ML20237K811

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Lists Weakness/Concerns Observed During Facility Emergency Plan Drill on 870609
ML20237K811
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 08/24/1987
From: Shanbaky M
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Nimitz R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8708270304
Download: ML20237K811 (2)


Text

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AUG 2 4 1987 Docket No. 50-309 MEMORANDUM T0:

Ron Nimitz, Senior Radiation Specialist Emergency Preparedness & Radiological Protection Branch THROUGH:

Dr. Mohamed Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section

SUBJECT:

MAINE YANKEE EMERGENCY DRILL OBSERVATIONS 1

During the Maine Yankee Emergency plan drill of June 9, 1987, the following weakness / concerns were observed:

1 1.

The licensee stated that a pancake GM probe on the vehicle dash, under the windshield, is used to locate the centerline of the plume. The vehicle is potentially operated at up to 55 mph.

Given the location of the probe, the beta shielding provided by the windshield, the efficiency of the probe for gamma, and the response time of the meter, this practice may be inappropriate to accurately detect the plume.

2.

There does not appear to be an effective mechanism to ensure that NRC personnel have une:corted access to the facility during E-Plan drills.

3.

The S0P located in the tunnel was established under free standing liquid, allowing the potential migration of contamination.

In addition, trash and clothing drums / containers were not staged by the S0P for use.

4.

The HP Supervisor did not review the access point S0P f. ; effectiveness until prompted by the NRC.

5.

An RM-14 at checkpoint had its alarm set at 500 cpm versus 100 cpm greater than background.

6.

A dose rate meter was not available at the control point.

In general, it appeared that the licensee had an insufficient supply of instruments with beta survey capabilities.

7.

None of the air samples in the E0F, TSC or OSC are equipped with automatic alarm functions.

8.

Air Samplers were located on chair seats, and therefore, did not collect samples representative of the breathing zone.

9.

Emergency decon supplies located in the staff building were poorly organized.

A list of contents was not readily available.

10.

Procedure 9.1.9, Rev. 8, " Personnel Decontamination Procedure" does not address the full range of decon agents available in the decon kit.

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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

Memorandum:

Ron Nimitz 2

AUG 2 4 1997 11.

The H analyzer in the PAB requires approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of manual setup.

7 It cannot be set up remotely.

This causes significant potential personnel exposure in a real emergency.

12. Only 15 hi-range pocket dosimeters were available. for use.

This was too limited. The licensee should consider increasing this stock.

In addition, the licensee. should include hi-range dosimeters in the off-site monitoring team kits so that technicians will have suitable dosimeters available and not deplete E0F supplies.

13.

No radiogas sampling was done in the EOF, TSC, or OSC even though there was 800 mrem /hr outside the E0F building.

The installed ventilation system would not remove these gases.

14.

The Radiation Monitoring System was not used to evaluate radiological hazards prior to re-entering the PAB/ Turbine building.

15.

The HP Supervisor in the OSC did not delegate any responsibilities.

He was too busy answering the phone, tracking exposures, and data plotting to provide effective oversight.

Technicians were observed " standing-by" and should have been used for these routine items so that the supervisor could have evaluated and controlled the big picture.

16.

There did not appear to be sufficient staffing of HP technicians and supervisory personnel to support a real emergency requiring around-the-clock coverage for several days.

17.

There was too much simulation of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment to adequately evaluate the licensee's HP response capability during emergency conditions.

Original signed Bya, Darryl P. LeQuia Radiation Specialist D

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