ML20238A320
| ML20238A320 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-070, OL-5-I-SC-70, NUDOCS 8708310023 | |
| Download: ML20238A320 (43) | |
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Exercise of the New York State and
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-1 Radiological Emergency Plans for
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GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION 3
FEBRUARY 12, 1982 l
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TABLE OF C0h7ENTS Page I.
INTRODUCTION.
I 1.
FEMA Responsibilities I
2.
Exercise Event.
2 3.
Exercise Objective.
2 4.
Pcrt icipating State and Local Organizations.
3 5.
Exercise Critique.
3 6.
RAC Evaluation Objectives.
4 7.
Federal Observer Team.
4 8.
Evaluation Criteria.
5 9.
Remedial Action Procedures.
5 10.
Review and Approval Procedures.
6 II.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
7 1.
Overview.
7 2.
Summary of Interim Critique: State Activities.
7 3.
Summary of Interim Critique: Monroe County....
9 4.
Summary of Interim Critique: Wayne County.
10 III. EXERCISE SCENARIO.
14 IV.
EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION.
15 1.
Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.
15 2.
Altering and Mobilization of Officials and Staff...........
19 3
Emergency Operations Management 21 4.
Public Alerting and Notification..
23 5.
Iublic and Media Relations..
26 6.
Accident Assessment 29 i
i 7.
Actions to Protect the Public.
33 8.
Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measure..
36 9.
Recovery and Reentry Operations 38 10.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience.
40
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I.
INTRODUCTION 1.
FEMA Responsibilities On December 7,
1979, the Pr esid ent directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's-immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Fac ility Radiological Emergency Planning include:
1.
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and review and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
2.
Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions.
3.
Coordinating the activities of. other involved Federal and volunteer agencies:
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
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- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the states and involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by evaluation of those plans, their exercising and critiquing.
A public meeting is held j
to acquaint the citizenry with the contents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.
This report is an evaluation of the first exercise at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station to determine whether the radiological emergency plans can be implemented, in accord with Item 2, above.
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2.
Exercise Event, A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on January 21, 1982, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. (EST) and approximately 5:00 p.m.,
to assess j
the adequacy of rad iologic al emergency response plans for New York St ate,
Monroe County, and - Wayne County, and state and local preparations to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency involving the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station (REGNPS), operated by Rochester Cas and Electric (RG6E) near Ontario, New York.
l 3.
Exercise Objective The exercise objective was to demonstrate both the on-site and of f-site response of the state end local governments according to existing plans and emergency response capabilities that would be brought into play in the event of a radiological emergency at the RECNPS that affected of f-site areas.
A synopsis of key state and local support capabilities, as presented in the radiological emergency response plans that were to be tested, includes:
1 Adequacy and implementation of. radiological emergency e
l response plans and preparedness 'of New York State, Monroe l
9 County, Wayne County, and local support agencies.
Capability of New York State and Wayne and Monroe counties j
e to notify and activate emergency response personnel, i
l Capability of the counties and state to notify the l
e af fected public within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ) of an incident at REGNPS.
Operation of the radiological emergency communications 3
e system (RECS) between the state, counties, and 12CNPS.
Activation and operation of county and state emergency e
operating centers (EOC), giving consideration to space, habitability, internal communications, and facility security.
Capability of the counties and state to notify the e
affected public.
Organizational direction and control and the capability e
for an integrated radiological emergency response.
Coordination of public information between New York e
l Stat., Monroe and Wayne counties, and REGNPS; and the l
l capal,ility for coordinated news' releases.
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3 Capability of the state to calculate dose projections and e
recommend appropriate protective actions. Capability of the counties to receive radiological data, evaluate and implement appropriate actions.
Implementation of off-site access control procedures by e
state emergency response personnel, Capability of Monroe and Wayne counties to notify and e
simulate evacuation of affected segments of the public within the plume exposure pathway, including activation of congregate care centers and' provisions for special po pul a tion s.
Deployment of and communication with radiological mon-e itoring teams.
Methods for radiation exposure control, including dis-e tribution of dosimeters and maintenance of individual worker exposure records, Ability to use decontamination facilities and lir.iting e
exposure of emergency workers.
Capability for providing medical support to radiation e
casualties.
Capability for implementing procedures for (simulated) o re-entry, dargge assessment, and recovery.
4 Participating State and Local Organizations Participating off-site state organizations included the New York State Department of Health, the New York State Of fice of Disaster Preparedness (at the State EOC in Albany and at the Lake and Western District Offices), and other state agencies.
Participating local organizations include Wayne and Monroe counties (at their EOCs), and other local. ipport groups, e.g.,
fire and police departments and volunteer org<snizations such as the American Red Cross and the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES).
In addi-tion, local social service agencies in Wayne and Monroe counties participated by providing capabilities for sheltering evacuees.
5.
Exercise Critique A prelir.inary oral critique of the January 21 exercise was conducted at 7:30 p.m., Janaury 22, 1982, at the Wayne County Court House, in Lyons, New York.
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4 6.
RAC Evaluation Objectives General objectives of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for the operational phase of the pl ans were to ob se rve and evaluate the exercise, focusing on the ten functional areas listed and briefly described below.
These ten functional areas include approximately 75 cpecific criteria taken 1
directly from Section II of NUREG-0654-FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, which is the basic planning document on which the state and local plans, and also the criteria for observing and evaluating the exercise, are based.
Functional areas:
Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources.
e Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials anc Staff.
e Emergency Operations Management.
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Public Alerting and Notification.
e e Public and Media Relations.
e Accident Assessment.
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e Actions to Protect the Public.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures, j
Recovery sud Reentry Operations, o
3elevance of the Exercise Experience.
o 7.
Federal Observer Team A 35-member federal observer team was established by the FEMA Region II RAC for observing the response at Ginna. Observers included:
Obs.rvar Agency Locale / Functions R. Kowieski FEMA (RAC Chairman)
Oversight Responsibility G. Siedenfeld FEMA (Team Chief)
State EOC C. Carleton FEMA State EOC M. Chivinski FEMA State EOC A. Davis FEMA St ate EOC M. Goodkind FEMA (ANL)*
State EOC P. Lutz DOT, USCG State EOC R. Olivieri FEMA (Team Chief)
Western District EOC
- h. Fish DOE (Team Chief)
Lake District'EOC S. Singer FEMA (Team Chief)
Monroe Co. EOC L. Lewis TEMA (ANL)*
Monroe Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment J. Feldman EPA Monroe Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment
- Argonne National Laboratory (under contract to FEMA)
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L. Martin HHS/PHS Monroe Co., Prot. Resp./ Medical j
S. McIntosh FEMA Monroe Co., Prot. Resp./ Evacuation l
F. Fishman FEMA Monroe Co., Prot. Resp./ Evacuation B. Bonaventura FEMA Monroe Co., Communications / Evacuation S. Class FEMA (PIO)
Monroe Co., EOC and Media Center l
L. Hof fman FEMA (INEL)*
Monroe Co., Radiological Monitoring T. Holliday FEMA Monroe Co., Communications z
C. Connolly FEMA (Team Chief)
Wayne Co., EOC l
R. Bernacki FDA Wayne Co., EOC/ Accident As sessment M. Jackson FEMA (PIO)
Wayne Co., and Media Center l
l R.
Reynolds FEMA Wa yn e Co., Pr o t. Resp./ Evacuation l
J. Tinsman DOT, USCG Wa yn e Co., Prot. Resp./ Evacuation l
R. Hellriegel FEMA Wa yne Co., Prot. Resp / Evacuation I
R. Rodriguez FEMA ( ARC Adviser)
Wayne Co., Prot. Resp./ Mass Care C. Malina USDA Wayne Co., Prot. Resp./ Ingestion Pathway N. Chipman FEMA (INEL)*
Wayne Co., Radiological Monitoring R. Ficke FEMA (INEL)*
Wayne Co., Radiological Monitoring l
J. Keller FEMA (INEL)*
Wayne Co., Radiological Monitoring l
R.L. Nebecker FEMA (INEL)*
Wayne Co., Radiological Monitoring i
B. Houston FEMA Wayne Co., Communicat ions R. Carelik FEMA (Team Chief)
EO7 R. Bores URC EOF R. Woolley NOAA EOF i
In addition to the FEMA Region II RAC observer team, contractor personnel and vistors observed the exercise.
8.
Evaluation Criteria Major functions witnessed by federal observers were evaluated in accordance with the following scheme:
Capability outstanding:
excellent d e= on s t r a t i o n, e
Capability good: exceeds minimum stand ards.
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o Capability acceptable: meets minimum standards.
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e Capability weak: does not meet minimum standards, e
Capability lacking: expected but not demonstrated.
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9.
Remedial Action Procedures Provided under Part IV of this report are evaluations and rec omme nd a-tions for remedial actions.
These evaluations and recommendations are based
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.on the applicable Planning ' Standards ( from which the state and ; local pl an s were developed) and Evaluation Criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
Other recommendations are suggested that are not keyed to NUREG-3654, but which could improve operations.
In this re po rt, recommendations are provided and are keyed-to each of I
the state and local jurisdictions that are required to take remedial. actions on a point-by point basis, to the formal recommeni itions of the RAC.
State and local jurisdictions should submit to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take.
If remedial actions cannot be instituted l
immediately, then a detailed plan for scheduling and impl ement ing remedial actions must be provided which include a t ime fr ame (dates) for completion.
.j The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible' for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Prog rams and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such i
corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
10.
Review and Approval Procedures A state that seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan and annexes submits an application for review and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the region in which the state is located.
The application, in the form of a letter from the Governor, or other state official as the Governor may designate, is to contain one copy of the completed state plan with an indica-l tion that deficiencies have been corrected.
Upon receipt of a state plan from the Regional Director, the Associate Director distributes copies of the plan, together with the Regional Director's l
evaluation, to members of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) and other FEMA of fices, with appropriate guidance relative to their assistance in the FEMA r ev iew process as described in 44 CRF Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123, Tue sday, June 24, 1980 (Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Prepared-ness).
The Associate Director is to conduct such review of the state plan as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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I II.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The first exercise of emergency preparedness plans for the off-site aree around the Cinna Nuclear Power Station on January 21, 1982, was evaluated by a team of 35 federal observers.
Participating in the exercise were the power plant o.sn e r, Rochester Cas and Electric (RG6E), and appropriate officials and agencies for the State of New York and the counties of Monroe i
and Wa yn e.
The emergency operating facility (EOF) was in Rochester at the offices of RC6E; the main emergency operating centers (EOCs) were, for the state, in Albany and at the Lake and Western District Disaster Preparedness Offices in Newark and Batavia, N.Y.; for Monroe County, in Rochester; and for Wayne County, in Lyons, N.Y.
i 1.
Overview In general, the participants perfomed in a professional and competent manner.
There were numerous demonstrations of adequate capabilities.
Resources and facilities were generally good to excellent.
Deficiencies vere noted in the pe r formance of tasks at the state and county EOCs and at the EOF.
These related primarily to:
Flow of information between participants; I
e e Collection and use of field monitoring data; o Timeliness of the counties' release of infomation to the Emergency Broadcast System; and Lack of plans for managing transient persons in e
evacuation zones.
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These deficiencies and additional comments are noted in greater detail in the interim critique summaries given below for each partic ipa ting group.
2.
Summary of Interim Critaue: State Activities Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources.
Facilities and resources were excellent at the state EOCs in Albany and at the Lake and Western Districts.
Displays were well placed and promptly updated.
Security was generally good, although members of the press were sometimes unescorted in the EOC.
State personnel in the EOCs were not informed immediately when the general emergency status was declared.
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Alert ing and Mobilization of_0f ficials and Staf f.
State officials were alerted and mobilized promptly, Backup teams were activated to demon-strate 24-hour capability, but these teams were deployed rather late in the course of the exercise, so it was difficult to assess their ability to ef fect a smooth transition to a new set of decision makers in the event of a continu-ing emergency.
Both subsidiary state EOCs and the EOF demonstrated 24-hour capability.
I Emergency Operations Management.
Le ad ership in the state EOCs was i
very good, and management of the operation was proficient.
There were minor I
deficiencies in dissemination of informat ion to tc = r epr e sent at iv e s of the various agencies present in the EOC.
Public Alerting and Notification.
In forma t ion released by the state l
to news media and the EBS was generally clear, accurate, and t imely; in one instance information concerning off-site radiation doses appeared inconsistent with data provided by the EOF.
News release clearances were good.
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Public and Media Relations.
The utility had distributed public in fo r-mation pa=phlets in 1981, and their effectiveness was tested in the county l
operations.
Rumor control procedures were not exercised sufficiently by the scenario to allow the state's canability to be assessed.
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Accident Assessment.
The state's accident assessment operations I
were timely, but communication from the radiological intelligence group to operating personnel was delayed in some instances.
In the EOF, radiological monitoring data were received late from the monitoring team in Monroe County, and never received from the four teams in Wa yn e County.
County roles in providing such in fo rma t ion, and its utility for the EOF, should be clearly defined.
Actions to Protect the Public.
Decisions on pro t ec tiv e actions were I
made in a timely fashion by the state. However, it was not clear that mor'eled in format ion used in developing strategies for public protection was accurate.
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Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures. An extensive drill 'was conducted to demonstrate decontamination procedures; other procedures in this category were also successfully demonstrated.
Recovery and Reentry.
The state EOC adequately demonstrated simulated recovery and reentry procedures, but a more det ailed ' simul ation would be preferable for proper assessment.
Recovery and reentry operations demon-strated by the EOF were well done.
Relevance of the Exercise.
The exercise, proved to be very useful to l
state participants, the district EOCs, and the EOF.
InternEl communications t
in the state EOC in Albany need im pr ov em en t, perhaps by assigning a liaison among all state agencies in the EOC.
3.
Summary of Interim Critique: Monroe County l
Emergency Operations, Facilities and Resources.
Operations were well conducted.
The plume plot model and display of population density were well organized and properly updated.
The plume plot was placed in a location at the rear of the EOC that was not readily observable by large groups of people.
Alertine and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff.
Overall performance was acceptable.
A change of shift for 24-hour capability was not exercised, but effective procedures are described in the plan and are capable of being implemented.
Emergency Operations Management.
Effective floor management in the county EOC ensured smooth operations.
Overall management of operations was generally acceptable.
Public Alerting and Notification.
The EBS was not alerted until 9:30, 24 minutes af ter the site area emergency was declared at 9:06 a.m.
The initial EBS message was aired about 20 minutes af ter a declaration of a generai emergency.
Only a few EBS uessages were broadcast prior to the Governor's announcement of a state emergency at -11:00 a.m.
,a 10 Public and Media Relations.
Relations with the press were generally good.
Availability of rumor control capabilities, e.g., procedures and phone numbers, should be publicized.
Improvement is needed in the posting of notices for transients in the area.
County participation in public in fo rm a-tion decreased after the governor's announcement of state emergency.
Sub-sequent county news releases should have included sufficient information on county activities.
l Accident Assessment.
Radiation monitoring was successfully performed because of the utility's participation.
Improved equipment, training, and coordination are required be fo re the county t e am can be depend ed upon for timely, ef fec tive operat ion'.
Actions to Protect the Public.
Plans for protecting the public we re generally good, but there were problems in Laplementation because of delayed receipt of information from the monitoring team.
As a result, some decisions on protective measures were delayed.
Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures.
All relevant exposure control procedures were exercised, but some decontamination personnel were not aware of the actions to take for a specified contamination level. Also, some field monitoring personnel did not check their own dosimeters of ten enough to l
ensure their own safety.
Recovery and Reentry.
Public in fo rma t ion concerning rec ov e ry and reentry was disseminated. Other relevant procedures were demonstrated accept-ably by simulation, but improv ement is needed in some details.
Relevance of the Exercise.
The exercise was perceived as a valuable experience by participants.
4.
Summarv of Interim Cricique: Wayne County Emercency Operations, Facilities and Resources.
Internal communica-tions in the county EOC were generally adequate, but the configuration of the l
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worHng space occasionally hindered operations; a small PA system would help.
One external communication problem was noted in transmitting calls from the l
Displays and security were adequate, and the RACES system was effective.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staf f.
Mobilization of EOC staf f was prompt and. orderly; two backup persons had been designated for each lead official in case someone was not av ail able.
The Sherif f's of fice i
demonstrated ability to make shif t changes and provide 24-hour functions.
In the field, Fire Department personnel were alerted by in-home monitors; this l
was considered ad e qua t e, but the' lack of portable beepers could result in inability to alert any fire personnel who were not at home or already on d ut y.
The radiation monitoring team at one site had no backup personnel; I
other teams got full response from primary staf f.
The staffing of access--
l control roadblocks was inconsistent, in that some had only one of ficer, and I
others had several.
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Emergency Operations Management.
Af ter some initial confusion in the i
EOC, the County Chairman assumed control and exercised appropriate leadership.
Both EOC and field personnel exhibited very positive attitudes and competency l
in their tasks. Information flowed only upward: both EOC and field personnel were aware of their roles, but were not always kept informed of the overall operation.
Nevertheless, decisions were made, by the Chairman, af ter proper coordination with state and county EOC personnel.
In the early stages of the exercise, some procedural confusion was associated with the fac t that the utility's EOF, rather than the county, determined the status of the emergency.
Public Alerting and Notification.
The County plan calls for the Fire Department to notify. the public via portable PA systems.
This activity was not tested; however, 1 ire personnel indicated they were capable of performing the function.
In lieu of this approach, the county elected to utilize their countyvide siren syst eta.
This system did not work effectively as at least one siren stuck and others were inaud ib le.
Public education regarding the warning system was inadequate.
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12 The rating for this category is based on the perceived capabilities of the Fire Department PA system in accordance with the plan.
If the siren system nas rated, the overall result would have been lover.
There is no indication of a plan for evacuation of transient pe r so n s.
The site area emergency was declared at 9:06 a.m., but the EBS was not alerted until 9:30.
The general emergency was declared at 9 : 20 a.m., and the first EBS message was broadcast about 20 minutes later.
Were was no radio in EOC to monitor EBS messages.
Random sampling of 10-mile EPZ residents revealed that some did not know what they should do after being alerted.
Public and Media Relations.
After the Governor's announcement (at l
11 a.m.),
county participation in public in formation ac tivities decreased sharply.
News releases did not proside sufficient pe rt inent in forma tion on events in the county.
Availability y of rumor control capabilities, e.g.,
procedures and phone numbers, should be publicized.
De EOC staff cannot be expected to handle calls from the general public.
Accident Assessment.
Staffing for accident assessment and monitoring was adequate, but each monitoring team had only one instrument, without backup.
Information from the field teams was not received in a timely l
fashion.
The first monitoring assessment was provided after the declaration of a general emergency.
It was not apparent that significant assessment data were generated.
Actions to Protect the Public.
Shelter operations were well conduc ted I
and evacuees were well cared for.
Shelter personnel complained that the forms were hard to understand, and expressed the need for radio communication in the shelter.
Evacuees were conveyed by pub lic buses, however, the bus routes l
should be planned to identify special transportation cases, e.g., handicapped individuals, and to minimize exposure of passengers to radiation.
Routes for evacuation by private vehicle were adequate, but need to be more widely published (it is understood that this is in process).
Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures.
Access control points were well placed.
Some radiation monitoring personnel, e.g.,
sheriff's l
13 department, would benefit from further training. Screening of evacuees at the personnel decontamination center was slowed to 4-5 minutes per person by insufficient equipment, which resulted in backlogs.
Dosimeters on hand did not meet the specifications of NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, which calls for both high-range and low-range, immed i at e-re ad ing dosimeters and permancat-record dosimeters.
Monitoring personnel had only the high-range immed i a t e-reading instruments.
I Recovery and Reentry.
Reentry operations were demonstrated in simula-tion only, but it appeared that EOC personnel had an adequate understanding of the procedures and their roles.
County and social service personnel voluntarily worked beyond the termination of the exercise to ensure full understanding of this phase of activities.
Relevance of the Exercise.
At the EOC and the personnel monitoring centers, participants considered the experience valuable.
In the field, however, Fire Department personnel, State Police, and county emergency workers felt isolated, because they had received no in fo rmat ion on the status and progress of the simul at ed emergency.
In a few instances field personnel (e.g., at roadblocks) were reluctant to cooperate with the observers, result-ing in some delays and inconvenience.
e 14 III.
EXERCISE SCENARIO The scenario provided a simulated series of events on-site that resulted in all four classes of emergency condicions being declared. In turn, these conditions triggered off-site response actions to take place or be simulated.
An overview of the sequence of emergency conditions, maj or events and approximate time of occurrence is summarized below.
EVENT TIME (EST)
Notification of Unusual Event 0620 Notification of Alert 0800 Cinna Evacuates Auxiliary Building 0855 District Offices Begin Steffing 0900 Notification of Site-Area Emergency 0906 Monroe County Activates All Emergency Workers 0908 Notification of General Emergency 0920
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Emergency Operations Centers asked to Activate 0931 J
Emergency Broadcast Message 0950 Activate Sirens 0950 Congregate Care Centers on Standby 1045 Governor Declares State of Emergency 1100 Schools Simulate Evacuation 1108 Recommend Evacuation of County ERPA's 1115 Evacuation Competed 1400 Downgrade to Alert Status 1610 Ic:pl emen t Recovery Procedures 1630 Exercise Terminated 1700 The timetable of exercise ev en t s wa s for the most part withheld from o f f-s ite participants.
However, the exercise date and the general time of the first exercise event was likely known, since demonstrations of response
. functions using volunteers require some advance administrative preparations, such as time off from work, etc.
.t 15 IV.
EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 1.
Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources State The state emergency response facilities included three emergency operations centers (EOCs) located at Albany, in the Lake District Of fice of Disaster Preparedness in Newark, N.Y., and in the Western District Of fice of Disaster Preparedness in Batavia, N.Y.
A state representative was also located at the emergency operations facility (EOF) in Rochester.
Teams of state personnel in these offices interacted with the utility and county response teams.
The resources and facilities at the state EOCs were excellen'.
Working space was adequate and effectively organized.
Displays of site data and plant conditions were well placed and promptly updated at each of the EOCs.
Internal com=unications at the EOCs were generally adequate, although improvement through practice is possible.
An unexplained internal delay occurred in the EOC at Albany at the time the general emergency was declared.
Communications with other elements of the response team were generally good, although confusion was noted at times with the oral tr an smi s s ion of dose infomation between the nuclear facility operator and the EOCs, particu-larly with regard to units being reported (rem vs. arem).
Security at each of the state offices was generally good, although the press was unescorted at times in the Albany EOC.
Recommendation:
Difficulty was observed in maintaining rapid communication e
between internal groups, especially in the Albany EOC, between the radiological intelligence room and the operations staff.
The use of liaison officers could speed the flow of infoma-tion between these groups; for instance, the operations staff could be assisted by a liaison person assigned to monitor information coming into the radiological intelligence room.
(Re ference NUREC-0654, F.1.d).
16 Security measures should ensure that the movements of media e
representatives can be monitored, e Improvement in internal communications should be possible based on the results of the exercise; for example, rapid communication between the radiological intelligence room and the operations staff should be ensured.
Monroe County The Monroe County emergency operating center (EOC) is located in the county effice building complex, Rochester.
This EOC was just recently moved and is still under development.
Substantial improvement s are scheduled in the near future.
The space was adequate and the lighting and ventilation were excellent. Noise control, crowd control, and security measures were very good. The USDA worked with the Monroe County EOC.
Overall, the communication systems performed excellently and had spare capacity.
The primary communication system with state and local governments was a commercial conference call witn dedicated service for the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS).
An executive hot-line system is on order but is not yet installed.
The telephone system operated very well until about 4:00 p.m.
In one instance after 4:00 p.m. Monroe County could not contact Wayne County when all telephone lines were busy and an attempt to reach Wayne County by radio was also unsuccessful.
The backup radio system between the nuclear facility and the EOCs was demonstrated. The RACES system personnel had plentiful and good equipment, and were well trained and eager to help.
The operation was good except that the radio seemed to require more time to deliver a message than did tha telephone.
Communication with federal agencies was adequate.
Internal communications within the EOC were provided by message logging and handling procedures.
These were supplemented by a public address system that made it possible for each agency or departmental coordinator give periodic status reports.
Display space was adequate in general.
However, some of the displays such as population density and evacuation routes were not always in place.
The projected plume location and field sample data were well displayed.
Sampling point data transferred to a large map at the front of the EOC were not easily visible.
Many very detailed maps of the areas in the EPZ were l
l t
17 J
^
l available for use by decision makers.
These were mounted on a display I
table in the front of the EOC.
i Recommendations:
The display space should be modified so that plume radiation e
contours can be overlaid on one of the wall displays so that the plume location is readily apparent. This should be updated as needed. (Re ference NUREC-0654, J.9 and J.10).
Displays of population density and evacuation routes should e
be provided near the display of plume location so that comparisons and decisions needed for emergency responses may be made easily. (Reference NUREG-0654, J. 9 and J.10).
l Wayne County The Wa yne County emergency operating center (EOC) is located in the county jail complex in Lyons.
It was staf fed by dedicated trained workers who performed their duties in an adequate manner. Some improvements in facilities would enable the staff to make and execute decisions quicker.
The EOC was considered too small by most ob s e rver s.
The configuration of the space also was not ideal.
One result of this was that communications between workers in the EOC were sometimes hindered.
A second result of the 3
small floor space was that some of the maps were displayed in various loca-i tions, including desk tops. This resulted in a delay b accessing some of the j
i in fo rmation needed to reach decisions.
These problems were accentuated by j
1 the presence of a sizeable number of observers.
Observers would not be present during an actual emergency; however, during a shif t-change operation the number of operators in the EOC may double.
At shift-change time good 1
internal coc=unications are essential to brief the new workers on the current status of the emergency.
The co=munications systems with the field teams were good and were provided with backup.
Adequate coordination between police, fire, and other groups was demonstrated and the RACES system was very ef fective. A dedicated (hotline) telephone between the Wayne County EOC and the Monroe County EOC would have improved coordination between the two counties.
The communication between the utility EOF and the county EOC was adequate.
Most of it took pl ac e over the dedicated telephone system, which was a "hard wired" system.
.s' 4
18 Nessage handling procedures within the EOC tended to be cumbersome.
Operators for the Civil De fen se (CD) and National Warning System dedicated telephone (NAWAS) communication equipment did not repo rt for duty.
Re pl ac e-ments hei to be instruc ted on equipment operation.
Some of the officials in charge of groups and fut;tions shared tele-phones (e.g., USDA and Department of Labor), slowing communications.
Recommendations:
}
Although the Wayne County EOC proved adequate during the e
exercise, a better floor plan is needed that will permit side by side displays of evacuation routes, sampling points, relocation centers and shelters, population distribution by evacuation area, and current status.' (Reference NUREG-0654, H.3).
o A dedicated (hot line) telephone between the Wayne County EOC and the Monroe County EOC is recommended.
(Reference NUREG-0654, F.1.b).
Additional operators for the communications equipment e
should be trained to provide additonal backup.
(Reference
)
NUREG-0654, F).
Additional telephones should be provided in the EOC for e
each agency or group official.. (Re ference NUREG-0654, F).
A small PA system within the EOC would facilitate briefings.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, H).
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) f The Ginna Station EOF was located in the RG&E corporate office building in Rochester.
St a t e radiological health and county personnel participated with the nuclear facility operator (NFO) in accident a s se s sment activities at the EOF.
Facilities and resources (space, internal communications, displays, and security) at the EOF were good.
However, it was noted that no maps showing population distributions were avail abl e.
Some lag time was noted in internal communications between the NFO representatives and state and county representatives.
Periodic utility briefings were beneficial in keeping participants in fo rmed.
Recommendation:
i Displays of Unportant site data should be available i
e in the EOF (Re ference NUREG-0654, J.10 a, b, c).
3, 19 2.
Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff State Prompt staf fing of the Albany and District EOCs was demonstrated; this was due in part to advance knowledge of the date of the scheduled exercise. Each of fice had 24-hour response capability. State representatives were promptly dispatched to the EOF.
The capabilities of backup personnel were not demonstrated due to the their minimal participation in the exercise and the limited duration of the scenario. While some backup staff did partie-ipate in the exercise (as in the radiological assessment group), the backup capability for each technical area could not be determined.
Recommendation:
The scenario used could not demonstrate the decision-making e
capabilities of the backup team that would provide 24-hour support.
Future exercises could be designed to demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities more effectively. This could be built into the exercise by simulating the passage of time between events (Reference NUREC-0654, A.4).
Monroe County Monroe County demonstrated good capability for notifying and staf fing their facilities in a timely manner despite the adverse weather conditions (snow and slick pavements).
The various emergency resource agencies also had procedures and rosters for backup manning if required.
Both the communica-tions and the procedures were very g sod.
The 24-hour response capability was demonstrated by double staf fing of several functions.
Two exceptions to this capability were noted:
the chief at the personnel monitoring center c )uld not identify other teams that would provid e 24-hour coverage; and the University of Rochester field monitoring key func tions.
team had no backup personnel.
Both of these operations are Recommendation:
Additional personnel should be trained to provide 24-hour e
capability for the decontamination center and for field sampling.
(Reference NUREC-0654, A.4).
i.*
20 4
Wayne County Wayne County demonst rated a good capability for timely mobilization of officials and staff.
Almost all of the staff (except for the CD and NAWAS communication operators) reported in a timely manner. Notification procedures were effective in general. However, there was some question of the ability to reach some volunteer fireman who had warning equipment in their homes, but who could not be reached if away from home.
Adequate personnel were available to provide 24-hour continuous response operations, except for the radiological monitoring team at East Williams.
One radiological monitoring team was mobilized at the Lincoln Fire Department instead of Ontario due to an error in setting up the exercise plan.
Emereeney Operations Facility (EOF)
Procedures fo r staffing and alerting were good.
The only question concerned the adequacy of backup staff.
'7 o,
21 s
3.
Emergency Operations Management State The organization of the state's emergency response teams was good.
Control and leadership were effectively demonstrated, and the professional h..
I quality of the staff was high, both at Albany and at the District offices.
1 With some high-level officials, prompting was observed that should be avoided in future exercises.
However, the management roles were proficiently demon-strated.
A sufficient number of state support organizations (police, fire, Department of Transportation, etc.) participated in the exercise and demon-strated awareness of their responsibilities.
Participation of federal I
agencies, however, was limited.
g Information f1w betwo :r icvels and organizations was gooc', with further improvement expected from practice.
Chains of command for decision-ti making were well demonstrated, a id checklists and forms were effectively j
used. Accident terminology was used consistently by all exercise participants.
Oral briefings and periodic summaries vere beneficial co=munications.
Honroe County The management was generally good.
'Ih e re was ampl e evidence that many organizations had specific responsibilities, that they understood them, I
ud tt.at they repor:ed thrcugh channels.
l I
The efforts of the ind ividual organizations were ef fectively coordi-nated through periodic staf f reports in the EOC and by periodic briefings by i'
the EOC director, General Smith.
One ob s erv'er thought that more frequent l
triefings should be made during the early " frenzy" to give detailed explana-tions of the status of the emergency.
The Monroe EOC director was a key figure in the operations.
The County Commissioner and the Deputy Director are his alternates; neither assumed control during the exercise.
Recommendation:
Drills are recomm^nded to give the County Commissioner e
and the Deputy Director experience in managing the EOC operations so that in-depth management experiente is d eveloped.
(Re ference NUREC-0654, N.3).
22 Fayne County After some initial con fusion, the County Chairman assumed total control; his leadership was strong and evident.
EOC and field personnel were observed to have a very positive attitude ad were judged competent to perfonn the duties assigned.
Information from the field and from utility personnel flowed very well to the officials making the decisions.
EOC and field personnel were aware of their roles but were not always kept abreast of the overall operations.
Decisions were made by the County Chairman after proper coordination with the state officials and with the County of Monroe.
In the early stages of the exercise, there appeared to be some confusion over the fact that the power plant operator, not the county, determined the emergency status.
Recommendation:
Some of the effects on operations produced by the very o
limited floor space in the EOC may be mitigated by assigning someone the responsibility for preventing persons (visitors, observers, workers) from standing or sitting so that they interfere or hinder operations and by declaring certain active areas in EOC off-limits to nonessential personnel.
(Re ference NUREC-0654, H. 3).
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Organizational control and decision making were adequately demonstrated the EOF, with state and county representatives taking a minor role.
at i
23 4.
Public Alerting and Notification State Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages were released from the emergency news center in Rochester.
These messages were posted in the EOCs.
News releases from the state vere carefully prepared and reviewed, and released in a timely manner. However, at least in one instance, dose inforra-tion released by the state in a news release fell behind the data rec e iv ed
{
from the EOF.
This may be due in part tc the compression of the scenario, l
which caused changes in dose rates to escalate rapidly.
Monroe Count:
The primary means for alerting the populace will be a system of sirens.
This system is now being installed, and will be tested by FEMA in April of 1982.
Those sirens that were installed were sounded at the appropriate time.
A backup system of notification by sound trucks was available.
Sound trucks (police / fire trucks with speakers) were seen in the area but no alerting messages were heard.
The EBS uas available, although the backup staf f in the EOC who thought they could activate the EBS could not do so.
The primary F.M.
EBS was not a c tiv a t ed with the two tone signal.
Station WHAM clearly understands its role in these broadcasts, even though there is no memorandum of understanding with the county EOC.
j The EBS station expressed concern over the lack of prepared EBS messages and general instructions (as for national EBS messages).
In addi-tien, the station thought that 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of maintenance of the transmitter per month may not be enough to ensure operation during periods of hot weather.
The EBS is activated through a two-digit code.
This is so simple that it may be susceptible to pranksters.
No radio or TV exists at the EOC for the PIO to use to monitor and verify the EBS broadcasts.
Alerting and notification of the transient popul ation at hotels and I
motels appears not to have been done.
Ob se rv er calls to three motels were made.
None of the motel personnel acknowledged receiving a notification.
Methods for alerting boaters were not demonstrated.
I I
. o 24 Recommendation 6:
Tests of the completed siren system should include sound o
level measurements made throughout the EPZ co establish the adequacy of the warning.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, J.10c).
Additional education of the public is needed concerning e
notification methods and responses such as turning on the radio and/or TV to get the EBS messages when the sirens are sounded.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, G.1 and G.2).
A more secure code for activating the EBS should be e
employed.
(Reference NUREG-0654, E.5 and E.6).
Prepared sample messages should be distributed to the o
EBS along with instructions on information to be supplied at the time of the emergency.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, E.5).
Messages should be prepared for use with the mobile PA e
units in the event that this backup is needed.
(Reference NUREG-0654, E.6),
The length of time needed to alert the EBS to standby e
and to activate the EBS should be shortened to deal with a f ast-moving sequence of events.
s Hotel and motel operators should periodically receive, o
or have available, instruction material for alerting transients.
Wayne Count y The primary means for alerting the populace will be a system of sirens.
This system is now being installed; testing is planned by FEMA in spring of 1982.
The existing sirens were activated at the appropriate time, but some of the units did not sound or were not loud enough, while one would not turn off.
Questioning of some local people by observers revealed that most of the people who heard the sirens did not know what to do in response.
The fire department was prepared to provide backup by driving pre-arranged routes and by giving messages over mobile public address s ys t em s.
This backup capability was not demonstrated.
Th e ability to use the EBS was demonstrated, but there were some questions concerning the timing of the broadcasts.
A site emergency was declared at 9:06 a.m. but the EBS was not alerted until 9:30 a.m.
The condi-tion at the plant escalated to General Emergency at 9:30 a.m. while the first EBS message aired at 9:50.
The time required to prepare, distribute, and verify EBS messages may be adequate for an actual emergency that does not
[
25 escalate quickly to a general eme rg ency.
In this exercise, the time was deliberately compressed to permit the exercise to be c ompl eted in one day.
Recommendations:
Tests of the completed siren system should include sound e
level measurements made throughout the EPZ to establish the adequacy of the warning.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, J.10c).
l Additional education of the public is needed concerning o
notification methods and responses such as turning on the radio and/or TV to get the EBS messages when the sirens are sounded.
(Reference NUREG-0654, G.1 and G.2)
The length of time needed to alert the EBS to standby e
and to activate the EBS should be shortened to deal with a fast-moving sequence of events.
e A radio and/or TV should be available to the PIO to monitor EBS broadcasts.
(Reference NUREG-0654, E.5, E.6, and G.4.C).
o Prepared sample messages should be distributed to the EBS along with instructions on information to be supplied at the time of the emergency.
(Reference NUREG-0654, E.5).
o Messages should be prepared for.use with the mobile PA units in the event that this backup is needed.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, E.6).
o The length of time needed to alert the EBS to standby and to activate the EBS should be shortened to deal with a f ast-moving sequence of events.
Hotel and motel operators should periodically receive, e
or have available, instruction material for alerting transients.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The EOF participated effectively in procedures for public notification.
26 5.
Public and Media Relations State Public information provided by the state included pamphlets previously distributed by the utility as in fo rma tion for near-site residents.
Press facilities at the Albany EOC were good, and media contact was effectively msnaged through the emergency media center at the Albany EOC.
The media spokesperson in Albany had very good access to developing information and was aware of appropriate procedures for review and release. Rumor control was not specifically included as part of the scenario, and was not demonstrated in the exercise.
b Recommendations:
Future exercises should demonstrate means for rumor o
control.
Rumor control officials should have the capability of monitoring local television and news broadcasts to determine whether messages and assess-ments are being perceived correctly.
(Reference KUREG-0654, G.4. C. ).
State and' counties should ensure that, after a state of o
emergency is declared, the affected public is provided with timely and complete information about actions being carried out by both state and county responders.
ifonroe County The pamphlet " Monroe County Emergency In fo rma t ion" by RG6E is not adequate.
This pamphlet will be revised and will address general information and cover special problems (for the handicapped, etc.).
There was no evidence uncovered by the observers of an in place public information program such as posted notices, information in the telephone book, etc.,
for alerting transient popul at ions.
Telephone calls to personnel at motels indicated that no information had been provided.
The joint media facility was located in the RG&E building.
The security procedures for the press were cumbersome and delayed clearance of individuals for the EOF.
27 Af ter the Governor declared a state emergency, some press releases and briefings were not coordinated with county PI0s.
Little if any county activities were contained in the state briefings.
Rumor control should be strengthened.
Monroe County did have two secretaries monitoring telephones at the PIO's normal office, but this tele-phone number was not distributed to the public.
Th e utility representatives indicated that the utility would answer questions by the press and by individuals only if they pertained. to events on-site.
They would answer other questions only if they were authorized in writing by all government agencies.
Recommendations:
Dissemination of educational material to the public e
should be completed promptly.
(Reference NUREC-0654, G.1),
o Press releases must be coordinated between utility, I
state, and county PI0s so that releases by each cover all activities and do not conflict with releases by others.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, G.4a and G 4b).
Coordinated procedures for rumor control should be e
developed jointly by the utility, state and county PI0s. (Re ference NUREG-0654, G.4c).
Wayne County During the initial stages of the exercises, the Wayne County PIO d emon s t ra t ed a good capability for issuinC adequate news releases and for providing information for the press. She had access to all necessary informa-tion and coordinated effectively with the PI0s at the joint information center.
Appropriate points of contact for the media were established in a facility that was adequate.
After the Covernor declared a state emergency, the state PIO issued the press releases and provided press briefings.
These contained little in fo rma t ion about the county activities, and county participation in PIO activities was much reduced.
e 28 The Wayne County PIO did not contribute to the update sessions at the county EOC.
The result was that the personnel in the EOC did not know what infomation had been given to the public.
A pamphlet has been prepared to provid e in fo rmat ion to the public.
However, there was no ev id enc e that there was a plan for notification and evacuation of the transient population.
Observers found no posters in public places.
Hotel and motel personnel had no knowledge of plans for transients.
Recommendations:
The county press releases should supplement the state o
releases during the period of time that a state emergency exists. The county PIO should continue to release appro-priate infomation on county functions until the emergency is over and recovery and re-entry have been completed.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, G.4.a).
e Coordination and information exchange between the PIDs at the county EOC, the PI0s at the joint information center, and the PIOS at the state should be strengthened.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, G.4.b).
Public information program for permanent and for transient e
population in the 10 mile EPZ should be strenget.sned.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, G.2) l i
l I
29 6.
Accident Assessment Acc id ent assessment is coord ina t ed by interaction between the nuclear facility operator (NFO), the emergency operations facility (EOF), and the emergency operations centers (EOCs) at the state and county locations.
The nuclear f acility operator is relied upon to provide release-rate information and meteorological data, which the utility uses for dose-rate eetimates.
The q
utility also provides for rapid dose measurements in the field.
The state provides dose assessments based on the utility data.
Field measurements are then compared to calculated values.
Observations of this interaction are as follows.
State The State Office of Disaster Preparedness and State Department of Health ef fectively coordinated activities of the state EOC in Albany and at the EOCs in the Lake and Western Districts.
Status reports were received at the EOC in Albany reporting the plans of the Department of Environmental Conservation and Department of Health for obtaining air and water samples for radiological analysis; however, these activities were not observed in the field.
The state has agreements with Brookhaven National Laboratory for additional support.
Federal assistance for radiological assessment was coordinated by contact between the state and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Procedures for establishing contact with FEMA were demonstrated in a timely manner.
Where contact was made, in formation provid ed was insufficient to dictate a p oper response.
This limit ed federal role is attributed to the scenario design and only required simulation.
The physical arrangements for radiological a s s e s smen t at the state EOCs were good.
Maps of site data and charts for developing plant parameters were effectively displayed. Communication between the NF0, the EOF, and other EOCs was generally good, with the exception of data on field monitoring.
'Ih e in foncat ion regarding meteorological conditions and evacuation time s was good.
Some delay was ob se rved in communication between the rad iologic al intelligence group and the operations staff.
Also, the oral relay of
information on radiation release rates and dose estimates from the NTO and the Albany EOC gave rise on occasion to some transitory confusion over dose units (e.g., rems vs. mrem).
Dose calculations perfomed by the state demonstrated that the personnel involved were well trained and qualified; however, calcula-tion procedures and input data were not well codified.
Loose pages of assumptions and dose tables should be replaced by a procedures manual, and input data should be documented better. With the methods demonstrated, it was not convincing that interim calculations of dose rates could be reconstructed, or performed quickly at a time of stress.
Calculations of dose rates mede at the Albany EOC were perforc ed slowly and with a lack-of traceability.
Dose ~ calculations were made on a small hand calculator without printing or programmable functions.
Six hours after declaration of the general emergency, population dose estimates were not yet availablo.
Since estimates of population dose require multiplication of population in each sector by dose rates in each sector, this calculation is time-consuming if performed with the available calculator, and was not observed.
Since evacuation orders preceded receipt of onsite dose measurements, onsite data were unavailable for evacuation planning at the EOCs. Monitoring data supplied by the nuclear facility operator were too sparse and too delayed to support dose projections, and did not provide an effective backup to dose rate estimates based on release races.
Confirmatory field measurements were also not available from either the state r counties on a timely basis.
No capability for tracking air-borne pl ume s was demonstrated by the state.
Recommendations:
Programmable calculators with printing capabilities would e
facilitate prompt estimation of population dose rates and all other dose rate calculations.
Such calculators would also improve the traceability and reproducibility of results.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, I.10 and M.4. ).
Procedures for obtaining the NFO's monitoring data at the e
EOCs should be improved. The role of each entity (utility, county, state, and federal) in providing monitoring data should be more electly defined, and procedures for obtaining and using the data should be reviewed. A separate drill could be beneficial to practice coordination of teams responsible for obtaining field dose measurements. Such
31 a drill should include participation by the utility, county and state agencies, and federal support teams.
Carry-throu;h of FEMA contact with other federal support e
agencies should be more effectively demonstrated in future exercises (Re ference NUREG-0654, F.1.C.)..
Nonroe County Monroe County had only one radiological monitoring te am, - wh ich wa s supplied by the University of Rochester.
This team was equipped with instru-ments that were adequate for whole-body gamma ray measurements, plus air-sampling equipment with charcoal fil t er s'.
This equipment requ res that the filter be exposed in the field and then sent to the university laboratory for analysis.
l Gamma ray data from the field team were transmitted by radio to the l
EOC.
Some delay was noted between the time the readings were taken and when the data were received.
One field team in Monroe County does not seem to be enough. No backup team was identified to provide 24-hour capability.
An adequate capability to verify utility dose projections, especially for radio-iodine, was not demonstrated by the state or the County of Monroe.
It was not apparent at the county EOC that significant as se s sment l
data were derived or shared by state, county, and plant personnel in a timely I
i manner.
Recommendations:
l The Monroe County radiological assessment should be e
i improved by additional training and by providing j
additional personnel so that a 24-hour capability is achieved.
(Reference NUREG-0654, A.4).
e Procedures should be modified so that initial readings
)
of contamination levels are transmitted to the EOC soon after the team makes measurements at a-new location.
i i
l Wayne County Wayne County participated in the a c c id ent assessment in a manner similar to that of Monroe County described above.
l l
1
r 32 Wayne County fielded four radiological measurement teams.
The teams were well trained and had the equipment specified in the county plan; however, none of the teams had backup instruments.
The instrumentation used was capable of measuring gamma ray radiation levels.
No capability for measuring the level of iodine isotopes was demon-str'atad by the county teams.
No field samples, e.g.,
water or feed, were taken and sent to an analytical laboratory and there fore the results were not submitted to the central receiving point at the utility's EOF.
This lack of field sampling appears to be a deficiency in the exercise scenario.
It was not apparent at the county EOC that significant a s se s sment data were derived or shared by state, county, and plant personnel in a timely fashion.
The results of measurements made by the field teams were called in g
to the EOC only after several readings had been taken.
This delayed the receipt of information in the EOC.
More frequent reporting, especially soon after arriving at a new location, is desirable.
Re c ocrsend at ion s :
The Wayne County radiological assessment capabi'.ity should e
be improved by additional training and by providing addi-tional personnel so that a 24-hour capability is achieved.
(Re ference NUREC-0654, A.4).
Procedures should be modified so that first readings o
of contamination levels are transmitted to the EOC soon af ter the team makes measurements at a new lo:ation.
i 1
,?,?
\\
- ] A,L:< f 33
\\
i 7.
Actions to Protect the Publie State Ij Actions to protect the public were based on timely decisions made si by the state.
Th e actions vere then earried out on a local level.
The state EOCs were kept we ll-in formed on the sheltering operations from the countles.
Evacuation plans were ef fectively made by the state, using current information on road conditions and evacuation times.
j
./
State monitoring teams from the Departments of Health and Environmental Conservation enacted their plans to obtain measurements that would be impo r-tant for longer-term exposures, including doses through the ingestion pathway.
This was in compliance with the emergency plan.
Total reliance on predicted doses for sheltering and evacuation planning and does, however, raise concern over the accuracy of such calculations.
Monitoring data obtained by the county were not effectively used by the state for accident assessment.
This may be due in part to the short duration of the scenario.
The absence of pre planning between state, local govercoent, railroad, and Coast Guard was evident.
Recommendation:
o The state should review the role that short-term field monitoring data obtained by the NFO should have for such decisions as planning evacuation routes, and determine whether changes should be made in the way data are obtained and communicated to emergency planners. The state should also improve its means of access to data collected by the county.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, H.12 ).
Monroe County The Henroe County personnel demonstrated a good capability to remov e an injured contaminated individual from a simul ated traffic accident and to transport to the Rochester General Hospital.
The health physicist from the plant did not appear at the Rochester General Hospital, as planned.
The hospital's health physicist performed the necessary functions.
t 34 The implement ation of protective measures was done with good decision making.
Roadblocks were set up in a timely f ashion and were ad equate.
The opening and operation of congregate care centers was well done, as was the establishment and actions at decontamination centers.
Communications between the EOC and the care centers were excellent.
In formation given the bus driver who demonstrated the evacuation route needs improvement.
He drove the wrong route.
None of the buses that vere observed had equipment for handling handicapped persons.
Staffing at the congregate care cee : er should be increased to handle the large number of evacuees expected in an actual emergency.
The method of final disposal of contaminated wastes (e.g., clothing) should be addressed in more detail.
The monitoring of contamination levels (iodine) in the food and water pathways was not demonstrated.
Recommendations:
The routing of public transportation equipment for evacua-o tion operations should be reviewed and the in-tructions improved.
(Reference NUREC-0654, J.2).
Procedures for the disposal of contaminated wastes (e.g.,
o clothing) collected into plastic bags at the decontamina-tion centers should be developed. (Reference NUREC-0654, J.9).
Wayne County ne Wayne County EOC personnel demonstrated good capability to protect the public by implement at ion of protective measures.
The methods used were adequate for relocating the populace.
The organizations responsible for implementing the protection measures were well organized.
Security at some locations was so tight that some federal observers were not readily admitted.
Relocation centers demonstrated adequate facilities and procedures for processing evacuees.
This included collecting the data needed fo r health Decontamination procedures were adequate, but disposal procedurec for care.
c ont amina t ed wastes (contaminated clothing, etc.) needs to be addressed.
Staffing was adequate for the exercise, but in an actual emergency it would have been insufficient fo r the number of evacuees needing to be
a s
9 35 processed.
This might result in long lines and waiting for registration, surveying, and decontamination.
o e
The protective measures that are to be used in the ingestion pathway emergency planning zone are a state function and were not addressed at the county level.
It appeared to some observers that bus routes for evecuating people from areas near the plant may not have been designed to minimize the exposure of the passengers.
Passengers should not be picked up and then driven closer to the plant or driven farther into the plume.
Each route should start i
in the region of highest exposure rate and proceed away from the contaminated area.
Recommendations:
Additional staff and radiological survey equipment e
should be considered for handling the number of evacuees expected at the relocation centers in a real emergency.
o Methods for disposal of the contaminated wastes collected at the decontamination centers need ' i be provid ed.
(Reference NUREC-0654, J.9).
o Evacuation routes should be designed to minimize exposure of the evacuees.
(Reference NUREG-0654, J.2).
a-0
- y o
s
(
36 8.
Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measure 6
State Most of the activities in this area vere handled at the local l ev el.
Communication to the EOCs on the events at decontamination cente rece pt ion centers was good.
The staff of the EOC in Albany evaluated the possibility of using potassium iodide and determined its availability, al-though current sta:e policy does not recommend its use.
Decontamination procedures were effectively demonstrated.
_ Monroe County Access control of evacuated areas was good and was capable of 24-hour operation.
Some field personnel did not check their dosimeters of ten enough (every 15 minutes) to ensure their own safety.
FEMA regulations, NUREG-0654, REP-1, Rev.
1, require both direct read ing and pe rmanent record types of dosimeters.
he county emergency workers were provided with only a 0-200 R d irec t-re ad ing instrument.
There was no permanent-record device and no sensitive d i rec t-read ing device (e.g., for the range 0 5 R).
Record fo rms were filled out at the time of issue of the 0-200 R dosi
.ters.
These forms had provision for recording the reading at the end of the period of use by field tecms.
Additional forms (pocket sized) for recording readings at 15-minute intervals are desirable for low range readings.
he forms should meet In' REG requirement s.
Facilities at the congregate care center for obtaining health infor-mation were good.
Some of the screenir; personnel were not fully aware of decontamination procedures.
Decontamination required 4 to 5 minutes for each individual processed, resulting in a backlog.
The facilities at the hospital were temporary, and there are plans for more adequate facilities. ne current facilities were not adequate to prevent contamination of other parts of the hospital.
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o Recommendations:
o It is recommended that a permanent-record type of dosimeter and a sensitive-range, direct-reading dosimeter be supplied to emergency workers in addition to the 0-200 R high-range instruments.
(Reference NUREG-0654, K.3a).
Additional training and procedures for the use of dosimeters e
is recommended.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, K.3b).
Additiona1 training on decontamination procedures is o
recommended.
Uavne County Access control of evacuated areas was good, with a capability for 24-hour operations.
FEMA regulations, NUREG-0654, REP-1, Rev.
1, require both direct-reading and permanent-record dosimeters.
The county emergency workers were provided with only 0-200 R direct-reading instrument.
There was no a
permanent-record device and no sensitive direct-reading device (e.g.,
for the range 0-5 R).
Records were adequate.
Dosimeters were read frequently by field workers.
One worker reported exposures as large at 90 R during the exercise.
Either the dosimeter was defective or the worker did not know how to read it.
Decontamination procedures fo r emergency workers were adequate, but waste-disposal methods and additional equipment should be provided.
Hospital services for contaminated individuals are pr ided for by agreements with hospitals in Monroe County.
Transportation of a contaminated member of the county population from a simulated traf fic accident was demon-strated.
Recommendations:
e It is reco= mended that permanent-record dosimeters and sensitive-range direct-reading dosimeters be supplied to emergency workers in addition to the 0-200 R high-range instruments.
(Re ference NITREG-0654, K.3a),
Additional training and procedures for the use of e
dosimeters is recommended.
(Reference NUREG-0654, k.3b).
e Waste-disposal procedures should be detailed.
(Re ference NUREG-0654, J. 9).
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9.
Recovery and Reentry Operations State Recovery and reentry procedures were informally simul at ed at both the state and county levels and were considered adequate.
Reentry procedures were not observed due to rapid time compression of the exercise. The trigger-ing event permitting initiation of the recovery phase was a message from the radiological health officer indicating that the release of radiation had ended and the downgrad ing of the emergency to an alert stage.
Subsequently, dis-cussions were held between the state, EOCs, and the utility indicating that there was no contamination in Wayne and Monroe counties, and recovery pro -
cedures could begin.
Since the termination of the exercise was generalized, the actual d emons t rat ion of capabilities such as continued estbnation of population exposure and issuance of a close-out press release were not per fo rmed.
Recommendation:
Future exercises should allow additional tune to o
demonstrate rather than simulate key reentry and recovery procedures (Reference NUREG-0654, N.1).
Wayne and Monroe Counties Participants at both county EOCs discussed their re spec t iv e roles for reentry operations.
All participants appeared highly proficient in their particular area of responsibility and indicated good understanding of the need for an integrated reentry response with followup responsibilities.
Sev eral examples of this were:
1.
The state police indicated that sheltered individuals should be delayed 30 minutes before release so as to permit the roads to be cleared of snow and to lessen the potential for initial traffic congestion.
2.
The offices for the age?. and nursing indicated that patients in need would be referred to other agencies, if necessary.
3.
The USDA planned to instruct livestock owners to keep their animals on stored feed until the county RDO determined the surface radiation levels to be safe.
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Wayne County EOC workers remained beyond the exercise termination to assure a full understanding of reentry operations. Monroe County appointed a committee to study the effects of the radiation on the population.
re Re commend at ion :
o Future exercises should allow additional time to q
demonstrate rather than simulate key reentry and recovery procedures (Reference NUREG-0654, N.1).
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Th e utility, state, and county representatives conferred on reentry plans at the EOF.
Although written procedures for reentry were not evident, the actions taken appeared to be appropriate.
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- 10. _ Relevance of the Exercise Experience State and County The scenario was sufficient to include most aspects of the state and county emergency plan.
The exercise provided practice by the participants in the complex network of communications needed for prompt action and a
comprehensive integrated response to an accident condition.
The exercise gave an indication of likely " log-jams" of information flor, and of personnel who might become overloaded with duties.
The exercise was felt to be beneficial by the participants of each state and county EOC.
Participants at the personnel monitoring center also felt the exercise was valuable; however, some of the field staff (fire depart-ment, state police, and county emergency workers) reported that they felt isolated.
This was due primarily to a lack of information to personnel in the field on the status of the event.
There were also incidents of lack of cooperation of field staff with federal observers, which resulted in delays and inconvenience to both participants and observers.
Scae aspects of the state emergency plan vera difficult to assess in this exercise due to the limited time available.
These aspects include backup staf f capability, adequacy of offsite radiation assessments that would take place over the longer term, and the ability te coordinate state, county, and federal accident assessment resources.
On January 25, 1982, four days after the exercise, an accident reaching the level of site-d rea emergency occurred at the Cinna plant. The experience gained during the exercise facilitated the response operation, as was noted by plant, state, county, and federal officials.
It was apparent that the plan, procedures, and response team personnel were fresh in the minds of the participants and facilitated the recovery effort.
Recommendations:
Consideration could be given to having the exercise o
simulate a longer time span to increase involvement of backup staff and to allow demonstration of procedures that would be used during the post-accident period to protect the public.
Flow of information back to field workers will be necessary e
to involve them effectively in the exercise.
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