave the school.
Based solely upon these Observations, however, and despite FEM A's acknowl-edged failure to observe LILCO's ability to effect an early dismissal, and the irrelevance of the situation postulated in the Ridge School free play message to the evacuation pro-eedures in the LILCO Plan (see Contention EX 20.G), FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 were met. FEMA Report at 38,43.
The limited observations and irrelevant sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions do nct justify FEMA's generalization about the ability to evacuate all schools, school districts, and school children in the EPZ and the ability to accomplish
_ an early dismissal of all such schools, districts and children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In light of FEM A's limited observation, the irrelevance of the Ridge School free play message, and the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 are without basis and invalid. The exer-cise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in that event of a Shoreham acci-dent.
EX 21.D.
According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ (excluding residents at facilities which LILCO assumes would not require transportation assistance and those in the three hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (cf. App. A at IV-175 and OPIP 3.6.5. Att 2)) requires 23 am-bulances and 178 ambulettes from 11 ambulance companies to make runs from the ap-proximately 10 special facilities in the EPZ requiring transportation assistance from LILCO (there ara, altogether,19 health care facihties, excluding hospitals, at 23 loca-tions throughout the EPZ) to unidentified reception centers outside the EPZ.
See OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-173 thru -178.
During the exercise, FEMA observed only one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver each drive one route. Based solely on its observation of these two ac-tivities, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 13 was met. FEMA Report at 43. The sample upon which FEMA based this conclusion was much too small to justify FEMA's l
generali'
- ion about all ambulance and ambulette drivers and LILCO's ability to evacu-ate institt.onalized, mobility-impaired individuals from all the special f acilities locat-ed in the EPZ. In addition, based upon its observation of two drivers, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met with respect to all the institutionalized, mobility-impaired residents of the EPZ. FEMA Report at 34. In light of the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16 are with-out basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a find-ing of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.E.
Under the LILCO Plan,165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 l
traffic control points (TCPs) in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ.
OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. More specifically,72 Traffic Guides from the Port Jefferson Staging Area are expected to man 58 TCPs: 41 Guides from the ':
gue Staging Area are ex-3 l
pected to man 28 TCPs: and 52 Guides from the Riverheau.. aging Area are expected l
l to man 44 TCPs. LILCO Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. During the exercise, how-4 ever, FEMA apparently only observed a total of 27 TCPs manned by 32 Guides (10 TCPs with 10 Guides from Port Jefferson; nine TCPs with 14 Guides from Patchogue; and eight TCPs with eight Guides from Riverhead). See FEM A Report at 57, 64 ar.d 74.
Based solely on those observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA
- 65. 72,74 and 75. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too l
small, however, to justify FEM A's generalizations with respect to all Traffic Guides, all j
TCPs, and evacuation and access control of the entire EPZ.,
j Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found (1) that the time between deployment from the staging area and arrival at TCPS was excessive - Q. two hours af ter declaration of a general emergency and well over an hour af ter the first evacuation recommendation - for the eight TCPs from the Riverhead Staging Area (FEMA Report at 74); (ii) that only one out of the 14 Guides in-terviewed from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Reception Center
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ (FEMA Report at 64); and,(iii) that communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was sometimes difficult due to poor radio reception (FEMA Re-
)
port at 56). In addition, FEMA acknowledged that it was unable to render any evalua-j tion regarding the timeliness of TCP set-up with respect to any of the 10 TCPs within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction. FEM A Report at 57. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the few TCPs it did observe. FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 6 and 11. SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those ob-jectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.F.
During the exercise, FEMA chose only two locations to observe LILCO's ability to dehl with impediments to evacuation (objective EOC 17). These two locations - in the vicinity of TCPs 41 and 124 -- both involved simulated traffic ob-structions; they were the result of a simulated accident involving a gravel truck and three cars (TCP 124) and a simulated accident involving a fuel truck (TCP 41). FEMA Report at 30, 36-38.
FEMA was unable to observe LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (s_e_e FEMA Report at 37, 57-58), found LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment in-adequate (FEMA Report at 36-38), and concluded that objective EOC 7 was only partly met and objective EOC 17 was not met (FEMA Report at 29-30, 36-38).
FEMA q
nonetheless concluded that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson j
Staging Area were met and that objective FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was partly met (FEM A Report at 34, 58, 65).
Those conclusions are without basis and invalid, in light of the following f acts:
)
I (i) FEMA never even observed LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (which occurred within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction) see App. A, Fig.
e 8, and FEMA Report at 57-58; (ii) LILCO did not respond to the fuel truck impeciment until more than three hours af ter the free play message had been injected at 11:00 (FEMA Report at 36-37, 57);
(iii) There were substantial delays in LILCO's response to the gravel truck im-pediment (which occurred witnin the Patchogue Stagig Area's jurisdiction, s_ee App. A.
Fig. 8 and FEM A Report at 65);
i (iv) The response was inadequate for removal of the gravel truck impediment l
l (only one tow truck was dispatched even though the simulated accident involved three l
cars and the gravel truck, and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road)(FEMA Report at 37. 65);
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At least two hours elapsed before LILCO's Transportation Support Coordinator was informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the i
gravel truck impediment (FEMA Report at 36).
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In addition, the sample upon which FEM A based its conclusions regarding objec-tives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the l
Patchogue Staging Area was much too.small to justify FEMA's generalizations with re-spect to the entire EPZ and LILCO's ability to implement an evacuation during a Shoreham accident. Under the LILCO Plan,165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traf fic control points in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. App. A, Fig.
)
8; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4.
These locations are manned by LILCO because traffic must be kept moving through them in order to permit evacuees to follow the routes prescribed in the LILCO Plan. The evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise were premised on the assumption that such prescribed routes were in fact available for full capacity use throughouc the evacuation process. Thus, there are a substantial number of places where impediments are likely to occur because of antici-
)
pated heavy traffic, and where their occurrence would have significant impact upon i
the ability to implement an evacuation, but which were ignored in FEMA's evaluation of LILCO's ability to remove impediments. Furthermore, the two locations actually cho-sen for the impediment demonstrations during the exercise are virtuelly the only loca-tions on ene evacuation routes chosen for the impediment messages which would allow easy re-routing of evacuation traffic around the traffic impediments, assuming arguendo. LILCO had been able to respond to the locations of the impediments in a timely manner.
In light of the small sample of traffic impediment locations observed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to the single attempted impediment response it did observe, and the unique and unrepresentative impediment locations chosen by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area are without basis and invalid, thereby precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 15.L. [To be litigated as an additional basis of EX _21]. A demonstration of the availability, accessibility, and adequacy of f acilities designated to be used as con-gregate care centers for evacuees under the LILCO Plan (s_e_e, e.g., OPII' 4.2.3, pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.6-7 thru 3.6-7a, 3.7-2, 3.9-6, and 4.8-1 and Appendix B of the LILCO Plan) was excluded from the exercise, in that the two facilities involved in the exercise are not among those identified in the Plan. See FEM A Report at 82-83. Such f acilities are also not referenced in any letter of agreement from the Red Cross. Such facilities and agreements guaranteeing and demonstrating their availability, accessibility and ad-equacy are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10): NUREG 0654 5 II.A.3, C.4, J.10.a and g., and J.12: and objectives FIELD 18 and 22. Their exclusion f rom the exer-cise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 32. [Not separately admitted but will be dealt with as an additional basis for EX 21]. The Congregate Care Center ARCA refers to the fact that the two facilities used during the exercise are not pet of tne LILCO Plan. FEMA Report at 83. Indeed, there are rio congregate care facilities indeLufied in the LILCO Plan, nor are there agreements in the Plan which indicate that any such facilities exist or are available for LILCO's use during a Shoreham accident. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate facilities to support the emergency responses as required by 10
)
CFR S 50.47(bX8), as well as a finding that the protective action of evacuation would be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of rea-sonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 22.K. [ Not separately admitted but will be considered under EX 21 to nxtent that the basis concerns the f act that only two centers were activated). During the ex-ercise, the LILCO players pretended that approximately 15 non-LILCO f acilities, in j
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addition to the two f acilities observed by FEMA, were available to serve as congregate care centers, and that such f acilities had a total capacity of approximately 34,900. Ap-parently, the LILCO players engaged in this pretense based on an assumption that the owners of such f acilities, primarily schools in Nassau County, had agreed to allow LILCO and the Red Cross to use their f acilities af ter a Shoreham accident. That as-sumption is false. There are no agreements between LILCO or the Red Cross and the owners of the facilitics mentioned during the exercise permitting tileir use as part of the LILCO Plan or following a Shoreham accident and the Red Cross has so informed LILCO. Because the exercise was premised on the false assumption stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shorcham emergen-cy. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally fla'ved.
EX 16.N. [To be litigated as an additional basis of EX 21]. The owners of f acili-ties, purportedly available and relied upon to serve as congregate care centers, did not participate in the exercise, nor were the f acilities themselves or their adequacy dem-onstrated, during the exercise. See LILCO Plan, App. B; se_e also FEMA Report at 82.
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I ATTACHMENT B i
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Attachment B Facility Exercise Date FITZPATRICK Aug.11,1982 GIN N A Jan.21,1982 GINNA June 22,1983 GINNA Sept.26,1985
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HOPE CREEK Oct. 29,1985 1
INDIAN POINT-2 Mar. 9,1983 l
INDIAN POINT-2 June 4,1986 3
INDIAN POINT-3 Mar. 3,1982 INDIAN POINT-3 Aug. 24-25,1983 INDIAN POINT-3 Nov.28,1984 NINE MILE POINT Sept.15,1981 NINE MILE POINT Sept.28,1983 NINE MILE POINT Nov.13,1985 OYSTER CREEK Mar.16,1982 OYSTER CREEK June 5,1985 SALEM Oct. 23,1984 BEAVER VALLEY Feb.17,1982 BR AIDWOOD Nov.6,1985 BYRON Nov.15,1983 CALLAWAY Mar. 21,1984 CALVERT CLIFFS Nov.17,1981 DIABLO CANYON Aug.19,1981 DUANE ARNOLD A ug.1,1984
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l Facility Exercise Date FERMI - 2 Feb.1-2,1982 1
HADDAM NECK May 12,1984 LIMERICK July 25,1984 l
l MAINE YANKEE Dec.11,1982 MILLSTONE Mar.19,1982 1
PEACH BOTTOM Oct.17,1984 PERRY Nov. 28,1984 PILGRIM Mar. 3,1982 PILGRIM Sept.5,1985 POINT BEACH Mar. 9,1982 SEABROOK Feb.26,1986 l
SHEARON HARRIS May 17-18,1985 VERMONT YANKEE Feb.18,1982 WOLF CREEK Nov.7,1984 ZION July 29,1981 l
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ATTACHMENT C 1
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1 Attachment C i
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11W ~SCRIFI' OP :?30 "EK
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In the Matter of:
Docket No. 50-322-OL-S LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, (ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL)
Unit 1)
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i DEPOSITION OF SHELDON A.
SCHWARTZ AND BERNARD H.
NEISS i
i Bethesda, Maryland i
Wednesday, January 14, 1987 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
I'm still not sure.
2 MR. IRWIN:
Let me try it from a different 3
approach.
You know that it is the intent of a utility and 4
whatever other entities may be responsible for off-site 5
emergency planning at a given plant to conduct a full 1
6 participation exercise.
How do you know that what's going I
7 into that exercise in terms of objectives to be demonstrated l
8 is going to be sufficient to establish it as a full 9
Participation exercise?
How do you determine that?
i 10 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
I know because it has been 11 reviewed by a committee that uses the criteria published --
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12 the guidance, sorry, the guidance published by FEMA, and it 13 meets that guidance, and the NRC person is satisfied that it i
14 meets our regulations, that the scope of that exercise 15 demonstrates or will demonstrate the integrated response of 16 that particular plan.
17 MR. IRWIN:
And so if you have -- strige that.
18 Let's look for a momer.t at the intensity of 19 observation of the resources deployed to meet objectives in 20 an exercise, and again we're talking about exercise design, 21 setting it up.
What's the process -- is there any 22 hard-and-fact line of criterion which tells you how many
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kinds of sample -- what kinds of samples you have to observe 2
or what size those sanples have to be in order to assess 3
whether an objective has been fulfilled?
4 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
Could you define what you mean 5
by " sample"?
6 MR. IRWIN:
Sure.
I will give you an example.
7 Let us suppose that in a given exercise, or in a given 8
emergency plan. it is contemplated that approximately 300 bus 9
routes will be run to evacuate members of the general 10 population if need be.
The exercise may call for deploying 11 in fact anywhere from zero to up to 300 of the buses to 12 actually run those routes.
From within that number deployed, 13 FEMA and its agents will observe the performance of anywhere 14 from zero te whatever the end happens to be of the buses 15 actually deployed.
What I'm interested in is whether you 16 know of any hard-and-fast rule or criterion which says the 17 sample size must be of X size or greater, or any other rule 18 by which sample size must be determined in order to be 19 minimumly acceptable?
20 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
I know of none in this area.
21 WITNESS WEISS:
No.
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22 MR. IRWIN:
,oth of you know of none?
Do you know 1
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of any rule which says sample sizes must be statistically 2
significant in size, using the term " statistically
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3 significant" as a term of art?
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WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
I understand what you are 5
saying.
The only area that I know where you get into that 6
FEMA has gotten into statistically significant sampling is 7
the example of the alert system.
That's all I know about 8
anything published..
9 MR. IRWIN:
With respect to any other kind of
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10 sampling, you are not aware of the use of --
11 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
I'm not aware of any.
12 WITNESS WEISS:
No.
13 MR. IRWIN:
Mr. Weiss, you also agree with that?
14 WITNESS WEISS:
Yes.
15 MR. IRWIN:
Again, in the process of setting up 16 the sampling to be used in an exercise, is it the NRC's 17 practice to defer to the RAC process in deciding what are 18 appropriate sampling sizes to verify the in,plementation of 19 objectives?
1 20 WITNESS SCHWARTZ:
Yes.
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21 MR. IRWIN:
Let's turn to Appendix E to Part 50.
22 That's Exhibit 3.
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