ML20237L525

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-28,consisting of Incomplete 850417 Partial Initial Decision Re Util Sponsored Offsite Emergency Plan

ML20237L525
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	03/30/1987
From:	Kline J, Margulies M, Shon F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
LBP-85-12, OL-3, OL-5-I-SC-028, OL-5-I-SC-28, NUDOCS 8708280139
Download: ML20237L525 (5)

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Y Cite as 21 NRC 644 (1985)

LBP-85-12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

'87 DE 21 P4 :21 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'.i ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR'D Before Administrative Judges:

$C-322 d/ 5 3/30/87 Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kilne

[ *~ M ~ 2 E Mr. Frederick J. Shon i

in the Matter of Docket No. 50-322-OL 3 (Emergency Planning)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

April 17,1985 in this Partial Initial Decision the Licensing Board considers whether a utility-sponsored ofTsite emergency plan meets the requirement of 10 C.F.R. y 50.47(a)(1) that there be reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The utility plan does not rely on participation of the State or local government. Although the Board makes findings of fact on each contention litigated, the Board does not reach an uitimate conclusion on the adequacy of the utility plan because the record has been reopened to take evidence concerning the identification of the relocation center.

When this matter is resolved the Board will decide whether the utility plan provides the requisite assurance.

STATE STATUTES: FEDERAL PREEMPTION l

New York State and Suffolk County statutes prohibiting Applicant 4

from performing activities necessary to implement emergency plans are l

not preempted by federal law where the State and local laws exist for 644 8708280139 B70330 PDR ADOCK 05000322 C

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$ii posts before the beginning of evacuation. Tr. 7426-27 (Herr). This gens cannot be achieved in fast-breaking accidents, and LILCO's assumptions 3

(wiB about sequential mustering of resources as accident severity increases or

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• about gradual buildup of people in time distribution are not appropriate.

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Tr. 7450 (Herr). Plans for rnobilization are therefore inadequate for acci-N dent scauences that would provide less than an hour's notification time.

N Tr. 7488-89 (Herr). SufioW County witnesses beFeve that LILCO's overall ability to mobilize is inadequate for accidents that could cause 1

k releases within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the declaration of an emergency. To arrive at that conclusion, they totaled up the discrete sequential elements or tasks b

that must be perfctmed for mobilization. Tr. 7499 7502 (Herr).

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z,, q IV.B.1.5 Conclusion on Mobilixrion i

4 Neither prefiled testimony of the parties nor cross-examination l

revealed significant factual disputes as to the length of time the various elements of mobilization would take. The dispute raises the fundamental y

question of whether the Plan can be approved, given that some accident i

sequences could occur so fast that prior mobilization could not be

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achieved. Even on this question there is no factual dispute. SuffoPe County urges the Board to accept, and LILCO concedes, that som:

emergencies could occur so quickly that the full LERO emergency force could not be mobilized before a release of radiation from the plant. Suf-

$4 folk County's witnesses thought that mobilization speed was a concern

'OC for as long as 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> into an emergency situation. However, after dgp weighing the evidence the Board believes that this is too long. The i

principal tasks to be accomplished in mobilization after notification are N

$m the initial trip by emelgency workers to staging areas, the briefing and is-Ne suance of equipment at staging areas, and the movement of workers to h$

their emergency duty posts. As mobilization progresses, there will be g

workers in cach group. It is tinrefore incorrect, as the County urges, to simp;y add the times requ;ted to fully accomplish each task. Essential op-

?p,!jn 4 erations wn! take pime simultw.eously, not sequentially. Some werkers will report for duty while others who arrived earlier would be receiving h[D ~

their briefing, and yet others having filished their briefing would be on t

their way to emergency locations. Thus, the Board finds that LILCO's jf.

4 estimate of approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to substantially complete staging area f //.

actnities is reasonable. Travel from staging areas to duty posts would re-

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quem additional time, which might vary from 5 to 40 minutes for traffic p',

gu' des. The Board finds that LILCO could substantially complete its mobilization in about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. We consider that an anbiased estimate

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since no basis exists for concluding that it either overstates or under-states mobilization time. Uncerta;nty exists since many workers will i

arrive at duty stat ons earlier and some later than estimated, however, i

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the Board sees no basis for reducing it.

Nevertheless, there are accidents that could progress to the general emergency stage bcfore the EOC or staging areas cu'd be activated, and l

8 that would allow inadequate time to go through LILLO's planned mobili-zation process before evacuation began. The Board can f.nl no defect in if

'I planning, however, since complete and timely mobilization un' der those conditions is simply impossible. The consequences of a failure to mobi-lize LERO before evacuation begins are relatively staall because an evac-uation unaided by LILCO traffic guides could still be accomplished al-though it would take more time than the controlled evacuation. The fast-g breaking-accident scenario introduces bounded uncertainty into the f

evacuation time estimates for the EPZ. If the traffic posts were totally

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i unstaffed, evacuation would require ubout I hour, 30 minutes more than if they were fully staffed. However, the testimony shows (nat the

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stafTing of key posts by emergency wo'rkers would occur as a distribution i

in time. Workers would arrive to take up daties during the evacuation which i'self would require 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to 6 h n., 30 minutes. The Board concludes that this would have some interpolated effect on the overall i

evacuation time. The EPZ could oe evacuated in some time longer than l

LILCO's nominal period of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> with full control and in some time shorter than the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,30 minutes LILCO has calculated for an uncon-trolled evacuation. The lioard is of the opinion that true evacuation l

times under extreme emergency circumstances are probably not pre-t dictable with more precision in any event. Tt ' predictive uncertainty raised by the possibility of fast-breaking accidents does not create a bar-t er to approval of the Plan.

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The Board concludes that LILCO has taken practical and reasonable steps to minimize the mobilization times for LERO workers. It was help-fut to establish three staging areas around the periphery of the EPZ and to distribute the responsibilities of LERO workers among the staging areas. It is reasonable to activate the EOC and the staging areas at the a!crt stage. It is reasonable to assign LERO workers generally to the clos-est staging areas and to develop callout lists in which the closest workers 1

are called first. Drills have increased the efficiency in processing workers d

through staging areas. LILCO has matched special vehicles to the three staging areas to reduce travel times. The Board finds that, for a reasona-ble spectrum of possible accidents, LERO can mobilize its workers in a timely fashion before there is a need for evacuation, i1 1.

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j s'y under some limited circumstances leads us to reject Suffolk County's L(l

? D Our analysis of the consegrences of the inability to mobilize fully

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concerns about the delaying effects of trafTic at specific times of day and y

'. ge-other contingent possibiliGes for delay. We also dismiss the County's as-

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' 'k'i sertion contained in Contention 27.C that the activities that are planned n

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,. :Y9h to take n! ace in staging areas constitute excessive delays in the mobiliza-M1 tion of emergency workers. Clearly, workers must be briefed and issued I.'

EW equipment. LILCO's estimate of 15 minutes to issue dosimetry equip-1

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'k ment,15 minutes more to issue job-specific briefings, and 5 to 10 min-M utes to dispatch workers is reasonable. The Board also finds no evidence k*

i in the record that LILCO has planned improperly with regard to special f,

"i vehicles such as buses, ambulances, tow trucks, and gasoline tank

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I trucks. These vehicles have everyday uses, and there is no requirement

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US in NRC regulations that they be in a state of alert continuously.

$3 The Board finds Suffolk County's assertions in Contention 27 and all i

fkM of its subparts to be without merit. LERO can mobilize its workers in a j

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timely manner for a broad spectrum of accidents. A specific subset of d

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' M accident scenarios exists that could progress so rapidly that it would be i

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difficult or impossible to fully execute a prior mobilization. The conse-

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quence of an inability to mobilize for some fast-breaking accidents is to L

M lengthen the time to evacuate the EP7 somewhat. This is acceptable.

dh The Board's finding of acceptability for this contention warrants no

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.c ElR implication that we would accept excessively long evacuation times l

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vide for substantial assistance to the public in an evacuation. The Bcard f

3 ph holds LILCO responsi' ole to make a reasonable effort to achieve prompt

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and expeditious evacuation of the EPZ under all conditions. The Board i

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cannot require what is impossible, however, and we do not do so here.

3.M In this contention, we are satisfied that the LILCO Plan to mobilize its emergency forces over a full spectrum of possible accidents is rasonable

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, [n quired for the most extreme conditions in that spectrum.

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.V yd IV.C. Communications (Contentions 28-34 and 24.L)

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I Contentions 28-34 and 24.L contest the adequacy of LILCO's propos-g,f als for communications among emergency response personnel. Inade-m quacies are alleged regarding LILCO's ability to communicate with feder-f g

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al agencies, its assignment of personnel to communications equipment, p g,1 its ability to communicate with its own emergency response personnel, I

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k the lack of direct communications between emergency respouse person-nel in the field and the EOC, and its ability to communicate with hospi-

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