ML20237G637
| ML20237G637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0654, RTR-NUREG-654 OL-5-I-SC-097, OL-5-I-SC-97, NUDOCS 8709020344 | |
| Download: ML20237G637 (3) | |
Text
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GUIDANCE MEMORANCUM AN-1 7
25 A o :15 FD% ACTICN TO QUALIFY AIZRT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTD4S MAINST NUREG-0654/FDG-REP-1 AND FDG-REP-10
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This Guidance Memorandum (GM) describes policy and procedures to be followed by l
ths Federal Emergency Management Agency (FD4A) Headquarters and Regional Offices in assessing and making findings and determinations on the adequacy of alert and Planning notification systems installed around ccramercial nuclear power plants.
Standards E, F, and N and Appendix 3 of NURm-0654/FDG-REP-1, and FEMA-REP-10, the " Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and tbtification Systems for Nuclear Powr Plants" contain the specific technical criteria against which alert and notification system designs will be re"iewed.
Bis GM supersedes the currently operative G4-18, Revision 1, entitled "FD4A Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUPEG-0654/FD4A-REP-1, Revision 1" dated October 19, 1983.
BACKGROUND S
The President of the United States, in a statenent.on December 7,1979, assigned FUG as the lead Federal Agency for coordinating State and local radiological ener-gency planning and preparedness activities arcund camercial nuclear power plants.
Bis responsibility included evaluating and approving State and local radiological emergency planning and preparedness for dealing with the consequences of an accident at a comercial nuclear power plant.
Following this Presidential directive, FDM and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) jointly produced, in November 1980, NUREG-0654/FD%-FEP-1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
This guidance document provides the basis for the develognent of radiological emer-gency response plans and preparedness by State and local goverrrnents and the NRC licensees for dealing with accidents at ccmnercial nuclear powr plants.
NUREG-0654/FD4A-REP-1 also provides the basis for the review of radiological emergency response plans and preparedness by Federal agencies.
Appendix 3 of NURE-0654/FDG-REP-1 states that NRC licensees are required to install alert and notification systems around commercial nuclear power plants and thet activation of these systems is the responsibility of the State and local governments. The licensees were mandated by NRC to have alert and notification systens installed arcund cperating ccmmercial nuclear gewer plants by February 1, 1982 (originally by July 1, 1981).
Any nuclear powr plant scheduled for operation after February 1,1982, is required to have an alert and' notification systen installed prior to comtercial cperation of the f acility.
Through agreement with the NRC, FEMA accepted the lead responsibility for review-ing and approving alert and notification systems.
Bis included confirming that the systens are in full ccmpliance with NURE-0654/FDM-REP-1, FR4A Rule 44 CFR 350, and NRC Rule 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
As part of this lead responsibility, FD%
developed the " Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Powr Plants" (FDM-43) which was issued as interim-use guidance for 8709020344 870520 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G
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cast of the protective action reccarendation to confirm that proper pro-cedures are being follcwed.
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Durirg exercises, decision-making time should be available to offsite offic-t However, it will be incumbent upon the exercise evaluators to deter-j.
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0 mine if the time required by offsite officials to make protective action recccmendations is excessive and would result in the public being placed p
at risk. Obviously in a re'al emergency, the nature of the emergency will
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dictate the amount of time available to offsite officials in arriving at Similarly, during an exercise, the protective action recommendations.
scenario and exercise play will give an indication of what reasonable de-cision-making time is and when a lack of action should result in a required corrective action citation or deficiency.
Decision-making time could range frcm absolutely zero in a sericus, fastbreaking accident, to the more J.ikely situation whereby consultation time would be available to offsite officials.
Once the offsite officials make a decision to implement a protective action, the 15-minute clock begins. Since every exercise is different, the decision-making time observed will vary.
- Primarv. Route Alertinc If route alerting is a primary means of providing the alert signal, the' Region can assign evaluators to acccmpany the individuals performing this function to confirm that proper procedures are followed and that the ap-plicable 15-or 45-minute requirements are achieved including all steps cut-lined in FEMA -RET-10 (e.g., mobilization of personnel, transit time to the beginning of the route).
If multiple routes are involved and sufficient evaluators are not available for evaluating every route, a sampling of the routes may be chosen for evaluation, possibly focusing on the most difficult routes or the more populated routes.
- Backuo Reute Alertina If backup route alert and notification system procedures are demonstrated during exercises, evaluators shculd be aware of the time required for off-site authorities to cceplete the entire backuo route alerting process.
These systems are designed to be put into effect only when primary systems, especially sirens, fail. There is no hard and fast time requirement for completing the backup route alerting process; however, 45 minutes is a suggested objective for ccmpleting the process.
- Simulation It is acceptable to simulate the activation of alert and notification systens during exercises.
However, even though the system activation is being simu-lated, the 15-minute capability can still be confirmed.
It is important that all jurisdictions participating in the notification process are operating off the same simulated alert activation time. Route alerting times should be con-Eirmed through actual observation.
Even though the notification process is being simulated, the observer should see the preparation of the instructional message, coordination with participating jurisdictions, communication with the broadcast station and completion of the authentication process.
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