ML20238A362

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-76,consisting of 860218 Post-Exercise Assessment,851113 Exercise of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of State of Ny & Oswego County for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station

ML20238A362
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
References
OL-5-I-SC-076, OL-5-I-SC-76, NUDOCS 8708310042
Download: ML20238A362 (99)

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r e j l 1 1 l l l l l l l l POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT 1 1 November 13, 1985, Exercise of the l Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans i of the State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's 1 N!NE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION { at Scriba, Oswego County, New York February 18,1986 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II Frank P. Petrone 06 Federal Plaza Regional Director New York. N.Y. 10278 s

i 2/18/86 CONTENTS PARTICIPATING GOVE RNMENTS AND ORG ANIZ ATIONS...................... vi A B B R E VI ATI O N S.......................................................... vil

SUMMARY

................................................................ vill 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N........................................'................ I 1.1 Ex e rc is e Ba c kgroun d................................................. 1 1.2 F e d e ral O b s e r v e rs................................................... 2 1.3 Evaluation Cri teria..................................... 3 1.4 E x e rcis e Obj ec tive s................................................. 4 1.4.1 N:.w York State Emergency Operations Center.................... 4 1.4.2 Central District Emergency Operations Center.................... 5 1.4.3 Em ergency Opera tions Facility.................................. 6 1.4.4 Jo i n t N e w s C e n t er............................................ 6 1.4.5 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center.................... 7 1.4.6 Os wego Co unty Field Ac tivities................................. 8 1.4.7 Jef ferson County Emergency Operations Center................... 9 1.4.8 Jef ferson County Field Ac tivities............................... 9 1.4.9 Onondaga County Field Activities............ 9

1. 5 E x e r c is e Sc e n a ri o..................................................

.................. 10 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events.............................. 10 1.5.2 Sc e n ar io O v e rvi ew............................................ 11 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources...................... 15 1.5.4 Actual and Simulated Off-Site Events Matrix..................... 19 2 E X E R C IS E E V A L U ATIO N................................................ 23

2.,' New York State Emergency Operations Center.......................... 23 2.1.1 Central District Emergency Operations Center.................... 28 2.1.2 E m ergency Opera tions Facility.................................. 30 2.1.3 J oin t Ne ws C e n t er.................................

33

2. 2 O s w e g o C o u n t y.....................................................

35 2.2.1 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center.................... 35 2.0.2 Field M o n i tori ng Te a m s....................................... 39 1.2.3 Field implementation of Count Public.....................y Acticas to Protect the .................................. 41 2.2.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Contro!.......... 44 2.3 Je f f erso n C o u n t y.................................................... 45 2.3.1 Jefferson County Emergency Operations Center................... 45 2.3.2 Fleid Implementation of Count Public....................y Ac tions to Protect the .................................. 45 2.4 Onondaga County Field Implementation to Protect the Public............ 46 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES OR AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NOVEMBER 13, 1985 E X E R C lS E.................... 48 4

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION............................................................... 67

1 1 .. -j 8 9 ] 2/18/86 l TABLES l 1.5.1 Emergtmey Classification Timeline.................................... 21 i 1.5.2 Protective Action Decision /Public Notification Timeline................. 22 3.1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises l Ne w Yo rk S t a t e EO C................................................. 49 3.2 Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action Ntave mber 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises C e n tr al D i s tri c t E O C................................................ 56 3.3 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises i E m erge ncy Operations Facility........................................ 57 3.4 Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises Jo i n t N e w s C e n t e r.................................................. 59 3.5 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises O s w e go C o un ty EO C................................................. 60 3.6 Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action i November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises j Je f f e rs o n C o u n ty.................................................... 65 l 3.7 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13,1985 and Previous Exercises OnondagaCounty................................................... 66 4.1 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises Ne w Yo r k S t a t e EO C................................................ 68 4.2 Nine Mile Po!nt Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exereises C e ntral Distri c t EO C................................................ 72 4.3 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action Nove mber 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises E m erge ncy Operations Facility........................................ 73 4.4 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station.- Remedial Action l Novemccr 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises Jo i n t N e w s C e n t e r.................................................. 75 4.5 Nine Mlle Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises Os w ego C o un ty E O C................................................. 77 [V L

a g 2/L8/36 TABLES (Cont'd) 4.6 Nine MIIe Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13. 1985 and Previous Exercises Je f f erso n Co u n t y................................................... 83 4.7 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Remedial Action November 13,1985 and Previous Exercises OnondagaCounty................................................... 84 l l l 1 l ) I i li l I i 1 1 1

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a e 2/18/36' PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS New York State e Department of Labor Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group e Department of Health e Department of Education e o Division of Military and Naval Affairs State Emergency Management Office i e Department of Transportation-e Division of State Police e Department of Agriculture and Markets e Department of State e e Office of Fire Prevention and Control. Department of Environmental Conservation e e Energy Office Department of Parks and Recreation j e e Public Service Department of Social Services i e e American Red Cross e Niagara Mohawk f Oswego County j o Highway Department Emergency Services Management Office e f e Chairman of the Legislature and Staff e Oswego City Police e Fulton City Police e County Administrator j 4 e Department of Health e RACES Emergency Medical Ssrvices 4 e Sheriff's Department e e Public Information Officer e Fire Coordinator I I e County Planning Board e Town and Village Highway Department of. Social Services Departments e City of Oswego Department of l e 1 Public Works Department of Mental Health e i l Jefferson County d Department of Social Services e Office of Civil Defense e M {p+ Onondaga County l North Syracuse Schooi System l e Division of Disaster Preparedness e e Red Cross e Department of Social Services l NONPARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS None. .Et I

1 d 2/19/86' ABBREVIATIONS. ANL Argonne National Laboratory CDEOC DOC ~ Central District Emergency Operations Center (Oneida) U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy ,tes DOH Department of Health (New York State) DOT U.S. Department of Transportation '?ol EBS Emergency Broadcast System EMO Emergency Management Office (Oswego County) EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory JCEOC - Jefferson County Emergency Operations Center JNC Joint !%s Center KI potassiu m lodide NMPNS Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OCEOC Oswego County Emergency Operations Center P!O public information officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System REPP Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan SEOC State Emergency Operations Center (Albany) TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter 1 i TSC Technical Support Center l USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture VCT volume control tank 1 .,i t l

e. 2/18/86.

SUMMARY

On Wednesday, November 13, 1985, a team of nineteen federal observers evaluated an exercise of the radiological emergency response plans and level of state and county preparedness for. the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station. This was a day exercise, which transpired from approximately 0700 to 1400. Following the exercise. an evaluation was made by the federal observer team and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants was held at the Hotel Syracuse on November 14,1985 at 1100. A briefing for the general public was held the next rnorning at 1000 in the Joint News Center at the McCrobie Building in Oswego, New York. Subsequent to those preliminary briefings, i detailed evaluations were prepared and are included in this report. During a full-scale exercise, FEMA requires that most compon'ents of the State l and local emergency response organizations participate. Federal obscrvers evaluated the j following operations: i State EOC in Albany I e Off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) e L e Joint News Center l e Central District EOC in Oneida [ 1 I e Oswego County EOC l Jefferson County EOC e Bus evacuation of school children and general population e l-l e Evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility impaired persons e Traffic Control Points (TCPs) l e Route Alerting l Alerting of the boating public e e Impediments to evacuation Radiological monitoring e Reception and Congregate Care Centers e The following is a summary of evaluations made by federal observers during the November 13, 1985 exercise. viil

1 4 g 2/13/36 State of New York Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Overall, management of the SEOC in Albany was very good. State and volunteer agencies demonstrated the knowledge and capabilities to respond effectively to scenario events. The Governor's designee utilized state resources and coordinated exercise events with county and utility representatives. Staff notification was adequate. However, there is a need to establish a staff sign-in board to ensure that all agency representatives report to the EOC as directed. The EOC space was more than adequate. Communication support equipment consisted of the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) and Executive Hotline telephones, teletype, commercial telephone lines and radios. All communications equipment generally worked well. A new computer simulator was tested and would appear useful in an actual emergency. However, due to a lack of clarity in transmission, there was a question as to the precise time of transmittal of the "1050" message recorded on the Radiological Emergency Data form. In addition, the 1253 RECS message did not contain a time and the 1313 RECS message did not contain release times. Evacuation and sheltering status boards need to be updated in a more timely fashion and the status chart in the command and control room should display sheltering I as well as evacuation data. The accident assessment staff demonstrated the ability to make accurate dose projections and recommend appropriate protective actions. However, some confusion resulted at the SEOC at about 1225 when information was received from the hint News Center that a release had begun at the plant. It took approximately 50 minutes for th!s confusion to be resolved. l 1 Central District Emergency Operations Center (CDEOC) Operations within the CDEOC were well managed and leadership was maintained throughout the exercise. Alerting and mobilization procedures were demonstrated and the CDEOC was fully staffed in a timely manner. The lack of a sufficient number of primary telephones and backup radios and telephones impaired the timeliness of communications between State agency representatives at the CDEOC and their counterparts at the SEOC in Albany. Briefings were held at each change in emergency classification level. However, it is recommended that the individual State agencies participate in the briefings to allow for a better understanding of the actions undertaken by each agency. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) The EOF has been renovated since the last exercise. There was aderluste space, equipment, and most supplies to support emergency operations. However, a lack of telecopier paper interrupted the rec jt of hard copies by state and county l l ix l

0 2 /18 / % representatives for two hours. In addition, the ability to maintain staffing of state functions at the EOF on a 24-hour basis was not demonstrated. The legibility of written messages was confirmed, but logs of hcrd copy transmissions and receipts were not kept by Niagara Mohawk support staff. Although status boards were generally well maintained, one status board was not updated for about an hour at one point during the exercise. The Emergency Director exhibited command and control. Although twenty (20) i situation reports were given, no formal briefings were prov!ded to incoming state and i l county personnel and the emergency action level was not displayed at tne EOF. ( 1 The head of dose assessment and technical support consulted almost continuously with the Emergency Director and state and county officials. The state liaison officer was present throughout the exercise and actively participated. Joint News Center The Joint News Center was officially activated at about 0910. Representatives from the utility, state, ar.d county were present. Twenty-four hour staffing capability was demonstrated through rosters. Adequate clerical support was present and greatly assisted the effectiveness of the overall operation. All EBS messages were aired within 15-minutes of the decisions on protective action recommendations and contained all appropriate information. Rumor control staff displayed excellent ability to follow up on inquiries from the public. One EBS message which stated that all buses with school children were being diverted to reception centers may have caused confusion to the public. Approximately 40 minutes after this message was issued, a second EBS message stated that only the Oswego City School District students had been sent to the New York State Fairgrounds Reception Center and that the Mexico School District students had been dismissed from school and were on their way home. The confusion that resulted at the Joint News Center was resolved by excellent communication between the PIOS. Oswego County l The notification of an unusual event was received at the Oswego County Warning i Point at approximately 0750 via the RECS telephone. Key emergency cesponse personnel l were mobilized to the EOC at the Alert emergency classification level and the EOC was l fully staffed at approximately 0915. l l Command and control in the Oswego County EOC was well dersonstrated by the ) Chairman of the Legislature and, the Director of Emergency Preparedness. After a shift change, command and control capabilities were well demonstrated by the alternate management team. The coordination of emergency activities was conducted in a pro-fessional manner and generally, with a minor exception, demonstrated understanding of l X __________.______________________.______m

i 2/13/36 the emergency plans. Adequate facilities and equipment provided for a well coordinated, systematic operation of the EOC. Public information activities were adequately handled by the County PIO who communicated the information to be contained in the EDS messages issued by the Joint News Center. Oswego County adequately demonstrated the capability to communicate with all emergency locationr. The RECS and Executive Hotline telephones which link the County EOC with the EOF and State EOC were operational throughout the exercise. Communi-cations systems at the County EOC also consisted of commercial telephone and a series of radio frequencies. All of these primary and back up communications systems func-tioned well and were properly used throughout the exercise. Internal communications within the Oswego County EOC were good. Messages were clearly written on message forms and channeled through the Director of Emergency Preparedness to the appropriate agencies for action. Status boards were properly main-tained with accurate information and updated in a timely manner. The Director held frequent staff briefings to keep the staff informed of emergency conditions as they developed. There was a good discussion of the simulated impediment to evacuation routes by representatives of the fire, police, and highway departments. However, the police should have been informed and consulted during the demonstration of the actual evacuation impediment. The County Radiological Officer and the dose assessment staff were mobilized and arrived at the County EOC in a timely manner. Continuous contact was maintained with the county liaison in the EOF through an open telephone line. Dose projections were performed using a computer system whose input was controlled by the utility, and by programmable calculators. Af ter the release of significant amounts of radioactivity, the field teams were efficiently utilized. The plume centerline and edges were located and the actual plume readings from the field teams were compared with the projected dose i rates. Initial protective action recommendations were based on plant status. The utility technical liaison, who was present in the dose assessment area, gave the Ccunty Radiological Officer numerous valuable briefings explaining the potential consequences of the plant status data. The Radiological Officer and the State Department of Health liaison, who was present in the EOC, coordinated their activities well. Available l Information, such as wind speed, plume transit time, evacuation time estimates, plant status, and the potential for serious offsite doses were adequately considered in the process of developing protective action recommendations. Two county field teams were activated in a timely manner. The teams had high I and low range survey instruments, air sampling equipment, and protective cloth!ng. Both teams were well trained in the procedures for use of this equipment. However, some additional training could be given to the teams to improve their counting techniques for the radioiodine fleid measurements. Both teams had proper dosimetry and properly communicated reading 1 to the EOC. The teams had potassium iodide (K!) an'd were famillar with procedures for its use. Early in the day, radio communications were interrupted due to dead spots. Back up radios and land lines were used to maintain l communications with the EOC. l xi

4 a i 2/13/B6 l i i The ambulette used to evacuate the noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired was dispatched quickly, and the driver knew the location of all four pickup points. The driver was well-trained in the use of dosimeters and knew that only his supervisor could j authorize the use of KI. i The County Department of Public Works responded quickly to the actual impediment to evacuation problem and simulated removal of the cement truck and bags l from the road. Both county personnel at the site of the impediment were well trained in l dosimetry and knew that only their supervisor could authorize the use of K!. The officers who responded to conduct route alerting, due to the siren failure demonstration, performed their task in an efficient manner. The officers knew the streets very well and traveled the area simulating use of their mobile public address system. i I j Officials at the four schools visited by the observer were all aware of what to do j when the tone alert radio sounded. All the tone alerts activated simultaneously when the sirens were sounded during the exercise. Maps of Emergency Planning Zones and l evacuation routes were posted in all the school offices. f i Simulated notification of the boating public was effectively implemented by the j Oswego County Police deployed from the U.S. Coast Guard Station in Oswego. The boat patrol was staffed by two County Police Officers, both of whom were knowledgeable about special considerations for notifying the boating public. l l The message ordering school evacuation was received via telephone at the City l School District of Oswego Bus Garage. The bus was officially dispatched to pick up school children at the designated school. Due to a misunderstanding on the driver's part, i he initially drove the bus to the wrong school. However, the dispatcher, via two-way l radio, redirected the bus driver to the proper destination. i There were two demonstrations of general population evacuation bus routes. Prior to this demonstration, both drivers had been issued all materials necessary to carry l out their assignments. The drivers followed their assigned routes, stopped at all the designated pickup points, and called in dosimetry readings. However, difficulty with radio communications between the buses and dispatchers was experienced on both buses. Public information brochures were displayed in the hotels visited during the exercise and the managers knew that information would be broadcast by a local EBS l station. 1 i j Jefferson County The Jefferson County EOC has adaquate space, lighting, telephones, kitchen and back up power. Maps were well organized and a clearly visible status board was used. There was ample and varied radio communication equipment including the availability of a hard copy device. Overall, the Jefferson County EOC 'is an outstanding host county EOC.

2/18/86 Emergency management was excellent. The Jefferson County EOC was promptly staffed with a full complement of exceptionally well-trained and knowledgeable personnel. The Jefferson County reception center was located in the gymnasium of Jefferson County Community College. Signs were available to direct evacuees to the proper location and a vehicle was used for traffic control. The facilities in the college gymnasium were good. Effective and professional radiological monitoring of evacuees was demonstrated. Separate showering facilities with adequate space ere available for I tne decontamination of men and women, if needed. The facility for congregate care in Jefferson County is located in the Sta:e Office Building. Three American Red Cross representatives and two radio communi- ) cation volunteers were present. Signs were posted to direct evacuees who would be j expected to arrive by bus from the reception center. Lists of personnel available showed an adequate number of shelter managers, nurses and other staff. A physician was on- ) call. There were plans for staffing the kitchen facilities. 1 Onondaga County l 4 The Ocondaga County reception center was well staffed and managed. Monitoring and registration capabilities were efficiently demonstrated. However, some additional training is required for the radiation monitors, since they were uncertain about the contamination level above background at which contaminated evacuees would need to be decontaminated. j i The congregate care center was staffed with seven Red Cross personnel who { served as shelter managers. They exhibited personnel call lists and rosters for 24-hour coverage. A floor plan of the center was available and staff explained various support agreements with schools and suppliers. Registration forms identical to the ones at the reception center are now being used along with the Red Cross forms. 4 xiii }

o 1.. 2/18/86 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND i l l On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federa'l Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear 1 l facilities include the following-l e - Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments, Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of e observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments, and Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities e in the radiological emergency planning process. U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) l U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) U.S. Department of Interior (DOI). Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Af ter formal submission, the radiological emergency response plans for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS) were critiqued and evaluated. _ A public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions and receive suggestions for changes in the plans. The NMPNS and the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant are located at the Nine Mile Point site in Oswego County, near.Scriba New York. A first exercise was conducted for NMPNS on September 15, 1981, and a final Post Exercise Assessment for that exercise was subsequently issued. A second exercise involving state and local agencies and utility personnel from the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant was held for the Nine Mile Point site on August 11, 1982. A final Post Exercise Assessment for the second exercise was issued on October 29, 1982. A third radiological emergency preparedness exercise was held on September 28, 1983, and a Post Exercise Assessment t I ____________-____-_L

2 2/13/36 was issued by FCMA Region !! on December 23, 1983. A fourth exercise was conducted on November 13, 1985 between the hours of 0730 and 1530 to assess the capability of the State and local emergency preparedness organizations to implement their radiological emergency response plans and procedures to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. The exercise of November 13, 1985, involved the NMPNS. An observer team consisting of personnel from FEMA Region !!, the RAC. FEMA's contractors, and federal and state agencies evaluated the November 13 exercise. Nineteen (19) observers were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions. Team leaders coordinated team operations. Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations. Observers presented observations specific to their assignrr.ents, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. Based on these preliminary assessments, a public critique of the exercise was held for exercise participants and the general public at 1000 on Friday, November 15, 1985 at the Joint News Center in the McCroble Building, Lake Street, Oswego, New York. The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of federal ' observers, which were reviev ed by FEMA Region !!. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discusred in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. I 1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Nineteen (19) federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These individuals, their affiliation, and their exercise assignments are given below. \\ Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function (O R. Kowieski FEMA Oversight Observation / Region II RAC Chairman G. Connolly FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader P. Giardina EPA State EOC/ Accident Assessment C. Malina USDA Central District EOC/ Team Leader l l l C. Amato NRC NMPNS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Liaison P. Cam marata FEMA Joint News Center (JNC)/Public Information Officer (PIO)

l' f 3 2/18/86 l Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function (s) i S. McIntosh FEMA Oswego County EOC/ Team Leader l T. Baldwin ANL Oswego County EOC/ Communications j H. Fish DOE Oswego County EOC/PIO; Operations 1 B. Gasper ANL Oswego County EOC/ General Observations J. Keller INEL Oswego County EOC/ Accident Assessment A. Smith ANL Oswego County EOC/ Field Team coordination; General observations R. Honkus INEL Oswego County / Radiological Field Monitoring B. Salmonson INEL Oswego County / Radiological Fleid Monitoring R. Berracki FDA Oswego County / General Population Bus Evacuation; Reception Center / Congregate Care Center (Onondaga County) i P. Weberg FEMA Oswego County / Impediments; Mobility Impaired Evacuation: Alert and Notification j J. Smith DOT Oswego County / Sheriff's Patrol Boat; General Population Bus Evacuation; School Evacuation R. Acerno FEMA Oswego County / Siren Failure; Traffic Control i l Points; Alert and Notification C. Herzenberg ANL Jefferson County EOC/ Team Leader; Reception Center - Congregate Care Centar 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), Sec. 11. For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of N U REG-0654. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions. Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonaole assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on c.mergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly i

4 2/18/86 corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or - other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective - Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are. not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and_ safety. In addition to 'these inadequacies, FEMA identifies Areas Recommended For Improvement, which are problem areas observed during an' exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance. an organizations level of emergency preparedness.' 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The objectives of state and local jurisdictions in ' this exercise were to i! demonstrate the adequacy of the radiological emergency response plans, the capability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment, and familiarity with procedures required to h cope with an emergency at the Niagara Mohawk Company's Nine Mlle Point Nuclear. f Station. The exercise was to involve activation and participation of staff and response-facilities of NMPNS as well as emergency organizations and facilities of New York State-and the counties of Oswego, Jefferson and Onondaga. Federal agencies lwere to be ~ notified during the exercise according to existing protocols. Federal agencies with - radiological emergency preparedness responsibility were not to participate actively in the play of this exercise. Federal representatives, however, were to act as exercise l evaluators. The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise to interfere with the-safe operations of the I NMPNS plant. The State of New York Radiological Emergency Group developed the following objectives for this exercise. 1.4.1 New York State State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and followup emergency notifications from the licensee. 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the State EOC in a timely manner. 3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis (shif t change). 4. Demonstrate that the State EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate that State. counties, and' licensee can establish appropr! ate communication links. both primary - and backup syste ms. a

[ ' 1 l.. 5 2/18/86 l 6. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate, ] legible, and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, j that status boards are accurately maintained and updated that j appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are-l briefed. 7. Demonstrate that the designated ' official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. 8. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all _ appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. 9. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and request, Federal assistance, if warranted.

10. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action

-{ recommendations to the public based on licensee. recom-mendations, independent recommendations from. the accident j assessment group, and off-site factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffle conditions. 11. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public, via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAG's.

12. Demonstrate the decision chain that has been established to authorize exposure for emergency workers in' excess of the general public PAGs.

1.4.2 Central District Emergency Operations Center (CDEOC) 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the CDEOC-l In a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the CDEOC on a 24-hour basis (shif t change). 3. Demonstrate that the Central District EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. 4. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained.and. updated, 'that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed. 5. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. 1 l l l

1 v 1, 6 2/13/B6 6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organ!zations, and field personnel. F 1.4.3 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 1. demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate State functions at the EOF in a timely manner. I 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State functions in the EOF on a 24-hour basis (shift change). 3. Demonstrate that the Emergency Operations Facility has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. t Demonstrate ' the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations.' and field personnel. 5. Demonstrate that messages' are transmitted ' in an accurate, 1 legible, and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are ] oriefed. o t 1.4Ihoint News Center (JNC) \\ 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate State and County functions at the joint media center in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State and County functions in the joint news center on a 24-hour basis (shift change). 3. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear accurate, and f timely manner. 4. Demonstrate the ability to share Information with other agencies at the Joint News Center prior to its release. { 5. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control / media resporse in a coordinated manner. 6. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and implement EBS to alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ in a timely mann'er (i.e., within 15 minutes after command and control decision for protective action. recommendations). !s y

.m-3; c . 4;y kfi D e, 7 [ N 7/18/86 i. c rk h h 1.f.5 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center (OCEOC) y s i De-(nonstrate the ability to rece'idinitial and followup. emergency 6 Y 1. D. S.. notifications. 2 s 4 43 s s 2. Degons rat.e the ability to mobilite staff and activate the EOC in a ttmCy.nanner. d>. .a g + 3.1Depinstrate. the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24- + kur b cis (ahlf t change). l g 14 's Demcutrate that the County EO' C has adequat Y 4. % and supplier to support emergency operations. ypac,e, equipment,' M-Mr s. 5. l-m' (- m 4 n "hn 5. Demonstrate that the State and County can establisr.; appropriate ,[~ [! "i\\'h' communiclu"dn IInks, both primary and backup syNmsU f r l s ( tA 3y w % s 1 1' ' t.. g {. ( '\\ ^% 6. Dem%,trate that the County EOC has adequate access co,ntrol and 4 yi ,; n g 'f thd%curity can be maintained. T Ih' ? .g; %). [ * '(., s / ' Ye ,7 f i p 7. Demqstra te that messages are transmi.ytsdl In an gyuryte,, 's' , " ' (' lepm, and tiniely mannerf*megaties are proJarly legged, inat ' S 2 stMM diards are accuraMy ' maintained and >pdated, that i y appropNeje bri?fings are held, and thnyncoming personnel are s \\ ?.(e. , briefed. V'?*L 1 y. i3s s. ,s 8. Demonstrate:"thdt the appropriate official is in chmge and in .o > m. aantrol of at mrall coo'dinated response. 7 1 s I ,-{ih ( t (( f L ?, 9 Detonst ata the ability of the designated dfficial to determine the L' [ I,

• need for {ard ability to obtain State sssistance, if warrandd.
• Ai l s.

,4 }) (J' \\. p. j

10. tDemonstraYe [tisNbility to ebmmunidt{In l diwidi all app' y

}brations, orgtnisations, and field personney,' c u ng Coast Guard ,3

• t A3.d Conra!'.

l (y.

j 3-

m.,

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11. Demonstrate the ability to project rarilation dodge to the pub!ic

( \\ via plucte exposure, based on plant dsti"and fhid measuremehs, 1 5 s ,, and to determine appropriate protective measur$ based on PAGs. ls T t i ; i g.- A .i y. at u ,3 x

12. gemoutrate the ability to pro!(fe',advar.co c;,ooro$ nation of pu$lic yl t

l alerting and instructional messajdwith the Ni$/ti ) k. tg l y ,L, ,3 1/.( 4, ' \\ l ., 'yl 13. f Demonstrate tN ;onjni;:ational aLMty' to isanage an Mrderly, t g t d $! evacuation of rE3e part of the 10-mile @2,'if warranted. g-i 4 r y +

• 2

( 3; ,g .t. ..' h ( Demonstrate JQe^~aganizational ability to deal with,impedimenfd { i c 14. .i s , to evacuation, sLch as inclement weather or traffic obstructio%.i If( ,\\ 'd g,- ) s1 \\ ,,y l.. Tj 1 sng 1,, s r. y w I 4s \\ ( I f,, 3 2 g h. ( <[3m%, h

• [>

) 1 \\^ g ,h.. l( _g,

] ,c 8 2/18/86 15. Demonstre.te the organizational ability necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.

17. Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in coordination with State instructions. 1.4.6 Oswego County Field Activities (OCFleld) 1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control emergency worker dose including proper use of personnel dosimetry. 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner. 3. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedure for determining I ambient radiation levels. t '. t 4. Demonstrate that emergency workers know who can authorize ( excess dose. I 5. Demonstrate the ability to administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so. l 6. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gases. 7. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup alerting procedures, if necessary, in the event of partial siren system failure. 8. Demonstrate that the permanent population within the 10 mile EPZ has received information on how they will be notified and what their actions should be in the event of a radiological emergency, and that this information is updated on an annual basis. 9. Demonstrate that information on emergency actions has been provided to transient populations within the 10 mile EPZ, including the water part. 10. Demonstrate that traffic control points can be established in a timely manner. I

9 2/18/86

11. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary.to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ. If warranted.

12. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic.

obstructions.

13. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

14. Demonstrate a sample of resources neces-sary to effect an orderly evacuation of the non-institutional mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ. 15. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly 1 ev3cuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted. 1.4.7 Jefferson County Emergency Operations Center (JCEOC) 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and followup emettency f notifications. 1.4.8 Jefferson County Field Activities (JC Field) 1. Demonstrate that traffic control support can be established at the Jefferson County Community College Reception Center to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees. 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the Reception Center by presentation of a roster for 24 hour operation. 1 3. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and l l radiological monitoring of evacuees. 4. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. 1.4.9 Onondaga County Field Activities (ONC Field) l l 1 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and 1. radiological monitoring of evacuees. l 1 2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the Congregate Care Center by presentation of roster for 24-hour operation. i 3. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate Reception / Congregate Care Center in a timely manner. l 4 l-

10 2/18/86 1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO ] 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events Onsite Given below is a listing of exercise events and the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario. Projected by Scenstfo Event 0748 Notification of Unusual Event Partial County EOC Activation f 0824 Alert Declared hl I 0820 Dispatch Personnel to EOF, JNC, EOC's. Reactor Serst l I 0900 P.eceipt of Plant Information for Evaluation 1 0900 Radiological Monitoring Teams on Standby \\ 0905 Traffic Control Points (out of sequence) ) 0925 Site Area Emergency Declared Ongoing Protective Action Evaluations 0915 Activate Public Alerting and Notification Systems, Sirens, EBS, Tone Alert 0915 Full Activation of EOCs 0930 Run School Route (out of sequence) Ongoing Agencies identify Resources and Personnei Availability 1 0930 Evacuate Noninstitutionalized Mobility Impaired (out of sequence) 1012 Route Alert for Siren Failure (out of sequence) 1015 Measures to implement Protective Actions l 1030 Establish Reception Centers. Congregate Care Centers. l 1040 Radiological Monitoring Teams Deployed I

l 1< 9 e l J 11 2/18/86 i Projected by Scenario Event 1045 General Emergency declared l 1115 Agencies Advised of Protective Action Decisions 1115 Evacuation Ordered I l 1120 Run General Population Bus Routes (in sequence) l l 1155 Road Impediment (actual, in sequence) 1 1245 Radiological Release Starts l l l 1315 Evnluation of Field Monitoring Data l 1445 Radiological Release Stops l \\ 1530 Terminate Drill 1.5.2 Scenario Overview Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is operating at 100 percent power near end-of-cycle for the present core. All systems are operable with the exception that Containment Spray Pump 111 is tagged out-of-service and the loop is isolated to repair a previously Identified leak between Containment Spray Heat Exchanger til and Containment Spray l discharge valve IV-80-16. In addition, motor operated containment isolation valve for l Drywell Vent, IV-201-09, has been jammed in the open position after testing it and l maintenance is scheduled to begin its repair later on in the day. Quarterly testing of i Reactor Coolant System isolation valves is being conducted per Tech Spec 4.2.7b. All other systems are operating normally. Current weather conditions are as follows: Weather conditions are fair and seasonable. - Wind out of the northeast at 45 degrees. Wind speed is 3 to 5 mph. l The exercise begins with a break in the air line from the Main Turbine Relay Dump Valve causing all extraction steam non-return valves to fall closed and extraction line drains fail to open with the corresponding loss of feedwater heating. As feedwater temperature decreases, reactor power increases (assuming no operator action) and localized hot spots in the core initiate clad perforations due to the reduced resilience of the old fuelin the core. The activity released into the reactor coolant would be detected by the Air Ejector Off-Gas Rad Monitor. As the off-gas activity reaches the high setpoint on both monitors an Unusual Event will be declared. Operators are expected to implement

i 12 2/18/86 Special Operating Procedure, N1-SPO-26, "High Activity Reactor Coolant or Off-Gas," which requires them only to monitor Stack Gas activity and obtain a reactor coolant sample. Additionally, N1-SPO-19, " Unexplained Reactivity Change" requires power to oe decreased to 80 percent using recirculating flow. Since the Off-Gas System recombiner and charcoal filters are in service, the charcoal filters provide sufficient holdup volume so no activity actually reaches the stack. In the meantime, while testing Emergency Cooling System steam supply isolation valve (IV-39-09), closes fully, but slowly, and the motor breaker trips on overcurrent due to mechanical binding when it is attempted to be opened. Resetting the breaker and any future attempts to open the valve results in the same effect. The valve would be declared inoperable and closed fully per Tech Spec 3.2.7b. With this action, Emergency { Cooling System 11 would be declared inoperable and the LCO of Tech Spec 3.1.3c applies. A Maintenance crew would be called in at this time to repair ~the failed isolation valve. Repair time would be estimated to be indefinite as the valve is a reactor pressure boundary and unf amming the valve will require it to be dismantled which cannot be done with the reactor at operating pressure. Approximately one-half hour af ter the loss of f.eedwater heating, a single control j rod scrams due to blown fuses in its scram circuitry. Off-Gas activity increases further, j ultimately reaching the high-high setpoint for both monitors necessitating the declaration of an Alert forty-five minutes af ter the Unusual Event was declared. The air i Ejactor Off-Gas discharge value (BV-77-03) closes at this setpoint, isolating the Off-Gas System and causing a gradual loss of Main Condenser vacuum. Attempts to reopen this value would be unsuccessful due to the high-high off-gas activity of the gas trapped in the line. Operators must reduce load and shut down the plant at this point per N1-SOP-26 and N1-SOP-20 " Loss of Condenser Vacuum." Eventually, vacuum drops to the reactor scram setpoint and the reactor and turbine-generator automatically shut down. Reactor pressure would initially be controlled by the Turbine Bypass valves but as vacuum continues to decrease both the Bypass valves and MSIVs will trip closed forcing i the operators to initiate pressure control via Emergency Cooling System 12. A plant cooldown to repair the failed RCS isolation valve will begin at this point. a By one and one-half hours into the exercise, a loss of power on Battery Board 11 causes a loss of field to the generators of #11, #12 and #13 Reactor Recirculation Pump M-G Sets and subsequent coastdown of the pumps. The following equipment is also affected: Automatic and remote control of fire equipment (except sprinkler i w and transformer Grinell systems) is lost. All fire zone detectors alarm from loss of power. e FW Pump #13 clutch control inoperative. e o EMRVs 111,112 and 113 inoperative. t Annunciators on L. K. H and F panels inoperative. e l I

1 13 2/18/86 l Diesel Generator 102 is inoperative. e Loss of control to breakers R-1012, R-1022 and R-1020. l e Loss of control power for the breakers of Core Spray and Topping e I Pumps 111 and 121 and Containment Spray Pumps 111 and 112. The Station Shift Supervisor will ensure the CSO implements Special Operatig Procedure, N1-SOP-7, "D.C. Power Interruptions" and directs an NOE and NOC to cross-tie Battery Board 12 to power the affected equipment. The TSC is expected to respond to the situation with advice based upon "what-if" problems which they foresee. Of { primary concern, since the unit is offline at this time, should be the loss of fire detection equipment. Shortly thereaf ter, a ground fault on Power Board 103 trips and this power board locks out, causir.g a loss of AC to the following equipment: Core Spray Pumps and Topping Pumps 112 end 122. o l Containment Spray and Raw Water Pumps 121 and 122. e e Power Board 178. Power Board (PB) 17B will be cross-tied to PB 17A, but restoration of power to PB 103 requires identifying and clearing the fault and would be estimated to take three to four j hours. Eventually, Battery Board 12 will also be lost when a maintenance man accidentally drives a forklift into it mangling the board. If DC power for Battery Board 11 loads are transferred to Battery Board 12, they will be lost again. The following normal loads fed by Battery Board 12 will also be aff,'eted: Reactor Recirculation Pumps #14 and #15 M-G Sets lora field to o the generators and the pumps coastdown. EMRVs 121,122 and 123 are inoperative, Diesel Generator 103 in inoperative. o e Vessel isolation (MSIVs previously closed on low vacuum) and Emergency Cooling are activated (but DC operated isolation valves are without power), Loss of control power to breakers R-112, R-113 R-122, R-123, R-e 1011, R-1013. R-1014, R-1030. R-1032. Loss of control power for the breakers of all Core Spray and Containment Spray Pumps.

I ] .M 14 2/18/86 1 As the complete loss of DC extends beyond 15 minutes, the emergency would be l upgraded to a, Site Area Emergency one and one-half hours af ter the Alert was declared. A faulty high steam flow isolation signal to Emergency Cooling System 12 causes ) its isolation valves to close, disabling reactor pressure control by the Emergency Cooling j System. Manual operation of the steam supply isolation valve, IV-39-10, would be precluded due to a blown packing and steam leaking to the area. Since both DC battery ( boards have previously failed, the EMRVs are also inoperative. With the complete loss of l reactor pressure control, pressure will increase to the SRV setpoints which will relieve steam to the Drywell and thereby limit the reactor pressure rise. Drywell pressure will increase as the SRVs are relieving to the Drywe'.l. Drywell Coolers will be unable to 1 keep up with the heat load. The reactor high pressure condition continues until the constant cycling of pressure causes a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The LOCA is I postulated to be a large break on the discharge side of Reactor Recirculation Pump 12 and will be on the reactor side of the discharge valve making it unisolatable. This loss of 2 out of 3 fission product barriers will necessitate the declaration of a General Emergency. Upon initiation of the LOC A, the Drywell pressure increases but Core Spray and Containment Spray will not initiate since no DC control power is available. With the loss of PB 103 and the initial tag-out of Containment Spray Pump 111, only Containment i Spray Punip 112 is available. Upon manual closure of breakers for Core Spray and I Topping Pumps 111 and 121, they operate normally; when Containment Spray Pump 112 breaker is manually closed, it will not latch in and immediately opens causing a complete i loss of Containment Spray. The Raw Water cross-tie to Containment Spray System 11 is precluded due to the maintenance of the system previously. If attempts are made to cross-tie Raw Water to System 12, valve FCV-93-72 will be mechanically frozen in the normally closed position and cannot be opened either manually or electrically. For two hours pressure gradually rises due to the constant heat input to the Drywell and Torus and the TSC efforts will be centered on ways to prevent a Containment failure on overpressurization. Power to PB 103 is eventually restored. Containment Spray Pumps { 121 and 122 starts and Containment pressure starts to drop. I The Containment fails but not due to overpressure. Instead, when Battery Board i 11 power is restored, Drywell vent isolation valve (IV-201-10), will fail to open due to a faulty control circuit, releasing the contents of the Drywell directly to the Reactor l Building Ventilation System. Emergency Ventilation will have automatically started l previously and now provides a filtered release to the stack and environment. i The release continues for two hours when emergency repair teams are able to manually override the faulty control signal opening isolation valve IV-201-10 electrically j closing the valve and thereby isolating the containment. During the release, a wind shift will be predicted, but never actually occurs during the timeframe of the exercise. The I core will be maintained cool by recirculating Torus water to the vessel via Core Spray Pumps. At this point, recovery planning ber; ins. I The radioactive material simulated to be released will consist primarily of noble l gases. However, the release of radioiodines will be considered in emergency response activities. The offsite radiological data were generated to provide an integrated whole

e 15 2/12/86 body dose of 1.3 REM at a centerline downwind distance of 4 miles. No filtering credit is. allowed for the noble gases. Filtering efficiency for lodine removal is taken to be 99,0 percent. Filtering efficiency for particulate is taken to be greater than 99.99 percent. Stack release concentrations are based upon a total stack flow rate of 140,900 CFM from the operation of the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation, the Waste Building Ventilation, the Turbine Building Ventilation and the Off-Cas Building Ventilation. The release path of radioactive material will be from the DryweII, through the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System to the stack, and out.to the environment. The Reactor Building atmosphere will show a buildup of airborne activity due to the assumed primary-to-secondary leakage of 0.5 percent per day. Meteorological data used during the exercise have been fabricated to meet the i requirements of the scenario. All meteorological and forecast information can be used in the formulation of protective action recommendations. The release of radioactive material will begin at 1245 and continue until 1445 when the Drywell vent isolation valve is closed. Radioactive decay during the release period and plume travel was not considered in offsite radiological release calculations. Post-plume data were omitted because a recovery phase was not to be tested in this exercise. 1 Af ter the plant is placed in as reasonably a safe condition as possible, the l exercise was to be terminated. j l 1.5.3 Description of State and Loca.1 Resources All emergency response agencies were to be tested for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in adequate numbers to reasonably test their l notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and c'.,mtnunications capabilities. l Except as noted below, state and county agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources in a radiological emergency at the NMPNS. Consistent with this intent, the decision to demonstrate or to actually deploy resources may be made at the time of the exercise. j The following personnel and resources were to be developed by the state and local governments to determine the capabilities of their emergency resources. Public Notification During the exercise an actual test of the sirens, tone alerts and I accompanying Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) announcement was to be demonstrated. Additional exercise EBS messages were to be prepared. Actual transmission of these messages to the primary insert e s*ation and broadcast by the EBS network was to be simulated. ? Radiological Field Monitoring Teams e In addition to offsite monitoring teams dispatched by NMDNS, two (2) county radiological monitoring field teams were exercised.

i 16 2/13/36 Each team was accompanied by a Controller supplied with simulated field data to be provided to the teams for determining local dose rate readings consistent with the scenario. Each team was to be equipped with the necessary equipment to determine both gamma dose rates and airborne radiciodine concentrations. The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anti-contamination I clothing. I Completion of Bua Routes for Evacuees Oswego County was to activate a limited number of evacuee bus routes as follows: 2 bus routes for general population evacuation ( 1 bus route for a school evacuation Bus routes were not to be preassigned. The Federal evaluators indicated which bus routes were to be demonstrated on the exercise day. The Federal evaluators in concert with the assigned State controller and appropriate county staff were to ensure that the selected bus routes did not impact on normal public transportation. The bus drivers were to assemble at their normal dispatch location, be assigned appropriate routes briefed and deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. The buses were to complete. their assigned route but they were not pick up any evacuees. Upon - ); completion of the general population evacuation route, the buses were to report to appropriate reception / congregate care centers. a. School The school bus run was to be conducted by the Oswego City l School District starting from the bus garage. The school bus route was chosen by FEM A. The school bus will make the run and then return to the bus garage. (Note: The school run will-I simulate travel to the reception center.) b. General Population One school bus from the City School District of Oswego was to be dispatched from the transportation center to the general population run (selected by FEMA). Upon completion of the run, the bus was to travel to the State f airgrounds. Upon satisfactory l evaluation, the bus was to be secured and return to the , transportation center. e l

f;, l l 17 2/18/86 i i The second general population run was to be demonstrated by Centro of Syracuse using a bus dispatched from the bus garage at One Centro Plaza. The bus was to travel to the starting point, complete its run and travel to the State fairgrounds. Upon checkout at the reception center, the bus was to travel to the Congregate Care Center at West Genesee High School and upon 1 completion at the Center, return to the garage at One Centro Plaza. Evacuation of Non-Institutionalized Mobility impaired The county will demonstrate procedures for identification, notification and determining availability of appropriate transportation for evacuation of non-institutionalized mobility impaired persons. It. addition Federal evaluators selected four addresses for mobility impaired persons in Oswego County. A vehicle for transportation of the handicapped was to be dispatched to these addresses for simulated evacuation. No handicapped evacuees were to be picked up. Traffic Control Points Local agencies supplemented by State resources were to deploy personnel to demonstrate activation of two (2) traffic control paints for major evacuation routes in the county. Traffic control points were not be preassigned or repositioned. In order to provide a greater test of the capability to respond to an actual incident and to allow more j free play in the exercise, the Federal evaluators provided to the State I Controller at the County EOC information on locations of traffic control points to be demonstrated during the course of the exercise. The State Controller then request the County EOC to demonstrate the TCP activat!on. 1 l Once traffle control points had been established and observed by Federal evaluators, local officials were to release personnel to normal duties and simulate continuation of control points where required. Impediments to Evacuation l Federal evaluators introduced free play events to test procedures for removal of impediments from evacuation routes. This demonstration s was to include the actuni dispatch of a police or other emergency I vehicle to the scene, report from the scene to the EOC requesting i appropriate resources, identification of the availability of the required j resources (e.g., tow truck, public works equipment) estimating the times of arrival at the scene and for niearing the impediment. b

18. 2/18/36 One (1) actual road impediment probler and one (1) simulated road impediment problem were to be handlen uring the exercise. Relocation Centers At least one reception / congregate care center was to be opened and staffed in each of Onondaga.and Jefferson Counties for evacuees of Oswego County in accordance with the Oswego County emergency response plan. Supplies required for long term mass care (cots, blankets, food, etc.) need not be acquired or brought to the centers. However, the center personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. The center personnel were then to make the necessary estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources of the potential supplies should then be located and the means of transportation'of the supplies should be determined. A limited number of volunteers were-to be processed through the registration procedure. Procedures for monitoring and decontamination of evacuees were to be demonstrated at the reception / congregate care centers located in Jefferson County and Onondaga County. Because of logistics and the necessity to make prior arrangements to gain access to relocation centers during an exercise, these centers have been selected prior to the day of the exercise. The following faellities were to be activated: Onondaga County 1 Reception / Congregate Care Center Jefferson County 1 Reception / Congregate Care Center Volunteer Organization

• Response organizations identified in the plans were to participate in the exercise. Members of vclunteer organizations such as volunteer fire departments, ambulance squads, amateur radio operators and Red Cross have responsibilities including earning a livelihood that take precedence ever their participatiori in an exercise. Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as available basis.

CLOSEOUT OF THE EXERCISE Closeout of the exercise was accomplished by the'following actions: 1. Emergency workers were secured as soon as possible after they have. demonstrated their capabilities. The decision to secure

I 19 2/13/36 l them was made at their controlling EOC, with concurrence from the State EOC, if applicable. l 1 2. The reception / congregate care centers were secured as soon as appropriate emergency workers and volunteers had checked out through these centers. 3. Participation of nonessential State and County EOC personnel was ended as soon as their emergency response had been essentially completed. 4. When the site reported termination of the release with no further release expected, items 1 through 3 above were to be completed. 1.5.4 Actual and Simula ted Off-Site Events Matrix New York Oswego Jefferson Onondaga State County County County l 1. Notification of Federal, Actual Actual N/A N/A County and Private Agencies 2. Activation of County EOC Actual Actual Actual N/A i and Joint News Center 3. Activation of State EOC Actual N/A N/A N/A (both Albany and Central l District) 4 Accident Assessment Actual Actual N/A N/A l 5. Field Monitoring N/A Actual-2 N/A N/A 6. Security N/A Actual N/A N/A l 7. ESS message prepared and N/A Actual N/A N/A l submitted to public (i.e., I within 15 minutes after corenand/ control decision l for protective action) i I

• 8.

Personnel Monitoring N/A Simulated N/A N/A I Center Activation for l Emergency Workers [ I 9. Evacuee Congregate Care N/A N/A Actual Actual Centers and Reception i Centers l l

~ I 20 2/13/36 New York Oswego Jefferson Onondaga State County County County 10. Personnel Dose Record Actual Actual N/A N/A Keeping (monitoring and control) l 11. School Bus Run N/A Actual-1 N/A N/ A J.

12. General Public Bus Run N/A Actual-2 N/A N/A 13.

Handling of Contaminated N/A N/A 'N/A N/A i Injured Offsite Patient 14 Access Control (control-N/A Actual N/A N/A ling ingress into evacu- [ ated areas) 15. Traffic Control Points N/A Actual-2 N/A N/A j

16. Activation of Prompt N/A Actual N/A N/A Notification System, EBS, and Tone Alert Radios 17.

Siren failure (simulated) N/A Actual N/A N/A i and resultant route h alerting 18. Notification to Coast N/A Actual N/A N/A Cuard and Sheriff's boat patrol (No boats will be deployed)

19. Traffic impediments N/A Actual-1 N/A N/A Simulated-l 20.

Mobility impaired evaca-N/A Actual N/A N/A ation (4 addresses) 21. Closing of parks /recrea-N/A Simulated N/A N/A tional areas 22. Closing of schools N/A Simulated N/A N/A

23. County and State A'e t ual Actual N/A N/A l

personnel at EOF 24 Reentry / Recovery N/A N/A N/A N/A

• For Federal
• observers this is considered a simulated activity.

N/A = not applicable.

21 2/18/86 TABLE 1.5.1 Emergency Classification Timeline* Central State District Oswego Joint Emergency Utility EOC EOC County Media Classification Declared EOF (Albany) (Oneida) EOC Center Unusual Event 0744 N/A 0812 0817 07485 N/A Notification Alert 0823 N/A 0826 0820 0827 0830 Notification Initial N/A N/A 0826 0820 0754 N/A (commenced) Personnel- - - - Notification N/A N/A 0903 0858 0820 N/A (completed) Facility N/A 0910 0900 0915 0917 0910 Declared Operational Site Area N/A 0908 0923 0919 0920 0916 Emergency Notification General N/A 1044 1101 1100 1057 1044 Emergency Notification Release N/A 1301 1307 1313 1313 1242 Started Notification Release N/A 1506 1525 1525 1520 N/R Terminated Notification

• Times that events were observed at each location: N/A = not applicable;

$ notification received at N Oswego County warning point. N/R - not reported.

22 2/13/36 i TABLE 1.5.2 Protective Decision /Public Notification Timeline EBS AT Juris-Affected Decision Message EBS + Decision Decision diction Areas ERPA Time Issued (Minutes) [ Sound sirens Oswego All of 10-0915 0929 14 I, and issue EBS County mile EPZ ,4 message; close schools and send children k. ( to receptier. centers, close parks, water-ways; shelter hg Oswego Hospital v Shelter ERPAs Oswego 1,2,3,5,6 0940 0946 6 County (correction to Oswego N/A 0955 1003 8 1st EBS) Oswego County School Districts b diverted to re-ception center instead of dis- [d missal; Mexico School District 'l students dis-I k missed and or the way home. Oswego School Oswego N/A 1048 1057 9 District are County being evacuated. Mexico School Districts are being evacuated. Evacuation / Oswego Evacuation - 1110 1121 11 Shelter County 1,2,3,$,6, 10,11 Shelter - 4,9,12,13, 19.20,21,22 Evacuate BOCES Oswega N/A '210 1224 14 County

~ i 23 2/13/86 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section provides a narrative overview of the observation evaluations from the November 13, 1985 radiological preparedness exercise for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. The evaluations are keyed to the exercise objectives listed in Section 1.4 of this report. References to those objectives are provided in the narrative whfeh follows. l 2.1 NEW YORK STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC) The objective of demonstrating the ability to receive and verify the initial and followup emergency notif! cations from the licensee (SEOC 1) was met. All changes in the emergency classifice.tton level were received at the SEOC within less than 20 minutes of the declaration by the utility. The notification.of the initial release was received within 6 minutes. The ability to mobilize staff and activate the SEOC in a timely manner was successfully demonstrated (SEOC 2). The SEOC was promptly activated after the Alert notification was received via the RECS line. Most of the state emergency management operations staff had already reported to work, since this notification was received at 0826. Representatives of other agencies were notified primarily by telephone calls. All personnel had been notified within approximately 35 minutes. Twenty-six state and volunteer agencies were notifled. The SEOC was considered operational at approximately 0900 and was fully staffed by approximately 1030. There is a need to establish a system to verify that all agency representatives have reported to the SEOC as directed. It is recommended that a status board listing each agency, its time of notification, and its time of arrival at the SEOC be placed in the operations room so that each agency can post its time of arrival. The SEOC is capable of 24-hour operations based upon a recently updated rester Indicating primary and backup personnel for each function (SEOC 3). In many cases both individuals participated in the exercise. The SEOC includes a complete kitchen and dormitory to service 24-nour operations. During the exercise, all accident assessment personnel went to lunch at the same time leaving the accident assessment area unstaffed for 5-10 minutes. Operations in the accicent assessment area could be enhanced by maintaining continuous staffing. Space, equipment and supplies at the SEOC were adequate to demonstrate that the SEOC can support emergency operations (SEOC 4). The SEOC is a large facility designed to function Independently under adverse conditions. The layout and workspaces are satisfactory. Agency representatives report to a large operations room which contains designated desks and telephones for each agency. Each agency has its own work area. Supplies are readily available since the SEOC is contiguous to the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) facility. A new computer which simulates the projected plume path was tested in the command room. Due to design criteria, this test used actual, rather than scenario weather data and was, therefore, not relevant to the exercise. However, use of this equipment in an actual emergency could prove nelpful.

24 2/i3/36 i l The state, counties, and utility demonstrated the ability to establish appropriate l primary and backup communication links at the SEOC (SEOC 5). The primary communications link from the SEOC to the utility is by the RECS dedicated telephone. l The backup system is radio linkages via the counties. In addition, commercial telephones, and RACES are available. The primary communications link from the SEOC to the county EOCs is by RECS and the Executive Hotline telephone with a backup radio e system. The state communicated to the emergency workers in the field via telephone with the OCEOC and via radio ikk through the state district offices. The Civil Defense i National Teletype System (CDNATS) linking the SEOC with the five contiguous states functioned well, correcting a previous deficiency. The objective of demonstrating that messages are transmitted in an accurate. legible, and timely manner, that messages-are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel i are briefed was only partly demonstrated at the SEOC (SEOC 6). Most messages at the SEOC were received over the RECS telephone. These messages were promptly recorded, j copied, and distributed throughout the SEOC to decision makers, to accident assessment and operations staffs, and to the agency representatives. Communications equipment generally worked well. However, due to a lack of clarity in transmission, there was a question as to the precise time of transmittal of the "1050" message recorded on the Radiological Emergency Data form. In addition, the 1253 RECS message did not contain a time and the 1313 RECS message did not contain release times. The state needs to take corrective action by training communicators at the SEOC to verify unclear information and to request items omitted from incoming messages. Status boards were maintained in each room within the SEOC and were updated throughout the day. However, the evacuation / shelter board in the operations room and the evacuation chart in the command and control room were not always updated promptly. Corrective action i needs to be taken by training staff to update all status boards promptly upon receipt of i updated information or eliminating boards not considered essential. The status chart in I command and control included only evacuation data; no sheltering data was displayed. Corrective action should be taken by including sheltering data on the status chart. i A rear screen projector was used in the operations room to provide a detailed summary for the agency representatives. General briefings were conducted periodically l I by SEMO and REPG personnel in the operations area. The REPG director was kept l informed on agency operations by SEMO personnel. A previous deficiency was corrected l by avoiding delays in transmitting copies of messages to the command. room. The accident assessment staff appeared to have no trouble reading sampling locations and monitoring data from telefaxed copies of the Oswego County Radiological Survey Monitoring Sheets. Use of these forms corrected a previous deficiency. Management of the SEOC was very good. State and volunteer agencies i demonstrated the knowledge and capabilities to respond affectively to scenario events. l The Governor's designee utilized state resources and coordinated exercise events with county and utility representatives. The director of the state Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group under the Disaster Preparedness Commission was effectively in charge and in control of the overall coordinated response at the SEOC (SEOC ?). The director promptly reported to the SEOC and assumed control upon his arrival. He l I i il 4

25 2/18/86 directed all state operations throughout the exercise and consulted with the counties using the Executive Hotline telephone frequently. Further, his review of the changing conditions, in coordination with SEMO, assured that the state was prepared to act if called upon hy the counties. l The objective of demonstrating the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel (SEOC 8) was only partly met. In general, the SEOC demonstrated this ability. However, beginning at about 1225, some confusion was occasioned in the command center in the SEOC when the JNC reported that there i had been a release. Apparently, the activity of the release reported by the JNC at this time was below the technical specification for a reportable release. The confused situation continued at least until the reportable release which occut:'ed at about 1245 was duly reported over the RECS telephone line at about 1305. Although the chain of events leading to the SEOC's receipt of the 1225 release report from the JNC is not known, the confusion should have been cleared up sooner by discussions with other jurisdictions over the open communications !!nes. The state needs to take corrective action by (a) determining the origin of the 1225 release report and revising procedures or training personnel to preclude the transmission of release reports not originating from the facility operator and (b) determining the need for and instituting, if required, additional training in verifying or clarifying nonstandard release reports. I Personnel at the SEOC demonstrated the ability to identify the need for, recuest, and obtain federal assistance, if warranted (SEOC 9). The FEMA Regional Office was promptly contacted by the SEOC after confirmation of the Alert emergency classification had been received from the utility. The state clearly was aware of which federal agencies to contact for specific needs and was prepared to contact them, if needed. t l Since the governor had not declared a state of emergency, the state did not have l the authority to make protective action recommendations to the public. However, based ) upon their consultations with Oswego County, the state demonstrated the ability to make i appropriate protective action recommendations based on licensee recommendations, independent recommendations from the accident assessment group, and off-site factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions (SEOC 10). Based upon the data available to them, the accident assessment staff at the SEOC demonstrated the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and fleid measurements, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAG's (SEOC 11). Dose projections based on the 1245 release were done rapidly and correctly and were verified based on field measurements. Information about the amount of radio-activity in containment and subject to release was not available from the facility. Prerelease dose projections at tle SEOC would have been entanced had this information been available. The state should arrange with the utility to be supplied with such { information. The evacuation time analyses for the Nine Mile Point 10-mile EPZ assume that all ERPAs in the EPZ are to be evacuated. This may lead to overestimates of actual evacuation times when only a portion of the 10-mile EPZ is to be evacuated. However, all decision-makers were cognizant of the limitations in the evacuation time analysis data and these considerations were factored into the evacuation decisions. Evacuation l l

26 2/18/86 time estimates could be enhanced by using more realistic estimates of evacuation times when only a portion of the 10-mile EPZ is to be evacuated. The state has a procedure and decision chain for authorizing potential exposure for emergency workers in excess of the general public PAGs. Although it was not demonstrated for this exercise, since the governor had not declared a state of C emergency, such a chain has been established, satisfying the exercise objective that a decision chain has been established to authorize exposure for emergency workers in excesa of the general public PAGs (SEOC 12). It would be the responsibility of the state health commissioner or his designee to decide whethee or not to authorize such excess exposure. ]l4 DEFICIENCIES N} U There were no deficiencies observed at the SEOC.

I, 5

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION r 1.

== Description:== There is no systematic procedure for verifying that all agency representatives have reported to the SEOC as directed. (NUREG-0654, !!, A.2, H.4). Recommendation: A status board listing each agency, its time of notification, and its time of arrival at the SEOC should be placed. in the operations room so that each agency can post its time of arrival. 2. Description Due to a lack of clarity in transmission, there was a question as to the precise time of the receipt of a message j recorded on the Radiological Emergency Data form. In addition, a RECS message received at 1253 did not contain the time and the 1313 RECS message did not contain release times. (NUREG-0654, !!. F.1). Recom mendation: The state needs to train communicators at the SEOC to verify unclear information and to request items omitted j from incoming messages. 3.

== Description:== The evacuation / shelter board in the operations room and the evacuation chart in the command and control room were not always updated promptly. (NUREG-0654. II, H). Recommendation: Staff should be trained to update all status boards promptly upon receipt of updated information, e l ~ l

[ i 27 2/18/86 l 4.

== Description:== The status chart in command and control included only evacuation data; no sheltering data was displayed. (NUREG-0654, !!, H). l Recommendation: Sheltering data should be included on the status chart in command and control. I i 5.

== Description:== Beginning at about 1225, some confusion was I occasioned in the command center in the SEOC when the JNC reported that there had been a release. Apparently, the activity of the release reported by the JNC at this time was below the j { technical specification for a reportable release. The confused situation continued at least until the reportable release which occurred at about 1245 wc5 duly reported over the RECS telephone i line at about 1305. Although the chain of events leading to the SEOC's receipt of the 1225 release, report from the JNC is not J known, the confusion should have been cleared up sooner by discussions with other jurisdictions over the open communications lines. Recommendation: The state should (a) determine the origin of the 1225 release report and revise procedures or train personnel to preclude the transmission of release reports not originating from the facility operator and (b) determine the need for and institute, if required, additional training in verifying or clarifying nonstandard release reports. i i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT I 1.

== Description:== All accident assessment personnel went to lunch at the same time leaving the accident assessment area unstaffed for i ] l 5-10 minutes. l L Recommendation: Staffing in the accident assessment area should I be maintained continuously. 2.

== Description:== Information about the amount of radioactivity in containment and subject to release was not available from the t facility. Prerelease dose projections at the SEOC would have been l enhanced had this information been available. Recommendation: The state should arrange with the utility to be l supplied with prerelease estimates of the amount of radioactivity in containment and subject to release. 3.

== Description:== The evacuation time analyses foe the Nine Mile Point 10-mile EPZ assume that all ERPAs in the EPZ are to be r-a

28 2/1B/96 evacuated. This may lead to overestimates of actual evacuation times when only a portion of the 10-mile EPZ is to be evacuated. However, all decision-makers were cognizant of the limitations in the evacuation time analysis data and these considerations were factored into the evacuation decisions. Recommendation: The state should consider using more realistic estimates of evacuation times when only a portion of the 10-mile EPZ is to be evacuated. 2.1.1 Central District Emergency Operations Center (CDEOC) The CDEOC satisfied an exercise objective by demonstrating the ability to mobilize staff and activate the facility in a timely manner (CDEOC 1). A current call list was used to alert emergency personnel beginning at about 0820, and the facility was fully operational by about 0915. Most of the State agenc'es were represented at the j EOC, however the Civil Air Patrol Military, and Salvation Army posts in the operations j i room were not ubserved. The facility was secured by the State Police at the alert emergency classification level. All positions at the CDEOC were double staffed throughout the day. At 1230, a shif t-change was demonstrated. Incoming personnel were adequately briefed on the emergency situation by their counterparts. By this shift change, the CDEOC met the exercise objective of demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour basis (CDEOC 2). l The exercise objective of demonstrating that the CDEOC has adequate space, j equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations was only partly met (CDEOC 3). The CDEOC is an underground structure located in Oneida, New York. The facility can be self-supporting for a period of 14 days and has work stations and living accommodations for 24-hour per day operations during emergencies. The EOC is equipped with the RECS line, commercial telephones, and radios for local and statewide communications. However, since there are not a sufficient number of telephones to l permit timely communications between state agency representatives at the CDEOC and their counterparts at the SEOC, state agency representatives relied on backup radio communications and telecopters to transmit their messages. A delay of 1-2 hours was experienced in transmitting and receiving information. The available communications I I systems, both the primary telephones and the backup radios and telecopiers, are not sufficient to permit agency representatives at the CDEOC to communicate with their counterparts in the SEOC in a timely manner. It is recommended that this situation be corrected by procuring additional primary telephones and/or backup radios so that state agency representatives in the operations room can communicate with the SEOC in a timely manner. i Because the telecopier is used solely to send and receive operational messages, it was not possible to receive hard copy confirmations of EBS messages and news releases [ from the JNC at the CDEOC. Operations could be enhanced by an additional telecopler l [ to receive hard copies from the JNC. t i

~ r 29 2/18/86 i Due to the lack of sufficient communications systems (see discussion of CDEOC 3), the CDEOC only partly met the exercise objective of demonstrating that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed (CDEOC 4). Messages were properly logged and distributed. However, the lack of sufficient ecmmunications systems impaired the timeliness of communications between state agency representatives at the CDEOC and their counterparts in the SEOC. Status boards were adequate and promptly updated with current emergency information. During the shift change, incoming i personnel were briefed on the present status of the emergency. Briefings were held at each change in emergency classification. Only one briefing was held which allowed each j state agency representative to describe the agency's activities. Operations could be i enhanced by having more frequent briefings in which each state representative describes the activities of the agency. Additionally, the Radiological Officer should provide briefings in non-technical as well as in technical terms for a better understanding by all staff members. The CDEOC was effectively managed by Mr. Frank Griffin, Director, Region II, ) State Emergency Management Office. He directed a coordinated response to the i changing conditions presented by the scenario. The CDEOC met the exercise objective of demonstrating that the designated official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response (CDEOC 5). l Due to the lack of sufficiant communications systems (see discussion of CDEOC 3), the CDEOC only partly met the exercise objective of demonstrating the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel (CDEOC 6). Communications with the SEOC, OCEOC, and Jefferson and Onondaga Counties were good. RECS, radios, and telephones all worked effectively. However, the lack of sufficient communications systems impaired the timeliness of communications between state agency representatives at the CDEOC and their counterparts in the SEOC. DEFICIENCIES l l No deficiencies were observed at the CDEOC during the exercise. i l l AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIOri

== Description:== Since there are not a sufficient number of telephones to permit timely communications between state agency representatives at j the CDEOC and their counterparts at the SEOC, state agency representatives relied on backup radio communications and telecopiers { to transmit their messages. A delay of 1-2 hours was experienced in i transmitting and receiving information. The available communications systems, both the primary telephones and the backup radios and telecopiers, are not sufficient to permit agency representatives at the CDEOC to communication with their counterparts in the SEOC in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, it, F.1.d).

e

• i 30 2/18/86 Recommendation: Additional primary telephones and/or backup radios should be procured so that state agency representatives in the operations room can communicate with the SEOC in a timely manner.

i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT-l 1.

== Description:== Because the telecopier is used solely to send and i receive operational messages, it is not possible at the CDEOC to receive hard copy confirmation of EBS messages and news releases from the JNC. Recommendation: An additional telecopier should be purchased and used to receive hard copies from the JNC. 2.

== Description:== Only one briefing was held in which each ' state agency representative described the agency's activities. Recom:nendation: More frequent briefings in which each state agency describes the agency's nctivities should be held. 2.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) State functions at the EOF were activated promptly and efficiently and all state staff reported promptiy, thereby satisfying an exercise objective (EOF 1). All state and county representatives had reported to the EOF by 0910, approximately the time that the Site Area Emergency was declared by the utility. According to participants in the exercise, there is a system in place to receive a call directing activation of the EOF and to call up EOF staff at any time. However, the objective of demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing of the state functions in the E02 on a 24-hr basis was not demonstrated (EOF 2). This ability needs to be demonstrated at a future exercise. The EOF has been renovated since the last exercise. There was adequate space correcting a previous deficiency. However, the objective of demonstrating that the EOF has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations (EOF 3) was only partly met. A lack of telecopier paper interrupted the receipt of hard copies by the state and county representatives for over two hours; hard copies of EBS messages and recommendations of the New York State Commissioner of Health were not received. This situation needs to be corrected by maintain!ng a supply of telecopier paper for use by state and county representatives at the EOF. Operations might be enhanced by limiting access to the dose assessment area which tended to become overcrowded and by improving acoustics in the technical support areas where, because staff work at side-by-side desks, staff conversations sometimes interfere with each other. Because of the lack of telecopier paper noted above (see discussion of EOF 3), the EOF only partly met the exercise objective of demonstrating. the ability to l communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel (EOF 4).

( 31 2/18/86 l l 1 l Five communications systems, including the RECS line, commercial telephones, RACES, the operation of which was demonstrated, and telecopiers, were available. The representative of Oswego County was in continuous telephone contact with the Oswego County EOC. The legibility of telefaxed copies of the new data forms with enlarged lettering was verified, correcting a previous deficiency. The objective -of demonstrating that messages are transmitted In an accurate, legible, and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, ' and that incoming personnel are briefed (EOF 5) was only partly met. The legibility of written messages was confirmed. However logs of hard copy transmissions and receipts were not kept by Niagara Mohawk support staff who relled on the time and date stamps automatically placed on hard copies of messages by telecopy machines to constitute a log. Niagara Mohawk should advise the support staff to keep logs. A single, unified log of hard copy messages is needed and the lack of one needs to be corrected by logging both the transmission and receipt of hard copy messages. Although status boards were generally well maintained, one status board was not updated for about an hour at one point during the exercise. Corrective action should be to train staff to update all status boards promptly upon the receipt of new information. In addition, the emergency action level was not displayed in the EOF. The current emergency action level should be displayed within clear view of all personnel in the EOF. Although twenty situation reports were given during the exercise at the EOF, incoming state and county personnel were not formally briefed. Although these situation reports may be adequate for briefing. Niagara Mohawk personnel, it is necessary to ensure that incoming state and county personnel are aware of current status information immediately upon assumption of their duties, it is recommended that incoming state and county personnel be formally briefed upon arrival at the EOF. In the dose assessment area, the staff made prompt and correct prospective calculations prior to the release. After the release, both Niagara Mohawk and county field team data were received at the EOF and were utilized by the dose assessment staff. Information exchange between utility, state, and county representatives during the development of protective actions recommendations had improved since the previous exercise. 4 The Emergency Director exhibited command and control and the heads of dose assessment and technical support consulted almost continuously with the Emergency i Director and state and county officials. The state liaison officer was present throughout the exereire and actively participated.. Although demonstration of such information exchange was not an objective of this exercise, it was noted that the mutuality, consistency, and timellr.ess of dose assessments and subsequent protective action recommendations could be enhanced by having the state and county participate in the development of protective action recommendations and by posting projected doses and field team data on a status board in the county operations room. DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in the state and county functions at the EOF during this exercise. - - _. ___ ______- __ _ = _ -_ _ - __ _ ___ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ - -__ _ -_ _ __ __-_ _ __ _ -_- - _ _

32 2/18/86 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.

== Description:== The ability to maintain staffing of the state functions i d at the EOF on a 24-hour basis was not demonstrated. (NUREG-0654, !!, A.4). i / Recommendation: The ability to maintain staffing of the state AW) functions at the EOF on a 24-hour basis needs to be demonstrated dT' > at a future exercise. j/ *) 2.

== Description:== A lack of paper interrupted the receipt of hard copies 1 by the state and county representatives for over two hours. g,# (NU REG-0654, !!, F.1.d). Recom mendation: A supply of telecopier paper for use by state and county representatives should be maintained at the EOF. l pr P 3.

== Description:== One status board was not updated for about an hour I at one point during the exercise. (NUREG-0654, !!, H). l Recommendation: Staff should be trained to update all status boards promptly. ) v t> g [ 4.

== Description:== The emergency action level was not displayed in the EOF. (NUREG-0654 II, D.3). l 1 Recommendation: The current emergency action level should be displayed within clear view of all personnel in the EOF. p.,1I.

== Description:== Incoming state and county personnel were not [# formally briefed at the EOF. (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a. A.4). Recommendation: Upon arrival at the EOF, incoming state and county personnel should be formally briefed with current status information. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l 1.

== Description:== The dose assessment area tended to become overcrowded. Recommendation: Access to the dose assessment area should be limited. 2.

== Description:== The conversations of staff who work at ::ide-by-side desks in the technical support area tended to interfere with each { f other. I i i t.

( 4 - r l 33' 2/18/86 l^ 1 Recommendation: Consideration should be given to improving the acoustics in the technical support area. 3.

== Description:== State and county representatives did not participate enough in the development of protective action recommendations in the EOF. Recommendation: The, mutuality, consistency, and timeliness of protective action recommendations could be. enhanced by having - state and county representatives participate.more in the development of protective action recommendations. 4.

== Description:== Pr6]ected doses and field team data were not posted in the' county operations room.- Recommendation: The mutuality, consistency, and timeliness of dose assessments ' and subsequent protective action recom-mendations could be enhanced by posting projected doses and field team data on a status board in the county operations room. 2.1.3 Joint News Center (JNC) The JNC demonstrated. the ability to mobilize staff and activate state and county functions in a timely manner (JNC 1). At approximately 0830, the county public information officers (PIOS) were notified that an Alert emergency classification level was in effect and requested to report to the JNC. The JNC was declared operational at - about 0910. The state representative simulated his arrival by assuming his duties at approximately 0950. All functions at the JNC were activated by appropriate staff immediately upon their arrivals. Communications with the county EOC and plant representatives were established immediately upon of the appropriate JNC staff member. The ability to maintain staffing of state and county functions at the JNC on a 24-hour basis (JNC 2) was demonstrated by presentation of a coster. Adequate clerical support was available and greatly assisted the. effectiveness of operations. The JNC is t located in ERPA 13 which was evacuated during. this exercise. _ Long term staffing (. capabilities were admirably demonstrated at this time by simulating activation of the ' second shift at the alternate JNC location in Syracuse to avoid an interruption of JNC fur.ctions. l The JNC demonstrated the ability to brief the. media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner (JNC 3). Press briefings were' held frequently, after the airing of each EBS message and whenever there was an update in the available information. In addition, the plant status and the status of protective actions were announced hourly. The ability to share information with other agencies prior to its release was demonstrated at the JNC satisfying an exercise objective (JNC 4). All EBS messages l prepared by the county P!O were reviewed by each agency to confirm the accuracy of information prior to airing the message.

i 34 2/18/8'6 l The exercise objecti"e of demonstrating the ability to establish and operate rumor control.f mada rtsponse in amoordinated manner (JNC 5) was met. All information which was inconsistent with information in EBS messages or press releases was immediately investigated to establish the correct information. Rumor control was effectively demonstrated. All EBS messages were complied and aired (simulated) within the required 15 minute time limit after command and control had reacht.d the decision to order protective actions to be taken (JNC 6).,In a previo.ts exercise, no EBS message had been issued to announce the countywide school closing. During this exercise, the first EBS message stated that schools in Oswego County, Mexico School District. and Oswego School District were to be dismissed. Inclusion of this text in the EBS message corrected the previous deficiency. However, this EBS message stated that all, buses with school children were oeing diverted to reception centers and could have caused confusion to the public. Approximt.tely 40 mint. cs af ter this message had been issued, a second EBS message stated th9.t only the Osnego City Sch ol District students had been sent to the reception centernt :he New York State Fairgrounds and that the Mexico School District students had been dismissed from school and were on their ways home. The confusion j that resulted at the JNC was resolved by excellent communication between the P!Os. but j corrective action should be taken by training personnel involved in preparing EBS j i messages concerning school closings to verify the correctness of the actions listed for f each individual school prior to airing the message. I The telephone numbers list at the JNC has been verified and corrected, resolving s pv2xs deficiency. I DEFICIENCIES ) There were no deficiencies observed at the JNC during the exercise. I i AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

== Description:== Confusion resulted at the JNC when the EBS message stating that all buses with school children were being diverted to l reception centers was released. This message could have caused l i confusion to the public. Approximately 40 minutes af ter this message had been issued, a second EBS message stated that only the Oswego City Schcoi District students had been sent to the reception center at the New York Statt F ~ gounds and that the Mexico School District j students had been d!* 5.ned from school and were on their ways home. Recom mendutoa: Personnel involved in primaring E3S message concernir..g school closings should be trained to verWy the correctness of tN actions listed for each individual school prior to releasing the j message. (NU REC-063 4,11., E.6, E.7). I' l l ) i c

N r. .Wl @ c. q &; l c y? 35 i > 2/43/86 1 3 y, w . v. g* n t - ik -f' y' AREAS RECOMMENDED FQR !!APROVEMENT %^ i 4- , j, ,m -n .x s + y ) 4 No areas are recom nended 'for improvement.besedom observatformmade s 3 this exere!se. f\\ L q3 g j. g m. w ,s i' \\

• WN.y 2//?OSWECO COUNTY

} w \\ 3 y-

~

4. - 3 e 3, Lj 4 a,,. ,s t n x + ff.1 Oswego County Emekency CperatidCdnter (OCEOC)

' y i

1, i The obje,:tive, to demond4te tss(j s andity tesreceive initial and s follow.p, t em'drienty notification was satisfa;tority rat (OCEOC 'i). The initial NotificationhD s, .,s Unusual Eient was received at the County #acaind Poirt tocitted in the County Sher L a Department's comddnication center in Oswya.' Thir/n%fication was received over 'g (' i ) Radiological EmergeMy Communication Sjitem (RF.CSF at approximately 0750; v l... g?' s,{ I ' cation of transmnMont Mer the RECS linSils automatically con'plifed by .1' procedure. in emergency c! duplications levels irdef recilved at7ollowing activa 3 1 s telephone was operational and utilized, throughout' the ' exer 6h [' jPersonne Q; the County EOC. The RECS '[ the RECS message forms. command and contre ( center and the dose as;essment are e 'Y t,. ' Y^ i',

• i

(' Unushi Event. Key emergency personnel were mobilized to the EOC after t. (Notificatio comp'.e' ted from, the County Warning Point. Alerting and notification proced C classifiestion the 4ther staff were notifled aad advised to report to the EOC Preparedness to establish a secu"ity check, point at the addition, tb In - security waj nalntainsd thro gcout the exatelse. This 0915, shortly af ter the declaration $the Sitd Area Emergenc/.All staff Std arrived a staf(and activate the EOC in a tirQmanner and to provide adequate access con The abliity to mobil'ite ,.'i and sec.:rity was ade pately derronstnted (OCEOC 2 and 6). y T derranstrated (OCEOC 3[ ty an av.ual shift chcnge ' personnel and by the pra9ntation of duty rosters for the othe s.,Some positiefs wers k double a taffed during the exercise for training' purposes. 's n Vacilities at the j75wego Coun*:y EOC were well organized with the n'eeded supplies and amenities. Adequate Exce furnitur<, lighting,sd com trunication 1 equipment were available. Re&{ra[maos a,nd displays, status boars were posted or available fu use throughout.the mic:do. Additionally, the EOC has an adeqJate p address syst' m (OCEOC 4). 7N e g Oswege County adequately demonstrated the capability to communicatecwith a 1 appropriate locations. organizations and field personnel, includmg Coast Conrail, and to estza!i{h primary and backup communicat'lon systems '(OCEOC 5 Guard and 10). The primary and tdekto communications systems were operational and functid "3 .y I s 6 i s t ) i

Y 36 2/13 m 1 I well during the exercise. These systems consisted of the - RECS telephone. Executive I Hotline telephone, commercial telephone, and numerous radio frequencies (Sheriff. Fire. Highway, Department of Health / Field monitoring teams and R AC ES), Continuous contact was maintained with the EOF via a direct telephone line in the dose assessment area which was staffed throughout the exercise. A computer printer linked the County 1 dose assessment function to the Technical Support Center and the EOF, when it became - operational. Five (5) telefax machines were available for the receipt and transmission of Nrd copy information. Two of these machines were dedicated for the communication of EBS messages and news releases from the Joint News Center. The three remaining a machines were available for communications with the EOF, State EOC or other locations, if needed. The Executive Hotline telephone linking the State and Oswego County's EOC was operational throughout the exercise. Both shifts for the County decision makers were familiar with their responsibilities to coordinate decisions with the State and this function was sufficiently demonstrated. Communications with the Coast Juard, Conrail and the FAA were via commercial telephones; these agencies were 1otified from the County Warning Point during the Unusual Event emergency classification level. Communications with the two County field monitoring teams were via high band radio with a fixed repeater. Some difficulties were encountered in communications with both field teams during the early portions of the exercise due to P what appeared to be atmospheric interference. These problems were. eliminated by moving the teams to different locations. Although there were some additional intermittent difficulties in communications with the field teams, Information could be l relayed to them through the Sheriff's radio without delay. j.. l The objective to demonstrate adequate internal communications within the Oswego County EOC was met (OCEOC 7). Messages were properly written on internal g message forms and routed through the Director of Emergency Preparedness to the appropriate agency (s). Briefings were held to keep the EOC staff informed on emergency conditio ts, as appropriate. Staff briefings included verbal status reports from all the [ agencies represented in the EOC. Status boards in the main operations room were accurately maintained and updated in a timely manner. The dose projection and field team status boards were maintained with pertinent data as soon as it became available, thus correcting a deficiency from a previous evercise. Demonstration that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of the EOC operations was adequately met (OCEOC 8). The Director of the County's Office of Emergency Management and his deputy effectively coordinated and directed the emergency response. A transfer of command from.the director to the deputy was j efficiently demonstrated during the shif t change. f The decision makers in the County were able to determine the need for and l request the State's assistance, if' required (OCEOC 9). The State was called upon by Oswego County for consultation on protective action recommendations. Generally, the State concurred with the County's decision. i The ability to demonstrate that proper projected radiation dosages to the public can be determined based on plant data and field measurements and that appropriate [ protective actions can be made, was met (OCEOC 11). The dose assessment staff performed all functions well. Precautionary protective action recommendations (P AR) i

a !o o l 37 2/18/86 were developed based on known plant status. Additional PAR's were recommended based on further determinations of plant systems. Continuous contact was maintained with the I County's liaison in the EOF via an open telephone line. This process ensured that timely information on plant status was available in the County's dose assessment area. During I the Site Area emergency classification level, dose projections were performed both by the computer system, the input for which was controlled by the utility, and by hand held programmable calculators. These projections confirmed that environmental dose rates were below measurable levels. Data ftom field monitoring teams (County and Utility) ] confirmed the projections. Following the General Emergency classification, dose 1 projections were made based on potential releases from the plant's containment which included very high radiation levels. Protective action recommendations were given to the EOC director based on those projections. Considerations were given to plume transient time, wind speed and evacuation time estimates in making these recom-mendations. The radiological officer gave excellent briefings to the director on the reasons behind the PAR's. A technical representative from the utility gave numerous I informative briefings to the radiological officer to explain plant status. After the release began, the field monitoring teams were efficiently deployed to locate the plume { centerline and edges. Comparisons were made between the measured field data and the projections. Air samples were taken to verify the lack of radiolodine in the plume. The ability to provide advance coordination of public alert!ng and instructional messages with the State was adequately demonstrated (OCEOC 12) In all instances i during the exercise that required public instructions proper coordination with the State was observed. These included, activation of the prompt alert and notification system, EBS message generation and subsequent transmission. Each protective action proposed was fully assessed internally with appropriate input obtained from emergency response j agencies present at the EOC and then coordinated with the State. l Decisions regarding evacuation of the general populat!on in specific designated l ERPA's were properly and promptly coordinated and implemented by the EOC staff (OCEOC 13). Available resources were inventoried and vetified as timely assessments and determinations were made concerning evacuation implementation. The ability to deal with impediment to evacuation was partially met (OCEOC 14). Two free play messages dealing with impediments were introduced to the EOC staff by the FEMA team leader. The initial message required coordination, decision making and actual implementation with deployment of county resources. The response to the ) second impediment was to be demonstrated by assessment and coordination within the EOC, but with only a simulated implementation of county resources. The initial message was not properly coordinated as specified in the County Plan. The message should have been communicated to the Law Enforcement representative but was instead given to the i Highway Department. As a result a police officer was not dispatched to the site. The l Highway Department, independent of coordination with Law Enforcement dispatched a l l heavy duty vehicle to the scene of the impediment, which was capable of clearing the l l road. Required coordination would have permitted proper assessment of the accident j scene by law enforcement personnel and mobilization of forces for alternate traffic I l routing and control if required. Coordination and implementation of traffic impediment activities was observed as a problem during a previous exercise. Adherence to Plan l l \\ ) l 1 t

e 38 2/1S/36 i procedures would assure proper implementation and response to traffic impediments. The second impediment to evacuation was fully coordinated and assessed using the planned procedures. Implementation and deployment of resources was simulated. Establishment of traffic control points for an effective, timely and coordinated evacuation including controlling access to evacuated areas was sufficiently demonstrated (OCEOC 15). H!ghway Department and Law Enforcement personnel worked together to assess and mobilize county personnel to activate traffic control functions. The organizational ability required to effect an orderly evacuation of schools was demonstrated (OCEOC 16). Appropriate agencies at the EOC involved in the decisions ultimately resulting in the evacuation of s::hools, considered the evacuation times and the available resources required. Timely decisions to evacuate the schools provided fcr the orderly closing of schools in the Oswego and Mexico School districts following the declaration of Site Area Emergency. An EBS message was issued that contained infor-mation on the evacuation of schools which could have caused confusion to parents of children enrolled in those schools within the EPZ. A subsequent EBS message clarified the confusion. Care should be used in preparing EBS information to assure accurate and clear instruction. 1 The prompt notification siren system was activated in a timely manner following j proper coordination. with State instructions (OCEOC 17). The director of the Oswego County EOC activated the sleen system as a prelude to issuing the first EBS message at 0929. In addition, a free play message was subsequently injected which simulated siren failure, thereby providing the county the opportunity to demonstrate their route alerting capabilities. DEFICIENCIES l There were no deficiencies observed in Oswego County's Emergency Operations Center. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION L 1.

== Description:== Proper procedures were not followed for the coordination and implementation of activities to deal with impediments to evacuation. The County Highway Department and Law Enforcement d!d not coordinate with each other as specified in the plan, resulting in an incomplete. demonstration of this function (NUREG-0654 II, J.10.k). Recommendation: Procedures should be reviewed and followed as necessary, to assure that impediment to evacuation can be acted upon correctly. ' 2.

== Description:== An EBS message was generated at the EOC which ~ contained information on the evacuation of school children that could have caused confusion (NU REC-0654, !!, J.9, J.10.g). L_____________________________.-

e 39 2/13/86 Recommendation Clear and concise information should be included in EBS messages to ensure that the proper instructions reach the public. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed in the Oswego County EOC. 2.2.2 Field Monitoring Teams Two Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring teams were deployed and used by the county to perform sampling and monitoring. Team members were activated at 0700 and reported to the staging area prior to 0848. Before equipment and supplies were loaded into their vehicles, a thorough check was performed using a written check list. Equipment was promptly packed into kits, two apiece for each team, and loaded into l their trucks for rapid deployment. Notification of their first monitoring assignments were received at 0907 followed by dispatch into the field at 0911. The field teams were familiar with their assignments and the area, having no difficulties reading maps and i directions to the sample locations. This demonstrated their ability to mebilize and l deploy in a timely manner (OC Field 2). Members of both field teams demonstrated the appropriate procedures for using l the radiation survey instruments to determine ambient radiation levels (OC Field 3). l They had the proper high-range ion chamber type survey instruments. However, the only low range survey meters that Team B used was an E-140 N with a pancake type HP-260 GM detector. This is not in accordance with the Oswego County plan. This low range instrument reads out in units of counts per minute, requiring that the controller convert counts per minute data into mR/ hour. The instrument readings were recorded on log ) sheets and reported by radio to the EOC. Proper radio protocoi was followed throughout ) the exercise. This corrects a previously identified issue from an earlier exercise. Field I teams recel/ed appropriate information on plant condit!ons and meteorological conditions, thus correcting a previous deficiency. Field teams were able to adequately define the plume boundaries and its centerline. Field Team B generally followed the correct procedures to measure airborne radiciodine in tne presence of noble gasest this objective was partially demonstrated (OC { Field 6). The air sampling equipment was calibrated prior to use. A proper power supply was available for the instruments. Af ter the air sample was taken, the team moved into a low background area for counting. Samples were labeled, logged and packaged following the field measuremer.ts. Some improvement should be made in the air sampling techniques exhibited by Team B: j l e The radiciodine cartridge should be purged in a low background area before the sample is counted in the field. Additional train!ng is needed on the appropriate configuration of the e iodine and particulate filters for sample counting. 1

0 40 2/13/86 i Field Team A was not requested by the coorf.inator at the EOC to collect air samples nor to demonstrate measurement techniques. However, they were equipped with the proper equipment and appeared knowledgeable in the procedure for sampling and corresponding counting. Both teams gave excellent demonstrations of their abilities to use personnel dosimetry equipment and radiation survey instruments to monitor their exposure (OC Field 1). Each team member had high and low range direct reading dosimeters and l j permanent record TLDs. Readings were taken every fif teen minutes and reported to the EOC. Pr0per protective clothing was available to the teams in their kit in the event that its use was required. A previously identified issue concerning field team procedures and the requirement for additional training was not verifled during the exercise. The deficiency cited, specifically deals with a team dispatched from the Scriba Volunteer Fire Department; this team did not participate therefore the statu's of the remedial action could not be ascertained. Members from both field monitoring teams knew the various dose limits which required them to notify the field team controller at the EOC. They were also aware that authorization to receive dosages in excess of predetermined limits would have to come f from the EOC. This objective was adequately met by the field monitoring teams (OC i Fleid 4). g 'l K! was available to both field teams in the~ir field kits. Team members knew that the use of K! could only be authorized by the health official in charge and that this decision would be transmitted to them by the EOC. Personnel appeared to be well i informed on the recommended use of KI(OC Fleid 5). t I I ) DEFICIENCIES i i i There were no deficiencies observed in the Oswego County's Radiological Field monitoring teams. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION P Description Sample counting techniques demonstrated by the field monitoring Team B should be improved on. (NUREG-0654, !!, I.9). Recommendation Appropriate co+ f ! rations of the iodine and particulate filters for sample counting sauld be used. 1 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 1.

== Description:== Low-range monitoring instruments used by the field I monitoring teams made measurements in units of counts / minute which then had to be converted into mR/ hour. l I 1 I I

l ) l. U 2/18/86 Recommendation: It would be beneficial in minimizing possible errors in unit conversion and improve response time if monitoring i l equipment was provided that did not require unit conversion. Low range survey instruments specified in the Oswego County plan i should be carried in the equipment kit and should be used. l 2.-

== Description:== Samples were not purged before counting. l Recommendation: Radioiodine cartridges should be purged in a [- low background area before the sample is counted in the field. jd6 3.

== Description:== Field Team A was not directed to demonstrate their air sampling procedures and techniques. Recommendation: Future exercises should provide for the demonstration of this function. 5 2.2.3 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public The objective to provide for backup public alerting in the event of partial siren system failure was demonstrated by the dispatch of a route alerting team (OC Field 7). Sleen sector #22 was used as the area requiring backup to the siren failure. officer was deployed to alert residents of this area in a police vehicle equipped with A police I public address system and a radiological kit. The public address system was demonstrated as the officer followed his route, covering it in approximately 16-17 minutes. The officer maintained frequent contact with the Ccunty EOC and was fami with the streets in the impacted area. Four schools were visited and a random sampling of residents was conducted to determine if the permanent population has received information on how they will b I notified and what actions they should take in the event of radiological emergency. on this survey objective (OC Field 8) was met. All four schools (Oswego High School, Kingsford Park School, Frederick Leighton Elementary School and Fitzhugh Park Elementary School) were equipped with tone alert radios which sounded simul during the exercise with the activation of the sirens. This equipment is maintained by the Oswego County Office of Emergency Preparedness. Maps of the emergency zone depicting evacuation routes have been provided to the schools and were posted the school offices. The principals were familiar with the routes and the procedures to follow to safely evacuate the school children in the Oswego school district. Interviews conducted with the general population indicated that they had been informed and were familiar with the procedures to take in the event of the so nding l the sirens. The objective to demonstrate that information on emergency actions has been provided to transient populations within the 10 mile EPZ, including the water part, was met (OC Field 9). Three hotels were visited and their managers interviewed. All three hotels clearly displayed the public information on emergency response actions th i

I O .I3Ikh had received from the utility. Each manager knew that in the event of an emergene., they should tune to one of the EBS stations listed on the public information pamon.ct Due to the season and the weather conditions on the day of the exercise there was no water traffic available for interviewing. Oswego County has a boat that it ceu!d use to alert and notify the transient population on the Oswego River. The simulated coa-l alerting (Notification of Boating Public) was implemented by the Oswego County pouce at the U.S. Coast Guard Station in Oswego. The boat patrol was staffed by two Count, police officers. Both of these individuals were assigned to the County Police Marine Division and they were knowledgeable regarding the procedures and scecia; considerations for notifying the boating public and to the seasonal fluctuations of tne recreational population and commerci21 boating activities. The demonstration of the ability to establish traffic control points and provide i sample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuation area was adecuate,., demonstrated (OC Field 10 and 13). Two traffic points, TCP C and TCP B were [j activated and staffed by County personnel during the exercise, at Route 104 and City l Line Road and at Hay Fly Road and Route 4. respectively. Traffic control point C was staffed at 0931; TCP B was staffed prior to the arrival of the observer at 0950. i Emergency workers at both locations were familiar with their responsibilities and procedures. The location of relocation centers and evacuation routes were known by the TCP perso., el who were able to communicate with the EOC by radio. This corrects an n issue identified during a previous exercise. Periodic reports to the TCP coordinator at h l' the EOC were made from the field locations. In addition, updates were provided to the j' ! TCP personnel from the field coordination at the EOC. A sample of the resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation was partially demonstrated in the field (OC Field 12). The impediment that was staged for j j observation consisted of an overturned truck (simulated) which had spilled its cargo of f I bags of cement onto the roadway. The County Highway Department responded by promptly dispatching a large vehicle which was capable of moving the overturned truck as well as cleaning up any of the spilled cement. The County workers were familiar with the proper procedures. The partial demonstration of this objective occurred because j there was no dispatch of county resources (sheriff) to the accident scene to assess the severity of the accident or more importantly to provide traffic control if needed. The objective to demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10 mile EPZ was met (OC Field 11). Two separate bus companies dispatched a bus to demonstrate an evacuation route to simulate i the pick-up, transport and delivery to the reception center, a portion of the population. At 1115 the general population evacuation order was received via telephone at the City School District of Oswego Bus Garage. Shortly thereafter a bus was dispatched to evacuation route 41. This route was followed exactly as outlined with the bus stopping at all designated pick-up points. The driver made periodic calls back to the bus dispatcher with dosimeter readings and the exact location of the bus along the route. l Af ter the bus completed its last pick-up point it continued on to the assigned reception center located at the New York State Fairground in Syracuse. i tb 1 (

I i .r 43 2/18/86 l The limited range of the communication system affected two way communi-cation at certain points along the evacuation route. There was no two-way communication once the bus reached the reception center. The Centro of Syracuse bus depot was placed on alert standby by the Counts EOC at 0851. The bus company received a message from the EOC at 1128 to dispatch a bus for evacuation of Route #31. The bus arrived at the start of the route at 1237 and completed it at 1242. The driver knew the route well, made all the required stops, and proceeded to the Reception Center located at the New York State Fairgrounds following completion of the route, arriving there at 1345. Problems were initially experienced in maintaining radio communication with the dispatcher in Syracuse, with complete loss of communication prevailing once the bus lef t Syracuse. 'i A sample of the resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ was demonstrated by the dispatch of an ambulette to simulate the pick up and transport of these individuals I (OC Field 14). Upon receiving a call at 0935 the ambulette proceeded to four I prede' ermined addresses and simulated a pick up at each location. The vehicle was l quipped with a two-way radio, a detailed map of the county and information concerning l the nature of the impediment. The driver arrived promptly at each of the four pickup i points and knew which relocation center to proceed to. The demonstration of this objective coerects a previous deficiency. I The objective to demonstrate a sample of the resources needed to effect an [ orderly evacuation of the schools within the 10 mile EPZ was met (OC Field 15). At 0935 a message ordering the evacuation of schools was received via commercial telephone at the City School District of Oswego Bus Garage. At 0939 a school bus was officially dispatched to the Fitzhugh Elementary School. The bus driver had previously been issued an emergency workers kit and was properly briefed. All of the buses that are available for evacuation of schools were equipped with two way radio communication. The Headmaster of the school had been notified of the ordered evacuation. The bus driver inadvertently drove the bus to the Riley Elementary School instead of Fitzhugh School. l The dispatcher informed the driver, via two-way radio, that he should have gone to Fitzhugh. The driver immediately proceeded to the proper pickup point, arriving there at 0955. DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in the field implementation of County actions to protect the public. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

== Description:== Radio equipment in the buses used for the evacuation of the general population was not able to maintain communication with the dispatch centers. (NUREC-0652,11, F.1.e).

44 2 /13 / N l i Recommendation: Equipment capable of maintaining communications l with the dispatcher should be installed in the buses. 'i !1 t AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed in the field ~ f. implementation of county actions to protect the public. I I 2.2.4 Emergency Worker Radiological E posure Control County personnel assigned to specific field duties in sne event of a radiological emergency at NMPNS adequately demonstrated the ability to monitor and control emergency worker dose including proper dosimetry usage (OC Field 1).' Exposure control j activities were observed for field monitoring teams, police assigned to traffic control and route alerting duties, ambulance personnel use for evacuation of mobility impaired. County Highway and Public Works employees assigned to impediments to evacuation control and bus drivers used for the evacuation of school children and the general population. In general, emergency workers were issued two 'self-reading pocket ] dosimeters, a TLD, and dose record cards. Most field emergency workers were familiar with procedures for periodic reading and recording of accumulated exposures and either knew their dose limits or knew to contact their respective dispatcher (OC Fle!d 4). il[ Emergency workers were equipped with K!. When questioned, they knew that j authorization for its use would be given to them through their dispatchers (OC Field 5). ( DEFICIENCIES 4 There were no deficiencies observed in emergency worker radiological exposure j control in Oswego County. { e AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed in emergency worker radiological exposure control in Oswego County. n l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no Areas Recommended for improvement observed in Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control in Oswego County. 1 i l ll I El

e o l 45 2/18/86 l 2.3 JEFFERSON COUNTY 2.3.1 Jefferson County Emergency Operation = Center (JCEOC) The Jefferson County EOC has adequate space, lighting, telephones, kitchen and { back up power. Maps were well organized and a clearly visible status coard was used. There was ample and varied radio communication equipment and a hard copy device. Overall, Jefferson County EOC is an outstanding host county EOC. Emergency management was excellent. The Jefferson County EOC was promptly staffed with a full complement of exceptionally well-trained and knowledgeable { personnel. The JCEOC demonstrated the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notifications, thereby satisfying an exercise objective (JCEOC 1). Notifications of the unusual event and alert were received simultaneously at about 0847. This occurred prior to the arrival of the Jefferson Countf ilaison et the OCEOC at about 0907. After arrival I of the county liaison, the JCEOC received the messages indicating the changes in emergency action level within about 35 minutes of the utility's declaration. During the l exercise, the liaison in the OCEOC correctly transmitted information to the JCEOC correcting a previous deficiency. 2.3.2 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public I } i Jefferson County functions as a host county for evacuees. The Jefferson County l Reception Center (JCRC) was set up in the gymnasium of the Jefferson County Community College. The JCRC met an exercise objective by demonstrating that traffic control support can be established to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees (JC Field i 1). There was adequate control of pedestrian evacuee and vehicular traffic flow within the JCRC. A vehicle providing traffle control was present along the entrance road to 1 the JCRC. Signs were located along the entrance road and parking lot to direct evacuee traffic to the reception center. A traffic control officer was present and directed traffic to parking positions adjacent to the reception center. These demonstrations also corrected a previous deficiency in the adequacy of staff to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees through the arrival, registration, and departing statfors, and of evacuees through the monitoring station. The JCRC was staffed with an adequate number of experienced and well informed personnel. A roster was exhibited to show staffing capability for 24-hour operation. Presentation of the coster satisfied the exercise objective for demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing at the JCRC by presentation of a roster for 24-hour operation (JC Field 2). Although demonstrations of vehicular and evacuee decontamination were not exercise objectives, the number of well-trained personnel and the amount of radiological monitoring equipment available were adequate to monitor the expected evacuees within the prescribed 12-hour time limit correcting a previous deficiency. I

8 C 46 2/18/86 Capabilities for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees at the JCRC center were very good (JC Field 3). Well-informed, professional personnel were present. Demonstrations of radiological monitoring of incoming evacuees were conducted thoroughly and effectively. The employment of proper personnel monitoring technique corrected a previous deficiency. l Three representatives of the American Red Cross and two radio operators were present at the Jefferson County Congtsgate Care Center (CCC) located in the State l Office Building. Signs were posted to direct evacuees who would be expected to arrive ~ by bus from the reception center. Personnel lists of additional staff including shelter managers, nurses, and registrars were exhibited and plans for kitchen staff discussed. A physician was on call. These lists provided for 24-hour coverage. 1 DEFICIENCIES j During the exercise, there were no deficiencies observed in Jefferson County's j field implementation of actions to protect the public. I I AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed during the exercise in Jefferson County's field implementation of actions to protect the public. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement in Jefferson County made during the exercise. 2.4 ONONDAGA COUNTY FIELD IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC j The reception center at the New York State Fairgrounds was well set up, adequately staffed, and well managed. Personnel at the reception cer.ter satisf!ed an exercise objective by demonstrating im adequacy of procedures for registration and f radiological monitoring of evacue.es (ONC Field 1). Evacuees were properly registered and monitored with recently calibrated instruments. However, the monitoring team was uncertain about contaminatbn levels above background at which contaminated evacuees would need to be decontaminated. It is recommended that corrective action be taken b'/ requiring additional training of evacuee monitoring teams in the contamination levels specified in the New York State RERP. A previous deficiency was corrected by using the same registration form at both the reception center and the congregate care center in { Onondaga County, thus avoiding the possibility that evacuees processed by the reception i center might be denied access to the congregate care center. Facilities for

r 47 2/18/36 decontamination and receptacles for disposal of contaminated articles and clothing were available. A floor plan of the center was available and staff explained various support agreements with schools and suppliers. Seven persons from the American Red Cross and a RACES operator were available to staff the CCC at Genessee High School in ~ Onondaga County. Call list rosters of additional personnel who could be activated during a real emergency were available, ensuring that sufficient staff would be available to perform all required congregate care functions and correcting a previous deficiency. Presentation of the rosters satisfied an exercise objective (ONC Field 2) by demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing at the Onondaga County CCC for 24-hour operation. The objective of demonstrating the ability to mobilize staff and activate the reception and congregate care centers in a timely manner was met (ONC Field 3). The reception center was activated and staffed before the federal observer arrived at about 1345. The CCC activated and staffed before the federal observer arrived at about 1500. DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the Onondaga County reception center. AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

== Description:== The monitoring team was uncertain about contamination levels above background at which contaminated evacuees would need to be decontaminated. (NUREG-0654, II, K.5.a). Recommendation: Additional training in the contamination levels I specified in the New York State RERP should be given to members of the monitorir.g teams at the reception center. i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Based on observations made during the exercise, there were no areas recommended for improvement in Onondoga County. I

48 2/13/36 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRING COR;tECTIVE ACTION: NOVEMBER 13,1985 EXERCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action f based on the findings and recommendations of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station held on November 13, 1985. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC. The Regir,,nal Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any j deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions have been corrected and that such l corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate. l FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these inadequacies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommer dations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately. No deficiencies were observed at the state or county level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. i Areas requiring corrective action which were observed at the November 13,1985 l exercise for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, as well as outstand!ng deficiencies or l areas requiring corrective action from previous exercites, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action I are summarized in the following Tables 3.1 through 3.7. i l { i l ^ l

W g,,.,< A 5.C a P .,z e s nop se R y t n uo C M l / e ta t S f o n io ta u a v E u A M E m F

1. .O N

m I r I O I cO .-GEd T C W oaO5* s A e l s e ) A ic NO D e E T m M C E F A P e ( - nC nt e t 7 iE s M f v n ee o 1 I r t p . T P a s 3 A e T t . N f.I r - sh ddt f ,e - ye et s o og n oe a c nl a o s s ecgh od t t o i f t a a uh teir nat ne tn n e ot c e s t eC h eC s e e se gs c m g id n o A sO r eE a isr e gn s o r e n O d c p emi E n o i m m ad eS nn e urS a d p i C t ai i i e e t O m s s t v t eg ES t s aE o n C n e a h e e c r e o t m F. ogt c h I rS o a t sh s e t l r s r ca n r I l R t o 'r t t a s py i e i o s s e r c dt h acat eh t t i f r n nt i omT a a o n o r t t C ic e a o io i g .n g on t sf o9 m t r> t t s ya ol '

4. C S

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s 67 Draft-2/18/86 i 4

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action noted during the November 13,1985 exercise. Tables 4.1 through 4.7 summarize recommendations to correct those defic' neles l or areas requiring corrective action. For purposes ci verification,' the table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based upon the previous exercises. The current status t.' all recommendations is indicated. l 4

68 TABLE 4.1 NINE M11.E POINT NUCI, EAR STATIONa - REMEDIAL ACTION November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises New York State EOC Page 1 of 4 NVREG-0654 Recommended corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Previoush ExerciseC Exercise Present N o. Racommanded Corrective Action Ref erenc e Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 1. There is no systematic procadars for verify-A.2 X y, ing that all agency representatives have H.4 reported to the SECC as directed. A status board listing each agency. Its time of notifiestion, and its time of arrival at the SEOC snould be placed in the operations room so that each agency can post its time of arrival. 2. Due to lack of clarity in transmission, there F.1 X I was a question as to the precise time of the b receipt of a message recorded on the Radi o-logical Emergency Data form. In addition. a RECS message received at 1253 did not contain the time and the 1313 RECS sessage did not contain release times. The state needs to train com=unicators at the SEOC to verify i unclear information and to request items omitted from incoming messages. f 3. The evacuation / shelter board in the opera. H X 1 tions room and the evacuation chart in the v' command and control room were not a lway s updated promptly. St af f should be trained to update all status boards p ro mpt ly apon 3 recetat of updated information. l 4. The status chart in command and control B X (~m I included only evacuation data; no sheltering L' data was displayed. Sheltering data should be included on the status chart in command and cont rol. 5. Beginning at about 1225 some confusion was X 1 occasioned in the c ocmand center in the SEOC when the JNC reported that there had been a release. Apparently, the activity of the release reported by the JNC at this time was below the technical s pecif *. cation for a reportable release which occu rred at about 1245 was duly reported over the RECS tele-phone line at about 1305. Although the chain of events leading to the SEOC's receipt of the 1225 release report f rom the fNC is not knwn. the conf usion should have been cleared up sooner by discussions with other jurisdictions over the open communications lines. The state should (a) determine the origin of the 1225 release report and revise procedates or train personnel to preclude the 4

= a 69i y. [ ""]. TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd) ,g Page 2 of 4 +- r et* NUREC-0654 Recommended corrective Action Ed FEM-REP-1 ~.d, Rev. 1 Previous Exercise

• Exe rci se Present Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercisa 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status sp Y"

transmission of release reports not originst- [.[ gng from the facility operator and (b) determine the need for and institute, if ! N5J required, additional training in verifying or n D* ' clarifying nonstandard release reports. ? e .Y s The notification of a general emergency was F.1.d K C 6k " received at the state EOC communications . center, but a copy of the message did not w. arrive in the command room until about one [ g', half hour later due to a backlog at the e s,. copying machine. The state should consider 7()- establishing a system to identify priority using additional copying facilities or 4-messages that could be placed at the head of the copying queue. [ 7. The Civil Defense National Teletype System T.L.b X C (CDNATS) malfunctioned when the state EOC attempted to notify five contiguous states. This malfunction delayed making these g notifications. The cause of the CDNATS problem should be deter'sined and corrected if corrective action falls under the state's pu rview. State communications personnel should be instructed to implement alternative means of notifying contiguous states more i quickly when CDNATS malfunctions. 8. It took about eight minutes to contact the E.1 1 N/Obj New Ycrk State Thruway Authority; the state f0C caller was repeatedly transferred. The g rtate should determine whether a new contact number is needed for the Thruway Authority, particularly for use outside normal working hours. 9 In some cases, accident assessment staff T.I.d X C found it difficult to decipPer sampiing locations and activity levels from telef axed copies of the Oewego County Radiological Survey Monitoring sheets. These sheets should be redesigned to improve the legibility of telefaxed copies. 10 The ingestion pathway field sonitoring team K.3.a. X N/Obj did not have a Ceiger counter to monitor for J.11 heavy surface contamination before sampling. Ingestion pathway sampling teams should be equipped with Cetger counters so that they can check for heavy contamination before sampling and thus reduce the risk of unnecessary personal exposure.

s r/o TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 NUREC-0654 Recommee.ded corrective Action FE!!A-REP-1 h Rev. 1 Previous g,,,,g,,c Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 1 1 11. The ingestion pathway sampling team did not. J.11 X N/Obj have written procedures. The state should consider including written procedures in the standard equipment for ingestion pathway as backup guidance. 12. The ingestion pathway easpling team could not K.4 X N/Obj report its actions or any level of exposure exceeding the exposure action level. Radios i should be considered for the ingestion l pathway sampling teans. q 13. Although members of the ingestion pathwar J.10.f X N/Obj sampling team knew that the KI container contained instructions for use. the ingestion l pathway sampling team did not know the procedure for using KI. They did not know how often to rea6 their dosimeters nor the maxinue do.e allowed before authorization j I would be required. Ingestion pathway sampling teams need additional training in standard radiological protection procedures including the use of KI, and the reasons for these procedures. 14 The ingestion pathway sampling team did not K.5.b X N/Obj have personal protective equipment such as J anti-contamination suits, gloves, tongs, or respirators. Personal protective equipment shou'd be furnished to the ingestion pathway j sampling teams. ] l l 15. Better display is needed in the Albany EOC of J.10.a. X C important data such as population, survey J.10.b l results, and dose projections. l 16. The data forms should be redesigned to F.1.b X C trovide lettering of su!!icient size that the telefax copies are clearly legible. 17. Procedures f or authorizing the use of KI by J.10.e, X N/Obj I l energency workers, dose authorization guides J.10.f for such authorization, and locations and methods of distribution of stockpiles of KI need to be furnished to TEMA for review and demonstrated during the exercise. I 18. Methods for the control of coetastnated K.2.a X C wastes generated by vehicle decontamination should be developed in detail. I 4 9 .--__._-_--.__---_-_._A

714 TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 4 NUREO-0654 Reco mended correettve Aceton TEMA-REP-1 b c Rev. 1 Previous Exercise Exercise Present No. Reconnended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 19 Future exercises should consider "out-of* Mal. X sequence" recovery and reentry activities so H.3 N/Obj that more time can be devoted to demonstration of these procedures. 20. Variations in wind speed and direction should 1.11 X d be incorporated into the scenario to provide N/Obj a better test of the accident assessment capability. l ) ___-m.-

o TA8LE 4.2 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION' - REMEDI AL ACTION November 13,198$ and Previoua Exercises Central District EOC Page 1 of I i NUREC-06$4 Recommended corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Previous Exercise" Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercice 9/29/83 [1/13/8$ Stacus ss 1. $ines there are not a sufficient number of F.1.d X N/Obj I telephones to pe rmit timely communications g,, between state agene.v re p re s en t ativ e s at the CDE0C and their counterparts at the SE0C. state agency representatives relied on backup radio communications and telecopters to transmit their messages. A delay of I-2 hours was experienced in transmitting and receiving information. The available communications systems, both the p rima ry telephones aad the tackup radios and telecopters, aru not sufficient to pe rmit agency representatives a r, the CDE0C to communications with their counterparts in the SEOC in a timely manner. Additional primary telephones and/or backup radios should be procured so that state agency representatives in the operations room can communication with the SE0C in a timely manner.

o TAALE 4.3 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATIONS - REME0! AL ACTION November 13. 1>85 and Previous Exercises Emergency Operations Facility Page 1 of 2 NUREC-0654 Recommended corrective Action T EMA-ILEP-L Rev. 1, Previous Exercise

• Exercise Present No.

Recomended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 1. The ability to maintain staffing of the state A.6 functions at the Ecr on a 24-hour basis we X (' I not demonstrated. The ability to maintain b staffing of the state functions at the EOF on a 24-hour basis needs to be demonstrated at a future exercise. j 2. A lack of paper interrupted the receipt of F.1.d hard copies by the state and county repre-X <1 l l sentatives for over two hours. A supply of telecopter paper for use by state and county representatives should be esintained at the EOF. 3. One status board was not updated for about an R hour at one point during the exercise. Staff X l should be trained to update all status boards promptly. 4 The caersency action level was not displayed 0.3 in the EOF. The current emergency action X I level should be displayed within clear view of all personnel in the ECT. 5. Incoming state and county personnel were not A.2.a. formally briefed at the EOF. Upon arrival at X 'I the EOF, incer.i's state and county personnel V-A.4 should be formally briefsd with current status inforfsation. 6 The m tuality, consistency. and timeliness of u NR accident assessment and subseouent protective X C action recommendations between the utility, state, and county could be enhanced. The utility, state, and county should consider exchanging information during the development of protective action re c o:rne nd a ti on s rather than af ter such recommendations are developed j independently by each AtenCy. l 7 Some overcrowding was observed in the limited H.2 work space provided for the X state and county C emergency response staffs at the ECT. Additional working space should be cade available for state and county emergency i response staffs at the E0f. 3 k I

74 a 4 TABLE 4.3 (Cont'd) f NUREG-06 54 Recommended coerective Aetten FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Previous Ex e rcis e* Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 !!/13/85 status 8 It should be verified that the state and H.2 X C local representatives at the EOF knJw their respective roles as outlined in the scate and local plants and act accordingly during the play of the exercise. 9 The plan of operation and the procedures for H.12 X C the EO F need to be strengthened to ensure a timely gathering of and transmittal of field data from the county and from the utility to the state accident assessment pe r sonr.e1 and between the county and the utility. 10. Additional telephone capacity (e.g.. F.1.d X C dedicated line) or a radio between the county representative at the EOF and the accident assessment room at the EOC should be provided. 11. The data forms should be redesigned to F.1.d X N/Obs C provide lettering of suf ficient size that the telecopies are clearly legible. l I i l t 4 h I e I

a 75 TABLE 4.4 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATIONa - REMEDIAL ACTION November IJ.1983 and Previous Exercisos Joint News Center Page 1 of 2 N UREG-0654 Re comme nded_Co rrective Ac t ion f FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Previousb ExerciseC Exercise Present ! g o. Recornended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 'l. Confusion resulted at the JNC when the EBS E.6 X 1 message stating all the buses with school E.7 children were being diverted to reception v centers was released. This message could have caused confusion to the public. Approximately 40 minutes after this message 1 had been issued, a second E35 message stated that only the Os wego City School District students had been sent to the reception center at the New York 55 ate Fairgrounds and that the Mexico School Dist t f et students had been dismissed from school and were on their ways home. Personnel involved in preparing ESS message concerning school closing should be trained to verify the correctness of the actions listed for each individual school prior to releasing the message. 2. Some EBS messages currently advise only those E.6, X C who cannot go to homes of friends or rela-E.7 tives to go to reception centers. Since some evacuees sight be contaminated, they should be advised to go to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination if neces-s a ry. The appropriate ESS messages should os revised to advise evacuees to report to a reception center for monitoring before they go to the homes of f riends or relatives. 3. No E55 message was issued to announce the E.6 I C countywide senool closings even throu65 the E.7 public education brochure stated that this would be done. An ESS sessage about school closings should be developed and aired when appropriate during radiological emergencies. 4. All ESS a.inou ne n t s, particularly WJM/WOS C E.6 1 should be trained on the ESS plan C requirements and be provided with a copy of procedure F of the County RERP plan. 5. A systes such as an internal checklist should E.6 I be developed to verify the content of public E.7 C messages aired by EBS to include and update the status of previously issued shelter and evacuation orders. l. f I l 1 I f t i

ID o g TABLE 4.4 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 2 NUREG-0654 Recammeeded Correettve Aetton P LV-R E P-1 h Rev. 1 Previous g,,,,g,,e Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 6. Announcers at the radio station VXPM E.6 X C transmitter location should have and be familiar with the local E83 Operational Area Plan. They should also have either the original or revised activation / authentication list and code. In addition, a copy of the public information brochure should be available. 7 Telephone numbers to be used in emergency E.6, K C messages should be reviewed. E.7 8. Procedures for the composing, checking. and E.7 I C numbering of E85 messages and news releases should be reviewed. 9 Wall maps should be provided in the news C.4.a I C center. I i

77 TABLE 4.5 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATICNa - REMEDIAL ACTION N o venba r 13. 1985 and Previous Exercises Oswego County EOC Page I of 6 N tT1tEC-06 54 Recommended corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, PreviousD ExerciseC Exercise Present g o. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 1. Proper procedures were not followed for the J.10.k X - I coordination and implementation of activities to deal with impediments to evacuation. The County Highway Department and Law Enforcement did not coordinate with each other se speci-fied in the plan. resulting in an locomplete demonstration of this function. Procedures should be reviewed and followed as necessary. to assure that imp edime nt to evacuation can be acted upon correctly. 2. An ESS message was generated at the EOC which J.9 X I contained information on the evacuation of J.10.g D school children that could have caused confu-sion. Clear and concise information should be included in EBS messages to ensure that the proper instruction reach the public. 3. Sample counting techniques demonstrated by I.9 r the field monttoring Team 8 should be 1 (I, improved on. Ap p ro:*ria t e configu rations of V the todine and partit>1e6e flicers f or sample counting should be used. 4 Itsdio equipment in the buses used for the F.1.e evacuation of the general population was not X i able to maintain com:sinic a tion with the y/ dispatch centers. Eq uipm e n t capable of main-taining com unications with the dispatcher should be installed in the buses. 5. The public information brochure stated that C.I. I C evacuees who cannot go to the homes of C.2 f riends or relatives can go to the reception centers. Since e vacuees might be } cont amina t e d. they should all be advised to j go to reception centers for conitoring and i deconta.ination if ne c e s s a ry. The public information brochure should be revised to advise evacuees to report to a reception i center f or monitoring before they go to the j homes of friends or relatives. I f

a 78 TABLE 4.5 (Cont'd) Prge 2 of 6 NU REC-06 54 Recommended Correettve Action FEMA-REP-1 b c Rev. 1 Previous g Exerche Pmm No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 6 The dose projection status board and the D.4 X C field team status board in the Oswego County J.10.a dose assessment room were not updated throughout the course of the entire exercise. The dose assessment staff at the Oswego County EOC should be trained to update the dose projection status board and the field team status board as soon as updated informa-tion becomes available. These status boards should be updated as soon as possible to facilitate the coordination of internal coo:sunications among the dose assessment staff at the EOC. 7 The Oswego County Sherif f's coordinators did J.10.k X 1 not consider the possible need to reroute traffic or the need to keep the public informed of congestion or blockages to evacuation in response to either of the two evacuacion route impediment problems introduced at the EOC during the exercise. The sheriff's coordinators at the OCEOC should be trained to consider alternate evacuation routes in case a primary evacua-tion route may become congested or blocked for extended periods of time. The sherif f's coordinators should also be trained to coordinate with the public information officer at the EOC to develop pubite instruc-tions conce rning the rerouting of evacuation traffic and the broadcast of inf o rmat ion to assure the public that the authorities are aware of the problem and are acting to remedy it. R. A RECS message notifying C:Junty officials of E.1 X C the deescalation from general esergency to the alert emergency classification level was not received at the Oswego County ECC prior to the discussion of recovery and reentry considerations initiated by officials at the state EOC in Albany. This error resulted in confusion among staff in the comsand and control roors of the County EOC concerning what emergency classification was in effect. The state. county, and utility should review the exercise procedures for advancing time and deescalating emergency classification levels. The means for verification of the eoergency classification level contained in messages that are verbally transmitted over the RECS systes should also be included in this review of procedures.

N i TABLE 4.5 (Cont'd) Pago 3 of 6 N UREG-0654 Recommended,Correet tve Action FEMA-AgP-l R e v. 1, Previoush EwerciseC i. Recommended Correcstve Action Exeretse Present uterence Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 9. The two Oswego County field monitoring teses I.8, X varied in their technical knowledge of 0.1. b. C' monitoring procedures and in the use of their 0.4.c equipment. Both t e a oc were able to perfora their responsibilities and one team was very well trained. The technical depth of the other team should be imp r o ved through more training in baste radiological field monitor-ing procedures. All county field monitoring personnel should have equally good knowledge of monitoring procedures and equally good skills in the use of their equipment. This in important to insure uniformity and j reliabtitty of the data that are reported from different locations throughout the county and to insure unifore backup monitoring capability. { 10. Some field monitoring data were not commu ni. I.8 cated to the Oswego County EOC in the proper I C units for ready use by the dose assessment staff. On several occasions. the county field t e a ms had to be recontracted to verify specific readings or to have an entire series of data retransmitted. The data forr.s trat are p re s e nt ly in use should be revised and simplified to insure that data com::unicated { from the county field monitoring teams are reported to the EOC in the ease units as those used by the dose assessment staff. The field monitoring personnel should also receive more training in radio coco:unication procedures to insare that das recorded on for:s in the field are co mru nica t ed to the EOC in the proper units. 11. Neither of the two Oswe g o County field I.8 monitoring teams was briefed on plant con = C X ditions prior to their r ployment or vntle e they were ca r rying ou their conttoring i respons15tlities in the field. Consequently. the field monitoring t eens did not know what readings tney could expect to find during their field surveys. Th e field teaa coordinator should be trained to provide more information to the monitoring t e ams. includ-ing the emergency classification level and the st=e at which a release has occurred. The ambulance used to staalate the evacuation i E.3.a of noninstitutionalised mobility-impaired I C persons was not deployed from the garage 1

80 ' TABLC .5 (Cont'd) Pago 4 of 6 NURIC-06 54 Recom ynded corrective Aceton TE.W KEF-i h Rev. 1 Previous g,,,gg,,c g,gg,, p,,, g No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status until approximately one hour after the volunteer ambulance company was notified to mobilize its personnel t.nd dispatch the vehicle. This delay was primarily due to two reasons. First, it took several calls to locate and activate the actulance driver and the radiological emergencies. Second, the radiological technician took an additional 30 minutes to check and issue the.tabulance cre# s radiological exposure control equip-ment after this individual had arrived at the garage. The county should provide additional training to volunteer ambulance personnel to increase the number of staff who are quali-find to respond to radiological emergencies and to increase the number of staff who are trained to check and issue radiological exposure control equipment to emergency workers. 13. The U.S. Coast Guard in Oswego, New York, was C.4, X C not involvad in the alerting of the boating E.6 public on Lake Ontario. The state and county should meet with the U.S. Coast Guard to discuss arrangements for coordinating the alerting of the boating public on Lake i Ontario. 14 The three Oswego County Shcriff's units that J.10.j X C staffed traffic control points war, mare of the location of the reception ce to which evacuees would be routed. Two of t' three units did not have maps of the primar evacuation routes nor did they know whit roads were to be used as the primary evacua-tion routes. The sheriff's personnel who may be called upon to staff traffic control points should be trained in how to locate the reception centers and in the primary evacua-tion routes that would be used in a radio-logical emergency. L5. Rearrangement of the (County) EOC space H.3 X C should be considered to ease inf ormation flow between the operations floor and the accident assessment room. 16. The role of the RCES staf f should be clearly T.l.a X C defined. l 3

31 8 TAst,E 4.5 (Cont'd) Page 5 of 6 i I NUREC-0654 Recommended correettve Action l T EM-R EP-1 Rev. 1 Previous Exe rcis e" Exercise Presunt No. Recorimended Corrective Action Reference Exercisa 9/28/83 11/13/85 status 17 Additional telephone and/or radio com-F.1.d X 1 I eunication between the EOF and the county EOC C should be provided. A comnuatcations equip-ment operator may be needeo in addition to the county reytesentative. This would make it possibiu for the county representattie to concentrate on obtaining and making certain that the latest data and infor1tation are provided to the utility, to the scate, and to the county. 18. An additional person should be trained so A.4 X that sufficient backup is available to ensure C the capability tu maintain 24 hour per day operation. 19 Dose assessee it procedures should be revised I.8 X to ensure deployment of the field monitoring C teams as early as possible in order to obtain 5 an early confirmation of the magnitude of the release. Procedures in deployment of and data taking by the field monitoring teams should be designed to maxistre the amount of data obtained during the earav part of the release of radleactivity from the plant in order to provide adequate data to confirm the magnitude of the release. 20 Improved direct comrsunica t ion s between the T.1.d X field monitoring teams and the EOC are C needed. Procedures for trans11tting data between the field team. the EOC. the EOF. and the ut!!1ty should include procedures for confitning that the data are correct. that the units are correct. and that the location of the sampling point is correctly recorded. 21. An improved consunications system for the y,1 x county EOC base station should be c implemented. 22. Although 15 buses were on hand at Mexico J.2 X N/Obj C School district and 58 buses were available from Osweto. It was not possible to determine whether resources were 41 equate for evacua-tion. The plan should clearly specify bus i requirements from all facilities. 23. The plans should be changed to state that X.3.a X flim badges will be used. Actual practice C should be consistent with the plan. i 4 f

f. 1 J f d2 i ) l TABLE 4.5 (Cont'd) l Page 6 of 6 l 1 ( NUREG-0654 Recommended Corrective Action { l FEMA-REF-1 l Rev. 1 Previoua g,,,,g,,e g,,,,g,, p,,,,nt b l No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/83 Status j 24 Procedures should be used that prevent the L.I. X N/Obj N/Obj contamination of emargency workers and ensure L.4 that contamination from the victim is not spread in an uncontrolled marner. 23. Additional training in the requirements for K.3 X C l reporting doses received by field workers 0.1 should be given. 0.4.c 26. The data f o rms should be redesigned to F.1.b X C provide lettering of suf ficient size that the telefax copies are clearly legible. 27 Procedures for authorizing the use of KI by J.10.e. X N/0bj N/Obj emergency wurkers, dose level guides for such J 10.f ] authorization, and location and methods of i distribution of stockpiles of KI need to be I furnished to TEMA for review and demonstrated f during the exercises. 28. Methods for the control of contaminated K.2.a X C . wastes generated by vehicle de:ontaoination should be developed in detail. i l i i W 1 i i I I l l l l l

_ _ _. ~ _-------------------n b 83 TABLE 4.6 NINE MILE FCINT NUCLEAR STATIONa - RIMEDIAL ACTION November 13, 1985 and Previous Exercises 1 Jeffersan County I Page 1 of 1 NUREC-0634 Recommended corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Previousb N o. ExerciseC Recommended Corrective Action Exercise Present Reference Exercise 9/28/63 11/13/85 Status 1. Incorrect information concerning evacuation T.1.b. I instructions in ERPAs 26 and 27 and school F.1.d C i evacuations in ERPAs !=) was initially tran-j smitted to the Jefferson County EOC. In addition. there was at least a one-hour delay in receiving notification that a radioactive release had occurred at the plant. Pro-ceduras to verify the accuracy of and insure the timeliness of messages between the Oswego County EOC and the Jefferson County E0C should be developed and implemented. 2. Additional traffic control support may be H.4 required to handle the number of evacuees J.12 I I C expected et the reception center. The county s hould review staff requirements to control the flow of vehicles and evacuees through the

arrival, sonitoring, decontamination. regis-tratico, and departing stations.

3. Additional radiological mont w ing team at H.4 8 the Jef f e rson County recepti.. center would J.12 C be requited to monitor the orpected eva:uees N within the prescribed 12-hour time limit. N The county should train additional staf f to ensure that all of the evacuees and vehicles expected at the reception center could be handled. 4. At least one sember of the radiological J.12 monitoring team demonstrated poor sonitoring o.4.c C I technique at the Jefferson County reception center. A more intensive training progras is suggested to ensure co mp e t en cy in radto-togical monitoring of individuals. 5. Sanit a ry fact 11 ties within the congregate J.10.h care facility were inadequate to accommodate C A the shelter capacity. Arrangeoests should be made to acquire access to rest room facili-ties on other floors of the building. Some i coordination and planning will be required to direct evacuees to approprface facilities. 6. Methods for the control of contaminated K.2.a I wastes generated by vehicle decont amination C j should be developed in detail. u 1 it il J e I hI i I I. l 1 l

M 84 TA81.E 4.7 NINE MIt E POINT NUCLEAR STAT 10N8 ~ REMEDIAL ACTION November 13. 1965 and Previous Exercises onondaga County Page 1 of 2-NUREG-0654 Recommended Corrective Action PEMA-REP-1 h Rev. 1 Previous ExerciseC Exercise Present . N o. Recoursended Corrective A.ction Reference ~ Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85 Status 1. The monitoring team was ' uncertain about K. 5. a X I cont amination levels above background at V which contaminated evacuees would need to be decontaminated. Additional training in the contamination levels specified.in the New York State RERP should be given to members of the monitoring tease at the reception center. 2. Staffing at the Genessee nigh School was not H.4 I C' - adequate to perf orm all the f unctions at the J.12 Onondaga County congregate care center. Responsibilities of organizations and staff requirements should be reevaluated to ensure adequate support for evacues entty and control, communications. and radiological monitoring. 3. Documentation of evacuee radiological J.10 I C monitoring and registration has apparently

0. 4. a.

not been coordinated between agencies. The P.4 problem was not resolved during the exercise. f.4 In a real energency. evacuees might have been denied access to the congregate care center either because the appropriate form was not used or because the volunteers at the center had not been trained to recognise the form that was in use. Since the reception and congregate care centers are physically separated and managed by dif ferent organisa-tions. it is suggested that the directors of each facility agree on s tually acceptable forms and procedures. Alt e rna t ive ly, volunteers at the congregate care center may need to be trained to recognite the approved form that would be issued to evacuees at the reception center. l ( 4. There was no evidence of a capability to L.4 X N/Obj i provide quick access to hospital care at the Cenessee Righ School congregate cars facility. Provisione should be made to l ensure rapid t ransport at ion to hospital l facilities. l { i

9 . o a Sun 85 i TA31.E 4.7 (Cont'J) Page 2 of 2' N t: REC-0654 Recoenne.ded corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 b.ExerciseC Exercise Present Rev. 1 Previous Reconsended Corrective Action Re f e renc e Exercise 9/28/83 11/13/85-Status I Methods for control of contaminated wastes K.2.s 1 Nf0bj generated by vehicle decontamination should be developed in detail.

• th the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station and the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant are located on the

.no Mile Point sit e. revious exercises were held on September 16. 1981, f or the Hide Mile Point Nuclear Station and on August 11 182, for the James A. Fitspatrick Nuclear Power Plant. scluding the October 12. 1983 medical drill. Corrective action complete.. l +

Cserective action incocelete.

/Obs: Not observed during 1983 esercise. i /0bjt Not an objective of the 1983 exercise. R No NUREC 0654 reference. neomplete f or wind direction only; wind speed variations during the 1983 exercise adequately tested the esponse capaht11ty. swego f told monitoring tease are no longer usei by the county. .ithough not an objective of the 1985 exercise, this was demonstrated and corrects a previous deficiency. l l- .}}