ML20237K128
| ML20237K128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1987 |
| From: | Traficonte J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237K111 | List: |
| References | |
| ALAB-869, OLA, NUDOCS 8708190099 | |
| Download: ML20237K128 (19) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR RJGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC-SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Administrative ~ Judges:
Christine N. Kohl, Chairman f
Gary J.
Edles
'Howard. A. Wilber j
)
.In the Matter of
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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR'
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Docket No. 50-271-OLA POWER. CORPORATION
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(Spent Fuel Pool Amendment (Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)'
' August 10, 1987)
Power Station)
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW L
OF THE CC:<MONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OFLALAB - 869
~!
JAMES M.' SHANNON AttorL%y General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts l
l By: George B.
Dean John Traficonte Assistant Attorneys General Nuclear Safety Unit C
8708190099 870810 PDR ADOCR 05000271 Q
PDR 1
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j 1
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Page(s) 1 Table of Authorities.......................................
ii-I Statement of the Case.......................................
1 1
Statement of the Issues.....................................
1 Argument THE APPEAL BOARD'S DISPOSITION OF CONTENTION 2 IS WITHOUT l
SUPPORT IN LOGIC OR LAW.................................
2 A.
Narrow Basis of the Appeal Board...............
2 B.
Staff Conflated Risks and Probabilities........ 4 C.
Staff Misread Commission Policy and Case Law...
5 D.-
Appeal Board Took Staff Position One Step Farther but Two Steps Back............................
7 Conclusion.................................................
14 l
1_
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page(s)
Carolina Environmental Study Group V.
United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
............................. 5 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC,
~~
799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1986)
............................. 2 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, passim and 14 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982)
.................. 12 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
CLI-86-12, 24 NRC 1 (1986)
................................ 2 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681 (1985)
............................... 3 Public Service Co. (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2),
.................................... 6-7 i
REGULATIONS l
10 CFR S 2.714
................................................ 1 i
10 CFR S 51.22
............................................... 11 l
10 CFR S 51.23(c) 2 i
45 Fed. Reg. 40,101 (1980) 5 and passim 50 Ped. Reg. 32,138 (1985) 3,9 STATUTES 1
j 42 U.S.C.
SS 4321 et sea.
3 and passim
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I STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1/
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the " Commonwealth") has filed.a motion with this Board requesting that it recor. side r i
its decisior, of July 21, 1987, affirming in part and reversing in part the Licensing Board's decision admitting three contentions and allowing the Commonwealth to intervene in this proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714.
S!
STATEMENT OF ISSUES I.
Whether this board erred as a matter of law in reversing the Licensing Board's decision to admit Contention 2.
I 1/
The Commonwealth incorporates oy reference the Statement of Prior Proceedings and Facts set forth in the Applicant's Brief to this Board dated June 10, 1987 with the exception of the
.last two sentences of the last paragraph on page 10, 2/
The Commonwealth also adopts the issues and arguments as Tramed by th; New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution
("NECNP") in support of NECNP's own motion to reconsider this Board's July 21, 1987 decision.
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ARGUMENT THE APPEAL BOARD'S DISPOSITION OF CONTdNTION 2 IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN LOGIC OR LAW.
A.
The Narrow Basis of the Appeal Board Decision In reversing the Licensing Board's decision to admit Contention 2, this Board did not reject the lower Board's analyses of several arguments presented oy the Applicant and the Staff.
This Board noted that Commission regulation and case law permit litigation of this type of contention in a spent fuel-pool expansion proceeding / ALAB-869, NRC 3
(slip. opinion at 22 - 23) (hereinafter ALAB-869).
Further, the Board cited Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo' Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-06-12, 24 NRC
],
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
NRC, 799 F. 2d 1268 (9th Cir 1986) (Diablo Canyon) for the proposition that the need for an Environmental Impact Statement 3/
Further support for this proposition is found at 10 C.F.R.
S 51.23 (c) which provides:
This section (setting forth a generic determination that no significant environme,tal impact will result from temporary storage of spent fuel for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of operating licenses) does not alter any requirements to consider the environmental impacts of spent fuel storage during the term of a reactor operating license or a license for an ISFSI in a licensing proceeding.
(emphasis supplied).
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b.
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("EIS") in a spent fuel proceeding must be deteruined on a case-by-case basis-and that a petitioner seeking an EIS must
" demonstrate sufficient impacts."
ALAB-869 at.23.
This Board did not challenge the Licensing Board's determination.that contention'2 had the requisite specificity in general'and otherwise' met the test of giablo Canyon.
Significantly, the Board did not overturn the Licensing Board's rejection of the Staff's' argument that Contention 2 is barred by the NRC's "P'licy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future o
f Designs and Existing Plants," 50 Fed.-Reg. 32,138 (1985)
(" Severe Accident Policy").4!
Instead, taking its cue from an argument presented by the Staff and developing it farther, this Board determined that "as a matter of law" Contention 2 is barred because it:does not present an issue that Can.be adjudicated in an individual proceeding.
ALAB-869 at 24-29.
4/
Thus, the Severe Accident Policy does not bar litigation of the environmental impacts of severe accidents, the. safety-aspects of which would be barred.
Philadelphia Electric Co.,
(Limer.ick Generatina Station, Units 1.and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 696 (1985) is not to the contrary.
In that case, the intervenor attempted to litigate safety issues as " design alternatives" under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 0.S. SS 4323 et se. ("NEPA") Id. The Board neld that
"[ilt is unreasonable to e leve the coE51ssion intended to preclude litigation of sovc a accident mitigation measures under the rubric of se.iety issues, while permitting the i
litigation of the same subject matter as an environmental issue "
Id. at 696 n.
10 (emphasis supplied).
In fact, in Limerick,.the EIS did evaluate the environmental impact of severe accidents, i
i A
d B.
Staff Conflated Risks and Probabilities The Staff in its Brief on appeal to this Board argued:
It would be anomolous [ sic] to apply a rule of reason to the preparation of a final EIS but require a supplemental EIS for a limited atandment to a-license to address remote and highly improbable consequences when there is no basis for asserting that environmental risks would be significant.
This.wculd lead to the result of a continuing agency requirement to supplement its EISs with consideration of effects that were not significant enough to require preparation of an EtB in the first J
place.
[ citation omitted]
Staff's Brief at 15.
As a matter of both fact and law this analysis is seriously flawed.
The Staff has conflated environmental risks and probabilities and misread Commission policy.
Contention 2 concerns very real and dramatic consequences on the human environment that would result from an event or events with low probabilities of occurrence.5!
- However,
"[b]oth the probability and the magnitude of a nuclear accident contribute to its risk San Luis Obispo I
Mothers For Peace v.
N.R.C.,
751 F.2nd 1287, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (San Luis obispo).
An action that increases the negative consequences of an event increases the risks of that event even if the probability of occurrence does not change.
Therefore, the Staff's discuscion is based on a non sequitur:
l 5/
The Commonwealth in its Contention 1 averred that the l
expected frequency of a severe accident was "non-negligible,"
however.
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l Contention 2 falls because no significant environmental risks are posed by " remote and highly improbable consequences."5/
Moreover, the Licensing Board determined that aa adequate basis
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l was presented for the assertion that reracking would increase environmental risks by increasing the consequences of a severe 4
accident.
This Board did not reject that finding.
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C.
Staff Misread Commission Policy and Case Law j
l The Staff finds it anomalous that an EIS evaluating the risks of a severe accident would have to be prepared now when such an EIS was not a requirement when Vermont Yankee received its operating license.
But there is no anomaly here.
As the Staff itself noted, prior to 1980 and the Commission's Interim Policy on " Nuclear Power Plant Accident Considerations Under l
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," 45 Fed. Reg, i
1 40,101'(1980)
(" Interim NEPA Policy"), such an EIS was not required by the NRC and not mandated by NEPA.
Vermont Yankee received its operating license prior to the adoption of the i
Interim NEPA Policy.
But this fact does not signify that no y/
In the same vein, the staff is in error when it contends that before 1980 the " effects" of a Class 9 accident "were not significant enough to require preparation of an EIS."
Staff's Brief at 15 (emphasis supplied).
Not the con. sequences of a severe accident on the environment but the low probability and therefore corresponding low " risk" of such an accident led the NRC, prior to 1980, to omit discussion of such accidents and their consequences in its EIS's.
See Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 510 F. 2nd 796, 799-800 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (upholding NRC EIS policy regarding Class 9 accidents because of their probability).
The Staff's confusion on this point is a cause and effect of its misreading of the relevant case law. '
__________-.________________________u
i such EIS could ever be required.
For example, had Vermont Yankee sought an operating license after 1980, then the NRC's EIS would have considered the environmental impact of a severe accident.
Similarly, if an EIS is necessary as a result of the proposed reracking, it may well have to include an evaluation f the environmental impact of a severe accident in light of that reracking.
In fact, the changed circumstances that wi13 result from the reracking may well constitute those "special ci rcumstances" recognized by the NRC in its Interim NEPA Policy.
Id. at l
40,103.
In such "special circumstances", the obligation to provide an expanded EIS which includes an evaluation of a I
severe accident is made retroactive to those licensees, like Vermont Yankee, that received their licenses before the adoption of the Interim NEPA Policy.
See San Luis Obispo, supra at 1303.
Logically, if, in certain c. circumstances, an EIS prepared before 1980 must be supplemented to. include discussion of the impact ~of a severe accident then a license amendment, which itself replicates those circumstances, may trigger the requirement for such an EIS.Z!
Special circumstances exist in those cases in which "the environmental risk from such an accident, if one occurred, would be substantially greater than that for an average plant."
Public Service Co. (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2),
7/
At the contention-admission stage of this proceeding, the Commonwealth need only show that the reracking may tequire an t
EIS becauce of its significant impact on the environment. l l
1
CLI-80-8, 11 NRC 433,434 435 (1980).
In fact, as the discussion in San Luis Obispo makes clear, a " routine recacking" could require such a retroactive supplementation of a pre-1980 EIS:
The parties initially disagree as to whether the special circumstances exception speaks only to cases in which the consequences of an accident, if one occurred, would be unusually severe, or whether the exception speaks to exacerbated probabilities as well.
Despite the silence of the Statement of Interim Policy and the ambiguous language of the Black Fox opinion, we believe that petitioners are correct in espousing the latter view.
Both the probability and the magnitude of a nuclear accident contribute to its risk; unusual factors that I
exacerbate that risk demand special consideration, regardless of whether they make an accident more likely or more catastrophic.
San Luis Obispo Mothers of Peace v. NRC, supra at 1304 (emphasis supplied).
D.
Board Takes Staff Position One Step Farther But Two Steps Back Having accepted the Staff's purported anomaly based on a confusion of probabilities with risks, this Board took the argument "one step farther."
ALAB-869 at 27.
The Board set forth a two pronged analysis leading to the determination that 1
1 8/
The Commonwealth raises this point as argument in support of the proposition that this Board erred in holdf.ng that as a i
matter of law Contentien 2 could not be litigated.
If j
Contention 2 could raise the issue of retroactive supplementation of an EIS then, mutatis mutandis, it can support the litigation of the issue whether a new EIS is required.
i ________________________________ __ O
f t
n ast a matter of.' law Contention 2 cob' d not be litigated.
- First, the Board noted that NEPA does not require NRC consideration of beyond design-basis accidents ir.: an EIS.O!
ALAB-869 at 27.
Standing alone, this'is also a non sequitur.
No party ~to this
. proceeding has' contended that in every instance an EIS otherwise mandated must include an evaluation of severe
. accidents.
Further, no party has contended that an EIS is
~
mandated simply because of the possibility of'a' severe accident.- Rather, the contention at issue asserts that an EIS l
is'necessary because reracking will increase the consequences and therefore the risks of a severe accident and such an increase in risk has a "significant impact" on the environment.
9/
However, as noted, the Interim NEPA Policy does contemplate
.that.in "special circumstances" an already final EIS should be supplemented to include an evaluation of the effects of a severe accident.
In fact, in Sar. Luis Obispo the court discussed precisely those circumstances in which an EIS would have to be supplemented in accordance with the NRC Interim NEPA'
. Policy..
Finding neither increased consequences nor increased probabilities of a severe accident due to.the proximity of the Hosgri Fault, the San Luis Obispo court determined that no expanded EIS was required.
Importantly, the issue of increased environmental risk (resulting from increased consequences
.and/or probabilities) was,1.itigated in that case.
Again, if a final.EIS would have to be supplemented to include an evaluation of a severe accident because of "special circumstances," including increased consequences of such an accident, then analogously a change of circumstances requiring a license amendment which arguably increased the consequences (although not necessarily the probabilities) of a severe accident'may require its own EIS.
The fact that in one instance th? NEPA legal standard is applied to the content of an-EIS and in the other to the need for an EIS is immaterial. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
9 Having stated that NEPA does not recuire an expansive EIS-,
the Board then construed the Licensing Board decision as being based on such a faulty premise."[T]he Licensing Board erred in its belief that NEPA ' mandate (s]' consideration of the risks of the accident hypothesized here."
ALAB-869 at 27-20.
But the l
Board misread the Licensing Board opinion.
The Licensing Board in rejecting the Staff's argument that the Severe Accident Policy precluded litigation of severe accidents in both safety and environmental contexts, held that the litigation bar of this policy does not extend to "NEPA -- mandated consideration of the risks of such an accident."
LBP-87-17 at 27-28.
The i
Licensing Beard did not find that NEPA mandates an EIS that considers severe accidents in every circumstance but rather that the NRC's Severe Accident Policy does not bar litigation of the need for such an EIS in every case.10/
Further, the
' Licensing Board did not base its admission of Contention 2 on any notion that an EIS evaluating a severe accident is mandated as a matter of law by NEPA but instead found that the
. Intervenous set forth with the requisite specificity the contentior, that the proposed reracking increased envirc* mental 10/
This Board, as noted, did not take issue with the f
Licensing Board's limited reading of the Severe Accident Policy's bar doctrine.
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risks'and thus will have a.significant impact.11/
Having. misconstrued'the basis of.the Licensing Board decision,1 this' Board' proceeded to find Contention 2 barred as a
. matter of law.
The Board reasoned as follows:
(1) consideration of beyond design-basis accidents-is-discretionary under the Interim NEPA Policy; (2).this Policy is not applicable'to a license' amendment proceeding; (3) further,.this Po'licy applies'only to those cases in which it'has already been' determined that an EIS is necessary
'and, therefore,-the' Policy' concerns only the content of an EIS and not the necessity to prepare one; (4) therefore, before the Policy is invoked,-there must be i
some. basis for'an EIS other than a claim of increased risk from a beyond design-basis accident scenario; (5)' Interveners point to no independent basis for an EIS I
other than increased risk from a' severe accident; and therefore 11/
In context, the Licensing Board's reference to "NEPA-mandated consideration" of severe accidents indicates that it meant simply to delineate the difference between safety and environmental sources of law.
The Licensing Board immediately referenced the Interim NEPA Policy which reiterated that-NEPA does not mandate EIS discussion of severe accidents but that in appropriate circumstances the NRC will exercise its discretion and issue such an EIS.
The Licensing Board in 6dmitting Contention 2 simply determined that that contention properly raised the issue of whether this reracking constitutes such appropriate circumstances.
I I 1 i
4 '
t (6) "as a matter of law under NEPA" Contention 2 is not j
litigable in this proceeding.
(ALAB-869 at 29 n. 28).
This reasoning will not wichstand analysis.
First, the Board's syllogism requires the unarticulated and incorrect premise that the.NRC's obligations under NEPA are limited by the NRC's Interim NEPA Policy.
However, that Policy does not exhaust the NRC's NEPA obligations but instead deals only with a set of NRC actions.
Therefore, whether the Policy applies to this proceeding or not is not dispositive. The issue instead is whether the license amendment and the actions it permits constitute a major federal action having a significant impact on the environment.
Second, the Board leaps from the fact that the Interim NEPA Policy deals with the content of an already-required EIS to the i
conclusion that if an EIS is not already required, increased environmental risk from a beyond design-basis accident resulting from a change of circumstances can not constitute I
independent grounds for an EIS.
This is simply bad logic.
The Policy deals only with the content of EISs already required and does not expressly or impliedly establish or delimit the circumstances when an EIS is required.
Nothing supports the Board's assertion that a change of circumstances resulting in increased risk from a beyond design-basis accident cannot be independent grounds for an EIS.
No such generic exclusion is contained in the list of categorical exclusions, 10 C.F.R.
S 51.22.
1
1 i
Third, the Board's syllogism ignores the facts of the very case on which it relies.
As noted, in San Luis Obispo, supra, I
the Court held that an EIS may be required to be supplemented
)
in light of the claim that there is an increased environmental risk based solely on a beyond design-basis accident.1S!
The proper focus under NEPA is the reality of the increased risk and not whether the EIS is required on some other basis or not.
If a contention raises the issue of increased risk from a spent fuel reracking with the requisite specificity then the fact that an EIS is not otherwise necessary has no relevance.12!
FoLrth, from the undisputed fact that NEPA does not mandate or require an EIS in every circumstance involving environmental risks from severe accidents, the Board has concluded that NEPA 12/
As discussed, the Court found no increased risk but the Issue was fully litigated.
The Board also relies on Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co.,
687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 3982).
Howevet, in that case the Licensing Board reviewed the Staff's Environmental Appraisal of a proposed spend fuel reracking and in order to affirm the Staff's no signi*icant impact determination evaluated the impact of a Class 9 -- TMI accident on a reracked spent fuel
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pool.
Id. at 745.
13/
Again, this argument assunes, as the Licensing Board and this Board have determined, that the Severe Accident Policy presents no generic bar to litigating Contention 2.. _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
prohibits such an EIS and any contention raising'the.need.for-1 one.
ALAB-869 at 29 n. 28.
But neither the' Interim NEPA Policy nor.NEPA itself prohibit at) EIS as a matter of law. NEPA l
sets the standard for assessing actions that may require an EIS and the Interim NEPA Policy identifies'those circumstances in which the NRC believes its-Staff'should produce or augment an EIS.. Neither the statute nor the Policy prohibit an EIS as a matter of law.
.Certainly, nothing in these directives prohibit
' litigating the issue whether in this case NEPA requires an EIS because of the change of circumstances.
In accepting the Staff's mischaracterization of.the issues I
here, and advancing farther on its own, this Board without supoort in logic or law has made the determination, in essence, that an increased environmental risk due solely to the increased consequences of a severe accident can not constitute a "significant impact."
This bare ' legal conclusion flies in the face of the Commission's holding in Diablo Canyon, supra, 24 NRC at 12, that the need for an EIS in a spent fuel reracking proceeding must be assessed case-by-case and determined on the basis of a demonstration of sufficient impact.
Moreover, the Board has reached this con sion without even permitting the Commonwealth to develop any record in this regard.
I 13 -
o
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proh'ibits such an EISLand any contention raising the need'for one.
ALAB-869 at-29 n. 28.
But!neither the Interim NEPA
. Policy:nor NEPA itself prohibit an EIS as a matter of law. NEPA sets-the standard for assessing actions that may require an EIS'
,and-the; Interim NEPA Policy identifies those circumstances in
~
which the.NRC believes its Staff should produce or augment an
~
EIS.-
Neither the statute nor the Policy prohibit an EIS as a
- matter o'f law.
Certainly, nothing in these directives prohibit litigating the issue whether in this case NEPA requires an EIS l
because of the change of circumstances.-
In accepting the Staff's mischaracterization of the issues here, and advancing farther on its own, this Board without support in logic or-law has made the determination, in essence, that an increased environmental risk due solely to the l
increa'ed consequences of a severe accident can not constitute s
a "significant impact."
This bare legal-conclusion flies in the. face of the Commission's holding in.Diablo Canyon, supra, 24'NRC at 12, that the need for an EIS in a spent fuel reracking' proceeding must ce assessed case-by-case and determined on the basis of a demonstration of sufficient impact.
Moreover, the Board has reached this conclusion without even permitting the Commonwealth to develop any record in this regard.
I s
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l CONCLUSION j
l For all of the reasons set forth above, this Board should reconsider its Decision of July 21, 1987 and affirm the Licensing Board's decision with respect to contention 2.
Respectfully submitted, JAMES M.
SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL By:
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W h
kCm Ge ge B.
Dean
(
ohn Traficonte As9' lear Safety Unit istant Attorneys General N4c spartment of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-1083 0064n 1 -__
i XtriiT
'h" l
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
{
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'87 AUG 13 P3 :07
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3
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u 0u n.:
3
"'h" In the matter of
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f
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l Vermont Yankee Nuclear
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Docket No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
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(V^rmont Yankee Nuclear
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Power Station)
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l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l
I, John Traficonte, hereby certify that on August 10, 1987, I made service of the within documents entitled Motion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to Reconsider the Decision of This Board Dated July 21, 1987 and Memorandum of Law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Its Motion for Reconsideration of ALAB - 869., by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, by first class mail to:
Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire David J. Mullet, Esquire Chairman Vermont Department of Administrative Judge Public Service j
Atomic Safety and Licensing 120 State Street Board Panel Montpelier, VT 05602 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i
I
w d
Mr. Glenn O. Bright Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire m
Administrative Judge Harmon & Weiss Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite 430 Board Panel 2001 S.
Street, N.h.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20009 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. James H. Carpenter Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
J=
Administrative Judge Ropes & Gray L
Atomic Safety and Licensing 225 Franklin Street Board Panel Boston, MA 02110 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission hashington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Ann P.
Hodgoon, Esquire Board Panel Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, DC 20555 hashington, DC 20555 Geoffrey M. Huntington, Esquire Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Chairman Environmental Protection Agency Atomic Safety and Licensing State House Annex Appeal Panel 25 Capitol Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Concord, NH 03301-6397 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Howard A. Wilber Appeal Panel Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Panel Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christine N.
Kohl, Chairman Washington, DC 20555 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Gary J.
Edles Appeal Panel Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Panel Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20555
/ Y,l Nb /ifMl-NT John Traficonte Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety Unit
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Dated:
August 10, 1987