ML20238A294

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-65,consisting of 850227 Post-Exercise Assessment,841128 Exercise of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of State of Ny & Westchester, Rockland,Orange & Putnam Counties for Indian Point..

ML20238A294
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
References
OL-5-I-SC-065, OL-5-I-SC-65, NUDOCS 8708310011
Download: ML20238A294 (189)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:, - - - - - . #.. (.. Jo-32z-es $Gx 65 , t '- 5/7/E7 7-sc-65 POST EXERCISE ,T ASSESSMENT !? ei [g.3cv m' D a t. w ~ 8 mr 3 h'd,7 %Q} S2 to ~ ~ i November 28,1984, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State and Westchester, l Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties 1 for the INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION Febfuary 27,1985 Federal Emergency Management Agency ~ Region II FRANK P. PETRONE 26 FEDERAL PLAZA Regional Director New. York, N.Y.10278 h[0 kOcCk $ l2 Q

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m- -v - l s 4 3 9 l i Participating Governments i 1 ) The State of New York Westchester County Rockland County Orange County Putnam County i Dutchess County Bergen County, New Jersey Nonparticipating Governments None i e o eo e e.

1 l l 4 i I CONTENTS l A B B R E VI ATI O N S......................................................... ix t S U 3t at A R Y............................................................... xi l 1 I NT R O D U C TIO N....................................................... 1 l 1.1 Ex e rc is e B ac kgro und................................................ I

1. 2 F e d e r al O b s e rv e rs..................................................

2 j 1.3 Ev alu a tio n C ri t eria................................................. 5 ) 1.4 Ex e rcis e O bj e c tiv es................................................ 6 l 1.4.1 N e w Yo rk S t a t e.............................................. 6 l ,1.4.2 Emergency Operatior.s Facility (EOF)........................... 9 j 1.4.3 Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information......... 9 l l 1.4.4 Westchester. Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties............. 10 1.4.3 D u t c h e ss C o un ty............................................. 13 1.4.6 Be rg e n Co un ty, Ne w J e rs e y.................................... 14 i 1.5 Ex e r c is e Sc e n a rio................................................. 16 1.5.1 af ajor Sequence of Events on Site............................... 16 1.5.2 Sc e nario O ve rvi e w........................................... 17 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources...................... 18 1.5.4 Actual and Simulated Offsite Events af atrix..................... 23 2 E X E R C I S E E V A L U AT I O N................................................ 25 ) New York State and Southern District................................. 25 2.1 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)..................... 25 2.1.2 Southern District Emergency Operations Center (SDEOC).......... 30 l i 2.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)................................ 31 2.3 Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information............... 33 2.4 Westchester County, New York...................................... 35 2.4.1 Emergency Ope rations Center................................. 35 2.4.2 County Radiological Field Stonitoring........................... 41 2.4.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 42 2.4.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect thePublic................................................... 44 l 2.4.5 P u b li c A w ar e n e s s............................................ 49 2.5 Roc kland County, Ne w Yo rk......................................... 50 2.5.1 Emergency Operations Center................................. 50 l 2.5.2 County Radiological Field Stonitoring........................... 58 2.5.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 59 l 2.5.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect thePublic................................................... 62 2.5.5 P u b li c A w ar e n e s s............................................ 69

2. 6 O ra n g e C o u n t y.....................................................

70 l 2.6.1 Em ergency Opera tions C enter................................. 70 2.6.2 County Radiological Field'3fonitoring........................... 72 2.6.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control 3teasures........ 73 2.C.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect thePublic................................................... 76 l v

e e 9 CONTENTS (Cont'd) 2.7 P u tna m C o un ty, Ne w Yo rk.......................................... 78 2.7.1 Emerge ncy Operations C ent er................................. 78 2.7.2 County Radiological Fleid Stonitoring........................... 81 2.7.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control 3teasures........ 82 2.7.4 Fleid implementation of County Actions to Protect t he P u b li c.................................................. 84

2. 8 D u t c h e ss C o un ty...................................................

86 2.S.1 Emergency Operations Cent 7,e................................. 36 2.S.2 Field implementation of County Actions to Protect thePublic................................................... 87 2.9 B erge n C o un ty, Ne w J e rs e y.......................................... 88 2.9.1 Em ergency Operations Center.................................. SS 2.9.2 Fleid Implementation of County Actions to Protect thePublic.................................................... 89 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: NOVE>tBER 28,1984 E.T E R C I S E............................................................ 91 4 SU 3t at A R Y O F D DEFICIENCIES........................................... ' 13 0 TABLES 3.1 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - ( Ne w York S tate and Sou thern District................................. 92 3.2 indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - Em erge ncy Operations Facility....................................... 94 3.3 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information............... 95 3.4 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - Wes tchest er Cou nty................................................ 97 3.5.1 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - Roc klan d Co un ty................................................... 105 4 3.5.2 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - New York State Interim Plan fer Implementing Compensating Ste asures for Rockland County....................................... 119 I i e i 3.6 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - O r an g e C o un t y..................................................... 123 3.7 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - P u t n a m C o u n ty.................................................... 123 a E--_- ____.a

l c 1 i l TABLES (Cont'd) l l 3.8 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - 1 D u t c h e s s C o u n ty................................................... 131 1 3.9 Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions - B e rg e n C o u n t y..................................................... 132 l 4.1 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies J in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at f Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: New York { Sta te and Sou thern Distric t.......................................... 134 4.2 . Summary of Defielencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: Em erge ncy Ope ra tio ns Faci 11ty....................................... 137 4.3 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information............... 138 1 4.4 Summary of ' Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: W e s t c hes t er C o u n ty................................................ 140 l P 4.5.1 Summary of Defielencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: R o c k l a nd C o un t y................................................... 149 4.5.2 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Responae Preparedness Observed at the August 24-25, 1983 Exercise of the New York State interim Plan for Implementing Compensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station........................ 159 4.6 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exerr' for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: OrangcCounty..................................................... 162 4.7 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at i ) Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: P u t n a m Co u n t y.................................................... 168 4.8 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at 1 Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: DutchessCounty................................................... 174 vii

i i TABLES (Cont'd) 4.9 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station: Bergen Co un ty, Jersey.............................................. 175 .o + e e e l -l l l L' l 4 e W l l ?% 1 viii l 0'

1 4 ABBREV 1ATIONS i ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory CCC congregate care center DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC emergency operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agercy HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory IP-3 Indian Point 3 i JNC joint news center K! potassiun. iodide / LOCA loss-of-coolant accident NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NYPA New York Power Authority PAG protective action guide i PIO public information officer PMC personnel monitoring center RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS Radiological Emergency Communications System REPG Radiologien! Emergency Preparedness Group SEMO State Emergency Management Office SEOC state emergency operations center TCP traffic control point TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture i t 1 ix l

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SUMMARY

g An exercise of the plans and level of preparedness for off-site emergency response organizations and personnel was conducted for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 (IP 3) on November 28, 1984. Following the exercise, an evaluation was made by a 54-member federal observer team, and a pzellrainary briefing for exercise participants was held at the Bear Mountain Lodge on November 29,1984, at 1930. A briefing for the general public was held at 1300 on Friday, November 30,1984, at the joint news center at the Westchester ' County Airport in White Plains, New York. Subsequently, detailed evaluations were prepared and are included in this document. State of New York The state response to the exercise was prompt and thorough. Each element of the response team clearly demonstrated its ability to effectively function under varying conditions. The emergency operations center (EOC) in Albany was fully activated and staffed by representatives from 26 agencies. These agency representatives were informed of all developments during the exercise by a series of briefings and by the distribution of key messages. A previous minor prob!em concerning lengthy messages was corrected. The state demonstrated its ability 'to direct response actions to handle a e C radiological emergency although this particular exercise did not require a state declaration of emergency. The director of the radiological emergency preparedness group was clearly in charge of the entire state response organization. He frequently consulted with each of the four counties throughout the exercise and offered advice on protective actions. Emergency Operations Facility Overall, alerting and mobilization of both state and county staff assigned to the emergency operations facility (EOF) was good. Personnel arrived at the facility during the Alert classification. The capability for 24-hour continuous operation was demonstrated by a rester. The overall facilities and resources at the EOF were good. The communication system included dedicated telephone lines with commercial telephone and radio for backup. A mobile radio and hand-held radio were also provided by the Southern District emergency preparedness office. The working space within the EOF is limited, but functional. The staff nad access to the work area and technical information.The technical information was compiled at the EOF and transmitted to the EOCs. Security control for access to the EOF was maintained during the exercise. l 1 i ( xi

si 4 Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information The new joint news center (JNC) is a well-equipped roomy facility located outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). The public information officer (PiO) staffs from the four counties and the state maintained contact with their respective EOCs. In general, Em,ergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages were accurate and complete. However, some ESS messages were issued more than 30 minutes af ter decision makers had agreed on protective actions. For example, an EBS message ordering the sheltering of Rockland County ERPAs 36, 37 and 41 was issued after the arrival of the plume and would have resulted in avoidable dose to some of the population I in these ER/As. The Orange County Executive ordered sheltering for emergency response planning areas (ERPAs) 24 and 26 at 1417, but the EBS message with this information was not issued until 1457,40 minutes after the decision was made. Improved coordination at the joint information center and improved communications between the JNC ed the EOC would increase the timeliness of the issuance of EBS messages. Press briefings were held after the issuance of EBS messages. The lead P!Os from Putnam and Orange counties did not attend all briefings. Provided staffing allows, each county should have a P!O at every press briefing in. Se event that questions are j asked by reporters about the county response. Public Education Based on spot-checks made by observers, the public education brochure has been received by residents and business people' within the 10-mile EPZ. Emergency public Information has been included in telephone books for Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties and is scheduled to be included in Orange County telephune books in Decemcer 1984. Test calls to the rumor control system indicated that the tapes provide accurate and timely information and that the staff has been well trained to answer questions. Westchester County, New York The facilities and resources in the Westchester Cot.nty EOC were good. Although the space was small, it was well organized, with appropriate public address, display, and communications systems. Security at the EOC was also very good. Activation and staffing of emergency personnel was excellent. 'In general, the exercise. participants knew their roles and responsibilities as designated in the plan, including organization, direction and control functions. The management of Westchester County emergency response operations at the EOC was excellent, and the county executive w6s clearly in command. County officials were consistently anticipating policy and management actions and demonstrated comprehensive staff support and independence in management decision making, based on l a thorough review of response options. xii i i I

a Accident assessment was performed well by county officials and was properly ( incorporated into the county executive's decision-making process. With only minor exceptions, communications at the Westchester County EOC went very smoothly. Primary and secondary links, including hard-copy capability, were maintained throughout the exercise with the state, the EOF, the JNC, and the other county EOCs. Similarly, close contact was kept with most field personnel, with excellent support from Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) and REACT. support. Communications within the EOC could be improved by better message handling, less distracting status boards end an Intercom system linking each EOC staffer in the operations room with his or her backup radio communicator in the communications area if appropriate. County public Information personnel performed well. Communication between the county EOC and the JNC was very good; however, there were delays experienced in the actualissuance of EBS messages. In general, the personnel monitoring centers (PMCs) were well organized and efficient in performing their functions. Registration, record keeping and security were thorough, as were procedures for handling solid and liquid waste. However, additional training is necessary at the county PMC for monitors using the CDV-700 survey meters, as this function was not always performed correctly. More low-range dosimeters should be provided at the state PMC. Further training and procedure modification is also necessary to assure that monitoring teams move to low background areas, if necessary, to count alt sample media in order to obtain valid data. e While not under the jurisdiction of Westchester County, the Peekskill Hospital participated in a medical drill. Both power plant and hospital staff members demonstrated adequate treatment and decontamination procedures. However, there is a need for additional training of medical staff regarding the use of the thyroid blocking agent, potassium lodide (KI). Rockland County, New York The Rockland County EOC was activated and fully staffed in a timely fashion. Twenty-four-hour coverage of each agency was demonstrated. The operations room was well lighted and necessary maps were displayed. Security at the access point to the EOC was good. The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) provided timely initial and follow-up emergency notifications to Rockland County from the utility. The command and control fpnction at the Rockland EOC was well organized and efficient. The chairman of the legislature exercised leadership and command throughout the exercise. Coordination among the counties and the state via the executive hot!!ne at the EOC was effective. However, bec'ause of a delay in making protective action recommendations for ERPAs 36, 37 and 41, an EBS message ordering the sheltering of these ERPAs was issued af ter the arrival of the plume. This would have resulted in avoidable dose to some of the population in the ERPAs. N xiii

j l l Internal communications among agencies within the EOC and communications with response personnelin the field were very effective. Agency messages were written. reviewed, and routed in a timely fashion. Agency representatives kept a log of all communications. Status boards were updated and briefings were regularly held. The PIO personnel demonstrated excellent knowledge of their responsibilitter and the plan. The EBS messages and news releases were compiled and reviewed in a timely manner. However, the hard-copy ' messages used to confirm the EDS information were delayed in transmission from the JNC during the early part of the exercise. The County Department of Health staff assigned to the dose assessment function was well trained and followed procedures. Projected dose calculations were made based i on potential plant conditions and release rates when this information became available. The State Department of Health liaison arrived in a timely manner. and made dose assessment calculations independently from the county and then compared the results. However, on one occasion, the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG)' I i l !!aison in the EOC unnecessarily delayed the Health Commissioner in making a protective l netion recommendation for the evacuation of ERPA 29, insisting on a call to the State j dose assessment director. Information on plant status was obtained from the utility - l liaison at the county EOC and the state liaison at the EOF. The field team coordinator { did an excellent job in keeping the field teams informed of changing conditions. After ( the start of the release, the recommendations on protective actions were correctly based l l on the available information. A significant problem was created for the dose assessment { staff by inadequately trained field team controllers. I The reception center at Suffern High School was well organized and efficiently operated. Proper techniques were demonstrated for monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles. A registration system was set up and a variety of social services l were available to evacuees. l Field monitoring teams were adequately trained and had the proper equipment to j determine radiation levels and to monitor for radiciodine in the presence of noble gas. The PMC was small but adequate for a limited number of emergency workers. Provisions were demonstrated to decontaminate vehicles and control contaminated water. l Bus evacuation routes were generally run well during the exercise; however, j some modifications in the route maps are needed. Drivers observed at the exercise have l had some training, but refresher courses are needed. Additional bus drivers also need to j be trained in driving evacuation bus routes. Most buses and vans had radios, although j some problems were experienced in maintaining radio contact in the vicinity of I Middletown, liew York. All drivers had good dosimetry equipment, but not all were certain about K! procedures and use. j 1 l Tne evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired was effectively i demonstrated during the exercise. Drivers were knowledgeable about their routes and responsibilities. v Xiv w_____________-______-

1 l Orange County, New York Overall, Orange County demonstrated a well-managed emergency organization i with good and adequately trained staff. Throughout the entire exercise, the county chief executive and his alternate demonstrated effective leadership. He was well briefed on all ongoing events and made decisions after careful consideration of all relevant factors. The facilities at the Orange County EOC in Goshen were very good. The EOC i layout and resources were adequate for extended operation. The status boards and displays were good and updated regularly by appropriate staff. Key messages were shown on computer monitors, placed throughout the EOC facility. An on-site generator was available as a source of backup electrical power. ~ Orange County demonstrated functional and well-integrated internal t,d external communications systems. The RECS line was monitored with timely distribution of information received; hard copies received on telecopy machines were also available. Commercial telephones, highway department radios, National Weather Alert l System (NAWAS) and the extra county frequency provided both primary and backup communication capabilities, as required. All messages were logged, and information flow l was timely and accurate. l The county PIO effectively addressed state, local, and public concerns. The EBS l m2ssages were telephoned in to the JNC in a timely manner. l Putnam County, New York l Putnam County officials demonstrated a high degree of professionalism in the areas of alert and notification and activation and staffing of the EOC by key personnel. The EOC facility, although limited in space, was efficiently designed and utilized. The security and area control procedures were well organized and performed. For the most part, the exercise participants demonstrated the expertise necessary to handle the events as they progressed. The command and control of the center were evident in the close coordination between the county executive and the county civil defense director. However, sharing of Information between the decision makers and EOC staff needs to be improved. The EOC demonstrated a highly effective capability for external communication with the state EOC, other counties, and the EOF. This was provided by an extremely professional RACES organization and state and county police communications staffs. The only problem was the failure of the facsimile equipment used to transmit hard copy between the EOC and the JNC. No effective backup capability was immediately available. There was no obvious internal distribution of messages from the JNC below the i j county executive level and no standardized message control or loggirg procedures. 1 l t i l l xv i l

i Dose assessment capabilities at the EOC were highly efficient as demonstrated through the effective use of computer and display systems. The coordination with the field monitoring teams was very good; the teams exhibited a high degree of knowledge. The congregate care center was good and staffed with professionals highly capable of handling evacuees. The traffic control points were activated promptly and manned by well-trained county police officers. Although generally available, some fleid personnel lacked dosimetry. One bus driver was not able to complete an evacuation route due to poor maps and inadequate training. Dutchess County, New York 1 Dutchess County is a host area for evacuees from Putnam,and Westchester Counties. The EOC was staffed by county departmental personnel who demonstrated an adequate level of preparedness for dealing with a radiological emirgency. Direction of emergency operations was well managed by _ the EOC director and all staff were effectively involved in the decision making process. Physical aspects of the EOC are good and able to support continuou.s emergency operations. Message boards, maps and other displays were posted and effectively used to facilitate the county's response. All communication systems functioned effectively throughout the exercise. A personnel monitoring center was established at the EOC to monitor all incoming field staff. Radiological monitors demonstrated the proper procedures in ' performing their survey assignments. 1 The Dutchess County EOC also successfully coordinated with the Roy C. j Ketchum High School reception / congregate care center in Wappingers Falls. New York. The reception center was well equipped and the personnel monitoring staff were knowl-edgeable abeut the proper techniques for monitoring evacuees including decontamination procedures. The Red Cross demonstrated the ability to set up a congregate care center. Proper registration techniques were used. Cots, blankets, nursing, care, and counseling services were available. Bergen County, New Jersey The Bergen County EOC initlally had some difficulty in maintaining a communications link with the Rockland County EOC. The county EOC director was not aware for about two hours that the sheriff's office had sent a liaison to the Rockland County EOC. The liaison officer provided the Bergen County Policy Department with the status of activity in the Rockland County EOC throughout the exercise. ee o ese e e e m xvi lj A. d' s w___-_____-__

..o 1 r 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December L 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site' nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radlo1 gical emergency planning for fixed nuclear 9 facilities include the following: e Taking the. lead in off-site ernergency planning and in the review- . and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans dev, eloped by state and local governments. e Determining whether such plans can be. implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.

• Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities In the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce (' DOC) ( U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) U.E. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) U.S. Department of Health'and Human Services (HHS) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) j U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) I Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Formal submission of the Indian Point' Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) to the RAC by the state and involved local jurisdictions was followed closely by .( the critiquing and evaluation of these plans. The first joint radiological emergency' S preparedness exercise for Indian Point was held. on March 3,1982, and two public i meetings were held in June 1982 to acquaint the'public with the plan contents,' answer i questions, and receive suggestions on' the plans. I A second joint exercise was conducted on March 9,1983, and the post-exercise assessment was issued by FEMA Region 11 on April 14,19ti3. An exercise of New York State's Interim' Plan for implementing compensating measures for Rockland County was. I i e _ g. u e Q______________._._________ __L_.__.__. a____._i_____________._.__

i 1 2 conducted on August 24-25, 1983, and the post-exercise assessment was issued by FEMA Region II on September 26,1983. A third joint exercise was conducted on November 28, 1984, between the hours of 0600 and 1900, to assess the capability of the state and local emergency preparedness organizations to implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures and protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the indian Point Nuclear Power Station. it should be noted that the Rockland County plan was tested during this exercise. An observer team consisting of personnel from FEM A Regions I, II, and !!!; the RAC; FEMA's contractors; and federal and state agencies evaluated the November 28 exercise. Fifty-four observers were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local jurisdictions. Observers were trained in radiological emergency planning concepts tind j given an evaluation kit, which included information on exercise objectives, the exercise l scenario, and other issues relating to the exercise. Team leaders coordinated team operations. Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations. Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. This final exercise report is based on these preliminary assessments. A public critique of the exercise for exercise participants and the general public was held at 1300 on Friday, November 30, 1984, at the Joint News i Center at the Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York. The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of federal observers, which were reviewed by FEMA Region !!. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to j the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, j D.C., that all defleiencies observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. 1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS I Fifty-four federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below. Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function F. Petrone FEMA Ceneral Observation /FE.MA Region II Director R. Kowieski FEMA Ceneral Observation /RAC Chairman R. Reynolds FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader F. Oleson FEMA State EOC/ Accident Assessment C. Hatch FEMA State EOC/ Cob.munications

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3 l l Observer Agenev Exercise Location / Function \\ S. Houston FEMA Poughkeepsie/ Southern District EOC E. Wolener NRC Indian Point Emergency Operations Facility / Liaison M. Jackson FEMA Joint News Center /Public Information N. Kelly FEMA Joint News Center /Public Information C. Connolly FEMA Westchaster Co. EOC/ Team Leader P. Weberg FEMA Westchester Co. EOC/ Assistant Team Leader E. Tanzman ANLa Westchester Co. EOC/ Communications and Public Informa-tion Officer b B. Salmonson INEL Westchester Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment R. Bernacki FDA Westchester Co./ Medical Drill, Personnel Monitoring Center M. Ku: man FDA Westchester Co./ Medical Drill, Personnel Monitoring Center R. Rodrigues FEMA Westchester Co./ Evacuation Congregate Care Center C. Saricks ANL Westchester Co./ Evacuation, Reception Center l X. Bertram ANL Westchester Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification 1 C. Kas:ynski ANL Westchester Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification R. Tinsman DOT Westchester Co./ Evacuation, Evacuation of Mobility-Impaired Persons L. Slagel INEL Westchester Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring, State Personnel Monitoring Center 1 R. Olivieri FEMA Westchester Co./ Traffic Control Points, Route Alerting, School Interviews P. McIntire FEMA Rockland Co..EOC/ Team Leader i 1 S. McIntosh FEMA Rockland Co. EOC/ Assistant Team Leader e T. Baldwin ANL Rockland Co. EOC/ Communications (. i i k

4 9 4 Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function R. Walsh FEMA Rockland Co. EOC/ Mobilization and Staffing, Radio-Logical Emergency Communications System Telephonc J. Keller INEL Rockland Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment P. Cammarata FEMA Rockland Co. EOC/Public Information j Y. Klein ANL Rockland Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification R. Rospenda ANL Rockland Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification K. Lerner ANL Rockland Co./ Evacuation, Reception Centa.r j T. Buckoski FEMA Rockland Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification D. Pettanech FEMA Rockland Co./ Evacuation of Mobility-Impaired Persons, Bergen Co./ Congregate Care f i N. Chipman INEL Rockland Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring, Personnel Monitoring Center M. Wordsman FEMA Rockland Co./ Traffic Control Points, Route Alerting, School Interviews J. Picciano FEMA Orange Co. EOC/ Team Leader R. Acerno FEMA Orange Co. EOC/ Assistant Team Leader H. Fish 00E Orange Co. EOC/ Communications C N. Rohrig BNL Orange Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment d M. Peterson WA Orange Co. EOC/Public Information S. Curtis ANL Orange Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification B. Swiren FEMA Orange Co./ Traffic Control Poin'es, Route Alerting, Congregate Care J. Opelka ANL Orange Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring, Reception Center, Perso,nnel Monitoring Center J. Dolan FEMA Putnam Co. EOC/ Team Leader R. Carelik FEMA Putnam Co. EOC/ Assistant Team Leader A

\\ j s 5 l Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function C J. Kelley FEMA Putnam Co. EOC/ Communications R. Honkus INEL Putnam Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment, Personnel Monitoring Center P. Becherman ANL Putnam Co. EOC/Public Information O Kelly FEMA Putnam Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification T. Holiday FEMA Putnam Co./ Evacuation, Alert and Notification S. Barisas ANL Putnam Co./ Traffic Control Points, Route Alerting, Congregate Care J. Moon EPA Putnam Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring, Personnel l Monitoring Center C. Malina USDA Dutchess Co./EOC, Reception Center, Congregate Care i A. Davis FEMA Bergen Co./EOC o { ( aANL = Argonne National Laboratory bINEL = Idaho National Engineering Laboratory "BNL = Brookhaven National Laboratory d l WA = Washington State Emergency Management Agency 1 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FE.TtA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), Section 11. Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deficiencies and accompanying recommendations are presented. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. The first category includes those deficiencies that would cause a negative finding, that is, a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living near the site in the event of a radiological emergency. A negative, finding would be based on at least one deficiency of this type. The second category includes all other deficiencies where, although demon-strated (and observed) performance during the exercise was substandard and corrective actions are necessary, other factors give FE.TtA reasonable assurance that, in a real radiological emergency, the health and safety of the public could be protected. These other deficiencies also include all other problem areas where performance was ( k

6 considered adequate but where a correctable weakness was observed. Correction of the weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to respond to radiological emergencies. 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1 The licensee, FEMA, NRC, and the state of New York planned a coordinated exercise of the emergency plans for both on-site and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff and response facilities of the l New York Power Authority (NYPA) and Indian Point Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3 (IP-3), as well as emergency organizations and facilities of New York State and the counties of Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam. Support (host) counties of Dutchess, New York, and Bergen, New Jersey, were intended to have limited activation and participation of their respective staff and organizations consistent with the exercise scenario. The exercise _was intended to demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the i IP-3 capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario was designed to activate the IP-3 and NYPA Headquarters emergency plans through their various action levels. Although this scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operators' diagnostic capabilities, but rather to l' provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operators' ability to respond to l events and that resulted in exercising both on-site and off-site emergency plans and procedures. Free play was encouraged and the controllers interfered only if operator or player action prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the exercise schedule. l In order to minimize the impact on scheduling and agendas, the scenario was l designed to complete the exercise in a time frame somewhat in excess of a routine working day. In order to provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses and l areas affected, exercise meteorology was developed. Actual meteorology would probably l lead to projected radiological doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of interest. The following objectives were developed for this exercise and have been referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation section (Sec. 3) of this report: 1 J l 1.4.1 New York State a. State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 1. Demonstrate the ability..to receive and verify the initial and ( follow-up emergency notifications from the licensee. 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the l SEOC in a timely manner. e i i O f S

t, 3. Demonstrate.through rosters the ability to maintain staffing. ( in the SEOC on a 24-hour basis. c 4. Demonstrate that the SEOC has adequate space, equipment and suppites to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate that the state, counties, and utility can establish appropriate. communication links, both primary and backup systems. 6. Demonstrate that the SEOC has adequate' access control and that security can be maintained. 7. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly. logged, that ' status boards are accurately.' maintained and updated.. that appropriate briefings are held, and that incomlig personnel are briefed. 8. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge'and in control of an overall coordinated response. 9. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and fleid personnel. (

10. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for, request, and obtain federal assistance.

11. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective' action recommendations to the public based on utility recommenda-tions, independent recommendations.. from the accident assessment group, and off-site factors such as~ evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions.

12. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public alerting and instructional messages with the local jurisdictions.

13. Demonstrate the ability to project ' radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure,- based on plant-data and field measurements, and - to.. determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs.

14. Demonstrate the decision chain that has been' established to authorize potential exposure' for emergency workers in excess of the general public.PAGs.

15. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, based on.

predetermined criteria, whether to issue potassium iodide (K!) _ *to emerre_qcy workers. L.___.__________.____.m__.____._____-.______m._.m..__ _______E____._______._.__.__.__.._.__._

e 1 8 ) b. Southern District Emergency Operations Center (SDEOC) 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and ' activate the l SDEOC in a timely manner. 1 s 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staff!ng in the SDEOC on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate that the SDEOC has adequate space, equipment., l l and supplies to support emergency operations. ' y I 4. Demonstrate that the SDEOC has ade'quate accass ' ontrol and. q c security can be maintained. F Ti t 5. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, ' essages ' are properly logged, status m boards are accurately. maintained and ' updated, appropelate briefings'are held, and incoming personnel are briefed. ' 6. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in i I control of an overali coordinated response. 7. Demonstrate the ; ability to cernmunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field persennel. 3 c. Field Activities H 1

l

\\ I 1. ' Demonstrate the ability to commu'nicate w'ith all appropriate-locations, organizations, and field personnel. 1 l .. i 2. Demonstrate the ability to continuously rnonitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personal dosimetry. / 4 r 3. Demonstrate that emergency workers understs'nd 'who ca'n authorize excess exposure undbr the PAGs. 4. Demonstrate the ability to supply and.a'dminister K1, once the decision has been made to do so. 5. Demonstrate adequdta equipment and procedures for decon-tamination of emer'gdacy workers, equipment, and. vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste. g t 4 ius e ga we ( ' w----_.-_.----.____..--_- }

d 9 1.4.2 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) C 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate state functions at the EOF in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing of state functions in the EOF on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate that the EOF has adequate space, equipment. and supplies to support emergency operations. 4. Demonstrate that the EOF has adequate access control and I that security can be maintained. 5. Demonstrate the ability to mobil!:e staff and activate county functions at the EOF in a timely manner (Westchester County only). 6. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing l of county functions in the EOF on a 24-hour basis l (Westchester County only). 2 1.4.3 Joint News Center and Coordination of Public Information 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate state and county functions at the Joint News Center in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing of state and county functions in the Joint News Center on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate the ability of state and county personnel to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner. 1 4. Demonstrate the abilit/ of state and county personnel to share Information with other agencies at the Joint News Center orior to its release. 5. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner. l 6. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute l appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner I (Westchester County pubile information officer only). I ( i 4 1

i t 10 1.4.4 Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam Counties Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) a. 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notifications. 2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner. 3. Demonstrate through a combination of rosters and shift change the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis. 4. Demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. 5. Demonstrate that the state and counties can establish appropriate communication links, both primary and backup systems. 6. Demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate access control o and that security can be maintained. l 7. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate j and timely manner, messages are properly logged, status ] boards are accurately maintained and updated, appropriate briefings are held, and incoming personnel are briefed. 8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and la control of an overall coordinated response. i 9. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to deter-mine the need for and ability to obtain state assistance.

10. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

11. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs.

12. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of public alerting and instructional messages with the state and other counties.

_ - -. _________ -______ _ a

^- m.

n: =-;

a 9 -i e. c' 11-

13. Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an orderly

( evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ).

14. Demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as traffic obstructions.

l 15. Demonstrate the. organizational ability necessary to control access to an evacuated area.- 1

16. Demonstrate, if appropriate, the organizational. ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.

17. Demonstrate, if appropriate, the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the.10-mile EPZ.

If this - - protective action is not recommended: by the decision makers in Westchester and 1 Rockland counties, (e.g., if schools-were dismissed early), a. free play controller's message may be inserted to demonstrate this activity. This demonstration may' be out of scenario sequence (Westchester and Rockland counties only).

18. Demonstrate the ability to activate.the prompt notifiestion system.

b. County Radiological Field Monitoring 1.

Demonstrate the ability to mob!!!ze and deploy. field monitoring teams in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for-determining ambient radiation levels. 3. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 3 0.1 picoeuries/em in the presence of noble gases.-

c. Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control 1.

Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control l dosimetry. j emergency worker exposure including proper use of personal .l 2. Demonstrate the ability to. supply and' administer KI, once the l decision has been made to do so. 3. Demonstrate that emergency workers understand who - can lauthorize exe.ess exposure under the PAGs. I I 'I ( ,l

4 12 4. Derronstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicJm including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste.

d. Field Implementation vf County Actions te Protect the Public 1.

Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting procedures, if necessary, in the event of partial siren system failure. 2. Demonstrate that access cons.ol points can be established in a timely manner to control access to an evacuated area. 3. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (Westchester tud Rockland counties only). l 4. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an l orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. This activity may be initiated out of scenario sequence by a free play controller's message (Westchester and Rockland counties only). I 5. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ. 6. Demonstrate a sample of. escurces necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of 'the noninstitutionalized mobility-Impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ (Westchester and Rockland counties only). l 7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate j reception and congregate care centers in a timely manner (Westchester and Orange counties only). 8. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the reception center by shift change and the congregate care center by roster for 24-hour operation (Westchester County only). 9. Demonstrate the ability through rosters to maintain staffing l at the reception and congregate care center on a 24-hour basis (Orange County only). l 10. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a reception center in a timely manner (Rockland County only). i 1 l i f mm. i

l l 13 11. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain stafflt.g C at the reception center on a 24-hour basis (Rockland County only). 12. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees (Westchester, Rockland, and Orange counties only). ] 13. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care center in a timely manner (Putnam County only). 2 14. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing at the congregate care center on a 24-hour basis (Putnam County only). 15. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration of evacuees (Putnam County only). 16. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees (Westchester, Orange, and Putnam counties only). 17. Demonst. ate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals. (Medical ( drill involves an on-site injury in Westchester County). 18. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals. (Medical drill involves an on-site injury in Westchester County). l 1.4.5 Dutchess County

a. Emergency Operations Center 1.

Demonstrate the ability _to mobilize appropriate staff and j activate the EOC in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain appropriate staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. I 4. Demonstrate that the appropriate communication links can be l established. L i i l E ---- l

9 14 5. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, status boards are accurately maintained and updated, appropriate briefings are held, and incoming personnel are briefed. 6. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response. 7. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. 1

b. Field Activities

-) 1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care center in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability through rosters to maintain staffing at the congregate care center on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and j radiological monitoring of evacuees. 4. Demonstrate the adequacy' of facilities for mass care of evacuees. l l 1.4.6 Bergen County, New Jersey

a. Emergency Operations Center l

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize appropriate staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain appropriate staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations. l 4. Demonstrate that the appropriate communication links can be established. 5. Demonstrate that messagea are transmitted in an accurate and ~ timely manner, messages are properly logged, status boards ar4: accurately maintained and updated, appropriate briefings are held, and incoming personnel are briefed. 6. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in

• control of an overall_ coordinated response.

I

w LS 1 7. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate (. locations, organizations, and field personnel.

b. Field Activities 1.

Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care center in a timely manner. 2. Demonstrate the ability through rosters to maintain staffing at the congregate care center on a 24-hour basis. 3. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. 4. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. O ( l l l l l 'i L

~ i 16 1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario, and the actual times that they occurred. Apprestante Ties Projected Actual

• be Scenario occurred Event 0620 0700*

Incident at pla~. : injured contaminated worker - medical drt11 co.enences 0730 0730 Norteteation of Unuousi Event claceificatico 0900 0856 Declaration of Alert classification 1015e* 1035 Fire in musiliary boiler feedpump building damaging safety related equipment 1030 1037 Escalation to site Area Emereene, classification 1300 1303 Large Break LoCA due to double-ended rupture of 32 Cold Les 1315 1303 Escalation to Ceneral Emergency classifiestion 1345 1345 telease to environment 1445 1450 Wind shifts toward northern Rockland County, and . protective action recommendation modified to reflect wind shift 1515 1520 Wind shift toward Orange County 1530 1550 VioJ shift toward Putnam County Northern Westchester County 1715 1715 telease Terminated site de-a calates to site Area teertency classificattor t 1745 NR Exercise play suspended for 10 minutes i 1755 NE Time Warp exercise advances 48 hours for considera-tien of reentry planning and ingestion esposure con-olderatione I 1900 NR Exercise terminated

• Drill intentionally started late due to inclement weather (i.e., fog).
  • Telephone call received in plant control room.

IEsact time net reported. O

i ~ 8 17 ( 1.5.2 Scenario Overview ( l The Indian Point Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 is operating at 100% reactor power generating 1000 MW electrical. The reactor has been critical for 63 days and at 100% pcwer since the last turbine stop valve test 27 days ago. All radiation monitor readings are normal and thera are no abnormal alarms annunciated on the supervisory or flight panels. Containment fan cooler units 32 and 35 are held off to allow maintenance to repair their flow-indicating sensing lines. Various maintenance activities are being performed in the plant. Maintenance forces are uncrating unit electric heaters in the auxiliary boiler feed pump building as well as welding supports for the installation on these heaters. Maintenance forces are also performing a breaker PM (preventive maintenance) on a nonessential service water pump and repairing containment fan cooler units 32 and 35 flow indicating lines located in the piping penetration area of the primary auxiliary building. i At approximately 0630 hours, the control room receives a call informing them t that a maintenance worker has been injured while working on 32 and 35 fan cooler units flow sensing lines. The scaffolding they were using collapsed, injuring one worker and damaging two of the three pressure relief valves,1191 and 1192, such that they are both open and cannot be closed. The injured individual falls to the 41' elevation of the piping penetration area where he becomes contaminated. The injuries require transportation to an off-site hospital. At approximately 0730 hours r. Notification of Unusual Event is declared due to ( either a degradation of containment integrity or transportation of an injured contaminated person to an off-site hospital. The plant commences a shutdown using I normal procedures. in accordance with technical specifications, due to the degradation of containment integrity. At approximately 0845 Accumillator 34 check valves leak approximately 30 l gal / min of reactor coolant system into tbe accumulator. The leak is capable of being isolated by MOV894-D (motor operated valve). The valve requires energizing of its l breaker and the motor for :ubsequent closure. The breaker is expected to be energized and the valve closed. However, upon closure the valve falls in a partially open position leaving a 55 gal / min leak. Efforts to close the valve are not successful and an Alert is i declared. When the Alert is declared, the Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are staffed. At this time (approximately 0900 hours) the support centers are l notified that they must demonstrate a shift and relief turnover. This is demonstrated by removing approximately 50% of the people from the drill to return later for a shift and relief turnover. (The EOF, staffed at the Site Area Emergency classification, is notified i at that time of the shif t and relief turnover.) At approximately 1015 hours a fire occurs in the auxiliary boiler feed pump building. The fire is caused by a welding spark igniting the crating material left from the unit electric heaters. A Site Area Emergency is declared at 1030 hours due to the fire damaging safety systems. The fire brigade responds and extinguishes the fire. The fire N

18 damages the electrical feed to auxiliary bo!!er feed pump 33. In addition, heat sensors in the room close the steam supply valves,1310A and 13108, to the turbine-driven auxiliary boiler feed pump. These valves cannot be opened from the control room, requiring corrective action. At approximately 1200 hours, the support centers demonstrate a shif t and relief ] turnover. 1 At approximately 1300 hours a full large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOC A) occurs due to the double-ended rupture of 32 cold leg. The ECCS will be initiated due to a low pressurizer pressure signal. A General Emergency is declared at this time. The. ECCS equipment operates as designed except 31 and 32 RHR pumps will not start i automatically,32 and 35 fan cooler units are inoperable, and MOV-894D Accumulator 3j ) isolation valve falls to open. The LOCA causes a high containment pressure'of 41 lb/in" I and some fuel damage. ) At approximately 1345 hours, the single remaining pressure relief valve falls to open, initiating a release. The release continues until approximately 1715 hours, at which time the pressure relief valve closes via its control switch or because the OSC is then able to isolate the line (either method at controllers discretion can be used to terminate the release). At approximately 1500 hours the EOF demonstrates a shift and relief turnover. At approximately 1745 hours a 2-day time warp occurs and all drill players are pushed ahead in time 48 hours. Plant conditions are stable and the recovery phase is demonstrated. The drill terminates at 1900 hours. I 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources All emergency response agencies were responsible for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in adequata numbers to provide a reasonable test of their notification, mobill:ation,

command, coordinator, and communications capabilities. Except as noted below, state and county agencies had total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources, consistent with this intent. Since the intent of the exercise was to demonstrate actual abilities as i

closely as possible, all action 5@Were to be taken where possible. Actions were to be l simulated only when they could not feasibly be performed. The decision to demonstrate or to actually deploy resources was to be made at the time of the exercise. l l The following personnel and resouras were to be deployed by the state and local governments te demonstrate the capabilities of their emergency resources consistent .j with the off-site objectives developed for the exercise. Public Notification During the exercise an actual test of the sirens and accompanying Emergency ) Broadcast System (EBS) announcement and EBS-activated tone alert radios were to be I I J

s. n. m_.. 4 \\ 19 ' demonstrated. Additional exercise EBS messages were to be prepared. Actual ) ( transmission of these messages to.the primary insert station (CPCS-1),- WABC,.and broadcast by the EBS network were to be simulated. i Backup Notification System '( 1 Federal evaluators were to introduce free play problems simulating.a limited failure of the siren system. 'One siren was to be simulated to have failed in each of the four counties. Each county was to. demonstrate an effective use of' the backup notification system (e.g., route alerting). Radiological Field Monitoring Teams In addition to off-site monitoring teams dispatched by Indian Point, the following - county radiological monitoring field teams were to be demonstrated. County Teams Westchester 2 Rockland 2 Orange 1 Putnam 2 ( Each team was to be supplied with a controller. The controllers were to have simulated l 1 field data which they were to provide to the teams to determine local dose rate readings ~ consistent with the scenario. Each team was to be equipped with the necessary equipment to determine both actual area gamma dose rates and airborne radiciodine-concentrations. The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing. 1 ) Orange County was to use one team of monitoring personnel both before and I during the release. A team with different monitoring personnel was to be available after release. This arrangement was to minimize impact on volunteers and time away from their jobs. Completion of Bus Routes for Evaeuces Each of the four plume exposure pathway EPZ counties was to activate a sample of evacuee bus routes as follows:- J Buses Ceneral County Pooulation Schools l Westchester 5 2 i Rockland '4 2 ( Orange 1 autna __ ._2_._-.__ .~ 1 1' l

20 Bus routes were not be preassigned. The federal evaluators were to indicate which bus routes were to be demonstrated on the exercise day. The federal evaluators in consort with the assigned I, tate controller and appropriate county staff were to ensure q that the selected bus routes did not affect normal public transportation. Two buses in ] each of Westchester and Rockland counties were to run two routes - a school evacuation l route followed by a general population route. One bus in Orange County and two buses in Putnam County were to run general population routes. The bus drivers were to assemble at their normal dispatch location, be assigned appropriate routes, and be briefed and. deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. The buses assigned to school evacuation demonstration were to complete their assigned school evacuation route to the appropriate school reception center. These buses were then to return to the starting point of the assigned general population route. Upon completion of the general population route, the buses were to report to appropriate reception ce congregate care centers. The buses and drivers were then to be secured. I No passengers were to be picked up during the simulated evacuations. J j i Evacuation of Nr. institutionalized Mobility-Impaired Persons Each county was to demonstrate procedures for identification, notification and determination of the availability of appropriate transportation for evacuation of noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons. In additfor, federal evaluators were to select a !!mited number of addresses for I l mobliity-impaired persons in both Westchester and Robkland counties. Vehicles for transportation of the handicapped were to be dispatched to these addresses for simulated evacuation. t l Traffic Control Points l Local agencies supplemented by state resources were to deploy personnel to l demonstrate activation of a suitable sample of traffsic control points (TCPs) for major evacuation routes in each county. l i County TCF3 i Westchester 3 Rockland 3 l Orange 3 l P_utnam 2 The TCPs were not to be preassigned or repositioned. In order to provide a greater test of the capability to respond to an actual incident and to allow more free play in the exercise, the federal evaluators were to provide information on locations of f TCPs to be demonstrated during the course of the exercise. i i

~ i 21 Once TCPs had been established and observed by federal evaluators, local off!- ( cials were to release personnel to normal duties and simulate continuation of TCPs where required. The relieved personnel were not to be used for any other exercise function. Rotation of traffic control personnel was to be simulated from personnel who would be available from off duty sections. For training purposes, selected traffic control personnel were to report to personnel monitoring centers after they were secured from their exercise assignment. Impediments to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce free play events to test procedures for removal of impediments from evacuation routes. These demonstrations were to include the actual dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle (s) to the scene, report from the scene to the EOC requesting appropriate resources, Identification of the availability of the required resources (e.g., tow truck, public works equipment) and estimates of the times of arrival at the scene and the time for clearing the impediment. The EOC staff was expected to analyze the situation and, if required, select an alternate evacuation route. If indicated, an appropriate EBS message was to be prepared and issued to inform the population about the impediment (s). Number of County Imoedimenen Westchester 2 ( Rockland 2 Putnam 1 Orange 1 Personnel Monitoring Centers Each county was to set up and demonstrate a personnel monitoring center (PMC) for local emergency workers. During the exercise, the processing of selected emergency workers who had completed their exercise participation was to be demonstrated. Decontamination actions were to be simulated. At the PMC, anything which may damage property (such as parking vehicles on grass) was to be simulated. All necessary equipment was to be assembled at tne PMC; however, its use may have been simulated. Detailed simulation actions were to be implemented at the center by the PMC leader. In addition, the state was to demonstrate the activation of a PMC for state emergency workers. County PMCs i i Westchester 2 (1 for county emergency workers and 1 for state workers) i Rockland 1 (joint state and county emergen:y worker facility) l ( Orange 1 (for county emergency worvers) 2 (for county emergency worker _s) Pu,tnam

r O 22 i Relocation Centers At least one reception or congregate care center was to be opened and staffed for evacuees from each of the four counties in accordence with respective local emergency response plant. Supplies required for long-term mass care (cots, blankets, food, etc.) did not need tte have been acquired or brought to the centers. However, the center personnel should have obtained estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving. had the exercise been a real emergency. The center personnel should have then made the necessary estimates of supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources of the q required supplies should then have been located and the means for transportation of the supplies should have been determined. A limited number of volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure. Procedures for monitoring and decontamination of ' evacuees were to be demonstrated at reception centers. Federal evaluators may have introduced free play problems of procedures for handling evacuees arriving at a congregate care center without appropriate documents from the referral reception center. Because of logistics and the need to make prior arrangements to gain access to relocation centers during an exercise, these centers were selected prior to the day of the exercise. County Facility Westchester 1 - reception and' congregate care ) 1 - congregate care (located in Putnam County) i Rockland 1 - reception 1 - congregate care (Bergen County, N.J.) Orange 1 - reception and congregate care l Putnam 1 reception and congregate care (located in Dutchess County) Medical Drills There was to be a medical drill involving demonstration of. handling and treatment of contaminated injuries at a hospitalin Westchester County. The injured and contaminated individual was to be a licensee worker. The medical drill was to involve treatment at the scene, transport by an off-site ambulance and subsequent diagnosis and treatment at an off-site hospital. Ingestion Sampling t The state was to exercise a limited demonstration of the analysis and decision-making process for the selection of ingestion exposure pathway samples consistent with the hypothetical problem posed by the exercise parameters. The state may have s

23 collected Ingestion pathway samples from open sources of public drinking water. ( Analysis of the samples was to be simulated. Volunteer Organizations Response organizations identified in the plans were to partic! gate in the exercise. Members of volunteer organizations such as volunteer fire departments, ambulance squads, amateur radio clubs, and Red Cross have responsibilities including earning a livelihood that take precedence over their participation in an exercise. Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as-available basis. 1 1.5.4 Actual and Simulated Off-site Events Matrix Event Actual Simulate _d Notification of federal, county, e municipal, and private agencies X Activation of state and county EOCs X e s Accident assessment X Radiological field monitoring X e e Traffic control state and county personnel X X EBS exercise message X e Additional EBS messages prepared e but not transmitted to the public X Activate prompt public notification, e system X Personnel monitoring center activa-e tion for emergency workers X Evacuee congregate care shelter and l e I registration-decontamination center activation (one for each county) X Monitoring and decontamination of l e I evacuees and emergency workers X f i Personal dose record keeping X I e i l Personal dosimetry issuance e X ( i j ( \\ i i l

7- - =.! y. 1 24 -Event Actuali Simulated e i Provision for thyroid blocking for e emergency workers X .,4 Evacuation of affected population X e e Evacuation of schools-X i e Handling of contaminated, injured on-site Personnel X e Demonstration of' evacuation bus l routes X \\ 1-X e Evacuation impediments X

e. Demonstration of evacuation of.

noninstitutionalized' mobility-impaired persons X X Ingestion pathway sampling (drinking e water sources only) X Ingestion pathway samples analyses X j e 1 e Law enforcement and crime prevention, l public health and sanitation, fire J control and rescue X X e Reentry and recovery planning X Reentry activities X e l l l l l l 9 l-l 1 s

• -l'),

i 4 t* 01 .j

25 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section provides a narrative overview of the observation evaluations from the November 28,1984 radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Indian Point 14uclear Power Station. These evaluations are keyed to the exercise objectives listed in Sec.1.4 of this report. References to those objectives are provided in the narrative which follows. 2.1 NEW YORK STATE AND SOUTHERN DISTRICT EOCs 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) The exercise objective (SEOC 1) to demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and follow-up emergency notifications from the licensee was effectively accomplished by the use of the Radiological Emergency Communications Syst6m (RECS) telephone. Because this is a direct communication link from the SEOC to the utility, verification is accomplished by a roll call procedure after the transmittal of each message. There is, in addition to the RECS line, an executive hotline with the capability to receive emergency communications from each of the four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). r ( The ability to mobilize staff and activate the SEOC in a timely manner was successfully demonstrated (SEOC 21. The SEOC was promptly activated after the Alert notification was received via the RECS line. Most of the state emergency management operations staff had already reported to work for usual duty, since this notification was received just prior to 0900. The other agency representatives had to be notified and mobilized. This notification process was accomplished primarily by telephone calls and by pagers for key individuals. All personnel were notified within approximately 30 minutes. A total of 26 state agencies were contacted. Additional personal paging devices could shorten the time required to notify all individuals. However, si.nce the existing system was demonstrated to work effectively, the need for additional personal pagers is not considered a deficiency. The SEOC was considered operational at approximately 0900 and was fully staffed by approximately 1030. The SEOC is capable of 24-hour operations based upon rosters indicating primary and backup personnel for each function (SEOC 3). in most cases both individuals participated in the exercise. The SEOC includes a complete kitchen and dormitory to service 24-hour operations. The SEOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations (SEOC 4). The SEOC is a large facility designed to function independently under adverse conditions. The layout and workspaces are completely satisfactory. Agency representatives report to a large operations room which contains designated desks and telephones for each agency. Each agency has its own work area, but all areas are in close proximity. Equipment is adequate but not always state-of-the-art. Multiple b

f 26 l ince the SEOC f systems are available for communications. Supplies are readily availab e 7 is contiguous to the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) f acility.f i te The state, counties, and utility demonstrated the ability to establish links at the SEOC (SEOC 5). The primary primary and backup communicationcommunications link from The backup i ions l system is radio linkages via the counties. Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) are available. The prim with a l link from the SEOC to the county EOCs is also by the executive hotlin backup radio system. Security was The SEOC had adequate security and access control (SEOC 6). l d the state police. promptly established at the SEOC by the buildi ffic was directed also stationed through the one remaining entrance. badge after being checked for proper credentials. Security officers wer inside the SEOC to monitor access to various areas. issu riate d areas. The transmittal and logging of messages, the maintenance of sta SEOC (SEOC 7). Most the briefing of personnel were successfully demonstrated at the These messages were messages at the SEOC were received over the RECS telephone. ii makers, to promptly recorded, copied, and distributed throughout the SEOC to d d Status accident assessment and operations staffs, and to the 26 agencies re h hout the boards were maintained in each room within th ide nducted a detailed summary for the agency representatives. General briefings wer ii makers periodically in the operations area, usually after d Message handling, loggleg, and distribution were effective duri keeping and message backlogs were minimized. This corrected a previous defi messages brief to minimize the time required for transmittal. The director of the state Radiological Emergency Preparedness G d in control of under the Disaster Preparedness Commission was effectively in charge an l orted the overall coordinated response at the SEOC (SEOC 8). The director pro to the SEOC and assumed control upon his arrival. i hot!!ne throughout the exercise and consulted with the four coun director of SEMO, assured that the state was prepared to act if calle on a frequent basis. counties. The SEOC partly demonstrated the ability to communicate with all 1). The existing locations, organizations, 'and field personnel (SEOC 9 and SFA dedicated communications systems available at the SEOC consist r,f RECS teleph telephones, commercial telephones radio, and telefax.. when a RECS mess Rockland County EOC on one occasit l a

27 not follow the procedures for use of the RECS system and did not contain complete ( information. It is recommended that all parties who have access to the RECS syste.m be properly trained in the procedures to follow for its use. Personnel at the SEOC demons'trated the ability to identify th 3 need for, request, and obtain federal assistance (SEOC 10). The FEMA Regional Offlee was promptly contacted by the SEOC after confirmation of the Alert emergency classification was received from the utility. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard was contacted and asked to clear Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) in the Hudson River of marine traffic. The state clearly was aware of which federal agencies to contact for specific needs and was prepared to contact them, if needed. The state assessment and evaluattori team at the SEOC successfully met the exercise objective (SEOC 11) to make appropriate protective action recommendations to the public based on utility recommendations, independent recommendations from the accident assessment group, and off-site factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions. Although the governor did not declare an Emergency, the independent recommendations for protective actions which would have been required (related to continued sheltering, reentry and recovery) had been carefully considered by the Department of Health team leader. He was aware that the plume exposure to the population had been reduced substantially below the PAGs because of wind shif ts and the sheltering providad by being inside homes which were closed tightly during the passage of the plume. State recommendations for protective action strongly favored sheltering rather than evacuation based on limited off-site monitoring data regarding the noble gas o to lodine ratio. These state recommendations did take into account Information ( available from the utility and Nuclear Regulatory Commission teams relative to plant conditions. Since there was no state declaration of emergency for this exercise, public alerting and instructional messages were under the control of the individual counties and not the state. Nevertheless, the state did demonstrate its ability to coordinate pubtle alerting and instructional messages with the local jurisdictions (SEOC 12). Each of the EBS messages was discussed over the executive hotline prior to its preparation and release. The activation of strens was coordinated by the counties among themselves as well as with the state. Personnel at the SEOC satisfactorily demonstrated the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant cata and field measure-ments, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based en PAGs (SEOC 13). Dese assessment personnel at the SEOC performed well. However, 3wo problems were observed. Improper, erroneous field data were given to the Rockland County field monitoring team by inadequately trained field team state controllers. Also, an entire packet of scenario materials (containing time and direction of release) was given to dose assessment personnel at the Putnam County EOC, and the controller at that facility made leading comments to the dose assessment staff. Exercise data and information must be kept confidential. It is recommended that only properly trained controllers be used in future exercises. ( l = I i l

28 The professional competence and organizational teamwork displayed inL the assessment and evaluation center of the SEOC was exceptional.- The nuclear engineers, ~! meteorologists, radiological' health' assessment' specialists, traffic analysts, and l supporting staff all contributed to an effective team. ~! Once a release of radioactivity had been announced by the EOF via the RECS. telephone, calculations were made manually and with hand-held calculators for. the projected dose rates in the downwind sectors. Plant conditions and data were considered in making judgments on protective action recommendations. A source. term of 375 - .j curies /s was used for projections. The sudden shift of winds during the afternoon had been anticipated by the meteorologist assigned to the group. He used a computer to j obtain plant meteorological data (simulated for the exercise) and was.able to anticipate the wind shifts from the southwest. However, the failure of county field monitoring teams to obtain and transmit more. timely off-site monitoring reports limited the performance of the state assessment and evaluation center team. The state has a procedure and decision chain for authorizing potential exposure for emergency workers in excess 8 the general public PAGs, thereby meeting one of the exercise objectives (SEOC 14). State personnel. were participating in field activities during the exercise. This participation consisted of personnel at. personnel monitoring centers (PMCs) in Westchester and Rockland counties, and state police at traffic control. points (TCPs) in Westchester,' Rockland, and Orange counties (see Sees. 2.4.3, 2.5.3, and 2.6.3 of this report). These stt *e emergency ' workers understood who can authorize I i excess exposure under the PAGs, thus meeting one of the exercise objectives (SFA 3). Although it was not demonstrated for this exercise, since the governor had not declared a state of emergency, it would t'e the responsibility'of the state health commissioner or his designee to decide whether or not to authorize such excess exposure. At the PMCs for state emergency workers in Westchester and Rockland counties, the exercise objective (SFA 5) to demonstrate the adequacy of equipment and procedures i for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste was met. This is described in Secs. 2.4.3 and 2.5.3. The potential exposure to emergency workers was periodically reviewed during the various situation briefings conducted by the director at the SEOC. Cumulative doses were discussed, as well as the composition of the plume. :The possible use of KI was also evaluated. At least one free play message required emergency workers to receive additional exposure which was correctly noted asipotentially exceeding the PAGs. However, the exercise objective (SFA 2) to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personal dosimetry was only partly met since j proper dosimetry was not used by-all state emergency workers. - As described in Sec. 2.4.3 of this report, the State Police at one TCP did not have permanent-record dosimeters. State officials demonstrated their ability to decide, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue K! to' emergency workers (SEOC 15). The state Department of Health radiological health team leader Indicated that state emergency workers would be furnished with KI when exposures of 5 to 25 rem thyroid dose were expected (SFA 4). It l

.~ 29 should be noted that the New York State Generic Radiological Emergency Response Plan C specifies that KI will be considered for use by emergency workers and selected captive populations when a thyroid radiation dose of 25 rem or greater is projected (see page II-44, REV.10/84 of the State RERP). The State Radiological Health Team leader should be trained in the KI policy contained in the New York State Plan. During the exercise. state personnel at the SEOC closely reviewed the composition of the plume, based on the limited information available from the plant. The state decided that the performance of iodine filters at the plant could not be verified and an iodine release was assumed to be present. Therefore, the state alerted the counties that the use of KI by emergency-workers might be necessary. Deficiencies That Woula Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the SEOC during this exercise. Other Deficiencies 1. Deficiency: A RECS message initiated by the state did not fo!!ow the proper procedures for use of the RECS system and did not contain complete information (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1). ( Recommendation: All personnel who have access to the RECS system should be trained in the procedures to follow for its use. 2. Deficienev: Improper,. erroneous field data were given to a Rockland County field monitoring team by controllers. Also, an entire packet of scenario materials (containing time and direction of release) was given to dose assessment staff at the Putnam County EOC and the controller at the facility provided leading comments to the dose assessment. (NUREG-0654, !!, N.1.a l.8, 0.1). Recommendation: Only properly trained controllers should be used in future exercises. Exercise data and information must be kept confidential. 3. Defielency: State police at one TCP in Westenester County did not have permanent-record dosimeters. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a) Recommendation: State police assigned to all TCPs should be equipped with permanent-record dosimeters. f i 4. Defielency: The State Department of Health Radiological Health Team leader indleated that State emergency workers would be ~ furnished with K! when exposures of 5 to 25 rem thyroid dose were

? 30 expected. It should be noted that the New York State Generic Radiological Emergency Response Plan specifies that K! will be considered for use by emergency workers and selected captive populations when a thyroid radiation dose of 25 rem or greater is projected (see page III-44, REV. 10/84 of the State RERP). (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.f) Recommendation: The State Radiological Health Team leader should be trained in the K! policy contained in the New York State Plan. 2.1.2 Southern District Emergency Operations Center (SDEOC) i The exercise objective (SDEOC 1) to demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff l and activate the SDEOC in a timely manner was met. The emergency staff call-up list, I containing 55 names was recently updated (11/7/84) and hsted the agency person's name with home and business telephone numbers. Personnel are alerted and mobilized by means of a new 15-line electronic telephone system which augments the previously installed 3-line key telephone system. This new system has 45 telephone instruments and a switchboard. The system's 2-digit speed-dialing feature can access up to 8916-digit i telephone numbers. Supplementing this system, a paging system is also used to alert four l key personnel. This paging system is expandable. Use of the paging system and tt:e improved telephone system to alert SDEOC personnel corrects a previous deficiency. l A roster was available which contained the names and positions of SDEOC personnel for the first and second shif ts demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing at the SDEOC on a 34-hour basis (SDEOC 2). In addition, some actual shif t changes were accomplished by various agencies during the exercise. The SDEOC had adequate space, equipment and supplies to support emergency l' operations (SDEOC 3). A copy machine and all other supplies and equipment necessary to l support emergency operations were also available. The new telephone system was installed and operating, thereby correcting a previous deficiency regarding an insufficient number of telephone lines. Two Xerox 455 telefax machines were also -installed and operating at the SDEOC on two separate telephone lines. This corrected an earlier defielency regarding an insuffielent number of telefax machines permanently assigned to the SDEOC. The SDEOC had adequate security and access control (SDEOC 4). The SDEOC is equipped with an electronic gate lock at its perimeter. This is backed up by a closed-circuit video camera and cudio speaker system that is remotely controlled by the secretary located behind the second locked door of the SDEOC. A temporary extension of the outer perimeter audio speaker system was provided for the state police trooper stationed outside the SDEOC during the exercise. This arrangement worked well. The exercise objective (SDEOC 5) concerning the timely transmittal and logging ) of messages, the maintenance of status boards, and briefing of personnel was met. The message forms and logging procedures at a!! operational positions were very good. All

1 ^ s 1 I 31 status boards were of sufficient size, were clearly visible, and were accurately [ maintained and updated. Briefings were held for incoming personnel and general briefings for all participants were conducted approximately every half-hour. The state district coordinator was in charge and in control of the emergency response operations at ;;he SDEOC (SDEOC 6). Staff meetings were conducted smoothly and effielently and the district coordinator was provided with all necessary data in a timely manner. [.. The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was demonstrated (SDEOC 7). The telephone dial-up system worked well and is relatively simple to operate. The RECS telephone was operational throughout the exercise. When the state radio transmitter failed at one point during the exercise, the RACES radio systems adequately handled the radio traffic without any problems. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding _ No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the SDEOC during this exercise. Other Deficiencies e No other deficiencies were observed at the SDEOC. C. 2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) The exercise objectives (EOF 1 and EOF 5) to mobilize staff and activate state and county functions at the EOF in a timely manner were adequately demonstrated. The alerting and mobilization of the staff assigned to the EOF were good. Both New York State and Wr.stehester County personnel arrived at the EOF during the Alert classification and the staffing was completed at 1020. According to exercise participants, a call-up list can be used to notify and mobilize staff members at any hour of any day. The staff present at the EOF during the exercise displayed adequate training and knowledge. Their active participation and their conduct of responsibilities was outstanding. The roles of the state and county personnel at the EOF are clearly defined in the plan as liaison officers responsible for supplying data from the utility to the New York State and Westchester County EOCs for use in accident and dose assessment. On the basis of rosters available during the exercise, both New York State and Westchester County would be capable of maintaining state and county functions at the EOF on a 24-hour per day basis (EOF 2 and EOF 6). The only shift change which took place during the exercise was for one of the two Westchester County staff members. There was sufficient space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations at the EOF (EOF 3). Although working space within the EOF was limited, it was adequate to suppcrt the required functions. The state and Westchester County (

~ s 32 i representatives had assigned working space on the balcony above the utility's work area. The communications system included separate dedicated telephone lines, RECS tele-phone, commercial telephone lines, and a mobile radio. An inventory of available equip-ment and supplies was located in the EOF. The state and county personnel had access to the utility's work area, including the technical information, maps, and status boards. ^ Meteorological data contained in the scenario, which was reviewed and approved l for this exercise, did not include provisions for the foggy weather conditions specified in l the RECS messages 7-A through 15-A issued by the utility from the EOF between 1009 and 1320. Since the scenario was developed to simulate a predetermined, set of conditions designed to test decision making under those circumstances, the inclusion of j fog (which was an actual weather condition on the day of the exercise) changed the i protective action options that could be considered. This change was a critical factor in the exercise because it became necessary to evaluate evacuation options using evacuation time estimates for adverse weather conditions. According to the county plans, reduced visibility due to fog or heavy rain increases the time needed to evacuate most ERPAs. Given the timing of the release in the scenario, the effect of including fog in messages issued by the utility was important because in some cases, sheltering became j the only viable protective action recommendation. In the future, changes to the agreed-1 upon scenario must be prohibited by properly trained controllers. Access control to the EOF was instituted at approximately 0930. Security was maintained throughout the exercise and no unauthorized persons were permitted into the EOF restricted area (EOF 4). Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies were observed at the near-site EOF during this exercise that would lead to a negative finding. ) Other Deficiencies 1. Deficienev: Meteorological data contained in the scenario, which was reviewed and approved for this exercise, did not include provisions for the foggy weather conditions specified in the RECS messages issued by the utility. The inclusion of fog (which was an actual weather condition on the day of the exercire) changed the protective action options that could be considered, hence it became necessary to evaluate evacuation options using evacuation time estimates for adverse weather conditions. The effect of incl. ding fog in messages issued by the utility was important because in some cases, sheltering became the' only viable protective action recommendation. l Recommendation: In the future, changes to the agreed-upon l scenario must be prohibited by properly trained controllers.

i 33 2.3 JOINT NEWS CENTER AND COORDINATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION C The exercise objective to mobilize staff and activate the state and county functions at the joint news center (JNC) was met (JNC 1). Although the public Information officers (PIOS) were repositioned at the JNC for the exercise, preventing direct observation of the alerting and mobilization procedure, a system is in place to alert and call up the required staff at any hour of any day. Alerting of the state and county P!Os is part of the EOC alerting system. During the exercise the state and county P!Os performed their assigned responsibilities successfully and displayed adequate training and knowledge. A full complement of staff was present at the JNC, in accordance with the plan. 1 A persannel shif t change did not occur at the JNC. However, rosters !! sting the backup personnel available for a shift change were presented, theceby meeting the exercise objective (JNC 2) to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of state and county functions in the JNC on a 24-hour-per-day basis. Approximately 10 media briefings were conducted at the JNC during the exercise, including briefings after the issuance of each EBS message. The briefings were accurate and complete and hard-copy EBS messages were made available promptly. Ldia kits were available for background information. P!Os from New York State, Rockland County, and Westchester County participated in all briefings. However. PIOS from Putnam County and Orange County did not attend all briefings. It is recommended that all state and county P!Os participate in all press briefings in the event that questions are asked by reporters about the irtdividual county's response. The exercise ( objective (JNC 3), to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner was satisfactorily met for New York State, Rockland County, and Westchester County, but only partly met for Putnam County and Orange County. The state and county PIOS did an excellent job of sharing information among themselves and with utility personnel at the JNC prior to its release, thereby successfully demonstrating this exercise objective (JNC 4). The ability to estab!!sh and operate rumor control in a timely manner was successfully demonstrated (JNC 5). A very good rumor control system was operated in cooperation with the state, utility, and counties. Up to 30 calls to the rumor control number could be handled simultaneously. Callers initially heard a taped message with current emergency information and could remain on the line to ask specific questions. Most test calls to the rumor control number were answered adequately and the personnel answering the calls appeared to be well prepared to answer questions. The exercise objective (JNC 6) to demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner was not met. Development und issuance of the EBS messages generally took too much time. Some EBS messages were issued more than 30 minutes after decision makers had agreed on protective actions. For example, Orange County ordered sheltering for ERPAs 24 and 26 at 1417, but the EBS message containing this information was not issued until 1457, 40 minutes after the decision was made. Most of the time delay occurred at the JNC in this specific case. ( As described in Sec. 2.6.1 of this report, the sheltering deelsion was a

- w. - m 34 observed at 1417 at the Orange County EOC, and the EBS sheltering message was sent to the JNC from the county EOC at 1425. Therefore, there was a delay of about 32 minutes between the time the EBS message was received at the JNC from the Orange County EOC and the time the EBS message was finally issued. in another instance in Rockland County, the decision to shelter ERPAs 36,37, and 41 was made prior to the arrival of the plume and the necessary EBS message was relayed from the Rockland County EOC to the JNC within 10 minutes of that decision at the EOC. This EBS message was not alred until more than 30 minutes later, af ter the arrival of the plume. As described in Sec. 2.5.1 of this report, this delay in notifying the pub!!c, combined with a delay in decision making for the sheltering of ERPAs 36, 37, and 41 would have resulted in unnecessary - and avoidable dose. This lag in notification of the public was not due to any action by l the Rockland County PiO personnel, who expedited the flow of information to the JNC as soon as it was available from the decision maker. The overall capability. to provide instructional messages to the pub!!c should be reviewed and revised as appropriate. Specifically, coordination at the JNC and communications between the JNC and the EOC l need to be improved to insure that the issuance of all EBS. messages is timely. Some of the EBS messages were also lacking information. For example. Westchester County did not provide the ERPA numbers for the evacuation of Verplanck l and Buchanan, and none of the EBS messages concerning Rockland County evacuation provided the names and locations of reception centers. It is recommended that coordination at the JNC and communications between the JNC and the EOCs be improved to ensure that the information contained in EBS messages is complete. A public education program has been carried out within the 10-mile EPZ. Based I, on spot-checks made by observers on the day of the exercise, the public education l brochure has been received by residents and business people within the 10-mile EPZ. Emergency public information has been included in telephone books for Westchester, j Rockland Orange, and Putnam counties. Discussions of public awareness of emergency j planning procedures, based on spot-checks conducted in Rockland and Westenester l counties, are presented in Sec. 2.4 through 2.7 of this report. i Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding 1. Defielency: The formulation and issuance of some EBS messages iook too much tim e. For example. Orange County ordered i sheltering for ERPA 26 at 1417, but the EBS message with this information was not issued until 1457, 40 minutes after the decision was made. In another case, the EBS message to shelter-l ERPAs 36, 37, and 41 in Rockland County was not aired until after the arrival of the plume. This would have resulted in avoidable dose. Most of the time delay occurred at the JNC in this specific case. (NUREG-0654,11, E.5, E.6, E.7). Recommendation: Although generally good capability was demonstrated of the interface between county P!Os at the EOCs and their counterparts at the JNC, the overall capability to l

.a .K r m. -l 35 provide instructional messages to the public should be reviewed ( and revised as appropriate. Specifically, coordination at the JNC and communications between the JNC and the EOCs need to be improved to insure that the issuance of all EBS messages is more timely. Other Deficiencies 2. Deficiency: PIOS from Putnam and Orange counties did not attend all media briefings conducted at the JNC. (NUREG-0654, !!, G.3.a. G.4.a) Recommendation: All state and county P!Os should participate in all press briefings in the event that questions are asked by reporters about the individual county's response. 3. Deficiency: Some of the EBS messages were lacking some information. For example, Westchester County did not provide the ERPA numbers for the evacuation of Verplanck and Buchanan, and none of the EBS messages concerning Rockland County evacuation provided the names and locations of reception centers. ' (NUREG-0654, !!, E.5, E.6, E.7) ( Recommendation: Coordination at the JNC and communications between the JNC and the EOCs should be improved to ensure that the information contained Iri EBS messages is complete. 2.4 WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NEW YORE 1 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center l l The initial notification message from the plant was received at 0735 by the desk officer at the county warning point, located in the Westchester County Department of -Public Safety (EOC 1). The county warning point is staffed 24 hours and is responsible for alerting the emergency staff of the Westchester County EOC. Mobilization and activation of the EOC was demonstrated in an acceptable manner with all staff members I receiving initial notification through the use,of ' a written call list. Activation and staffing of emergency personnel was excellent..The EOC was fully staffed and operational within 45 minutes fo!!owing the activation call (EOC 2). The. ability to staff the EOC on a 24-hour continuous basis was. adequately demonstrated by the presentation of a multiple-shif t duty roster, double staffing within various county agencies, and actual shift changes (EOC 3). In the dose assessment area, a complete shift change was initiated at 1502. Personnel on the incoming shift were k briefed on the status of the emergency and message flow procedures. The shift

s 1e r, -

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36 transition was executed smoothly without any interruption of the dose assessment activities. Midway through the exercise replacements for the RACES operators and the backup telecopy machine operator were brought into the communication center and briefed on current conditions. A quallfled replacement was available in the EOC for the director of communications, although he did not actually assume this responsibility. The communicators who staffed the backup radio base station were not replaced during the exercise. All of these communicators were RACES and REACT volunteers whose organizations have repeatedly proven their ability and commitment to provide emergency communications when needed over extended periods of time. The working space for the central operations at the Westchester County EOC was good but somewhat small (EOC 4).. Noise levels were excessive at times, but this was negated by a good public address system which was used to keep the entire staff i informed of the current status. The county has an electronic display board that indicates evacuated and sheltered ERPAs. All other pertinent maps and displays were posted and available for easy access. Accident assessment, radio communications, and the county executive staffs have separate rooms detached from the central operations room. I The accident assessment area at the EOC was well equipped and had adequate I l j space for conducting the various required riose assessment activities. I Space, equipment, and supplies in the communications room were sufficient to support overall emergency operations. The communications system consists of: the RECS net (linking the plant, EOF, SEOC, and 10-mile EpZ counties), the executive hotline (linking the state and county executives), a dedicated telephone line to the JNC, three telecopy machines, three copiers, and numerous commercial telephones for use by j the EOC staff to communicate with their offices. In addition, various two-way radio nets for direction and control of field activities and supplemental backup to primary systems are available. All communication systems performed well during the exercise with the exception of the two-way radio between the EOC and the radiological monitoring teams. An interference problem, temporarily rendering the system inoperable, was remedied easily by switching to the secondary two-way radio operated by the RACES volunteers. The Westchester County EOC and the SEOC established excellent primary and backup communication links (EOC 5). The county executive was in constant contact with his state and county counterparts over the executive hotline telephone in making operations decisions. The dose assessment staff maintained communications with the EOF, utilities, SEOC and other 10-mile EPZ counties using the RECS telephone messages to keep track of plant parameters, plant status, dose projections and protective action recommendations. Telecopiers were used to provide hard-copy backup, as well as for some primary message communications. In addition, RACES and REACT volunteers would be available with their backup equipment in a real emergency. All messages received by Westchester County from the, state via RECS and the executive hotline were i verified by telecopier messages and voice familiarity. This corrects a previously identified deficiency cited during an earlier exercise. Access control and security measures demonstrated at the entrance to the EOC were very good (EOC 6). A security guard was on duty throughout the exercise, requiring

1,, 37 all people entering th'e EOC to provide necessary identification, sign in, and carry and ( display in a visible location, an identification card. The handling of internal communication in the EOC was demonstrated, but some areas for improvement were noted (EOC *l'. Messages received were transmitted promptly to their recipients, although their filLv and logging was carried out in several places and would benefit from centralization or automation. Status boards stationed throughout the EOC were maintained and updated periodically, but three problems were observe 3: First, the states boards in the EOC operations room contained so much information, much of it irrelevant to most of the staff, that they were distracting. Second, the status board of greatest importance, which contains information on most-recent events and which should be highly visible, was too small and difficult to see. Third, the communications room had no r.tatus boards and could have benefited from their presence. The county executive and director of disaster and emergancy services conducted periodic briefings which contained all pertinent information on current events and updates from each county agency r: presented. The one problem noted during the briefings was that the persons conducting the presentation sometimes did not speak directly into the microphone. Hence, the briefings could not be heard clearly in the dnse assessment and communication rooms. Incoming personnel were briefed appropriately upon their arrival at the EOC by thoso staff members present within their corresponding agencies. The objective of demonstrating that an official is effectively in charge and in control of an overall coord5eted response was met (EOC 8). In general, the exercise participants knew their trge.;tive coles and responsibilities, demonstrating knowledge of the plan, organizatfory end cirection and control functions. The management of county emergency reponse ot era?!ons at the EOC was excellent, with the county executive i clearly in command.,Ccuty' officials consistently anticipated policy and management actions. They demonstedted depra in staff support and independence in management decision maxing based on Othorouf2 review of response options. Westchester County effectively demcastrated thp Ability to taksjndependent actions., T!.e ability to demonstrate that designatec officials can deterraine the need for, request, attd obudn state assistance wat Wiequately exhibited (EOC 9). The county 3 executive rel@d 'sfgnificardly son c:Amty response. funct?ons, but coordirited ma}d;tirdhrees to assess and implement ' decisions and actions with the state and the other counties within the 10-mile EPZ., Although state assistance was not requested during tite vixercise, the county executive demdistrated sufficient management skills to know how to ask for it, if it becan' necessary. e The objective of demonstrating the ability tc communicate with all appropriate ~ i locatlov.,Nrtrenizations, and field personnel was adequately demonstrated (EOC 10). Comthurication activities between the EOC antj the field operations were established and maintained throughout the exercise. The primary IMks between the EOC staff and their ( hocie off%es were usually by commercial tele;hpr.0, The home office is responsible for n, y 9.._..._.,_;_...._>. 1 q g ', N, . *y t-c n. ( m

+ i 38 i relaying messages to the field, except for the Civil Air Patrol and the field radiological monitoring teams, whose primary link to the EOC was via two-way radio. An extensive backup radio network that provided direct two-way communications from the EOC to every field activity was operated by RACES and REACT volunteers and worked sell. However, the description of the communication system utilized to direct and control emergency response personnel in the field Is not adequately described in the county plan. Improvements are needed in the internal flow of messages at the EOC. In order to transmit a message, county agency representatives located in the main EOC operations room and their corresponding communications officer in the communication center must meet to discuss the messag'e. An intercom system installed between the two would improve response time and help to control excessive noise and movement. The ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure was well demonstrated (EOC 11). The dose assessment staff was very competent'and efficient in performing its dose projection calculations. Calculations made with hand-held calculators were cross-checked against computer projections present in the dose assessment room and with field monitoring data when they became available. The dose assessment staff asked appropriate questions for utilizing field monitoring data which were available from Rockland County. Field team deployment and movement in the field was well executed by the team coordinator at the EOC. The appropriate protective measures were made based on either plant conditions or PAGs associated with projected exposure calculations. The dose assessment director and county executive made excellent use of the utility liaison representative in clarifying technical information. There are two items that need attention in the dose assessment area: First, protective action recommendations and their times of implementation should have been posted on the status board in the dose assessment area in a more timely manner. Second, field monitoring data should have been routinely plotted on the available wall map to provide easier analysis and comparison with the preplotted plume isopisths. The ability to provide advance coordination of public alerting and instructional messages with the state and other counties was adequately demonstrated (EOC 12). The county executive discussed proposed siren activation and EBS activities with the state and county agencies over the executive hotline telephone. Coordination and flow of information using this system worked well. Westchester County demonstrated the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ and the control of access to an evacuated area (EOC 13 and 15). These objectives were adequately achieved by simulating the evacuation of schoolchildren and a section of the general populace and by the activation of road blocks for traffic and access control. County personnel performed independent assessments, plotted potential plume coverage, and made their own protective action recommendations on evacuations. The county implemented protective actions to evacua'te schoolchildren and the general population in ERPA 1 prior to receiving recommendations to do so from the SEOC. In addition, Westchester county officials did not agree to recommend evacuation for certain ERPAs j based strictly on the state's suggestion, choosing to wait until further information and i data were provided.

39 The county Department of Transportation implemented a new transportation plan ( which was developed as a result of previous exercise concerns. This plan provides for an earlier dismissal of schools at the Alert emergency classification level which is designed to enhance evacuation of the general public should this become necessary. The county Department of Public Works simulated the distribution of provisions of barricades and signs for use in traffle control. These would be available to augment local supplies and equipment. The objective of organizationally dealing with impediments to evacuation (EOC 14) was adequately demonstrated by the handling of two simulated accidents; one involving a railroad tank car leak and the other resulting from the collapse of a utility pole. The deputy commissioner of public safety assessed the environmental and chemical impacts associated with the rail car leak, which Indicateo that the substance was an irritant and not toxic unless fire ensued. The New York State hazardous material team was requested to respond. EBS messages were drafted advising the public to avoid the accident acu. The, health commissioner was notified and concurred with the public safety comm!ssioner's decision to isolate the area. The Department of Transportation was requested to advise commuter trains (Metro North) of the situation and provide alternate routes. The response to the utility pole collapse was dealt with in a similarly professional and competent manner. The EOC staff was advised of the incident; Department of Transportation personnel recommended alternate routing. The utility was alerted to dispatch repair crews. Police were dispatched to the scene, arriving within ( approximately 8 minutes, and an EBS message was draf ted, recommending detours. The organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal and an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ was adequately demonstrated (EOC 16 and 17). Westchester County announced the early dismissal of schools at 0937 for ERPAs 1, 3, 4, and 6 during the Alert emergency classification, following consultation with the county Health Department, Transportation Department and school offleials at the county EOC. Buses were deployed and completed their routes. County officials activated the emergency notification system to alert all affected schools during implementation of both the early dismissal and a subsequent sheltering notification at 1320 (ERPAs 2, 3, 4, and 7). The resources and capabilities demonstrated indicate that Westchester County is adequately prepared to relocate schoolchildren. Activation of the prompt notification system was effectively demonstrated in Westchester County (EOC 18). The stren system was activated at 0925 and the EBS network was activated by county officials at 0928, providing instructional mess 3ges to the public. Deficiencies That Would 1,ead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Westchester County EOC during thia exercise. ,(

1 a e 40 l l Other Deficiencies 1. Deficienev: The filing and logging of messages received at the EOC was done in several places, potentially causing confusion and l possible misplaced messages. (NUREG-0654, II, H.3) I Recommendation: The message filing and logging system should be reviewed and redesigned to centralize or automate its operations. thereby assuring accurate and uniform records. l l 2. Deficiency: Status boards were too small to contain all the appropriate informr. tion and be visible throughout the EOC. Also, irrelevant and excessive Information was included on some of the status boards causing possible confusion. The communications room did not have a status board. (NUREG-0654, II, H.3) l Recommendation: The status board system should be reviewed and corresponding corrections made. In addition, a status board should j l be Installed in the communications room. 1 3. Deficiency: Some emergency personnel conducting periodic ) briefings to the EOC staff did not stand close enough to the j microphone at the podium.. As a result parts of the briefings were inaudible throughout the EOC. (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1) l Recommendation: Advise those who brief the staff to speak loudly into the microphone at all times. 1. Deficiency: Representatives from various county agencies at tne EOC, in order to transmit a message, must leave their station and go to their corresponding communications person in the communication room. Delays in messages transmitted as well as excessive noise and movement are a result of this system. (NU REG-0654, !!. F.1) Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the installa-tion of an intercom system between each representative in the EOC operation room and their counterpart in the communication center. 5. Deficiency: Timely posting of protective action recommendations and their times of implementation on the dose assessment status boards was not demonstrated. (NUREG-0654, !!, H.3) Recommendation: Status board information in the dose assessment area should be updated in a more timely manner. 9

6 o 2 1 ~ 9 .41 6. Deficienev: Field monitoring data should have been plotted on the - fA wall map to provide an easier analysis of the monitoring data and comparison with the preplotted plume isopleths. (NUREG-0654,11, I.8) Recom mendation: Dose assessment personnel. should plot field d monitoring data on the wall map that is available in the dose l assessment area of the EOC. I l 2.4.2 County Radiological Field Monitoring ') Four radiological field monitoring teams were mobilized and deployed by Westchester County. Teams MD-1 and HD-2 were deployed Initially, and later replaced by teams HD-3 and HD-4. These teams were mobilized and deployed to the field in a timely manner (FBt 1). All four teams demonstrated professional and competent monitoring procedures, exhibiting familiarity with standard operating. procedures and equipment functions. The field teams were appropriately-equipped to. determine ambient radiation levels. Due to the scenario and the flow of events during.the exercise, the shift change of the teams occurred before any radioactivity had entered Westchester County. Therefore only team HD-3 was required to evaluate plume radiation by determining the i location and centerline relative activity. Dose assessment personnel at the EOC did not request the field monitoring teams to take air samples or any stationary point monitoring data. For the purpose of demonstrating procedural knowledge and equipment operations, three of the four teams were asked by the observer to perform air sampling and fixed-point monitoring techniques.. The monitoring teams were outfitted with appropriate equipment to measure radiolodine concentrations at the required levels. Techniques and procedures were demonstrated well; however, only one team was aware that in order to obtain valid radiolodine concentration data, the sample media should be counted in a low-background area, typically outside the plume area (FM 2 and FM 3). All teams need to be tralned in these procedures, particularly because of the unshielded counting equipment 1. that was used. Standard operating procedures provided to the teams do not define this l procedure. 1 Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the activities of the Westchester County radiological fle!d monitoring teams during this exere!se. ( l ~ _ _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _

1 j I 42 l Other Deficiencies { l 7. Deficieney: One radiological field monitoring team was not aware ) of croper procedures requiring the transportation of air samples to a point outside the. plume for determining radiolodine 3 concentrations. (NUREG-0654, II,1.9) l Recom mendattom Field team operating procedures should be revised to include instruction for moving outside the plume to a low-background area to determine radiolodine concentrations. 1 i 2.4.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control I Westchester field personnel generally demonstrated the ability to monitar their exposure with pocket dosimeters (EC 1). All members of the radiological field monitoring teams were equipped with both high-range and low-range self-reading pocket dosimeters and permanent-record l thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). Readings of pocket dosimeters were taken and I I recorded at 15-minute intervals. All emergency workers stationed at the two personnel monitoring centers l (Valhalla and Hawthorne) were provided with permanent-record TLDs. Drivers for all six transportation companies that were observed (Lakeland School District, Liberty Bus Lines, Chappaqua Bus Company, Hendrick Hudson Bus Garage, Vangard Bus Company, and American Ambulette) were provided with the appropriate dosimetry equipment. Personnel at one of the three traffic control points did not have permanent-record dosimeters. All personnel who were properly equipped took and recorded dosimeter readings at the appropriate intervals. However, one bus driver read only his high-range (0-200 R) dosimeter, neglecting to read the mid-range instrument (0-5 R). A reading of 1 R which requires that emergency workers notify their supervisor l would not be detected using this method. All personnel were aware that they should call in their readings either periodically or at a given threshold value, and that there are limits that should not be exceeded without authorization. The ability to supply KI to emergency workers was adequately demonstrated by including K! in all emergency kits. Field personnel were aware that it should only be taken on orders from their dispatcher or supervisor. All radiological field monitoring teams had been issued 130 mg of KI(expiration date of June 1985) and knew that it was to be taken only upon the direction of officials at the EOC. Potassium iodide was provided to the bus drivers and they indicated they would take it when they were so instructed by their dispatcher. The dispatcher !s in contact with the county health commissioner who conveys decisions on the use of KI. Thus, the objective was met to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI(EC 2). Field personnel in Westchester County satisfactorily demonstrated that they understand who can authorize excess exposure under the PAGs (EC 3). Bus drivers

p 43 Indicated that they would call in exposures to the radio dispatcher. If drivers indicated ( that readings reach or exceed 1R (on the 0-5R direct-read dosimeter) the dispatcher ] would call the county EOC to inform them; the field workers would recheck their reading j to verify dosage and this information is then relayed to the county EOC where j appropriate protective action recommendations are obtained. The dispatcher and traffic j manager of at least one bus company knew that excess exposures must be authorized by j the county health commissioner. 3 Two of the four radiologleal field. monitoring teams were unaware of the j prescribed authorized emergency worker exposure dose limits but were able to refer to their written procedures to determine them. All field monitoring team members knew to contact the EOC regarding any questions concerning exposure limits or authorizations to exceed PAGs. j The PMC for state emergency workers and vehicles located in Westchester { County was activated at the Hawthocne Troop K State Police Substation. Staff personnel j showed evidence of good training and familiarity with procedures. Procedures that were demonstrated for monitoring, logging and recording data, isolat'ng hot and cold zones, and decontamination were adequate. Methods for the cont.sinment and disposal of radioactively contaminated wastes and wash water were all sufficient (EC 4). A second PMC in Valhalla was set up and operational during the exercise for local emergency workers. The physical layout was adequate and the facility was set up ) in accordance with Attachment 13 of the Westchester County Radiological Response Procedure (Health). The facility was set up to prevent the spread of contamination. C Labeled drums were provided for the collect!on of solid contaminated waste and subsequent shipment to the utility. Separate shower areas were available for male and j female workers. Registration and record-keeping procedures were adequately i demonstrated in accordance with written procedures. Decontamination of vehicles was performed in a secured area with waste wash water to be drained into a sewer and i collected in a buried holding tank. However, several improvements are needed in the emergency worker radiological monitoring procedures. These include: e The subtraction of the background readings from the CDV-700 survey meters; The CDV-700 probe should be held approximately 1 inch away from e the body of the individual being monitored. The probe was allowed to touch individuals being monitored. ~ e Individual exposure rates me'asured on various parts of the body were recorded as "to'tal dose to date" on the Contamination Referral Sheet. New York State and Westchester County procedures stipulate that this information is to be obtained from the Emergency Worker Exposure Cards; e Too much time was taken monitoring each individual. If P M C workers maintain a scan rate of one ft/s as required by county (

] l 44 I procedures, any backlog of emergency personnel awaiting processing would be mitigated. j l I Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the demonstration of Westchester County emergency worker exposure control activities l during this exercise. l Other Deficiencies l 1 8. Deficiency: At the PMC in Valhalla, emergency workers,were unfamiltar l with proper procedures for the radiological monitoring of incoming j personnel. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.5.a. K.S.b) i Recommendation: Additional training in radiological monitoring procedures should be provided to the emergency staff at the PMC. A training schedule should be furnished to FEMA. 9. Deficiency: One bus company's driver read only his high-range dosimeter during the exercise, and did not read the mid-range (0-5 R) dosimeter. l (NUREG-0654, II, K.O.b) Recommendation: Drivers should receive additional instruction regarding the functional differences between the two types of dosimeter. 10. Deficiency: Personnel at one traffic control point did not have permanent-record dosimeters and did not know what they were. (NUREG-0654 II, K.3.a, K.3.b) Recommendation: All field personnel should be supplied with permanent-record dosimeters and trained regarding their function. 2.4.4 Field implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public A siren failure was simulated to test backup route alerting procedures (F 1). A Westchester County patrol car was deployed with a message card to read over the unit's mobile public address system in the area served by the stren. Although they did not have a specific route map for the area co'vered by the stren, the drivers knew the local stree?.s well and traversed the required area. The route alert unit had an appropriate message to announce over the public address system but did not actually do so. Three traffic control points were set up promptly following s controller message inserted at the EOC. Personnel at the TCPs were familiar with traffic control procedures and with the evacuation routes (F 2). However, they were not aware of the l

~. 45 l (. reception center locations. Traffic control personnel should be trained to know the location of reception centers since they would likely be asked by evacuees in an emergency. Barricades and other traffic control equipment were available, but were not brought out to the TCPs for the exercise. Personnel et all TCPs had radio communications with their command posts and with other patrol cars. i i Principal of two schools in Westchester County were interviewed regarding j radiological emergency procedures for indian Point. Both principals were familiar with j their procedures and with the information in the public education brochure (F 3). Both j schools were equipped with tone alert radios. Officials at one of the schools interviewed, { planned to use early dismissal as an emergency procedure. Officials at the other school ] would prefer to evacuate to a designated school in Port Chester, New York, and parents j have been so informed by school officials. 3 l The organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools and an orderly l evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was adequately demonstrated (F 4). Westchester County announced the early dismissal of schools in ERFAs 1, 2, 4, and 6 at 0937 during the Alert stage, following consultation with county health, transportation, and school officials at the EOC. Buses were deployed and completed their toutes in a I timely manner. County officials activated the emergency notification system to all I affected schools during both the early dismissal stage and a subsequent sheltering notification at 1300 for ERPAs 2,3,4, and 7. Capabilities of five bus lines were demonstrated for the evacuation of the general population and schools within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ (F 5). At ( approximately 0930 the dispatch offices for the bus companies received notification of the need to implement resources to simulate the evacuatic 2 of schoolchildren which, I according to the agreed-upon off-site scenario for the exercise, was to be demonstrated out of sequence. Soon after this notification had been completed in response to a controller message, the decision was made at the Westchester County EOC to dismiss school early. Personnel and equipment were promptly activated and deployed in a timely manner. Prior to their dispatch, bus drivers were properly briefed on evacuation routes, emergency worker exposure control, including dosimetry and the use of KI, the location of the reception center where schoolchildren would be delivered, and communication procedures. This corrects a deficiency observed at a previous exercise. Buses were dispatched from company garages and proceeded to the assigned schools in a timely manner. Following the simulated loading of schoolchildren, the buses continued on to the various reception centers (at Harrison, High School, Fishkill Plains, and Solomon Schecter School). In general the bus drivers exhibited an adequate ability to find the pick-up points, follow the predetermined routes, and deliver the students to the appropriate relocation centers. However, two bus drivers experienced some difficulties navigating in the field. In one instance, an incorrect location for the reception center was noted on the map provided, but the. driver had no difficulty in finding the proper location. Another instance observed a bus driver who was unfamiliar with the assigned routes. The driver was aided by the RACES operator on board the bus and managed to find all the stops correctly. L

e 46 All four buses observed during the exercise were equipped with either a radio to their dispatch station or a volunteer RACES operator with his own radio unit. However, some RACES operators assigned to ride on. evacuation buses and provide backup communications with the EOC missed their buses. Apparently this happened because the staff at the EOC failed to give them proper rendezvous information. In all cases the communication systems worked and provided a continuous link between the buses and the dispatchers. To complement this system, one bus company has a sophisticated computerized system for tracking each bus's location and schedule; this along with their communication system allows them to quickly identify and solve problems with equipment breakdowns and traffic congestions, etc. Following the simulation of the delivering of schoolchildren to the reception center, buses w' re instructed to run evacuation routes, stopping at preselected pick-up e points to simulate the loading and evacuation of the general populace. l l A sample of resources necessary to evacuate noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired individuals was adequately demonstrated by dispatching an ambulette to i simulate the transportation of Individuals located at five addresses (F 6). A vehicle was dispatched in a timely manner from the garage selected for this exercise. The driver was able to locate the assigned addresses quickly with the aid of good maps. It took about 2 t hours altogether from dispatch to arrival at the reception center, stopping about 5-10 minutes at each of the 5 pickup addresses. The ambulances's radio worked most of the time but did not function well in the northern reaches of the county. Telephone backup was demonstrated. A joint location at the Harrison High School in Harrison, New York, is used by l Westchester County for a reception center and congregate care center (CCC). Both operations were demonstrated and activated during the exercise. l The reception center was activated and staffed in a timely manner, and was fully l operational by 1540. A full complement of staff was present. A!! positions in the reception center were staffed according to need; if one position became backlogged, other staff could be reassigned to help. l Set-up and staffing of the CCC was timely (workers were notified at 1400 and l the facility was staffed by 1430). The objective to mobilize staff and activate a reception / congregate care center in a timely manner was adequately demonstrated (F 7). Appropriate functions performed at the CCC were adequately staffed with trained personnel. The anticipated shift change to show 24-hour capability at the reception center was not demonstrated (F 8). How.ever, participants assured the observer that a full i complement of relief staff was available for a second shift. Backup staff were observed at several positions. but only one individual each was performing decontamination for males and females respectively. The o'bjective to demonstrate 24-hour operational capability at the CCC was satisfactorily met by the presentation of a second shift personnel roster (shif t change estimated 45 min. to complete). l

~ 47 Procedures for the registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees at the reception center were as per the New York State Emergency Worker Manual. s Performance of those procedures was generally good, although some minor problems l were noted with respect to the handling of radiological contamir,ation (F 12). First, the arrival of large numbers of evacuees could create substantial backlogs, given the monitoring rates observed during the exercise. Five or six additional monitors would be needed to avoid delays. Second, potentially contaminated and known " clean" evacuees were not kept completely segregated prior to registration. Lastly, the decontamination specialist was not equipped with protective gloves for handling contaminated articles of clothing. The reception center staff has been trained in radiation surveying and decontamination, thereby correcting a previous defielency. The objective was met to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees (F 16). The staff at the CCC is composed of volunteers from the American Red Cross. The Red Cross command center, located at the Westchester County EOC, maintained communication with the CCC staff throughout the exercise via radio and j commercial telephone. Backup communication capabi!!ty was provided by RACES and REACT personnel. All requests for supplies, personnel, and equipment would be directed j to the Red Cross representatives at the command center in the county EOC. The .j representative at the command center coordinated requests from the Westchester County CCC with the other counties participating-in the emergency response. A j continual flow of information between the CCC and the receptien center was maintained, thereby assisting the emergency staff in coordinating the capacity at the CCC (1217 at Harrison School) with the reception center's census. Additional CCC facilities and associated capacities were made known to the reception center staff and the Westchester County EOC staff. This corrects a previously identified deficiency. j Activities adequately demonstrated at the CCC included registration of j evacuees, communleations, and mobile feeding. A support trailer equipped with 1700 cots and 2500 blankets was set up and available for use. Activation, staffing, and set-up of the facility was timely (notified at 1400, staffed by 1430). The capability to establish a separate nursing station was not I demonstrated; however, a nurse who was adequately trained and knowledgaHe in his l duties and functions was in attendance at the CCC. An ambulance was not stationed at i the center but a list of emergency medical personnel and vehicles available to respond to a medies! problem was provided at the CCC. l The objective for demonstrating the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for hand 1!ng injured and contaminated individuals, involving an on-site injury, was met (F 17). The Peekskill Hospital has an agreement with NYPA to provide medical l care for any injuries sustained by on-site personnel. During the exercise, a medical drill was conducted at the hospital, separate from the Westchester County operation. At approximately 0700 Verplanck Fire Department personnel were notified at their homes that a utility worker had been injured and contaminated on site. An ambulance was dispatched from the fire house at 0710 with a crew of two, arriving at the plant at 0720. The victim was treated by plant emergency medical staff and health physics personnel and plc.ced in the ambulance using proper medical and health physics procedures. A, plant health physicist and an emergency medical staff worker

i 48 accompanied the victim to Peekskill Hospital, arr Mg there at 0800. The ambulance ( radioed information ahead to alert the hospital of ' :ir estimated time of arrival so that the hospital was set up for immediate action. Bou. the crew and the ambulance were checked for radiological contamination af ter the patient was removed from the ambulance. The adequacy of the hospital facilities and the procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals was satisfactorily demonstrated at the Peekskill Hospital (F 18). The hospital emergency room was very well prepared to handle the patient, with all of the equipment necessary for treatment and decontamination readily available. Security at the hospital was adequate. The utility provided numerous health physicists who assisted in hospital operations and treatment of the patients. A health physicist was present in the emergency roo m, a supervisory health physicist was positioned just outside the emergency room to direct activities, and another health physicist was stationed to monitor the ambulance and crew for contamination. In addition to the three survey l meters provided by the utility, the hospital had its own recently calibrated survey l Instruments. The injured patient was monitored by a health physicist and a hospital x-ray technician prior to admittance into the emergency room. Under instructions from the utility's medical director, the emergency room I physician was preparing to administer 130 mg of K! to the injured contaminated patient. l The supervisory health physicist intervened, saying that the patient had not been exposed l to radiciodine and therefore should not take KI. It was then decided not to administer ( KI. A consistent policy should be developed concerning the administration of K!; if suen i a policy is already available, emergency staff should be trained in its implementation. Deficieneles That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding. were observed in Westchester County's field impleme.atation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. Other Deficiencies 11. Defielenev: Some RACES operators assigned to ride on evacuation buses and provide backup communications with the county EOC missed their ouses, apparently due to improper rendezvous information. (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.d) Recommendation: Training should be provided to the dispatcher (s) of RACES personnel providing mobile I communications with buses so they can be deployed to the field with correct information so that they can rendezvous with buses before they are dispatched from the garage. ( I

49 12. Deficiency: A shift change _ was not. demonstrated at.the reception center, and not all positions there tsd backup statf available. (NUREG-0654.11, A.4). Recommendation: An actual shif t change should be demonstrated at a future exercise to fulfill this objective. 13. Defleiency: Arrival of large numbers of evacuees at the reception center could create substantial backlogs, given the monitoring rates observed at the' exercise. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12). Recommendation: Five or six additional monitoring staff should' be trained or the current staff should be trained-in radiological monitoring procedures to increase the efficiency of preregistration monitoring. f 14. Deficiency: At the reception center potentially contaminated and known " clean" evacuees were not kept completely segregated. (NUREG-0654. II, J.12) Recommendation: Arrange routes or partitions to assure i complete segregation. 15. Deficiency: The decontamination specialist at the reception center was not equipped with protective gloves for handling contaminated articles of clothing. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12) Recom mendation: Decontamination personnel should be provided with protective gloves and their use should be demonstrated at a future exercise. 16. Deficiency: A consistent policy concerning the administration of K1 to injured contaminated individuals at the Peekskill Hospital was not in evidence. During the exercise, there was some. confusion caused by a lack of an established procedure. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.e) Recommendation: Peekskill Hospital should establish a policy on the administration of El including standard operating procedures. Also, the medical staff should be trained in this polley and a training schedule should be furnished to FEMA. 1 2.4.5 Public Awareness Spot checks of public awareness regarding emergency measures for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station were conducted in Westchester County. Twelve of 17 A.

a 4 30 respondents in the 10-mile EPZ said they had received the public information brochures ( and maps, but there was a general lack of interest in becoming familiar with them. Fourteen of 20 respondents heard the sirens sound. Fifteen of 20 respondents knew the drill was in progress. At the Watergate Hotel, the manager indicated that public information had not been received. The FDR Veterans Hospital (1100 patients) received public information brochures and maps and had been visited by the utility. 2.5 ROCKLAND COUNTY, NEW YORK 2.5.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The Radiological Emergency Communication System (RECS) was effectively demonstrated to provide timely initial and follow-up emergency notifications to Rockland County from the utility. Initial notification of an Unusual Event was received at the county warning point at 0735. Initial notification of key emergency response personnel was completed via radio-pager or telephone by approximately 0750 and the EOC was promptly activated. Additional emergency response agencies were notified by radio-pager and verified by telephone from the county warning point. Primary agency personnel were notified to report to the EOC at approximately 0805 based on deteriorating conditions at the plant. The initial call-out of emergency personnel was verified to be adequate, which corrected a deficiency observed at the 1982 exercise of the Rockland County EOC. Support personnel were placed on standby per agency ( procedures and the EOC was fully operational by approximately 0915, within 20 minutes of the Alert declaration which was received at 0855. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow-up notifications and to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner were met (EOC 1,2). One of two Bergen County representatives was present at the Rockland County EOC. The Bergen County Police representative arrived at approximately 1000 and signed in on the EOC roster as representing both law enforcement and Bergen County EOC liaison functions. However, this individual was unaware of the role of the Bergen County liaison and what procedures to follow. As a result, the information flow between the Rockland County EOC and the Bergen County EOC was ineffective, repeating defielencies observed at the March 1583 exercise. Arrangements for Bergen County to send an operations liaison to the Rockland County EOC have not been completed. Representatives of Rockland County and New York State should meet with representatives of New Jersey and Bergen County to establish the responsibilities of the Bergen County liaison and attempt to ensure that this function will be ataffed in the future. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis was met (EOC 3). All agencies, using rosters and assignment sheets, demonstrated the ability to staff 15eir functions for 24 hours. The EOC has adequate communiestion equipment and sufficient persoanel to staff all communleation functions on a 24-hour basis. Twenty-four-hour capability to staff the RECS telephone line was verified by roster for the Rockland County warning point in the county communications t

$1' center and for the RECS operator when the EOC became operational. Changes in agency leadership were demonstrated for five agencies and most support agencies had additional staff available to serve as backup. This corrects three deficiencies identified at the 1982 exercise. The objective to demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations was met (EOC 4). The Rockland County EOC is welllighted with ample work space for agency representatives. The accident assessment room and decision makers' offices have ample space and are Isolated from the operations area. Maps.were well displayed and one showing the Bergen County congregate care centers was present, correcting a deficiency identified at the l 1983 exercise. The RECS telephone is located next to the RACES radio table in the dose assessment room. Noise from the RACES radios made it difficult for the RECS operator to hear messages that were received over the RECS speaker telephone. It is suggested that the RACES radio communications function should be relocated preferably to a ( separate area of the EOC to facilitate the receipt and recording of necessary l Information over the RECS telephone which is the primary communications link with the l utility and the state. 1 Initial and follow-up notification of changes in emergency classification level, plant conditions (including notification of a radiological release to the environment), l recommended protective actions and meteorology were received at the Rockland County EOC via the utility's RECS telephone. Communications via this dedicated telephone, which links the utility with the state and the four counties within the EPZ, were acceptable (EOC 5). However, considerable confusion and delays were caused on two occasions. The first resulted when a RECS message initiated by the state did not follow l the procedures for use of the RECS system and did not contain complete information. It is recommended that all parties who have access to the RECS system be properly trained l In the procedures to follow for its use. The second problem arose when erroneous field ~ data were given to the participants. It is recommended that the properly trained controllers be used in future exercises. The preceding two items are considered state deficiencies and are included in Section 2.1.1. The Rockland County Police controlled access to the EOC. All personnel entering the facility were required to sign a register, and allirdividuals were required to sign out when they left the EOC. The objective to demonstrate that the county EOC has adequate access control and that security can be maintained was met (EOC 6). Internal communication among agencies within the EOC and with response personnel in the field were effective (EOC 7). Internal messages were written on standard New York State emergency log forms and all agencies maintained message legs. An individual was identified to pick up and deliver messages which were reviewed and routed to the appropriate agencies through a central clearing location at the front of the operations room. All messages were nu.mbered and copies were kept in the operations office. However, it was observed that not all agency representatives at the EOC were familiar with the New York State emergency log form. Also, there were several periods during the exercise when the flow of information lagged among agencies. It is recommended that all agency representatives should receive additional training in the a4

f 52 procedures for the communication of internal messages and use of the emergency ( message log forms. Emergency management staff at the EOC generally performed tneir functions effectively, correcting two deficiencies observed at the 1982 exercise of the Rockland County EOC. However, additional training would strengthen management and staff's familiarity with the Rockland County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) and procedures. Operations room personnel were periodically briefed concerning plant status, weather conditions, and emergency response activities. Status boards were properly maintained with accurate information and updated in a timely manner, correcting a deficiency observed at the 1982 exercise. Emergency operations staff are generally familiar with the county RERP. An overhead projector was extremely useful as an aid to remind agencies of their responsibilities during various emergency classification levels. The chairman or vice chairman of the Rockland County Legislature, supported by the deputy director of emergency management, was clearly in charge and coordinated the overall response of county agencies (EOC 8). The command center functioned effectively. The chairman ascertained that there was no need for significant state assistance (EOC 9). Consideration of whether or not state assistance was needed was discussed several times on the executive hotline. The state had two staff liaison 4 personnel at the EOC, one of whom was located in the command center. External communications with the state and adjacent New York counties were effectively accomplished via the executive hotline telephone. Communications via this ( dedicated telephone were timely and the equipment functioned without difficulty. Agencies' communications with support functions outside the EOC via commercial telephone and with field personnel via telephone and radio were adequate (EOC 10). The radiological field ' /n coordinator communicated with field teams via a radio base station located la the accident assessment area. The field team coordinator did an excellent job of keeping the field teams informed of plant conditions, meteorological changes, and protective actions. Coordination of the field teams was well managed in order to obtain both plume boundary and center line readings. The plume center line values measured by the field teams were compared with the dose rates projected by the { Department of Health staff at the EOC. The field data were plotted as they were received; however, the plotted data became difficult to use, particularly when wind shif ts occurred. It is suggested that an alternate approach to plotting the field data be j considered. The county and state compared radiological dose calculations prior to making recommendations to the health commissioner (EOC 11). When necessary, the county contacted both the state dose assessment staff and the state liaison at the EOF. Dose calculat!ons were made in accordance with procedures in the county REPP. A minor delay was caused on one occasion when the county and state did not agree on dose projections. While the differences were not significant, resolution of the cause for the difference resulted in a minor delay. It is recommended that the county and state attempt to use an identical dose projection methodology or at least recognize ahead of time that differences are likely to occur and not become concerned over minor differences. Dose projections were made manually and on several occasions checked agsins_t_qqmputer_calculatinnt. _.-.._.. __ _.... -

53 3 In accordance with the plan, Rockland County dismissed all schools and closec' all parks at the Alert emergency classification level. This decision was made at 0910, the sirens were sounded (actual) at 0925, and an EBS message was alred at 0928. All of these actions were timely. At 1005 the Rockland County Health Commissioner briefed the chairman on a { projected change in meteorological conditions. The prevailing conditions were of low i. wind speed so that any release would be carried down the Hudson River. The new projection, however, would have the plume go into Rockland County, potentially impacting several ERPAs. d At 1037, the state liaison officer again reminded the chairman about the projected wind shift. At 1049, after the Site Area Emergency, the chairman directed a l precautionary evacuation of ERPA 29 only. { ) Although not called for in the scenario, RECS messages 7-A (at 1009) through { 15-A (at 1319) indicated that foggy conditions did exist (see Sec. 2.2). This change in conditions and the subsequent impact on evacuation time estimates was not discussed during the decision-making conversations in the EOC. Both county and state Department of Health personnel who staffed the dose assessment function in the Rockland County EOC were well trained in the county plan and followed their procedures, which corrects a deficiency noted at the March 9,1983, exercise in which State employees substituted for Rockland County personnel. However, on one occasion, the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) !!aison in the EOC unnecessarily delayed the Health Commissioner in making a protective action recommendation for the evacuation of ERPA 29, insisting on a call to the state dose assessment director. I At about 1130, the evacuation situation was discussed during a conference call on the executive hotline telephone. Af ter a shif t change, the deputy chairman and staff discussed ERPAs 38 and 39. It was then decided to formally order the evacuation of tue 37 residents in those two ERPAs even though the assumption was made that these individuals would have voluntarily evacuated when the parks were closed earlier in the morning. The discussion in the EOC dose assessment area dealt with the number of special populations in ERPA 30. After a conference discussion on the executive hotline telephone, the decision was made to shelter ERPAs 30, 31 and 40 at 1320. The remaining Rockland County ERPAs (36, 37, and 41) which were at risk were not I addressed by the decision maker for approximately one hour after the utility recommendation to evacuate. At 1417, the decision was made to shelter ERPAs 36,37, and 41. Although the county had the benefit of additional technical input from the SEOC in Albany and the state REPG representative, who was present at the Rockland County l EOC, information flow over the executive hot!!ne and communication between the dose i assessment functions in the state and Rockland County EOCs needs to bc improved. l The decision to shelter ERPAs 36, 37, and 41 was made just prior to the arrival of the plume and the necessary EBS message was relayed to the JNC within 10 minutes q i of that decision at the EOC. This EBS message was not aired until more than 30 minutes 1 later. after the arrival of the plume. The delay in notifying the public. combined with ~ 1

54 the aforementioned delay in decision making for the sheltering of ERPAs 36,37, and 41 ( would have resulted in an avoidable dose to some of the population in these ERPAs. Given the time at which a decision was made and the evacuation time estimates for foggy conditions, sheltering was the only acceptable recommendation. It is recommended that greater emphasis be placed on potential consequences and that the health commissioner be more forceful in presenting these consequences to the decision maker at the earliest possible time so that all options will be available. Also, to improve the facility with which protective action recommendations are coordinated between the c state and Rockland County, the role of the state REPG I!alson should be reviewed and formalized in the Rockland County plan, both prior to and after the governor's declaration of state of emergency. , The Rockland County PIO demonstrated good coordination with the joint news center (JNC) by providing timely and detailed informat!.on regarding decisions made by the chairman of the legislature (EOC 12). However, in several instances, there was a lag in the receipt of information by the PIO at the Rockland EOC. For example, the notification of Site Area Emergency was received from;the utility at the EOC via the REC 8 telephone at approximately 1037. The PIO received this information 13 minutes later at approximately 1050. At 1101, the JNC requestad confirmation that the sirens were to be activated for precautionary evacuation of ERPA 29. The sirens were then simulated to have been sounded at 1115 and the instructional message to the public was alred on EBS at approximately 1125. At approximately 1300 the County PIO was Informed of the decision to recommend the evacuation of ERPAs 38 and 39. This ~ information was transmitted to the public via EBS at approximately 1316. At ( approximately 1320, the County P!O was Informed of the decision to shelter ERPAs 30, 31, and 40. However, the EBS message (#6) was not aired until 1350, approximately 30 minutes af ter the deelslon was made. As mentioned earlier the decision to shelter ERPAs 36,37, and 41 was not made until shortly before the arrival of the plume and the EBS message was not broadcast until the plume was actually over parts of some ERPAs. This lag in notification of the public. vas not due to any action by the Rockland County PTO personnel at the EOC who expedited the flow of information to the JNC as soon as it was available from the decision maker. It is important to note that activation of the public notification system requires four-county coordination. Therefore, although this evaluation found good capability between Rockland County P!Os at the EOC and JNC, it is recommended that the overall capability to provide' instructional messages to the public should be reviewed and revised as appropelate (see Section 2.3). The objective to derecastrate the-organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPl. was adequately demonstrated (EOC 13), State and local pollee, as well as the highway department and transportation coordinators, made proper decisions and were prepared to evacuate designated ERPAs, as directed. The activation and deployment of resources for demonstration of the following evacuation free play activities were effectively managed by emergency coordinators at the EO C: ) 1 i i L

+ s 55 I e Traffic Control Points Willow Grove Road and Palisades Interstate Parkway Wayne Avenue and Route #202 Grassy Point Road and Beach Road e General Population Bus Evacuation Routes Haverstraw Transit - Routes #18 and #16 l Peter Brega Bus Company - Route #3 i - Harran Bus Company - Route #24 I Evacuation of Noninstitutional! zed Mobility-Impaired Persons e ) i Rockland County Trips - dispatched appropriate vehicle to the l addresses of five persons I 1 l The organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, suen as traffic obstructions, was not exercised in Rockland County because an evacuation of the ERPA that would have effected the intended impedimeat was not implemented as part of the exercise (EOC 14). Therefore, the free play message to demonstrate this objective i was intentionally not inserted by the federal evaluators. However, an automobile fire. I which occurred on the same road in the area selected for the demonstration and consisting of a similar incident as that portrayed in the free play message, allowed l l' authorities to effectively demonstrate the ability to deal with an impediment that was not associated with an evacuation. l The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to control ] access to an evacuated area was met (EOC 15). State and local police and highway department representatives at the EOC were well acquainted with the procedure necessary to control access to an evacuated area. Decisions to dispatch personnel and equipment to the traffic control points selected for demonstration during the exercise were implemented promptly. The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was met (EOC 16). An early dismissal of schools decision was made and the necessary actions were simulated. However, time estimates for children to arrive home appear to be incomplete. This is based on the observation that time estimates given at the briefing of EOC personnel appeared to be unrealistically long. These school dismissal estimates should be reviewed and revised as appropriate to assure that the decision mai<er is provided with accurate information. The organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools was demonstrated by the activation, mobilization, and deployment of bus resources. The simulated evacuation of two schools was timely, thereby satisfying an objective of the exercise (EOC 17). The Rockland County PIO adequately demonstrated the ability to activate the prompt notification system (EOC 18). During this exercise, the sirens were sounded or 4-w_________

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i 56 At approximately 0910, the coordinated. four-count At 0914, the JNC requested confirmation of the b simulated on several occasions. At 0925, sirens were decision was made to sound the sirens. decision to sound the s g \\ i actually sounded and an EBS mecsage was aired at 0928 to mpl h l ification leve, t e of schools and the closing of parks. At the Site Area Emergency c as i sirens were sounded at 1010 and the EBS message was transm tted to i sirens were sounded and at 1125, the EBS messa imately 1117.* In addition to this actual event, the ability to effectsim i tching resources to route alert the public. 90 Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding Although not a part of the scenario, RECS messages f 7-A (at 1009) through 15-A (at 1319) indicated that co Deficiency: 1. cuation foggy weather were present. this in their considerations of protective actions since eva The time estimates increase significantly during adverse weather. 7 decision to shelter ERPAs 36,37, and 41 was not made un By the time the EBS message was broad would have been exposed. Future messages should be carefully reviewed Recommendation: meteorological conditions. Protective action deci d should be more timely, especially when recommendations are regarding to the county. Other Defielencies The Bergen County Police representative at the EOC liaison and was unaware of the role of the Bergen County EOC Deficiency: 2. As a result, communications between what procedures to follow. OC were the Rockland County EOC and the Bergen 1983 exercise of the State Compensating Arrangements for Bergen County to send an exercise and the operations liaison to the Rockland County EOC have not b Measures Plan. completed. (NUREG-0654. II, F.1.b) j i not lt is unknown when this route alerting for Sleen 36 was compl observed in the tield. ~ ( e. O e t 7 - ~ - ' - - - ~ - - - - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )

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57 Recommendation: Representatives of.Rockland County and New York State should meet.with representatives of New Jersey and s Bergen County to establish the responsibilities of the Bergen County EOC liaison and attempt to ensure that this function will be staffed in the future.- 3. Defleiency: Not all agency representatives ' at the Rockland County EOC were familiar with the New York State emergency log form. Also, there were several periods during the exercise when the flow of information lagged among agencies. (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1) Recommendation: All agency representatives at the. Rockland County EOC should receive additional training in procid'ures for the communicatica of internal messages and use of the emergency message log forms. A training schedule should be provided to l FEMA. 4. Deficiency: A minor delay was caused on one occasion when the county and state did not agree on dose project!ons. While the differences were not significant, resolution of the cause for the difference resulted in a minor delay. (NUREG-0654, II,1.8) Recommendation: Rockland County and the state should attempt to use an identical dose projection methodology or technical personnel should at least be trained to recognize ahead of time that differences are likely to occur so that they do.not become j concerned over minor differences. 5. Deficiency: Although Rockland ~ County had the benefit of l additional technical dose assessment input from the SEOC in Albany and the state REPG representative, who was present at the county EOC, protective action decision making,was delayed in i i Rockland County. Information flow over the' executive hotilne and communication between the dose assessment functions in the state f and Rockland County EOCs needs to be improved (NUREG-0654,!!, F.1.b). The. following two ' recommendations relate to this i deficiency: Recommendation: The county health ' commissioner should be trained to place grCater emphasis on potential consequences and to - be more forceful in presenting these consequences to the decision maker at the earliest possible time so that all protective action options will be available. Recommendation: The role'of the state REPG liaison should be reviewed and formalized in the county plan, both prior to and af ter j. the, governor's declaration of state of emergency, to improve the 1 m

.s s 58 facility with which protective action recommendations are i .( coordinated between the state and Rockland County. 6. Deficienev: Time estimates given for children to arrive home af ter early dismissal of schools appear to be incomplete. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.L) Recommendation: Rockland County School dismissal estimates should be reviewed and revised as appropriate to assure that the decision maker is provided with accurate information. 2.5.2 County Radiological Field Monitoring ~ l The mobilization and timely deployment of field monitoring teams was l adequately demonstrated (FM 1). Personnel necessary to staff 2 f'ald monitoring teams reported to the EOC within 10 to 15 minutes after their initial notification. Monitoring kits were inventoried using a check list available in the kits. !nstruments were source l checked and spares are available at the EOC. About 30 minutes were required to check f out the kits and issue the self-reading dosimeters and permanent-record devices to field l monitoring personnel. Both field monitoring teams were briefed before being dispatched to the field. This briefing included meteorological information, plant status, exposure limits, emergency worker protective action guides, authorized use of KI, and initial monitoring assignments. ( The field monitoring teams were equipped with the proper monitoring instruments and backup instruments available in the kits. Lo w-and high-range instruments were used (PRM-7 with RO2A backup, CDV-715 and CDV-700) to determine radiation levels. All instruments had calibration stickers indicating that they had been calibrated within the one-year time period called for in the plan. Both field monitoring teams were familiar with the use of the monitoring equipment and the procedures to record and transmit the data (FM 2). This corrects a deficiency observed at the 1982 exercise. Written procedures were followed for all monitoring operations in the field. Radio communications between the EOC and field monitoring teams were well i established, correcting a deficiency observed at the 1982 and 1983 exercises which involved Reckland County field monitoring resources. The field team coordinator at the EOC directed the field teams to sampling location points where measurements were to be taken. Only a few dead spots were observed in radio communications. In these cases, the teams moved to a nearby location and reestablished radio communications. Teams in the field were kept abreast of plant status, meteorological data and other information by periodic updates from the field monitoring team coordinator at the county EOC. l The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for 3 I measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/em in the presence of noble gases was met (FM 3). Both field monitoring teams demonstrated the ability to take air samples and to determine the presence of radiolodine. The proper equipment was available and used. Charcoal cartridges were used for purposes of the exercise. However, riiver zeolite cartridges were available in both kits. Collection of ( 1 4

a 1 59 i i the samples and counting ~of the sample media were done following a written procedure that was available in the monitoring kits. Field monitoring teams knew the procedure for ] counting the samples outside the plume area if radiation levels were above background. l Sample media were placed in sealed plastic bags or envelopes and properly labeled. All 1 radiolodine monitoring instruments (Radeco air pump / sampler tnd RM-14) had calibration { stickers showing that they had been calibrated within one year. j j .s t' j Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding { ti { No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the ] activities of the Rockland County radiological field monitoring teams during this 1 exercise. 1 l Other Deficiencies i No other deficiencies were observed in the activities of the Rockland County 1 radiological field monitoririg teams during this exercise. [' n 2.5.3 Emergency Worker fiadiological Exposure Control The objective to, demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control I emergency workers exposure including proper use of personal dosimetry was partly met I j l (EC 1). All emergency workers at the Rockland County EOC, which is located inside the 10-mile EPZ. were issued both a self-reading dosimeter (0-20 R) and a TLD. Radiological field monitoring personnel.were issued both low (0-500mR) and medium (0-5R) range self-l reading dosimeters and a.'TLD. Each of the transportation companies observed at this i l exercise had an adequatelsupply of dosinieters (0-5R and 0-200 R) and TLDs. The availability of these exposure control devices for all emergency workers corrected a defielency previously obsyrved at the 1982 and 1983 exercises of Rockland County rescurces. It was noted,, however, that staff members-at the Suffern High School reception center were equipped with '!LDs only. Since monitoring instruments are used to monitor evacuees at the reception center, the absence of self-reading dosimeters is not considered to be a prdslem. Most emergency workers had been adequately trained to read their dosimeters at 55-to 30-minute intervals and were knowledgeable that they should keep their superior informed of doses they may receive. However, the bus dispatcher at one transportation company had difficulty using the dosimeter charger to zero dosimeters before issuing them to the driver (s) and he was concerned _that some of I l the dosimeters would not stay zerced. Also, one bus driver from another transportation company and one police officer who staffed a traffic control point did not understand what readings on their dosimeters would mean. This repeats in part one of the deficiencies observed at the 1983 exercise of Rockland County resources. Additional training is recommended for transportation company dispatchers and drivers and police units to reinforce knowledge in use of the pocket dosimeters and the charger units that have been issued to these emergency response organizations. l

a e g Although the use of KI by emergency workers in the field was not recommended ( by decistoa makers In this exercise, the objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI was partly met (EC 2). The field monitoring teams were familiar with the use of KI and who would authorize its use, if recommended by decision makers. Both monitoring teams had an adequate supply of K1 that was within the expiration date printed on the bottles. Supplies of KI were available at the transporte.tfon company garages and drivers were to have been supplied with K1 tablets in the packet (s) of materials which they received from their dispatcher prior to departure to the field. The dispatchers and drivers at each transportation company understood that they would be notified if it were recommended that emergency workers should take KI. There were prob'lems at one transportation company with the procedures for distribution and the understanding of how KI would be recommended by decision makers. The dispatcher knew that the company would be advised by the county and that he would in turn advise the drivers that they should take Kl. However, the packet of materials lasued to one of the two drivers dispatched from this company's garage was missing KI and neither of the bus drivers were adequately trained in the procedures for taking it. Also, at least one police unit that staffed a traffic control point vaas unfamiliar with the use of KI. This l repeats in part one of the deficiencies that was observed at the 1983 exercise of Rockland County resource 3. It is recommended that further training be provided to bus drivers and police units to acquaint them with procedures for the use of KI. Bus dispatchers should also be trained to ensure that K! tablets are issued to all drivers before they are deployed to their field assignments. j The objective to demonstrate that emergency workers understand who can l ( authorize excess exposure under the Protective Action Guidelines (P AGs) was partly met A (EC 3). Field monitoring teams were familiar with exposure limits and who could authorize additional exposure. These points were covered in a briefing given the teams before they were dispatched to the field. Training sessions attended by the field monitoring personnel prior to the exercise also covered the PAG limits for emergency workers and the general population. The bus drivers were generally conscientious about l reading their dosimeters at approximately 15-minute inter :als. However, it was generally observed that the bus drivers and the police units staffing traffic control points did not understand that they should notify their supervisor at 1R and that permission to exceed a cumulative dose of 3R would require authorization by the county health department as set forth in the Rockland County plan. It is recommended that all bus l drivers and police officers receive training to acquaint them with New York emergency l worker radiological exposure limits and procedures for authorization to exceed exposures above the PAGs for the general pubile. The demonstration of equipm ent and procedures for decontamination of l emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including provisions for the handling of contaminated waste was adequate (EC 4). A joint personnel monitoring center (PMC) for state and county emergency workers was set up at a New York State Department of Transportation maintenance facility. New York State Police were in charge of the PMC and provided security for the facility. All PMC workers were assembled in about three-quarters of an hour. The PMC was set up within about one hour af ter workers arrived. A j nurse was on duty to provide first aid and an ambulance was on site. All workers at the PMC had self-reading dosimeters (0-5R and 0-200R) and permanent-record devices. L I j

a .e ? 61 j k 4 Anticontamination protective clothing was worn by PMC workers. Communications were established by the New York State Police to the EOC and maintained throughout the exercise. I The area for monitoring and decontaminating emergency workers at the PMC 3 was.small and could handle about,10 to 15 persons per hour. Adequate monitoring equipment (CDV-700) was available and monitoring personnel knew the contamination levels requiring decontamination efforts. The facility had only a single shower stall ]' available for decontamination. Although both male and female workers were available to assist. In the decontamination of emergency workers, separate. showers should be considered for males and females. Rope barriers were used to direct persons entering the facility to the monitoring area and for separating clean areas from potentially contaminated areas. Some food vending machines were located in the potentially contaminated areas. but these were sealed with tape to prevent usage. Blotter paper step-off pads were used in monitoring areas to help prevent the spread' of contamination. Walkways for contaminated persons were covered with paper. Registration forms were completed for all emergency workers reporting to the PMC. Provisions were made to !dentify personal property which might be contaminated so that it could be returned to the owner. Plastic bags and plastic trash containers were available at the PMC for the collection of contaminated clothing and other contaminated solid materials. Clean clothing was available to clothe persons who may have had contaminated clothing. An outdoor facility to monitor and decontaminate emergency vehicles was set up at the PMC. This facility is estimated to be able to monitor or decontaminate 5 to 10 vehicles per hour. The vehicle monitoring and decontamination personnel wore anticontamination protective clothing and had self-reading dosimeters and permanent- ] record devices. Adequate monitoring equipment was available and the monitoring and i decontamination personnel knew limits requiring decontamination efforts. A pumper truck and six firemen (from West Nyack Fire District) were available to assist in vehicle decontamination efforts. Earth-moving equipment and sand and crushed gravel were available to construct a shallow pond or bed to contain water from vehicle j decontamination. A large stockpile of sand was available; plastic was also available to line the containing pond and the decontamination area was not near an open water i source. Defielencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the demonstration of Rockland County emergency worker radiological exposure cont'rol activi:les during this exercise. cuanessay esuisemam sem o em gun em eegno amp acusa e eseamm mein emp e m o

~ ~ 62 Other Deficiencies C 7. Deficiency: The bus dispatcher at one transportation company had difficulty using the dosimeter charger to zero dosimeters before issuing them to driver (s) and was concerned that some of the dosimeters would not stay zerced. Also, one bus driver and one police unit that staffed a traffic control point did not understand what readings on their dosimeter would mean. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a) Recommendation: All emergency workers should be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimeters. 8. Deficiency: The packet of exposure control materials issued to one bus driver was missing KI. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.e) Recommendation: Bus dispatchers should tie trained to ensure that KI tablets are issued to all drivers before they are deployed to their field assignments. 9. Deficiency: Two bus drivers and one police unit that staffed a traffic control point were unfamiliar with the use of KI. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.e) { Recommendation: All emergency workers should be fully trained in radiologteal exposure control, including the use of KI. A training schedule should be provided to FEMA. 10. Defleienev: Bus drivers and police units staffing traffic control points did not understand that they should notify their supervisor when their dosimeter reached IR and that permission to exceed a cumulative dose of 3R would require permission from their supervisor as authorized by the County Department of Health as set forth in the Rockland County Plan. (NUREG-0654, II, K.4.a) Recommendation: Additional training is needed in the procedure emergency workers are to follow in requesting authorization to exceed Protective Action Guidelines. 2.5.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public The objective to demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting pro-cedures. If necessary, in the event of partial siren system failure, was partly met (F 1). A local police unit equipped with a public address system was dispatched to demonstrate route alerting of the population to be alerted by Siren 25 (around Central Highway and Route 210 in Stony Point) which was simulated to have failed at approximately 1130. Several difficulties were observed in this demonstration. Local police could not locate ( C___

63 the siren area map and the mobile unit was delayed in arriving at the field location until approximately 1220. Route alerting was initially demonstrated in the wrong area. After police officers were told of the error and directed to the correct map of the area to be alerted, the unit completed their route alerting responsibilities, covering the appropriate area in a satisfactory manner. It is recommended that local organizations with backup route alerting responsibilities should be familiarized with the siren area maps and trained I to complete this function in a timely manner (i.e., within 45 minutes of the initial I notification). Standard operating procedures are recommended. I i The capability to establish traffic control points in a timely manner to direct traffic and maintain access control to a potentially evacuated area was adequately demonstrated in Rockland County (F 2). State and local police units were dispatched to traffic control points (TCPs) and set up their posts in a timely manner. The officers I chserved at two of the three TCPs established for purposes of this exercise understood l their responsibilities and were capable of managing access control with flares and cones j or by using their police vehicle as a barricade. Both units were equipped with mobile radios for communications with their base stations if additional resources had been needed. l l 1 The objective to demonstrate a sample of resources to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was mixed, based on a small sample of two schools l (F3). Tone alert radios had been issued to both schools. This receiver worked properly at one school, but failed to operate at the other school where school officials did not know how the unit should be set up and installed for operation. All tone alert receivers that have been issued to schools and other institutions should be checked to ensure that they i are properly installed and operationally tested periodically. One of the schools has written procedures for the early dismissal of schoolchildren and these procedures have been used in other situations (e.g., snow, boiler failure). A handbook which is provided to l parents early in the school year advises parents to establish an alternate plan for where their child is to go in the event no adult is home. No telephone calls to parents are initiated when an early dismissal is effected by this school. The principal has attended several workshops and planning seminars on radiological emergency planning for schools. The other school, with the Inoperable tone alert radio, has no written procedures for the early dismissal of children. The informal procedures that are in place do not call for parents to be telephoned when an early dismissal of school is initiated. School officials at this school have not been trained or received guidance on radiological emergency planning for schools and the principal was unaware of a distinction between the early dismissal of students to go home and the evacuation of students to a reception center. Training should be given to more than one official from each of the schools within the 10-mile EPZ to familiarize them with off-site radiological emergency planning l In Rockland County and the interrelationship of the Rockland County plan with existing school emergency plans. There is a need for further evaluation of the level of l preparedness of schools and staff in Rockland County. i l The demonstration of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was partially met (F 4). Per the off-site scenario, this demonstration involved activation of transportation resources to simulate the evacuation of students when the decision was made to implement an early dismissal of schools at the _____.-______m____.m

e 64 Alert emergency classification level. The transportation company responsible for this { demonstration was notifled to mobilize drivers and dispatch buses to two separate schools. This notification was received from the County Department of Transportation representative at the EOC within 10 minutes of the school evacuation decision (i.e., insertion of the message at the EOC to demonstrate simulated school evacuation). Two buses were dispatched to the schools after the dispatcher completed a checklist review of responsibilities with the bus drivers. This review included the location'of the school they were each responsible for, radiological exposure control procedures, including dosimetry and the use of K!, and the reception center where schoolchildren were to be taken. Both buses were dispatched from the garage and arrived at the schools in a timely manner. Both buses were equipped with radios and the drivers maintained communications with the dispatcher at the garage. Radio communications with the dispatcher were generally effective, although som9 dead spots were encountered in transit to the reception center from the school. Aftet simulating the leading of students at the schools to be evacuated, both buses proceeded to the appropriate reception center specified in the Rockland County plan (i.e., Orange County Community College, Middletown, New York). Although both drivers were generally familiar with routes that could be taken to Middletown, they were not familiar with the specific location of tne schools' reception center. One driver received directions to the reception center via radio. When radio communications were difficult to complete from the second vehicle, the driver stopped to ask for directions in Middletown and then telephoned the dispatcher before returning to the garage. It is recommended that maps be developed showing the location (s) of reception centers to which schools are assigned. These maps should be maintained at the bus garages for distribution to drivers in the event a school evacuation { becomes necessary. The objective to demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ was partly met (F 5). The resources j necessary to complete four general population bus evacuation routes were activated in a l timely manner during the Site Area Emergency. Drivers safety-checked their vehicles, reviewed their maps and instructions and were deployed by their dispatchers after being issued radiological exposure control packets. Bus drivers arrived in a timely manner at the routes for which they were responsible and were generally able to locate their pick-up points and the reception centers without delay. However, one bus driver had difficulty in following the route map provided to him, which required rerunning a portion of the route. This was due to the driver's unfamiliarity with the route and a missing street sign. All routes should be test-run by drivers and landmarks noted where street signs are missing. Although the drivers observed at this exercise have had some training, l refresher courses are needed. Also, not all Rockland County bus drivers at each bus l company have received training in driving evacuation bus routes. Additional Rockland County bus drivers shculd be trained in driving evacuation bus routes. Problems were also observed in the route maps issued to drivers. Two drivers showed good judgment in modifying the routes to avoid railroad crossings which potentially could cause delays. The bus evacuation route maps should be reviewed and revised with input from the drivers to ensure that the most efficient routing is used. Three of the four vehicles observed at this exercise were equipped with two-way radios. A RACES radio communleator was dispatched from the county EOC to the bus company whose vehicles i are not radio-equipped. This radio communicator arrived at the bus garage af ter the bus

1 WT t.,,. - c .,s y__.. s + 4 '. ( e' g 4 M 65 j s y ' s ibbeengd3[stched. The lack of radiosior[all buses to be used for evacuation In ' Roditnh dostyty vras a deficiency at the 982 and 1983 exercises. It is recommended tMeach Rob.cland County transpodst bn chmpany,with an emergency response mission ~ shopd acquire eq@ ment b.jermit racto communications,with its vehicles and with the ] tr2 Wit coordinator in th< ?.00. Rading-tmunications bhtween driverrand dispatchers wEre' generally good, althdgh')}ome pedlems were experienced in maintaining radio co.hmunications due d distaede frk'4the base istation, topography, electrical i innke'ren.te, etc. The alternate method of'demmuoication for both non-rad!o-equipped ] anyadio-eqtaipped veM'51es which ergerienced operational problems was by telephone. j \\ Effet!ve use of this ait@nate means of c6mmunication was demonstrated.. Difficulties 1 with mol'ile comm# cations between transpodation' companies and' vehicles en route j during their emerge /cy re'sponse missions wert.3 pre kuslp oliserved at the 1982 and 1983 l exerdes that involied Rockland Cou3ty transportatipresources. In response to these earlier observations, communicator ne ds for transportation companies are under review as S.rt of,the Recklahd County ersecat bn stud 9 effort that is currer.tly being performef by the Tr2nspor)stio1 Study Planjing Group. Therefore, the, communication needs for each Rockland Count / Transportation Company with an amergency, response rnission remains unresolved tdtil the st9dy is completed. The study should give specific N recommendations repsding these communication Ji,eedu. 7% si a % 'na resourns necessary to evacuate n$d, stitutionalized mobility-impaired si individa'd within the 10-mile EPZ in Rockland County were effsetively demonstrated.

• Nirk 4 %1 river and tg.tcle represently ordtrdr.sMirtatioMmpany were mobilized ar4 cdpatched to Almulate the pick-up o(mobility-!sthaired persons at five addresses and '

'q l th5fQinsportr.tlon.to a reception cinter. This transportation company currently has nhWes capable of' holding 10 wheelchairs end[expecte +his capacity to be,[ expanded to 16 I s wheelchairs in the near future. Based on the peYfUdtance at this exercipe, it was evident that the driver had been trained concerning his route and restdnsibilities. correcting a p 'eviously observed deficierjcy. It LChoted, hcpever, that the transpectation company. l Brierved at th!s hercise is open only 12 hours'per day Monday throgh Friday and 8' hours on Satnday. It is suggested that the procedures for notify'ag th s and other e t co"tpanies with responsibilities t'or transporting noninstitutionalized mobility-!mpaired individuals be%viewt{to ensure tt[t 3hese companies can be not!fied $nif resources mobill ed 6n d 24-hour basis. n(, t 'l The mobilization of staff and activation of a reception center that can be staffed v, i , o n 5 24-hour basis werejndeqvn'ely Omonstrated (F 10,11)s The reception cestd at j gSelfern High School was set 7.a a timn[, manner and this facQlty had well ohhed. ,tperations. Each organization represented at the reception J,enty (County Departraents ' Wlaalth and Socie) Service, American Red Crost County Sherid, and Ramapo Po' lice) 5.\\ 't d a staff activation procedure with ak le'ast wcf and home telephone nu6t ers 11$ted ) a rimary and backup personnel. Atsrding to the reception center director, riduerits

• for p$t'f activation of the reception center (s) would be bredidsn on EBS i for s

_ County DeparuNent of Health perr5tnel;were double-staffed for ' an retuda:Orgency. tratring.purpeus at tMs c.nr$et staff from the County Department of Social Services stated that suf(ielent persornet had, heen trained to staff two shifts. %, 6 q s t43 g y' i f mp g.. ~b

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o 66 Procedures for the registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees were ( well demonstrated at the Suffern High School reception center (F 12). Reception center workers have been trained in the procedures for processing people arriving at the reception center in vehicles, correcting a previous deficiency. Traffic check points were set up to separate clean and contaminated vehicles as they arrived at the center. The monitors responsible for meeting vehicles were familiar with their procedures which required a quick check of the vehicle and passengers and a check of the driver af ter the 4 l vehicl+ had been parked in the appropriate area marked either " clean" or " con'. aminated." Proper techniques were demonstrated for monitoring both vehicles and persens using CDV-700 meters. A test source on the observer was quickly located by his monitor. Male and female locker rooms with showers were available for decontr.mination and County Department of Health staff were aware of the proper procedures for washing and ramonitoring contaminated individuals. Plastic bags were availabic for the disposal j of contaminated clothing and other solid wastes, demonstrating that methods for l permanently disposing of these materials have been instituted. Paper suits were l avallnble to replace contamlaated clothing. Traffic flow into the reception center adequately provided for the separation of clean and contaminated persons. Individuals who had been monitored and/or decontaminated were issued " clean" tags which were visible to reception center workers. A registration area was staffed by representatives of the County Social Services Department in the school cafeteria. Registration forms were completed by simulated evacuees and filed by the reception I center staff. Social Services personnel were available to assist with medical problems, locating relatives, and for providing transportation to a congregate care facility. Maps to the congregate care centers were available for persons who may have needed {- directions. Although a RACES radio operator was available at the reception center. it was not possible to demonstrate communication capabilities at this exercise, since the reception center was set up after the county EOC had been deactivated and other activities had been completed. It is recommended that a future exercise include the demonstration of communications capabilities to keep reception center director (s) l Informed of exercise events (e.g., radiation releases, evacuation recommendations, etc.) as they occur. This exercise provided for more-extensive participation by Rockland County police, sheriff, fire, and ambulance personnel which corrects a previously observed deficiency. The overall response by these local emergency response organizations was adequate although additional emergency response and radiological exposure contrcl training is needed. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in Rockland County's field implementation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. L l l l

67 Other Deficiencies 11. Deficiency: Local police were delayed in arriving at the field location for backup route alerting of the population and initially -demonstrated this activity in the wrong area. (NUREG-0654, II, E.6) - Recommendation: Local organizations with backup route alerting responsibilities should be familiarized with the siren area maps and trained to complete this funct!on in a timely manner (i.e., within 45 minutes of the initial notification). Standard operating procedures are recommende'd. 12. Deficiency: Not al! school officials have been trained or received guidance on radiological emergency planning for schools and some officials are unaware of a distinction between the early dismissal of students to go home and the evacuation of students to a reception center. (NUREG-0654, II. J.10.g) Recommendation: Training should be given to more than one official from each of the schools with the 10-mile EPZ to familiarize them with off-site radiological emergency planning in Rockland County and the interrelationship of the Rockland County Plan within existing school emergency plans. There is a need for further evaluation of the level of preparedness of schools and staff in Rockland County.

13. Deficiency: The tone alert radio failed to operate at one school where school officials did not know how the unit should be set up and installed for operation. (NUREG-0654, !!, E.5, E.6)

, Recommendation: All tone alert receivers that have been issued to schools and other institutions should be checked to ensure that they are properly installed and operationally tested periodically. 14. Deficienev: Bus drivers were not familiar with the specific { location of the reception center where they were to take school evacuees. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.a) l Recommendation: Maps should be developed showing the location (s) of reception centers to which schools are assigned. These maps should be maintained at the bus garages for distribution to drivers in the event a school evacuation becomes necessary. 15. Deficiency: One bus driver had difficulty following the route map provided to him, which required rerunning a portion of the route. This was due to the driver's unfamiliarity with the route and a mjfsjne street sign. (NUREG-0654, !!..J.10.g) l

m i j se 68 i Recommendation: All bus routes should be test-run by drivers (. and landmarks noted where street signs are missing. 16. Deficienev: Not all Rockland County bus drivers at each bus ' company have received training in driving evacuation bus routes. l (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.g) Recommendation: All Rockland County bus drivers should be trained i'l driving evacuation bus routes. A training schedule j should be furnished to FEMA. j

17. Deficiency: Two bus evacuation routes were modified by drivers on the day of the exercise to avoid railroad' crossings which potentially could cause delays. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a)

Recommendation: The bus evacuation route maps should be reviewed and revised with input from the drivers to ensure that the most efficient routing is used. i

18. Deficiency: One of the four buses used to demonstrate simulated I

evacuation of the transit-dependent general population for this exercise was not equipped with' a two-way radio. Bus-to-dispatcher communications continue to be a problem for some bus companies; the lack of radios on all buses to be used for ( evacuation was a deficiency at the 1982 and 1983 exercises. (NUREG-0654, II.F) l l Recommendation: Each Rockland County transportation company with an emergency response mission should acquire equipment to permit radio communications w'ith its vehicles and with the transit coordinator in the EOC. I

19. Deficiency:

Some problems were experienced in, maintaining mobile radio communications with buses due to distance from the I base station, topography, electrical interference, etc. The alternate method of communication for both non-radio-equipped i and radio-equipped vehicles which experienced operational l problems was effectively demonstrated by telephone. (NUREG-l 0654. II, F.1.d) l Recommendation: Communications needs for transportation l companies are under review as part of the Rockland County i evacuation study effort that,is currently being performed by the Transportation Study Planning Group. Therefore, the communication needs for each Rockland County Transportation Company with an emergency response mission remains unresolved until the study is completed. The study should give specific L L l l l l

~ ~ ~ 69 recommendations regarding these communication need. The ~ ~ ~ completion date for this study should be provided to FEatA.

20. Deficienev:

The transportation company observed at this exercise for the evacuation of noninstitutionalized. mobility-impaired persons is open only 12 hours per day Stonday.through Friday and 8 hours on Saturday. (NUREG-0654, if, J.10.d) l Recommendation: The procedures for notifying all. companies with.. responsibilities for* transporting non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals should be reviewed and revised !f required, to ensure tha't these companies can be notified and resources mobilized on a 24-hour basis. 21. Deficiency: Although a RACES radio operator was available at the reception center, it was not possible to - demonstrate communication capabilities at this exercise, since the reception center was set up after the EOC had been deactivated and other activities had been completed. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d) Recommendation: A future exercise ~ should include the demonstration of communications capabilities to keep reception center director (s) Informed of exercise events (e.g., radiation i releases, evacuation recommendations, etc.) as they occur. 2.5.5 Pub!!c Awareness Interviews with approximately 30 store managers and residents of the 10-mile EPZ indicated that a large majority of residents heard the airens and associated their activation with the Indian Point exercise. Approximately half of the respondents knew to turn on the radio for further instruction, and had a basic understanding of evacuation procedures. Approximately half of the respondents stated that they had received pamphlets from the utility; most had kept them.

22. Deficiency: Of the limited number of residents of the 10-mile EPZ questioned by federal observers, only about half could recall having received the public information brochure. understood its contents, or were aware of the meaning of the sirens. (NUREG-0654 !!, G.I. J.10.a)

I Recommendation: Additional public education is needed so that the public will understand t.he locations of the areas th:t are to take protective actions, will know how to carry out the protective actions, and will be aware of what the strens mean. i

70 2.6 ORANGE COUNTY 2.6.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The Orange County EOC functioned in an efficient and effective manner. The Initial Notification of an Unusual Event was received at 0735 by the designated county warning point (sheriff's office). This call was transmitted by the plant and was verified by the county after it was received. All subsequent notifications were timely, messages were verified, and the communications were posted, demonstrating that the ability to receive initial and following emergency notification was met (EOC 1). The verification procedure that was in place corrected a previously reported deficiency from the 1983 exercise. Initial activation of the EOC was begun at 0815 when staff were notified using a call list. By 0930, the EOC was fully functional and by 1000 staffing was complete (EOC 2). Continuous 24-rour staffing capabilities were demLstrated using a shif t change and presentation of a roster (EOC 3). An actual shift change was demonstrated by the dose assessment and county executive staffs as well as the OPS director. The county EOC had adequate space, equipment and supp!!es to support emergency operations (EOC 4); the EOC facilities are very good. The furniture, space. I lighting, noise control, and telephones were accept'able and the work space was ample for staff needs. The EOC facilities also included cots and a complete kitchen which could support extended operations for a 133-person staff. An on-site generator was available ( as a source of backup electrical power. Orange County met the objectives for demonstrating both primary and secondary communication links (EOC 5). Internal communications among the agencies within the EOC and with response personnel in the field was effective. External communication systems linking Orange County with the state, other counties within the 10-mile EPZ and the utility also functioned very well. The RECS line was the primary link with the utility, the state and county EOCs. A dedicated executive hotline telephone was also available linking Orange County with the state and other counties within the 10-mile EPZ. The RECS line was consistently monitored and the information received was distributed in a timely fashion. In eddition, commercial telephone, highway department radios, NAWAS and the extra county frequency provided both primary and backup communications capabilities as required. Access to the EOC was adequately controlled and a thorough security system was in place as evidenced by the demonstration of procedures to handle a suspected (simulated) bomb (FOC 6). The required status boards and displays u 9 e of good quality, prominently displayed, and were updated regularly by appropriate staff. Messages were logged and key messages were displayed on computer monitors which were strategically located throughout the EOC. Messages were transmitted to the various EOC staff in an accurate and timely manner and critical information w ; relayed during briefings. Detailed s briefings were held af ter a shift change when new personnel arrived for duty (EOC 7). L i

q \\ 75 The county executive and his alternate demonstrated effective leadership throughout. the entire exercise. The appropriate official was in charge and provided excellent coordination of the EOC emergency response (EOC 8). Copies of the plan and written procedures were available throughout the EOC. A checklist was also maintained for EOC activities at different emergency classifications levels. The county $mergency manager and county executive were familiar with the i process for obtaining state assistance and the need for state support was discussed (EOC 9). Other EOC staff included representatives from approximately 12 organizations: the individuals were well aware of their Assignments and emergency support rolls. The EOC staff provided ample opportunities for observing their ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel (EOC 10). The objective to demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public l via plume exposure based on plant data and field measurements an'd to' determine appropriate protective measures was partially met (EOC 11). EOC staff determined appropriate protective measures based on dose projections and protective action guidelines (PAGs). Because of the initial wind direction, dir*nnee from the plant site, and utility dose projections, sheltering was recommended. However, measurements from different sectors were not coordinated before the wind shift and the field monitoring team was directed by the dose assessment staff at the EOC to leave the plume before a non-zero reading was obtained and before an air sample was taken. Recording of field measurements by staff at the EOC was also inadequate. Logs were not maintained and the dose assessment staff was unable to determine iodine concentrations. The county P!O effectively addressed state, local and public concerns. EBS messages were telephoned to the joint news center using a dedicated telephone line. The demonstration of the system to provide advanced coordination of public alerting and instructional messages within the state and other counties was met (EOC 12). The P!O notified the joint news cente'r as soon as a decision was made requiring a change in emergency classification or protective actions to be followed by the general public in Orange County. Most of the messages that were generated were prompt, clear and appropriate to the situation. The EOC staff had written procedures for managing an orderly evacuation of the l 10-mile EPZ (EOC 13). Activities involving the ability to deal with impediments to evacuation were also demonstrated with a simulated highway accident involving a tractor trailer truck (EOC 14). EOC staff ordered several agencies to respond to the accident scene and rerouted highway traffic. However, the objective to demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to control access to an evacuated area was not tested in l Orange County since the area was not evacuated (EOC 15). ~ Orange County demonstrated an "early dismissal" of the Highland Falls School at 0945 (EOC 16). This demonstration involved one bus route which was completed efficiently and effectively. During tti demonstration, the bus driver was in radio communication with the bus company president who ' carefully monitored the bus route j and was in direct communication with the County EOC. This company also carried out 3 its responsibility to notify other Orange County school bus companies of the status of the ) emergency situation. i 1

72 The decision to activate the sirens was made at 0910 and the sirens were sounded ( at 0925 Demonstrating the county's ability to activate the prompt notification system (EOC 18). An EBS message was logged at 0928. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No defielencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Orange County EOC during this exercise. Other Defleiencies 1. Deficiency: Activities of the field teams were not well coordinated from the EOC. The timing of field activities, recording of data and determination of iodine concentrations were not well executed. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d) Recommendation: More training should be provided for the EOC dose assessment staff responsible for coordinating field monitoring team: including training in criteria for establishing priorities, interpreting air sample data, recommending appropriate protective actions based on PAGs, understanding critical scale of release rates and use of a field log and map to record data. ( 2.6.2 County Radiological Field Monitoring The radiological field monitoring team was mobilized and deployed in a timely manner (Fat 1). This team was equipped with the appropriate instruments and procedures for measuring both low and high radiation levels (F312). The objective to demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cm3 in the presence of noble gases was met (F313). The monitoring team used an air sampler and an appropriate detector with repeatable geometry for measuring air concentrations with a cartridge and filter paper. Counts per minute were measured on a meter; the average fluctuation of the needle had to be Interpreted. A digital counter of cumulative counts would offer more accuracy. Furthermore, a discriminator to single out the lodine peak would be more accurate. The R31-14 measured gammas and betas of all energies for all fusion products collected on the cartridge and filter. Deflelencies That Would Lead To A Negative Finding { No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the activities of the Orange County radiological field monitoring teams during this exercise. I (

a n 73 Other Defielencies ~' o other deficiencies were observed in the activities of the Orange County field monitoring teams during this exercise. 2.6.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control Measures The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personal dosimetry was partially demonstrated (EC 1). The 2 radiological fleid monitoring team had 0 5R self-reading dosimeters and TLDs and read their dosimeters regularly. Emergency workers at the PMC had 0-5R dosimeters and TLDs. At the reception center, the emergency workers who were responsible for decontamination had 0-5R dosimeters and TLDs. The workers who were responsible for registration only had TLDs, not self-reading dosimeters. The driver who performed the school and general population evacuation had received training in radiological exposure control measures. He read his dosimeter and had in exposure control kit in the bus. This kit included a suit, gloves. TLD, dosimeter, air filter mask and cover boots, but did not have Kl. The driver stated that his training was updated yearly. A bus company representative stated that only 10% of their 70 drivers had received training in radiological exposure control measures. Should more drivers be needed in an actual emergency, exposure control could not be effectively managed. More exposure control equipment and training of additional drivers is needed for full partic!pation by this bus company. The two state police officers who staffed one TCP demonstrated proper use rf dosimetry, and understood record keeping requirements and exposure guidelines. However, the deputy sheriff who staffed another TCP and the emergency worker who performed route alerting did not have any dosimetry. When j questioned, these individuals indicated that there were dosimetry kits containing both l self-reading dosimeters and film badges, and K! at their town offices. Both of these emergency workers said they were trained in exposure control by the Orange County ) Civil Defense Director about a year ago, but could not recall the procedures. It is again recommended that permanent-record dosimeters (e.g. film badges, TLDs and KI) should be provided to all emergency workers. This deficiency was identified during the March 3, 1982 exercise and then corrected in 1983. The ability to supply and administer K1 once the decision has been made to do so was partially demonstrated (EC 2). The state police had KI, and were aware of the provisions for its use. Personnel at one TCP and the route alerting emergency worker did not have their radiological kits (including KI). Neither of these individuals were sure l whether their dosimetry kits contained KI. Field monitoring teams, PMC emergency I workers and reception center emergency workers understood the decision process for the supply and administration of KI. l The distribution and administrate ~on of K1 to the driver of the bus evacuation route was not demonstrated. The bus driver had not been provided with K! in his prepacked radiological emergency kit. It is recommended that emergency kits include Kl. The driver understood from previous training sessions that K! should be included in the kit and that the company dispatcher would tell him when to take K!. No decision was _ _ _ _ _. - _ - - _.. - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _. _ - - _ ~

u 4 74 made and transmitted to the driver concerning the use of this substance while he was C driving the evacuation route. Distribution and procedures for administering KI should be demonstrated in a future exercise. Procedures which have been establ!shed in evacuation driver training sessions should be followed. The o'bjective to demonstrate that emergency workers understand who can authorize excess exposure under the Protective Action Guidelines, was partially met (EC 3). The driver of the bus that was used for both schools and the general population understood that his supervisor would authorize excess exposure. He followed procedures and called in his dosimeter reading every ten to fifteen minutes to the dispatcher who relayed this reading to the company president. He knew that a decision on exceeding exposure limits would be made by company management and re8ayed to him via the dispatcher. Management would consult with EOC staff for this decision should the reported readings begin to increase. The state police at one TCP Indicated that the state would authorize excess exposure. However, the personnel at the other TCP and the emergency worker performing route alerting activities did not know the excess exposure procedures. The radiological field monitors were aware of who could authorize exposures in excess of l PAGs. However, they were not aware of daily (and exercise) exposure limits. Emergency workers at the PMC were not aware of the procedures for exceeding PAGs nor were they l aware of daily or exercise exposure limits. This could create a problem since the PMC maintains the records on emergency worker exposure. The PMC staff would not be able to advise emergency workers on exposure limits and procedures for exceeding the limits l under the PAGs. Reception center personnel were aware of the PAGs'but not of the ( daily and exercise exposure limits. Addittor.al training is recommended so that all personnel know which individual (e.g., the county executive) can approve emergency workers receiving a radiation exposure in excess of the PAGs. Adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste, were successfully demonstrated (EC 4). At the PMC, there was an adequate supply of CDV 700's to perform personnel and vehicle monitoring. However, vehicle monitoring was incomplete; the air cleaner and inside of the vehicle were not checked for contamination. Contaminated waste was appropriately disposed of in specially i designated containers correcting a deficiency identified at the March 3,1982 and March 9,1983 exercises. There were adequate shower facilities. Defielencies That Would Lead To A Negative Finding No defielencies that woulci lead to a negative finding were observed in the demonstration of Orange County emergency worker radiological exposure control activities during this exercise. b

75 Other Deficiencies 2. Dericiency: According to a representative from a bus company which.is responsible for evacuation, only 10% of that com.pany's drivers have received training in radiological' exposure control ~ ' measures. Should more drivers be needed In an actual emergency, exposure control could not be effectively managed. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a. K.3.b) Recommendation: All emergency response personnel should be fully trained in radiological exposure control procedures. A training schedule and the number of individuals trained should be provided to FEatA. 3. Deficiency: The emergency worker at one TCP and the emergency worker who performed route alerting did not have any dosimeters. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a) Recommendation: Permanent-record dosimeters (e.g., film-badges TLDs) should be provided to all emergency workers. 4. Defielenev: The bus driver for the evacuation route, the emergency worker who staffed one TCP and the emergency worker. who performed route alerting did not have KI. (NUREG-0654, !!.J.10.e) Recommendation: KI should be included in radiological emergency kits. 5. Deficiency: Several emergency workers were not aware of the procedures for receiving a radiation exposure in excess of PAGS. (N U REG-0654, II.K.4) Recommendation: Personnel should be trained so that they know which individual (e.g., the county executive)- can. approve. emergency workers receiving a radiation exposure in excess of the PAGs. 6. Deficiency: At the PatC, vehicle monitoring was incomplete. The. air cleaner and inside of the vehicle were not checked for contamination. (NUREG-0654, II.K.S.b) Recommendation: Additional training should be provided 'in decontamination procedures to emergency workers at the P3tC. A training schedule should be provided to FEatA. or e 4 Om ^'

4 76 2.6.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public Backup public alerting procedures in the event of a partial siren system failure were successfully demonstrated via the simulated failure of one siren (F 1). The territory to be alerted by the failed siren was covered in about an hour. However, in a real emergency, three teams would be utilized, providing coverage in about 20 minutes. Resources available for route alerting in a real emergency consist of three fire company automobiles equipped with portable loudspeakers, three fire trucks equipped with loudspeakers, and two police cruisers. The emergency worker Indicated that route alerting would be conducted regardless of siren function in a real emergency. Two traffic control points, 7-A and 7-C, were promptly established (F 2). Since the military liaison was not present at the Orange County EOC, the TCP at Thayer Gate, West Point, was not established. However, traffic control responsibilities at West Point are handled by military personnel, who are always available. Police officers at both TCPs that were demonstrated indicated that there were sufficient police at the state and local level for access control purposes. The performance of personnel at the two TCPs activated for the exercise satisfactorily demonstrated a sample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area. A bus company successfully demonstrated a sample of the transportation resources necessary to evacuate the portion of Orange County within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ (F 5). ' An early dismissal and the simulated transportation of students to their homes was demonstrated during the Alert. During the General Emergency a simulated evacuation of the general population was performed by driving a ( prescribed route with seven pick-up points. The driver demonstrated good knowledge of the route in spite of the route map which had street names which were different from the actual street signs. It is recommended that evacuation route maps be corrected. The communication system between the EOC, bus company, buses and garage was efficient and effcetive. 1 The Red Cross successfully demonstrated the ability to mobilize staff and l activate a reception / congregate care center in a timely manner (F 7). The center at the .T!!ddletown Senior High School was staffed by a shelter manager and three staff i assistants from the Red Cross and an Orange County civil defense volunteer radio operator. I The Red Cross shelter manager was notified by his Red Cross headquarters in Harriman, New York, to open the shelter. He ~as expecting to be notified by the Red Cross liaison in the Orange County EOC. It is suggested that this discrepancy in notification procedures should be clarified. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the reception / congregate care center on a 24-hour basis was satisfied (F 9). The center was double-staffed for the exercise and the shelter manager indicated that he could mobilize two shifts of 11 people each. At the reception center, procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees were not fully demonstrated (F 12). Registration was efficient and the L l l

~ ~ s s 77 appropriate form and procedures were utilized. However, personnel monitoring was not j thoroughimot all body parts were monitored. In addition, evacuees were considered clean if their vehicles were clean so that contaminated people could potentially be misclassified as not contaminated. Vehicle monitoring. was not observed. Additional l training for those workers performing radiation monitoring and decontamination is recommended. 'This recommendation was first made in the March 3,1982, exercise and was successfully demonstrated in the March 9,1983, exercise. There were no provisions for the care of handicapped persons at the entrance to the monitoring section of the reception center nor were there ramps and shower faellities for the handicapped. This repeats a deficiency identified in the March 3,1982, and March 9,1983, exercises. i Facilities for mass care of evacuees were demonstrated (F 16). The shelter manager indicated that the congregate care center could accommodate about 500 evacuees. The Red Cross has immediate access to 100 cots and blankets and can obtain additional cots and blankets if they are needed. Food is available from the school cafeteria and nearby supermarkets. The congregate care center has adequate kitchen, i, bathroom and nursing facilities. A Red Cross nurse would manage the nursing facility and an ambulance, staffed by volunteers, would be on permanent duty. l Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would letd to a negative finding were observed in Orange County's field implementation of actio7s to protect the public during this exercise. l Other Deficiencies 1 7. Defielenev: The bus dri rer responsible for driving an evacuation route was provided with a route map with incorrect Information. (NUREG-0654. II, J.10.a) Recommendation: Bus drivers responsible for driving evacuation routes should be provided with correct maps and a description of each route. l 8. Deficienev: Personal monitoring at the reception center was not i thorough; not all body parts were monitored. In addition, evacuees were considered " clean" if their vehicles were " clean." Hence-contaminated individuals could potentially be misclassified as not contaminated. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12) Recommendation: Additlocal training is needed for the reception center personnel who do radiation surveying and decontamination. A training schedule should be provided to FEMA. l l

y_- -y , 7 .b 4 '/ 8 \\. c 9. Deficienev: Provisions for care of the ' handicapped at the '{ reception center are inadequate. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d) 9 Recommendation: Provisions for care of the handicapped should j be considered at the reception centers. ,l I 2.7 PUTNAM COUNTY, NEW YORK 2.7.1 EmerTency Operations Center (EOC) 1 The Putnam County EOC demonstrated the ability to receive initial and follow-

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up emergency notifications through use of. the RECS hotline, the county executive's Hotline, and the RACES radio communications links (EOC 1). ' All notificationswere I handled either via the hotlines (RECS or county executive's) or via radio links through RACES which were verified by RACES operational processes. These procedures correct a deficiency identified in the March 9,1983, exercise. The county warning point at the county sheriff's office was notified of the Unusual Event by the plant operator at 0735 'via the RECS line. ~ The sheriff's offlee notified the county civil defense director at 0741 and then the county executive at 0742. The staff was mobilized and the EOC was activated in a timely mannar (EOC 2). The ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated '( by a roster listing additional staff' for most agencies (EOC 3)..The dose assessment function has two well trained individuals to function as radiological ~ officer. For the exercise, one served as radiological officer, the other as assistant. To maintain 24-hour capability, several RACES volunteers should be trained to assist the radiological officer (i.e. provide field team direction, feed data to the computer, etc.) This would allow each of the two trained radiological officers to work for 12-hour shifts during extended operations. Although the Putnam County EOC has limited space, there is sufficient space and equipment to support emergency operations (EOC 4). All agencies had table space and telephones. Accident assessment staf( had computer capability and RACES personnel had desks and equipment.' However, county operations would be enhanced if the county executive had a more private and spacious work area. The objective to demonstrate that the state and counties can establish appropriate communication links, both primary and backup s'ystems,. was partially. satisfied (EOC S). Communications with the state and three' counties were via the commercial and dedicated telephone lines. Backup-systems were provided through RACES radio networks and county police, fire and highway. department radio nets, all loested in,the EOC communications center. Two facsimile systems were utilized by the radiological monitoring team and by the county executive for communications with the The RACES team provided a radio teletype link for VHF record copy through a-j state. packet terminal using an RTTY,1200 Software Program. ( 'd

79 The public information officer used a commercial telephone and a telefax machine to communicate with the joint news center. When the telefax machine malfunctioned. there was no backup available for transmitting hard copy. Attempts to use the state telefax system were made but abandoned it is suggested that procedures be developed to reroute messages from the joint news center for the P!O in the Putnam County EOC. Perhaps they could be sent to the SEOC and then passed to Putnam via the NEFAX Systems I and II. This would eliminate any equipment incompatibility problems i between the joint news center and the county EOC. The EOC had excellent security and access control which was maintained throughout the exercise. A Putnam County Sheriff's Department officer was stationed at the door of the EOC and assured that everyone entering the EOC had authorization to do so (EOC 6). The objective for internal communications (message transmittal and logging, maintenance of status boards and briefing EOC staff) was only partly met (EOC 7). The RECS line was monitored very effectively and the standard form was used for recording messages. However, there were no standard procedures for message control, maintaining message logs and ensuring that messages were distributed. Each group handled messages in their own way. A central system for message control, logging, and distribution should be developed and utilized. l' The status b'oard was updated only with major events and not utilized to track the wind changes, plant conditions (other than emergency classifications), nor radiological impact data. The staff briefings that were held were informative but too infrequent and did not include statistical data. The EOC staff were only given data and specific information which they needed to know, but were not kept abreast of the overall situation. It is recommended that the status board be used more frequently to provide updated data and general information and that staff briefings be given more frequently and be more comprehensive. The county executive was in charge and in control of the overall coordinated j response. He worked closely with the civil defense director who directed operations l (EO C 8). The county executive and civil defense director determined that it was not j necessary to obtain additional state assistance beyond the state police assigned to traffic l control points (EOC 9). Since there was no evacuation, they determined that the county's resources were adequate. l The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel from the EOC and county sheriff's communication center (county warning l point) was excellent (EOC 10). The performane e of responsibilities by the j Communications Chief (RACES) and the RACES staff worcing both in the EOC and in the field were very good. They demonstrated total familiar'ty with the county equipment l l and interfaced their own equipment with the < ounty's :o provide very efficient and effective radio communications links. In addition to providing voice communications, a secure radio teletype record copy link was established via a computer terminal which would have been able to support a myriad of functions if land-line telephones had failed. i l The performance by the police and fire communication coordinator was excellent. The coordination via the RECS hotline was handled very adeptly and was another example of the comoetenev exhibited by the EOC communications staff. l ) l i t i t_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ _ _... _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

'7 1 g 80 s The ability to project radiation dosage to the public was well demonstrated at ( the Putnam County EOC (EOC 11). The radiological section was staffed by two well-trained radiological individuals and a RACES operator who communicated with field teams. Communications with the field teams were excellent, correcting a deficiency identified in the March 9,1983, exercise. They were notified of all changes in plant status, meteorological conditions, releases from the plant and ongoing protective actions. Calculations were performed both by hand and by computer and were checked internally and compared with state calculations. Field teams were utilized as effectively as allowed by the scenario (there was very little activity in Putnam County until late in a the scenario). Protective action recommendations were made in a timely manner. Communications between the county, state, utility and field teams were good. Information was easily obtained which enhanced dose assessment calculations and recommendations. Work space was very limited but was used effectively. Maps of plume and field team locations were easily accessible and well displayed. As mentioned earlier, staffing for long-term continued operations could be better accomplished by utilizing RACES volunteers to assist the radiological officer on duty. This would permit each radiological officer to work one 12-hour shif t per day. 1 l At 0938 the lead controller asked radiological personnel what meteorological data they had received. He then told players that he would give them data at 1100 which would change the status of meteorological conditions and what they were currently doing. At 0955 data were provided by another controller to the participants. A portion of the package was given to players at this time which allowed access to the technical scenario (i.e., time and direction of release). In addition, the lead controller made g ( inappropriate and leading comments to the players. This is considered a state deficiency and included in Section 2.1.1. In spite of controller interference, the dose assessment personnel demonstrated their capabilities, which are very good. However, this type of l interference is inappropriate and should be avoided in future exercises. q The decision to do public alerting (via activation of the sirens) was coordinated by the four county executives in a telephone conversation on the executive hotline, demonstrating the objective to provide advance coordination of public alerting. All EBS i messages as well as informational press releases were released from the joint news center (EOC 12). 1 I Since there was no evacuation called for in Putnam County, the ability to j manage an orderly evacuation from the EOC was not demonstrated (EOC 13). Therefore, the objective was not tested in this exercise and should be tested in a future exercise. The organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as traffle obstructions, was successfully demonstrated in response to a message that a l i tractor trailer had jackknited, resulting in the possibility of a hazardous materials Incident. The civil defense director transmitted the message to the county sheriff, who promptly dispatched police to the scene, along with firemen wno were equipped to handle hazardous materials. All actions were prompt and decisive. Traffle was rerouted and l the evacuation would not have been impeded (EOC 14). 1 Although there was no evacuation in Putnam County, the county sheriff's k department and the New York State Police did establish access control points at the

-s. i 81 i direction of the county executive (EOC 15). This action was coordinated by the county sheriff's department representative and the New York State Police representative in the EOC, thereby satisfying the objective. j The organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within l the 10-mile plume.. exposure pathway EPZ was demonstrated (EOC 16). The school representative called all county schools and put them on " alert." Then a decision was made by the county executive for an early dismissal of schools in the 10-mile EPZ. The assistant PIO (in the EOC) reported the decision for early dismissal to the county PIO at the joint news center. This was supported by an EBS message (#2a) which was broadcast (simulated) from the JNC. The prompt notification system was activated when the strens were activated from the Putnam County EOC for that portion of the county within the 10-mile EPZ (EOC 18). This was based on a decision made jointly by the four count'y executives in a conference call on the executive hotline. The civil defense director activated the system j at 0925 and this activation was verified by emergency workers in the field. I Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Putnam County EOC during this exercise. l Other Deficiencies 1. Deficiency: Internal communications in the EOC need improvement (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1.d). i 1 i Recommendation: Internal communications would be improved by { (1) developing and utilizing standard procedures for maintaining message logs and distributing messages; (2) updating the status board more frequently; and (3) holding more frequent and more comprehensive staff briefings. 1 1 2.7.2 County Radiological Field Monitoring Field monitoring teams were effielently mobilized and deployed (FM 1). They knew the lo:ation of specifle monitoring points so no time was lost in moving from one point to the next. Workers were well trained in field monitoring procedures and had the appropriate equipment for determining ambient radiation levels (FM 2). A CDV 700 was used for this purpose. However, no ground-level readings were observed. A micro R meter was also available but was not used. Both open and closed window readings were transmitted to the EO C. 1

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4-82 The field monitoring teams used Appropriate equipment ahd procedures for the ( measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cm3 in the presence of noble gases (FM 3). The field teams followed the proper procedures when taking air samples. Silver zeolite filters were available but charcoal filters were used for the exercise. A calibration curve was used to determine the correct sampling time to obtain a 3 10 f t sample. This corrects the deficiency identified in the March 9,1983, exercise that field teams need additional training consistent with procedures outlined in the procedures manual. Deficiencies That Would Lead To A Negative Finding 'No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the activities of the Putnam County radiological field monitoring teams during this exercise. Other Deficiencies There were no other deficiencies observed in the activities of the Putnam County field monitoring teams during this exercise. 1 l 2.7.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Erposure Control Measures ( l The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of dosimeters was partially met (EC 1). At one bus dispatch point, individual kits had been prepared for bus drivers consisting of two dosimeters (high-and low-range), a radiation exposure record form, a TLD, and potassium iodide (Kl) tablets. However, the transportation director indicated that bus drivers need more frequent training in using dosimetry. The Department of Pub!!c Works employee who was dispatched to a TCP to provide barricades,if needed, did not have any dosimetry nor had he been recently trained in exposure control procedures. This repeats, in part, deficiencies identified at previous exercises of the Putnam County ~1 sources. It is recommended that all emergency workers be fully trained in rau.ological. exposure i procedures. It is also recommended that all emergency workers be provided with both direct-reading and permanent-record dosimeters. At the other bus dispatch point, all equipment, other than a recharger, was available. The county police officers who were dispatched to TCPs and route alerting locations all had permanent-record dosimeters and pocket dosimeters (0-200R,0-5R) and were familiar with procedures for reading, recording, and reporting their doses. Each field monitoring team member had high, low-and medium-range self-reading dosimeters and a TLD. Desimeters were read approximately every half hour. Emergency workers at -{ one of the PMCs were supplied with only high-range (0-200R) dosimeters and each workee had a packet labeled with his/her name containing K! tablets, a TLD, and dosimeter. Since this PMC was outside the 10-mile EPZ, low-range dosimeters would have been J more appropriate. { l l

n. e 4 83 The ability to supply and administer K! once the decision has been made to do so was partially met (EC 2). The county police officers who were involved in activation of TCPs and route alerting had sealed bottles of K! and knew that it was not to be taken without proper authorization. Field monitoring workers each had a bottle of K! with the m. When questioned, they knew when and under whose authority they were to take it. The county Department of Public Works employee who was dispatched to a TCP did not have KI. It is recommended that all emergency workers be provided with KI. Bus drivers at one dispatch point were unsure of the procedures regarding the use of KI. A power failure prevented the demonstration of this objective at the other bus dispatch point. It is recommended that all emergency workers be fully trained in radiological exposure control including the use of KI. Emergency workers successfully demonstrated that they understand who can authorize excess exposure under the PAGs (EC 3). Personnel from the county police department and Department of Public Works indicated that they would contact their supervisors concerning a decision on how long to remain in the field. Field monitoring personnel knew the levels of exposure allowed under the PAGs. They confirmed that the county radiological officer could authorize exposures over 3R. They would report to their immediate supervisor when a dose of IR was received. (Note that the plan uses 100 MR - this should be corrected to reflect the more realistic value of 1R.) The objective was not observed for bus drivers. The objective to demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste was met at the two PMCs (EC 3). Monitoring was very thorough at the Carmel Fire Department PMC. Personnel were well trained in s decontamination procedures and provisions were made to decontaminate both vehicles and emergency workers. The waste water pump should be placed on a plastic mat to j prevent leakage and contaminating the floor. At the PMC in North Highlands, the equipment was properly used and calibrated. Emergency workers knew the levels considered contaminated to be 0.1mR/hr. Uncontaminated persons were separated from l contaminated persons. However, there were no contamination referral sheets as per the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Emergency Worker ) Reference Manual. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in the j demonstration of-Putnam County emergency worker radiological exposure control i activities during this exercise. j i l Other Deficiencies 2. Defleienev: A representative from a bus company which ls responsible for evacuation Indicated that bus drivers need more frequent training in using dosimetry. The emergency worker at ~ i

o a 84 one TCP had not been recently trained in exposure control { procedures. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a. K.3.b) Recommendation: All emergency response personnel should be fully trained in radiological control procedures. 3. Def!cienev: The emergency workers at one TCP did not have any dosimeters. (NUREG-0654, II, K.-3.a) Recommendation: Permanent-record dosimeters (e.g., film badges, TLDs) should be provided to emergency workers. 4. Deficienev: The emergency worker at one TCP did not have KI. (NUREG-0654, !!, J.10.e) Recommendation: K! snould be included in radiological emergency kits. 5. Deficienev: Bus drivers at one dispatch point-were unsure of the procedures regarding the use <>f KI. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e) l Recommendation: All emergency workers should be fully trained in radiological exposure e;ntrol including the use of KI. 2.7.4 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect The Public Backup public alerting procedures in the event of a partial siren system failure were successfully demonstrated (F 1). Route alerting was completed promptly and effectively by three Putnam County police cars. The police officers had route maps and a written message to read over the mobile public address system. l Two traffic control points were established promptly by two Putnam County police officers demonstrating that access control points can be established in a timely manner (F 2). The officers indicated that additional resources (barricades, additional police cars) would be requested, if needed, demonstrating a sample of resources i necessary to control access to an evacuated area. Both officers were knowledgeable about evacuation routes, established procedures for routing traffic and procedures for clearing traffic obstructions. They were aware that there were congregate { care / reception centers in the area and in an actual emergency would request information j from headquarters on which ones were open, j The objective to demonstrate resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation was not fully demonstrated at either of the two bus dispatch points (F 5). A decision was made, based on scenario events, not to evacuate any part of the 10-mile EPZ within Putnam County. At one bus dispatch location (which did not run an I evacuation route), all buses which were assigned for evacuation had radios. Bus drivers had maps and instructions for bus routes and the locations of the reception centers. An ( i U_.-_._

85 evacuation bus route was voluntarily implemented from the other bus dispatch point. None of..the buses from this bus dispatch point had radios or RACES operators for communications, so the recommendation identified in the March 9,1983, exercise that each bus used for evacuation should be equipped with radios has not been implemented and the deficiency remains. The bus drivers did have map packages and instructions but they were incorrect. The evacuation route driver was unfamiliar with the route (it took one hour to find the first pickup point). Therefore, the previous recommendation identifle.d in the March 3,1982, and March 9,1983, exercises that bus drivers responsible for evacuation services should be trained regarding evacuation procedures and supplied with maps and instructions concerning the routes and the locations of the reception centers has not been implemented and the deficiency remains. The congregate care center was promptly activated and staffed by volunteers and staff from the American Red Cross (ARC), meeting the objective to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care center in a timely manner. The center was fully operational approximately one hour af ter the telephone call that initiated activation (F 13). The shelter manager indicated that staffing would be maintained on a 24-hour basis by using personnel from the local chapter of the American Red Cross. A personnel roster is available (F 14). The congregate center successfully detnonstrated the capability to register evacuees (F 15). Procedures were in place to check evacuees to ensure that they had proper documentation indicating that they had been cleared through a reception center. If an evacuee did not have the proper papers, then they would have had to remain in a holding area, separated from the main part of the center, until they could be transported to a reception center for monitoring. Evacuees with proper documentation would be registered using an ARC Disaster Shelter Registration Form. Af ter registration evacuees would be referred to a nursing station to identify any medical problems or special needs. The center has adequate facilities for mass care of evacuees (F 16). The center can house 1595 persons. For the exercise, cots were set up and food and water were available. Additional cots, blankets, etc., are stored in ARC tractor trailers at several locations in the state and would be requested if the shelter was fully operational. There is a two week supply of food on the premises and additional food supplies could be requested from the ARC. The ARC truck has a mobil communications unit and there were several hand-held radio units in the center. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in'Putnam County's field implementation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. Other Deficiencies j 6. Deficier.cv: The bus used for evacuation was not equipped with a j radio for com mun' tation (NU REC-0654,11 J.10.g).

.v .. _ a ~.; 3 u, 86 Recommendation: Each bus used for evacuation should be ( equipped with a radio. 7. Deficiency: Futnam County transportation personnel have not been adequately trained regarding evacuation procedures, the routes they should follow to pick up evacuees and the location of reception centers (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a. J.10.g). Recommendation: Bus drivers responsible for evacuation services should be trained regarding evacuation procedures and supplied with better maps and instructions concerning the routes and the locations of reception centers. 2.8 DUTCHESS COUNTY 2.8.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) The-activation and staffing of the Dutchess County EOC was timely and efficient. Mobilization of emergency personnel began at approximately 1058 during the Site Area Emergency classification (EOC 1). The EOC was fully staffed with all appropriate agencies responding within 30 minutes of the initial activation of the call down list. Commercial telephone and radio are available to notify the emergency { workers at any time of the day. The ability to maintain appropriate staffing at the EOC on a 24-hour basis was satisfactorily totally demonstrated by presentation of a duty coster (EOC 2). The Dutchess County EOC is located in the Dutchess County Office Building in poughkeepsie, New York, and is an adequate facility to support continuous emergency operations (EOC 3). There is sufficient space, lighting, furniture and telephones and backup power is also available along with kitchen and shower facilities. Security procedures were good. A guard was posted at the entrance to the EOC and a log was kept of every one entering and leaving the facility. Message boards, maps and other displays were posted and effectively used to facilitate the county's response. All communication systems functioned effectively (EOC 4). The primary means of communication with the state and local governments is by telephone, with a two-way radio system provided by the county with RACES volunteer radio operators used as a backup capability. i All Dutchess County EOC.<.ff were _ involved in the emergency response l operations. Primary and support functions have been assigned to specific organizations j and written procedures are available for the various emergency classification levels. Message legs were kept. Message handling procedures were effielent and distributed to the appropriate response personnel (EOC 5). The director of the Dutchess County EOC displayed outstanding emergency operations management capability (EOC 6). The facility was fully staffed by dedicated i l

87 and informed personnel, and it was well managed throughout the exercise. The county commissioner was present and participated in the decision making process. The EOC director conducted periodic briefings. These briefings were comprehensive and dealt with changing plant conditions and off-site emergency consequences, and provided agency heads with the opportunity to coordinate their actions with each other. The ability to communleate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was satisfactorily demonstrated through various communication systems (EOC 7). The primary system to the state and the county EOC is via commercial telephone, with the RACES radio net av.allable as a backup. A thermofax machine on j loan from the state provided hard copy transmission of information between the counties and the joint news center. The RACES net is used for backup communications to the ) JNC. The support hospitals are linked to the EOC by the Emergency Medical System ] Radio as a primary system and by commercial telephones as backup. The Fire Radio Pubtle Works radio is used to communicate with the ambulances. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Dutchess County EOC during this exercise. Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed at the Dutchess County EOC during this exercise. 2.8.2 Field implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public The ability to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care center (CCC) in a timely manner was adequately demonstrated (F 1). A CCC was activated at the Roy C. l Ketchum High School in Dutchess County, New York, using established activat on i i procedures and a call list for the emergency staff. According to this procedure the is placed on standby at the Site Area Emergency classification and actually activat, s I the General Emergency. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain 24-hour staffing at the congregate care center was adequately demonstrated (F 2). Additional staffing would be provided by the American Red Cross by coordinating through their representative at the county EO C. Procedures for the registration of evacuees at the reception center was adequately demonstrated. Evacuees were radiologically monitored and registered using the disaster shelter registration form and the contamination referral sheet. If contamination were discovered, evacuees would be referred to the reception center where decontamination is carried out.

i e 88 Facilities for the mass care of evacuees were adequate (F 4). The center was { located 5 miles beyond the plume exposure EPZ bounc'xty and could accommodate 1,789 evacuees. Supplies and accommodations in the form of blankets, cots, toilets, drinking water, storage and parking were all in adequate supply or could be secured rapidly. Provisions for food would be handicd by the American Red Cross, using the school cafeteria, supplementing any supplies available there. The center was equipped to handle handicapped evacuees and the staff was aware of the possible number of evacuees they should plan to process. A nursing station was established with quick access to hospital care available. Communications with the Dutchess County EOC were estabilshed by commercial telephone with RACES as a backup. The overall operation at the reception center was demonstrated to be adequate. Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in Dutchess County's field implementation of actions to protect the public during titis exercise. Other Defielencies No other deficiencies were observed in Dutchess County's field implementation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. l ( D i!ERGEN COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 2.9.1 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) i Bergen County staff showed good performance in the ability to mobilize the staff i and activate the EOC in a timely manner (EOC 1). A duty roster listing the personnel assigned to the Bergen County EOC sufficiently demonstrated the ability to maintain continuous 24-hour staffing (EOC 2). 1 Sufficient space, equipment and supplies were available to support emergency operations at the EOC (EOC 3). A map showing the locations of the Congregate Care and Reception Center was posted, thereby correcting a previous deficiency. Appropriate communication links were established and maintained in Bergen County (EOC 4). Land-line telephones and radio communications links were utilized as primary and backup systems; both of those primary and secondary systems were adequately demonstrated during the exercise. As discussed in Section 2.5.1, there was i some initial confusion in communication between Bergen County and Rockland County. Although the situation was corrected after a few hours, communications between the Rockland Countf EOC and the Bergen County EOC were difficult to complete, repeating deficiencies observed at the 1982 exercise and the 1983 exercise of the State Compensating Measures Plan. Arrangements for 5:rgen County to send an operations liaison to the Rockland County EOC have not been completed. Representatives of C

i 1 4 89 Bergen County and New Jersey should meet with representatives of New York and Rockland. County to establish the responsibilities of the Bergen County liaison and ensure that this function will be staffed in the future. 1 5 Message traffic was transmitted in an accurate and timely fashion, messages were properly logged, status boards were maintained and updated. The county director briefed his staff periodically during the day. This objective was adequately demonstrated (EOC 5). The Bergen County EOC director effectively demonstrated the ability to manage q his staff and coordinate various activities within the EOC in a very professional manner l (EOC 6). He provided the staff with an update from the Rockland EOC and also-1 expressed concerns about not being notified in a timely fashion. l Telephones and-RACES communications equipment were used to effectively l demonstrate communications links with appropriate locations and field personnel (EOC I 7). J Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No defielencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the i Bergen County EOC during this exercise. Other Deficiencies .q 1. Deficiency: Communications between.the Rockland County EOC and the Bergen County EOC were difficult to complete, repeating j ] a ~ deficiency observed at the 1983 exercise of the State Compensating Measures Plan for Rockland County. Arrangements ] for Bergen County to send an operations liaison to the Rockland County EOC have not been completed. Recommendation: Representatives of Bergen County and New Jersey should meet with representatives of New York and Rockland County to establish the responsibilities of a Bergen ) County EOC liaison and ensure that this function will be staffed in the future. 2.9.2 Field Itaplementation of County Actions to Protect the Public A congregate care center (CCC) was activated in Bergen County on the campus of the Ramapo College in Mahwah, New Jersey. The ability to mobilize staff and activate a congregate care facility in a timely. manner as demonstrated by Bergen-County was not observed by federal evaluators during the exercise (F 1). When the federal observer arrived at the congregate care faci!ity, the American. Red Cross was already fully activated and precared to process evacuees. ~ l4 i i __m.___ m .._._.m.-._. ____.__.i..__

90 Twenty-four hour staffing for Red Cross personnel at the 'CCC was available. l ( Second-shift emergency workers would be activated by the Red Cross District Headquarters in Westchester County, New York, and additional staff would be available upon request. The objective to demonstrate 24-hour staffing was met (F 2). The adequacy of the procedures for registration of evacuees was satisfactorily demonstrated (F 3). Standard Red Cross registration forms are used to register evacuees. Under optimum conditions, evacuees would be radiologically monitored and screened at the registration area of the reception centers before being sent 'to the CCC. However, if there is a breakdown in this operation, New Jersey has a supplemental system for monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. The CCC is equipped to provide temporary lodging for 1000 evacuees (F 4). In a real emergency, students at the college would be dismissed and the entire facility could be ut!!! zed. If shelter capacities were exceeded, requests for additional provisions or locations would be directed to the American Red Cross District Headquarters in 1 Westchester County. Sleeping accommodations, toilets, drinking water, storage and parking are all in adequate supply at the college. Provisions for food supplies would be handled locally or by the American Red Cross in New York. Communications between the county EOC, emergency medical facilities and the American Red Cross District Headquarters is via the Red Cross radio and RACES radios. - Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding ( No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed in Bergen County's fieM implementation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. 1 Other Deficier,ves No other defielencies were observed in Bergen County's field implementation of actions to protect the public during this exercise. i L 9 L

1 .c 91 1 l 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: NOVEMBER 28,1984 EXERCISE j ~ Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies based on the findings and recommendations of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station held on November 28,1984. These l evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set j forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980) and objectives for the exercise sgreed ) 1 upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any l defielencies that require corrective actions have been corrected and that such j corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate. FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of l actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies. FEMA I recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and I Implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted l immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels I of government to improve intergovernmental coordination, in all aspects of the ) l emergency planning process. A meeting between state, county, local and FEMA officials is advisable. No deficiencies were observed at the state level that would cause a finding that i off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable as,surance that l appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in j the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. However, one suen l deficiency was observed at the Joint News Center and another in Rockland County. l These and other deficiencies observed at the November 28,1984 exercise for the i Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, as well as outstanding deficiencies from previous ( exercises, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies ) are summarized in Tables 3.1 through 3.9. The deficiencies in these tables have been cross-referenced to the corresponding defielency and corrective action specified in Tables 4.1 through 4.9. These cross-references appear at the end of each deficiency / recommendation in Tables 3.1 through 3.9 and indicate the number of the item as it appears in Tables 4.1 through 4.9. 1

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x. c, e.

- ^ %;2 ..,2 v. 7 133 4

SUMMARY

OF DEFICIENCIES 1 J s-Section 3 of. this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies' noted during the November 28, 1984-exercise. Tables '4.1 through 4.9 summarize recommendations to correct those deficiencies. For purposes of verification, the table 3 compares these recommendations with the recommendations based upon the previous -- ) exercises. The current status of all recommendations is indicated. All: deficiencies / recommendations for the 1984-exercise and the previous exercises of radiological emergency preparedness at the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station are cross-referenced in this table to the section of the post exercise report in which that-deficiency is described. These cross-references appear at the end of each deficiency / recommendation in Tables 4.1 through 4.9. i I i d I l f i l

p. sn a47

= . q u... 4 e 134 [ TAaLg 6.1 Summary of Deficiencies and Recomendatione to Remedy Deficiencies in Off $ite Radtalogical teergener Baseense Preparedness et taercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stattens New York State - State and . Southern Otstrict 2/21/85 Refleienef Identtfted ' NUREG-0634 - FEMA-REP-L Raercise Defisteney and-Rev. 4 teoretse tearsise S/26-4/13 tserstee

Preseng No.

Rosemended Corteestre Aetten Referenee* 3/3/42' 3/9/83-83 41/28/44 status amacact opna&Ttous CENTERE 1. & Radiologtsal ' toergoesy Ceauensi-F.4 1 1. . eettoes Systees (EECS) eseeage laist-ated by the State did not follau the proper precedures for use of the RSCS systes and did set contale.esepiste taf ereet ten. All perseasel who have - estees to the EECS syetes should be trained in the precedures to follow for its use (Secties 2.1.18 4). 2. Improper. erroneous ftold data were N.I.e.- E I given to a teckland County field soat-1.8 - toring tese by controllers. Alse. e 0.1 persion of the tethatcal acenarie estartale (conceinAng stes and dites-tien of release) use given to dose assessenet staff at the putnam County t*C and the centrollar at the fas111ty provided leadtag comments to the dose. esessement. Only properly trained sentre11ers should be e.44 la future emeettaes. Eseretse data and safer = C estion east be - kept _ sentidential (sect 16a 2.1.84 2). 3. Only three telephone 11ase were avat1= - N/R - X: 8/Ote(1+) able for the 12 agencies at the scroc - to contest their of fices. Addittenal telephone lines are resoamended (setzten 3.1.14 a). 4 The telephone essesse used by Treep F ' t.2. I N/Ot)(6.) ta Middletoun to advtse repteseeca-tives of state agencies to report to the W/RC IOC did not indicate - the current esertency classificatten level met note that an eserstee. not en actual emergency. was la progress. Seth pietas af saf ermet ten should be given to oestere of the state eenpen- - eating taae (section 3.4.2 a). S. At the $0E0C alerting and nettittsalon F.I.e 2 C depended on - commerstal teleonone lines. Backup outematic pegers enould be constdered for key staff and key aden:y representatives (Settlen 3.1.25 b). 1-j l 'l l l l 1 l

.a + .P. i. i le ' 135 \\ TASLE A.1 (Cont'd) MtV TotK STATE - STAft AND $0GTMEAN DISTRICT 2/27/85 Defteteney ideartfted rut!C-065A FEMA *tKP*t tsertise Dettetency and Rev. 1 Eseretse Esercise s/26-4/25 Esercise Preseng so. ' recommended Corrective Action Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/28/a4

. status 6. Two of the three telef as nachtnes at N/t 1 g/oy,(34) 1 the $0E0C had been borrowed f ree other - districts to keep up with the antacta pated nesesse flew for the emeretee. I I At least one additional telef az should be considered for the SDECC (Section-341.18 b). 7. O'ftelata of the state. Westchester. E.1 I C Orange and Putnam Counttee who are responstbte for the mobittaatton of emergency resources did not receive mettftcataan of the Alert classif1* cation in a timely manner. Representa atives of the state. Westchester. Orange and Putnam Counstes should meet with the utility to review and endify. if necessary, the procedures for ensuring that mottitcation messages are verLited by county offsetais responsible for the mobittastion of emergency resources (Section 2.1.2). 4. Telefated messaaes regatred an F.1.d 1 C excesstve asosat of time for complete message transatssions between the EOF and the state 10C. 10C and E0f messages should be brief. An investia gation should be made to esamine the possible use of a second telefas aschtne (section 2.1.1). 9. State support egencies should be given A.I b 1 E note involvement in the euertise (Settion IV. 16 p. 21). 10. Ceumunications systems between the F.1.d g C state toCs and other ECCa should be taproved (section IV. It p. 21). The state may wish to consider its own 1.7 E M/0 b)( 6. ) field monitortnd capability which would attow the state to make an independent scendent assessment (Section IV. 11 p. 23). 12. Aditatenet calculating equipment 1.8 I C enoutJ me cenetJered to espedite dose solculations (Secties IV.1: p. 23). 13. Additional ma p s for displaying popua J.10.a I C tartans within ERPAs and iteld saap!!ss locattens show!d be provided in the 4Lbany ECC (Section IV, 13

p. 21 ).

e %m O =e=mme - ee e -me s e amm e.ame + emed em e en.een en ame a.- ...e espe ese. t a L d

43 s,' .i .L.,. '. -4 eg a 136-( TASt.E 4.1 (Cont'd) MEW Y081 STATS - STAft AND $0LTTM11N DISTRICT 2/2 ? '8 Defletene, tienetfted .PEMA-REP-1 Esercise Deficioney and Rev. 1 tuercise Esercise 0/26-8/13 tsercise preseng .No. Recomenaded Corressive Action taference* 3/3/82 3/9/83 43 !!/28/84 statue' ase0ENCT 50,EE3 aas101ACICAL-EEFOSURE IINrtE06 14 State Police et see traffic seecret E.3.s E 'l point to Westchester Ceuety did' est have perenneet-record destesters. State Pellee seeigned to all TCPe sheeld be equipped with perenneer ressed dealentars (secties 2.1.11 3). 15. The state Departemat of Health Radie. J.10.f I 1 togical Neenth Tese leader ladiested that State energency verkers would be furulened with E1 when espesures of 3 to 23 ree thyroid dose were espected. It should be neced thac the New York State Generic Radiale (1&el * *senef Response Plan speelflee that E1 will be cons &dered for use by energency workers med eclected septive populettone when a thyteld radiettee deee of 23 ree er steater le projected (see pace 111-44 REY. 10/84 of the State RF.RP). The State Radielegttel Realth Teae leader should be traAmed T.rh,e El pettcy contained.1.11.h,e new in th in t c c.te rie. (...tlee "NUttC-0654. FtMA. REP *1, Rev. 1. Criteria for Preparatten and Statuettom of Radlelogical leergency Respease flame and Freparednese la Support of Nuclear Poweg Plante, f art 11. NR No NuttC-0654 taference. b tenedial action complete. C la Reemetal action tacemelete. P/Ca Defastency covere more than one function and/or area. A pertion(e) of the deficiency has been secrected. The encerrected pertion(s) le included on the thert as a separate deficience. J N/0)e(93): !a t aboerved during the 1983 esercise. a Nfat)(81): Not an objective of the 1983 esercise. N/0te(Sa): Not eteerved during the 1984 esercies. j N/O bj (d. ): Not se objective of the 1984 sserties. 1 l 6. I 4 !k I 4 l i i l l l l l \\ 1 L__

-*i-p' l 137 ? l i A TAtl4 4.2 Summary of Deficiencies and Recoseendations to Remedy Deficiencise in Of f* Site Radiological taargency - Response Preparedness at tuercises for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations Near Site teergency Operattens Fae.111ty (107) .j '2/27/85 Deftelenev Ideattfted IEUttC-0654 FEMA-REF-! Eseretse Deficiency and Rev. l. Exercise Eneretes 8/24-8/2$ taercise preseng No. Recommended Cerrective Action taference" 3/3/42 3/9/83 83 11/28/86 status t. Meteorological data contained ta the N.I.a 2-I acenatto. which eas reviewed.and. approved for this eseretse. did not include previstone for the - foggy weather sanditions specified in the REC 5 messages tesued by the utility. The incluaton of fog (which was se actual usather condition en the day of the eseretse) changed the protective estion opstone that could be cons &da ered, hones it became necessary to evaluate evacuation *optione using evacuation tLee est W. to for adverse weather conditions. The effect of including fog La messages tasued by the stility was toportant because. in seem

cases, sheltering became. the only viable protective action recommenda-tien.

In the future, changes to the agreed open scenario aust be prohibited by property tratned controllers. - (Section 2.21 !). 2. The role of county representatives at C.2.a 1 C the 20F ' needs be tter defintsten (Section 17. 2; p. 24). le The communications _systes needs F.1.d E C taprovesent, and backup telephone 1tnes should be avattable (Section LY. 2 4 p. 26). 4 Improvement to needed in the flow of F.I.d 1 C infersation back to the ECF free stats-and total respunse ergentsations (Sectten IV, 2; p. 25). S. More space is needed for ef fective dis-E.9 E C' play of information in the E3F. and a single ftaar area would seee censuunt

• cations (Section IV. 24 p. 24).

6. Response Ctse f ar analystas changes in 1.8 K M/0es(93) dose calaulatten pascostere should be N/Cb)($4) j ehortened (Section IV. 24 p. 24). i i

• Nt1Lt M 654. ftMA. ttp.t. Rev. l. Criterta for Preparation and Evaluation of Radtetogical Energency Response Plans and FrepareJsess in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Part II.

%R No N W IC-0sS4 reference. I: Remedial acttan casolete. C Is ResedtJ1 action incoestate. pica Deftstenew covers sore than one function and/or stee. A portion (s) of the deficiency has been corrected. The uncorrected pertion(s) ta included on the chart se e separate def tstency. N10bs(S D: Not abaerved during the 19 ^ Mean sni 5.t an.bjective of the i,83 enerctee. 83 e..rcts.. 1 0$siO4)! Mot abserved during the 1994 eseretee. 1 o,g.. n ,.c.a.bjecu...f th. i,. ee.tets.. ___I.________.___.___________..____

,I ,,:. u ..L.*, ,L lw. ._e - , + + s 1 l 138 TA31.E 4.3 Sumary of Deflaiencias and Racemendattens to Remedy Dettetencies la Of f-Site Radtelegical Emergency Reseense Preparedness at Esercises for the Indian Point Nuclest Generating $4attent Jetat Newe Center end Caerdinatten of Public taf ormatten i 2/17/81 Defletsacy MontC-0654 1dentifted FEMA-RE7*! Deflateney and Reseemended Rev. I, teoretse Esercise Eserttee ptesent us. Corrective Aettee Reference" 3/3/02 3/9/83 !!/28/84 Statue

• i 4.

The forestation and 1somenee of eeen E.5. ' E 1-ESS assoases teek too mich stas. For E.4 esemple. Grange County ordered shel-E.7 ( tering for ELPA 26 at 1417 but the ] ES$ eseeage with this taferestion wee set issued until 1417 40 stoutes after the deciales wee ende. le another ease. the CBS eseeage to shelter ERFAs 36, 37 and 41 te Rockland County was not aired untit. ~ af ter the arrival of the plues. This would have reestted te entdable dese. Most of the tLee delay ecourted at the JNC in thte specifts case. Although genere11y goed capettlity was demonstrated of the interf ace between County FIOe as the E0ca and their eewaterparta et the JNC. the overall capability to prewt.de teatructional assoages to the puolis eheeld be reviewed and revised as appreertste. Specif tsa117. - coordinatten at the JNC and comunicattene between the JNC and the EOCs need to be taproved to insure ( that tne tesuance of all St$ esseeges la more time 1P (Section 2.3g (). 2. sees of the Ett assoases were lacking E.$. E 1 sees informatten. For esamete. E.6 Westchester County did not provide the 8.7 s ERPA nusters for the evacuation 'of Ver71 sack and Duchanan, and none of the 135 eessages eenceratag Reckland County evacuattee provided the names and locattene of receptten centers. Coordinatten at the JNC and consunica* tiene between the JNC and the EOCs should to Leproved to enevre that the inforw eten contained La ERS eessages to complete (section 2.3; 3). 3. Plos free Putnam and orange counties C.3.a. E I did not attend all media telefinge C.4.s tendocted et the JNC. All State and taunty P!0s should participate in sti press betafinge in the event that queettens are asked by reporters about the individual county's respeese (sectten 2.3s 2). f i S I - U

.. f t.1

:. c. -

., Q.i. ', e e o e 139 1 ) \\ TABLE e.3 (Cont'd) JOINT NEWS CENTtt AND COORDINATION Of PUBLIC INPotMATION 2/27/55 Deficteney ) NUREG-0654 tdeattfted 1 PEKA-R1P-1 Deficiency and Recommended Rev. 1 Esercise Esercise tsareise Present ] No. Corrective Action Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/84 Status' A. In conjunctier with county' P10s. E.5 'I C cr1teria should be developed to determine what type of information will be issued via E81 and what type via neve releasse (Section IV. li p. 21). 5. A new location for the JMr. with C.3.a I ~ C

• \\

adequate space and equipment. that te outside the 10-=11e (*I. should be established (Svetten IV, 34 pe 31). 6. Procedures for quickly activating C.4.c A C rumor-control telephone numbe rs and ' j procedures should be formalised (Section IV. 13 p. 22). "NutzG-0654. FEMA.11P*l. Rev. 1. Criterte for Preparation and Evaluation of Ladiotegical Laergency 4 Reeponse Plans and Preparadoess la Support of Nuclear Power Plante. Part II. Nat No NURIG-0654 reference. b tenedial action coepiste. C It Lemedtat action incomplete. P/C Deficiency covere more than one function and/or area. A portion (e) of the delictency has been l corrected. The uncorrected portion (s) la included on the chart as e separate deficiency. g, M/Obs(83): Not observed during the 1981 esercies. M/Obj(81h Not en objective of the 1983 etere194. N/Obs(84): Not observed during *ehe L984 esercise. M/Obj(84h Not an object 1ve of the 1984 asercise. I - 1 I i 1 I k.m 'w

• * -su. e eno = mas amo em o em w 1

W

e,a ~ < 1 1 140 l C TAaLE 4.4 Seemary of Deftstancies and Receemendations to Remedy Dettetencies in Orff-$ite Radiological leergency tasponse Preparedness 6 at Exercises f or the Isotaa Point 18vetear Generating Station: Westchester County 2/17/83 Def1stency NonEG-0654 tdantified FEMA-REP-1 Deltstency and Recommended Rev. 1 Ezeretse taeratt.e Eseretse Preseng me. Corrective Action Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/84 Status W OpstAY10sss CElrrat 1. Representatives free various cemety - F.1 1 1 agencies at the 80C. Le order to transett a enesage, east leave their statten and go to their corteepending commanteattens person in the somnita* tien fees. Delays in enesage transettted as well se escessive netse and sevesent are e result of this sysses. Consideraciaa should be given to the instattation of as intertoe systes between each representative in the goc operatten toes 'and their counterpart in the cousunication center (Seatten 2.4.13 4). 2. Sees energency personnet senducting F.1 1 1 periodic briefings to the 10C staf f did met stand slese enough to the aterophone at the podive. As a result parts of the betafings were taaudtble throughout the 10C. Adytse these who hetet the staf f. to spesh toudly into the escrophone at all times (Section ( 2.4.1 1). 3. The filing and legging of messages u.3 1 1 I received at the 10C was done in several places. potentially causing confuston and pesstSta 31splaced sessages. The message filing and legging systems shoute be ravtewed and redesigned to centraitse its operattens, thereby assertag accurate and unifars records. (secates 2.4.14 1). 4 status heards.were too sealt to contain N.3 1 1 att ene appre,rtate infersatten and he vistate antougneus the toc. Alse. treelevant and esesselve tafersatten I was included on seen of the status boards caustng pesettle confusten. The cosaunications rees did not have a status board. The eastus toerd systen i should be rewtowed and eergesponding i l serrections sade. In odottlen, a status neard enould be instatted in the teamantaat tens tsee LSectten 2.4.13 2). 1 i = emano em one =====. amen om een a een en asume om.mm. - __ emesse 6

] d

e-

,ew.- J,.;- 4 i p i l i 141 4 i \\ ' \\ sm ) 'fASLE 6.4 (gent'a) WESTCMESTta cottNTY 2/27/85 Deftotency WUREG-06 54 1dentttted FEMA-REP-1 1.s Esercise Eseretse ' Eseretse Present Deficiency and Recommended Rev. No. Corrective Action Reference 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/86 Status' J { 5. Tiesty pesetas of protective action' R:3 I I recomeandations and their stees of implementation on the does assesseest j st uus boards was not demonstrated. Status kard information in the dose assessment area should be updated in o l eere steely meaner (Section 2.6.18 S). 6. Field conttoring date ' couW have been 1.8 E 1 ylotted on the watt esp to provide an easter analysts of the monitoring data and comparison with the pre plotted d plume toeptschs. Dese assessment personnel should plot fleid monitortag ) data en the wall map that to availaole - 1 in the dose assessment area of the 10C I (Section 2.6.13 6). j f. Criteri.a should be developed. in con-E.S I C juncties with the state and the other counties, to determine the type of ) inforsattoa to be Lasued via ESS and the type to be tesued via news releases l (Section KY, 28 p. 31). - { 8. More detatted alerting and mottilaation E.2, 1 N/ob)(83) j procedures should be included in the N.6 N/Obj(84) written plan (Section IV. 3; p. 21). l . i 9. 8schap connunications systees and F.t.a I C procedures should be reviewed to reduce 1 depen 4ence on the commeretal tete, hone j systes. since this may be overloaded ta' a rest energency (Section IV, 34 p. 28).

10. A dedicated 1tne between the EOF and' F.1.4 I

C the EDC should be installed to taprove communications (Section IV. 3; p. 28). it. County Ptos shestd a ' e a'. sil major G.6.b I C media briefings (L stion IV s.y. 32), e e e em-r i _._.___..____.__.__.1___._.____.__..__._______' m

.A '.i.D T ..c :. 4

E 1.

-/,0

• -.,,.'(S

g. ;-;;

+ m .' ?., g e e 142 i ) TABLE 4.4 (Cent'd) WESTCMESTtt COUNTY 3/27/83 i1 .i Deficiency nut 20-0654 Identified FEMA-REFat Defisteney and Receamended Rev. 1 Emeratee. Esaretoe.tserstee - Present so. Correettve Action Reference *' 3/3/82 3/9/03 11/18/44 - statuet ^l

12. It le'reseemeaded that eerbers in the,

8.3 X C-BOC user identificatten badges that give thstr names, their ergeeLaatione (e.g.. Red Crees.. etc.) and -their functions. la order to espedits the~ flee of meseases and orders (Seettee IV, 3s p. 24).

13. The-arrangeeset of tables and the u.3

.X C leesttene for each energency worker in the 50C should be reviewed in order to eintetse the tapact e( the small space en the operettee of the 80C (Seatten. IV. 38 p. 20).

14. Proced ree eheutd.be developed fee 1.8 I.

C obtstatas the field data mesoured by the utility's field monttoring tese la e stisty esaner (Seatten IV

3. p. 34).

15. A populetten distribution es, should be '.

J.10.b I C displayed la the EOC (Seatten IV 34 p.- 24 ). i

86. Future esertise scenettes should pre

• N.1 2

C vide mee stee' for e desplied reentry settetty (secties 17. 38 p. 34). ' CDOWTT RestotaC1 CAL FIELD 19W17041N0

17. One teatelectset field monstering tuae 1.9

,I 1 ese not aware of proper precedures requiring the transportattee of elt,- semeles to a point eutside the plume fer detersantag redtetedtne concentra* tiene. fla1J tese aperating procedures chauld be revised to tastude instrue* < tien for aeving outende the pluso to a low techground area to deterstas redte* Ledine sensentratione (section 2.4.28 7).

18. Meattering equipment eheutd be re-5.10 I

C ea11brated perledicatly eeeerding to the sc%edulee set forth Le the plan (Secties IV. 38 p. 37). 4 9 O 't b

j u r t ~ ~ + e l e 143 I -j ] \\ TABLE 4.4 (Cent'd) 2/27/93 WESTCHE5ftR COUNTY De ficioney ++ nut 20-Ot S4 tdentttted FEMA

• REP *1 Dettetency and Recommended Rev. 48 Esercise Esercise taercise Present No.

. Corrective Action Reference J/3/g2 3/p/83 11/28/84 Status" l c

18. The sequence of sanote peinte used.

1.8 I (routes driven by the sonitoring teses) should be carefully chosen to given the esmimas amount of data for use in asklag the early independent asersament (Section LY, 31 p. 33).

20. The numbe r of eaerlee needed for an 1.8 1

C independeer early as se ssment. and the peastate htadatances to f ast deployment of the field monitoting teses, should be reviewed to assese the possible need for addlttonal field monitertng tease (Section IV, 3s p. 34).

21. Silver seelite filters should be used 1.9 E

C is the att sasoting equipment that to used for seasuring radletodine. NOTts Characal filters may be used during dettle and esercises. but the stiver seellte (11ters mast be in the tastrua ment hits ready for use in en actual energency (Sectten IV. 3; p. 33). EMERCruct woEEER RADictactCAL EIF0$URS 03ffT10L

22. A coaststent pottsy concerntag. the J.10.e 1

1 \\. adotatstration of El to injured con-taetnated individuals at the PeeksutL1 Hospitat was not in evidence. During the eserstae. there was some confusion caused by a toch of an estat11shed procedure. Peensh111 Kaspital should estan16e e pettsy en the administra-tion of Lt instadtag standard operatLng precedures. Also the meetsat statt should be tralned La this pelley and a tratatag schedule should be furstehed to Ft v (Sectten 2.4.63 16 ). I 1 )

23. Personnet at one traf f ts control point K.3.a.

did not have pe rmanent record dest

• E.3.b

] seters and did not know what thee were. All field perseenet should be supptted utth persanent record dest

• Seters and trained reg their a

fun.t!.n ti..ti.e 2.. 3, i.ardtog 1 s /I ~ * ~ - t l

-r. p y,y ,,. g j --., _, a.. a c., t. m;' v. 1 1 i l l'. 144 . 1 e l }. TA8L.E 4.4 (Cent'd) , I/II/S$ WESTCHESTER COUNTT I.. Defittency McAEG-0454 tdanttfied FEMA-REFat Def tstency and Recomended Rev. 1, toercise Essestee ' taerstee Preseng No. Carreettre Aatten - Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/44 scacue 1

4

g 24 One bus company's driver read esty bia*

E.3.h ' I I 1 high reage. destanter dueles the esercise. med did met read' the' std reage (0=$ 1) doelester. Det ve rs. ' should resetve addittenal teatructies a' regarding the functiesel differensee between the two typee of destanter 4 (Seestee 2.4.33 9). 1

13. At the PMC to Valhalla. esorgency ~

E.S.a. E { workers were-unfeelliar with proper E.S.b preceducee - for the redselegleal asettering of tecentag personnel. Addittenal tratalag in redtelegLtel asettertag preceduret should be pro #tded to the emergency staf f et the PMf A training schedule eheuld be fa,uished to FEMA (sectice 2 4.34 8).'

24. Transport asten sempantee tevolved to E.3.e I.

E-F/C the eserstae apparently did not have adequate op ptLee of desteeters. Foressent ressed desteeters (e.g., f LLs badges. TLDs) should be prevised to oestgency workers (sectten tv. 33 p. 37 end Section 2.4.64 pp. 32-33). ( 27 Sus and ashutance detwers who esy. be E.3.h I P/C salted upon to enter the 10-e11e plume - espesure pathway EF2 were not conste= tently trained in the use of destaetere and Itt. Att energency workere eheute be tutty tratned in radiotegical espo* sure central including the use of destseters and E1 ($estten 2.4.sg p. 33).

28. ?stwnent record desteeters (e.g., f ate 1.3.e E

I. P/C bad 6s. TLDs) should be provided to energency wethers (Sectice IV. 33 p. 37).

29. More sensitLee self-reading desteetere E.3.e I

P/C (e.g. 0 200 eAes. 0 20 tes) should be ptertded to energency workers (Sectten IV. 3.

p. 37).

4 .s - - - -.. = = - -.. - -.

• 2 I.'

I i

. 15 / , '.s "s:

e l

w r 145 i l 6 TAALE 4.4 (Cont'd) 3/37/83 WC$TCHESTEA CourTV Deitciency NUstG-0654 tdentified j FIMA-RIP-L Dettetency and recommended Rev. 1.s 1:eretse Eserttee taeretse Present No. Corrective Action Reference 3/3/82 3/9/43 11/28/86 statu 8 I'

30. Methods for permanent 1r disposing o(

K.S.b. I C { contaatnated titeld and solid westes j need to be developed f or. the decon-tamination centers (Section IV. 38 p. J. 17 ). ritta DartanswfAftou or CDOWTT ACTt0#8 10 FtartCT TBE FUBLIC

31. A shift change was not demonstrated at A.4 E

~ ! l l the reception center, aid not all post

• tions there had backup esaff avatta able. As actual shif t change should be demonstrated at a future esercise to fulfill this objective ($ection 2.4.6g it).

12. Sees LACES operators' assigned to ride F.t.d I

L en evacuation buses and provide backup tessunications with the County E0C atssed thett bue apparently due to Leproper rendesvous Laformation. Training should be provided to the dispatcher (s) of LACES personnel providing mobile' communications with buses se they can be deployed to the field with corrett information se that before they can rendeavous with bu a g, they are dispatched free e garage LSection 2.6.45 18).

33. Arctval of large numbers of evacuees at J.12 K

I the reception center could treate suba scantist bacalogs. steen the sonttoring. rates observed at the eserstee. Five r or sts additional monttertns staff should be trained er the current staff should be trai. tee in radiological monta toring procedures to intresse the eff1* 4tency of protegistration monitoring (Section 1.6.48 13). I 1 ) 34, At the reception center potentially J.12 j contastnated and known " clean

• evacuees 1

were not kept toeptetely eelregated. ) Arrange routes or partletone to oesure ...piste .egregatto. (se iios 2.4.a. is >. o %m a O 98 se e a gw, .-----__---______w

o, 41 146 TASLE 4.4 (Cent'd) WESTCHESTit COUNTT 1/27/85 Deftetency nut 10-06S4 tdentified FEMA-rep-l Deftstancy and Receamended Rev. 4 Esercise Eastetse taerstee freeent No. Corrective Astles Refreence* 3/3/82 3/9/83 !!/28/84 Statue 8 l'

35. The decostamisattee specialtet at the.

J.12 E 1 teception center wee est equipped with protective glases for handitag con-l tantaated articles et elething. Detentaminatten peeseenet should be. 3 provided with protective gloves and l theit use eheuld be de.mettsted at a feture eserstee (secties 2.4.4 13).

36. Westchester Cevaty trmacpert attes J.10.a.

1 C i personnel have met been adequecely J.10.g tratned regarding evacuatica pre-sederes. the toutes they sheels fe1 LOW q to pick up evacuees and the lacettee of 1 teceptten centers. Sua drivate reopensible for evacuation servicae cheeld be resined regarding evacuatten i precedures and supptted with better esos and instrustlene concerning the routes and locastene of reception sentere ($estaan 2 4.71 p. 31). ) i 31 Adittional trateing and possibly J.to.d 2 C addLttonal reseufces. inclodsag l personnet and vehicles, are needed for I the evacuation of institutionalized and l men tna t t tutionalised. embtitt riepaired - { l persons. Transpettatten personnel ] l responsthis for the evacuatten of { mobility-tapatted persone eheuld be l tratnad is evacuatten precedures, and the supply of assulances for the i evacuatkan at nuesteg homes should be - revleued (Sectten 2.4.13 p. 32). l

30. The espacity of the constegate care J.10.h E

C tac 11 tty to see esa11 to accommodate i the capactty spostfled in the plan. I N tapattty at tentfergte acre f actLittes la vestthester County should ] be reviewed and additleast fact 11stes should he identifteJ Li necessary (Seatten 2.4.73 p. 32). p 4 i i 4 'N

• = =

e e. .mmmm., 4

%M; .e

1 p v-.

.Jc u p. .e '147 f k TASt.* 6.4 (Cont'd) 3/27/85 WESTCHESTER CDU1rTT c Deftstency - NUREO-0634 tdentiftad ' FEMA-AIP-1 pe. Corrective Astton Reference". 3/3/83 ' Emertise taeretse Preseng-Deftetency and Reconsended Rev. l. Esercise 3/9/83 11/38/84 8tatus

39. Test eenagemeet of sound -levels should 8.6 I

C l be made-throughout the 10-stle tpt. J.10.f Nedtftcation and/or addittene should then be made until the spetse meets the nettiteactos requirements (section 17, 3; p. 31).

40. toute* starting precedures and essesgos E.4.'

E C should be developed to supplement the J.10.c stren systee. especially in those areas of low stren-sound tevels (Section IV, 34 p. 31). 41. Suses used' for eveevation eheuld be J.10.a. I C e,pplied setter maps and testructione J.10.g - concerning the routes and the locattens of the reception centare (Section IV.. 36 p. 36).

43. Procedures and equipment f or the evac-J.10.'d E

C ( uation of the mobility-tapatred need to be tsproved (Section IV. 33 p. 36).

43. ALI buses used for evacuation should be J.to.g X

C equipped utth radios fer dispecching (lettton IV 38 p. 36). e*. Precedures for staffing treffts control J.10 3 I C A pelate in a steely manner need to be reviewed and strengthened (Section IV. 3; p. 33). 45. Procedures for dealing utch impedtsente J.10.k I C to evacuatton need to be developed and eserstaed. These tapealments inalvde auto actL4ents. auto treshJouns. aevere read senditiene, and the unavallasttity of gasoline unen needed (section tv. 3;

p. 35).

46. Additional training to needed for the J.13 I

F/C reception caster personnet who de radtatten surveying and decontamination (Secttan IV 38 p. 36). s i ) l 1 l l s.-- ~.. -... i

1. 't /s. % 0 jaL, *. ' 's , MSL ! A. A Jt 91. .a L !a-a +m 1 e .t e. '148 TABLE 4.4 (Cent'd) WESTCHEST!R COUNTT 1/27/05 Deftstoney NUREG-0456 tdenttried i #' FEMA-RAF-1 Def tstoney and Receemended Rev. 1 Emerstee Emeratee tsaretse Present us. Corrective Aesten Reference" 1/3/82 3/9/83 11/28184 - statue'- Eggb1C All&SENESS 47 The anneet pubits educetten brochure. G.! I C settently la review. has not yet been ' distributed la Westchester County. Publicattene and distributten of t% pubits educatten brochure for West = e-shooter County should-be eepedited (Seatten 2.6.33 p. 28).

44. There use no evidence of signe er C.2 X

P/C' nottees posted in hotete end estets withis the 10-mate plues espesure path = way EPZ to provide helptist emergency taforession to the transient popota* tien. As seen as peestble. the necesa eery pub 1ts inforsetten estettate should be distributed and posted la puttis places for the use of trenetent petulattens who ser eene into the 10= elle 171 (Sesttee 2.4.33 p. 28).

49. A very escolate educatten campaign G.!.

E C regarding IRFAs cheeld to taptemented that includes distributee of det.11ed mope showing these areas ($estten IV. 3s p. J1). (

50. Intense ef forts should be made to este G.h E

C the public aware of the seentag of the stres stenals ($ettien tv. 3s p. 31). St. addittenat pubitt edutetten is needed C.l E C se that the publia utl$ understand the lecettans of the areas that are to tese preteettve actions. and vt!L know how - to carte est the preteettve sattene. Canetterattan eheute be given to sacer= tain unether a signiftsant number of people d&J not retelve the posphlete. If this to the case. addittenal disa teth etse should be sede (Seetten 11 3; p. 3* ).

• M"11J 4el.. F!MA. REP-l. Rev. 1. Critetta for Preparatten and Evaluattan of Radiotegical taergency Response Plane and Preparedness to Support of Muclear Feuer Plante, Part it.

Met Me C R13 4 6Sn reference.- b Reasdtal easton taeplete. Is tenedtat actlen inteestete. P.C Deftstence eevere more then one fumetten and/or eres. A portion (s) of the def tetency hoe been 43rretted. The unterretted porttee(s) te tactoded on the thert se a espetete def tstency. M'$bs(33)1 Net observed duttRd t% 1993 eseretee. I?Obj($3)1 Wet se objecttee of the les3 eserette. M.'Obs(sa)t Net observed daring the 1984 esartles. M/obj t s.): Net en objesttee of the itse ee nesee. < :1 L ~. ~ 1 l l i k

s '= =w e la e 149 \\ TA3LE 4.$.8 Summary of Deficiencies and Recommendations to Remedy Deficienstes in off-Site Radiological Emergency Resoones Preparedness Observed at Caercises f or tNe Indian Point Nuclear Centrating Stattent Rockland County 2/17/05 Deftetenev ider(('ted WUREC-0654 FinA-LEP*1 f 3sectee Deffetency and Recommended Rev. 1 taercise tsarcise 8/24*4/23

• =ercise Preseng Wo.

Corrective Action Reference 3/3/32 3/9/83 83 11/.'* / 84 status DancamCf OrtsAr10ns curfta t l 1. Although not a part of the scenario,. J.lO.1 1 1 RIC5 messages 7+A through 13*A india cated that conditions of foggy weather were present. Personnel in the EOC did not reflect this in their conald-erstione of protective settens since evacuation time estiaates increase significantly during adverse weather. The dactsien to shelter EAFA's 36, 37 and el was not made until 1487. By the time gne 155 message was broadcast to shelter. the plume had already arrived over parts of the EPZ a nd seee Inhabitants would have been esposed. Future usosages,novid be carefully reviewed regarding esteorological conditions. Protective accion decision should be more casely, es,secially when recessendattens are made to the county ($ection 2.1.15 1). 2. The 8erten Covaty Police representative A.2.a I X 1 at the 10C was unaware of the role of F.l.b the Sergen County EOC 11steen sad what g, procedures to fullow. As a result. cetsunications between the Roc'iand a County EOC and the Sergen County 10C vere 4tfficult to coe71ste repeating a defitteney observed at the March. 1983 eseretse. Arraigesents for Sergen County to send an operations 11steen to the tackland County (OC have not been consleted. Representatives of Rockland g* County and New York State should mee t eith representatives of New Jersey and lercea Countv to establish the respone* tb111ttes of the Sergen County COC 1141 son and attespt to ensure that this function will be staf fed La the future (Section 2.5.14 2 and section 2.5.11 p. 3 7 ). 3. Mot all agency representatives at the F.I 1 1 Recaland County EOC were f amiliar with the New Yor's State energency leg fkrs. Als.. there were several periode ating t%e esercise when the flev of inf ersatlan legged among agencies. All agenew representatives at sie Retsland Co Alv $JC s hog Ld gggg[vg g(fgg[ gag [ training in grocedures f or the communt* cetten of internal messages and use of the esergenev message leg f o rms. A trateing scheJule should be provided to r!%A ilection 2.5.1; 3). s.

i s .g. 14 130 TAaLE 4.5.1 (Cent'd) 20CK1.AE J!rTT 2/27/85 Detteteaew tdentiffed NUa2C-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Esercise Deficioney and Recommended Rev. 1 Exercise Esercise 8/24-8/15 Esercise Ptesent No. Cettective Action Reference 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/28/84 states

• 4 Altheegh teckland County had the
• F.1.b g

g benefit of additional technisat dose ressesment input f ree the State EOC in Albany, and the State REFC representa*. tive, who was present et the County 30C. protective actien deciaien asking see delayed La Reckland County. later= estion flev over the taecutive Met 11ae and ceamunicatten between the dose assessment functlene in the State and Reckland County toCe need to be to-proved. The following two receamenda-tiene relate to thte deficiency a) The County Nealth Commissioner should be trained to place greater eephaels en patent 141 consequences and to be more forceful ta present= ing these consequences to the decisten eeket at the earliest possible ties as that a11 protective action options will be available. b) The rete of the $cate REPC 1141sen should be reviewed and formalised in the County Plan. both prior to and ( siger the Covernee's declaratten of State of taertency, to leprese the facility with imten protecttve action receemendattoma are coer. dinated between the State and Recaland County (Section 2.5.11 $). 1. A sinet delay was caused en one occa-1.8 K 1 sien wien the County and State dia not agree en dose projections. While the J1fferences were not s itt.l f ic ant. rese* lution of the danse for the dif ference results in a ainee delay. Rockland County and the State should attempt to use an identical Jose ptejectfen anthodelety endler technical personnet should at least be trained to resegntae ahead of 11as that ettlerences e,re it'ely to esset se that the? de nst s betone conestned ever alast dif ference. (section 3.5.11 4). 6. Ylee esclasses given f or children to J 10.1 g g j ertive hees af ter early diantesal of I scheels appest to be Laceostete. These i estinct es should le reviewed and 1 rettsed as appre,etate te assure that l the desisten easef la provided with' ) accurate informattee (secties. 2.5.11 6). 1 I l l (

• am - i esame a+*w me e se aus e=mmm, eeen ein e e i ese as m, m,

l

.5-_ 4_ t e e 4 '151 \\ TABLE 4.5.1 (C ent 'd) LOCKLAND COUNTT 2/27/85 Deftetency identtried MUREG-0634 FEMA-LEP-1 Esercise Dettetency and Rossemended Rev. 1 taercise taercise 8/24-8/23 Esercise Presenj No. Corrective Attien Reference 3/3/$2 3/9/83 33 11/18/84 gtatus 7. The RECS line in the ESC malfunctioned' E.3 g C during the esercles. Although the mal-F.1.d function was rectified during the eser-case and did not adversely affect tho' emergeney reopense, the cause(s) for the malfunction still seed te be is-vestigated and corrected (3ectica 3.2.1; a ). 8. Rockland County has not finalised and A.l.a 'I C edopted a radiologler' emergency F.4 reopense plan and precedures to respond to an emergenet at the ladian Feint Nuclear Generating Statten. Rockland County should finn 11ee and adopt a radtelogical energency response plan and precedures to esopond to an emergency as Indian retnt (secties 2.58

p. 36).

9. State Department of Realth (DOM) pe r= A.4 1 C sonnel based in Monstaelle were sa a f ae111e r with precedures for 24-hour continuous emergency response opera-tiens. State Departesat of Realth pereennet utth dettee in teckland County should be given addistanal g, training in the Rockland County plan and precedures (Section 2.4.28 p. 39).

10. A map shoutng the location of congre-J.10.a 1

C gate care centers te. Sergen County, New Jereew. vaa not posted in the Rockland County 10C. A map of congregat' care centers in Sergen. County sha 14 be pested in the Rockland County 10C' (Section 2.5.16 p. 37). II. Reckland County officials and personnel N.I.b I C did not participate in the ladian Fstat euerstee of March 9 1983. Rockland County sheund participate fu117 in the next emertare of radiological energency response plane and preparedness for the Indian Point Nuclear Fewer Station (Section 2.1s p. 36).

12. toergency staf f would benefit f ree more A.I.b I

C fea111erity with the resposee prece-dures (Section IV. 48 p. 41).

13. More effective management of the EDC is A.1.d 1

C aseded to ensure eff&stant operatten. (Section tr. ai p. 41). 14 Addittenal eensideration eheuld be A.1.e I C 1 Steen to staffing of cetttest posittene j by bassop pereennel (Section 17. 48 p. 41). ?

-~i-o., an 8 e 152 TABLE 4.3.1 (Cont'd) !!27/S5 20CKLAlf0 COUlrT1 Def tetenew identtf ted NunLC-0614 FEMA-REP-1 tserstee Defitteney and llecomunaded Rev. 1 Esercise toercise 8/24-4/2$ Ese rcise present me. Corrective Acties Reference 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/28/84 status *

15. There wee tasuff tetent statt ovatiable A.I.e E

for 41seting and esb111 sing emergency' personant and a 24=tse capability for meet functione vee not doesnocrated. These have not been addressed (Section. 11 A s p. 40 ).

16. The dettee of the teckland Ceuety C.2.e 1

C representative at the 20F should be aere stearly defined (Secties IV. 63 p &S). l . ere ef f ective methods are needed for E.2 1 C 17. intstal call-eve to energency personnet (Sectica IV. 6: p. 61).

18. Criteria should be developed in con =

E.S E C junction with the state and other E.6 asunties to detersane what types of informatten will be broadcast over Els and what type v111 be issued in news releases (Section IV 63 p. 61).

19. Substantial taprovement te needed is F.I.h E

C equipeens and pts..eeures for esternal comun tsat t en. The RECS Line systes meeds to b6 ande este rettable. Staff C support is needed to retteve prLnetp41s f rom telephoning tasks (Jettin IV. og

p. 60 ).

20. A ptocedure la needed for keeptag the F.1 4 I

C 3 ope ratione*voos staff better ina f orse d. It is essdested that the operd atten led be updated frequently and streulated to provide a phrenological record of activities (Sectten IV en p. 40 ).

21. Sueer teatret methode need to be C.6.s 3

C strengthened (Seatten IV. 63 p. 62). l

12. Consideration shoute be given to sList*

R.3 1 C ting eere space to the ettident assessa sens reos (Seesten tit. 48 p. 40). EDOWTT RADietectCAL Fitta pes 1TotIlec

23. An terreved eenen nteattees eveses to C.2.a x

2 C needed to support assessment activities and tieste use of field data (lettien IV. *

p..e and Settian 2.4.63 p. 21).

24 Addittenal training of field monstering 3.3 g C teams wav.J be beneftalat to' tatrease 1.9 thett fatt1(artty with equipment and precedures. Responettilittes f at field j raJtatadine sessureeents eheutd be ( tieerly defined (Sestten IV. 44 p. 45). 1 i

== = 1 l

,; (; .1'+* .a .m ~ s 4. a 4 8 1 4 ~ 153 l l 'N I 1 TABL1 4.S.1 (Cent'd) 2/27/8) ROCKLAND CDUTM Def tetenew ident tf ted NUREC-0654 FEMA-REP-1 Ese retse i Dettetency and Recensended Rev. I. Emeretse Esercise 8/24-8/25 Esercise Nesent j No. Corrective Action taference J/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/28/84 Statue

• t

25. Silver see11:e filters should be uset 1.9 E

c la the att saepting equipment that is j used for esasuring radiotodine. I N0fts Charcoat (11ters say be used I during drills and esercises. but the 1 ettver soollte fliters suet be in the inst rument kits ready for use in se 4 actual energency (Section IV. 48 p. 44). 1 EMEactNCY vosEEE RA010tActcAL EEFosatt CIurnof.

26. The paches of esposure control mate-J.10.e 1

1 rials issued to one bue driver usa aiestas K1. Sus dispatchers should be trained to ensure that El tablets are issued to all drivers be f ore they are deployed to their field aestgesents (Section 4.3.31 8).

27. Two bus drivers and cw police unis J.10.e 1

1 1 that staffed a scaffic control point were unfaa111st with the use of K1. All energency workers should be fully trained in radtologtcal esposure teatret. including the esa of K1 (Sectten 4.5.81 p. 45, section 3.2.6s

a. rad Sectten 4.8.34 9).

28. The bus dispatcher at one transports-E.3.e X

ties compaev had difficulty using the l destaeter charger 19 sero docteaters before Leeutag thee to detwor(s) and was concorre$ that sose of the desta asters veutJ not stay screed.

Also, one bus driver and one petice uait that staffed a treffts contral point did not understand what readings on shete d istseter would mean.

411 ene'sency workers should be fatty trained in radtaleginal espesure control taciuding j the use et desteeters (eettion 6.S.S.

p. s1 Secttan 3.2.61

e. and section 6.3. 3; f).

29. lue drivers and petice units staf fing E.6 1

1 tesific control potats did not under-stand that ther should settfy their supervisor vsen their doetseter reached it and that peru ssten to enceed a eundative dose of 31 would require permise sen free their superviser as i aut%ertsee bv the County Department of j nes1th as set forth in the tocansad 3 Caunty Plan. Addittenal trotning is -] ) needed ta the procedure emergency workers are to follow ta requeetteg aut%ortsstion to etceed Protective j acetan cutd itsee (section 6.3.31 to). 1 1 I l l e4 %e.== 1

s. o. .9-8 154 C TABLE 4.3.1 (Cont'd) 20CK1MO t'001rn 2/27/83 Deftetecew identified NURIC-0454 FEMA *REF*1 Esercise Defielenty and teceanended Rev. 1 Esertise Eserstae 5/26-8/25 Eseresse present No. Corrective Actice Reference 3/3/81 3/9/83 $3 11/28/86 Status"

30. pereensat-record desteeters and self-E.3.e E

E g reedtag pocket dos teste rs were not eve 11able La suf fletent nuet>ers for all emergency workers. Seth. permement= record destosters and self-reading pocket des testate cheuld be precured for distributten to all, energency workers (Seatten IV. 43 p. 44 and a section 4.5.83 p. 45). Ftt1A IMPLEMENTATION 0F CDONTT ACT10AS 10 ptDTECT TER PUBLIC

31. Net all buses used for evacuattee were E.1 E

E E E 1 squipped vsth radies. Each Rockland 8.2 County transportation toepany with an energency reopense elasten should acquire equipment to potest radte cossuascations with its vehicles and with the transit geerdlagter le the ROC. Sus-to-dispatcher esseunicattene continue to be a prettee f or sees bus companies f$ection IV. 43 p. 45 Section 4.S.7

p. 43. Sectten 3.2.5; b erd Section 2.3.43 18).

32. The tone alert radte f atted to operate E.5 K

I at one scheel where scheel of fletata E.6 did not know how the unit shes td be set up and installed for e eratten. All v tone alert receivers that have been issued to scheels and other taatter-tiens should be checked to ensure that they are ptsperly instatted and evers. Stenally tested pertedically (Sectten 2.S.44 13).

33. Local petite wees delayed le scriving t.6 8

1 et the field lecetten for becamp route alerting of the populatten and int-41s117 demonentsted thte activity $n I the wrong ares. Local organteettena l with tasaup reuse alerting respons1= bt!Lttes shevid be fea111artaed with j the etten aree espe and tratned to templete this fumetten le a eteely i esaner (i.e., within 45 minutes of the tattial notificatten). Standard operating precedures are recommended (section 2.S.at it). l l l l O __._m.____.-

4 L. .4 r I 4 155 4 9 i s TA8LE 4.$.1 (Cont'd) h0CKLAND COUNTY 1/27/85 Defteteaev identtfted NUREC-0654 FEMA-LEP-1 Entretse Deficiency and Recommended Rev. 4 Eueretse Exterise 8/24-6/25 Eseresse present No. Corrective Aeston Seference 3/3/82 3/9/d3 83 11/28/46 Status' 34 Some problaas were espertenced in F.I.d I '1 malatatning mobile radte communicattens Flth buSee due to distance free the base statten. topography, electrical interference etc. The ette rnat e i anched of ca municattee for both non* i radio sgulpcod and radie equipped 3 ochteles whge supertenced ope rat tenal problems was effectively desenetrated by telephone. Ceemunicastens needs for transportation compantes are under ravlev as part et the Rockland County evacuatten study effort abat is cut-rently being pe rf ormed by the frans-portation $sudy Planetag Group (TS pC). Therefore, the communication seeds for each Reckland County trane* Portation company with an smargency reopense miesten remains unresolved untti the TSPG study la coepleted. The study should give specific recommenda-tiene retarding these connuntcation needs. The coepletion date for this study e%sutd be provided to FEMA (Seesten 2.S.4; 19).

35. Although a LACT 3 redte operator was F.1.d 1

1 g swallable at the reception center. It use not possible ce demonstrate eennunteatten capattlistes at this e*eresse. stace the reeratten cent e r was set up after the LOC had been deactivated and otner acttittles had been completed. A ft:ure ererstae l eheuld includs the demonstratten of i connueicatteds sepabilities to keep l I recepties center director (s) lafersed of esertise events (e.g.. rsJiation estesees. evacuesten recessendattoes. ett.) as they occur (Section 2.5.48 21). )

34. Sus drivers were not faattlar with the J.10.e J

specific lacetten of the reception 1 1 j tenter where they were to take scheel i evacuees. % ape eheutd be developed l. eheving the locastee(s) of recepsten ) centers to which schools are ees trned. These ma,e eheuts be maintained at the bue garates for distributee to drivers in the event a school evacusttee beteses necessarf (Sectice 2.S.4; 14). I 1 s- - - - - - - = =. - =. - 4 .2

o e 156 c TA3LS 4.3.1 (Cent'd) toCE1.AND CotrtY Z/27/s5 Def t eteae, t4.at t t ted IftItZC-063 6 FDtA-tKP*l Esercise Deficiency and teceemanded Rev. t. Exercise taeretse 4/24-4/23 gaercise Present No. Corrective Action taference 3/3/82 3/9/83 43 11/18/84 status

• 37 Tve bus eescuattes routes were dedified J.10.e I

1 by drtvetro en the day of the esercise te oveld railroad creceings which potentially could cause delays. The bus evacuatten route este should be reviewed and revised with teput free the drivers to ensure that the aest efficient routing is used (Secties 2.S.6; if).

34. The transportattee compeer for demon-J.10.4 E

1 strating the atentated evacuatten of nee-institutt ne11:ed men tit y-tapa t ted persons is spee only twelve (12) hours per day Monday throg h Friday and eight (8) hours se Saturday. The precedures a for nettfytag all coepantes with respenstM11ttes for transporting men-instituttenaltaed sett11ty-tapatted tea dividuals should be reviewed. and { revised if required, to ensure that these compantes can be nettfled and resources mett112ed on a 26-hour taats ($ection 2.$.43 20).

39. 1st sti scheel efficials have been J.10.g E

1 ( trained er received guidance 6a radiolegleal emergency planning for scheels and some of ficials are uuware of a distinetten between the early disalssal of saucents to go home and the evac 4atten of students to e recapsten cancer. Trainteg should te given to aere thaw one of ficial f ree each of the scheels etch the 10-sA la LP1 to f analterise thee with ef f-s tte radiological eeergency planntag in Rocktsad County and the interretasten-shts af t%s tackland County Plan vttnin ontvetag seseet ene rgens, pts,s. Therg to a need for further evaluetten of the leve l of preparedness of schools and staff in Recs 1 sad County ($eceton 2.5.s; 1:1.

40. 0*e bus driver had difficulty following J.10.g E

1 the reste map provided to his. which required re-running 6 portien of the route. This was due to the driver's unfamiliarity with the toute and a misstag street sign. All tue toutes should be test *run by drivers and landsares noted where street signe att etsstag (SectLas 2.3.4; 13 ).

+ e ~ e e 157 \\ TASLE 4.5.1 (Cont'd) - 2/21/8S ROCKLA.10 COUNTT Def tetene s tdent tried 18U11C-06$4 Eseretae FEMA-11P*! 9eftetency and Recommend *d Rev. l. Esercise Eseretse S/26-8/25 taeresse present Referenes 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/23/4a Status

• Wo.

Corrective Action g g &l. Not all too tand County bue drivers at J.10.g. each bus company have received tratatng All in driving evacuation bus routes. Reckland County bus ' drivers should be trained to be obte te sospiste evacue-A testates schedule ties bus routes. should be furnished to ftMA (Section 2.5.41 16). C 42. Future esercises should include more 1.9 E R entensive parettica:Lon by police. eheriff, fire, and ambulance ser* vices. Training needs in these areas should be identtited (Section IV. 41 p. 47 and Section 2.5.21 p. 38). C I

63. Due to the abeence of detatted evacua-J.10.g tion plans and procedures for Kockland County in the state coepensectag essaures plan (dated March. 1983). the capattttty ' to taptement actions to protect the public could not be i

seasured against e, plan. Detailed evacuation plans and procedores should be developed and tacorporated within the plans t$ection 2.3.7 8 p. 43). g I 44 The ef festiveness of the initial pubite E.6 2 nettitcatten system needs to be tested to decirsine whether the stree systes will be suffletent or uhether a backup nottftcattua syetes to needed (laction IV, et p. 62). U

65. On-the-jsb training would make proce-J.12 1

fures iLow more smoothly at the congre-gate care centers (Sectin IV. 41 p. 46). pCSL1C ANA11NFJS 46. The annual pub 1'i education brochure G.! 2 C j has not been distributed La Rockland County. publication and distribution of the pubits educatten brochure for Reckland County should be empedited (Section 2.5.54 p. A1). ~*~ * - - - - = = - - - -. -.. .M M9 m

L. ~ 158 ( TAat.E 4.S.1 (Cont'd) soCKLAND Cot'NTT 2/27/IS Deft'lene, identifted e NU113-04$4 FEMA-REF-4 tuercise Defistency and Rosessended new. 1.. Emeretse tiereise 8/24-8/23 taercise Fresent se. Cortsettre action Referesse 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/18/84 statue

• 47 Cf the 11etted eueber of residente of 8.1 1,

1 3 1 the LO-elle EF3 questioned by federal J.10.a eteerwere, sely atest half eeu14 resa11 havtag resetved the public teformaties brochure. understeed its coetente, or were aware of the escalag of the ettene. Additteaal public educattee is needed so that the pue11e util mader-stand the 1ecettene of the areas that are to take protective settene, will knew how to carry out the protective estions. and v111 he aware of what the strene mean (Seatten IV. As p. 43 Secties 3.2.48 a. and Seettee 2.3.34 22).

44. There wee se evidence of signe er C.2 X

X U settaes pested in hetste and estela within. the 10-e11e pluso espesure pathway 871 to provide helpf ul emer-gency taferset tee to transient pecula-tien. As seen as possible. the neces-eary puelle taformatten esteris ta should be poeted in hetets and estate to infers transient populattens who ser sees inte the 10 n11e pluso espesure C. pathway 1F1 in Reekland County ($ectise 2.3.34 p. 41 and Section 3.2.41 p. 40). 49. The pullte edudstlen progree shev14 be - C.2 I E 1 C rewtewed to detentne whether efforte are needed to leprove Les effee:Lvenese (Seesten IV. At p.

42. Section 2.1.5; J

p. 40 and lesttee 3.2.4; e).

$0. Addittenal petite educatten la needed 0.1 1 0 I no Ost the public wt11 understand the J.10.4 toundattes of the areas that are to take protettive settene. and kaev how ) to carrv eut the protective actions (Sectise IV. 41 p. 43). 'st;t2C-Oe54. ftMA. E1F-l. Rev. I. Cetteria for Preparatten and Evaluatten 6f Radtelegteal taergency aesponse Flene and Preparedness to Support af Nustear Fever Flaats. Part 11. b tenedtal action seeplete C 1 temedial setten inceeplete. Of This defisteasy identified durles prewteve eseretee(s) tedicated. Present statue eeu14 not be determined because recedtal attian forse were not templeted at the 11/24/84 esercise and/or corretties of the dettstency could nse ha 1 stated f ree previews escretee(s). I l i L ... ~., i I i o t '

e 8 159 \\ TA8tt 4.$.2 Svenary of Deficiencies and Recommendattens to Resady Deficiencies in Of f-Site Radiological toergency Response preparedness observed at the August 24*23, 1983 teoretse of the New Terk State Inter 13 Plan for 1splementing Ceepensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Muclear Generating itattra 2/27/83 Def teteaev tdenttf ted NUREC-0434 FEMA-REFat Eserstee Defittency sad recommended Rev. 4 Esercise tuerstae 8/26-9/23 1sarcise Preseng No. Corrective Action Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/83 $3 11/28/84 $tatus 1. New York State dLJ not taptement its A.1.b 1 C compensating measures in a menner conetstent with its plan et prece-dures. New York State thould improve its capab(11ty to implement ter pensating essau,ree in light of the een* participation by Reckland County eser-gency response personnel at the March

9. 1983. esarrise (Section 2.5

p. 36).

2. Mape showtag the location of congregate J.10.a 1 C care centere in Setten County. New Jersev. were not posted in the Reckland County 20C. A map of congregate care l centers in Sergen County eneuld be posted in the Rockland County EOC (secstan 2 5.1

p. 3 7 ).

3. Cassunicattene systems between the 80Ce F.I.b 1 1 I in Rec'< tand Couaty and largen County. New Jersee, need taprovement. Another communications link between the Ross. 14ad County and Bergen County 10Cs is destrable (Sectten 2.5.1 p~ 37). 6 N3tther the status board nor the F.1.3 1 I \\ display of weathet condittena is the Armory to Orangeners were updated dwring the esercise. Seth should be kept surrest tset:Aen 5.2.!: b ). 5. Security at the Armory in Orangenets NR 1 i could be 1streved by esattening sverds et sna factitty (sectinn 3.2.ls c). l 6. thartas the three hears that the Bergen F.I.a 1 1 County (DC vse obsened, only two F.1.b eassages were rete n ved f ree the Nf /RC ECC. T*e current emergency riassifice-tien levet was not provided to the Sergen County 10C during the intetal nestitcatten telephone catt from the NT/RC (OC. The XYfRC EOC cheute keep the Bergen Cownty 10C better safersed as to the status of the tecident (Section 3.2.18 d). i 7 No entft change occurred on the RICS A.4 I 1 l Line in the WT'RC ECC. 4 antit thence of ceansnicattens ope raters on the RECS Itne should be demonstrated (Sectten 3.2.2 sh I i j u I

n e I e 160 l l l TA8LE 4.5.2 (Cent'd) { STATE COMPENSATING PEA $U215 FOR ROCELAND COUNTT 2/27/85 l i Deftelency tdenttfted NU21C-0634 FEMA-EEP-1 Emeratae Defisteney and Reconeended Rev. 1 Esercise Esertise 8/24-4/13 tsaretse treeeng No. Cetressive Acatee Referesse* 3/3/82 3/9/83 83 11/18/84 5tatus l 8. Staffing of the County Weening Petet A.S.e E C l end receipt of the lettial setittention J seutd set be eteerved et the FT/AC EOC because the federet observer wee net parattted access to the eewaty peitte assunsefestions are s. These obse rve-i tiene should be permitted duties future l esertises (Section 3.1.24 b). j 9. The New York State eesponsating A.S.a E I messares for Seekland County should ta= elude previsione enabitag the Amettesa 2ed Crees and the Sergen County. New Jersey.10C to coordinate thets activt-l time with New Jereer law enforcement egencies reopensible for traff14 centret.

10. The corrent emergency claselittattee 0.3 E

1 lavet see set updated on the status i board at the Ateery la Otanteburg. 1 This Laf64eation should be posted and l updated to a timely meaner (Setstoa 1 2.3.31 a). (

11. E f f ort s should' be made to estertale C.1 E

I E U whether a significant number of people J.10.a i 414 not receive the posentets. If not. additional distftbut ton should be made ] (Seatten 3.2.43 b).

12. The eccess of media representatives to C.3.s E

1 the Arsery in Orangeburg needs to be C. 4. 6 better centrotted. Media representa-tives should to directed to the jetna media center for the scoutststen of l tafarsatten free designated spokes-persons (54stion 3.1.48 e l.

13. Only a few techtsed County bus drivets J.10.g 1

1 at each bus coepony have received i training to drivtag evacuation bue I routes and La energency worset radte* j protective measures. Addittenal teck" l Land County bus ettvets searald be l tratned te driving sweewation bue restee and la emergency weeter taste - protective asasures (Section 3.2.51 a). 14 Emergency desvete es evacuattee routee J.10.g E C l fet nobitat e-tsest re d tes tdents shoute be gives more tratelag to the esecuttee of these toutes (Sectten 3.1.31 c). l l N N *8B

• epee. D '-US esem une d et a some gas meme e euume man

-m _______________-----_J

e 9 e 161 \\ TABLE 4.I.2 (Cont'd) $ TATE COMf!MSATIMO MEA 5C125 FOR ROCXLAND COUNTT 2/27/85 Defteteaev identifted Net.EG-0634 FENA-11P-1 tseratse Deficiency and Recosmonded Rev. 1 tuarstae tuercise 8/24-8/23 tiercise Preseng me. Corrective Action Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/43 83 11/18/44 status

15. The trateing received by the utility J.10.4 1

1 veluateers and the estulance drivers L.4 appears to be inconsistent with respect l to the destination of the sabulance l following dettvery of the patient to the heepital. The inconsistency should be resolved (Sectios 3.2.54 d).

16. At the Rockland County pubite reception J.12 1

C center, energency workers were unsure whether ventcles were to drop passen-gets off before er after vehicle decon-tastnation. Addtstonal training to the proper procedures fr>r processing people arriving at the reception center in vehtetes to recommended (Section 3 2.5 e ).

17. Sus drivers and dispatchers were una J.10.e I

1 tratned in esposure contret prece-C. 3. a dures. Att meergency workers shoutJ be E.3.b fu117 trained in radiological espesure control procedures. taciuding the use et destseters and at (Seetton 3.2.6; a ).

18. Addtttenal training is needed in the E.4 1

1 g procedere energency verkers are to follow in requesting authorization to esceed P40s (Section 3.2.61 4).

19. The traffic flow pattern outside the E.$.b I

C receptten center required people te vath in areas traversed h potentially con t an ha t ed vehtetes. It she%1d be detarstned whether the outside testite pattern can be chanted to avoid tt.e pesetM itty of craes7 e*.tastnation (Secstan 3.2 6; c).

• R1J N 45.

71'tA. 117-1. Rev. 1. Critetta for Preparattom and Evaleasion of Radiottgical Energency Aespense Plate and preparedness in Support of Euclear Power Plante. Part II. 54: Me Ml11C-0654 reference. I Ree.dtat action soaplete. C 13 tenedial action tacesplete. s

y .a s a, - i 162 1 TA8LE 4.6 Susumery of Deficiencies and itseeemendattens to Remedy Deficionales in Of f*$1te tediological teertney te,,, nee Pftpatedness at Emersisee for the Indiae Point Nuclear Cenefating Stattent Orange County 2/27/83 Deficiency NUREC-0454 tdentified P3MA-41P-1 Delistency and Re.esmonded Rev. 1 Emettise Eseectee Exercise Preseng s no. Corressive netten Reference

• 3/3/82 3/1/83 11/28/84 Statua anacENCT ersaartoeg 43rrER I.

Aetivities of the field tease were met F.1.4 I 1 well eseretaated free the ROC. The tintas of field estivities. recording of data and deterstaattee of tedine sencontrations were set well seesuted. More teststag should be provided for the 50C dose assessment etaff respea-etnis for esordinating field amettertog tesen including training in criteria far establishing priesstles. inter = preting air sample data, receumandieg appropriate preteettre actions beoed en FACs. vede rstanding efitical scale of release rates and see of a field los and esp to record data ($essies 2.6.1; 1). 2. Sees Grange County news releases were 0.4.h 1 P/C tesued late and sectained taascura-stes. The tiastinese and accuracy of Orange County eews releases should be tapteved (sectise 2.6.38 p. 43), 3. Prerade eere esserehenette tratains for A.4 E C key backup poteennel (Saatten IV. 3; p. 0.4 50 ). 4 ECC workere should be faa111stised wLth N/R I C dispiare ($ection IV. Si p. 49). 3. Energency wortere in the 20C should be E.S 1 C kept better informed of the inf arset ten betas released to the public (section IV. 18 p. 52). 6. Critetta should be developed te sew-E.5 E C juncaten with the state and other c anstee te determine what type of taler 1hatten will be attad evet 133 and what type will be leeued is neve teleases (Settlee *.V. $4 p. 31). i 7 AldLttenet telephone itsee et equive-F.4.b E C ] { tent systems should be provided in the 10C to eeeva as an additional backve for dedicated phones (Sectten IV. Sa p. 69). i l I u______.__._.______

e ..e. t. o e o 6-163 TA3LE 4,6 (Cont'd) ORA.4C1 COUNTT 2/2I/81 Def tetency WUREG-0654 tdentt fled FEMA *t1F-t Deftetency and Recommended Rev. 1 Esercise-Esercise taeretse Present No. Corrective Action Refer?nce* 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/24/84 Status' 8. The Orange' County 20C should make t he F.I.b 'I C Esecutive het1&ne operational to f acit=' state t he information flow between comettee (Section IV8 p. 49). 9. Provide additional training and. F.1.dl I C resources for communication with field 1 oopport pe rsonnel (Section IV. $5 p. 30).

10. The plan for Internal communications F.1.4 X.

C-and disseatnation of informattoa within M.2 the 20C shtald be improved to increase efficiency and coordination. Radto* togical field monitoring data should be transaatted directly into the accident assessment room (Section 1Y. $3 p. 49). it. The divided floor plan within the 20C F.I.4 X C requires that effective communicat ten flow and procedures be estaD11shed to ensure efficient management (Section 17 la p. 51).

12. Press briefings should be announced in C.k.b 1

C edvance se that F10s can attend (Section IV. Si p.12). I s. is. erecedures<.hou te b. revie.ed fe, C..c e s i identifying rsmors and for dealing with i thes (Section tv. Si p. 52). 14. 1eportant recovery and reent ry pro-n.1 2 C Sedures should be effectively demon = strated to ensure capabilities and to provide tretning ($ action IV. 3; p. 55).

15. teprovetent to the esercise espertence 3.1.a I

C could be gained by having activities desighed to thoroughly test teams with co' soles duties (such as field monitor = tag teams) untie ministstag activities that are routise far einer participants (Section IV. 5. p. S S). l 8 b I l l

164 ( TA4LE 4.6 (Cent'd) ORA.T;t CDtnrrt 2/27/85 Deficiency NtfREC-0654 toentified PEMA ASP-1 Deftalency and Receamended Rev. l. Esercise Esercise tuercise Preseng No. Corrective Aattee Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/18/84 Status

16. Establish a eshedule for aidttional N.2 1

N/0bj(83) drilla te order to esvale, note E/0Dj(O') familiarity and efficiency vich precedures and recources (Seat tee IV. S e p. 50 ). CDCwff RAD 10LDCICAL PTELA NWrITUSDG

17. Pield tease should desenstrate 1.5 1

C familiarity with instruments having reopense ranges that alght be needed ductas an actual event (section 17 la

p. 33 ).

18. Sitest seettre filters should be used 1.9 1

C la the att sampling equipment that to used for seasuring radiotodine. Motta Charcoal filtere may be used during dritts and emerttees but the ettver seelite (11 tees met be la the instrua ment kits reedy for use in an actual emergency (Section IV. Si p. 33).

19. Means for obtaintes proept and accurate 1.9 E

C field esseurements of radiotodine ( should be specif Led to preetde guidance en protective aatten dectatens (Seettee IV. 5

p. 54 ).

EMttCENCT WQtEEE SAD 10ttJG1 CAL EXP01tTt3 CONTEDL

20. The bus drivet for the avecuattan J.80.e 1

1 route. the energency worker who staffed one TCP and the acergency worker who perf arned teste alerting did not have Lt. El should be included in radie* 1ssical meergency hits (Section 2.6.3; 4 ).

31. The energerty worsar et one TCP and the K.3.a 1

1 emergency worser who performed route ale rt1*f. did not have any desteesty. Perg.nent teeerd desheeters (e.g. file bad g es. T*J s ) enould be provided to all emerdancy workers (sectten 2.6.33 3).

'l ) . 1. , +. i a 4 a 165 I TABLE 4.6 (Cont'd) t ORANCE COUNTT 2/27/65 i 1 d Deficioney WUEEC-0654' tienetfted FEMA-REF-1 Deficiency and Raceemended Rev. 1 - Emerstee - Esercise Emeratae - Preseng Be. Corrective Aetten Re f e rence* 3/3/82 3/9/43 11/28/64 Status -) + \\

22. Acserding to a representative f ree 'a E.3.b 1

1 bue ceseany which is responettle for i evacuattee. eely 401 ef that seeeany's j drivers have retelved training la esdiolosteal espesere sentrol measures. Should more drivers be needed in an actuti emergency, espessee concret could est be effectively managed. All energency respeese personnet should be fully tratned in radiological espesure. control procea dures. A training echedule and the number of Ladtviduals trained should be provided to FEMA (Session 2.6.38 2).

23. Several emergency ~ workers were not E.4 X

1 overe of the precedures for receiving a radiation espesure in escess of FAGS. Personnet should be trained se that thov know which individual (e.g., the Count y Esecutive) saa approve emergency workers receiving a radiation espesure la escese of the PAGa ($ection 2.6.3; 5 ). l 24 At the PMC. vehicle monit oring was E.5.b 1 I i incomelete. The att close+t and inside of the swhicle were not checked ter contamination. Additional training aheutd be provided la decentastaa:Len procedures to energency workere at the PMC. A training eckedule should be provided to rtMA (Section 2.6.3; b).

15. The shortif's personnel who are J.10.e.

I P/C tesponettle for traff14 control were E.3.6 l oot aware of t he proceourre for espesure sentret and did not have Et er e doetseter. All energency verkers chseld be fully trained in radiological espovers teseret instuding the vem of desineters and 11 ($4etten 2.6.8, p. SI). i 26, Fernanent=retardins devleet (e.g. TLDs E.3.a I F/C or filt bad.t es ) steeld be considered f er eeergency wer'sers (lettles IT. 5;

p. 54).

!?. Disposal me t hods for tentsetssted E.S.b I C materials should be developed (Seatten

17. 54 p. Sa).

.e L-_____

4 0 166 TA3LE 4.6 (Cent'd) ORM CI COUlrTY 2/27/85 Defittency ifURIC+0434 Tdentified FEMA *REFat De f tstency and stecemoended Rev. 4.a Eseretee Ezerttee Emerttee Present se. Corrective Actise deference gjgfgg gf97gg gggggjg4 gggg,,o FIELD IMPLEMENTA210N OF GMnfff ACT10e3 ' 10 ftDTECT TEE FUBLIC

28. The bus driver reopenalble for driving J.10.a 1

I se evacuattee route wee provided with a reste map with interrect informatten. Sua drivers roeponettle for drittes evacuatten routes should be provided with correct espe and a desertpttee of each route (Secties 2.4.43 7 ).

29. Freetstene for care of the handlespped J.lo.d X

E E at the reception center are inade* quate. Provistens for care of the handicapped shaeld be considered at the reception cent. irs (sectten IV. Sa p. 54 sectten 2.4.14

p. 30. and sectten 2.6.43 9).

i

30. rersen.1.nitetta, at the rece, ties J.12 1

.e.ter wee not therewint.et all med, parts were menttered. le addition. evacuees vers eene&dered *aleas' if their vehtetes were *atess.* Hence sentsetnoted individuate could C pote9tta11y be siectassifted as not contaminated. Addittenet training to needed for the recepeten center personnet who de radistten surveying and decontaetnatten. A tratatng echedute should be provided to FTMA (Section 2.6.44 8 ).

31. Here estensive back6p systess should be E.6 1

C constJerad for tecations where otrone f all to funciten er vnere they try to taeudtDie to these tadeers. Use of bullhirne er toute alerting sherald be sensidered (Secttee IV. $s p. SL).

32. Addittenal trataing te needed at 1scel L.I E

N/Obe($3) keepitals on radiattaa monitoring N/Obs(34) (Sectise IV. 31 F. $4). L

i. 4 1... 2-f N e 167 \\ TA8LE 4.6 (Cent'd) 2/2F/83 / OEMCC CovirrY l l DefSciency i NU11G-0654 1de m tfie4 j FEMA *t2P-L Deficioney and Receemended Rev. t. Esertise Esercise Eseratse Preseng Be. Carrective action Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/83

!!/18184 Status J 1 FWBLIC AMAAENESS [

33. Addittenet pubite educatten to needed -

C.L. 1 C ee that the putLtc wtL1 understand the J.10.e locastene of the arose that are to take protective actione and will know how to carry out the protective acttene (Section tv. Si p. SI). 1

• NURIG-0634. FEMA REP-1. Rev. 1. Criteria for Preparatten and Evaluatten of 1ad101031441 Seertency Response F1ans and Preparedness to Seppert of Nuclear Power Plants. Fort II.

NR No NURIG 44$4 refetence. i 1: Remedial aatten incomplete. bCa Remedial s'etion complete. F/Cs Deficiency covers are than one function and/or area. A pertlon(s) of the deficiency has been corrected. The uncorrected persion(s) la Lacluded on the chart as a separate dettaiency. 3/Ols(53): Net eteerved during the 1983 eseretae. j 5/06](83): Net an enjective of the 1983 esercise. 3/obs(84): Not eteerved during the L954 esercise. N/Qtj(44 )1 Not an enjective of the 1984 esercise. 1 1 i l 8 b ++ mm e - a

ae

.. = = 4

' i ~, -- , ?;4 - cA, o d 168 e.. TA31,1 4. 7 fuesnary of Defittencies and Rosessendastens to teendy Defittenstee La Of f-$tte RadLototical Eeergency teopense Preparedness at Isarcises for the Indias Feint Nucleal Generating Stattent Futnam County s i 2/27/83 s' Defittency FJREC-045A identifted l FEMA +REFa t j Defisteuy and Recomended Rev. 1.a Eserstae taeretse Emerstse Preseng j No. Corrective Action Ref e rence 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/84 Status + StaastnCT Orttaf1088 CarrtR 1. Internal seensaicattene la the 50C need F.1.d E 1 to be taproved by (1) developing and ettttstag standard procedures f or esta-tatning eseeage lege and distributtag messagees (2) updattsg the status board eere frequentlys and (3) heading este frequent and more toeprehenetve staff brieftage (section 2.7.18 !). 2. Although fle &d data were effectively F.1.d E C t,ana.itted buh to a e De. nu es..r, j intersatten updates were not teseo* I mitted to the field monitoring teses. leformatten anchange betweee the EOC sad f t:L4 aonitettag tsaans needs to be ~ improved se that field tease are kept 1aformed of emergeur escalation and esteorotegical data (Su tten 2.7.63 p. 36). 3. Alte rnaces for the CD ttrester and A.4 E C RADtf Of ficer should la trained as seen as possible (Seatten If. 68 p. $8). 4. An emergency power generater should be A.4 1 C eenottered for use during a power F.1.4 fatture (Section IV. 63 p. $8). Ctteerta should be devoteped la coa-1.3 I C juretten with the state sad egnet sovattes to determine what type of tafwesatten v111 he atted ever Eli and what type witi be leaved te aaws retaases ($ection IV. 63 p. 60). 6. The Orsage County MC shouti be added F.1 4 1 C to the %et-Etne network es that all of the counsw CX4 can res411y ceasuntcate with each other. e.g., Putnas with Granse (Settlan IV. 6

p. 17 ).

7. Procedures for transettting astee-F.1.e. I C telastaat dets, plant estostena data. 1.8 and data attained by the attitty field sonstartag teses free the utility sad ECF to the E3C ensutd be reviewed and strengthened (Sectise !Y. 6; p. $8). e p m e e e m 1

..a. - . s., L ~ ..,.<ac

== le l . 4 j 9 I 169 l \\ TA3LE 6.7 (Cont'd) FUTNAM COUitTY 2/27/45 Deficiency m112C-0636 ' identified FLMA-11P-1 1 Deficiency and Recommended Rev. 1 Esotatae taercise tseretse Preseng ,f se. Corrective Action Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/28/86 Status 4

8. Procedures should b devolered foe' O.6.c I C j identify 1eg rumors and for dealing with T thes (Sectise IV. 68 p. 62). l 9. The arrangement of tables and the R.3 E C locattens for each emergency werker Le the IOC should be reviewed to minielse the ef fects of the ses11 space on the l eperstless (Section IV. 63 p. 37). 10. Proceduces for. escurity should be E.3 E C reviewed (section IV, 6: p. 57). Lt. All enjer press briefinge eheutd be C.6.a I C announced in advance so that Plos can attend (Seesten IV 63 p. 62).

12. Future esercises scenaries should pre

• M.!

I C wide more time for a detailed recovery activity (Section IV 6; p. 66). CDONTT RAD 101ACICAL F181A nowifet.tNG e

13. Althowth field teams demonstrated 1.7 E

C capsettity and recevrees for field coatter113 within the 10-e,ile plues espesure pathway EPI. they were not coepletely f aalliar with the procedures l suttined in the procedure manual. Field teams need addttlanal trotsted consistest with proceduces euttined in the prose 4ure manual (Section 2.7.68 p. Se). 1.. Monttering tease should be diepstehet. M.6 I C to the field at the estitest peestble 1.8 time. se that they are is poettien to pravtJe data for an independent early as se ss ment of the energency (Settlee IV, es p. 58). 4 .m. .~ ~~ )

~. _ _ _ _ 4 t. .s - -s., it g e 170 TABLE 4.7 (Cent'd) FUTl TAM COUNTY 2/27/85 Det tetency NUREce0454 tdeactfted FEMA *REr*1 Defistensy and Receemended Rev. 1,s tseretee taarttee Esercise Present No. Corrective Acties Reference 3/3/81 3/9/83 11/28/84 States'

15. The emosee of eseples needed for es.

1.8 1 C

• .i ladopeedest early assessment, and the peestbie hindersaces to fast deployment of the Gele eseitoting tsaan ehemid bei, reviewed to ordet to seesee the possible need for addittenet field meettertag teses (Secties IV. es p.

63).

16. Precedures eheu14 he developed for 1.8 I

C eb;a19 tag the field data esseured by the ettlity's field esattertag tease (Section IV, 63 p. 63). 17 $11ver seelite filters should be used 1.9 E C te the sit saasting etutpasat that la used for esseuttag radtstadine. Charcoal filters may te used during drills and eseralses but the stiver seelite f11ter should be la the inattveset hits ready f or use la an actual emergency (Seatten IV. 43 p. 63).

18. The sequence of semple petets need 1.8 E

C (routes deteen by esatsering teses) ( should be sarefelly chosen to given the eastaus assent of data for use in asktng the eatly independent assessment (Section IV, 63 p. 63). EMERCENCT totEER 8401054CICAL EXFOSF88 CDefl0L

19. The energency verter at one TCP did not J.10.e 1

1 have K1. El should be included in endtelegical emergency kits (Settien 2.7.h 4).

10. Sus drivers at ese dispatch potat were J.*0.e 1

1 eneere of tio pro 4eders regarding the use of K1. All emergseev uortere rheald be fully tratand to radiotestral esNeare concret tacteding the use of E1 (sersten 2.7.3; 3). 9 SO --- -- emeno me + em me ee - eem as m. . mme. .. -mum S (. _____m_ ___m____.

2 . >. :. v s .s.,.. 8 171 i J \\ TA81.E 6.7 (Cant'd) 2/27/83 ] FUTNAM C0tlNTY Deficiency, m/EES-0656 tdentified PEMA-tEP-1 Rev. 1 Esercise Emerstas Esercise Preseng Defictancy and teenemended Eeference' 3/3/82 3/9/83 11/18/84 status No. Corrective Acsten 21. t. representative free a bue company

• E.3.a.

I 1 t which to reopensible for evacuation E.3.b indicated that bus drivere need more frequent training in using destestry. The eastgency worter at one TCP had not been recently trained to espesure sentrol precedures. All eastgency response personnet should be fatty trataed. in redtetetical contret procedures (Section 2.T.3% 2).

22. The emergency workers at one TCP did E.3.a I

I est have any doetsetry. permanent record desteaters (e.g.. file badges. Ttos) should be provided to emergency workers (Section 2.7.3% 3).

23. sue detwers and county pottes ef ficers J.lo.a.

E P/C I are not f as1LLar with procedures for E.3.b ee8 ding desteeters. reporting and recording doses, espesure threshold 14Mte and the use of El. All ener= gency response personnel shavid be, fully tratned in redtetogical espesure central precederee, tacluding the use of destasters and 11 ($ecties 2.?.8% p. 39).

26. Addit tedal training to needed se that E.S.a E

C personnel scattsrtng workers will be more fauttar with the action levets for desentastnation actions (Section tv. 68 p. 65).

23. Addlatonal training foi these ustkers E.S.b E

C performact esdlattes senttoring and decentsstaattea procedures is enceanensed 13ection 17, 6; p. p).

26. Permanent-recere des t ea te rs (e.g..

E.3.e 1 FJC TLDs. fLie badges) should be pteetded (Sectiets IV. 6; p. 65).

27. Procedures should be clartited se that E.6 K

C all persone el knee which todtvidust (e.g.. the County Eatcative) can approve energency werkers receiving a radistian,spesure La escoes of the PMs 15ecttee IV 61 p. 45). i l l l l 4 ao l ) 1 l

e .< + a - w; hs 4 .,m i e 0 172 I i TABLE 4.7 (Cont'd)- .2/27/85 q pvTNAM COUNTT Defittency NUstc<ieSA tdeneified 'J FEMA-REP"1. Def tstency and Rosemanded Rev. L. Smerstae Emerstee tsaretse Present me. Correctiva Aeties Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/81 L1/28/84 : Status *

28. Training to methode for desentanteetten

' LS.b. I C of equipment med supplies should be given te FMC workers (Secties 17. 68 p. 63). g. I

29. Methods for permement disposet of.

E.5.6 E. C sentaminated articles (e.s. 11tutda. elechteg) sheste he addressed (Section IV. 68 p. 65). l - FLELS BtPLaSNtar10A Of GISRT ACTIONS 10 PROTECT TER PUBLiC

30. Putnae eeunty transpertetten pereennel J.10.e.

X X t have not been adegestely.treteed J.10.g regarding eveeuesten precedures. the routes they should fettee to pick er eveeuses and the locasten of reception senters. - Sus detwere reopensible for eveeuettaa servisse should be trained regarding eveevetten - procedures and eupplied utth better espe and lastrue* tiene eeneerning the routes and the 1stettene of receptten contate (Section i 1 2.7.74 p. 37 and Seatten 2.7.43 7).

31. The bee used for eveesation vae not J.10.g X

X 1 equipped with a radte f or seeminice-tien. Each bue used for eveeustion eheutd be eestpped with a radte (Seattee 2.7.76 p. $7 and Section 1.7.61 el.

32. Reuse-stertiss meseeges and preceduees t,6 I

C shoeld be devoteced to sappiteens the J.10.e etten erstes. espectatir in these stese of law stren eevnd Level (Seesten IV. 63 p. 60). St. Tees measure = ente of sound level should t.6 1 C be made throug%eut the 10-eite EP1. J.10.e Modiftsettene and/or addittens eheeld then be made untti the erstee meets the nottf tsatten requirements (Setties IV. 6 3 p. 60 ). t' e 9 f 4 --_.-.-.._L--._-D_._

) - we. < . f. s. .s a 1 t o t 15 j l en 173 s TAALE 4.7 (Cont'd) PVTNAM COUNTY 2/27/11 ~ Deficiency NULEC-06 54 tdenttfted FEMA-REP-! Deficiency and Recommended Rev. 1.s Ezet eise taercise taeresse-Present No. Carrecttwo Action Reference 3fgfgg 3f9/83 !!/18/84 Status # 34 Procedsres for deallag with tapediments J.10.h I C En evacuaties need to be developed and esercised. These tapediasets include ante estidente, este treakdowns, severe-reed sendittene and the unevellattitty of sseellne when needed (Sectlee IV el

p. 64 ).

l Pom.1C Amansmiss

31. Intense efforts should be made te make C.1 E

C the puelle aware of the aesning of the stren signals (8sesion 1Y. 6 g p. 60).

36. A etspier alternative to the ELFA sone -

C.l. I C designations should be devaleped. or a J.10.4 very complete education 41 campaign that toaludes distribution of amps showing these areas should be conducted (Section IV. 64 p. 60). 37 Additional puttle education la needed C.1 K C se that the punits will understand the J.10.a locattans of the areas that are to take the protective actions and will snow gm how te carry out the protective acticaw (Section IV. 63 p. 61). aMgtEG-0654 rtMA. LIP I. pe,. 1. Cetteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radtelegical tsergemst Laspense F14es and Preparedness to Suppott of Nuclear Power Plants. Part 11. !!L: No IMLt90634 reference. l I: Rese4 tat action complete. C 1: Remedial action incoepiste. 3 t/C Deftstence covers more than one funetton and/or area. A pertion(s) of the defittentF P.44 been i corrested. The uncorrected pertian(s) to included on the chaet as a separate deftcLency. N/Gts($3): got eteerved during the 195) esertise. N 'O bj(8)lt 1st an enjective of the 1983 emeretse. Nicts($*): Not observed during the 1904 eserclae. i j N/0tj(84): Not en owjeestve of the 1984 esercise. 1 l .) I 1 s 4 l. ) l l m. .e 6

.e .e e e 174 TAALE 4.8 Sumary of Deficiencies and Reseamendatione to Remedy Deficiencies le of f-tite tadielestcal Emergency Aaepense Preparedness at Esercises for the Indlea Point Nuclear Generating Stations Dutchess County l 2/27/CS I l i feliciency i IRJ!tE3-06 $4 Tdentified l rem-Ru -i Deficiency and Receamended Rev. 1 taercise Exercise taercise Present us. Corrective Actice Reference

• 3/3/82 3/9/8J

!!/28/86 Status

• Te date. the actione to remedy all deficienstes and reteemendattene to correct ef t-ette radialestaal samtgency response preparedness for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stetten have been comeleted la Dutchess County (Table 3.8 h L

V /,>s,

e s

.;_1 J i.

• Y 6

O 175 \\ TABLE 4.9 Sumarv of Deficionetes and teeenmeendattena to tenedy 0*ficiencies in Off-$ite Radtelegical taergency teopense Preparedness at tastelsen f ar the Indian Feint Nuclaar Generating Stattent largen County, New Jersey a ~ / 2/27/35 l Defteteney toenttfted nut 2C4654 FEMA-A1P-L taarcise Delisteney and Rev. I. taercise tsarcise 4/24-4/25 tsaretse Preseng us. Reseaumended Corrective Aesten Reference" 3/3/82 3/9/03 53 11/28/8a Status i 4 BERGEACT OPERAfloss Clarftt 1. Ceaunent rat tene between the Rockland F.1.b 1 1 3._ County ECC and the Sergen County 20C were difficult to secolete. Arrange

• mente for Sergen County to send an operattens 11staen. to the Rockland County 10C have not been tonelated.

Representat&ves of letten County and New Jersev should eeet with representatives of New fers and locatand County to estattish the reopenstit[13tes of a Sergen County 20C 11atsen and ensure that this functten will be staffed to the future t$ection 3.2.11 4 and section 2.9.11 8 ). 2. The Americae ta'd Cross and the Sergen A.I.a 1 N/Obj(la) County. tot did not coordinate their activttles with New Jersey law enf orce* ment egenstes. The New York Stata sospensating measures for tecutand County should Laciude provistene efe-anklag the american Red Cross and the Bergen County 10C to coordinate their activities with New Jersey Law enforce

• ment assactes reopensible ist traffic centret (Seatten 2.9.3; p. 62),

3. Maps of the 10-s11e EF2, including J.80.a 1 C populatten (), ELFA) and evacuatten J.40.6 routes, and maps of receptton centers end relocastas centers in Recstand and Sergen Counties were set posted in the Sergen County 10C. These asps should be in the largen County 10C (Section 2.9.1s

p. 6 4 ).

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