ML20238A479
| ML20238A479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Mcloughlin D Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-056, OL-5-I-SC-56, NUDOCS 8708310093 | |
| Download: ML20238A479 (69) | |
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'87 AUG 24 A9 :44 fn Z-SC-SS q,[40%; Federal Emergency Managernent; Agency
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gc Region II 26 Federal Plaza New Yoik.'New York 10278 SEP 2 S 1953 Mr. Dave McLoughlin Deputy Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support Federal E=ergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S. W.
l Washington, D. C.
20472
Dear Mr. McLoughlin:
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Attached, please find one docen copies of Region II's Post Exercise I
Assessment of the August 24, 1983 exercise of the State of New York's Radiological E=ergency Response Interi= Plan for I plementing Co:pensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station.'
ne planning for and conduct of the *'estchester drill and Rockland County 9
Exercise was a cooperative endeavor, ne Governor, Lt. Governor and the Westchester County Executive all displayed leadership.
Both utilities were =est cooperative in providing resource ~s and caking personnel l
available, ne August 24th exercise demonstrated the adequacy of the State's interi=
l co:pensating plan for Rockland County and the ability of the State to 1 -
l ple ent the plan.
Berefore, the significant deficiency for Rockland County identified in the Dece=ber 16, 1952 Update Report no longer exists.
At this point in the FD'.A CFR 350 process, based on a review of the State of New York's Radiological E=ergency Response Interi Plan for I:plementing Co:pensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; the assessment of the August 24th exercise in Rockland County; and the assess =ent of the August 23rd drill in L'estchester County, I can reasonably assure that the health and saf_ety of the residents.living within a ten-cile radius of Indian Point carr "Ee/ protected. man m, l
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Frank P. Petrone Regional Director Attach'=ents 8708310093 870504 PDR ADOCK 05000322 o
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O August 24-25,1983, Exercise of the State of New York Radiological Emergency Response i
l interim Plan for implementing' Compensating q
Measures for Rockland County for the INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION September 26,1983 i
Federal Emergency Management Agency' Region II 1
8310050552 830929 PDR ACOCK 05000003 F
PDR FRANK P. PETRoNE 26 FEDERAL PLAZA Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278
.U17453; POST. EXIRCIS E -
ASSESSMENT
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August 24-IS,1983, Exercise of the State of New York Radiological Emergency Response Interim Plan for Implementing Compensating Measures for Rockland County for the INDIAN ?OINT NUCLEAR P0k'IR STATION September 26, 1983 Tederal Emergtncy Management Agency Region II l
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Trank ?. Petrone 06 Federal 71azai-1 Regional Director New York, N.Y. 10278 1
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U17461 CONTENTS V
A3 3 RE V I AT I O N S................................................... -.........
SL*MMART...............*................
- ....................... vii 1
1 INTRODUCTION...........................................................
I 1.1 Exercise 3ackground...............................................
4 1.2 T e d e r al O b s e rv e r s..................................................
5 1.3 Evaluation Criteria...............................................
6 1.4 Exercis e Obj ectiv es..............................................
11 1.5 Ex er c i s e S c ena r1 o.................................................
1 11-1.5.1 Major Sequence'of Events on Site..........................
I'1 1 5.2 Scenario Su= mary..........................................
12 1.5.3 Description of State Resources...........,................
2 EXERCISE EVALUATION:
DEFICIENCIES AND REC 0W{EKD ATIONS..................16 5
i 16 2.1 S tate o f New York and South ern Dis trict...........................
16 2.1.1 Emerg ency Operations Tac 111 ties and - Resources.............
2.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff..........
17 19' 2.1.3 E= er g ency op er ations Manag ement...........................
20 2.1.4 Ac ci d ent As s e s s m en t.......................................
2.1.5 Actions to Protect the Public.............................
20 2.1.6 Health, Medical, and Exposur e Control Measures............
21 21 2.1.7 Recovery and Reentry Operations...........................
2.1.8 Rel ev anc e of the Ex ercis e Experience...................... 22 21 2.2 Em e rg enc y Opera tio n s Fa cili t y.....................................
2.3 New York S tate Compensating Tor Rockland County...................
23 23 2.3.1 Emergency operations Facilities and Resources.............
2.3.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff..........
25 27 2.3.3 Em erg ency Op erations Mana g em en t...........................
2.3.4 Public Aler ting and No tification.. /.......................
28 2.3.5 Pu bli c and M ed i a Rel a t i o n s................................
29 i
2.3.6 Accident As s e s sm e n t.......................................
30 2.3.7 Actions to Protect the Publ1c.............................
31 2.3.8 Eealth, Medical, and Expo sure Control Measur es............
33 35 2.3.9 Recov ery and Re entry Oper a tions...........................
l 2.3.10 Relevance of the Exercise Expe 1ence......................
36 36 l
2.4 S e r g en Co un t y, N ew J e r s e y.........................................
l 2.4.1 Emerg ency Operations Facilities and Resou6ces.............
36 2.4.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f..........
37 2.4.3 Actions to Protect the Public.........................'....
37 2.4.4 Relevanc e o f Ex ercis e Experi enc e...................
37 38-3
SUMMARY
OF DEFIC;INCIES................................................
3.1 The State of New York and Southern District.......................
38 3,1.1 Emergency Operations Tacilities and Resources.............
38 3.1.2 Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f..........
38
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U17462 ABBREVIATIONS ANL Argonne Na:Lonal.Labora:ory BCECC Bergen County EOC- (N.J.)
i DOC U.S. Department'of Co==erce DOE U.S. Depart:ent of ' Energy.
.U.S. Depart =ent!of Transporta: ion s
EBS E=ergency 3readcast System ECL emergency classification level
'EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations f acility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency -
. emergency planning zone ERPA emergency. response planning area TDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Manage =ent Agency EHS U.S. Department of Health and ' Human ~ Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory K1 potassiu= iodide NAVAS National Warning System-NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NY/RC New York State compensating for Rockland County 1
ODP New York State Of fice of Disaster Preparedness PAG pro:ective ac:fon guide PIO public information officer PMC personnel monitoring center RAC Regional Assistance Com=ittee 1
i RACES Radio A=ateur Civil E=ergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Co==unications System RERP Radiological E=ergency Response ?lar RERIP State of New York Radiological E=ergency Response Interim Plan for Implementing Compensa:ing Measures for-Rockland Coun:y SDEOC Southern District E=ergency Operations Center (Poughkeepsie)
SEOC state emergency operations center (Albany)
TLD thermoluminescent desieeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture i
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U17464
SUMMARY
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The State of New York and Southern District
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l he state response to the exercise was pro pt and ef f ec:ive.
Opera-j e:ergency operations center (SEOC) were well organized i
tions vi:hin the s: ace and efficiently executed. Displays of affected population, evacuation routes, and other per:inent infor=ation were current and i= proved from previous j
exercises.
This was an off-hours exercise.
Nevertheless, a full co=plement of e=ergency responders participated.
Accident assess:ent was thorough and timely.
The review of technical data with the county was handled by a county liaison for radiological intelligence.
In addition, a New York Power Authority representative was present to explain the status of conditions within the facility to the assessment and control of ficials.
The participa-tion of these individuals was an i=provement from previous exercises. Coc:=and and control for the response was based upon a deliberative review of all technical data.
Decisions to i=plement protective actions were carefully veighed and frequently reviewed as meteorological conditions within the 10-ctile e=ergency planning zone (EPZ) or conditions at the plant changed.
The scenario tested the major response elements at the SEOC.
No preknowledge of l
the scenario was evident.
l The Division of State Police, coop F, at Middletown notified repre-sentatives of all state e=ergency re.,po n s e agencies within 30 cinutes that they were to initiate their procedures under the State of New York Radio-logical E=ergency Response Interim Plan for implementing Compensating Measures for Rockland County ( RIRI?).
However, the alerting eessage used did not s pe cif y the currect e=erge:cy classifica: ion level nor did it note tha: a drill, not an actual e=ergency, was in progress.
Overall, the Southern District e ergency operations center (SDECC) perfor=ed well during the exercist.
However, the three available telephone lines were not sufficient to allow all participating agency representatives to coccact their agency offices.
The alerting r.nd notification of staff and officials could be enhanced by a secondary systes like au:osatic pagers for key personnel.
E=errenev 0:erations Facility The objectives of the exercise did not require that acciden: assessment and reco==enda: ions for protec:1ve actions be demonstra:ed at :he esergency operations facility (EOF).
The appropriate counties were notified over the Radiological E:ergency Co==unications Syste= (F.ECS) line and coordination was
=aintained vi:h the 1.ieutenant Governor's office throughout the exerefse.
Scenario data vere provided to New York State and to the New York State compensating for Reckland County (NY/RC) in a timely canner.
Messages were clear and appropriate delays were si=ulated.
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U174,65 4
f New York State Cocoensatine for Rockland Countv_
I New York State demonstrated in this exercise : hat it is capable of l
that Rockland County is unable 1:plementing compensating measures in the event f
an effective radiological emergency response.
to Sount the h7/RC EOC vere I
~he e:etgency operations facilities and resources at good and were adecuate to support the emergency respense.
Although the RICS dedicated line malfunctioned on several occasions,-
alternative backup j
co==unications syste=s were effectively us e.d to coevenstte for thest j
l malfunctions until the RECS line was reptired.
J Fest activities necessary to implement the RERi? vere accomplished in a The Division of State Police, Troop F, in Middletown notified timely fashion.
representatives of all state response agencies within one half hour and these personnel reported to the Rockland County EOC in a timely canner.
The procedures and equipment used for notifying and mobilizing hT/RC emergency response personnel were adequate.
and executive decision-making were well Emergency operations management coordinated between the state and county EOCs.
The I.ieutenant~ Governor and, during his absence, the Director of Helen Hayes Hospital vere in charge of the emergency response as specified in the RERIP.
Upon his arrival at the EOC, Governor assu=ed the decision-=aking authority and directed all the Lieutenant e=ergency response activities through his staff.
The representatives of all state agencies de:enstrated the ability to accurately assess and anticipate the evolving e:ergency situations on the basis of technical infor:ation l
presented throughout the exercise. The Lieutenant Governor was able to arrive
-l appropriate decisions after consulting with his staff.
at Sirens were used to alert the public in the 10-=ile EPZ vithin Rockland County.
The sirens were sounded in a ti:ely =anner at the alert emergency
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classification level.
Airing of the first Emergency Broadcast Syste: (EBS) message,was well coordinated with the siren sounding.
New York State has =ade an acceptable effort in the area of public education.
As part of this l
progra=, an interim public education brochure was mailed to Rockland County I
residents within the 10-=ile EP2.
Based on limited spot checks cade by l
federai observers, not all residents have received the public education
=aterial.
Additionally, not all individuals questioned by obsetvers understood that the siress are a signal to tune to an EBS radio station for additional emergency infor=ation.
The dose assessment staff in the EOC and the field monitoring personnel were outstanding.
~he field tea =s had proper equip =ent and were well trained in radiological sonitoring procedures.
Co==unications between the field teams and the ST/RC emergency operations center vere outstanding.
The dose assess-ment staff in the EOC =ade nu=erous hypothetical calculations and briefed decision =akers on the range of the consequences that could be expected.
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During :he final' stages of the exercise the s:aff desens: rated an ou: standing cacabili:y to plan for :he ac:ivities :ha: vould be necessary for :he recovery and reen:ry to evacua:ed areas.
Sufficier.: personnel and equip en vere available at the W/RC EOC for i= cl e=en:1eg procee:ive actions.
All f r e e-play emergency response activities decision akers by f ederal observers including the traf fic s
in:;oduced to the control points, impedimen:s to evacuation, and ' evacuation of ocility-1: paired persons were ef f ectively carried ou: by the appropriate agencies in the EOC.
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The capability to evacuate the general public was also demonstrated.
This d e= ens tr ation of emergency transportation response by bus companies estab-l l
11shed that there has been a significant improv e: tent of capabili:1es over previous performances.
However, further f.mprovesents are desirable, particu-
' I larly with respect to mobile radios for vehicle-to-base communications and the total nu ber of drivers trained in both evacuation bus routes and radio-protective measures f or emergency workers.
More training in the execution of evacuacion routes for the transit-d epend ent, mobility-impaired population is ;
also needed.
The de=enstration of measures for controlling radiological exposure to e= erg ency workers was generally good.
Staff at the W/RC EOC vore ther=o-f luminescent desi=eter badges, since the EOC lies within the 10-=ile E?Z. The l
i u:ili:y volunteers dis patched from the Armory in Orang eburg were to be provided with desi=eters and potassium iodide (KI) by the agencies to which they were dispatched.
Training in the use of dosimeters is recommended for 3
emergency personnel who are to be stationed at traffic control points.
?ersonnel at several of the traf fic control points that were observed had not been trained in the use of desi=eters and hov often to read the= nor in the keeping of radiological exposure records.
~he d e=ons :ra tion of plans and procedures for recovery and reentry l o'p er ations was outstanding.
A task force consisting of one me=ber from each for=ed to monitor recovery and reentry operations until they would agency was be co:ple:ed.
3erren Countv. New Jersev 3ergen County, New Jersey, is a host area for evacuees - from Rockland l
l County requiring congregate care.
The Bergen County EOC (3CEOC) was activated on a limited basis and the Red Cross established a congregate care c ent er.
'"h e 3CEOC vas promptly alerted and mobilized.
Although telechone and radio sys t ems were available for co==unication from Rockland Coun:7, only two
. :essages were r ec eived over a thr e e-hour oeriod.
The M/RC EOC should keeo
- he 3CEOC be::er infor=ed.
The congregate care center at the Bergen County Co=munity College in Para =us, New Jersey, was well equipped and well canaged. Personnel soci:oring 4
was handled e.f ficiently by the yairlava civil def ense direc:or.
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'U17468:
1 INTRODUCTION 1
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11 EXERCISE 3ACKGROUND On Dececher 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency l
Management Agency (TEMA) to assume lead responsibility-for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed,by state and local governments.
e Determining whether such plans ' can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.
e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with I
responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
U.S. Department of Cot =nerce (DOC)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co - ission (NRC)
U.S. Environmental Protection-Agency (EPA)
I U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
U.S. Depar.tment of Health and Euman Services (FRS)
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)'
l U.S. Department of Administration (FDA) l~
Representatives of these agencies serve as me=bers of the Re gional Assistance Coe=ittee (RAC), which is chaired by FIV.A.
The Indian Point. Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) was formally submitted to the RAC by the state and involved loca.1 jurisdictions.
I The RERP was subsequently critiqued and evaluated.
A first exercitie was held on March 3,
1982, and revealed several deficiencies in -the plan and in emergency preparedness.
In response to a request from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated June 16, 1982, the Federal E=ergency Management Agency sub itted its **nterim Findings on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparation of l
State and Local Governments at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station ~ dated July 30, l'982 (referred to as the Interi= Findings).
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U17469 2
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A deter =ication of adequacy in the Interis Findings was based on a I
review of the radiological e=ergency response plans of the S:a:e of New York and :he counties of Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Ves:ches:er, as well as on 3
- he observed performance of these political jurisdic:1ons during the exercise
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of the plans on March 3, 1982, and upon a review of co==en:s cade at two public cee:ings held in Vestchester and Orange counties on July 26 and 27, 1982.
Based on the review of the responses from the State of New York rela:ing to the state and county co=penents of. the RERP, and after review of the legislative ac:1on taken by the Peckland Coun:y Legislature (Resolution 320, da:ed May 18, 1982), FEMA deter:.ined that significant deficiencies existed with respec: to five planning standards of NUREC-0654/TEMA-REP-1.
These standards included:
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Notification Methods and Procedures, j
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b Public Education and Information, e
o Protective Response, Radiological Exposure Control, and e
I Responsibility for the Planning Effor:.
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I Tollowing the FEMA transmittal of August 2,
1982, to the NRC, the i
Administrator of NRC Region I invoked the 120-day regulatory clock on August 3,
1982.
During the 120-day period, task force groups coeposed of the state, counties, utilities, RAC cembers, and TEMA vere established to address the deficiencies outlined in the Interim Findings.
On December 17, 1982, FEv.A provided NRC vith an updated progress report on correcting the deficiencies together with a coc:prehensive plan review.
This report cited major irprove ents in off-site radiological e=ergency planning during the 120-day period.
Two deficiencies that re=ained unresolved were:
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e Protec:1ve Pasponse "Possible" nonresponse by private and public bus operators j
in Ves:chester County, and Planning Responsibility e
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- Rockland County's nonparticipation in the planning process.
i A second radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on M. arch 9, 1983, be:veen the hours of 5: 15 a.=.
and 5: 45 p.m.,
to assess :he capabiliry of the state and local e=ergency preparedness organiza:1ons to ieple=ent their radiological e:ergency plans and procedures and protec: the public in a radiological emergency involving the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station.
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3 U17470 A final Post Exercise Assessment for the March 9 exercise was issued on April 14, 1983.
The findings presented in this report were based on evalua--
tions by federal observers, which were reviewed by TIMA Region II.
Based on deficiencies observed during the March 9 exercise, FEMA was not able to issue a positive deter =ination on the adequacy of off-site planning and preparedness at Indian Point.
Deficiencies noted were:
he state was not able to compensate satisfactorily for the lack of the Rockland County's participation and resources, and e Bus drivers in L'estchester County needed more training on
, evacuation routes and dosimetry.
The f asue 'of "possible" nonresponse by private and public bus operators remained unresolved at that ti=e.
As a result of this report, the NRC voted 5 - O to close the Indian Point reactors on June 9, 1983, unless TEMA re=oved the' deficiencies or other infor=ation was made available to the Commission to justify continued operation of the reactors.
On June 8, 1983, FEMA, Region II issued an update on the status of off-site emergency planning at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station.
This update r eport indicated that since the issuance of the Post Exercise As s e s s=ent, dated April 14, 1983, the State of New York had under-taken the e=ergency planning necessary for Rockland County and had dedicated a j
sizeable resource base to develop a response capability.
This resource base j
consisted of assets and personnel drawn from state agencies and the private sector, including the licensees.
Examples of coe=it=ents by the state and the licensees include:
e Co=i t =e n t and training of staff to perfor=
various e:ergency response functions, e Agreements with bus owners to provide equipment to the licensees to carry out evacuation, and e Development of an interim public information program for Rockland County.
The RAC for Region ' II reviewed the state's Radiological Emergency Response Interi= Plan for Implementing Co=pensating Measures for Rockland County (PIRIP) and found the concept proposed in this state co=pensating plan to be sound.
The *.lestchester deficiency cited in FEw.A's April 14, 1983, report had also been addressed by the state.
Contracts had been signed with the licensees. - Under the ter=s of the,se contracts, three bus companies vill cake equipment available to the licensees in the event that there is a need to undertake an evacuation in k'estchester County.
The licensees are funding the
s U1747f develop ent of new co=prehensive transportation plan for Westchester Coun:y.
~he state and the licensees are training bus drivers and providing then with esergency safety equipment.
So:h regular drivers and u:ility volunteers are being trained.
Based on the update report, NRC decided to allow the Indian Poin:
reactors :o con:inue to operate.
A radiological e ergency exucise for Ro ckland County was conducted from 4:00 p.=.
on August 24, 1983, until 2:00 a.c.
on August 25, 1983, to assess the capability of the state and volunteer emergency preparedness organizations to implement the RERIP and to protect the public during a radiological emergency involving the Indian Point Nuclear Power Statio,n.
i An observer team consisting of personnel from TEMA Region II, the FAC, T FS.A ' s contractors, and f'ederal and state agencies evaluated the exercise of August 24-25, 1983.
Twenty-three obs e rvers were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions.
Obse rve rs were trained in l
radiological emergency planning concepts end given an evaluation kit, which l
j included appropriate portions of the RERIP, info:sation en exercise obj ec-i tives, the exercise scenario, and other issues relating to the exercise. Team leaders coordinated team operations.
l Tellowing the exercise, the federal obs ervers met to compile their evaluations.
Observers presented observations specific to their assign =ents, the tea:s of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdie-
- tion, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team
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me=bers.
This final post exercise report is based upon these assessments.
I A public critique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general public was held at 1:00 p.m.
on Friday, August 26, 1983, at the Rockland County fire ::aiting f acility in Pomona, N.Y.
l The findings in this report are based on evaluations of federal ob s e rve rs, which were reviewed by TEMA Region II.
FFS.A requests that the state submit a schedule of re=edial actions for corree:ing the deficiencies discussed in this report.
The Regional Director of FD% is responsible for certifying to the FD% Associate Director of State and Local Progra=s and
- ' ashing:en.
D.C.,
that all negative findings obs e rved during the Support.
exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate.
1.2 TIOEFA1. CBSERVERS
'ven:7-three federal obs ervers evaluated off-site e=ergency response func: ions.
These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assign-ments are given below:
U17472
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OBSERVERL ACENCY EXERCISE LOCATION /iUNCTION
'?. Mc ntire FEMA FEMA ' Command Post / overview observation R. Kevieski FEMA Rockland EOC/Rockland County tea = leader /RAC Chair:an R..Reynolds TEMA State e=ergency operations center (IOC)/ state tea:
leader
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. EPA State EOC/ accident assesscent C. Gorden SIC,
Indian Point e=ergency' operations facility (EOF)/.
liaison-M.. Jackson TEMA Rockland News Center /public information C. Malina USDA State Ar ory/ utility; personnel mobilization A. Smith ANL Southern District EOC/coc=unications P. Becher=an ANL Troop F, State Police Headquarters / personnel
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notification;~ Rockland. County /public alert and notification coordinator J. Keller' INIL Rockland EOC/dese assessment T. Baldwin ANL Rockland EOC/ communications E. Fish DOE Rockland EOC/public information R. Rodrigue:
TEMA Harran Transportation / evacuation; Rockisnd County / reception center C. Saricks ANL Eaverstrav Transit / evacuation P. Lut:
DOT Educational Transportation / evacuation -
P. k*eberg FEMA Peter Brega, Inc./ evacuation N. Kelly TEMA Clarkstown Central School' District / evacuation F. Fishman FEMA Rockland County / evac'uation, traffic control points; Eudson Valley A=bulance Co pany/ evacuation of mobility-impaired persons Y. Klein ANL Rockland County / evacuation, traf fic control points; Eaverstrav Transit / evacuation of mobility-1= paired persons L. Hoffman TNIL Rockland County / radiological monitoring R. Honkus NEL Rockland County / radiological monitoring J. Opelka ANL Rockland County public reception care center and e=ergency worker personnel sonitoring center / radio-logical monitoring R. 3ernacki FDA Bergen County, EOC and congregate care center / team leader and radiological sonitoring 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERI.A -
Radiological emergency --'monse activities were evaluated by federal observers in accordance with tollowing sche =e:
Capability outsti, mine:
no i= prove =ents necessary.
e Capability good:
only minor improvements needed.
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Capab'ility ' acceo table:
some ' i=p rovements needed ' to insure e
ef f ective perf or=ance s.
e Capability weak:
deficiencies' noted that could impair
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af f ective perf or:ance.
.e Capability lackine:
response' called f or 'but not ; demon-strated..
L 1.4 EXERCISE OLIECTIVES The objectives of state and county in this exercise were to demonstrate the ad equacy of the RERIP, the. capability ' to mobilize 'needed ~ personnel and equipment, and f aciliarity with procedures. required to cope with an' emergency at the Cot.solidated Edison Company'.s Indian Point Nuclear. Power Station.
The exercise vas intended to demonstrate the capabilities to respond to a vide range of emergency - conditions.
Although the scenario ' accurately simlated operaticg events, it was not intended to assess all of the diagnostic capabil-ities, but rather provided sequences which ultimately demonstrated the ability.
to respood to events by exercising of f-site emergency plans and ' procedures.
Free play was acceptable and the referees were to 1nterf ere er.ly if player-
~
sction p rema turely te rminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule.
~
The exercise did not involve the staffing of any of the on-site ecergency response facilities.
The licensees _ had already. demonstrated the operation of these facilities during the March 9,
1983, exercise.
The licensees' emergency opera tions facility.(EOF) was staffed to provide inf ormation f or the exercise.
The state emergency operations centers (EOCs) were staf f ed to provide f or direction and control,. communication and _ varning, and activation of the operat. ions and assessment areas to give adequate support to New York State cocpensa ting for Rockland County (NY/FC).
The ' exercise l
involved activation and participation of staf f andL response f acilities.of New
(
York State and NT/RC.
Federal agencies were notified during the exercise according to existin;; protocols. Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility did not actively participate in ~ the play of this exercise.
Federal representatives, hwever, acted as exercise evaluators.
In order to provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses:
and areas af f ected, exercise me teorology was used.
Ihe New York State Radiological Emergency ?recaredness Group developed the f ollowing objectives f or this exercise.
9
---_-.___-----.--__w-__
U17474 1... Radiological Imercenev Preparedness Plans -
a.
Evaluate the adecuacy.~ and capability' of i=elementation of radiological; e=ergency plans f or New York State. and the
. NY/RC.
b.
De=enstrate - the emergency response capabilities of state and local support agencies,- appropriate f ederal agencies and emergency wo rkers. -
De=enstrate the capability' of New York. State and NY/RC to c.
i=plemen t their respective radiological emergency plans in a manner satisfying FEMA acceptance criteria.
2.
Notification Procedures a.
Demonstrate the ability to. commnicate technical inf orma-tion between the state, NT/RC, and the EOT.
b.
De enstrate the capabiliry of the
- state, NT/RC, and utility vorkers to notif y and activate emergency response persocnel in accordance with established protocols.
c.
De=enstrate the actica necessary f or NY/RC and the state to alert and notify the affected permanent and transient -
public within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (IP2) for nn incident at the Indian Point Nuclear P ower Station and to provide f ollow-up inf ormation as' required.
These actions includ e activation of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and sirens in Rockland County.
d.
De=enstrate the notification of and the request for assistance f rom f ederal agencies.
e.
Demonstrate, as appropriate, the notification by the state and the. county of tounties and states vitbin the-ingestion p athway EPZ, host counties, and' agencies such as Conrail and the Coast Guard.
3.
E:errenev Co==unications a.
De:onstrate effective emergency. ce==unications capability be twe er. : hT/RC.and the state, including the ? radiological Emergeng Com:unications Sy ste=
(RECS).
Commercial telephone or Office of Disaster Preparedness radio and/or s
)
7 1
-t
..i
U17475 the National Warning System (NAWAS)' vere to be used if the l
PICS line was postulated to be inoperative.
b.
De=onstrate an adequate inf or=ation flow between local and state emergency respense personnel in order to:
e Transmit instructions to activate emergency response f
staff, and e provide
'y an accurate and timely transmittal of essential information.
c.
Demonstrate the ability of NY/RC to coordinate, control, cnd deploy radiological monitoring teams via the appro-i priate field co=munications system.
4 Emergenev Resoonse Facilities (State and hT/RC).
a.
De=enstrate the activation of, adequacy of staffing in, l
and timeliness in retting up emerg ency response facili-ties, as well as the adequacy of space and habitability for canag e= ent of a radiological mergency at. the ST/RC and Rockland County EOCs.
b.
Demonstrate the adequacy of internal co==unications in the state and hT/RC EOCs including the use of status boards, charts, maps, diagra=s, and other displays.
c.
Evaluate the adequacy and competency of state and NT/RC l
staff to operate the e=ergency response facilities.
d.
Evaluate the adequacy of access control and security for e=ergency response facilities.
5.
Directien ned Centrol l
a.
Demonstrate the ability of key emergency personnel at all j
levels of government to initiate and coordinate time.lv and effective decisions with respect to a radiological emer-
)
gency, including a clear demonstration of who *
- in charge and the ability to make protettive action rec' s sada:Lons.
i r
.1 direc-b.
De=enstrate that there is eff ective organia:
tion and control and integrated radiologic.m c=ergency res pons e, including deployment of field monitors,. acquisi-tion of field' monitoring. data, receipt and analysis of
.___m_____
. _ _ _ _ _ _d
S U17476 field data, and effective she. ring of field data 'between 1
the state and ST/RC' for evaluation and verification.
c.
Demonstrate the capability of federal, state, and ST/RC i
c= erg ency response agencies to id entify and provide for resource requirements.
Any required federal response 3
1 activity =ay be simulated.
i, d.
De=onstrate the capability to coordinate internal and l
ext ernal actions among. government organizations in order to obtain support and make appropriate decisions.
a.
Demonstrate the capability of gcvernment officials to l
implem ent appropriate radiological e=ergency r espons e l
actions cand procective action reco=cendations.
6.
Accident Assessment and Evaluation a.
Demonstrate the activation, operations, and ra.po rting procedur es of h7/RC field monitoring teams.
Field. moni-toring taa=s were provid ed with risulated data by referees.
b.
Demonstrate the ability of hT/RC and the' state to receive and assess radiological field data.
c.
De=onstrate the ability of the state and h7/RC to. calcu-l late dose proj ections, compare proj ections to the protec-l tive action guides (pAGs), and make appropriate protective actions recoc=endations.
7.
Proceetive Resoonse a.
De=onstrate the capability of the state and 57/RC e=er-gency response organi:ations to make decisions and to implement appropriate protective action response options.
The response options include:
l e
Sheltering and evacuation (simulat ed) of off-site ar eas; Activation of reception and congregate care centers and e
provision for monitoring evacuees for contamination; e Identification cd provision for special populations including provision for id entification,. notification, e
i 4
U17474'1 l
10 1
i and evacuation (simulated) of. noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons; e
Analysis of need for and deter =ination of appropriate
)
protective responses in the ingestion pathway EpZ; and provision for re= oval of i=cedi=ents fro = evacuation e
routes.
i 8.
Radiological Fxoosure Control De=enstrate the decision process for limiting exposures to a.
emergency workers.
I b.-
De=enstrate processing 'of. state and local e=ergency workers through personnel monitoring centers (PMCs) including monitoring, decontamination, and a knowledge of the decontamination action levels.
l c.
Evaluate the capability of off-site emergency response personnel to implement access control procedures.
d.
Demonstrate =ethods and resources for distribution of dosimeters and thyroid blocking agents to e=ergency workers.
1 e.
Demonstrate record keeping and use of dosimeters and thyroid blocking agents for the protection of e=ergency workers.
l f.
Demonstrate knowledge, on the part of the emergency
)
- workers, of dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI)
(simulated) usage.
The emergency workers must also know who is authorized to allow emergenc7 workers to receive-exposures above the permissible licif.s.
9.
Reentrv and Recover,r ( Of f-sit e) l 1
s a.
De=enstrate the capability of emergency personnel to plan-for reentry and recovery activities.
4 e
l l
a
~~
U174'78 11 1
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Ma'or Secuence of Events on Site 1
Date Ae:roximate Time Event S/24 1600 Start of exercise - Notification of Unusual Event.
1800 Exercise escalated to an Alert.
2000 Exercise escalated to a site Area Emergencv.
2145 Exercise escalated to a General E=ergenev.
8/25 0100 Release to the environment s ecur ed.
0140 Start of recovery phase.
0230 Secure f rom exercise.
1.5.2 Scenario Su==arv_
The plant was cc 100" reactor power with normal operating temperatures and pressures.
A Reactor Cooling System (RCS) Leakage Surveillance was performed and an unid entified 2 gal / min (gpc) leak as indicated, thus initiating a notification of an unusual event e ergency classification.
The' leakage increased to 50 gym, initiating an alert e=ergency _ classification.
The rate of coolant leakage increased to 100 gpci and exceeded the capacity of two charging pe= ps,
thus initiating a
site area emergenev emerg ency classification.
I The !=ergency Care Cooling System (ECCS) was activated by a true safety inj ection signal because of an abrupt violation of RCS integrity in the Loop
- 34 Rot Leg leading to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
The ECCS was initially successful but the plant indicat ed that the !32 Diesel Generator f" ailed to start, the #33 SI pump failed to start, both the 431 and the #32
- ieat Re= oval pumps f ailed to start, and some clad da age had l
Resid ual j
o ccurr ed.
Residual Heat Removal pumps #31 and #32 did, however, start when j
the operator manually started the pumps.
At this ti=e a general emerrenev was
]
declared due to the large radiation fields inside containment, indicating clad 1
i damage with possible fue.1 damage.
Shortly following the LOCA, a containment pressure spike occurred l
lif ting the containment purge exhaust valves off their seats (as. indicated in the control room).
Also the R-27 monitor in the CCR verified that a release was being made from the vapor containment building to the environment.
Since efforts to r e=ot ely close these valves were futile, the releas e continued until the purge exhaust valve located outside of contain=ent could be closed
=anually.
l J
U1747'9 i n
1.5.3 Descriccion of state Resources it was the responsibility of all e:ergency response agencies to ensure that their resources were actually deployed in adecuate nu:bers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobilitatien, co==and, coordination, and co==unications capabilities.
Except as noted below, state and 5'Y/ RC agencies had total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deploy =ent of their resources, consis t ent with. this intent.
ne decision to de=enstrate er to actually depley resources ay have been made at the time of the exercise.
Lien the us e of an ag ency 's resources was simula t ed, it was the responsibility of the agency to ensure that st eps necessary to utilice the resources were demonstrated.
Use of a resource could be simulated only after the es timat ed mobilization time had ela ps ed.
k~ hen use of a resource was s1=ulated, the co==and and control also had to be demonstrated.
Personnel shift changes of key decision makers and radiological asses sment and
. evaluation staffs were to be d emonstrat ed at the county and state level.
Actual shif t changes for personnel involved in field response activities such-as radiological monitoring, decontamination operations, and traffic control were not demonstrated during the exercise.
State and NT/RC agencies were to maintain rosters of personnel providing for any required 24-hour operations.
ne ' f ollowing provides a list of personnel and resources that were to be deployed by the state and hT/RC to de=enstrate the capabilities of their resources.
Also provided are specific de=onstration objectives.
,Public Notification ne Rockland County sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System were to be activated..
Radiological Monitoring _
- vo NT/RC radiological field monitoring teams were to be de=enstrated.
Each team was to be supplied with a controller, ne controllers were to have simulated field data which was to be provided to the tea =s to determine local dose rate readings consistent with the scenario. Each team was to be equipped with the necessary equipment to determine both actual area ga==a dose rates and airborne radiciodine concentrations.
De monitoring teams were to have anticontamination clothing with them in the field but they were not to suit up.
O P
.U17480 g
Cocole: ion of Bus Routes for Evacuees Five evacua:ica bus routes were to be demons: rated by W/RC.
Bus routes were not to be preassigned.
The federal evaluators were to indicate which bus routes were to be de=enstrated.
The federal evaluators in concert with the assigned sta:e controller and appropriate W/RC staff were to ensure
- ha: :he selec:ed bus routes did not affect nor=al public transportation.
Evacuatien of Noninstitutionalized, Mobill:v-Incaired Persons W/RC was to demonstrate procedures for identification, notification, and determination of the availability of appropriate transportation for evacuation of noninstitutional:ed, mobility-impaired persons.
In additien, f ederal evaluators were,to select six addresses of mobility-icpairad persons in Rockland Coun:y. Vehicles for transportation of the handicapped were to be dispatched to these addresses, locate the address, but not stop.
Evacuation l
vas to be simulated.
Traffic Control Points W/RC, supple =ented Ly state resources, was to deploy personnel to de:enstra:e ac: vation of a selected number of traf fic control points for major evacuation routes.
Four points were to be demonstrated.
Traffie control points were not to be preassigned or repositioned.
l In order to provide a greater test of the %apability to respond to an actual incident and to allov = ore free play in the exercise, the federal evaluators were to provide information on locations of traffic control points to be de=enstra:ed during the course of the exercise.
Once traffic control points had been established and observed by federal evaluators, NT/RC officials were to release personnel to normal duties and si=ulate continuation of control points where required.
The relieved persennel were not to be used for any other exercise functioa.
For training purposes, selec:ed traffic control personnel were to report to pers onnel coni:oring centers after they had been secured fro: their enercise assign =ent.
Imoedi=ents to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce a free play event to test pro-cedures for removal of impedi=ents frem evacuation routes. ~his demonstra: ion was :o include the ac:ual dispatch of an e=ergency vehicle to the scene, a repor: from the scene to the IOC requesting appropriate resources, identifica-tion of the availability of the required resources (e.g.,
tow t ru ck, public works equipment), and the estimation of the times of arrival at the scene and for clearing the i= pediment.
U17481 1
personnel Moni:oring Centers l
I NY!RC was to set up and de= ens: rat e :vo perscnnel =eni:oring cen:ers.
One pMC was to be us ed for evacuees and the other for emergency workers.
During the exercise, the processing of selected e ergency workers who had to be d e=enstrat ed. Decenta:1 nation completed their exercise par:icipation was ac:fons were to be si ulated.
All necessary equir:en: bas :o be asse bled at the PMCs; however, equip =ent use =ay have been si=ulated.
In addition, the state was to de-ons t r at e the activatica of a ?MC for e= erg enev vorkers.
Relocation Centers One reception cent'er was to be opened in Rockland County and one con-gregate care c en t er was to be opened in New Jersey.
The centers were to be staffed for evacuees in accordance with b"Y/RC e=ergency r es p'ons e plans.
Supplies r equir ed for long-t erm cass care (cots, blankets, food, etc.) need not have been acquir ed or brought to the centers.
F.ovever, the center per-sonnel should have obtained esticates on how many evacuees vould have been arriving had the exercise been a real e=ergency.
The center personnel should, then have made the necessary esti=ates of supplies required for the potential 8
Scurces of the required supplies should then have been located and evacuees.
the =eans for trans portation of the supplies should have been d e t er:in ed.
A limited nu=ber of volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure.
procedures for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees were to be d e= ens trat ed at reception centers.
Tederal evaluators may have introduced free play proble=s for. handling evacuees arriving at a congregate care center
. 1 without appropriate docu=ents from the ref erral reception center.
Because of logistics and the need to =ake prior arrange =ents to gain i
access to relocation centers during an ex er ci s e, these cen:ers were to be selected prior to the day of the exercise.
./
l l
l l
Volunteer Organi:ations 1
Response organi:ations identified in the plans were to participa:e in the ex ercis e.
Me=b ers of volunt eer organizations such as volunteer fire d epar t=ent s, ambulance squads, a=ateur radio operators, and Red Cross had other responsibilities char may have taken precedence over their participa:lon in an exercise.
I 1
Closecut of the Exercise l
'losecut of the exercise was to be accomplished by the following actions:
t
is U17482 1.
Emergency votkers were to. be secured as soon as pos sible after thr-had d e= ens t ra t ed their capabilities.
'"h e decision to secr the exer cis e was to be nade at the NT/RC EOC vich concurrence fr:n the state EOC, if applic-able.
Selected e=ergency workers were to check out through decontamination centers.
Emergency worker radiological.1 exposure records were to be cocpleted in accordance with the standard opera' ting proc edur es.
The co:spleted dose record fer=s were to be marked clearly "For Demons tration 'Only" nd f orward ed to the. responsible agency for review, 2.
The _ emergency worker FMCs and the reception and congregate care c a..t ers were to be s ecur ed as soon as appropriate emergency workers and volunteers had checked out through these centers.
3.
Participation of nonessential state and NY/RC EOC person-nel was to be ended as soon as their emergency responses had been essentially compl et ed.
Reducing EOC staff to those responsible for long-t er= planning and recovery was to have the concurrence of the State Disaster Preparedness Coc=ission Chairman or the chairman's
- designee, if applicable.
O e
_.__.._________m._
U17483 J
13 2 EXERCISE EVAI.UATION:
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMEh'DATIONS 2.!
STATE OF NW YORK AND SOUTEERN DISTRICT
- 1 1
1 2.1.1 Emercenev Ocerations Facilities and Resources j
1 Tacilities and esources at the state e:ergency operations center (SEOC in Albany were good.
Except for public information funcpons, which l
vere.ot to be ac*ivated for this exercise, the SIOC was fully %ctijv ted and i
all the equipme.
needed to support the e=ergency response vas vavailable.
set of charts, maps, and tables.
The SEOC was Each work area d ajcomplete
\\/ ell organized and Mdequate space was available or all activated response functions.
yithup to 8,0 people in the SEOC,
.o overer ding vas obs e rved.
V ntilation vvas adequate.
Displays and maps were outstanding and were l
were l
boardfs yallable in ach operational area of the SEOC.
All status p pdated in a imely fashion and t emergency classification level wasM1early l
displayed.
Current maps were 1 splayed showing population distribution by l
emergency respense planning area (ERPA), evacua a routes, evacuation areas, relocation centers, and shelter areas.
Upon receifp of radiological field Field monitoring data vere \\/p.ed verf clearlyvearked on the appropriate'
=enitoring data, the locations sam posted Wsing uniform 1 cational designations I
caps.
and proper para =eter and units.
Radiciodine data were not posted even though background levels ere reported by the field teams.
The posting of such l
radiciodine data to indicate that this paraceter had been measured would l
enhance the already outstanding dispia s of field cionitoring data at the SECC.
j l
Internal co=unications were utstanding.
Each agency representative 4
l received a su==ary of all cessages.
/ Co==unications facilities at the SEOC vere e,ood.
Multiple ephones andV dios supplied communications links with othertsfates, the ldunties, and Operators \\Iocprehendedandcorrectly anscribed incocing messages.
the :.0 F.
Wen the Rockland County RECS line malfunctioned between 18:00 and 19:00, a me=ber of the assess =ent group a the SEOC, assigned as a co==unifa tions liaison with the county, insured that all rertin. t infor ation wasVreceived and exchanged by the SEOC.
The state also ad a full-ti e liaison for radiological coe=unications to transmit and discuss radiological information over the telephone.
This. procedure enh need coe=unic ions both within the radiologic intell'gence group at the EOC and with ockland County and the F0F.
TEF and the..adiologi 1 Assistance Program group in DOE vere contacted ro:ptly as were' -trak an onrail.
Security was estanding and was stab 1 shed at the alert em gency classification level.
AYign-inlogwaskept, adges were issued, and enti-fication =aterials vere verified.
dt@
0
_______________l
.o.-
- - ~ ~ - - - - -
U17484 17 The primary functice of the Southern District IOC (SDEOC) in Pough-keepsie was to coordinate and deploy backup, not compensating, state resources in the event that unty or NY/RC r sources were exhausted.
The SDECC f acilitpes and.esources were generally good and there was o
ov er c r o s-ding.
Eevever, only three outside telephone lines were available for the twelve agencies at e SDEOC.
The radios used by some agencies in place of telephones did not york and consequently, the representatives of some agencies occasionally could[not contact their agency offices in a timely carner.
Additional telephones are needed.
Two telef ax =achines from other districts were being used in addition to SDEOC's own telefax to kee up with the message flow.
In an actual emergency, these additional machines might not be readily available, since other district offices are locard in other tef ax should be considered lf sections of the state; pt least one additional SDEOC.
Maps and displays were generally,Mxcellent, e rly visible, fortp'e and Vupdated as nsv information became available.
Maps were sted showing evacuation routes, population by epa, and r elocation c ent ers.
A map of radiological monitoring points wasWvailable in the radiological intelligence room.
' h other states or federal agencies.
The SDEOC does not co==unicate t
The RECS dedica ed telephone line was vaflable to com=unicate with the SEOC,1 the utility, d Rockland County.
The Wadio Amateur Civil Emergency Servi e
]
(RACES) and oc=ercial t elephones could also be used as backups.
NAVAS was but[s not activated or esfreises, difficulties were also available encountered in co=sunicating with the SEOC, Yhe EOF, or he NY/RC EOC.
Security measures at the SDEOC vere good.
Access was controlled by a state police trooperjat the gate through the' f ence surrounding the f acility.
j Id entificatijin was btequired, badges were vis su ed, and a log of ingress and i
egress vas%aintained at another check point in the entryvay to the SDEOC.
2.1.2 _Al e r ting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and m 1112ation of officials and staff ae the SEOC ve.e cod.
The SEOC was fully staffed throughout the exercise, except for the public infor=ation function at the joint media center which was not rec,uired by the y' ercise obj ectives.
Although a shift change was not de=onstrated, a 24-hour vcapability for icityL1 emergency response with activation of com=unications at any time and the,vcapability to maintain c tinuous operations were clearly evident.
Many positions at the SEOC vere overed by more than one person and lists of additional backun personnel were available.
The state poli e warning point provides the capability to receiv e initial notification fa radiological energency on a continuous basis.
The SEOC vas initially notified at the unasual event emergency
' ossification level at about 16:10 by t elephone from the state warning poi t.
The call clearly dentified that an exercise was in progress and was verified by a h)
18 U17485 call-back over RECS.
Wen it had been ified that Rockland County ould not
- nt an effective eee gency
- response, state responders were proeptly jtivated at the alert e=ergency classification level lefr ed.
The SIOC vas a
\\/( Eci.).
Personnel were Motified by standard telephone call-up procedures and eported pro:ptly to the r duty stations at the SEOC.
The state radiological asse (=ent officer was et.ied at the alert Eci. at about 18.05, at which ti=e he lephoned the EDT to\\ btain detailed infor:stion.
He rived at the SEOC at about 18:45.
he Division of State Police Troop i Headquarters (Troop F) in u.iddletown is responsible f or advising the representatives of state agencies to report to the ST/RC EOC after the Lieutecane Governor has assu=ed control of emergency response activities p Roep and County under the RERIP.
The co=unications room at Troop F isFfu.11y\\n,taff ed during norm l' business hours and is staf fed by two people at all other ti=es.
Thus it rovides a 24-hour capab'?ity for making initial emergene response notifications.
During an actut. emergency, Troop 7 personnel indicated that troopers would go on 12-hour shifts to pr vide sufficient staff for extended operations.
Troop F was notified at the unusual event ICL at approxi=ately 16:35 by
}
the Division of Co==unications at state police headquarters in Albany (the state warning point).
Since the notification was made over a dedicated ~
talephone line, no verification call was made.
Police radio
.e tves as a backup to the t ephone.
Notifica on calls to state personnel egan ic=edi-ately and were completed /in under 0 minutes at approxi=ately 17:05. The list for the alert ECL vasVused.
Thejuipment used for alertin and activating emergency response personnel was vout s t anding.
Troop F sed an automatic dialing syste.: which has the telephone nu=bers for the notification of e:ergeycy response personnel progra==ed into Two other telephones were also% sed.
Alternate telephone numbers were alled when contact could not be T
cade using the primary nu=berf. In one case, the primary personj gould not be reached and an alternate wasWotified. The telephone cessage used for initial notification identified the caller, noted tha*p the Lieutenant Governor had ordered the activation of the NY/RC EOC, and equested that the recipient of he message follow the agency activation procedures.
However, the message did nc, t indicate the current ECL nor ote that an exercise, not an actual emergency, was in progress.
These two pieces of information should be giveri to ce=bers of the state compensating team.
Af ter a pri=ary person from r.h a edcy had been ocified, follow-up contacts with key p/e sonnel vere
=i.d e sing autocatic pagers which alerted personnel to call ablesignated telephone nu=ber for notification infor=ation.
At the SDEOC, alerting and mobilization of officials ar staf re good.
The director of the SDEOC acked up by the secretan' is available on a continuous basis to make initial notificati calls.
These individuals are on site during nor=al working hours and can trive at thy facility in les than 20 =inutes at other times.
Initial notification wasMeceived at the SDECC at about 16:00 over the RECS line and washerified upon request of the
3 19 U17486 1
director.
Alerting and notification of personnel was acco::pli hed within 35 minutes using ec=:ercial :elephone lines.
No ba ckup system was avail-considered f or both primary staf f and key able.
Au:::atic pagers should be Twelve of 15 key agency positions had beenNaf f ed a:
agency representatives.
- he SDEOC by 18:00, one hour af ter call-ups were started.
So=e personnel at the SDEOC ca=e fro: o:her Office of Disaster Preparedness district offices.
5:af f at the SDEOC indicated tha: (1) travel tices up tohhree hours would be required for these personnel to arrive a: the SDEOC had they been at their he=e districts when the exercise began, and (2) personnel travel between district offices during actual nonradiological e=ergencies.
2.1.3 Emergenev Ocerations Management The manaFji=ent of, emergency operations at both the SEOC and the SDEOC was good. neV airman of the New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission (DPC) or the hair =an's designee was, at different times, ef f ectively in
(
I arge of the emergency response at the SEOC.' A representative of the DPC vas esignated as the person responsible for requesting f ederal assistance, if required.
he director of the Of fice of Disaster Preparedness also partici-
)
paced in the exercise.
With the exception of public inf or=a tiejn f unctibos, which ere not required by the objectives of this exercise, al1% organizations j
and all e=e rgeng resppnse functional areas required by the RERIP actively part1[ipated in the ex(reise.
Coordination between decision makers and staf f was\\ Achieved through cup rehensive briefings. Decision pakers. vere riefed by staff members in the conf erence room.
Rese briefingstfeeluded discussions of weapder conditions, and technical al:erna:ive actions, changing plant and data.
Regular staff briefings were alsoneld for all staff and agency representatives in the operations room.
The RERlP and acco anying procedures
[re nsulted and elleued at che SEOC.
De accident a sessment team also used a cocpreh'ensive manual of procedures and cables inY.eveloping its assessments.
The ECL was sted throughout the SEOC, ed in initial notifications, c om::unicated p ro::o tly to response. organizations when it changed, and was v[onsisten vi:h the standard system used by the utility.
The SDEOC vas clearly der the control of the direc:or.
Observation of activities at the SDEOC vas limited to the early portion of the exercise.
Not all agency representativeshad reported by 18:00 and theback of telephone f rom %ctive lines noted in Se c.
2.1.1 of this report kept some ag eies p articip ation in the exercise.
The eoedtions efficer.riefed SDEOC staff
,f re gularly and agency representatives Wu=mari:ed theirf.espect1v7 agency 's ac:1vities.
Briefings on ico ortant developments wereL<ondue:edl4 hen needed.
.e current ECL was clearly sible to all agency representatives and enf ormed to the s:andard syste= used by the utility.
$i X
~
20 U17487 2.1.4 Accident As s e s s=e nt at the SEOC was od.
The radiological intelli-Accide-as'sess=e,n/t gence group thotoug. y Mssessed the cent of the accident.
Radiological i
calculations were performed in a tieely canner.
Alternative protective actions vetel/e' valuated carefully prior to the development of recommenf ations for consideration by decision makers.
TT.e.altert tives were Vreviewed periodically and the results of these reviews, were o=municated to decision
=akers.
All field ata were ived in the radiologieajl intelligen e room in the SEOC where sufficient staff were available toWecord_ and analyze the data.
The assessment te fa demonstrate an outstanding capability to make rapid assessments of the =agnitude and ocationofradiologicalhazardsding core invent
'y data, source term data, and field data Current meteorological l
data vere ailable f or" use' in the assessments.
rojections of dose rates were made hortly af te \\r'e#ceiving source term informati n from the utility.
, pfections were enfirmed against field data as it became available and I
The pe were wo= pared to the projections being made at the NY/RC EOC a.
the EOF. Any i'
qujkly resolved inconsistencies between the three sets of projections were using telephone coc=runications.
Field team measurc=ents ' werewsed to locate the plume.
The capability to recoc=end protective actions was outstanding.
Appropriate protective actions, based upon PACS, were reco= mended by the radiological jtssessment officer.
The re coc:= ended protective actions were based uponl/' accurate j' calculations of potential radiological doses to the population and upon\\/f::ensideration of the effect of the recoc= ended action on the public, given the time of day, projections of shifts in the vind direction, the projected duration of the release, and the consequences of the action being considered.
Specifically,/ a recommendation to shelter livestock and to close parks and beaches was wade at the site area ECL.
In anot r ent of Agriculture and Markets was ersed instance, an order by the Deparjt by the radiological of ficer Wased on an assessment that the effect on the public of re=oving drinking water would have been more detrimental than the risk of conta=ination to the water from ? release of noble gases.
All fi 'id =enitoring readings were
==unicated to.and ecorded at the SEOC in the proper units.
Personnel at the SEOC indicated th t about 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> vould have been required to transport field sa:ples to ee state laboratories for analysis.
The facilities at the laboratories were sufficient to handle the anticipat'ed types and nu=bers of field samples.
i t
I
-______.______________..u
..__.2m_
21 U17488 2.1.5 Ac:1 ens to Protect the Public The re co==end a t io n/of actions to protect the public were ed at the SIOC.
The decision to Weco==end evacua:Lon and sheltering of various ER?As was evaluated on the basis of the degree of protection afforded by the available al:erna:ive protective actions as well as the risks associated with 1:ple=entation of the alternative actions.
Wea:her conditions, projected ratien of the release, and anticipated changes in related f ae: ors were all considered in deter =ining the cost approp; a:e recoc=endation.
Changes in conditions were carefully and repeatedly.xami ed for possible consequences.
S ecific agency responsibilities were also.eviewed by decision makers to ssure that there were suf ficient resources to i=ple=ent the reco= mended actions.
The decision to recomme evacuation off'RPAs 29 and 8 and sheltering in ERPAs 30 and 31 was mplemented in aktimely f ashion tilizing planned procedures.
Deci ions to recoc: mend protective actio for the ingestion pathway EPZ vere also good at the SEOC.
Information was allable shoving the location of-dairy r=s, food processing plants, and water supply intake points. Criteria were sed in dje er=ining yhether to place animals on stored feed.
Local agencies were Grevided th infor=ation to assis: in the i=plementation of protective actions, and.ngestion pathway sa=pling was ordered.
1 l
l 2.1.6 Eealth, Medical, and Exnosure Control Measures l
Heal:h, medical, and exposur control censures at the SDEOC vere good.
Personnel in co==and and control questioned,whether the use of. ' should be asses sment staff reviewed the authorized.
The decision makers andjccident necessity for using KI and correctlykoncluded tha its use was not warranted given the lack of radiciodine in the postulated repe' ase.
Knowledge of the PACS for authorizing the administration of KI was Demonstrated d ring these discussions. Noble gas exposures to emergency field workers were =inimized by positioning workers at the edges of the plume and thus authorization to exceed PAGs was not required during the exercise.
The RERIP does, however, indicate that the representative of the New York State Depart =en: of Real:h can authori:e exposures in excess of PAGs.
2.1.7 Recoverv and Reentrv onerations Recovery and reentry operations at the SEOC vey[
ood.
A about 01:10 on Augus: 25, participants at the SEOC v re verballybinfot=ed th : reentry and recovery could begin.
A discussion ensued centering on th actions which needed to be :aken.
Written plans and procedures were.ollowed by the participants in the exercise during th development of a plan for recovery and reentry.
"'he established procedures ddressedallnecepa, concerns.
During recovery and reentry planning, decision makers had vc plete access to all participating agencies, both within the SEOC and in the field.
M /
OV i
i 22 U174SD [
1.1.8 Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience The scenario provided a good experience for personnel at the SEOC. No p+eknowledge of the scenario was exhibit ed by participants.
SDE00 personnel
,,a r t i ci pa t e d actively in the ex e r ci s e, which provided beneficial emergency r es pons e training to participants.
The =ajor response e'ements of accident j
assess =ent and decision making at the SDECC vere tested by the scenario.
4 The scenario tra s outstanding in providing an opportunity for State
{
Police Troop F to =obilize its resources and to practice its responsibilities l
f or making the initial notification calls to all of the NY/RC compensating i
r es pons e org anizations.
I P er sonnel at the SDEOC participated actively in the exercis e to the extent permitted by the imit ed number of t elephone lines.
I 2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY Participation of the nuclear facility operator in the EOF was limited use of emerg ency co=munleations, to d emons tra ting notification proc edur es,
activation of emergency res pons e personnel, and use of emergency equipment.,
Accident assessment and the ability to make r eco= mend ations for protective
]
actions had been demonstrated during the previous exercise.
l l
"he facilities and resources at the EOF vere s't anding.
The RECS line rovid ed the primary co =nunication link between the EOF and local l
governments, the SEOC,
'e
- SDEOC, and the NY/RC EOC, The inc e'grat ed co=unications network a the EOF rovided secondary co==unications links by telephone.
The system.nclud ed co=mercial dial telephones, hotlines to the Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission, dedicated lines to plant emergency centers, and between the various EOF work areas.
Designated work stations co=ueji ations werevas sign ed to the emergency director, radiological assessment staff, off-l site conitoring fa=s, and two co==unications oper ators.
ata for the ed NY/RC in
.imelv fashion.
l scenario were.ransmitted to the state Messages trans=1sted by the EOF staff were lear and an repriate delay was allowed between the time uhen plant parameters were obtained pd the time when taey were t r ansc' e t ed to off-site authorities.
Clearly Vvisible maps and 7
status boards 14tovided current inf o r=ation aboye the do e proj ections and changing plant conditions.
Map dis plays wereMood and.ncluded maps of the 10-mile plu=e exposure pathway EPZ, the nuclear facility operator's thermo-lu=in es c ent dosimeter (TLD)
- network, and its air monitoring stations, emergency sampling sites, an ' radiological jaonitoring sites.
Maps of ERPAs also displayed and Veurrent as of February 25, 1983.
with population vef:
15-30 =inutp.
A separ e status board was S;atus boards wer el/upd at ed ev erv
\\Aivailable for weather inf o t=ation nd was Mpdat ed in a.1:ely fashion.
The flow of internal infor:ption was aided by additional statur board for state and NT/RC personnel. Ventilation was adequate and there was no overcrowding at the EOF.
y/
)X
U17490 q
23
/
and l mobilization l
of officials and staf f was at the J
The alertin EOF.
The staff participating in the exercise were capable of maintaining j
c ntinuous, 24-hour operations.
At 16:10, nuclear facility operator. personnel l
sed the RECS line to notify Rockland, Putna=, Orange, and Westchester counties ' and the town of Peekskill t n an unusual event ICL exercise was in j
progress.
The EOF manage =ent team ssu=ed control at the site area emergency 1
ECL but.ad been at the EOF since the unusual event ECT. The standard utility pdceduresfore:ergencyclassificationwereusedin nitial notifications d
j ther coc=unications
.o response organizations.
Changes in the ICL ere trans=itted pro =ptl to emergency response organizations via the PICS line.
]
t Emergency operations canage=ent at the EOF was cod.
Although there l'
no decision-making related to protective actions, the EOF director did l
ovide outstanding direction and control throughout the exercise by means of periodichriefings covering on-site and off-site activities.
2.3 NEW YORK STATE COM?ENSATING FOR ROCKLAND COUbTY (NY/RC)
In this exerc.ise, New York State de=onstrated that it was capable of imple=enting co=pensating measures in the event that' Rockland County was I
hnable to mount an effective radiological emergency response.
The state compensating tea = vas composed of representatives of the New York State Disaster Preparedness Co==.is s i o n, other responsible state agencies, nuclear facility operator personnel, and volunteer organizations. Durin the exercise of August 24-25, 1983, all participating emergency workers demonstrated the l
capability to i=plement the compensating measures required by the RERIP. This I
de=enstration corrected a deficiency noted during the March 9,1983, exercise for Indian Point.
1 2.3.1 E=errenev Coerations Facilities and Resources The e=ergency operations ilities and ources at th N/RC EOC were
, ped and were adequate to support the emergenc-response.
Working space and g
W:ecities were adequate.
Separate roe =s were available for coc=and, accident assess =ent, operations, and public inf ormation of ficer (?!O) functions.
Some overcrowding was noted with over 70 people so=etimes present in the IOC.
However, this overcrowding was primarily due to observers and backup persennel who would not be present during an actual emergency and did not interfere with EOC operations.
Map displays were good.
Maps shoving evacuation routes, reception centers, field =ccitoring points, the EFZ vich sectors,.eception centers. and congregate care centers were osted in the opera.ons room.
A nap of congregate care centers in Bergen County, N.J., was posted at the NY C EOC, correcting a deficiency noted in the last exercise.
All caps ver clear and j
easily understood. However, the map of evacuation routes could be improved to show pri=ary and secondary evacuation routes more clearly.
This =provement YY
n U17491 is expected to be made when the transportation revisions. to the RERIP,.
currently under development, have been completed.
A cap shovirg sixteen Indian Poin
, f Decision makers %p'and population by ERPA vasVavailable in directional sectors f ro:
sed an overlay of plume direction on this the co==and room.
j
=ap when Considering alternative, protective. actions.
In the accident a sess=ent roe =, caps of the pl [e exposure pathway EPZ and ERPAs were also vallable.
One cap clearly specified the location of the preselected conitoring points.
/
Coc=unicaticns at the W/RC EOC vere ry good.
The RECS line evided the p ri=a ry contact with other counties in the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
e condary systems included the Office of Disaster Preparedness (CDP) telephones, RACES radios, and telefax machines for the transt.ission and receipt of hard copies.
At about 18:00, the ICS line at the NY/RC EOC began The NY/RC EOC was the on1y goint encountering reception
)
tohalfunction.
j roble =s.
Several secondary syste were vused effectively to maintain i
coc=unications, inci ding use of the DP line in the cot: mand room nd relay of eessages ove the
'CS line from the Westchester County EOC.
The roblem with RICS was.ectified by 19:00.
However, the cause(s) for the RECS line j
malfunction should -
investigated and corrected.
Coe=unicatioy between New l
York counties were ell coordinated. The U.S. Coast Gua d'wastfictified by the Westchester EOC and the required federal' agencies were notified by the as noted in Sec. 2.1.1 of this report.
Separate telef ax machines wereld a11able in the accident assessment, coe=and, and PIO roons for the transfer of hard
]
5 information.
The telef ax machine in the accident assess =ent reem was ppy vused to receive hard copies of the RECS ejesages from the IOF to the h7/RC EOC.
An executive hot line could also be Wsed for co==unicapens between the utility, the SEOC, and the h7/RC EOC. NAWAS radio was also Mvailable.
In the accide e assess ent room, pn'for=ation was received fro Indian Point over both the ICS line and th Vhot line.
Contact with h7/RC radiological field
=enitoring tea =s was aintained via radio contact with t utility vehicles used by the tea =s.
The fire depart =ent radio frequencie provided a secondary eans of contact with the.ield teams.
The agency representatives in the operations room generally sed ce==ercial telephones to ce==unicate viph' their i
agency of fices except for the state police and fire department wholised their own radios.
Internal, ce==unications at the NY/RC EOC vere 3eod.
1 splays and featus boards a the operations room and ine the accident assessment room were Vouts tanding, visible to EOC staff, and Yupdated sjp (opriate.
Ma of as population distribution by ERPA vere availab in the,Mperations and o==and rooms. Upon arrival, each ECC staff =e:be vrete her/his name on the staffing board in the operations roe =.
The Lieutenant Governor and or r co::and personnel, as well as operations room s aff, could thus easily etet..ine the evel of EOC staffing and who was crually presesti RECS essages were transcribed in the accident assessment room and ro=ptly.orvar
$' the co==and r'oom.
The operations room staff was also kept v9 1.nfor=ed throughout the exercise.
The Lieutenant Governor and his staff @ eld frequent vi /
3 x
.a.
.2-.
a..
I o
U17492
,3
.iefings f or the apn/cy representatives in the operations room.
In addition, s:atus beards and V_essage logs were ept current.
l l
Security =easures were estanding.
The gate to p e Rockland County i
fire training facility, hich houses the hT/RC EOC, vastientrolled by a state police trooper who quired proper identification to grant access to the fenced grounds.
The pri=ary security points were oc ted at the entrances to the EOC proper, where state police troopers ' vere also on duty.
A log of autherized personnel vasNecked before individuals were allowed to enter the alsedecuired.
A log of ingress / egress EOC.
Addit 4nal identification was was also ept.
At the outset of the exe-ise, all people, except five previously cleared operations workers, were leared from the EOC.
The New York State Ar=ory in Orangeburg was used as an assembly and dispatch point for utility volunteers who were to perform particular e=ergency response functions as part of the hT/RC team.
The Armory is a good facility.
It is large, with space and equipment adequate for accet=nodating large nu=bers of personnel for extended periods.
Tele ph, oys provided the pri=ary -means of co==unication with the hT/RCJ.OC and vereWacked up by RACES hand-held rad %s.
Co==unications were neverkbacklogged.
Internal coe=unica-
,f tdons were Vacceptablet A cap showing the area affected by the plume was ailable and keptleurrent.
Hove er, neither the status board nor the display' for weather condition was ever used during the xercise.
Security measures at the Armory wef*
ood.
Utility volunteers wore identification badges and
- l l
ke're registeredWecording to their e=ergency assignments and whether they were f rom Consolidated Edison or the New York Power Authority.
Security could be 1: proved by having guards stationed at the Ar=ory; none were present during 1
the exercise.
2.3.2 A.lerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff As discussed in Sec.
2.
2, the state warning point, which is caffed p
on a 24-hour-per-gy basis, otified the State Police Troop F in Middletown, j
vhich is also taffed continuously, to notify state emergency workers to report to t.
57/RC EOC.
The Lieutenant Governor, his s t af /', and key hT/RC i
_j personnel ere at the EOC by 17:00.
Tull staffin was L4chieved by 17:'.
j Procedures and ecuipment for notifying and obilizing personnel were a equate.
Accident assessment, pisonnel were notified from the Ft/RC EOC sing pagers, with telephones Verving as,bja kys[
The perfor=ance of state Depart =ent of Health personnel in alertingVand mobilization demonstrated that the additional training in the plan and procedures recoe= ended after the last exercise had been i=plemented.
Each agency in the erations room at the ST/RC demonstrated ara outst nding capability f or entinuous 24-hour operations through the presence of ackup ' personnel.
A shift change was effectiv[y demonstrated.
In the accident assessment room, a double staff was Vp re s ent.
The two field monitoring teams called for in the RERlP re deployed and two additional
'h ON
U17493
/
26 e ams were ilable at the EOC to provide a second shif t.
The ?IO staff.had sufficient personn el a a11able for 24-hour operations.
?.ovever, in the c:_:unica: ions area, a hift change of the RECS co.:unica: ions operators uys g
d e=en s :ra t ed when the ieu:enant Governor called for a shif: change and/\\no al:ernates were pos : ed.
However the RECS operators did indicate that training in ' this function had been iven to additional, personnel who could have been used to de onstrate a shif: change.
The s:af fing of the county warning point and the receipt of the initial notification could not be obs erv ed because the observer was not per=it t ed access to
.e county police com=unications area.
Even though the warning point i caffed on a continuous basis, it is suggested that such observations be permitted during future exercises.
The de=enstration of alerting and mobilization of the two key staff me=bers (the utility tesi coordinator, and the coordinator's backup) and a
, jr ngeburg seventy participating utility volunteers at the Armory ' in 0
was good.
The radio pagers worn by the utility volunteers were Met ated in a manner by the utility liaison at the W/RC EOC and rovid ed the Ld=ely f
capability for an initial response at any tin:e.
According to the volunteers,
cpev {pdled a preassigned telephone nu=ber for instructions a,'rer having been W reed by their automatic pagers.-
All volunteers had Veported and b e en..
.egist ered at the armory withi 50 minutes after the pager alert. During the exercise, a shif t change was e=onstrated for the utility tea = coordinator.
A 1
ball for additional volunteer field workers was simulated.
bfIgular bus Notification an mobilization of bus drivers v drivers as well as ined utili:7 volunteer driv ers par:icijaced in the evacuation exerets e at five bus companies.
The rivers wereL<(otified at the aler: e=ergency classification level and wer
- anding by at thei-respective dispatch points vi:hin thirty e nutes.
At Raverstraw Transit,.eceipt of the initial notification call nitiated a telephone call chain to company drivers.
Sufficient personnel werekv ilable to initiate the call chain on a 24-hour per day basis and to provide continuous service.
Eackup driver
. ode the buses during the ex ercis e.
Calls for the dispatch of buses were received about ' 20:55 and 21:20.
The och by Eaverstrav over coc.mercialp-1ephone at four bus companies were alsolfotified by telephone f rom :he n/RC EOC and used
- elephones to cal
. heir operators.
Backup bus drivers and a backup dis-patcher vere orb c ndby at the Clarkstown Central School District.
Some Rockland County transportation companies do not hav e their ovo radio equipe e to pe:ait their dispatchers to co==unicate both with their vehicles an vith the transit coordinator in the NY/RC EOC, a deficie y noted during :he.ast ex ercis e.
The bus f rom Edu tion Transpor:ation cid have a radio set from :he company and was also ecompanied byp RACES operator.
C :=unications, on the Harran Trans rtation bus were Vrelayed to the EOC through the company office. Movev er,
nly RACES operators vould provide radio contact with Haverstrav Transit and Peter 3rega buses and sufficient RACES SI /
hi U--____-_.----.-_.---
, _ _. _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _. - - - _ _ _ _ _. - _. = _ ~
1
. -. ~
2' U17494 l
- a Clarkstown Central School District, a base station and an antenna had been j
installed.
yif teen radios had been purchas ed for the buses and delivery was exrect ed within two veeks af ter the exercise.
I l
Utility volunteers who were to staff traffic control points were di patched from the Armo y in Orang eburg.
Some traf fic control peints were l
taffed by a utility olunteer and a state police trooper.
Other traffic trol points were staffed by state police. troopers.
State police radio rovided a means of cot =:unicating with the traf fic control points.
c i
Both the Rockland County recept cen,ty g the personnel monitoring f
cent er for emergency workers were r mptly vstaf f ed before the radiological
{
The s t ' staff at both of these
)
celease pos tulat ed by the se -rfa/no began.
At the eEontamination and pe.sonnel monitoring.
f acilities was adequate f or for emergency workers, a call-up list kIdicat ed personnel monitoring center staf f members were available to maintain 24-hour operations.
that sufficient Radiological monitori g teams were ted in a d mely manne, by automatic pager and were ilized within one hour.
Telephones revided a to the automatic pag er s.
Sufficient teja members were ailable to
'u p the NT/RC EOC.
b rovide 24-hour coverage and backup teams wereptfa11able at 2.3.3 Emerzenev operations Management The management of emergency operations at the NY/RC EOC vas' good, e
Lieutenant Gove.
and, during his absence, the Director of Relen Eayes Hospital vere.n charg e of the emergency response fa specified in the PIRI?.
Governor %ssumed the decision-making the Lieutenant Upon arrival aejhe EOC, and, irected all em rgency response activities through his staff.
'l When the
.ft change was econs trat ed, the Director of the Helen Hayes l
W authority i
Both decision Hospital ssumed the responsibility,fpr command and control.
makers e=enstrated the ability to %rrive at appropriate decisions regarding tb radiological emergency and protective action reco=mendatiop af ter j
onsulting with the technical staff.
All actionsjdere clos y lloordinat ed l
among response agencies.
Both decision-=akers Vconsulted requently with preparedness Commissica or the o
representatives of the New York State Disaster New York State Decartment of Health at the SEOC in Albany.
' by the agencies at the
.411 r equir ed response elements were ver All agencies listed in the FIRIP rticipated activ ely in the NY/RC EOC.and[ Demonstrated a good knowledge of their responsibilities.
cjl se exercis e the repr es ent atives of the various agencies was Vnot ed j
interaction between The NT/RC communications personnel were well trained and d ring the e.xercise.
the exercise, ctively participated throughout i
l Covernor and his staff, eld frequent briefir s for staf f The Lieutenant room.
Thes e comprehensive riefings t,v er ed plant f
operations in the and off-site emergency situations and b ovided the opportunity for conditions
\\
40 /
OK
.-....a.-_....--.
?
1 017495 2e agfncy r epr es ect ativ es to update the other staf f = embers in the operations rpo: on actions taken by their agencies.
The accident assessment staff tdo rief ed decisjgn makers frequently during the early part of the exercise and also rief ed' the operations staff.
When additional 4.cident assess =ent personneltdrived fro: Albany, a separate liaison was pointed to brief the decision makers in the co==and room.
Each e=ergency res pons e organization ' in the operations room was provided with outstanding, detail [d, written procedures that were keyed to the ECLs.
These procedures werehs ed by a~ency representatives in perforcing their duties.
No written procedures were available ia the accident assessment s
excellen understanding ef the RERIP room. j evever, the staff demonstrated a.
j and emons t rat ed a capability to carry out its duties without using writt en aida.
t/..
The cility E was consistently and effectively ' ed throughout the exercise.
t was sed in initial ' no tifications,
was roninently displayed, and was
.h nged as ppropriate on the EOC status boards.
All changes in the ECL vere romptly communicated to the emergency response organizations.
Emergency operations canagement at the
'ry in
.angeburg was od.
Decisions made at the NT/RC EOC vere prompt 1 ass. to the' uti ity team coordinator by the utili y liaison at the EOC.
The coordinator.=plemented i=gy canner.
The utility tea = coordinator or an these decisions in a alternate was clearly inVeharge at the Ar=ory.
Voyl'nteers from b 'th the New Tork Power Authority and Consolidated' Edison werebssembled and ispatched at the Ar=ory.
About 70 personnel Mrticipated in the ex ercis e.
All utility essdency r es pons e volunteers who were obs erved during the exercise were i,
iliar with the proper response and dispatch procedures for their' e=ergency response assigc ents.
Pt aquept briefin;;e and upd at es were v es by the coordinator, ep' t' e -olunteers at the Armory.
The standard utility team utility classification vasWsad in all of these oral briefings.
However, the current ECL was not posted on the status board at the Armory.
This infor:a-tion sheuld be posted and updated in a timely manner.
Such a posting would serve as a re=inder and would assist newly arriving volunteers.
2.3.4 public Alertine and Notificatica Overall, public alerting and notification was good.
Sirens were used alert the public in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EP2 and were j
activat9d by the Westchester County sherif f's of fice. The sirens wereHiounded in a \\rimely canner at about 18:45 at the alert E C'. L.Affing of the test notification nes sag e over EBS vas well dinated 5th the siren sounding.
The Lieutenant Governor and other EOC staff ed the sounding of the sirens and the airing of the test IBS message.
Limited spot checks of reside.nts of the 10- 11e plu=e expos ure pathvay E?Z vere conducted on the day of the exercise.
.ly about half of those questioned had heard the sirens and hose who were eside buildings at the time of the siren sounding had not su n
U174bb 29 heard them.
Route alerting by vehicles was not required by the' exercise objectives.
Af ter an initial test cessage was aired over
.3C an
,' the airing of 23S messages was simulated.
The NY/RC EOC staff eted pertinent and news releases.
They also de=enstrated the infor ation fog EBS =essages capability tol/transeit infor=ation to the joint cedia center.
2.3.5 Public and Media Relations acceptaple.
An interim infor:ation Public educa on fforts were oped/and distribute 4/ o the residents of Rockland t
brochure had been ev County._ The brochurelgives informae. ion on sirens, the radio stations that are to carry EBS. messages, sheltering, ' evacuation to e bus stops for the transportation-dependent, evacuation routes, recepti centers,.and provisions f or the mobility-i= paired.
The brochure had been distributed within the two weeks preceding the exercise.
This distribution corrects a deficiency noted during the last exercise.
However, of the limi ed number of residents of the 10-cile EPZ questioned by federal observers, only about half could recall having received the brochure.
Fever still had read the brochure. )f those who had read it, knowledge of he brochure's contents ranged froml#amiliarity.
an individual's neighborhood to a limited
-ith the inf or:ation pertinent to recall of the pertinent information. {f [her public education activities had j
neluded newspaper and radio-spot advertise =ents explaining the emergency plans Less than half the people questioned knew that the sirens meant that hey should tune to an EBS station for additional emergency infor=ation er sso.ated the= with Indian Point.
Additional public education is needed, as j
n ced in previous exercises.
In addition, the public education effort still needs to be reviewed and efforts still need to be made to dec e mine its ef f ectiveness as noted during the last two exercises.
The interim brochure was also serving as an interim poster for place-nt in public buildings.
Li=ited spot checks indicated that the poster was displaye in parks, post offices, libraries, and one nursing home.
- However, it was et displayed in any of the hotels, motels, real estate offices, or munici buildings visd ed by observers, although some motel and hotel operators acknowledged.eceipt of the poster.
Although progress has been
=ade, continuing ef f orts are needed to i= prove the display of these caterials for the transient population as noted during previous exercises.
The exercise objectives did not ca'l for the activation of the joint ware f the information f acility in media center.
Howev the press was Clarkstevn to which
=ely information was IM:varded on a regular basis from the PIOS in the NT/RC EOC.
In NT/RC EOC, the PIO staf f was ke d by decision
=am.rsa:he
.ne 4ptully aardee 1n,omamon
,t.e.ppropr1.t. z,e.essages.
1, to Clarkstown.
20 /
(c,X
1 U17497'.'
30 Although no,e j[ quired by the exercise objectives, an unpublished ru or A telephone call to this rumor control number by a control number was Met up.
f (eral observer indicated that accurate infor:atien about the exercise was
. eing given out.
v.edia personnel who were present at the Armory in Orangeburg and who
=edia were interviewing exercise participants should be referred to the joint center to obtain infor:ation free designated spckespersons.
i 2.3.6 Accident Assessment The overall accident assesspent capability demonstrated b he accident assess =ent staff at the EOC waskutsj:anding.
The field teams ad appropriate equipment and were well trained i procedures.
Backup radiological monitoring kits and field teams were lava lable.
Each team had high-and low-range i struments for easuring radiation.
The instruments had been recently calibrated n'd operationally checked before departure to the field.
The CDV j
700's are adequate for determining 0.1 mR/hr above background, the threshold for de onta=ination. All field monitoring team me=bers v e'very well trained and a=111ar with procedures.
Surveys were properly e, air samples are Ld orted br6mptl'y in the per correctly en, and all readings were units.
The field teams Ymonstrated excellent professional judgment.
Both to men.itor for radiciodine.
Each field tea:s d eonstrated the j'apability and a TLD.
All team
{
peycil dosimeters me=ber of the field teams %d two ce=bers were fully trained in the use%f dosimeters and KI.
Coc=unications be reen the field monitoring teams and the EOC vere j
f V6utstan ing, correcting a deficiency noted in the previous exercise.
R. adios j
d vere laced in th / utility vehicles used by the monitoring tea =s and field data were easily communicated to the accident assessment staff at the EOC.
The accident assessment staf f in th OC onstrated an outstanding capability in both the use of data and the projection of dose estimates. The EOC dde
\\
numerous hypothetical calculations and deje'as s e s smen t staff in the griefed the decision makersfon the range of poss le consequences.
The accident assessment ptaff Wonsulted, in a
%ely.ashion, with the SEOC on minor dif f erences in projected doses and.esolved the differences.
The pluce boundaries were\\.1[cated by moving the field teams.
The accident assess =ent staff all available infor:ation to tfor=ulate recoc=endation for the decision makers.
Current conditions and forecast changes were usidered in arriving at reectmendations, as well as plant status inf or=ation and the protective action,p.ri' des in the plan. During the final stages of the exercise, the staf f Demonstrated an,o fu*anding capability to plan the recovery activities prior to reentry and toWfstablish a realistic time estimate for =aking the required = measurements.
36 /
ox
=...
31 U17498 2.3.7 Ac:1 ens to protect the public_
Sufficient personnel and equipmen: vere allable at the 57/RC EOC for I
~
icple=enting protective ac: ions.
Proc,edy for responding to 1: pedi =en:s to vf.ectively de ens: rated.
Folleving j
e.vecuation were in place and were e
introdue: ion of an ini:ial evacuation i-edieert the state police and
- ranspor:ation representa:ives a: the ECC.esponded quickly by. establishing an alterna:ive evacua: ion route.
This terna:ive ' route was s)u sequently blocked and a secend alternative route was stablished followingIc6nsultation with :he State Police Troop F in Middletown.
Traffic detours were Mablished in re'onsetotg impediments and traf fic wasWe' directed.
Fire tru 's were anched :oYva pilled gasoline off the road and a tov truck was rected to the scene to emove vehicles.
Four evacuation rodces for the general population requiring bus transportation had been preselected for this exercise, one route for each 1
operator participating.
The specific routes were not revealed to the bus companies until the exercise evacuation order was issued by the Lieutenant Governor, although in each case the route was one of a set that company drivers had been trained to follow.
Regular bus drivers as well as trained (utility employees) weredotified at the bus drivers volunteer replacement alert stage and voobilized for standby at their ryspective dispatch points within 30 c:inutes. All of these bus drivers were1p(uipped with dosimetry kits at the dispatch point and initial readings weredaken.
At the exercise, the nu=ber of utility personnel who had received training both in driving evacuation bus routes and in emergency worker radioprotec:ive measures far surpassed the number of Rockland County bus drivers who had received such latter nu=bered only (f ew at each participating bus company.
training; the Additional Rockland County bus drivert should be trained in driving evacuation bus routes and in emergency worker
.adioprotective measu General population evacuation bus routes ver an corree:ly and their arrival at the not[ demons trate appropriate reception centers was timely.
Drivers did a
knowledge of what their specific responsibilities would be following arrival at the centers but all indicated they would stand by for further instrue: ions.
Bus-to-dispatcher coc=unications remain problem for some operators.
As reco== ended in the previous exer:ise, all buses used f or evacuation should be equipped with mobile coc:=unication radios.
Several companies are in the process of installing radios f or bus-to-dispatcher co== nications, but, for others, the presence of RACIS operators on the buses is still the only means e
g for contacting dispatchers.
It is understood that ef forts to equip all buses
- hat =ay be involved in general evacuation vi:5 radio co =unications vill continue.
~he,means for group eva antion from re:ete areas (e.g.,
Bear Mountain State Park) were successfully demonstrated.
Hove er, pri arily as a result of lacking radio ce==unications, the bus driver di not know the specific c2= ping area f rom which the evacuation was to be effected.
A state police trooper, 40/
bx
U17'499 l
n called in to assist, direc ed the bus to the vrong ca=p and therefore, the 4
s1=ulated evacuation jv s considerably delaye.
Nevertheless, after the l
si=ulated pickup wasMeco=o, ijhed, travel to the reception center wasL415ely and efficient and thedlMge of radiological protection and deconta=1 nation procedures exhibited by the bus driver and other personnel on the bus was satisfactory.
1 Rockland County maintains a list of =obility-i= paired residents vhe I
have notified authorities that they would require special transportation l
d assistance (e.g., wheelchair-lift vans) in an evacuation.
Pickup routes to f
provide e=ergency eva dacion transportation to these persons at their homes have recently been eveloped.
However, it was apparent during the exercise
(
l not[had the opportunity to drive these routes.
that e=ergency drivers have f
During the course of one demonstrated route, the driver:
J Could not locate one of the addresses due t unfamiliarity with land = arks along the route; Made a wrong turn and ecaee disoriented and only direc-tions given by the state controller put hi= back on the i
correct route; and j
Missed a turn due to an tror in the directions provided f or running the route.
More training in the execution of these routes is needed. There appears to be no problem in the county with respect to the nu=ber and capacity of vehicles (including wheelchair spaces) that would be needed to acco plish this special i
service.
I Utiliev personnel were essential to the de=enstration of a=bulance i
Those participating in the exerc1seWr' rived at the a=bulance f
~
d tr'ansportat n.
t base with automatic pagers and code cards to keep the: in direct and constant coe=un tion with the NT/RC EOC.
However, these specific individuals had d
been eployed from well inside the New Yo k metropolitan area, which could
=ake it difficult for them to =obilize in a timely fashion during rush hours.
The exerciae =essage requesting a=bulance service centioned an injured and potentially contaminated individual.
Oney=ployee of the ambulance company acco=panied the util ty volunteers and,14 rove the vehicle to pick up the individual.
It was not bserved whether there was a survey meter or any of directly checking for contaminate [oaboard the a=b.ance but other means the utility volunteers were well versed in bothldose reading and ecenta=ina-
]
tion procedures.
The training received by the utility volun eers and the a=bulance driver appears to be inconsistent with respect to the destination of a
the a=bulance folleving delivery of the patient te a hospita or a special-f care facility.
While the utility volunteers believed the a=bulance would go
(
~
///
/3 X
U17500 33 directly to a designated decontamination center, the driver thought that it veuld re=ain at the hospital for decontamination.
Four traffic control points were selected for staffing prior to the 3
exercise by FEMA and no advance know e of these poin s given to exercise participants.
State police, local police, and rained utility
)
volunteers were dispatched to these poin:s af ter their location was revealed as in progress.
Wi:hout exception, the at the NY/RC EOC vhile the exercis fe personnel deployed to these pointsWnew the correct tragf# control procedures to be followed at each poin.
All personnel were,Wquipped with dosi=e:ry ki 1.
The utility personnel serving as traffic controllers ver more newledgeable of appropriate dose reading and recording procedures tha9 tate or local personnel. Local police need more training in these procedures.
l The personnel monitoring center very good equipment for monitoring e' erge.ncy workers.
Primary and backup communication and deconta=ination of m
consisted ofYelephone an CES, respectively.
A su fd tent number of well-trained personnel from the utility and the ODF vere available at the personnel facility was[tstanding and moni:oring center.
Control of access to the procedures for processing e=ergency workers were excellent V The Rockland County public reception center had excellent for.
oonitoring and decontamination.
Facilities, including sani (commoda-tiens, co==unications equipment, and pith care amenities, e good.
The staff members were well trained and,Vavailable in adequate numberjo perf orm I
all of the necessary fune:1ons.
tablished procedures were lefmployed for i
processing evacuees.
F.aps were rovided to people o ng to the congregate care center. Some procedural proble=s were identified.
.e outside layout for I
processing evacuees allow them to walk where pot utially contaminated d
vehicles had been.
In addition, personnel at the center were unsure as to and buses would[ drop off passengers before or af ter the whe:her automobiles vehicle contamina: ion check.
Additional training in the proper procedures for processing people arriving at the reception center in vehicles is recommended.
'"hree relocation centers, the Spring Valley Jr. Eigh School, the Tappan Zee Eigh School, and the Para =us, New Jersey, congregate care center vere loca:ed at least 15 miles from the plant.
The congregate care center in Paracus New Je rsey, along with its associated decontamina:1on f acility, was good.
~
l 2.3.8 Eealth. Medical, and Excesure Control Measures Heal:h, =edical, and exposure control measures were generally good t
- he correc:f on of some deficiencies vould improve performance.
The utility volunteers dispatched from. the Armory in Orangeburg h
Y
9 U1750T vere to be provided with dosimeters and KI by the agencies to which they were dispatched.
The RERIP has provisions for using KI.
Eevever, because the si=ulated pri=arilygoble gas with limited radiciodine, release for this exercisa. vas tpe use of KI was never required. 'Timel) evaluation of the need for KI use was V de by the accident assessment staff at the $*Y/RC EOC.
Arrangements vere made to read n.Ds in the Rockland County area.,In an actual energency, it is expected that this capability could be functional locally vichin 12-20 hours.
l Bus drivers and utility volunteers on the buses were equipped with KI, j
self-reading dosimeters covering two different
- ranges, permanent record j
devices (TI.Ds), and record cards.
Although the Haverst av Transit office lies q
vithin the 10--mile EPZ, the dispatpher at the of fice did not have dosimetry J
p equip =ent even though the co=panyWad 70 sets availab e.
The availability of personal radiological exposure monitors (dosimeters and TLDs) for most emergency workers improved a situation noted at the last exercise.
KI and J
dosimetry equipment had not been provided for the RACES operator on the f
Haverstrav Transit s d iving the route for. the evacuation of mobility-impaired persons.
Although the emergency workers on the buses generally i
exhibited a =uch higher level of training in radioprotective procedures than had been observed in previous exercises, additional training is still I
recce= ended.
The frequency with which self-reading dosimeters were prd. by energency workers in the field varied.
On most bus routes, drivers Wead and recorded dosimeter readin s every 15-20 minutes, while on others the reading every 25 minutes with records being made only about f requency was about one once an hour.
On one route, the driver read and recorded the desiteter.
reading only at departure, te first stop, the last stop, and the reception s
as to the proper reading frequency gave ansvers Drive 7' questioned center.
ranging f rom \\J3 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
Self-reading dosimeters and TLDs were available for e:ergency workers at the traf fic control points.
However, training in desitetry is recoc= ended for e=crgency personnel who are to be statiened at traf fic control points.
New York State Department of Transportation personnel at one roadblock had not beentrainedintheuseoffosis andNhekeepingofradiologicalexposure l
records.
The state police at f the traf fic control points did not knov l
how of ten to read their dosimeters.
The trooper a* one traf fic control point l
did not have a card for recording d e utility volunteer at one traffic j
control point knew how often to rea< and record the dest =eter readings tea =s had and Each member of the radiological field monitfring nderstood the procedures for its
~h alsoMad 0-5R and C-200R self-reading dosimeters.
Readings were ade and recorded at 15-30 minute intervals by one tea =, whereas the second team used professional judgment to deter:ine when to read its dosimeters.
/g/
//x'
a
\\
U17502 i
35 l
1 I
Dosimeters were read every half hour at the reception center a,ndjt the persennel cenitorir4 center.
Both 0-5R and 0-200R dosimeters were Wvailable in adequate cuantfties'for all personnel at both locations.
l Wased en questions asked of scoe of the e:ergency workeg, additional l
training is needed in the procedure to be followed for obtaining / authorization to exceed protective action guides.
'One bus driver who was questioned did
[new the action level for contacting the dispa'tcher for special instructions.
two different traffic centrol points
- however, state police tre ers gt reported action levels of 2F nd SR vhile the utility rd r on the. route for
=obility-impaired persons thought the action evel was IR.
State Depart =ent of Transportation personnel at the roadblock ere untrained in the p ocedures emergency workers should follow in contacting their supervisors an obtaining instructions for exceeding protective action guides.
On the o* er hand, me=bers of radiological field monito.cg teams were aware of the recedure for authorizing excess doses and the evels appropriate for requesting such an authorization.
Action levels for decontaticating equipeent (0.1 mR/hr) have been l
specified in the PIRIP.
Thje (levels were known to perptinel at the keception I
and personnel conitoring Venters.
There was also anW understanding of what to do in cases involving a contaminated indivi ual requiring cedical at ution.
Facilities for deconta=1 nation at the eception center Aiid the PMC vere good.
~be layout inside the reception center was Very good.
- Outside, hcVever, the traff c pattern required people to walk in areas that could have been traversed by centa=inated vehicles.
It should be deter =ined whether the outside traffic pattem at the reception center can be changed to avoid the possibility of cross-conta=1 nation.
f l
Liquid vastes at the PMC vere acceptably isposed of in a lined trench.
At both the reception center and the PMC, contaminated solid vastes from a real e=ergency would be placed in appropriate containers and turned over to the utility when the e=ergency was over.
/
Control of access to evacuated areas as good and was i=plemented in a V i=ely canner.
Access was controlled early as a precaution when the sheltering order was given.
This action was taken to reduce the nu=ber of people in the sheltered ERPAs and to assure a rapid response by e ergency personnel for traffic control if evacuation became necessary.
2.3.9 Recoverv and Reent v Oeerations
/
Plans and procedures for recovery and reentry opejr clons vere outstanding At 00:!9 on August 25, the Lieuteaani Gove-noV infor=ed all l
agencies that recovery could begin.
Each agene ve a er d ensive report en the acIivities to be undertaken before evacuees couin return to thir homes. \\dlans were c.ade to prepare,gn' EBS =essage. A task force consisting of one member from each agency wasVIormed to monitor recovery and reentry until j
/W 78
U1750[
l 36
/
j= ale for route alerting for people who cocplete.
Special pr visions were eight have been shel cred and who =.ight not have access to a radio to receive EIS =essages.
In ensultation with SEOC, reentry was delayed until 16:00 to pe =it ti=e for sa=pling and analysis, j
/ considered The dose as s e s s=ent and N.Y.
De part=en t of Health staff confir:atory =casure=ent needed for the. ingestien pathway EPZ and j pen water sources.
Outstanding iscussions between the staf f led to the testablish=ent
~ king the neiessary =easure=ents.
These of a realistic schedule for a
ceaningful discussions led to eco==endations for the decision =akers.
3 1
2.3.10 Relevance of the Exercise Exoerience The scenario provided an outstanding test of the state's capability to co=pensate for Rockland <ounty's lack of participation in the radiological e=ergency response.
The scenario recuited notification, activation, an d
= mobilization of all ele =ents of the hT/RC emergency response.
All h7/RC EOC participants interviewed indicated that the exercise had been a good training exercise f or the=.
The exercise was also a good test and learning experience for the volunteer verkers at the Ar:ory, s
The scenario provided a o
test of evacuation procedures and training. State and local polic,
state Depart =ent of Transportation, bus co=panies, and RACES operators participated fully.
The extensive participa-tion by these and other agencies corrected a deficiency noted at the last exercise.
The scenario was a good test of the ability t'
establish a reception center and a personnel =onitoring center.
Except for perfor=ing an actual deconta=ination, all aspects of e=ergency procedures vete tested.
Tha scenario was a good test of the ability of the radiological field monitoring I
tea =s to respond to an e=ergency.
l l
2.a SERGEN COUNTY, h*EW JERSEY 2.a.1
!=errenev Orerations Tacilities and Resources E=ergency operations facilities and resour at the Bergen County e=erge operations center (BCEOC) were generally good.
The working space vas ate and, in the event of a real e=ergency, ad ffional space can be
=ade ilable.
Ac ess to the operations roo= vas entrolled and a log of cep t. [di s playe d,
ingress / egress was
..a p s shoving evacuation routes fro:.{ocKland County 6
correcting a deficiency noted during the reception centers werev last exercise.
t Co==unicatips syste=s vere adec,uate to contact contiguous state / local J
ydvernments vit b the 10-=ile EPZ.
The pri=ary coe=unication syste= vas by j
Vtelephone with radio as i backup, correcting a previous deficiency.
- However,
/f/
OX
n U17504 there was ittle co==unication between the BCEOC and the W/RC EOC dying the exercise.
During the three h.urs that the BCEOC was obserted, Anly two cessages were received frc: the W/?.C EOC.
The W/RC EOC should keep the ECEOC better infor:e a to the status of the emergency.
2.4.2 Alertine and Mobilization ef Of ficials and Staf f Alerting and mobilization,of Af ficials and staff at the SCEOC was j
o by telephone good.
The civil defense director V.eceived,lnitial notificat from the W/RC EOC.
The call was Werifled.
- However, afor ation on provided,. A.e BCEOC personnel vere quickly e assificatio level.vas not a efted and bilized.
Perso.nel were Wontacted by telephone and the EOC was caffed within 30 minutes.
Although a shift change was not demonstrated, additional personnel could be called upon during a real energency.
i f
2.4.3 Actions to Protect the Public b
Reception and congregate care facilities and procedures for handling evacuees were good in Bergen County. There was suf ficient space at the Bergen County Co== unity liege to handle the nu=b of potential evacuees. Cots and:
children, and a nursi j
blankets were vailable, a nursery was set up for f acility had aVar,pg station was stablished to meet health eace needs.
.4 ge
, p handle persons parking area for vehicles.
A Methodist church was set up with special needt. and problems The Jacilities we re vprepared to receive evacuees and case workers werek vai to provide assistance and counseling.
A =anager and an assistant cana e ce available at both facilities.
Fire protectionandemergencyvehicleswereavailaplethroughthecollege.
/
Shelter personnel vere trained inNandling mass evacuees and able to l
Vcoc=unicate wit)/' authorities outside the shelter by telephone and rjdio.
A.n area was se t baside for registratipc and record-keeping card we reVavaila ble.
Decentacination f acilities wereMvailable or evacuees but not for vehicles.
was et up by the fairlava civil efense The radiological monitoring statifo director.
!nstrueentation was vadecuate and personnel ef ficiently rocessed evacuees throu5h the center.
RelevanceofAxerciseExoerie_uce/
2.4.4 V
The BCEOC and reception centers participated fully and actively in the exercise.
The exercise was particularly helpful to Red Cross personnel, because they have not had to deal with any actual disasters in this area.
O
1 38 j
U17505 j
e 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES
-l
)
3.1 TEE STATE OF NEW YORK AND SOUTHERN DISTRICT Deficiencies observed a t the SEOC in Albany, the SDEOC in Poughkeepsie, and at the State Po11 ~ Headquarters, Troop F, in Middletown have led to the f ollowing reco==endations.
)
J 3.1.1 E =e rr e n ev Ooerations Facilities and Resources a.
Only three telephone lires were available for the 12 agencies at the SDEOC to contact their offices.
Additional telephone lines are recoc::nended.
j b.
Two of the three telefaz nachines at the SDEOC had been bortcwed f rom other districts to keep up vich the antici-pated message flow for the exercise.
At least one additional telef ax should be considered f or the SDEOC.
3.1.2 Alerting and Mobili:ation of Of ficials and Staf f l
a.
The telephone nessage used by Troop 7 in Middletcun to j
advise representatives of state agencies to report to the NY/RC EOC did not indicate the current e=e rgency classi-fica tion level nor note rlna t an exercise, not an actual cuergency, was in progress.
Both pieces of inf ernation should be given to nenbers of the state compensating tean, b.
At the SDEOC alerting and notification depenced on co::ner-cial telephone lines.
Ba ckup autocatic pagers should be considered f or key scaf f and key agency representatives.
3.2 TEE STATE OF NEW YOPI COMPENSATING FOR ROCC.AND COUh*TY (NT/RC)
Deficiencies noted by observers in Rockland County, at the New York State Arnory in Orangeburg, and in the Bergen County EOC have led to the f ollowing recoc::nendations.
3.2.1 Enereenev Onerations Facilities and Rescurces a.
The RECS line in the NT/RC EOC calf unctioned during the
' exercise.
Although the mal.f unction was rectified during the exercise and did not adversely affect the energency L_
1 U17506
)
~
39 response, the cause(s) for the malfunction still need to be investigated and corrected.
b.
Neither the status board nor the display of weather con-dicions in the Armory in Orangeburg were updated during the exercise.
Both should be kept current.
the A nory fu Orangeburg could be improved by c.
Security at stationing guards at the facility, d.- During the three hours that the Bergen County EOC was observed, only two messages were received from the NY/RC EOC.
The current emergency classification level was not provided to the Bergen County EOC during the initial notification ;;elephone call from the NY/RC EOC. The hT/RC j
EOC shsuld keep the Bergen County EOC better informed as I
to the status of the incident.
3.2.2 Alertine and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staf f 1
I a.
No shift change occurred on the RECS line in the hT/RC EOC.
A shift change of co=unications operators on the RICS line should be de=onstrated.
b.
Staffir4 of the county warning point and receipt of the initial notification could not be observed at the h'Y / P.C i
l EOC because the federal observer was not permitted access to the county police co=unications area.
These observa-tions should be perr.itted during future exercises.
'l i
3.2.3 E=errenev coerations Manaze=ent a.
The current emergency classification level was not updated on the status board at the Armory in Orangeburg.
This i
infor:ation should be posted and updated in a time:y manner.
3.2.4 Public and Media Relations a.
Of the li._i t e d number of residents of the 10- ile epi questioned by federal observers, only about half could tecall having received the public infor=ation brochure,
- understood its contents, or were aware of the meaning of the sirens.
Additional public education is needed so that the public vill understand the locations of the areas that a
\\
1
~U17507 -
to f
are to take protective actions, w-ill know how to carry out '
the protective actions, and vill be aware of what the f
sirens mean.
b.
Ef f orts should be cade to ascertain whether a significant number of people did not receive the. pamphlets.
If not, additional distribution should be =ade.
?
The public education progra= thould 'be reviewed to deter-c.
cine whether ef forts are needed to i= prove its effective-ness.
d.
As soon as possible, the necessary public information l
materials should be posted in public buildings, hotels, and motels tc infor= transient populations who cay come into the 10-mile plume. exposure pathway EPZ in ' Rockland County.
e.
The access of media representatives to the. Armory in Orangeburg needs to be better controlled.
Media repre-sentatives should be directed to ' the joint media center for the acquisition of information from designated spokespersons.
'l 3.2.5 Actions to Protect the Public Cmly a few Rockland County bus drivers at each bus company a.
have received t rair.ing in driving evacuation bus routes
']
and in emergency worker radioprotective reasures.
Additioral Rockland Ccunty bus drive rs should be trained q
in driving evacuation bus routes and in emergency worker j
radioprotective seasures.
.l 1
b.
Each Rockland County transportation co=pany _vith.an l
emergency response mission should acquire equip =ent to per=it radio coc=unications with its vehicles and with the l
transit coordinator in the EOC.
Bus-to-dispatcher co==unications continue to be a problem for so=e bus co:panies.
c.
E=ergency drivers on evacuation routes for cobility-i= paired residents should be given =cre training in the execution of these routes.
d..The training received by the utility volunteers and the ambulance driver appears to be inconsistent with respect l
to the destination of the a=bulance following delivery of E________
-j
j U17508' the patient to the hospits1. 'The inconsistency should be resolved.
e.
At the Rockland County public reception center, emergency workers were unsure whether vehicles were to drop passengers off before or after vehicle deconta=ination.
Additional training in the proper procedures. for. process-
~
I ing people' arriving at the ree ption, center in vehicles is reco== ended.
3.2.6 Realth. Medical, and Exposure Control Measures a.
All emergency workers should be fully trained in radio-logical exposure control, including the use of dosimeters and KI.
b.
Additional training is needed in the procedure emergency workers are to follow in requesting authorization to exceed PACS.
~
c.
The traffic flow pattern outside the reception center required people to walk in areas traversed - by potentially conta=1nated vehicles.
It should be deter.ined-whether the outside traffic pa t t e rn can be changed to avoid the possibility of cross-conta=ination.
1 4
e e
i i
J
U17509 4
4 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES l
Section 3 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and 1
reco=mendations of f ederal observers at the radiological emergency prepared-ness exercise f or the Indian ?oint Nuclear Power Station held on August 24-25, 1983.
These eva'luations are based on the applicable olanning standards and evaluatica criteria set forth in b'URI G-06 54 -FF3.A-1, Re v. 1 (Nov. 1980) and objectives f or the exercise agreed upon by the state, TEMA, and the RAC. The accompanying cable se==arizes reco::endations to correct deficiencies identified as requiring corrective actions based on this exercise.
For purp ose s of verification, the table cogares 'these reco=mendations with the recommendations based upon the previous exercises of March 3,1982, and March 9,
1983.
The current sta :us f or all reco==endations is also indicated.
It should be noted that Rockland County participated in the exercise of March 3, 1982, but that New Tork State substituted for the Rockland County emergency in the exercises of March 9,1983, and August 24-25, 1983.
- Hence, response the f olicwing table distinguishes between those deficiencies which are based on Rockl and County's participation in the 19,82 exercise and the state's demonstration of its Interic Plan f or Igle=enting Co:pensating Measures f or Rockland County during the two 1983 exercises.
i ne Regional Director of FEMA is responsible f or certifying to the FDiA Associate Director, State and Local Progra=s and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies that require corrective actions have been co'rrected and i
that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.
FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit the ceasures they have t aken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies.
FEMA recc== ends that a detailed plan, including dates of c ocple tion for scheduling and ircle=enting reco==endations, be pr ovided if remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately.
I 1
1 I
1 e
1 E
_g
43 U17510
~
4 i
f or j
Recoe::endations to Resedy Deficiencies in Radiological Isergency Resconse Preparedness at Exe 1
d Augus t 24-25. 1983 tr.e Indian Point Nuclear Twer Sea:lon on nrch 3.1982. Nrch 9.195., an stle 4.1 WRIC-0654 Def tetece. Identified TEPA-RI?-1 Present-Rev. 1 Izercise Exercise Ese rcise b St a tu s*
.i Ref ereces 3j3jg; 3f9/83 t/24-25/83 Jurisdiction s
0 Recoscended Remedial Actico N o.
- ntrodcetiec *o Rcekised Counre 1
New Yors $ tate should imp r ove it s ' cas e-A.I.h 1
NT/RC C
bility to isolement concessaging measures in light of the nonparticipation t.y lock-land County eme r gency tercones personnel 3
.t the m e e,. 1, 3...eruse.
y
!serrenev cearsticos racilities a nd Re s ou rc e s.
l 1
EDT and state EOC sessages abould be F.1.4 I
State N/0 I
brief. An investigation should be made to examine utilization of a second telef az nachine.
I Stste-SD I
2 only three telephone lines are available N1 for the rvelve a gencie s at the 5 EOC ce
(
contact their effices.
Additional tale-I phone lines are reco= mended.
I State-SD I
3 Two of the three telef az nachines at the NR SDEOC had been bort wed from other districts to keep up with the anticipated l
sessage f1w f or the asercise.
At least l
one addittenal telefu should be c ort-sidered f or the SOEOC.
Rockland C
4 Sub s tantial teoroeesent is needed in F.1.b Z
equipmen t and p r oce dur e s for external c oexu nica tiot The RICS line systen needs to, be wde acte rt11able.
5ts.f f support l
Le needed to relle*c p rincip ale fres telephoning taske.
Rock. lard C
E.3 I
Cocaineration should h given to allotting sore space to the accident a s se s sma t roos.
Roc'xi and I'
6 The plan should be revised to cocedisate f.1.c I
cor. tact be twe en the coutties. the Coa s t Guard, the railroad. and f ederal agescies vnere maltiple contacting may also occur.
J.10.a I
NT/Rc*
C 7
A map of congregate care centers in Bergen County abould be posted in the Rockland County 10C.
8 The RICS line in the NT/RC EOC nalf une-E.3 1
KT/EC I
tioned during the emarcis a.
Althougn the F.1.d l
aalf unction was recti!!ad during the exer-cise and did not adversely af f ect the e me rg ency r e sp ons e. the caus:(s) f or the e.alf unction still need to be investigated and cortseted.
9 Nps of population by Elf A, ev acuati on J.10.a 1
Sergen C
routes, reuption centers. and relocation J.10. b tenters sLuld 1,e posted in the IOC.
.U 1 7 5'1 1.
44 l
1 l
Table 4.1 (Cont'd) l I
f bn EG-0654 De f f et ece, !dentified TEM-fl?-1 Pa v. 1, E.x e r r.is e
!.x e r ci s e f.zarcise Present 4
No.
Recensended Rasedial Action Reference' 3/3/82 3/9/83 8/24-13/83 Jurisdiction gg,gy,c
]
b 10 Another cot = ;nica tions itnk be twe en the f.1.b I
hT/ RC*
C Rockland and Sergen County ECCa is desirable.
11 Neither the status board nor the display F.1.s I
tt!/RC I
of weather conditiocs in the A:isory in Orangeburg were upd a t e d during the exa r cise. Seth should be kept current.
12 Security at the Armory in Orangeburg could NK I
NT/RC j
I be improved by stationing guards at the l
facility.
13 kring the three hours that the Be rge n F.1.s I
hT/RC I
(
d l
County 10C was observed. only two sessages F.1.b were received from the h7/RC EOC.
ne current EC. was not provided to the Bergen l
County EOC during the initial notification telephone es11 from the NT/RC EOC.
The KT/RC EOC should keep the Sergen County EOC better informed as to t he statu.s of the incident.
1 II.
Alerties and Mobilitetten of l
l Cffietals and Staff 1
he telephone teessage used by Troop T in E.:
I
$ tate 1
Middletown to advise representatives of state agencies to report to the ST/RC ZOC 3
i did not indicate the current energency classifiestion level cor note that an e x e r cis e, not as setnal emergency. was in progresa.
loth pieces of information should be given to eenbers of the stata compensating tess.
2 At the SCTOC alerting and notification T.1.4 I
State-5D 1
dapends on commercial telep>cne lit s.
Ea t' up automatic pegers should be a
considered f or key staff and key agency rentesentatives.
3 Addi:1utal tenaideration should be given A. 1. e I
Rockland C
l to staffing of criticki positions by h7/ RC C*
y backup personnel.
More affective methods are needed for E.2 I
RocM and D
initial call-out to emergency personnel.
NT/RC Ce 5
nere vaa insufficient staf f sva11able for A.1.e I
RocM and U
alerting and mobiliting emergence person =
nel 4.nd a 14-tr capabilite for most funca q
tiens was not demonstrates.
These haea q
not teen adcressed.
1 i
1
_______m..____m
-__._____-m..
a.
n p
U175.12-Table 4.1 (Con t 'd )
NilU G-Of36 Oef t tiemew ?deettftef TIMA-U P-1 Re v. 1.'
Isercise Exercise.Ezercise Present b sg,g,e Recoc. mended Rasedial Action:
Reference 3/3/82 3/9/83 8/24-25/83 Jurisdiction s
No.
A.4 I
NY/1C*
C l
0 State Oerartment of Health persennel with.
duties in Recidaad County should be given attitional tr aining in Rocxland County plan and procedures.
I tr!/tc 1
A.4 7
No shift change occurred on the EECS line in the trT/1C ECC. A shift change of coe-maications operators on the RICS lies abould be demonstrated.
NT/RC I.
8 Staffing of tt.e county warning point and A.I.e receipt of the initial notificat1*on could not be observed at the NT/RC ECC because i
the federal observe r was not paraitted access to the cwnry police consuefications area.
These ' observat. ions should be per itted during iuture eserc.isea.
III, t serseeev Oeerations Manasement
$cate e.
C State support agencies should be iven A.I.b I
ocre invcivenest in the esercias.
s t ate-ECT C
2 The role of county representatives at the 1.6 I
EDT needs better definition.
3 Ene rg e:ce staff w?uld bene fit free sore A.!.b I
Rockl and U
trT/1C
'C' f amiitarity v'ith the tarpense procedure s, o
More ef f ective managesent of the ECC is A.1.d I
Rockland D
oeeced to ensure ef ficient operation.
. f /1C*
N/obj v
5 The New Yers state cocoensating eensures A.1.a X
Bergen N/Cbj f or Rocila+d Cmaty should includa provi-i stoos enabling the American led Cr oss and the Sergen County, New Jersey. ECC to l
coordisats their activities with New Jersey law enf orcement agencies re sp oo-sible f or traf fic control.
6 A s toc edu r e is needed for keesisg the F.1.d I
Rock. land C
NT/EC C'
everatione-room staf f better inf ormed. It is suggested that the operation log be up-dated f requently aod circulated to provide a chronological record of activities.
7' The current emergency c.laseLfication level D.3 I
NY/RC I
was not posted.on the status board at the Armory in orsageburg.
This inf orma tion shodd be posted and updated in a timely sanner.
!T.
Public Alertint and Mocifiestico None.
1Q__x_____-__-.--
u U17513 Tabla-4.1 (Cont'd) hTRIC-0634 Deflefemew !!*ntified TIy.A-RIF-1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Fresent Rev. 1, s b
.No.
Reco== ended Remedial Action Reference 3/3/E2 3/9/53 4/:6-23/52 Jurisdictive 3,;,,
l l
lj V.
Public s-! Media Reistfees I
C.1 I
n/Rce c
1 Publication and distribution of the public education. brochures fer Rockland County should to expedited.
U.
C.!
1 I
X Rockland '
I Of the li=ited cu=ber of residents of the '
J.10.a n/RC 10-z.ile EP:.euestioned by federal observ-4 ers, only, bout half ceuld recall having i
received the public information brochure, understood its concents, or were avers of t he meaning of'the sirens. ' Additional l'
public education is.needed so that the I
l public vill unde rs tand the locations of the areas -that are to take protective actions. will know how to carry out the protective actions, and vill be svare of what the strens mean.
3 Efforts should be. made to as ce rt ain C.1 1
1 1
bekland' U
whether a significant numAr of people did J.10.a n/RC I
not receive the pamphlets. If not. addi-tional distribution should be made.
4 The public educatica progras should be C.:
I I
I Rockland U
yr/RC I
reviewed to deters 1:e whether ef forts are needed to improve its effectiveness.
5 As soon as possible. the necessary public C.2 I
I n/RC I
ief or:stion saterials should be Fu ted in p-ablic bu11dinis. hotels, and motels to i
infotas transient populations vtc may come into the 10-s.il e plume esvesure pathway
!?: in Rockland Cour.ty.
6 The accens of media representatives to the C.3.a K
n/RC I
Aruo t*
in Oest.g e bu rg needs to be be t t e r C.4.5 controlled. Media representatives should be diree* ed to the joint sadia censcr for tSe receipt of inf or oation from eesigssted spokespersons.
l v1. Accide.c u se senent Additional calculating equipeent shosid be 1.8 I
State C
considered to expedite dose calculations.
l i
The state sa? vish to consid e r its. own 1.7 1
Statt N/Obj field monitoring capability which would I
allow the state to make an independent accident assessment.
3 Re s oons e time for analyting shanges in I.8 I
State-EOF N/0bj dose calculation parameters shodd be 1-shorteced.
4 The duties of the c.ounty representative at C.:.a I
Rockland D
s tat e-EOF WCbj-l the IOF should be more clearly defined.
5 Additional trati"g 'of field teams would 1.8 I
bekland U
be beneficial
't,
.ncrease their f amiliar-1.9 ff/RC C* -
icy with o V sent and procedures.
Res ponsibiliti6 for field radiciodite ld be ciently defined.
sessurements :
e 1
6 Aa. improved communicatiose system is C.2.4 1
1 Rockland U
1 fneeded to support assessment-activities NT/RC C
~ -n _ m we w
o 47 U17514 i
I Yable 6.1 (Cont'd) m.!G-0654 teftetenev Identified yD'.A-R.E F-1 i
Rev. 1, Exercise Extreise Exercise ytesent
.)
h 3, y,:
Reference
- 3/3/82 J/9/83 8/2s-15/83 Jarisdictien No.
Recommended Keeedial Action Vi!. Aettens te ?retect the public 1
Detailed evacuation plans and procedures J.!C.9 I.
NY/Rc*
N/obj for Rock 1 sed County should be developed and incorporated vtthin the plans.
2 only a few Rockland County bus drivers at J.20.g I
NY/RC Y
sach bus company h.ve rectived training in driving evacuation bus routes sad in
)
energency worker radioprotective esseures.
j Additional Rockland County bus drivers I
should be crained in driving evacuatica bus routes and in energency* verker radieprotective sensures.
I J
Each-Rockland County tracaportation E.1 I
I NT/1C 1
I company with an energency response mission E.2 should acquire equipment to perait radio consrunica tions with its vehicles and with the transit coordinator in the EDC.
Bus-to-dispatcher cos:unic ations centinue to be a probles for soee bus comparies.
6 Emergency drivers on evacuation routes for J.10 3 I
NY/1C I
sobility-impaired residents should be given more tra.ining in the aracution of these toutes.
5 he training received by. the utility J.10.d.
I NY/RC I
volunteers and the ambulance driver 1,. 4 appears to be inconsistent with respect to the destination of the ambulance folloving t' e hospital.
delis a ry of the patient to o
Ihe inconsistency should be resolved.
6 At the Rockland Coenty public reception J.12 1
NY/tc 1
center. voetsency workers vere unsure whether vehicles vere to drop pas s enge rs off >< fore or af ter vehicle dacontamins-l tion.
Additional training tu the proper i
procedures fer processing people arriving at the reception ceater in eehicles is r e come nd e d.
VIII. Realth Medical, sed Ex3esure controi M.sssures J.12 I
Rockland U
1 On-the-job training wuld make procedures flow more racochly at the congtegate care centers.
So h pe r=a n e nt racord desineters and self-K.3.a I
I Rockland U
NY/RC C
reading pocaat dosimeters should be procured and distributed to all energency workars.
3 All emergency,.verkers should be f u.11y J.10.e I
I NT/RC 1
trained in radiological exposurs control K.3.a including the use of dosiseters and C.
L.3.b
U17515 yable 4.1 (Cont'd)
~
rJKIC-0654 Defiefemev identified TI.W KI?-1 Rev. 1, s Exerciae Ixercise,Esercise Present D
t No.
Reco sended te=edial Action taference 3/3/82 3/9/83 8/2 -:!/83 Jurisdiction 5:a:us 4
Additional training is needed in the pro-K.4 W/1C 1
cedure e=ergency verkers are to follov in recuesting authorization to e.zeeed FACs.
5 Methods for permanently disposing of K.3.b I
Rockland U
W/RC C*
conta:.insted liquid and solid vastes need to be developed for the deconta=ication centers.
6 yhe traffic flow patters outside the K.S.b I
NT/tc reception center required people to walk in areas traversed by potentially contaminated ve hicle s.
It should be d e t e r=.io e d whether the outside traffic pattern can be changed to avdid the possibility of cross-contamination.
II.
Recoverv and Reett-v Ooerations None.
1.
Relevsete of the I.xercise Exoerience Tuture exercises should include w)re e.r-1.9 1
1 Rockland C
tensive participation by police, sheriff, W/tC*
C fire, and ambulance services.
? aining needs in these areas should be identified.
'nt No NWM-065/. ref e rence.
b5tates
? tin.arily or wholly related to state of $10C in Albany.
j s t a t e-SD:
Primarily or Wily related to $0E0C in Foughkeepsie.
'l St at e-.EDT : Primarily or wholly related to EDT or h'r0 functions.
J Rockland:
Prin.orily or wholly related to the 1.ockland County response at the exarcise on f. arch 3,1982.
trf/ EC:
Prisarily or v5o117 related to the State of New York cospecsating for Icekland County (W/tc) at eitter the March 9,1983, exercise or the August 24-25, 1983, e xe r cise.
NT/RC':
"he same as NTIRC exespt that the deficiency was observed at the March 9.1983, estreise end was lie:ed in *4tle 1 of Sec. '. of the April 14, 1983, Fest-Exercise Aaserseent as pertaining to Rockland County.
Sergen:
Prit.arily or vno117 relan.e4 to functions is Bergen Covuty, It.J.
C:
Remedial action complete.
8 I:
Assedial action incomplete.
N/0:
Not observed duri:g the August 16-15, 1983, exercise.
Nicbj: Not an cejective of the Augvst 26-25, 1983, exercise,.
3:
Could not be de t e rzined. " hts deficiency, identified during the Marc.h 3,1982, exerc.ise required remedial action by Rock. land County. Since lock. land County has not adopted a plan sad since state personnel compensated for Rockland, County personnel at the exercises on March 9,1983, and August 2 t-23, 19 83, the eff ectiveness of Re,ck. land County's remedial action, if any, could not be determined.
C*:
A Rockland Cgu=ty deficiency observed during the March 3,1982, exercise and 3 repeated by NT/RC during the August 2'-15, 1983, exe r ci s e.
___-__m_-
W
o i
m U17516 Federal Emergency Management Agency j
A j
Region II 26 Federaj Plaza New York, New York 10278-w
'- 'e 4
SEP 21 Yn3
)
(
j Mr. Dave McLoughlin J
Deputy Associate Director State and Local Prograss and Support Federal E=ergency Managesent Agency 500 C Street, S. W.
Washington, D. C.
20472
Dear F.r. McLoughlin:
Attached, please find one dozen copies of Region II's T est Drill Assessment for the August 23, 1983 drill of the bus evacuation pro-for Indian j
cedure for Westchester County's Radiological Isergency Plat i
j This transportation drill demonstrated the adequacy of Vestchester j
Point.
- j County's evacuation procedures, and the significant deficiency for i
Westchester County identified in the Decenber 16, 1962 Update Report
-l no longer exists.
i Sinc ly, Wil~
W I
. rank P..etrone
/
Regional Director Attachments
3 U17517 POST DRILL. ASSESSMENT August 23, f983, Federal. Emergency Management Agency.
Observed Drill of the Westchester. County Bus Evacuation Procedures for the' Indian Point Nuclear Power Station September 15, 1983 Federal Emergency Manage:ent Agency Region II 1
i
)
1 j
26 Federal Plaza Frank P. Petrone New York, N.Y.
10278 Regional Director S310050554 030929 05000003
(->@R ADOCK i
PDW
'l s.
v.
U17518 C0hT!h75-
.h.
.DL,C,0h.
1
- ..s s 3
0 EVALUATION...'...........................................................-
i I
3
.. 2.1 Ale r:ing and P.cbili:stion of Bus. Co=canies and Drive rs.............
- 2 Adecuacy of. Sus Evacuation Training, Resources, and ?rocedures.....
4 5
2.3 Radiological Exposure Con:rol Re sources and Procedures.............
6 2.4 Relevance of :he Drill Experience..................................
1 l
l J
l l '
l 1
-}
l l
1 e
)
i
'1 I
l l
l e
l
l.
U17519 1
INTRODUCTION The state of New York sub i::ed s: ate and county Radiological Emergency Response Plans (REPJs) for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station to :he Federal Emergency Managemen: Agency's ( PT.MA ' s ) Res;ional Assistance Co==1::ee (RAC) in 19 81.
nese plans were subsequen:ly cri:icued and evaluated.
After the exercise was condue:ed on March 3, 1922, two public =ce:ints were held in June 1982 for the purpose of acquainting :he public vich :he contents of 'the rians, ansvering cues:f ons, and eliciting suggestions.
A second radiological emergency exercise was conducted on ' March 9,
l l
19Eh to assess the capability of the state and local e=ergency preparedness organizations to i=plement their radiological emergency plans and procedures and pre:ect the public in a radiological e=ergency involving the Indian Point Nuclear Fever 5:ation.
A final Pes: Exercise Assesscent for the March 9 exercise was issued on April 14, 1983.
Based on deficiencies observed during the March 9 exercise, TERA was unable :o jucge :he adecuacy of of f-site planning and preparedness at l
Indian Point for Vestchester Coun:7 because of the status of_ procedures,
r'esources and training for bus evacuation in the county and beccuse of the possibility : hat bus drivers vould no: respond.
Also, some radiological e r.co sur e con:rol procedures, resources, and
- raining for
- ranspor:ation
- ersonnel were found to be deficient.
A drill of the Westches:er County bus evacuation procedures was con-due:ed on Augus: 23, 1983.
De objectives of this drill were as follows:
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans e
'a.
Evaluate the adequacy and capability of imple=entation 1
of
- he bus evacuation procedures. for Westchester l
1 i
County.
'l
, w U17520 2
b.
Demons: rate the ste s:ches:e r Coun:y Depar:=ent. of Transporta:1on's ability to. ac:iva:e' bus ec=panies.
e Protec:1ve Response a.
De= ens:: ate :he capability of *tes:ches:er County :o i=ple=en: appropriate bus evacua:1en res:enses.
Radiological Exposure Con:rol e
4.
Demonstra:e me:ho'ds for distribution of dosi=eters and thyroid blocking agents :o bus drivers, b.
Demons:ratg bus drivers' knowledge. of dosimetry, radiation exposure record-keeping, potassium iodide
- use, and procedures for obtaining authorization of exposures above pe r=issible limits.
b e
6
_-__._____.__-._m._.-
U17521
- e 3
e 2 EVALUATION
e s:che s:e r Coun:y A: :he Augus: 13, 1983 transpor:a: ion drill, demons:ra:ed a good capabill:y :o =ebilize public transpor:a:1en services in a l
radiological e=ergency.
Evacua:1on procedures, the training of e=ergency j
i personnel, and the procuremen; of radiological and co==enications eculpment to : hose de= ens ra:ed during the March 9, were subs:antially improved relative 1983, Indian Point exercise.
The Coun:y Executive effec:ively directed the ciobilization of :he buses 1
and drivers of five t ra'as po r:ation cocpanies.
Ten bus routes were activated
{
i l
county personnel had no prior knowledge of the routes l
on a " free play" basis; to be run.
Bus company operators, dispatchers, and drivers all actively I
i participated in the drill.
Dispatchers and drivers were faciliar with j
evacuation procedures and promptly deployed buses on all routes.
This i
perfor ance was far superior to earlier demonstrations.
l ALIF. TING AhJ MOBILIZATION OF BUS COMP ANIES AND DRIVERS 4
2.1
\\
I Vithin 10 minutes of the initial request from the County Executive,
'Jes:ches:e; County Department of Transper:ation (DOT) s:sf f reques:ed each bus company :o assemble drivers and prepare buses.
Vi:hin the following 10
=inutes, DOT s:aff relayed :o each bus dispatcher evacua:ien orders, including i
DOT staff at :he county e:ergency l
the iden:ification of each rou:e to be run.
as :he pri=ary com=unica-
^
opera:1ons center (EOC) used com=ercial telephones each j
Radio A=ateur Civil E=ergency Service (RACES) operators at tions sys:ce.
bus dispatch point established backup radio coecunica: ions with the county EOC.
i each bus company, bus drivers were preselected. Each driver arrived j
1 A
30 minutes of the ini:ial' decision by :he l
at :he first pickup point within i
l 1
D
th
'U17522 6
Coun:y Execu:ive :o order bus evacuation, and within 10 minutes of :he of:heorderhedeoloyevacua: ion' buses.
dissa:cher's receict 1
2.2 ADEQUACT OF BUS EVACUA!10N TFAINING, RESOURCES, AND.PROCEDURIS l
Iach of :he five bus ce=panies the: participa:ed in the ::ansper:a: ion drill has an adecua:e nu=ber of buses and bus drivers fer the evacuation rou:es assigned to it in :he curren: Wes:chester Coun:y evacua: ion' plan. Each company demons::a:ed a good capabill:y :o deploy buses on the routes assigned l
l
- o 1:.
i l
l Upon receiving the order :o deploy bus drivers :o the 10 evacuation
.)
I cou:es, each dispa:cher assigned drivers to scecific routes and briefed :hes l
i l
on their assign =ents.
Each driver was supplied with a set of four esps describing :he reu:e in de: ail:
from garage to the first pickup poin:, t h'e evacua: ion rou:e L:self, from :he last pickup point to the reception center, and from the reception center to the garage.
All drivers - followed their l
rou:es corree:1y; mos: drivers were able to s:op at each pickup point along
-]
d the evacua: ion route.
Drivers were aware of the procedures tobe followed
)
J
.af:er arrival at the receptiesa center.
All drivers re:urned to their dispa:ch points by the return routes designated on the maps.
l-Mos bus drivers maintained radio contae vi:h their.respec:ive dispa:ch points during :he drill; several bus drivers were accompanied by i
R.ACIS operators, who es:ablished a backup co==unications link with the EOC.
Several buses bound for the reception center at the *'hite Plains Migh School l
encoun:ered a traffic obstruction on rou:e I-287.
Bus drivers and ?ACIS 1
opera: ors repor:ed traf fic condi: ions to their respective contae: points.
On the basis of :his information, EOC staff pro:ptly designated an alt e rna:e l
1
e
\\. :,' r.
U17523
(
j 3
s
.\\
route :o :he. reception center, -_ mini =1:ing delay for later buses.
- However,
\\
bus-:o-garage and bus-:c-EOC co=:enications were lici:ed by :he f olleving:
Radios on one company's buses-were.nc: opera:ional; e
e In several ins:ances,.the range of bus radies was no:
adecua:e to per 1: bus-:o-garage ce =unica: ions along :he en: ire evacua:Lon route :o :he recer:icn cen:er; and o'
RACES operators were available on only so=e of the evacuation buses.
Although all buses used for the drill were radio equipped, some buses that may be required in a radiological emergency were not.
The county's goal is to have all buses radio-equipped in the future.
2.3 RADIOLOGICAL 1. EXPOSUP.E CONTROL RESOUP.CES AND PROCEDURES
)
Radiological exposure con:rol rerources and procedures, vere accept-able.
Only or.e operater repor:ed that he did not have enough desize:ry ki:s for :he drivers who muld be required :o opera:e buses in a radiological
.1 emergency.
Each depo: had an adequate supply of petassium iodide-(KI).
J Each driver was supplied vi:h a self-reading pencil-dosimeter (in Seneral, 0-200 R), a dose record card, a permanent-record dosimeter, and a be::le of KI.
In each case, self-reading dest =eters were correctly calibrated 1
and ini:ial readings taken prior to the driver's depar:ure.
Drivers were familiar with :he procedures for reading dosimeters and maintaining dose records.
In general. dosimeters were - read - and recorded' at.
. he-
-i approximately half-hcur intervals.
This rectifies a deficiency no:ed a:
M. arch 9.-1983 exercise.
y.any drivers were f amiliar vi:h the procedure for authorizing exposure.
]
in excess of protec:ive action guides and knev that : hey should notify :he
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U17524 6
-l dispa:cher when the dose reached 1 R and again a: 3 R.
However, using the i
l J
curren:1y available 0-200 R desi=e:ers, drivers =ey have difficul:7. accura:ely l
1 de:er=ining when they have reached :he 17 or-3 K exposure levels. The s:a:e to procure low-range (0-5 R), self-reading should expedi:e the ongoing progra=
desi=e:ers for all emergency workers.
bus drivers are :o no:if y their dis:stchers uhen According to the :lan, f
they reach the radiation dose threshold, and avat: f ur:her instructions.
In Furnish-some cases, this notifica: ton would be cade by co==ercial :elephone.
ing each bus with radios of the appropriate range or having RACES operators j
this aspect of radiological' exposure acco:pany each bus would fur:her i= prove control.
2. I.
RI:.!VANCE OT TR. DRILL EXPERIENCE The Ves:chester County Executive, DOT staf f, bus operators, dispatch-i ers, and drivers actively participa:ed in :his :ranspor:ation drill, de=on-Westches:er County could provide adecuate transpor:ation for the s::a:ing that general public in a radiological emergency.
The transportation drill denenstrated :he.ad e qu acy of Ves:chester County evacuation procedures.
In particular, :he.four par caps were easy to fo'.lov and con:ributed significan:1v to :he :1:ely completion of :he bus rou:es.
The transportation drill has identified :vo areas ' in which addi:ional resources should be obtained:
e Coc:=unica: ions with evacuation buses can be ade more reliable by procuring a radio for each evacua: ion bus.
(Ideally, a RACES operator should accompany each bus as backup.)
.