ML20238A302
| ML20238A302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-067, OL-5-I-SC-67, NUDOCS 8708310015 | |
| Download: ML20238A302 (62) | |
Text
b&h y
Sc-f 7 y 666666666 6666666666dC666666666 4
O E
'87 AUG 24 P3 :56 l POST EXERCISE i e
e i
ASSESSMENT 1;
e e
SSSSSSSSSSSSSESSGGSSSGGGSSSSESSSG
~
)
Exercise of the New Jersey State, Ocean County and Twenty Municipalities Radiological Emergency Plans for OYSTER CREEK NIKLEAR GENERATING STAil0N J U N E 1,19 8 2 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 2 FRANK P. PETRONE l[083100ckOE00022 26 FEDERAL PLAZA PDR q
,y g,y, gpg Regional Director W
s l
l
-r$
l
\\
d I
s Is'ks b.
E'! si ill f
r r
f
! 3' So o
2 sen a e a Ra eCS
- c g 5%
EOU
$ S h" w
3 Id 9""
a y; "f %
a k>
a a
2 i
2!? ]
\\
e 6=
at sce s.
- "t si 1 k$U$h 3 t4 20#35E$$
- 2
4 e
a I
s.
CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION.
1 1.1 FEMA Responsibilities.
1 1.2 Exercise Event 2
1.3 Exercise Scenario Objectives.
2 1.4 Exercise Scenario.
6 1.5 Participating State and Local Organizations; 6
1.6 EAC Evaluation Objectives.
7 1.7 Evaluation Procedures and Criteria.
7 1.8 Exercise Critique......
8 1.9 Federal Observer Team..
9 1.10 Remedial' Action Procedures.
10 1.11 Review and Approval Procedures.
10 2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
12 2.1 Overview.
12 2.2 Summary of Activities - State of New Jersey..
12 2.3 Summary of Activities - Ocean County.
16 2.4 Sunnary of-Activities - Municipalities.
18 3 EVALUATIONS.
22 3.1 State of New Jersey............
22 3.2 Ocean County, New Jersey.
28 3.3 Ocean County Municipalities.
33 4
SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIINCIIS.........
51 4.1 State Functions.
51 4.2 Ocean County, New Jersey.
52 4.3 Ocean County Municipalities.
53 5
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES.
54 5.1 State Functions.
54 5.2 Ocean County, New Jersey.
56 5.3 Ocean County Municipalities.
57 6 CORRICTIVI ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES.
59 6.1 Schedule for Correcting Significant Deficiencies.
59 1
I 1
1 1
INTRODUCTION 1.1 FEMA RESPONSI3ILITIES on December 7,
1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all of f-site nuclear planning and response.
TEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological Emergency Planning include:
TaNing the lead in off-site emergency planning and review e
and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.
e Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conducted in these jurisdictions.
Coordinating the activities of other involved Federal and o
volunteer agencies:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Department of Ensrgy (DOE)
Department of Commerce /NOAA Department, of Transportation (DOT)
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 1 Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
Representatives o f. these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by TEMA.
Formal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the states sud involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by evaluation of those plans, their exercising and critiquing.
A public meeting,is held to acquaint the citizacry with the contents of the plans, answer questions about them, and receive suggestions on the plans.
This report evaluates the first joint exercise at the Oyster Creek site which involved the participation of state, local, and Oyst'er Creek personnel to determine whether the draft radiological emergency plans can be implemented.
1
2 1.2 EXERCISE E7ENT A radiological emergency exercise was conducted on March 16, 1982, between the hours of 6:00 a.m. (EST) and approximately 4:00 p.m.
B is exer-cise tested the ability of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County, 'and twenty municipalities within Ocean County to protect the public in the ev ent of a radiological emergency involving the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS). Bis station is operated by General Public Utilities (GPU) - Nuclear Corp. and is near Torked River, New Jersey.
1.3 EXERCISE SCENARIO OBJECTIVES he exercise scenario objectives were developed to test the ability of the state, county and local governments to respond in accord with existing plans in the event that a radiological emergency at the OCNGS af fected of f-site areas.
De exercise provided the basis for an evaluation by the participating organizations of the' adequacy of their emergency plans and of their competency in impimenting the plans.
Me benefits of the critique are the identifica-tion of problems and the development of the correc tive measures required to improve performance.
2e on-site and off-site objectives of the exercise scenario were as follows:
Emergency Oeerations Facilities and Resources Demonstrate that each EOC and emergency response facility has e
adequate space, equipment, and supplies, Demonstrate that each E0C and emergency response facility has e
adequate access control and that adequate security can be main tained.
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner; that messages are properly logged; that status boards are accurately maintained and updated; that appro-priate briefings are held and incoming EOC personnel are briefed and updated.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to activate and man l
e the emergency response facilities as appropriate for the existing acnergency class and to transfer functional responsi-I bilities to the appropriate operations center when escalating or de-escalating to a dif ferent emergency class.
o e
4 3
Demonstrate the ability of the State of New Jersey, Ocean Cbunty and the participating municipalities to activate and man the amergency operations centers as ' appropriate for the axisting muergency class.
- Demonstrate that licensee and off-site notification and alerting of officials and staff can be accomplished in a i
timely manner rad that all initial notification and updating is verified and logged.
e Demonstrate that the state and county can establish notifi-cation and communication links with all municipalities.
Demonstrate the ability of the licenses to communicate e
with their monitoring teams, rescue parties, and other persotaal as needed.
Demonstrate that the communications systems between the e
l licenote, the EOCs, the Federal agencies, and the contiguous states are operabla.
d Emergenev,gperations Management Demonstrate that state, county, and municipal elected and e
appointed officials and local off-site agencies such as first I
aid squads, police, and fits companies will provide tbsely support.
Demonstrate that the designated state, county, and municipal e
officials in each EOC are in command; that officials desig-nated in the plan are actually in charge of the overall coordination' of the response; and that designated off-site officials are represented in the ECF in accordance with the axisting emergency plane.
e Demonstrate that licensee management is in control in accordance with the saisting emergency plan.
Demonstrate coordination betrean state, county, municipal, e
and Federal ag sscles and between those agencies and the licensee.
Demonstrate that all agencies have 24-hour capability and e
that all agency ropeesentatives who are assigned emergency responsibilities can effectively operate from their planned locatien inside or outside the EOC.
Public Alerting and Notification Demonstrate that the state's decision to notify the public e
can be accomplished in an effective and timely manner.
Demonstrate the Emergency Broadcast System procedure by e
having an exercise EBS test message transmitted, Demonstrate that prompt notification is timely and is a
consonant with E3S activation.
4
4
}
i
)
s Public and Media Relations 1
Demonstrate the ability to establish a' public iriformation e
center; that there are accurata - 4 simely press reltrases and briefings and hhat desig.. phblic information personnel are implementing fpeie ' procedures.
Demonstrate that caergmicy response information macerial e
will be available to the public.
6 Durastrate coordination and arrangemerds for dealing e
}witto namorIt.
3 AedldentAssessment Demonstrate the ability of licar see personnel to recognize an e
emergency initiating event and properly characterize and s
classify the energency according to the pre-established Emergency Action levels and make proper notifications to 4
off-site agencies.
Demoncrate that the State of New Jersey and CD" Nuclest e
personnel can perform off-site dose projections and accident 1.
assessment for both radioactive noble gases and radiciodina i
quickly and accurately.
Demonstrate the field monitoring capa'oility of the l'icensee, e
state, and county, for (1) predetermined area readiation levels; and (2) air sampling and analysis for radiciodine and parriculates in the plume exposure EPZ for pitsas exposure rate verification; demonstrate that results can be effectively.
used by the licensee and the state in determining protective action recommendations.
Demonstrate that appropriate sampling can be done in the e
ingestion EPZ.
41though' no radioactivity antlyses will be performed. Samples will be forward s
1-13 concentration in milk will be predetermined to demonstrate that the results of such analyses could be effectively used to determine fasestion protective action recommendation.
Demonstrate that independent accident assessment can be e
accomplished by the Department of Environmental Protection of tt.s Staen of New Jersey; that they are capable of recommend-ing appropriate protective actions and that information is communicated between the licensee and the state accident assessment personnel.
Demonstrate that the field monitoring teams of the li. censes, e
state and county can be dispatched and deployed in a timely I
sanner; that ceamunications are adequate; that radiologi cal sonitoring equipr.ent is functional; that simulated data are g
accurately obtained and transmitted through their respcetive channels.
Demonstrate the ab.dity of the licensee to obtain and analyze a post-accident saeple.
l
=
5 e
Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to assess the e
accident and provide appropriate protective action recommendations, Demonstrate the ability of the state to evaluate and make e
decisions to take protective actions based on recommenda-tions from the licensee and their independent as ses sment s.
Demonstrate the ability of the state to receive meteoro-e logical data and apply the data to the making of recom-mandations.
Actions to Protect the Public Demonstrate protective actions (including mock evacuation e
and sheltering) by preparing an exercise scenario which provides for a hypothetical total integrated whole body or thyroid dose exceeding the evacuation PAGs for at least the nearest residents.
Demonstrate the ability to perform personnel monitoring e
and decontamination.
e Demonstrate the following for at least one congregate care / decontamination center:
that it can be opened and staffed on a timely basis; that records can be maintained; that adequate provisions for the care of the evacuees can be located; and that health and sanitation requirements can be met.
e Demonstrate that access control points are established promptly and according to the plan, and that access and traffic control can be ef fectively Laplemented with 24-hour capabilities.
o Hetich, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Demonstrate the ability of the designated hospital to e
treat an off-site hypothetically contaminated injured patient and that the ambulance service can ef fectively trans po rt off-site hypothetically contaminated injured personnel to the hospital.
Demonstrate that the ambulance and associated equipment can be decontaminated and that contaminated clothing and sacerials are properly disposed of.
Demonstrate that off-site agencies with on-site support e
responsibilities such as fire and first aid squad personnel can gain access to the site and proceed to the correct location.
Demonstrate that appropriate state, county, and municipal e
emergency workers are briefed, receive dosimeters and II supplies before assignments; that permatent records are maintained; and that the opened decontamination centers are properly manned and supplied.
N
.4 t
Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to account for e
personnel on-site and to provide adequate radiation protec-tion services such as dosimetry, personnel monitoring and the ability to perform area surveys under emergency cond itions.
Demonstrate the ability of the licensee to enter a highly e
contaminated area for the purpose of rescuing casualties.
Demonstrate the ability of the license to provide first aid e
and transport to a suitably prepared medical facility for an injured individual who has been contaminated or has received a high radiation dose.
Recovery and Reentrv Operations e Demonstrate that licensee, state and local reentry procedures such as health and sanication, safety criteria for acceptable radioactive contamination levels, reentry access control, and public information are implemented.
1.4 EIERCISE SCENARIO The scenario provid ed a simulated series of events on-site that resulted in all four classes of emergency conditions being declared.
The scenario began at approximately 6:00 a.m. with the notice of unusual ev ent.
Within an hour the notification of alert was issued and the staffing of E0ca and other operations centers began.
At about 10: 00 a.m., a site area amargency was declared and the siren warning and E35 systems were activated.
Emergency workers were activated at this time.
The ganaral emergency was declared at approxirtately 11:15 a.m.
Evacuation of specific areas was ordered by the Governor during the time of general emergency.
The general energency condition remained in effect throughout the afternoon until about 2:00 p.m. when it downgraded to a site area emergency.
Further downgrading of conditions continued until the azercise was terminated at about 4:00 p.m.
~
1.5 PARTICIPATING ST.AIZ AND LOCAL ORGANT.ZATIONS i
Participating of f-site state organizations includ ed the New Jersey Scace De partment of Semith, the New Jersey National Guard, New Jersey 3 tate Police, Bureau of Radiological Protection, and other state agencies. Partic i-pacing local organizations include Ocean County, municipalities within Ocean
e I
)
County, (at their EOCs), and other local support groups, e.g.,
fire and police departments and volunteer organizations such as the Anerican Red Cross and the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES).
1.6 RAC EVALULH ON OBJECTIVES General objectives of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for the operational phase of the plans were to observe and evaluate the exercise, focusing on the ten functional areas listed and briefly described below. These ten functional areas include approximately 75 specific critaria taken directly from Section II of NUREG-0654/FZMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
This NUREG document is the basic planning document on which the state and local plans, and also the criteria for observing and evaluating the exercise, are based.
Functional Areas:
e Emergency Operations Facilities and Rasources (Space Internal Communications, Displays, Security) e Alerting and Mobilization of officials and Staff (Staffing, 24-hour Capability. Alerting Timeliness)
Emergency Operations Management e
(Organization, Control, Leadership, Supporting Officials, Decision Making)
Public Alerting and Notification e
(Means of Notification, Effectiveness) e Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Tacilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination) e Accident Assessment (Staff and Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Calculations, Use of PAGs) e Actions to Protect the Public (Sheltering, Evacuation, Reception and Care, Trans-portation)
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Meausres e
(Acesss Control Adequacy of Equipment, Use of KI) e Recovery and "Raentry Operations Relevance of the Exercise Experience e
1.7 EVALUAUCN PROCIDURES AND CRITERIA The EXERCRIT form provides the means for each observer to record and evaluate his observations of the exercise in a consistent f o rm a t.
This
~
G EXERCRIT contains about 74 elements, most of which were developed directly from criteria taken from Section II - Planning Standings and Evaluation Criteria of NUREG-0654/TEMA REP-1, Rev 1.
Many of the 74 elements are specific to only certain locations or energency response functions so that no individual observer can evalete all 74 elements. In order to ensure complace coverage, each observer was 3.ven an assignment sheet listing those elements that he must evaluage.
Zach obser er then evaluated each element observed according to the following scheme:
Capability outstanding - During the exercise no deficiencies e
were noted and no unprovement is needed.
capability Cood - Capabilities displayed as implied in the e
plan, though minor deficiencies may hsve been noted.
Capability Acceetable - The function was understood and e
accomplished. However, deficiencies were noted which could limit effective performance.
Capability Weak - The function had significant deficidacies e
or the intent of the plan was not followed.
Capability Lacking - The scenario exercised called for a e
specific response which was not demonstrated.
Capability Not Observed - For one reason or another, the e
observer was not able to establish a racing. Either the observer was not present to witness the function, the activity was not called for in the scenario, or not applicable to the site or functier. Th'is rating does not imply that a deficiency exists.
1 After the exercise was terminated, the individual observers met with their team leader to consolidate all of ths data for each element.
Next, the team leaders ensured that the data entered into the consolidated EXERCRIT was completeo and represented a consensus of the observer teams. The RAC Chairman then prepared summary statements based on the data in the consolidated EXER-CR.ITS for each of the team functional areas listed in Sec.1.6 above.
These summary scacements formed the basis of the Interim Critique which was presen-tad to the state and local governments in public vichin two days of the exercise.
1.8 IIERCISE CRITIQUE An interim critique of the March 16.1982 exercise was conducted at 11:00 a.m., March 18, 1982, at the Lacey Township Municipal Hall, in Lacey
- ? owns hip, New Jersey.
Mr. Trank P.
Petrone, Regional Director of TEMA Region II presented the Interim Critique of the off-site exercise evaluations.
9 1.9 FEDERAL OBSERVER TE.AM A 29-nember federal observer team was established by the FEMA-Region II RAC chairman for observing the response at Oyster Creek.
Obs ervers included:
Observer Agency Locale / Functions l
F. Petrone FEMA (Regional Oversight Responsibility Director)
- 1. Kovieski FEMA (RAC Chairman)
Oversight Responsibility H. Fish DOE (Team Leader)
Ocean County EOC
- 1. Reynolds IIMA (Team Leader)
State EOC G. Smith FEMA (Team Leader)
On-Site EOF S. Glass TEMA (Team Leader)
Lacey Township ECC A. Davis FEMA NJSP Command Post /Comm.
M. Goodkind ANL*
State EOC E. Levine ANL*
Bureau of Rad. Proc. FCP I. Eusar TEMA Ocean County EOC/Comm.
N. Stauber NWS On-Site EOF L. Lewis ANL*
Radiological Monitoring H. Mittelhauser ANL*
Radiological Monitoring L. Phillips DOE Radiological Monitoring N. Chipman INKL**
Radiological Monitoring / Sampling J. Tanner INEL**
Radiological Monitoring / Sampling J. Kaller INEL**
Radiological Monitoring / Medical D. Inscht INEL**
Radiological Monitoring /Decon Center
~
T. Bart s ANL*
Access Control / Island Hts EOC/Public Alert F. Fishman.
FEMA Access Control /Public Alert R. Rodriquez FEMA Congregate Care / Mass Care / Evacuation M. Jackson FEMA Media K. Lawrence FEMA Media J. O' Sullivan TEMA Barnegat Light Borough EOC
~
J. Bravo FEMA Harvey Cedars Borough EOC T. Holliday TEMA Long Beach Township EOC J. Jchsson TEMA Ocean Township EOC/Barnegat Township EOC Beach Haven Borough
/ Beachwood Borough 1 Berkeley Township Dover Township Island Heights Borough Manchester Township P. McIntire FEMA Ocean Gate Borough R. Garelik FEMA Pine Beach Borough Seaside Heights Borough Seaside Park Borough Ship Bottom Borough South Toms River Borough (Staf ford Toveship Surf City Borough
- Argonne National Laboratory (under contract to FEMA)
i I
e t
10
)
In addition to the FIMA-Region II RAC observer team, contractor personnel and visitors observed the exercise.
1.10 REFDIAL ACTICH PROCEDURES Pr ov id ed under Parts 4 and. 5 of this report are evaluations and recounseada tions for remedial actions.
These evaluations and recommendations i
are based on the applicable Planning Standards (from which the state and local plans were developed) and Evaluation Criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654/TIMA REP-1, Rev. 1.
Other minor recommendations are suggested that are not keyed to NUREG-0654, but which could improve operations.
In Part 4 of this report, recommendations. are provided and are keyed to each of the state and local jurisdictions that are required to take-re-medial ac tions. State and local jurisdictions should submic to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take.
If remedial actions cannot be ins tituted innaadiately, then a detailed plan for scheduling and implementing remedial actions must be provided which include a time frame (dates) for completion.
The Regional Director of TEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and 'l.ocal Programs and Support, Washington, D.C.,
that any deficiencies noted in the exercise have been reported and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
l 1.I1 REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES A state that seeks review and approval by TEMA of its plan and annexes submits an application for review and approval to the TEMA Regional Director of the region in which the state is locates.
The application, in the form of a letter from the Governor, or other state of ficial as the Governor may desig-nate, is to contain one copy of the completed state plan with an indication that deficiencies have been corrected.
Upon receipt of a state plan, the Regional Director initiates the review process as described in 44 CTR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123. Tuesday, June 24, 1980 (Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness). After the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) and the TEMA Regional staff have completed their review, including the waluation of the supporting exercise and the public meeting i
i 11 required in proposed 44 CTR Part 350, the TDiA Regional Director will issue a r epo rt to TD(A Headquarters regarding the state and local govertament plans, procedures, and preparedness capab ilit ie s.
Bis report will consist of a s uunnary of the overall findings and determinations in respect to the pr o-cedures, tr aining, resources, staffing level qualifications, and equipment av ailab ility.
The TEMA Associate Director is to conduct such review of' this report as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
1 i
9
'S O
O e
9 e
- - - - - - - - ~ - - -. - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 1
12
)
i 2 EIECITTIVE
SUMMARY
]
A joint exercise of emergency preparedness plans for the off-site area surrounding the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station on March 16, 1982, was
~
evs Luated by a team of 29 federal observers.
Participating in the exercise were the power plant owners, General Public Utilities (GPU) - Nuclear Corp.,
and appropriate officials and agencies for the State of New Jersey, Ocean The State Emer-County, New Jersey, and municipalities within Ocean County.
gency Operations Center (EOC) was located at West Trenton, the main Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was at the plant site, with a backup EOF located at 1.akewood. The Bureau of Radiological Protection forward command post (BRPTCP) was located in Berkeley Township, Ocean County.
1 2.1 OVERVIIW In general, the participants performed in a professional and competent manner.
Decision making se the state, county, and local levels, along with j
resources and staff to implement decisions was very good. Bare was exce!. lent pa:-ticipation by officials at all levels and there were numerous demonstra-i J
tiens of good response capabilities.
hose deficiencies that were noted are given in greater detail in the
~
summaries provided in this section, in the Exercise Observations-Section 3, in the Summary of Significant Deficiencies-Section 4 and in the Summary of Mitor Deficiencies-Section 5.
2.2 SI24 MART OF ACTIVITIES - STATE OF NEW JERSIT Emergency Oterations racilities and Resources Emergency operations f acilities and resources were good, vich only minor deficiencies noted.
Se primary state facilities, which were the ECC and the 3RPFCP were good and were well organized and ' operated during the exercise.
Internal ecemunic ations were excellent, however, some initial
~
incoming sessages were intercepted by the situation room staff.
Bis minor flav vas promptly identified and resolved.
De 3RPFCP at Berkaley Township had occasional difficulties with security during the exercise. For example, a
member of the press entered the 3RPFCP unchallenged. De state police forward
13
)
command post and f arsite EOF se Lakewood were well managed.
It was noted that interplay between the state polios and EOF personnel was slightly hindered by the arrangement of the operations which was divided between two floors.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff' Alerting. and mobilization of of ficials and staf f were good with only.
ainor deficiencies noted. Alerting of all personnel was prompt and ef fective.
The capability of alternate means for notifying key individuals was observed.
Twenty-four hour alerting capability was' ef fectively simulated in the EOC, the-forward cossand posts and the EOF.
However, there is some question as-to whether sufficient personnel are available to maintain a 24-hour continuous response.
As in the alerting, mobilization was also prompt and ef fective.. The facilities were staf fed in a timely manner and communications were promptly activated.
All laboratory facilities were staffed within 45 minutes of ene alert. The only deficiency noted was one as.sessment team was slightly delayed-due to vehicle unavailability.
Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management was good with only minor deficiencies noted.
Organization and control'of activities were good and the appropriate -
organizations were involved in the response.
Written procedures were ef-factively utilized and were consistent with the operations requirements.
Participation of elected of ficials was outstanding.
The Governor, his staf f and the Commissioner of Environmental Protection were present in the EOC and demonstrated first-hand knowledge of operations.
At the BRPFCP, strong leadership was provided by the Radiological (EAD) officer.
Public Alerting and Notification.
Public alerting was weak with significant deficiencies. noted. Public alerting and notification were accesplished through sirens and Emergency-
~
Broadcast System (EBS) sessages. In. general, issuance of the EBS massages and the sounding ~of sirens'were coordinated.
In addition, no comprehensive f eedback system for verification of the sounding of ' sirens or of the broad-casting of E35 messages were observed at the state.
E3S procedures are not 1
1
)
permanent and were used for the day of the exercise only.
There is no evi-dance that this temporary E3S system has been approved by the FCC to meet minimal requirements.
E3S messages which were issued were timely but lacked sufficient details and more frequent E35 messages should have been issued.
In-addition, written copies of E3S messagas were not distributed at the state EOC or transmitted to county and media center.
Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were lacking with significant deficiencies I
noted.
The state public information officer (PIO) was not close enough to -
the decision making process to have sufficient access to all the necessary information.
The joint media center was used as the point of contact for media by the state, but was lacking in both facilities and staf f.
Significant deficiencies were observed both in the flow of information between the state and county and in. passing information to the public and news media.
No news releases were issued, and the center was lacking in maps, radios, and adequate telephone cosasunications.
The presene state of public education is deficient.
Public education.
brochures for the 10-mile EPZ residents have not been mailed.
Posters for I
transient areas are planned. The utility sent out a one page letter to some -
1 residents explaining the exercises and local newspapers carried public notices explaining the exercises.
Rumor control phones were staffed during the exercise.
The coll-free number (800 number) had five lines but the capability of five lines to handle rumors is questionable.
The two individuals staf fing the phones understood-basic procedures but need more training regarding overall rumor control.
l Accident Assessment Accident as sessment was excellent with only minor deficiencies noted.
Accident assessment operations in the EOC were good and included the utiliza-
~
tion of computer capabilities for _ radiological calculations.
The dapability to identify and resolve conflicts in data was demonstrated.
Equipment and
~
display for dose assessments and for acnitoring were good.
The capabilities of the state monitoring teams varied, but overall were adequate.
There ucre-l 1
scoe discrepancies between monitoring teams in terms of the level of training l
15
)
and equipment availab le.
Supplemental radiological monitoring was simulated by helicopter.
A backup team was also employed to investigate questionable readings thereby demonstrating a capability for ' verification.
The state also demonstrated good laboratory capabilities and facilities.
Actions to protect the Public Actions to protect the public were good with only minor deficiencies-noted.
At the state EOC, of ficials ' demonstrated first-hand knowledge and awareness for all aspects of protective. action.
The appropriate state agencies were consulted for technical advice prior to formulation of recom-mandations.
The decision to evacuate was personally reviewed by the Governor and implemented at his direction.
l Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures were good with only minor deficiencies noted.
Distribution of potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers was simulated and the possibility of use by the populace was reviewed by the state.. All emergency workers reported for decontamination. Effective
~
utilization of pocket dosimeters varied greatly among individual emergency workers. Radiation exposure levels of field monitoring teams were received at the forward command and reviewed by the State Health Department.
Escovery and Reentrv Recovery and reentry operations were lacking with significant defi-ciencies noted.
A thorough and completa discussion of ' considerations and requirements for reentry was conducted at the state EOC.
This discussion included the state police, state envirennental protection agency and the-agricultural and health departments.
It effectively demonstrated the know-ledge at the state EOC of how to recover from an incident.
However, accuni recovery. and reentry operations for this scenario were not demonstrated, nor were municipalities provided guidance on recovery and reentry operations.
~
This was due partly to the short duration of the exercise. The stat's forward command post at 1.akewood did not participate due to a reported actual chemical spill which required a response.
Recovery operations were not demonstrated either at the Berkaley forward command post.
_.______mm_..
16.
l j
Relevance of the Exercise Excerienee_
j i
he exercise was a positive experience for all state participants.. De j
f participants believed the ex ercise ef fectively tested the emergency responsa system capabilities as well as serving as a useful training tool.
- However, the pertinence o f assignments for the field teams was varied, with some only performing mobilization and deployment while others actually performed monitoring.
I I
2.3 StlMMARY OF ACTIVITIES - OCIAN COUNTY l
a Emergency Coerations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good with~ only minor i
deficiencies noted.
The Ocean County EOC was able to be fully operational in j
spite of being recently relocated.
An integrated communications system was l
d emons trated.
Appropriate maps, charts and update boards were displayed and security and control measures were good.
A noted deficiency was related to the dedicated " hot line" which was not inst alled.
Two commercial dial phones were used as " hot lines." The dedicated system was to be installed within two weeks after the exercise.
?
Alerting and Mobilization of O fficials and Staf f I
Alerting and mobilization of officials and staf f were good with only minor deficiencies noted.
Ocean County demonstrated prompt mobilization o f l
emergency personnel.
Capability for 24-hour mobilization was demonstr ated I
throughout the organization, including field units. 2e county also, overall, d demonstrated good capabilities for 24-hour continuous emergency r es ponse.
However, there is some question as to whether the county has 24-hour radio-logical monitoring capabilities.
E,mergenev Operations Management good vich only minor deficiencies l
Emergency operations management was
)
noted.
Se emergency management responsibilities were clearly defined and well executed.
Staff briefings were effective and timely.
Ef fective parti-
]
cipation by elected officiIls was denoustrated.
(
l l
i j
i
17
}
1 Public Alerting and Notification
)
L Alerting and notification of the public we re acceptable with defi-ciencias noted that limited effective performance.
The deficiencies are the siren system and public education.
Due to an equipment. inadequacy during the exercise, there van a delay in activation of the siren system.
In addition, a capability to verify siren system activation was not demonstrated.
A limited survey during the exercise indicated that only about 50% of the population surveyed heard the sirens and that most people did not know how to respond.
Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were weak with significant deficiencies noted.
A joint state-county media was established ' at Tous River during the exercise. Significant deficiencies were observed both in the flow of informa-tion between the county and state and in passing information to the public and news media. No news releases were issued, and the center was lacking in maps, radios, and adequate telephone communications.
The county spokesperson at the Joint Media Center in Toms River us not furnished with information about state amargency information procedures and as a result could not respond to pedia inquiries. There i's no evidence of an adequate education program for the transient and permanent population.
Accident Assessment Accident assessment was acceptable with deficiencies noted that limit effective performance. Although the county radiological monitoring capability represents an interim and supportive role to the - State Bureau of Radiation Protection, the county's monitoring equipment,- resources and training were observed to be deficient.
Equipment was limited to whole body exposure monitoring and teams were not trained in methods of monitoring liquids se, reams or earth samples, for radiological contamination.
No capabilities to monitor radioactive iodine were demonstrated. -
Actions to Frotect the Public Actions to protect the public were good with only minor deficiencies noted.
Th e county EOC demonstrated timely initiation for ev acu a t io n,
J gg a
reception care and transportation of individuals.
Medical, first aid, Red I
Cross and social services were integrated and coordinated from the EOC.
Instructions were quickly formulated and communicated to operational units.
The congregate care facility that was demonstrated and the planned relocation l
facilities do not appear to have the capacity to handle the potential evacuees for which they were intended. Decontamination expertise and security was also lacking at the congregate carw facility.
I l'
Health, Medical and Exposure Control L
' Health, medical and exposure control were good with only minor de-ficiencies noted.
Field nonitoring teams had adequate doeinsters and read them at proper intervals.
The operations at the. decontamination center, j
.overall, were good. However, it was noted that the decontamination center was j
located within the 10 mile EPE. This center did not exhibit adequate controls for the liquid wastes from decontamination and was lacking certain amenities such as sufficient number of showers. The medical drill activity was success-fully descastrated by a staff of well-trained personnel.
1acoverv and teentrv Operations Recovery and reentry operations were lacking as the response was called for but not descastrated. This was due partly to the short duration of the exercise.
The esercise was terminated prior to demonstration of recovery and reentry.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience The time constraints inhibited demonstration of full capabilities.
It was felt that optional events could be pre planned to more fully test the response systems.
While a number of deficient areas were noted, the partici-1 l
pants felt their overall response espabilities are good.
2.4
SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITTES - MUNICIPAI.ITIES This section summarizes the activities of all municipalities that took part in the exercise.
The activities of specific municipalities are given in section 3.3.
l l
_______________._-_______m.
_.._..m.__m
9 19 Emergencv Oeerations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good with only minor deficiencies noted.
Most municipal EOCs had facilities with adequate space and security systems.
Communication systems. were in place and operational with backup systems demonstrated.
The Emergency Management Radio System was o perational and effective.
A few EOCs had the State Police Emergency. band acd others are expected to install it.
The thility to dispatch their own resources including fire, first aid, Department of Public Works,' and police, was demonstrated.
- he majority of the EOCs also had amateur radio civil amargency operators av ailab le.
. Internal commun ic ations, including message handling, were good.
Displays of maps and other information were generally weak and require additional consideration.
This is especially true of maps showing the disr.ribution of transient population and evacuation. routes.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good vita only minor deficiencies noted.
knicipalities, -in general, demonstrated efficient staff with backup capability to handle 24-hour operations.
Some preposition-ing in anticipation of the drill ves obvious but the ability to. mobilize personnel was demonstrated.
& nicipal EOC staff and their fire, police, first aid, and public wrks ' parsonnel responded promptly and efficiently.
Emergency Management Operations Emergency managmeent operations were good with only minor deficiencies noted.
In most cases, the individual in charge in each EOC was familiar with the community's responsibilities in case of an incident.
Written procedures were lacking in a number of the municipal EOCs and actual plans and procedures were utilized to varying degrees.
In most situations, E0C staf f were kept appraised of activities at the municipal level, though formal briefings were relatively rare.
Elected officials d eoustrated varying ' degrees of participation.
l Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting and notification were acceptable with deficiencies noted that limited ef fective performance.
Most municipalities utilised route
(
i i
i
)
i
20 1
alerting in which public service vehicles with loud speakers were used to broadcast the information to residents.
In most cases, however, it is unknown a large transient f
if this system has adequate alerting capability when population is pr e s e nt.
While most municipal EOCs acknowledged hearing the sirens, there is no plan in place to verify siren activation back to the county EOC.
In one instance, the municipality said they received no alerting, either by siren or direct contact by the county EOC.
Public and Media Relations f
Public and media relations were not observed and no deficiencies are implied.
This response was generally not applicable to the municipalities.
I Accident Assessment l
Accident assessment was not observed and no deficiencies are implied, f
l Accident asses sment is not considered applicable to municipalities.
Actions to Protect the Public i
Actions to protect the public were not observed and no deficiencies are
]
implied. However, a number of municipalities reviewed activities and plans in their respective communities to assure no impediment existed to hinder 'evacua-tion control.
1.ong Beach Township police identified potential bridge impedi-ment and initiated early evacuation to compensate. Similarly, Seaside Heights and Seaside Park socad that the narrowing of the main evacuation route from 5 lanes to 2 can also be a potential probles. The overall plan does not address the issue of coordination with adjacent communities and the county in the area of independent evacuation prior to the stata government' declaration.
Health, Medical and Excesure Control Measures Health, medicti and exposure control measures were weak with signifi-cant deficiencies noted.
These control measures were variable ancas the various municipalities.
A number of municipalities were unavaie of the availability of potassium iodide fcrr emergency workers. ~ Emergency workers in most municipaticles were not trained in the proper use of pocket dosimeters and were unaware of appropriate dose limitations.
Many workers were not
21
)
supplied with the dosimeter equipment even though it was available in some cases.
andkeencrvOperations Recovery Recovery and reentry operations were not observed and no deficiencies are implied.
This was due partly to the short duration of the exercise. The exercise was terminated prior to demonstration of recovery and reentry.
Relevance of the Exercise Erperience Generally, the local participants felt the exercise was beneficial and their response and resources were adequately tested.
However, the munici-palities that were not in the plume generally felt there was too much " dead time" during the exercise and they could have been more actively involved.
O e
D e
L 82 4
i 3 EVALUATIONS l
This section presents a more detailed discussion of the performance of l
the participating agencies and localities, as noted by the observers.
The l
format used follows the can areas listed in Section 1.6, with state, county, and municipaticies presented separately.
3.1 STATE OF,NEW JERSET 3.1.1 Emergene? Ooerations Facility and Resources The state emergency response facilities include the emergency opera-tions center (EOC) at the State Police Headquarters in West Trenton, the New Jersey State Police forward command post (NJSPFCP) and che'farsite E0y located at Lakewood, and the state Bureau of Radiation Protection forward ccumaand post (BRPFCP) located in Berkeley Township.
At the state EOC, facilities and resources were observed to be good.
The internal and external cessmunications were excellent.
Contact was main.
tained with the contiguous local governments within the EPZ.
Prepared tables
'snd forma appeared to be used effectively.
The ' facilities appear good, but are somewhat small to allow for all workers and displays. The dose assessment
~
operations were confined to a small space, and it was observed that an adjoin-ing room may have been available, indicating better use could have been made I
of available space.
Security at the IOC was adequate, but there was some problem in ini-tially setting up the security system. Identification badges were effectively used.
Displays and maps were good and.were effectively used at the IOC, I
although display space was somewhat limited.
It was observed, however, that the emergency planning and area saps have sone numbers that dif fer from sector-numbers, which can be somewhat confusing.
The NJSP forward ce===M post facilities at Laksvood were observed to be good." There was evidence of some minor telephone commuelcations problems, but overall capability of the communications was good. ' The major inadequacy-was that state police and EOF operations were on separate floors.
This cau' sed some problems in internal communication 'and overall operations.
l 23 i,
At the 3RPTCP, emergency operations facilities and resources were also observed to be good. Com:aunications consisted of a police radio, s tate radio, and telephone which were ef fectively utilized.
The communications with the s tate IOC were adequate.
The 3RPTCP displayed status boards and maps' showing sampling points, but there were no maps showing population or location of care centers.
The major weakness at the BRPTCP was lax security.
During the exercise, for example, a member of the press entered unchallenged.
I 3.1.2 Alertint and Mobilization of officials and Staff The alerting and mobilization of officials and staff 'in the state ECC were observed to be good.. Each officer had instruction packets at his home and of fice which included necessary instructions and telephone numbers.
The capability of maintaining both 24-hour initial and' continuous emergency responses was good.
However, availability of enough personnel for. 24-hour continuous coverage was questioned for some response - agencies.
The timely dispatch of a representative.co the licensee's near-site EDT was. good.
However, a sinor deficiency was noted regarding which personnel should be assigned to this task.
Some einer training deficiencies were noted in the areas of slerting, notifying and mobilizing emergency response personnel, and in the prompt activation of emergency response communications.
As at the EOC, the NJSPFCP and the EOF showed good alerting and
~
notification capabilities.
It was demonstrated that 24-hour coverage could be maintained.vich present staff.
The emergency communications equipment was good and was activated in a timely manner.
It was noted that the team sent to the EDT did not have an assessment of ficer.
At the 31PTCP, it was observed that 24-hour initial response and 24-hour continous response capabilities and personnel alerting procedures were l
acceptable.
The radiological monitoring teams arrived by helicopter and the mobile laboratory arrived about 45 minutes later.
Communications were ac-tivated promptly. The only mobilization problem noted was that the deployment of one assessment team was slightly delayed due to the unavailability of a i
l vehicle. This situation was quickly rectified.
.j 1
l l
l I
i 1
-_--_._---_m
24-
)
3.1.3 Emergenev coerations Management The emergency operations management of the state ECC was good and j
effective cooperation between the state and county was observed. It was' ef fectively demonstrated that emergency response management roles were well known and were conducted well. It was demonstrated,that a specific person was authorized to request federal assistance.
The governor, his executive staff, and the comunissioner of environmental protection were present in the EOC for auch of the szercise.
Emergency operations management at the NJSPFCP was good and it was demonstrated that one individual was in charge.
It appeared that good primary and support functions were effectively assigned and that specific organiza-tions had been assigned to the emergency response.
As in the other areas, emergency operation management at the BRPFCP was good.
The Bureau of Radiation Protection radiological (RAD) officer was observed to provide strang leadership in all operations at the forward commaand post.
However, in a prolonged emergen::y, operations would be facilitated by delegating some of his responsibility to others.
The Department of Health effectively charted dosimeter readings and assured that milk samples were obtained.
The emergency classification system was consistently used. and the RAD officer gave good and frequent update briefings to the staff.
Some confusion seemed to exist at the BRPFCP with nomenclature.
Specifically observed was confusion between the terms aR and 1, designation of wind directions (does it ref er to the direction the wind is blowing toward or direction it is blowing from) and identification.of two sampling points.
It was also observed, that while the RAD officer was clearly in charge, and that the 31PFCP was operated in a skillful, effective manner, there was little delegation of functions to a back-up 1AD officer.
3.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification The public alerting and notification during the exercise were, observed to be weak. Activation of the sirens and the emergency broadcast system (EBS) was coordinat ed, although the siren activation was delayed about 15 minutes due to an equipment malfunction.
The sounding of the sirens was verified at the state EOC through telephone contact with the - county ECC.
However, no
1 25 s
i I
means for verifying the activation of all sirens and the E3S by the state was obs erv ed.
The E35 messages generally lacked sufficient detail.
More frequent EBS messages should be issued to announce important ac t io ns such as the l
a state of emergency.
Info rmation received from governor's declaration of participating radio stations showed that no permanent E3S procedures are in place.
The EBS procedures used were devised for this exercise and do not
{
conform to established procedures nor have they been approved by the Federal Communication Cosuaission (FCC).
3.1.5 Public and Media Relations Overall, at the state level, public and media relacions were vtak.
1 Effective communications between the Joint Media Center and state EOC were not demons trated.
At the state EOC, the public information officer (PIO) was isolated from the decision making level and thus the flow of information was not ef fectively established.
It was not demonstrated that a media spokesperson with access to all i
necessary information had been asssigned and there was no clear plan for trans f erring information between spokespersons.
There were no news releases published during the exercise and except for media coverage insnediately prior to the exercise, no other public information program was demonstrated.
Hard copies of the E3S messages were not available at the Joint Med'ia Center or county EOC.
Rumor control at the state 10C consisted of five telephone lines and its existence was not publicised during the exercise.
The capacity of this system to handle a large number of inquiries is questionable.'
3.1.6 Accident Assessment overall, the state capability in the area of accident assessment was very good. The EOC utilized computer capabilities for radiological calculations and also demons trated alternate means to check and verify the calculations. There were good posting and utilization of the data.- Decisions relating to recommendations such as protective actions were well thought out and were based on the radiological calculations.
The state also demonstrated that, between the mobile van and state radiological laboratory in Trenton, well equipped and available laboratory' facilities did exist.
l
26 As at the state EOC, the forward command post (FCP) at Berkeley Town-ship demonstrated good radiological assessment capabilities.
All state and county radiological monitoring data were transferred through the FCP to the state in a timely manner.
Field monitoring teams were judiciously deployed from the TCP as was the helicopter equipped ~ vich monitoring instrumonc4. The special monitoring team was also well utilized when some questionable moni-toring data required verification.
The mobile laboratory was also brought to the TCP in a timely manner.
It was well equipped and de'monstrated capabili-ties to analyze water, milk, and carbon to distinguish radioactive iodine from noble gases.
The TCP had the capability to recommend procactive action, but this was not called for during the exercises.
Generally, the performance of the state radiological monitoring teams was good.
The teams were equipped with Geiger counters and Reuter-Stokes (R-5) or Sam II instrumentation depecding upon whether their monitoring assignment was to be outside or ins ide the pluais.
However, the amount of back-up and supplementary moni. coring equipment varied between the teams.
The vanguard teams did not demonstrate the use of silver zeolite filters or have particulate filters available.
The lack of the particulate filters could cause radioactive particulate to interfere with the measurement of radioac-tive iodine.
One Reuter-Stokes tems only had two instruments which measured 0-1000 uR/Hr end 0-50 R/Hr respec'tively.
They did not have any capability to monitor between these levels.
The other R-S team had a third instrument chat allowed such capability.
One vanguard team did not have a ground probe to measure ground contamination.
Some teams did not have adequate maps to aid in moving to various sampling points.
Adequate dosimeters and badges were observed so that workers could assess their personal doses.
Some teams were equipped with protective clothing and respirators, but this was not verified for all teams.
With the exception of one of the Reuter-Stokes teams, all teams were observed to be adequately trained and appeared to be versed in the operations of the instrumentatica and how they were to be u-i.lized.
3.1.7 Acti'ons to Protect the Public The state actions to protect the public were observed to be good. The people involved appeared to follow a logical decision process concerning implementation of protective measures. The Department of Health contacted its
27 I
representative at the energency office in Trenton and the staff contacted hospitals and nursing homes, and simulated an evacuacion of the persons in these institutions.
The decision to ev acuate was personally reviewed by the governor and implemented at his direction.
3.1.8 Health, Medical and Excesure Control Measures The health, medical and exposure control measures generally were good.
There seems to be good knowledge concerning the purpose of potassium iodine (KI) for emergency workers and the possible' use of KI by the general populace was reviewed.
Emergency workers were not issued KI during the exercise, but generally were aware of where to obtain KI (Department of Health) and also knew they would be notified when and if they were actually to administer potassium iodide.
The Department of Health seemed to have good capability of maintaining 24-hour dosage records.
The reporting of monitoring team worker axposure to the 3RPFCP was only adequ.ece and was not done on any* consistent basis.
While all monitoring team members had dosimeters and badges, not all reported frequent readings to the 3RPTCP.
In some cases, readings were taken by workers when they were in
~
cle plume, but not when they were outside of the plume.
At least one team knew the maximum dose they could receive before reporting and requesting further ins tructions concerning the need for decontamination.
It was not determined whether other workers knew this information.
3.1.9 Recovery and Reentrv Recovery and reentry operations were not observed during this exercise as it was terminated prior to simulating reentry.
This was partly due to the short duration of the exercise.
A rather detailed discussion of this phase was held at the state ECC and included state po lice, state environmental protection, and the Departments of Agriculture and of Health.
The personnel seemed to understand the recovery process.
No reentry activities took place at the forward comanand post.
3.1.10 Relevance of the Exercise Experience Tha axercise did show areas of strength and areas where improvements should be cons idered.
It showed that federal, state, county and municipal
I 28 efforts can be coordinated to provide an effective response to a nuclear power plant incident.
It af forded an opportunity to evaluate many areas critical to a proper public response to a possible nuclear incident including deployment, l
mobilization, accident assessment and communications.
Some aspects of the plan, most notably reentry and recovery, were not
^
adequately exercised. Some participants felt that there was too much " sitting I
around" and that the scenario could have provided better testing of backup capabilities and response to changing wind directions.
3.2 0CIAN COUNTY, NEW JERSIT 3.2.1 Emergenev Ooerations Tacilities and Resources The county emergency operations facilities and resources were evaluated as good.
The communications systems are excellent and the Emergency Manage-ment Radio (EMEAD) system is the primary means linking the county with the state and municipalities.
Backup systems include the sheriff's radio net which is monitored in all municipal police stations, land line telephone to In addition a 25 and 75 meter esdio system with municipal EOCs is the state.
to be completed within 60 days.
During the exercise, no dedicated " hot line" was available from the EOF to the county or between the state and county 30Cs.
This was pri-marily due to a last minute change in the location of the county EOC prior to the exercise. The " hot lines" were expected to be installed within two weeks.
The working space at the EOC was good.
Amenities, however, were lacking, primarily due to the recent relocation.
EOC security was good and there was good demonstration of message handling procedures.
The public address system was effectively used to keep EOC personnel informed.
The county EOC had good maps displayed showing population distribution.
However, state maps were not available to identify access control points by niaeber.
Access control points had to be identified by road intersections,
which is inconsistent with the state identification system.
3.2.2 Alerting and Mobilization of officials and Staff overall the county's alerting and mobilization of of ficials and s taf f were observed to be good.
In the ECC, the sheriff's office provides 24-hour
29
)
4 initial staffing of communications and notification.
Rosters of backup personnel were available and it appears that 24-hour continuous emergency response capabilities are good.
Alerting of EOC personnel was o b s e rv e d to be excellent.
Contact was made using the celephone and pagers.
The county radiological monitoring teams responded in a timely manner to the assembly point.
The teams were aware of backup capability and thus it l
appeared that the county could continuously maintain its own radiological monitoring.
The capability to coessunicate with medical support facilities was acceptable.
The off-site medical drill ambulance could not directly contact the hospital.
3.2.3 Emergenev Ooerations Management The county emergency operations management was observed to be good.
The emergency responsibilities were clearly defined and it was evident that specific organizations had been established to handle the emergency response.
6 1
The county Emergency Management Coordinates (EMC) was effectively in charge 'of the emergency response.
A backup EMC provided effective 24-hour staffing.
Oral briefings for EOC staf f were timely and effective and the public address system was extensively used for this purpose. The emergency classifi-cation system was effectively used."
Excellent participation of elected officials was also demonstrated. The emergenc, services director was on hand throughout the exercise and elected officiale participated in the briefings.
3.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification Alerting and notification of the public by the county was observed overall to be accept ab le.
The major problem areas are the siren system and I
public education.
l l
The primary means N alerting the public is through the use of sirens and the emergency ber" c system.
During the ex ercise, neither the county sheriff's radio dis;
,uer nor the licensee's siren activation repeater had 0
}
l private line encoders / decoders (private l'ine encoders / decoders are on order).
Therefore, for the exercise, a licensee employee had to physically disconnect the sherif f's repeater in order to activate the sirens, his resulted in a delay in the sounding of the sirens.
In addit ion, the county plan does not
{
include a procedure to verify activation of the siren system. These problems indicate that the existing system for disseminating information to the public needs some improvement. A public education brochure for EPZ residents has not
~
been mailed.
A limited survey conducted during the exercise indicated that only about 50% of the' people surveyed heard the sirens.
3.2.5 Public and Media Relations At the Joint Media Center in Tous River, the public and media relations were observed to be weak.
Significant deficiencies were observed in both the flow of infomation betiveen the state and the county and dissemination of information to the public and news media.
Other than media coverage prior to the exercise, there was no evidence that a public information system for county residents exists. A one page circular concerning the exercise was distributed to some residents, but the extent of overall coverage is not known.
Interviews with socal owners, however, indicate that there is no formal progras in place to instruc t the transient population.
1 A principal point of contact for the media was not demonstrated during the exercise.
The Joint Media Center was inadequately staffed and the county PIO did not have access to sufficient in formation.
The joint center lacked maps, access to rad io s, telephone communications with the state EOC, and a backup communications systems.
The county did not issue any news releases during the exercise. - Be county spokesperson at the Joint Media Center in Tous River was not provid ed I
with information about staff emergency information activities and as a result could not respond to media inquiries.
Further, no formalised proc,edure for l
exchanging information within the Joint Media Center wai-desonstrared. -
l
31 3.2.6 Accident Assessment The county accident assessment capabilities were observed to be accep-g table.
It is recognized that the an.in duty of the county teams is to support the state ceans.
However, the county monitoring teams had limited monitoring instrumentation and also experienced some communication problems in trans fer-ring monitoring data to the EOC.
The county is limited to measuring only whole body gamma and beta radiation.
Some, but not all, of the instruments showed they had been cali-beated.
The seat recent calibration noted on any instament was December, 1981.
Due to the lack of the appropriate instruments, the county did not d emons trate the ability to measure radiciodine concentration, although this was called for in the exercise scenario.
Further, the county monitoring teams did not have adequate means for j
monitoring liquids or the ground for radiation contamination. In addition, it appears that nonitoring team personnel have not received extensive training in these areas, and thun they are lim'ited in their ability to judge whether they actually in the plume, or juac under the plume.
a.
l During the exercise, some communication difficu" 2ies were uncovered.
One county team communicated to the sheriff's office who then contacted the EOC.
Another team was communicating directly with the state BRPyCP due to radio coonunication problems with the county.
t 3.T. 7 Actions to Protect the Public The county actions to protect the public were generally observed to be good.
The' initiation of measures was timely and many of the protective actions were demonstrated.
The major problem areas appear to be in the procedures for processing evacuees and the adequacy of relocation facilities.
The capability for implementation of protective measures was good.
Decisions were quickly rendered and orderly implementation of protective measures was demonstrated.
Written plans and procedures exist regarding evacuation of the mobility impaired and institutionally confined.
The plan includes des ignated trans-portatica, evacuation routes, and relocation sites as well as staff to
32 secoespany pstients fr e.3 institutions.
'"hile the plans exis t, these procedures
=
were not called for during the exercise. However, it was evident that written l
plans do not exist between the county or state and New Jersey transit (NJT) or local bus companies to relocate the po pulac e.
Maps are available showing primary and alternate evacuation routes.
Coordinat2d, well timed actions at the EOC indicated a good capabil!cy to select alternate congregate care centers and evacuation routes. This was clearly demonstrated during the exercise.
The es tablishment of relocation centers was confire m Procedures for processing evacuees were adequate and 24-hour staffing capabilities were demons trat ed.
No procedures were demons trat ed regarding disposition of contaminated vehicles and there were no security procedures.
Some reservations were expressed regarding the capability of the congregate care center to handle the number of evacuees expected.
The relocation and mass care facilities that were to be utilized during the exercise were lacking.
The actual si'te to be used' in an emergency is a school whica was not avail.able during the exercise.
However, it appears that this site could only accmaodate 500 persons and has inadequate amenities (3 showers, no kitchen, insufficient bed space).
3.2.8 Eealth, Medical and Exposure control County health, medical and exposure control measures vers good.
Deficiencies were indicated in some areas including distribution of potassium iodide, access controls, and the decontamination center.
The county EMC sas aware of the need for potassium iodide for emergency workers.
The county medical officer simulat ed the ordering of KI although there was no KI available at the EOC.
Accass control provided by the state police was good.
They were in place in a timely manner and control personnel were well avara of procedures and carried protective clothing, maps, barricades.
There was some confusion over which intersection was supposed to be cccers control pc(nc 25.
Another consideration regarding access control is responas.
The. state troopers must be eslied in and there was no demonstration of Sal security ele =ents manning the access ecstrol points, prior to the troo of arrival.
T i
33 The operations and facilities at the decontamination center were observed to be good.
Decontamination procedures for both personnel and vehicles were obeerved to be very chorough and well designed Personnel were equipped with disposable clothing, respirators and inanitoring equipment.
Personnel seemed well trained.
The decontamination center was, however, located within the 10 mile EPZ and there was no procedure demonstrated for contaminated runoff from vehicle decontamination.
There was only one shower available for decontamination of personnel and that water was not contained but discharged directly to the sanitar'y sever.
The response of hospital and medical services and personnel were good.
The ambulance team was properly equipped and well trained.
Due to a communi-cations problem, the hospital was not warned ahead of time about the ambu!ance arriving.
However, within 10 minutes after the ambulance arrived, the hos-pital was functioning well.
3.2.9 Recoverv and Eesucrv Operations Recovery and reenty were not demonstrated.
~
3'.2.13 Re2evanceoftheExerciseExcerience The basic scenario was good but time constraints inhibited the demon-stration of full capabilities.
The exercise participants expressed satisfaction with their pe rform-ance.
EOC leadership participants " believed the exercise tested the emergency response capability.
Some areas require further equipment, training, and planning, but overall, participants felt their response capabilities are good.
3.3 OCEAN COUNTT MUNICIPA1.ITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BOROUGHS)
Twenty local municipalities were involved in ths Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNCS) integrated radiological emergency exarcise. S ix of the localities were active participants as they were located within the l
hypothetical plume exposure pathway.
The other municipalities were not 1
seriously affected and their participation was limited primarily to alert, mobilization and stand-by preparedness.
34 The six participating municipalities are reviewed individually and the fourteen nonparticipating towns are collectively critiqued.
3.3.1 Participating Municipalities Barnegat Light Lacey Township Barnegat Township Long Beach Township Harvey Cedars Ocean Township 3.3.1.1 Barnegat Light Emergency Operatiens Tacilities and Resources e
The Barnegat Light Borough EOC facilities and resources are good.
The communications system included EMRAD and citizen baud (CB) radio, and tele-phones.
Communications functioned very adequetely although at one time a message transmitted to the county EOC was not acknowledged and later the Barnegat Light Borough EOC was requested to retransmit the same information.
The working space is adequate and internal communications and massage handling procedures were efficiently demonstrated.
Security measures are sofficient for this IOC and the map displaying the one evacuation route, relocation centers and shelter areas was good.
Although not actually demonstrated, the EOC displayed the capability of recording instructional messages to the public for broadcasting over loud speakers.
Alerting and Mobilizacien of officials and Staff e
Alerting, mobilizing and timely staffing of the EOCs were good. The capability to notify emergency response perstwnel and to operate continuously was good.
Emergency Operations Management Emergency operations management demonstrated in tais exercise vas good.
The Emergene.y Management Coordination (IMC) was clearly in charge of ECC operstions and the First Aid, Dept of Public Works, Police and Fire Depart-ments were all fully aware of their functions and responsibilities.
It was not observed whether a consistent emergency classification system was used or
i if written procedures were prepared for emergency actions bue the EMC briefed his small staff frequently in an excellent manner Although not present, the Mayor and the Council President reported in and it was demonstrated by the EMC, that the Mayor could be reached at any time.
e Public Alerting and Notification Public alerting by the Barnegat Light EOC was considered adequate for its circumstances.
The personnel
- t. ore in place for the route alere plan for the public in the plume exposure pathway, e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed at Barnegat Light Borough because it is not within the scope of of their clan.
e Accident Assessment Accident assessment capabilic'ies were not observed in Barnegat Light Borough.
Responsibilities for this function are in the state and county and the local ECC relies on information from the state.
6 Actions to Protect the Public The Barnegat Light Borough EOC did not demonstrate actions to protect the public, but it was evident they had a prepared plan. Two ambulances were in constant contact for the evacuation of mobility impaired persons and the ECC displayed the capability for implementing evacuation procedures through traffic control of their evacuation route.
In discussions, the EOC also considered dealing with unforeseen impediments to evacuation such as auto breakdowns, a fire, etc.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
The Barnegat Light Borough EOC procedures were weak or lacking in health, medical and exposure control measures. No system was demonstrated for i
distributing monitoring equipment, dosimeters or KI and they had insufficient equipment for 24-hour-a-day monitoring coverage of their emergency workers.
1 36 Recovery and Reentry Operations e
The capability for implementing recovery and reentry operations was not observed because of the shortened exercise.
Relevance of the Exercise Experience e
The exercise showed ability of the EOC to function adequately despite limited equipment and the need for training.
3.3.1.2 Barnegat Township Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources e
Emergency operations facilities and resources in the Township of Barnegat are good.
The new building contained good security naasures, ample space, and the counsunications systems were used to establish and main-tain reliable contacts.
The observer did not witness internal ccausunications systems, displays or sessage handling procedures.
There was no map display of evacuation routes, relocation centers and shelter areas but plans were on the front desk available for instant use.
Additionally, there was no popula-tion distribution map although discussions demonstrated that the year-round population (summer and winter) was acceptably known.
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff e
Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good. The Barnegat Township EOC demonstrated good capabilities for initial and sustained emergency responte operations.
The EOC staff and emergency workers were notified rapidly in a relir41e manner and responded promptly, as did desig-nated emergency response organizations.
The EOC demonstrated good commsunica-tions with medical support facilities.
Emergency Operations Management e
Emergency operations management was good.
The Civil Defense Direc-tor was the Emergency Management Coordinator, acting through the police liaison officer.
Representatives of several organizations with response
37
./
functions participated in the exercise.
There vere several volunteers and part-time participants, including the Mayor.
No use of emergency classifica-tion systems, vricten emergency action procedures or coordination of ef forts through staf f briefings was observed.
e Public Alerting and Notification There were no observations made concerning the efficiency of public alarting and notification.
e Public and Media Relations 1
}
Public and media relations functions were not observed at the Barnegat Township ECC because they were not incided in the scope of plan responsibili-ties or actions, e Accident Assessment Accident assessment capabilities are not called for in the Barnegat Township EOC and were not observed.
~
Actions to Protect the Public e
Actions to protect the public, made at the ECC, were not observed.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
Health, medical and exposure' control measures within the Barnegat ECC vare not observed but they did demonstrate good local and backup medical support services for personnel.
Recovery and Reentry Operations e
No recovery and reentry operations were observed at the Barnegat Township ECC.
1
~
e Relevance to the Exercise Experience l4 The majority of the participants believed that the exercise experience I
was good and that the scenario sufficiently tested mobilization capabilities.
l
1 38
)
3.3.1.3 Harvey Cedare e Energency Operations Facilities and Resources Emergency operations facilities and resources were good. ne telephone and EM. RAD radio system were used for primary communications, with police radio
- backup, he capability was demonstrated by notifying all EOC personnel.within 12 minutes of receiving exercise notification and by notifying all stand-by personnel within 10 minutes of Site Emergency condition declaration.
The primary working space was good for no more than 10 staff but there is addi-i i
t:2nal space available in the back if needed.
Logs and displays were good.
I Message handling was performed well and the maps of evacuation routes, relo-
-]
cation centers and shelter areas were displayed effectively. The security of.
the EOC was suitable for the population at the time of the exercise but would require acre personnel during the suaner season.
Although the staff knew the population (500 in winter; 11,000 in summer) the EOC lacked maps or displays showing the population distribution.
I
,e Alerting and Mobilization of Offici41s and Staff Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good.
Between ene hours of 7'.00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., the police station is open and would receive any alert notifications. Af ter 5:00 p.m. when the station is closed, the police station at Surf City would notify the Harvey. Cedar's Chief who would activate the EOC.
Emergency response organizations were' initially alerted to the exercise by radio and telephone systems, in a minutes.
When the Site Energency exercise conditions were announced, response personnel were notified in 10 minutes.
The EOC was completely staffed within 26 minutes of receiving the alert notification.
Emergency Operations Management e
Emergency operationa management of the Harvey Cedars EOC is good.
The emergency management department conducts road checks, assists people during evacuation.
The fire department provides support plus 15 staff trained to monitor radiation.
The police department is charged with traffic control. and protection of life and property and the public works department has heavy equipment for such activities, towing cars if needed.
During the summer,
39 there are 30 lifeguards who are assigned support functions as necessary.
The EMC (police chief) is the IOC manager and effectively conducted staff briefings, the Mayor and Daputy Mayor were present and participated in_the drill.
Written a-procedures were good and a consistent emergency classification system was used.
Public Alerting and Notification e-Public alerting and notification were good.
Police patrols utilized route alerting to notify the population through ' the
~ of mobile loud use speakers.
The publie alerting ar.d notification were carried out in a' good,
. timely and apparently complace manner.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations generally were lacking.
There was no evidence that any nuclear accident information was distributed to the public within the past year.
There were no residential, transient or commercial notices posted relating to a radiological incident although procedures were posted for other events (hurricane, etc.) which would require the same esacuation system.
Other types of press _and media relacions were not consid-ered within the scope of responsibilities for this EOC.
e Accident Assessment There was no observation of accident assessment capabilities as it was not considered within the scope of this EOC.
e Actions to Protecc the Public Actions to protect the public were observed to be good.
Implementation of protective measures was good (dosimeters issued to all emergency workers within 6 minutes of decision and all monitoring teams in the field within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 25 minutes thereafter) and evacuation was stated to be good (within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 9 minutes from notice, a!.though _.in summer this would take. consider-ably longer).
The adequacy. of methods to protect the mobility impaired and institutionalized residents was not observed.
40 Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
Health, medical and exposure control measures generally were not observed.
However, the Harvey Cedars EOC has trained 15 staff to monitor radiation and the emergency workers were issued dosimeters and cards.
There were no other activities within this category that were observed.
l I
Recovery and Reentry Operations e
Recovery and reentry operations were not observed.
In a discussion j
with the Harvey Cedars police chief, recovery and reentry would be implemen':ed i
by way of monitoring traffic and updating the public on situation status to ensure a safe and orderly return.
Relevance of the Exercise Experfance e
The experience gained from this exercise was good. Except for reentry, the scenario tested mobilization capabilities of local and state organizations and demonstrated to the participants that they were capable of an integratsd emergency response.
Additionally, it provided participants with on-the-job training so that response to a real emergency would be more familiar.
3.3.1.4 Lacey Township Emergency Operations Tacilities and Resources e
In general, emergency operations ' f acilities and resources were good.
They had an excellent radio system for police, fire, first aid, and public works.
This was backed by an EMRAD system and a new SPENI (State Police Emergency band) installed the day before the exercise.
Telephones were also available. The work space was excellent, with space for representatives of response organizations, the Mayor, the emergency coordinator and a separate l
communications room. Runners vers used to distribute messages for the coordi-nator's review and then back to the proper responder, which caused a slight delay although it was not critical.
Existing displays were good. The master map displayed did not show evacuation routes, relocation centers," shelter areas or the population distribution although some points could be charted.
l l
41 f
Alerting and Mobilization of Of ficials and Staff e
Alerting and mobilization of officials and staff were good.
The Lacey Township EOC, located in the police department, demonstrated excellent initial response capabilities with 24-hour trained dispatchers on duty.
Although no formal Standard Operational Procedure exists, they demonstrated hour continuous operations by short-shift changes of two key individuals.
The notification of response organizations was, good and key personnel have pagers.
The ability to communicate with medical support facilities was acceptable but when they go to mutual-sid, the county switches medical / first aid information to a frequency not possessed by the Lacey police.
The police thus lose contact with first-aid facilities. The Lacey EOC was staffed in key positions until the volunteers, arrived and the clerical staff is based upon staf f from -
the adjacent township building.
Energency Operations Management e
was acceptable.
The Deputy Emergency Emergency operations management Management Coordinator is the police captain and was effectively in charge.
Existing organizations showed an understanding of their particular responsi-bilities and a capability for effective coordination.
Although there were no formal emergency action procedures in the EOC, the individual organizations had their own Radiological Emergency Response Procedures manuals,and followed the plan.
There were few briefings and that was attributed to the apparent lack of information provided by the county and state.
The elected officials were clearly supportive of the EOC op6 rations.
Public Alerting C4 Notification e
Public alerting and notification were weak.
The E35 was not heard in the EOC, and the EOC was not aware that the message was being broadcast.
They had no provision to monitor the E35 via T7 or radio.
Because the sirens were not heard in the EOC, response personnel were not aware that the sirens were ac tivated.
Th!.s caused the failure to dispatch route alerting although they had prepared a procedure.
The EOC did simulate use of a' helicopter to alert the public to listen to the E35.
l
+
q e Public and Media Relacions l
l 1
f There vere no ob s e rvations of activities within this category at the J
i Lacey Township EOC.
e Accident Assessment l
The responsibilities for accident assessment are not part of the Lacey l
l EOC pl2n and, thus, no observations were made.
1
'l e Actions to Protect the Public j
l
\\
4 Actions to protect the public generally were not observed. There was a call for evacuation and treatment of utility workers. from on-site by the rnwnship First Aid Unit and a review of work in progress by the Department of t,slic Works to catalog pctantial evacuation impediments. However, there was no other activity or procedure observed that would indicate actions taken to protect the public.
e Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures Health, medical and exposure control measures were weak in all activi-ties within this responsibility that were observed.
The use and knowledge of KI were not demonstrated.
Emergency workers were issued dosimeters and film l
badges but were not informed of how to use them, what the readings mean and how to process them.
They received no instructions about protective action I
guides (PACS) and, at one specific briefing, emergency workers were z.is-inforned as to ',evels of allowable exposure. Other workers were not informed.
Recovery and Reentry Operations e
The recovery and reentry activities were not demonstrated.
Relevance of the Exercise Experienes l
There were no observations relating to the relevance of the exercise and benefits to the participants.
G
\\
5 43 l-1 3.3.1.5 Long Beech Townshio Emergency Operations Tacilities and Resources e
Emergency operations fa cilitie s and resources we re good.
Commun ica-tions included a Police "9" Backup system, DIRAD, RACES, dedicated phone line to county EOC sud telephone lines to other EOCs.
Working space was observed to be acceptabic, but ves tw owhat limited.
Equipment and message handling were good' and displays were acceptable but difficult to see.
Security good with a T7 monitor screening entry and uniformed patrolmen guarding was the door.
The maps displayed were weak, too few and too small, with inade-quate indicators of evacuatioc, routes, shelter areas, relocation centers, med RAD checkpoints.
I Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff e
overall, the alerting and mobiliza tion of officials and staf f tore good. Procedures for notifying emergency response perosanel end organizations were good.
Lists of persoons.1 and organizations with their functions delin-eated were published and effectively used.
A means of message verifications was id entified.
The amargeocy communications dedicated phone line to the.
county, backed by EMRAD, perf ormed in excellent fashion ' during the incident.
A specified person was in charge of activities in maintaining good contact with madical support facilitie s, and the EOC was completely staf fed peceptly atter notification in accordance with prescribed procedures, Emergency Operations Management e
Energency operations management was good.
The EOC Director was ' ef fec-tively is charge.
It was observed that certain protective measures unique to this community were not reflected in the city plan.
Tor exsaple, the police i
department had backup procedures to assist the public in the event that the primary notification systein f ailed.
The staf f was ef fectively briefed i
by the c'irector who was assisted in general EOC operations.by the Mayor.
j l
i Public Alerting and Notification e
Public alerting and notification were considered good.
In the early
- s t ag e s, ISS satsagas issued by state PIO at state EOC were timely but later l
i
g slacked of f and did not appear to be reliable.
The sirens were audible as evidenced by many verification phone calls from the community.
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed at the Long Beach EOC because it was not considered applicable to their responsibilities.
I e Accident Assessment Long Beach does not have responsibilities for accident assessment and, consequently, no activities were observed.
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public generally were act observed. However, it was noted that impediments to evacuation were addressed by the town, particu-larly in light of the fact that the plume directly affected only part of the town, and that there was only one evacuation route from the area.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
There were no observations of health, medical or exposure control measures taken by the Long Beach EOC.
Recovery and Reentry Operations e
The recovery and reentry operations were not demonstrated.
i Relevance of the Exercise Experience e
Long Beach had never participated in an exercise before so the experi-
, ence gained was good.
It was noted that the second half of the scenario was not enacted (no complete stepdown of operations from state.of emergency back to alert), and thus, the communities did not get the full benefits of the operation.
q 45 1
3.3.1.6 Ocean Township E:nergency Operations Tacilities and Resources e
Emergency operations facilities and resources were ac c e ptab le.
.The communic ations systems'.were good with talephone and radio syscuss, _ D! RAD and other backup.
The backup systems - were used, in many cases, to obtain sessage verifications from the' county EOC.
Dedicated telephone capabilities were not demonstrated.
There was no hard-copy demonstration of. massage fl ow. ' from f
receipt or inception to the denk of. the lead er.
Security, in the police station, was acceptable with a guard verbally informed to request identific a-tion although uniformed personnel could come and go. at will.
There were no -
)
aaps displayed showing evacuation routes, etc. although they were defined in the plans and population distribution was discussed although not formalized ~
vith a ssp.
~
Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff e
Alerting and mobilization of of ficials and staff were good.
The e,imeliness of notification for slerting and mobilization of initial response and continuous response staff was good. Communications equipment for contact-ing emergency response personnel and medical support ' facilities' was good.
Activation of the EOC and other facilities was good.
Emergency Operations Mr.nagement o
Emergen:y operations managssent was good and there was acceptab le demonstration that the fire, police, and Department of Public Works (DPE) were auch assigned specific responsibilities.
There was no evidence, demonstrated or simulated, that the amarger.cy classification system consistent with the ut.ility was used.
The Mayor and Deputy Mayor participated in the exercise.
Public Alerting and Notification e
Public alerting and notification were good.
However, only
- a limited stabdr of EBS messages were issued by state PIO at state ~EOC, It - is the st: ate's responsibility to issue IIS messages.
1 1
l 46 e
e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations' activities of the Ocean Township EOC were l
noe observed.
e Accident Assessment Accident assessment was not observed, i
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were not observed.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
Health, medical and exposure control measures were not observed.
Recovery and Reentry Operations e
The recovery and reentry operations vere not demonstrated, Relevance of the Exercise Experience o
The participants of the Ocean Township IOC believed the exercise was accpetable to test their adequacy but indicated several concerns.
Volunteers who ver6 losing work pay sencioned the long delays in the exercise as not beneficial. Several camments were made concerning the need for more equipment.
I l
3.3.2 Nonparticipating Municipalities 1
Beach Haven Borough Pine Beach Borough l
l Beachwood Borough Seaside Heights Borough Berkeley Township Seaside Park Borough Dover Township Ship Bottom Borough Island Heights Borough South Tous River Borough Manchester Township Stafford Township l
Ocean Cate Borough Surf City Borough
47 l
Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources e
la general, emergency operations f acilitie s and resources we re good.
Communications systems, both primary and backup, were considered acceptable or better with typical systems including police and fire department radio, LNRAD, etc., dedicated phone line and regular phone communications.
l Most communities could effectively use additional equipment ' and several were in the process of obtaining it.
Island ' Heights. was small and some equi;eene. was moved into the space for the exercise.
Internal communications and message handling were acceptable, if informal, although several held periodic staff briefings.
Displays and maps were weak or lacking.
Beach Haven, Ship Bo t tom, and Surf City had excellent security with buzzer systems controlling access to the EOC.
Berkeley and Dover also ex-hibited excellent security and the. rest of ' the towns demonstrated acceptable security for. their circumstances.
Maps displaying evacuation routes, sampling. points, relocation centers and shelter areas were weak and not clearly evident although plans containing the infotsation were available in a number of EOCs.
Similarly thers was no evidence of any population distribution maps although there were some indica-tions that the EOCs had considered the problem.
Alerting and Mobilization of of ficials and Staff e
Alerting and mobilization of of ficials ' and staff were good.
The nonparticipating communities appear to have sufficient staffing to perform t
well on a continuous basis, although a sustained response might impo se a strain on available personnel.
All i:ommunities exhibited. good capabilities for ' communications with emergency response organizations and employed a variety o f me ans - ( radio,
telephones, beepers) for assurance of contact.
There was evidence of message
- ---- - verificatiotr plans.--tsergwacy response personnel verr alerted 1parkly 1:hrough sirens, phone, radio or beeper, and were mobilized promptly through use of prepared _ resdy lists.
Where ob serv ed, there was a good communications i
system established with medical support facilities.
i l
____-_.________-_-m_.__-._____-J
48
)
o Local governeencal un it s demonstrated that local EOCs po s s e s s a good mobilizatica response capability, Emergency Operations Management e
Emergency operations management was good. Generally, the organization, leadership, control, decision making and suppo rt from elected officials were good at the municipal EOCs.
Various degrees of formal operating procedur es were observed to be in place but most functioned well, vichin their particular c ircums t anc es.
The officials in charge were generally knowledgeable about their community's responsibilities and required response actions.
The communities relied upon existing organizations to fulfill partie-ular respcase obligations.
Most prominently mentioned were the Police, Fire, Civil Defense, Department of Public Works and Health Departments do could bring a background of experience in dealing with other emergency situa-tio ns.
Volunteers were used to supplement and to furnish additional expertise.
Most locations operated efficiently to accomplish their obj ectives whether in a formalized organization with a designated leader or in a struc-ture of shared responsibilities.
The operations appeared appropriate to the local situation.
In Island Heights, no specific individual was in charge and no designated replacement was observed.
Although the presence of written plans was not generally demonstrated, emergency response organizations were svare of their functions within the overall connunity response plan.
A consistent emergency classification system was not observed in use by most nonparticipating municipalities.
The EOC staff of Island Heights knew the classification terminology but were not aware 'of differing response requirmnents for the classification levels.
Consistent with the size and scope of municipal EOCs, there were few documented emergency procedures.
Some EOCs had written action pl ans.
o b s erv ed' to hav e In the nonparticipating towns, Beach Haven was excellent representation and participation by elected officials; while at Island Heights, participation of elected of ficials was observed to be minimal.
49 j
Public Alerting and Notification e
Public alerting and notification overall were acceptable.
The mun ic i-palities generally demonstrated an acceptable capability to notify the public of an emergency.
However, the ef fec tivenes s of the local alerting system to in form the transient po pulation. was not demonstrated.
The issuance of E3S messages is a state responsibility, e Public and Media Relations Public and media relations were not observed.
e Accident Assessment Activities to assess the incidence and scope of nuclear accidents were not considered applicable to municipal responsibilities.
e Actions to Protect the Public Actions to protect the public were acceptable.
Several municipalities have identified possible impediments to evacuation and made plans to minimize their impact.
Fine Beach had plans prepared for the prospe evacuation o f resi-dents who had impaired mobility or were institutionalized.
In considering emergency actions, there were several areas of concern over imped iment s to traffic fl ow.
Ship Bottom was concerned about the bridge on its evacuation route and began planning the evacuation early in the exercise.
Seaside Heights and Seaside Park evacuation routes marge and, in common, hit a potentially severe bottleneck where the road narrows from five lanes to two.
Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures e
Health, medical and exposure control measures overall were weak.
Some mun icipalitie s had acceptable supplies and equipment while others were lacking. However, it appeared that, aside from general knowledge, almost none had the specific expertise required concerning KI usage, the use of dosimeters and exposure record keeping, and decontamination requirements.
50 i
e Recovery and Reentry The recovery and reentry activities were not demonstrated.
The sca-nario did not require the nonparticipating municipalities to demonstrate recovery acd reentry procedures, e Relevance of the Exercise Experience Generally, the overall response of the observers indicated ' chat the I
exercise was very good in measuring the response capabilities of people, equipment, and the necessary coordination of ef forts among numerous o' erating p
entities.
There was comment that ex ercis e benefice were restricted by inherent limitations in the exercise. Overall, a highly professional attitude l
l vas displayed as was the willingness to learn and improve operations.
l I
1 9
O t
51 g
4
SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES "Significant deficiencies" are capabilities that may impede an effec-tive response and that were rated either " weak" or " lacking" (see Section 1.7).
These "significant deficiencess" must be corrected in a timely fashion to ensure an acequate level of preparedness in the event of an emergency.
l l
4.1 STATE FUNCTIONS Significant deficiencies in state-level functions have lead to the following recommendations.
4.1.1 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.2 No significant deficiencies noted.
l 4.1.3 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.4 Public Alerting and Notification l
- a. The overall reliability of the system used to alert the public and provide emergency public information must be f
reviewed and improved. It is suggested that a system for verification of siren activation be included within the capabilities of the state. Equipment should be upgraded to avoid delays in sounding sirens such as that which occurred in the exercise.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5, E.6)
- b. A permanent EBS system should be put in place.
The local radio stations should have this system as part of their j
basic operations and FCC approval should be obtained.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5, E.6) 4.1.5 Public and Media Relations
- a. The entire operation of the Joint Media Center should be reviewed. This operation was weak during the exercise and did not effectively pass on information to the public or the media.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.3)
- b. Public information pamphlets giving information and in-structions for use during an emergency should be printed and distributed to the public.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1)
- c. A public information program should be initiated within the 10 mile EPZ. Posted notices, etc. should be placed to instruct the public in the proper courses of action.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1, G.I) l
52-
- d. A plan for dissemination of information ' to the public and the media should be developed., This plan should include provisions such as the issuance of news releases, and j
transfer of information between spokespersons including the county PIO.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.1, G.2, G.4.b).
)
- e. The state public information officer should have access to all pertinent information so that factual information will
)
be given to the public.and the media.
(Reference NUREG-0654, I
II. G. 4. a. )
- f. The facilitise (display, etc.) at the. joint media facility need upgrading and strengthening.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.3) 1
- 3. Capabilities for rumor control should be reviewed.
j (Reference NUREG-0654 II.G.4.c).
4.1.6 No significant deficiencies noted.-
4.1.7 No significant deficiencies noted.
I 4.1.8 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.1.9 Recovery and Reentry Operations In future exercises, recovery and reentry should be included and fully demonstrated as part of the overall activities.
(Reference NUREG-0654 II.M) 4.2 0CEAN GOUNTY, NEW JERSEY TUNCTIONS Significant deficiencies in county-level functions have. lead to the following recommendations.
4.2.1 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.2 No significant deficier.ci n acted.
4.2.3 No significant deficiercia, noted.
4.2.4 Public Alerting and Notification l
l
- a. The siren equipment and system should be upgraded to insure l
that it can be activated in a timely manner.
(Reference l
NUREG-0654. II.E.5)
- b. The county should consider installation of a system to verify siren activation, as this is the major means used to alert the public.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.5) l l
l l
l l
{'
53
- c. A comprehensive public education program should b2 conducted especially in light of the large transient population.
Emergency procedures should be posted-in motel rooms and a program should be instituted to insure that both full-time and transient residents receive emergency information.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.c)
- d. A program should be initiated to determine the ef fective-ness of the siren system.
Such a program can be a survey of the population after a siren test.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.6, J.10.c) 4.2.5 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.6 No significant deficiencies noted.
4.2.7 No significant deficiencies noted.
i 4.2.8 No significant deficiencies noted.
1 i
4.2.9 Recovery and Reentry Ooerations Recovery and reentry events could be performed as a parallel exercise during the af ternoons of future
'l exercises to be sure time constraints do not preclude this response.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.M.1 and M.3) 4.3 OCEAN COUNTT MUNICIPALITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BOROUGHS) i Significant deficiencies in municipal-level functions were uniform for all and r e given below.
- a. Sufficient equipment should be procured to enable amergency
)
workers to monitor their exposure to radiation. A plan I
should also be instituted to train personnel in such areas as exposure monitoring, exposure record keeping, protective action guides, maximum allowable exposure, use of KI, etc.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.e, K.3.a. K.3.b)
- b. Displays and maps should be improved and provided for all EOCs. Maps should show population distributions, evacuation routes, and relocation centers.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.J.10.a J.10.b) l
e..
54 5
SUMMARY
OF MINOR DEFICIENCIES
" Minor deficiencies" are capabilities that were raced either " accept-able" or " good" (see Section 1.7).
Although these minor deficiencies did not prevent the state and local organizations from adequately implementing their radiological emergency response plans, correcting them will Laprove prepared-ness or facilitate operations.
5.1 STATE FUNCTIONS Minor deficiencies in state-level functions have lead to the following recommendations:
5.1.1 Emergency Coerations Facilities and Resources At the BRPFCP, emergency operations facilities and resources were observed to be good. Communications consist:2d of a police radio, state radio, and telephone which were effectively utilired.
The communications with the state EDC were adequat e.
The BRFCP displayed status boards and maps showing sampling points, but there were no maps showing population or location of care centers.
The noted weakness at the BEFCP was somewhat lax security.
During the exercise, for example, a member of the press entered unchallenged.
- a. Consideration may be given to increasing the available space el? acted to dose assessment operations.
- b. On-the-job training should be bnplemented to smooth out the procedure of initially setting up security at the EOC.
This will avoid problems such as having unauthorized personnel being in the work areas when EOC staff is attempting to bring the EOC into operation.
- c. More space should be allotted for maps and displays.
- d. Consideration should be given to assigning a separate coding system to the EPZ maps, to avoid confusion with the ownber designation system given on the sector maps.
For example, EPZ maps could have letter designations for the various zones.
- e. At the NJSP forward command post, it la suggested that the-state police and EOF personnel be physically located together rather than on separate floors to Laprove internal communications and logistics.
j 55
- f. A more ef fective. security system should be implemented at the Bureau of Radiation Protection forward command post.
The system needs to address the problems of free access by unauthorized personnel to the TCP working area.
5.1.2 Alertint and Mobilization of Officials and Staff i
- a. It is suggested that aanpower planning be reviewed to insure that sufficient personnel are available to sustain a 24-hour continuous emergency response and that personnel can be dispatched to the licensee's near-site EOF.
(Reference NUREG-0634. II.A.I.e., G.2.a)
- b. On-the-job training may be considered to enhance the operations of alerting, notifying and mobilising emergency response personnel and prompt activation of raergency response communications. - (Reference NUREG-0654, II.E.2, i
F.1.a) 5.1.3 Emerzenev operations Management It is recommended that training of personnel be conducted to alleviate the confusion over nomenclature which could hamper and delay effective communications.
5.1.4 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.1.5 No sinor deficiencies noted.
5.1.6 Accident Assessment
- a. The instrumentation issued to field monitoring teams should be reviewed, so that each team will have identical equipment.
Provisions should be made to insure that teams have the capability to measure the air, ground, and water for con-tamination. Unilormity in the issuance of protective clothing, maps, etc., should also be reviewed.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.P.7, I.7, I.8, I.11)
- b. All personnel assigned to off-site monitoring should receive identical training.
The training level of personnel should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. The training should includa field esasurements for radiciodine.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.I.7, I.8,1.9) 5.1.7 No sinar deficiencies noted.
5.1.8 Health, Medical and Erposure Control Measures Training should De initiated for workers in the area of reporting radiation dosages received. This procedure, including reporting intervals, should be included in the training as well as part of the overall plan. (Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.b) 4
a **
5.2 OCEAN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY Minor deficiencies in county-level functions have lead to the following r econanandations :
5.2.1 Emergenev Oeerations Facilities and Resources State OEM maps should be obtained by the county so that designation of such areas as access control points will be i
consistent with the state.
(Reference NURIG-0654, II.J.10.a)
I l
5.2.2 Alerting sud Mobilization of Officials and Staff The capability for fixed and mobile medical support f ac ili-ties to couununicate with each other should be reviewed and upgraded. This was deficient during the exercise and such
)
connounications should be, available.
(Reference NUREG-0654, 1
II.T.2) 5.2.3 No minor deficiencies noted.
l 5.2.4 No minor deficiencies noted.
4 5.2.5 Public and Media Relations l
The county and state need to develop a plan and facilities
)
which will improve the effectiveness of the joint media j
eenter as a contact for the news media.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.G.3.a.)
5.2.6 Accident Assessment l
- a. The county sheuld undertake the efforts to improve the equipment used for field radiological ~ monitoring as well as to improve the training of monitoricg personnel. This should be done to insure that capabilities meet those required by the county plan.
(Reference NUREC-0654, II.E.7)
I
- b. The county monitoring teams should have the capability l
to monitor solids and liquids for radiation contamination l
and for the presence of radiciodine.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.I.7, 1.8, I.9)
- c. Communications systems between the county monitoring teams and the county EOC should be reviewed and upgraded as necessary. This was deficient during the exercise.
(Reference NURIG-0654, II.H.12)
57 5.2.7 Actions to Protect the Public It is suggested that the system and procedures for processing evacuees be reviewed.
Plans should include facilities for the decontamination of personnel and vehicles and security should be considered for the congregate care centers.
(Re f erence NUREG-0654, II.J.12) 5.2.8 Health, Medical and Exposure Control
- a. Training regarding the reporting and maintenance of doses received by emergency workers should be reviewed and upgraded to insure proper dose monitoring.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.3.a. K.3.b)
- b. Location and facilities for the decontamination center should be reviewed. Consideration should be given to relocating the decontamination center outside of the 10 mile EPZ. Facilities should be improved for containment of runof f decentmaination of vehicles and improved person-nel facilities such as more showers should be considered.
(Reference NUREG-0654, II.K.5.b) 5.2.9 No minor deficiencies noted.
5.2.10 Relevance of Exercise Experiene_a_
Optional events should be planned into the scenario to avoid too much " dead time" during..se day.
5.3 OCEAN COUNTY MUNICIPALITIES (TOWNSHIPS AND BOROUGHS)
, Minor deficiencies in municipal level functions that apply to most of the municipsi level EOCs have lead to the following recommendations:
- a. A formal system for message handling and internal communica-tions should be implemented.
This would assist in accurate end timely dissemination of information,
- b. Training and planning should include more effective use of staff briefings to coordinate emergency response activities,
- c. Consideration should be given to establishing a program for dissemination of emergency information to the public. This may be considered in conjunction with an overall state and/or county program.
(Reference NUREG-0654 II.G.1)
- d. Improve communicacious systems so that local police do not loce contact with first aid facilities.
(Reference NUREG-0654 II.F.2)
W
o'**
38 i
1
- e. It is suggested that overall formal operations procedures be l
devised which incorporate the existing, individual radiolog-l ical emergency response procedures manuals.
This can assist in coordinating overall. response activities.
(Reference l
NUREG-0634 II.D.4)
- f. A more formal security system including written instructions should be considered to limit access of personnel to the a
EOC.
I 1
l l
l
\\
\\
\\
J l
l l
l O
l
/..
s 59 i
.s 3.
L 6 CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR DEFICIENCIES s,
Sections 4 and 5 of this report listed significant and minor deficien-cies based on the findings of the federal evaluators of this exercise.
These I
evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II or NUREC-0654-TEMA-1, Rav 1 (November,1980).
Correction of the minor deficiencies noted is suggested for improved opere-tions.
Both the state and local jurisdic tions should subsic to the RAC the measures they havt tsken or intend to take to correct significant deficien-cies.
If ' remedial ections cannot be instituted immediately, then a detailed plan, including dates of completion, for scheduling and implementing rasedial actions must be provided.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate ' Director, State -and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any significant deficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the pl an.
6.1 SCHEDULE FOR THE CORRECTION OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES (To be su'pplied by the State of New Jersey) 4
(
r k
[.!
-