ML20238A150

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-46,consisting of Undated Article Entitled Media in Disaster

ML20238A150
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	04/21/1987
From:	Hartsough D, Mileti D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
References
OL-5-I-SC-046, OL-5-I-SC-46, NUDOCS 8708280332
Download: ML20238A150 (14)

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In fact, t R The Media in Disaster

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Don M. Hartsough The area --i Dennis S. Mileti by the p: -

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It is generally recognized that the mass media are the conduit by which to alter society receives information and on which it forms images of any ma-4 jor disaster. But do the media contribute to disaster psychological ef-and to t

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fects-both positive and harmful? This chapter will address this general question and provide a brief overview of the influence of the mass media CONVE cn the psychological effects of disaster. In addition, selected comments EFFEC.

will be made specifically regarding the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI).

Observe :

The ThG accident which began on March 08,1979, was not under

&e som control for several days and remained an incident of international sig.

i that the nificance for even longer. During that time most of the information and stated b.

impressions regarding TMI were conveyed to the public by the mass Cil W fl media. Thus, the media actually conveyed to the general public the ma-jor dimensions of the accident as it was unfolding. As in other techno_

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logical incidents, it is only natural that those concerned with assessing 7

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h the psychological impact of the TMI accident be highly conscious of rep the likely role played by t he mass media as a major determinant of the P0;,

impacts observed.

f der For the purposes of this report, media will be definec is tele vision, j

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radio, newspapers news magazines, and the wire services. Other mass i

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media of interest to researchers would include entertainment media,

' l such as films, fiction and nnnfiction books. and others; however, these

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eff seem beyond the scope of this report.

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bd There is a great deal of opinion, usually in the form of " conventional!

j wisdom," about the topic of psychological disaster impacts and the

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The mt mass media, but very little systematic data are actually avauna There

y than s J _.

have been, however, many studies of the effects of mass media on dp j

' news' saster populations regarding warnings See, for example, Anderson K

obt ain4 j,

0 969,1970), Bates et al. (1963h Danzig et al. (1958), Drabek (1969h Leik Co et al. (1981), McLuckie (1973), M;leti (1974,1975), Mileti et al. (1981),

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'ItIE MEDIA IN DISASTER 283

" Moore (1964), Quarantelli and Taylor (1978), and Turner et al. (1981).

13 To our knowledge, the only study on the topic of postdisaster mass media related psychological effects is reported by Murphy (Chapter 3).

! In fact, there seems to be a paucity of scientific studies on the effects r, of mass m xlia (e.g., television news, newspaper stories) on behavior in general, in cluding all the behavior that occurs in nondisaster situations.

The area also seems to lack a comprehensive theoretical base, as noted s

by the participants et a 1979 workshop on mass media and disasters (Disasters and the Mass Media,1980). Our aim in this chapter will be to summarize the relationships between the mass media and ps;<cho.

logical impacts in reference to two research areas. These are: (1) post-disaster effects (however scarce the information is in this area) and (2) the effects of the media in emergency warning situations as they serve duit by which to alter psychological states-thoughts, perceptions, and so forth-

1. d any ma-and to mobilize people for warning response.

t chological ef.

1 e this general e mass media CONVENTIONAL WISDOM REGARDING MASS MEDIA

.ed conenents

/

EFFECTS ON DIS, ASTERS e Mile Island Observers of the mass media in disasters have two different positions.

'as not under One sees the media as having a positive effect, while the other concludes rnataonal sig-l that they have a net negative effect. The negative position was well stated by Gary A. Kreps, a participant in the National Research Coun-rmation and by the mass cil Workshop:

sublic the ma.

1?ther techno-There appears to be a long standing assumption among tth assessing disaster researchers that the media are deficient in disaster

conscious of reporting. The media have been accused of inaccurately re-ninant of the porting disaster impacts, of giving undue emphasis to the sud-den and dramatic, and of conveying false images about disaster as television, behavior. Concern has been frequently expressed about these

4. Other mass and other supposed deficiencies while, at the same time, there

ment media, is the inevitable admission that very little is known about the

' wever, these effects (positive or negative) of disaster reporting on human behavior. (Kreps,1980, pp. 40-41) ets and the The media, in other words, a2 e seen as caring less for accurate reporting Them than sensationalism or at least giving their readers or viewers a mafia on di-

" newsworthy story." This position was supported by interview data 4

e, Anderson

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obtained by Murphy (see Chapter 3).

I i(1969), Leik Conventional wisdom among disaster researchers and observers also has e positive side. The media are seen as having the potential for

'l, et al. (1981),

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IIIIN 284 PERSPECTIVES ON DISA$TER RECOVEny Tile Mi informing the public of threatening situations, for giving precise warn.

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a harm ings, for giving information about disaster impact, and for helping to geogrg prevent inappropriate and unwanted behavior, such as widespread con.

note th vergence on the disc tier scene. The media also help to bring aid to the disaster struck populi tions. Kreps sees this r. e of the mass media as agreerr simply an extension of what we expect from the media under normal pact a disaste circumstances, that is, the rapid transfer ofinformation to a widespread audience.

Th L

for unc There is little doubt that the media occupy an ambivalent position the gee with regard to disaster relief managers and others who have important responsibilities associated wah any disaster. A disaster site is filled portan with emotional tensions, especially if there has been an unexpected, sud.

term p effects den catastrophe. Along with this tension, there is an urgent need to meanie.

gather, transmit, and receive information. Disaster managers are de.

in the ;

pendent on the mass media, for example, to convey information to the public that will help the public come to behave in appropriate ways. j As L

reactoe Because of this extreme dependency, there may be a reluctance to recog.

q ly repc nize the limitations of the media. To quote Kreps (1980), "We expect the 1st a great deal from the media, and we are easily disappointed if expec.

tations are not fulfilled."(p. 47) The media are also highly dependent C

fin,ed a on disaster managers. If Ihe media are to report information, some j

quite li reliable source must give.his information. Someone must be willing y

proper to be quoted and take responsibility for what is said. Given these con.

j to have ditions, it is easy to see how major tensions develop between those with t

imateh it was,

emergency manager roles in a particular disaster and the media that report it. It is not surprising that once the disaster is over, and dis.

a natic crepancies are found, mutual fingerprinting and even scapegoating may teristic take place.

i At cerns t.

be perc t

DISASTERS AND NEWSWORTHINESS if it is r plant i i

nor the Nearly all disaster typeincidents start out as local events reported on.!

at such ly by the local media. It is only after they reach a certain level of " news.'

worthiness" that disasters are reported widely and become national or genera international events or news. Precisely what is it that propels an inci.

tion as dent to become a nationally reported disaster? In so many words, Kreps A !

what n says that an incident must have significant physicalimpact in order to achieve this status. And how does one assess physicalimpact? To empha 4

quote Kreps '1980), "With regard to measurement of impact the focus repc4 ti view.1 must necessarily be on relatively readily available measures of the scope This wl (geographic) and the intensity (deaths, injury, property damage, ratesj notorid of disease, and so forth) of physical impact."(p. 53) The scope and in.

f and stl tensity of a situation are the criteria that determine newsworthiness:

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ternati i

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STER RECOVEHY THE MEDI A IN DISASTER 285 J28 precise warn-a harmful situation must achieve widespread destruction and/or great ad for helping to geographic significance before it is reported. Kreps also notes in a foot-

' widespread con-note that, "Socialimpact is very imprecisely defined and there is little

• bring aid to the agreement on how it can be measured. Even measures of physical im-e mass media as.

pact may not be finally determined until weeks or months after tho l

ta under normal disaster-l',in the end, they are ever unequivocally presented."(p. 53) t to a widespread The point regarding newsworthiness is an extremely important one for understanding the dynamic relationships among disaster events, uvalent position the general public, and the mass media. It may also be especially im-

> have important portant for the long term psychological effects of disas er. The long-4ter site is filled term psychological effects of disaster include not only the immediate

• Ipected, sud-effects of the agent itself, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the i urgent need to meaning or significance that that disaster experience comes to have lanagers are de-in the life of the individual.

'ormation to the As a case in point, why did TMI become so newsworthy? The TMi pmpriate ways.

reactor accident did not fit the typical pattern of disasters that are wide-2ctance to recog-ly reported by the mass media. It was limited in geographic scope to N8. "We expect the Island (to be literal about where it was happening) or to an unde-

.mted if expec*

fined area downwind of the Island up to about 10 miles. It was also ghly dependent quite limited in intensity because there were no deaths or injuries or rmation, some property damage or diseases to be reported. Three Mile Island came must be willing to have great socialimpact by virtue of the mass evacuation of approx-stven these con-imately 144,000 residents, but even before the evacuation was advised, ween those with it was newsworthy almost instantly. Why did TMI suddenly become the media that a nationally reported incident, one that carried many of the charac-9 over, and dis-teristics of the reporting of more conventional major disasters?

2Pegoatmg may An obvious hypothesis regarding the newsworthiness of TMI con-cerns the potential danger in the situation. That is, nuclear energy may be perceived to be highly potent and possess great destructive powers if it is not carefully controlled. Moreover, the f act that a nuclear power plant involves a highly complex technology which neither the media nor the public generally understands could fuel public interest in events its reported on-at such facilities. So the newsworthiness of the TMi incident likely was i level of " news-generated by potential danger rather than by actual loss or destruc-1rne nattor:a! or tion as was originally suggested by Kreps.

Pmpels an inci-A different hypothesis would cast these perspectives into a some-y words, Kreps what more dynamic arrangement. One might hypothesize that reporters mpact m order emphasized the potential dangers in the situation in order to justify cal impact? To reporting the incident nationally. That is, from an objective point of Ipact the focus vww, TMI was a serious problem with the machinery at a utility's plant.

res of the scope This was hardly the kind of story that usually achieves instant national damage, rates notoriety. Perhaps it could not have been reported in an objective way e scope and in-and still have carried the justification for national attention. This al-twsworthiness; ternative hypothesis supposes that to achieve national newsworthiness,

286 PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER RECOVERY THE MEDI<

the potential scope and intensity of the incident had to be elevated That is, the focus of reporting came to be as much on what could hap..

formation '

pen as to what was happening in order to justify national coverage, tion. One.

IL is unlikely that media reporters consciously or deliberately went status of a through this logical process (as described by the alternative hypothe-an impendi sis). Instead, it is likely that reporters covering the TMI accident un.

with ensui consciously added their justification for national attention to their One rt story, that is, the potential dangers that they perceived to the area

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manding p around Middletown and eastern Pennsylvania.

press disa After the TMI accident, it was very difficult to separate a media.

manageme induced psychological effect from an " actual" effect, since there weredescription potentially very real dangers at TMI. From one viewpoint, one could ture. One call TMI a " media event." This argument would presume that psycho.

respondin logical effects stemming from TMI could be laid on the doorstep of the mately the mass media. This view would be just as much in error as one that ig.may exist.

nores the very realinfluence that the media were likely to have had ate situati on people's reactions to the TMI incident.

First, they is unreliabl may get a SOME QUESTIONS TO AID IN TIIE ASSESSMENT OF out someo THE MASS MEDIA IN DISASTERS ing to givt sides of an Participants in the National Academy of Sciences panel (Disasters and tings this the Mass Media.1980) posed some questions that helped to guide their receives th assessment of the effects of the mass media on disasters. Five similar fiicting inf questions are proposed here:

was partic in the acci

1. Ilow accurate are the mass media in reporting disasters and postdisaster situations?

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How Tho

2. How thorough are the mass media in reporting disasters?

The issue (

3. Do the mass media contribute to the impressions and images

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cause medi of a disaster and its effects?

of a disast

4. Regardless of the answcrs to the three questions above, how duce a dist do the mass media actually affect the behavior of individuals.

l last sever either positively or negatively, in disaster situations?

and thus rr

5. What are the specific psychological effects of concern, that is L

fore report what are the dependent variables and are they adaptive or dys.

i forces mco functional for individuals and groups involved?

be one mes tains to th<

How Accurate Are the Mass Media in Reporting Disasters s

lic by the and Postdisaster Situations?

E The mass media ere often accused of being inaccurate in basic news Do the M reporting. However there seem to be relatively little hard data to demon.Images o strate whether the source ofinaccuracy lies more in the sources of in.

This quest

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reported.1

287 FER RECOVEltY Tile MEDIA IN DISASTER to be elevated.

formation (e.g., disaster managers) or in the reporting of that informa-ihat could hap.

tion. One study, however, does document how the media inflated the nalcoverage.

status of a disaster prediction study from a scientific hypothesis about liberatel.v went an impending earthquake to an actual earthquake " prediction warning"

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ative hypothe-with ensuing public alarm (cf. Mileti et al.,1981, pp. 39-44).

II accidt at un-One repeated fault of media reporters seems to be that of de-mten to their manding preche and certain information where none exists. They may ed to the area press disaster managers, such as incident commanders and relief management personnel, for damage estimates, projected decisions, and

'arate a media-descriptions of disaster populations which turn out to be pure conjec-

".ce there were ture. One might easily imagine that the media reporters are in turn

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'Jmt, one could responding to other pressures, that is, the needs of editors and ulti-e that psycho-mately the viewing or reading public, for precise information where none rstep of the may exist. The reLult is that the need on the part of reporters can cre-as one that ig-ate situations which unfortunately result in inaccuracy in their work.

y to have had First, they can pressure interviewees until they get information that is unreliable, but which is reported as reliable information. Second, they may get a "no comment" from a legitimate news source but then seek

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out someone else who is not a legitimate news source but who is wili-MENT OF ing to give a news story. Third, the media also seek to present both sides of an issue. In disaster situations or in emergency warning set-tings this practice can create confusion on the part of the public that iDisasters and receives that information (Mileti et al.1981). These actions produce con-ito guide their flicting information which is inaccurate. At TMI, accurate reporting

s. Five similar was particularly difficult because of the complex technology involved in the accident.

disasters and How Thorough Are the Mass Media in Reporting Disasters?

The issue of thoroughness is just as important as that of accuracy, be-

disasters?

cause media may wittingly or unwittingly omit certain crucial aspects is and images L

of a disaster situation from their report of it. The omission may pro-duce a distorted understanding of the total disaster situation. Over the is above, how last several decades, media reporting has become more professional,

')f individuals.

I and thus more attention has been given to confirming a news story be-Ate, ns?

fore reporting it. Still, the pressure of deadlines in disaster situations ncern, that is.

forces incomplete reporting by the media. Incomplete reporting may

,aptive or dys-be one means of developing or maintaining a " story line," and this per-teins to the third question. that of images conveyed to the general pub-lic by the media.

Do the Mass Media Contribute to the Impressions and in basic ne.<s Images of a Disaster and Its Effects?

tata to demon-This question has to do not only with what is reported but how it is wirees of m-reported. Included here are e'l the nonverbal cues such as tone of voice 3 -

288 PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER f ECOVERY TE W,N I and gesture, and the communication techniques of word selection, scene the broadca selection (for television reporting), the use of context, and so on that as an acepu are used to enliven and give depth to straight reporting. It is widely the situation.

accepted that news teams select a " slant" or story line which will form gerated the e the context for reporting of a news event (Frank _1973). The slant of reactions of a news story gives interpretation and meaning to the factualinforma.

vented the s tion ernoodied in the story. For example, the hypothesis was proposed f

Thus, the im that the slant of the TMI incident was the potential danger of the situa, duced. (This tion, and it was this slant that allowed the TMI story to become a na.

cast that ree tional event.

social scid It is likely that the general public forms an impression or image The Bar of a disaster situation based in large part on the way in which it is con-age creation veyed.This is especially true with those who are not familiar with the generalize fr situation, for example, those who are informed of it only through the may project mass media, viduals to a The general public seems particularly susceptible to image creation, overgenerah, because apparently many people are unaware of the practice of taking ond source o slants or story line approaches, and feel that they are getting " straight ple happen t news." This is especially true for TV news reporting, the medium which One thousa2 is under the greatest constraints to condense its information and thus Police statio produces the least amount of factualinformation. An Opinion Research of calls, eve Corporation poll in 1972 showed that television news reporting was con-cent of a po sidered as most objective (53 percent) and most complete i63 percent) of all the news media (Frank,1973). (In contrast to the "most complete" ?D*""U20" icant numb <

rating given television reporting, newspapers achieved only 19 percent, a short timt news magazines 7 percent, and radio 5 percent. In contrast to the tele.

Dupont vision rating of 53 percent, for being most, objective, newspapers got casts from t only 15 percent.)

beten Au it is likely that the question of imsge creation is concerned primarily the TMI act with the medium of television. Even though factual information is series of nu highly condensed and limited, a sense of objectivity is conveyed by the "on-the-scene reports" that television can produce. Viewers have a sense Repork of "being there" and come away with a feeling of participating some-what directly in the situation.

in daar w rst c Do the mass media produce exaggerated images of most disaster they ha situations? The conventional wisdom of disaster watchers says that guilty o this is often so. Of the social scientists, Quarantelli(1980) has been the be "in most persistent in accusing the mass media of keeping alive myths with be fou regard to disaster reactions.

and be One example that has been documented is the Barseback " panic" Island in Sweden in 1973. A Swedish radio station broadcasted a fictitious" * * "

account of a nuclear power station accident to highlight public interest clear h in a discussion about nuclear energy risks and advantages. Although

Cronks,

l

'E*t REggn TiiE MEDI A IN DISASTER 289 election, acene the broadcast took only 11 minutes,it was accepted by some people l

as an account of an actual situation. In studying media response to md so on that the situation Rosengren et al (1974) concluded that the media had exag-

4. It is widely hich will form gerated the extent to which the listening public had experienced strong

'. The slant of reactions of fear and anger, and very much exaggerated or even in-

tual informa.

vented the stories of panic flight that were supposed to have occurred.

was proposed Thus, the image of panic regarding the incident was largely media pro-er of the situa.

ducod. (This incident is reminiscent of the " War of the Worlds" broad-

, become a na.

cast that received a similar kind of treatment from journalists and even social scientists in this country.)

Sion or image The Barseback incident demonstrated several sources of false im-

'hich it is con.

age creation. First, jou nalists, as well as social scientists, may over-tiliar with the generalize from a few individuals to the general public. That is, they

/ through the may project the actions, attitudes, and behavior of only a few indi-viduals to a wider population. Journalists may be especially prone to age creation, overgeneralize if the atypical br havior observed is newsworthy. A sec-

.ing " straight ond source of f alse images can occur when only a small number of peo-Lice of taking pie happen to converge on one point in the communication network.

5 1edium which One thousand frightened people calling mass media switchboards or tion and thus police stations represents a tremendous increase in the usual number tion Research of calls, even though one thousand people is only one tenth of 1 per-

-ting was con-cent of a population of one million. To generalize to the population of e(63 percent) one million would be a mistake. Of course, one thousand is still a signif-ist complete" icent number of frightened people if they all converge at one place in

-y 19 percent.

a short time span.

it to the tele-Dupont reviewed 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> of videotapes of nuclear energy broad-vspapers got casts from the three major networks on their evening news programs between August 5,1968 and April 20.1979-a period encompassing ned primarily the TMI accident. In DuPont's view, fear was the motif of the entire formation is series of nuclear stories.

veyed by the have a sense Reporters do not play a reassuring role because there is interest osting some-in disaster, and because the reporters are worried that if the worst case should come up and they don't signalit in advance, iost disaster they haven't given the facts to the people. They would be found rs says that guilty of minimizing a potential problem, a whot if. They would has been the be "in bed" with the " authorities," and they do not want to e mvths with be found guilty of that. So they have got to talk about the risks and be cautious of reassurance. For example, at Three Mile ack " panic" Island the bottom line in the media coverage was not that no 1 a fictitious one was hurt. The bottom line was: we narrowly averted a nu-tblic interest clear holocaust, a nuclear catastrophe, the ultimate. As Walter o Althougis Cronkite said, "The world has never known a day quite like

290 PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER RECOVERY THE MEDI A today. It faced... the worst nuclear power plant accident of the atomic age." This is the bottom line of the public's aware-warning inf inf rmation ness. The Three Mile Island experience is going to be a domi.

nant image, probably for the next decade, because it has been forced, peo burned into the collective consciousness,largely through tele.

or not. Fou vision news. (DuPont,1980, pp.13-14) pcrception

%8 Many studies of emergency warnings before disasters occur have fashion m t been performed which document how information-including media in,of real worl formation-contributes to public images and perceptions of a potential response to disaster and its effects (Mileti et al.,1975). The conclusion is that thethe charact media, along with other sources ofinformation, are the key factor that is mfonnat determines public response (Mileti et al.,1980.

proc m.ed.I respmse.

llow Do the Mass Media Actually Affect the Behavior of sistency, s Individuals, Either Positively or Negatively, in mode-how Disaster Situations?

through th.

in terms of psychological effects, this is the bottom line question. One (4I P"C'i" cations are must first define what is a positive or a negative reaction to disaster, if an individual answers a questionnaire that he or she has "been much formation s more afraid since the disaster" or "become more demoralized since a who the mi disaster" will the investigator be satisfied with this opinion, or search official, or s further for the form of behavior that the fear or demoralization too s e receivin It is stecessary to look at behavior in terms of time sequences re.

Morep lated to the disaster situation. There is more information available Informatio predisaster behavior and mass media than there is for either the imme.ple they t diate or long run postdisaster phases. An overall conclusion is that the hanced if ti media-which are the major " givers" of information to the public inor high ran emergencies-have a profound effect on the predisaster behavior of indi. of certainty viduals.

i3) are num The process that research suggests as the best description of how than a few; people come to respond to disaster warning information is relatively conveyed L straightforward iMileti et al.,1981). First, people receive risk infor-vague;and ficial warnings, neighbors and friends, and the like; howe forcement (

tain specif,2 comes from the media. Second, people evaluate the inforn ation that which affec is available to them. Ifinformation from multiple sources-or infor, Put si mation from the same source over repeated communications-is con.

ferently be sistent, that risk information is psychologically confirmed throughdefinitions reinforcement with a resultingincrease in trust and belief. Ifinformationand differe become confused or anxious. People typically seek con ing situati strongly sh reinforcement of risk information during times of receiving disaster warnmgs-Immed f

11 Ht@VE H y Tile MEDI A IN DISASTER 29I

ident of warning information from any source. Third, on the basis of available s atrare-information, be it confirmed and reinforced or conflicting and unrein-t a domi-forced, people form situational perceptions of risk-be they accurate has been or not. Fourth, people respond to disaster warnings on the basis of the ugh : ele.

perception of risk that they hold.

This general process rarely operates in this straightforward a fashion in the real world. The process is typically altered by a number s occur have of real world factors that reshape the general model. However, human 223 media in-response to emergency information or warnings is directly affected by if a potential the characteristics of the information received. Warning information n is that the is information to which people respond after that informatio, is v factor that processed. Information differs in six important ways that affect human response. These are: (1) u arning content-for example, information con-sistency, specificity, clarity, and message content; (2) communication mor of mode-how the information is transmitted, for example, in person, or through the media; (3) number received-how many warning communi-cations are actually received, for example, none, one, several, or dozens; 2estion. One (4) perceived certainty-how certain or sure the person giving the in-to disaster.

formation seems to the person receiving the information;(5) source-

"b*n much who the information comes from, for example, a stranger, a friend, an dzed since a official, or someone in a uniform;(6) perceived trust-how much the per-

n. or search son receiving the information trusts the person giving the information.

a' ion took?

More people will respond more appropriately to disaster warning

'quences re-information if those warnings-or risk information:(1) come from peo-Avadable on ple they trust, respect or define as authority figures-the effect is en-r the imme hanced if the givers of information are familiar persons, in uniforms,

,is that the or high ranking officials;(2) are delivered by the media with a good deal 7a public in of certainty in reference to what information is being communicated; n 20r of indi-(3) are numerous, such that many communications are received rather than a few; (4) are delivered in some personal way or the information ition of how conveyed is personalized by the media rather than made general or e relatively vague; and (5) are consistent in content to enhance information rein-

! risk infor-forcement (rather than conflicting in content), clearly stated, and con-neluding of-tain specific ir. formation rather than general information. These factors

/ever. most which affect human response are largely under the control of the media.

nation that Put simply, people respond to disaster warning information dif-wr mfor-ferently because people respond to perceptions of risk or cognitive ms-is con-definitions of danger rather than to the danger that actually exists,

-d th ough and different people hold different perceptions of risk in disaster warn-11fmli"n ing situations. Perhaps most significantly, risk perceptions are most mpic may strongly shaped by the varied dimensions and aspects of the disaster mat)on and warnings-risk information-that are received from the media.

ng disaster Immediately postdisaster, the mass media are concerned wit h pro-

i 292 PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER RECOVERY viding information about the disaster situation. As the situation seeps reas gradually becomes known by the general public, the media influence may have much more to do with conveying significance or meaning to

• [

the event rather than simply providing information.

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that this a The bc MODEL OF MASS MEDIA-DISASTER RELATIONSHIPS by the info about an There has been a tendency in the communications field to use a straight linear model of effects of the mass media on a particular population message is dent, for or situation. A linear modelimplies a series of cause-effect relation-ships, somewhat analogous to a set of billiard balls in a straight line strumenta controlled on a pool table. In the disaster area, a linear model would resemble the following chain of cause-effect: The disaster agent produces a situa-tion that is assessed and reported by a disaster manager to repre-REFERE sentatives from the mass media, who then pass on the information to the general public, and individuals in the general public have certain psychological effects. In this model each stage or level is considered Anderson,}

mumto as a cause for the reaction that occurs in the next stage.

Anderson, \\

More recently, communications experts are using what was labeled I" T by the National Academy of Sciences Workshop participants (Disasters D C' and the Mass Media,1980) as a flow model, which also might be la-8"]'

beled a cybernetic model. This is, a model that considers the interplay of forces on each other, as a total system of interdependent influences-tionali An example is that disaster managers may give out selective informa-Acader tion about the disaster agent in order to produce certain kinds of in-Danzig, E.1 fluences on the generel public. In turn, the mass media reporters are on a Di influenced by impressions of what they feel the general public wants Resear to know or should not know. The mass media have pressures on them Acadei for certain kinds of reporting and they impose these on the reporting Disasters sciene; situation. Newspapers and television stations are private enterprise Drabek. T.-

companies, and may select to report or not report information which

1969, will effect their business. The disaster managers are strongly influenced, Du one might suppose, by their perceptions of how they thmk the public will react to whatever it is that they report. Thus, ti;ey are not simply Frank, R.S reporting what they know about the disaster situation as unbiased ob-1973.

servers, but they are anticipating how this information will be received Kreps J.A by the general public. In turn, the general public is not a passive re-ing. I cipient of information but may directly or indirectly make certain

Acade, demands on those who report the information to them.

sity of Leik, R.K..

A comprehensive analysis of the influence of the media on psycho-

[

McLuckie, logical effects of disaster should attempt to come to grips with at least i Co the major dimensions of these interdependent forces. For example, it Woml

EQ ggm Tile MEDI A IN DISASTER 293 the situation seems reasonable to believe that the reporting of TMI as an isolated

+dia influence incident could not be separated from the context of nuclear power as or rneaning to a controversial and generally emotionalissue for many members of the general public. One might guess that media representatives were quite aware of the potential significance of TMI as related to this issue, and that this awareness may have influenced h >w they reported the event.

The bottom line, however, is that people respond and are affected

.IONSIIIpS by the information and the manner in which information is exchanged about an impending disaster, That information and its story line m a straight message is the basis for their perceived realities. During the TMI inci-tr Npulation dent. for example, media provided information may have been in-feet relation-strumentalin determining public repsonse because the media largely straight line controlled the factors that affect human response.

resemble the

uces a situa.

M ".o repre-REFERENCES for 3ation to have certain Anderson, W.A. Disaster warning and communication processes in two com-8 considered munities. Journal of Communication. 1969,19,92-104.

Anderson, W.A. Tsunami wandng in Crescent City, California and Hilo. Hawaii.

wa* bbeled in The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964

Human Ecology. Washington ts ' Disasters D.C.: National Research Council National Academy of Sciences,1970, might be la.

Bates, F.L., Fogelman, C.W., Parenton, V.I., et al. The Social and Psychological he interplav Consequences of a Natural Disaster. National Academy of Sciences Na-t inOuences.

tional Research Council Disaster Study No.18. Washington, D.C.: National IVe nforma-Academy of Sciences.1963.

kir.ds of in-Danzig, E.R.. Thayer, P.W., Galanter, L.R. The Effects of a Threatening Rumor on a Disaster Stricken Community. National Academy of Sciences, National Y.mrs am Research Council Disaster Study No.10. Washington, D.C.: National ubuc wants Academy of Sciences.1958.

ms :.n them Disasters and the Mass Media, Washington, D.C.: National Academy of

'e NportinM Sciences.1980.

+ en:erprise Drabek, T.E. Social processes in disaster: Family evacuation. Social Problems.

stice which 1969,I6.336-349.

' inihaenced, DuPont. R.L. Nuclear Phobia-Phobic Thinking About Nuclear Power.

< th+ public Washington. D.C.: The Media Institute,1980.

not simply Frank. R.S. Message Dimensions of Television News. Toronto: Lexington Books, nb:ased o6 1973.

he gce;y(,d Kreps. J.A. Research needs and policy issues on mass media disaster report-pmive re ing. In Disasters and the Mass Media. Washington. D.C.: National ike certtun Academy of Sciences.1980.

I,eik, R.K.. et al. Community Response to Natural llazard Warnings. Univer-sity of Minnesota, Department of Sociology,1981.

on psycho-McLuckie. B.F. The Warning System: A Sociological Perspective. Department ith at least of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Fort

• xa nple, it Worth. Texas: National Weather Service, Southern Region,1973.

294 PERSPECTIVES ON DISASTER RECOVERJ Mileti, D.S. A normative causal model analysis of disaster warning response Doctoral thesis. Boulder: University of Colorado, Department of Sociology,.

1974.

Mileti, D.S. Natural hazard warning systems in the United States: A research assessment. Boulder:

Science,1975.

University of Colorado Institute of Behavioral Oh Mileti, D.S., Drabek T.. Haas, J. Human systems in extreme env'.onments:

A sociological pers,mtive. Boulder: University of Colorado Inttitute of Obu{

f Behavioral Science,1975.

l Mileti, D.S., et al. Earthquake prediction response and options for public policy.

Boulder: University of Colorado Institute of Behavioral Science,1981.l Moore, H.E. And the Winds Blew. Austin, Texas: The Hogg Foundation for Jacob D Mental Health, University of Texas,1964.

Joanne Quarantelli. E.L. Some research emphases for studies on roass communication systems and disasters. In Disasters and the Mass Media. Washington, D.C.:

National Academy of Sciences,1980, Quarantelli E.L., Taylor V. Some views on the warning problem in disasters

, i Contempo as suggested by sociological research. Weather Service Disaster Preparedness Report, February 1978, Special Issue. Washington, D.C :

Department of Commerce,1978.

the waysi through t f

Rosengren, K.E., Arvidson, P., Sturesson, D. The Barseback " panic": A radio

(

assertion i programme as a negative summary event. Acta Sociological, 303-321.

1974, 18.

primary s Turner, R.H., Nigg, J.M., Paz, et al.. Community response to earthquake threat i

observatm, in Southern California, Part Ten. Summary and Recommendations J ossituations Angeles: Institute for Social Science Research, University of California To da.

1981.

l recovery 1 I

mentd he-(Miller, Wg than emot is to repoi assist futi and resear i

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