ML20237G094
| ML20237G094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1986 |
| From: | MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237G050 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-327 PR-860327, NUDOCS 8708130307 | |
| Download: ML20237G094 (13) | |
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' THE COMMONWEAL.TH OF MASSACHUSETTS
,7lr En cuTive DEPARTMENr f
STATL HOUSE
- DCSTON 02133 i '5
<ce n 5 ouc os a a nu s-( March 27, 1936 l
l ( St Ater!ent of Governor Mtobasi S. Dukakis ! on Sechroc_y E prgency Responeo Plans Attornay Genera! Dellott3 and I are .toiming today to accoucca the Co:r.t;onwealth's position on tha atergenoy respopeo place for the six Massachaustto com: unities located in tbo eveoustion tone of the Seabrook r.ucient powar plant. The Attorney Gonstal and hi.= staff have worked for many years on tFa legni issues ral Aed by the siting of the nuclear plant at Seabrook. Her:bers of r.y own airladatration have workel intensively for msny months on tho l ovsoustion pJans WMch.n:st- be approv<-d bafore tre Saabrook plant can b:s j licens2d to operata. While thare is cr.'e lef t to be dons on thoes plana, wa' have coce to none beeio conclusions. First an:1 foremost, wa believe thare wil] be a 83gnificantly incrassed hazard pased to the public in tha aurmer nanths whon ths Seabrook pient. is in oporatd<>n. The area around tha St<sbrook plaat is a difficult aras to esseunta, particularly dur3"6 those sur.mor weuka when so rany Nsen:ha40tt9 residents and visitors uso the ben 3hos in the vicinity. Vo tsu crke1 very hard to reduce this inrraased bnzard by developtrg the best emergency plans wo enn, bat w have conclu: led that the on2y prudent wsy to protect against thia hazard is for the Seabrook plant to shut-down during those aur .er conths, until soeb
+1ee no adenuata sh91+or for tbs public cen be piant9d end built.
We era prepsred to erk.espaditious3y and in good faith to eat etmiards for shel:er.*, which wa culd expect the Ssabrook ownora to conot.ract. under the Oc:: .on-,nith's supnviaton Until sueb tite as thoes sholtars era available to be public, howsvsr, wa w211 ineiot that the Seabrock plant not operate during the period of posk beach desga.
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Vo do not believe trat the evaccetion plans are adequate or capable of impleesotation during the su:=sr conths, unican the Senbrook plant in abut down or adequate shelter is tv piece. For that reanon I do not. believe the plems aro aufficient for an esercias unle?e thsre is aseuracco that. either com:iitton, shut-down or aholter, la ::st by the Soabrook p3 ant. I,et me any that. I hope that the Seabrook owners will work with us ao thot wo can put theos prudent. sofesuerde into place for the protection of the public. I think it bao been.c3 ear from tha atart of construction at Seabrook that the siting of the plant at that location wou)rf n:ske the protection of the public difficult, It is unfortunate that the nucionr rece}atoxf process regarde plant. er:ergency planningc as a2r ost s last atep in the liconsivg of a nuclear Thio has not boon an easy pro 0 ens for the citizens of the affected co sunities. Their concern and their involvement in this process has been a tremendous help to c:e a 4 to the Attor:sey 03naral. We will continue to work closely with those affected as thf e proceos Soop f o rweird . To this en1, I hava inetracted Public Sofety Secretsry Chorles Barry. to Po3d a publio hearing within two w3 eke. at which the evacustion plans, with this ir.portant. now provision, will be reviewed by the citicana of the affected cor.::un.t ties, o 1055E-
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M The Boston Hetalo. Wedne, day. July 23.191 i FRom To9 G m J A T A s6 ,.. g iro Perus
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P c la Public G v12.fafety SecretaryG
$ ; created a alle among the utility's Charles Untry and Energy $cere.
DUkO execidives, who claim the reporg la a guide for Dukakis = caught tietween as samleus busteess comsnunity and a strong antl ou. tary Sharca l'ollard. What's more.the r. port statesit was a preject " performed in con. clear movesseet -te aveld snak. jucilon with...iDukakin't Er.% nUkO ing a po(Itically tougt deciaten. The federal government re. flulrta eV6CilAtlgn plpMR fgr gli mic Development Offics" ana written with Hubbard's assis. lance. Thu rcport c.dvises Dukak's to communities within a 30 selle ra. take advantage of a " flaw"in ene S Il , 61us of the plant. Approvalof eva. cuallenplans forthe 5eabrook seu.
] clear power pladt is a amajor ficensing prueces that gives him power to 4adefinitely delay aute mission of an emergency evacus.
e , hurdle for ning of Seahreek. lan for federal review, "If he's tol laga atrategylike tion it ap!*o outlines how the admla. that for polltleal gala. that's the letration can follow that strategy height of k. O Z!bility." aald and not be accused of being "op. Coorte Edwards, president of - portunistic."
"Falture to submit a plan would ]
(Jnited Illuminating Co. a Coa. readily be perceived as anillegitt. i poeticut utillty whh a17.5 percent mate use of the flaw lathe federal, stake in the Scabrook plant. process which puta the otherwise "I would hope he'd turn his back well. intentioned utility at the , T on that mort of advice.- mercy of opportun,,isde state and ty FRANK Pltti.fJPS
- Dukakia aide Tom Hubbard local government. It states.
said the study - written by Kaa. "The key to avolding this enyt l j nedy School student ftovert Fits. acterization." according to ther cOV. Michael Dukakia, e off6ctal report. "lles in focusing on safety l just days before the siennsons stato repcriand- was not fhegever. denied The ambiguity of { cosicerns. . Chernobyl dlaaster, ap- no,,,, ,ciying on gg gw .t, , safety Samues provides a broad
*The governor as dng om proved a secret study on shield frum accusations of oppor.
' now to delay approval of own Instincts and on advice I'm tunts m." evacuation plans for the giving him sad others," he said. in delaying submission to the l Seabrook nuclear power However. Hubbard - who is fedecalguvernmentof evacuation Dukakis* chief adysser on sea. plans for me six M State com-plant. The Herald has brook -acknowledged the report, munttles within 20 miles of the I co85pletodia carly Aprii.waa giv. bhdA.WDW learned'tud The s April by a e
'nnedy written in Schoolen to Dukakis and two cahtaat
, pointed to snicty considerations, For emansple. Dukakis has pub-shident in conjunction with liety called on New Hampshire I the governor's offlee, ad. '
vises a hands off strategy { hhore Yankee up -safety the piant's issues.bullecr Such as-to that would force Ihe fcccral l* guntantcca of beach shelters and government to step in. summer shutdowns for beech Dukakte's strategy to j crowds. dMe has almost perulleted The reports crincludes that Du- I the advice contained in the kukis han em. ugh Irvcrage within study.. . the emrrgency planning procce-The 92 page study has dores established by Corgress to Turri to Page 12 ' hold up the Scabrt*k opening.
- ". . .the Gut ertwr han an incen.
I a. Live to delay autmith=6cn." the re twin 6tnin.rl.uming such a staff lkJ N DN ) i d" T M W .1 (fTL(k' r..ul.l tiring prneure un the fed. cral g nernment t.: step in and 1 L 'hc Pr' e** Q {Y q 44JM WT b e (R . yys (ahe hew
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. Enclosure v
- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SEABROOK STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N05.: 50-443 AND 50-444 EMERGENCY PLANNING SEh5ITIVITY STUDY
- 1. Describe how the overpressurization calculations made by SMA were checked or design reviewed.
- 2. A meeting should be arranged with the originator of these calculations to assist the BNL reviewers in following these calculations and understanding the assumptions.
- 3. Eccument the basis for the assumptions in the calculations. In particular, explain the uncertainty factors assigned to various pressure capacities. '
4 Explain the mechanism for transferring the load from the penetration sleeves to the containment wall, in particular, the equipment hatch, when subjected to high strain conditions. Explain how the rebars around the penetrations were assessed to assure that they can resist these loads in addition to the primary pressure induced loads. !o
- 5. The calculations use a rebar ultimate stain value of 4.7%, i.e., more than l
21 feet of linear extension for the hoop bars. This linear extension under the high pressure load will be accommodated by formation of cracks in the concrete totaling approximately 21 feet in width. Justify the assumption that the pressure loads will be carried proportionately by the linear plate and the rebars (similar to the elastic condition) in this highly cracked condition. Also address the potential for developing a crack large enough for the local extension of the liner plate to lead to its failure at that point. ,
- 6. Wds compatibility of strains in the rebars and the liner plate satisfied in the calculations? For example, the outermost hoop bars will fail before the inside bars and the liner plate reach their respective ultimate strengths.
Was this fact reflected in the calculations? In addition, how is the biaxial stress-strain state of the liner plate considered.
- 7. The combined tension, shear and bending effect at base and spring line levels was not considered in the calculations (Ref. p. 35, assumption 6).
Verify that the combined effect does not change the conclusions of the analysis. r
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. ' Sir!ce'-31 cadwelds out of a total of 169 test samples failed at a stress lower than the rebar ultimate strength and there was apparently a i construction problem concerning staggering of these welds, provide '/
\% justification for not usin,g,_a_ reduced-ulttmate strIK tH~for g the rebar.
- 9. The containment, analysis is based on an axisymmetric geometry and loading. , t This is not the case due to the presence of adjoining structures such'as -
the fuel building and main steam and feedwater pipe chase. Identify these axisymmetric conditions and assess their impact on the failure modes and analysis.- . 4
- 10. Only a sample of pipe penetrations are considered in some detail (X-23, X-26andX-71). The justification to consider.only these should be-provided.
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- 11. A structural evaluation of electrical penetrations should be provided. -
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- 12. The basis for the leakage' area assigned to the flued head a'. failure i should be provided.
- 13. A-mure detailed evaluation of the impact of punching shear at the Fuel Transfer Building should be provided.
- <- 14 Clarify the extent to which double ended piping failures have been considered in the overall containment performance assessment. Provide isometric drawings of all piping attached to containment penetrations.
- 15. In PLG-0465, page 2-10 Figure 2-3, the conditional frequency of exceeding whole body dose vs distance appears to be driven by the S2 source term. If this is the case, please describe all accident. sequences
.(internal and external events) that contribute to the frequency of the 52 source term given in Table 4-2, pg. 4-7. in particular, define how the timing and size of containment leakage was determined for each of these classes of accident sequences. Justify the appropriateness of the binning of each of the accidents into this particular source term. {
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- 16. Provide justification for the liner yield stress increase from the specified yield stress of 32 ksi to a mean yield stress of 45.4 ksi.
- 17. Indicate the correlation between containment failure sequences and the 1 containment failure modes.
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- 18. Provide the basis for concluding that the sight glasses in the hatches will not fail under high containment temperature and pressure conditions.
- 19. Document the effect that the recent update in seismic frag 1lities will have on the conclusions of the PSA results.
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i~ 3 FC. Assess the impact on risk of using the assumption of ultimate containment - capability predicted by J&C analysis (150 psig).
- 21. What is the impact on risk from acci e nts during shutdown and refueling when the containment function may not be available?
- 22. It is the staffs understanding that preexisting violations of containment .
integrity were " included" in the PSA by assuming the average effect was to raise the containment leak rate to the design basis value of 0.1%/ day,
- a. Compare this assurrption with the containment integrity violation data presented in hUREG/CR 4220.
- b. Khat contributions would these containment integrity violation data make to the probabilities for each of the release categories (Assume the 55W category is redistributed over all the appropriate categories .-
by the conditional probabilities of preexisting leakage paths of the sizeappropriatetoeachcategory).
- 23. a. Provice a narrative description that quantitatively delineates the dominant contributors to the dose probability vs distance curves and the early fatality probability curves. The dominant release categories should be specified and the dominant accident sequences
... contributing to each of these release categories should be specified.
The probability of occurrence of each release category should be stated. These data should be provided for the current study and for the original PSA results. Changes between the two studies should be attributed to specific differences in the analysis,
- b. Provice a set of e6rly fatality conditional probability curves for each release category, assuming evacuation distances of 1 mile a.nd 2 miles.
- c. Provide the conditional mean risk of early fatality for each of the curves provided in b.
24 Provide a quantitative description of the effects of the following differences between the original PSA and the current study:
- a. reduction in probability of core-melt V sequences
- b. factor of 1000 scrubbing of releases through RHR seals
- c. change of release category (56 to S1) for unscrubbed event V sequences.
l The effects should be described in terms of differences in risk curves for early fatalities and fur 200 rem vs distance. .
- 25. Provide a list of all paths for loss of RCS inventory outside containment.
Show how these have been considered with respect to LOCA and with respect to containment bypass for radioactive materials following core damage. r
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- 26. Indicate the extent to which the effect of local deflagration / detonation of hydrogen qas concentration in localized areas both inside and outside the containment has been considered in the assessment of risk. Include a discussion'of how weak areas of' containment have been considered in --
your assessment, for example, the containment is considerably weaker ' in its resistance to pressure loading from outside the containment.
- 27. Discuss the effect on risk of hydrogen deflagration / detonation in the RHR -
vault.
- 28. Identify-any penetrations connected directly into the containment atmosphere which rely on any remote manual or manual valves for isolation.
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- 4 As you know I have been concerned for some time about the feasibility of protecting the public in the vicinity of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Stablon in the event of a serious accident, especially during the summer months. As a result, this office has participated in all proceedings involving the p- evacuation issue and commisaloned a study by a b nationally-recognized expert in the field of nuclear accident
' analysis. He has concluded that under many conditions it is not possible to evacuate safely the persons in the vicinity of this plant in the event.of a severe accident on a summer weekend. Indeed, it is hiarcon'clusion that it will not be possible to avoid'even immediate fatalities,16 alone less l serious or more long-term health effects. And this is true
( even if one accepts the utility's short evacuation time ' estimates. (I am attaching a copy of a document which my staff filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission detailing the
, results of this study.)
l While the ef forts to date to develop the bebt possible . emergency plans for Seabrook have been important, given the huge summer weekend population in the immediate vicinity of the plant I contend that even the best possible emergency plans J will not necessarily protect the public. In other words, there
- remains a serious question of the feasibili_ty,of effective -
energency response which is independent of any particular plans and which I intend to raise in the state planning process, before the NRC, and possibly even the courts. - r 7: / W g I Q, .
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zou too v114 pisy a critical role in tne evaluation Before you approve any draf t plan, therefore, I urge you to consult with this office. The Assist' ant Attorneys , General who handle Carol Sneider (727-2265). this matter for me are Jo Ann shotwell and Please feel free to gentact either
- of them for further information on t nclosed filing or on any other evacuatlog-related matte of nterest o you.
V r* y your
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FR , IB Attorney General
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CONSEQUENCES TO THE BEACH POPULATION AT SEABROOK STATION FRO'i THE WASH-1400 ACCIDENTS WITH THE SHORTEST RELEASE TIMES
SUMMARY
NUREG-0654 (Reference 1) requires that the emergency plan for a nuclear power plant consider radionuclides releases, defined in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (Reference 2), which have release times of 0.6 hour to 24 hours. During a warm summer day, the beaches can have a high population density in proximity to the site. This population density must be considered should an evacuation be necessary. Calculations have been completed to determine the whole-body doses that coulc occur at the closest beach location from the accidents that, as determined in WASH-1400, have a release time of 0.5 hour. The closest location of a beach to the plant is 1.75 miles east of the Seabrook site. Assumptions regarding the release of radioactive materials were taken from WASH-1400. Only the PWR-8 and PWR-9 releases have short release times of 0.5 hour. All other releases listed in WASH-1400 have release times of 2 hours or longer. 'The PWR-8 release is more severe than the PWR-9 release. The results of the calculations for'PWR-8 are summarized in Table 1. A whole-body dose of 5 rem, which was established by the EPA as the protective action guideline (PAG) (Reference 3) for implementing population protection measures, is not reached at any time, given a release typified by the PWR-8 release category. Furthermore, for a PWR-8 release, the thyroid PAG dose of 25 rem is also not exceeded at the beach for the beach weather scenarios. The integrated mean (or average) whole-body dose, assuming an accident. occurs at any random time, would be 0.1 rem within 8 hours after the accident. The maximum integrated whole-body dose under weather conditions conducive to large' beach populations would be less than 1 rem at 1.75 miles from the plant. The doses from a PWR-9 release are even lower. The methodology and assumptions used for the calculations are described below.
- 1. INTRODUCTION The guidelines for emergency planning at nuclear power facilities are defined in NUREG-0654 (Reference 1). These guidelines require that radionuclides release times that range from one-half hour to 24 hours be considered. The technical bases for these emergency planning guidelines are defined in NUREG-0396 (Reference 4). The analyses of doses performed in NUREG-0396 are based on radionuclides releases, which were determined in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (Reference 2). Therefore, the j range of release times for the radionuclides releases, which are required i to be considered in developing the offsite emergency plan for Seabrook Station, are traced directly to the release categories defined in the i Reactor Safety Study. Table 2 reproduces the radionuclides release l categories determined in WASH-1400 for pressurized water reactors. These '
are labeled PWR-1 through PWR-9. From Table 2 it is seen tnat only release categories PWR-8 and PWR-9 have release times of o .e-half hour. All other release categories have release times of 2 hours er more. It is also noted that the fractional release of all radionuclides for PWR-8 I 1340P011526 >
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and PWR-? is very small. Therefore, the manner in which one-half hour release tines are considered in the Seabrook offsite emergency plan depends en the dose consequences for the population from tnese two release categories, PWR-8 and PWR-9. The Seaorook and Hampton beaches represent the closest distance from the site at which high population densities could exist during a potential accident at Seabrook Station. Population protective measures are implemented if the doses from an accident are projected to exceed the upper protective action guideline levels of 5-rem whole-body exposure or 25-rem thyroid exposare. Determination of accident doses is based on the WASH-1400 methodology. Evacuation is one of the available population protection measures. Whether or not the upper PAG levels are exceeded depends on a combination of factors, including the time of release, the mrgnitude of release, and the weatner conditions at the time of release. It is tne objective of this study to determine the dose levels on the l Seabrock teaches for those WASH-1400 releases that have a 0.5-hour release time and to place these dose levels into perspective relative to the upper limits.
- 2. SOURCE TERMS The shortest release times for accidents evaluated in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, is 0.5 hour. This occurs for the accident scenarios designated PWR-8 and PWR-9. All other accident scenarios for PWRs have release start times of 2 hours or greater. While release categories PWR-1 to PWR-7 are considered in emergency planning, they should not affect the consideration of half-hour releases, according to the emergency planning guidelines. The PWR-8 scenario involves a design basis loss of coolant accident combined with a failure to isolate the oe containment. The PWR-9 scenario is characterized by a design basis loss of coolant accident with successful containment isolation.
Table 2 shows the fraction of the total core inventory released from the containment for each of eight isotope groups. All release fractions for the PWR-9 isotope groups are less than for the corresponding PWR-8 release. Therefore, dose calculations in this study are made for the PWR-8 category, which has the larger of the two accident releases. i 1
- 3. WEATHER SCENARIOS A 1-year period of meteorological data, measured on the Seabrook site tower fron April 1979 to March 1980, was available for evaluation of appropriate meteorological scenarios for this study. The Seabrook t meteorological tower was designed and operated in accordance with the applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidelines (Reference 5).
It provides hourly data representing the site meteorological conditions that are specific to the Seabrook site. i Because this study is focused on the beach location, only ceta for periods when the weather is conducive to significant beach use were selected for evaluation. The times when a large beach population could be present are in tne daytime (between 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.n.) during 2 1340P011536
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*\ the nhamen season (f eom May 30 to Septemaar-7). Accordingly, there are j 391 beacn twurs in a year. Itc> addition, the beach p6pplation is only at risk if, at 'the ti~e of an accidental release of radioactivity from the
,' : plant, the wind direction is from the site toward the beacp(dish -
generally blow ~from the WNW, west, and WSW, sectors). An n:ur-by-hour - search of the meteorological data tape was made to isolde the weatbef , conditions that met these criteria. Of;the 891 beach hours, the wine ' directin W from the site to' the beach during '_'82 hours, cr one-tnied of the time.
- Table 3 shows how these 282 beach hours, with winds from the west, are distributed with respect to wind speed and atmospheric ; !
stability. It is noted that :tni)pheric stability,conStions ,E and F are not observed) /tmosphericstat,i,lityconditionsEandFrepresenpstable atmosphe es th6t only cccur dur{rg temperature inversior! conditicr,s when i the ground is colder thM the atmosphere. These conditions can oc W r during tne ni,ght or duritg cold tea-bDeeze conditions, but not on suitny days witn westsly winds. Based on in%ection ,of this taoie, six combinations rf Yind speed and stabilityjpre Selected for anatgis, itse frequency'of cgch',rence for each Jonbination dhs ceterminac and exp"Ossed as a fraction of 'lqe 282 beach hoes having westerly winds. These.six combinations and their respec;iw7tevencies are shown in Table l'. i e + The "best" beach days are ; characterizedg by sunny skies,i.na comNM wind speeds. < Mese conditions often result g onshore bre?.zes (sd-ca' lled ste. ; breezes) that would carry any releases ,f rom the plant away fro 6 the beich to the west of the plant. Thus, the fonditions selected for evaluation " in which the winds are blowing from the plant toward the beach are'not necessarily characteristic,of tje "best,Lbeach days. It is liso of interest to note that the, clear sunny CJys woul6*Pesult in consider $ble i< atmospheric turbulence due %c therr'al convection from the ground that has
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beentneated by the sun. These cordition are typified by stability classes A 1hrough C and re,sult i%CheiloWest doses,' es show) in Table 1. 1 '{ j
- 4. i METHOD 0LM v>
J s; [rl L, , Atmospheric dispersion was modeled by using the strhigM-line Gaussian plume model described % WSH' MOD, Apperdix VI,+ Sectips 4 and 6.1 Dose calculations were based on the obsimerci; mode % desenbed in Wash-1400, Appendix VI, Sectic n 8.2. The coinputerind version ot'these models are i f .ncluded intthe CR4C (Calculatiott of Reiqtof M cident Consequences) h - s computer program'that was used to prodyce the WASH-1400 results. Both ht i; the dispersirn and the dose models in CRAC were used in a version of CRAC !/ \ that was mod 1'fied by Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, 'Inc. (PLG), and is P' referred to 4s CRACIT (Calculation of Reactor Accident! Consequences
, Including % jectories). In ;4is study, all,* Esther scenarios were j assumed tc;be straight-line; therefore, there' are nc.significant differences between results produced by CRAC or,by: CRACIT.
t The six weather conditions sele'
. Table 1)wereprocessedthrough'3tedforevaluaklorinthisstudy(see CRACIT separetely. Because dose as a functienf time was of interesy fouf0RACIT runs in whicn the time was c firw.d jkere made fo each combination of release and weatre scenario.
Tl.e cyoosure times 1or each of the four runs were set at 1, 2, 4 and 8 l hours./ Since the release duration is cc'y' one-half hour, tne increasing ' e
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doses c:.3i ved for the longer time periods are due to exposure from isotopes nat are deposited on the ground. Evacuation is not modeled for dose calculations. Therefore, the calculated doses enuld only be obtained by a stationary incividual locatec 1.75 miles downwind from the point of release during the entire duration. 1 As a quality assurance verification check, the source terms for the PWR-8 release category were run through a second computer program referred to as MIDAS (Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System), which is used by PLG in support of emergency response activities. The results were in substantial agreement with those determined by using CRACIT.
- 5. RESULTS The whole body doses ccmputed using the methodology descrioed above are listed for each weather category in Table 1. As shown, none of the weather scenarios, including the worst case resulted in exposures above the upper PAG limit of 5-rem whole body for any time period out to 8 hours. In fact, even the highest calculated dose of 0.4 rem is well below the lower whole-body PAG level of I rem. Also shown in Table 1 are the weather category frequencies. Mean (or average) doses are computed by weignting the dose for each weather category. They are also shown in Table 1. The mean value: for all exposure times are well below the PAG coses. It is also interesting to note that after the first time period doses do not increase rapidly. This is due to the relatively small fraction of particulate isotopes assumed to be released in the PWR-8 release category and deposited on the ground. Thus, most of the dose is received during the time period of about one-half hour as the plume passes the beach.
Thyroid doses have also been determined although less emphasis would be placed on the thyroid PAGs due to the high cure rate for thyroid cancers. The maximum thyroid dose, calculated for combination D-2 (atmospheric stability category D, with 2 meters per second wind), is 9 rem. This dose is well below the thyroid PAG dose of 25 rem.
- 6. CONCLUSIONS The lower PAG dose of 1-rem whole body is not reached at the beach locations in the vicinity of Seabrook Station for those radionuclides releases in WASH-1400 that have a release time of less than 2 hours.
This conclusion is valid for all weather conditions that are conducive to large beach populations. Furthermore, the thyroid doses also are well below the upper PAG dose for the worst case analyzed. Therefore, even if release times as short as 0.5 hours are considered, it is concluded that the dose levels do not reach the level for which emergency actions would be undertaken and evacuation would not be requireo. All other releases in WASH-1400 have release times of 2 hours or greater, witn a typical plume travel time to the beach of 0.5 to 1 hour. 4 1340P0115?6
- 7. REFERENCES 1.
Feceral Emergency Management Agency, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," prepared for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0654, January 1980, 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), October 1975. 3. EPA, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear incidents," EPA-520/1-75-001, September 1975. 4 Collins, H. E., et al., " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0396, December 1978. 5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Guide Commission, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," 1.23, 1972. ( I 5 1340P011586 ' i
j TABLE 1.
SUMMARY
OF 00SE VERSUS TIME AFTER RELEASE FOR PWR-8* ACCIDENT Wea-her Condition ** Whole Body Oose After:t PG Wind Speed Frequency 1 Hour 2 Hours 4 Hours 8 Hours Stability (m/sec)tt (f) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) A 3 0.13 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.016 A 5 0.35 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 1 B 4 0.16 0.034 0.035 0.D38 0.041 C 3 0.10 0.099 0.100 0.110 0.120 0 2 0.17 0.300 0.320 0.350 0.400 D 5 0.09 0.135 0.145 0.162 0.187 Mean 0.0829 0.0880 0.0952 0.1089
- Release rates for PWR-9 are lower than for PWR-8; therefore, doses would be lower.
**0nly weather conditions conducive to high beach usage and westerly winds are evaluated.
tTimes are after start of release. tti m/sec = 2.2 miles per hour. I I i 1321P011086 6
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TABLE 3. BEACH HOURS PER YEAR WITH WESTERLY WIiGS,* ** CATEGORIZED BY WIND SPEED AND ATMOSPHERIC STABILITYt Beach Hours per Year Wind i Speec PG Atmospheric Stability Condition * (m/sec )tt A B C 0 0-1 1 0 0 0 1-2 0 0 1 8 2-3 12 4 2 24 3-4 31 12 5 15 4-5 36 l 12 11 16 5-6 40 14 5 8 6+ 18 2 3 2 TOTAL 138 44 27 73
- Winds from the plant toward the beach.
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~
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e i June 18,1986
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a Spence W. Perry, Acting General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency q ' Room 840 500 C Street, S.W. ) j Wasidngton, D.C. 20472 1 In the Matter of ; Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al.-~ 1 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL
Dear Mr. Perry:
I
.f In response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we ]
have evaluated, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your office, an l undated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Gray on behalf of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plant ("Dignan Memoran dum", a copy of which is attached Attachment A). Our evaluation is set forth in the following discussion.gs I The Dignan Memorandum addresses what are described as "three misconcep-tion s" pertaining to offsite emergency planning for - the Seabrook nuclear plant , and concludes that they are " false as matter of law" (Dignan Memorandum at 1). These purported " misconceptions" are as follows: A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the pubile health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook. P. That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certain time. In particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approximately 1/2 hour. ' I It should be noted, however, that under the Commission's regulations, 10 CFR I 50.3, only written regulatory interpretations provided by the Gener 1 ; Counsel will be recognized as binding upon the Commission.
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l l Spence Perry, Esq. I 1 l C. That the plans must be designed , and shown to be i able , to cope with a particular type of accident -- in particular , one involving an early release of i radioactivity off-site. For the reasons set forth below, it is our opinion that, with minor clari-fication, Mr. Dignan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and ! (B) above; however, his discussion of item (C) appears to contain an error l which requires correction. l 1 DISCUSSION i A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety. As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident may occur at the plant. In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[n]either the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2). As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-lations require a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergen cy. " la C.F.R. 9 50.47(a)(1). With respect to offsite matters, the NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented." Id., 5 50.47(c)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any demonstration of " absolute assurance" that the public will be totally protected in the event of a radiological emergency. Rather, the intent of the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of an accident and achieve " dose savings" through protective actions that take into consideration plant conditions, evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6): The overall objective of amergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce i offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides ! (PAGs). The Appeal Board has similarly stated, "[t]he basic goal of emergency planning is . . . the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency." Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1) ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983).
I s 1 l Spence Perry, Esq. -$- L In Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre , Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized its rationale for selecting an - emergency planning basis as follows: The underlying assumption of the NRC's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR I 50.47 is that, despite application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu- , clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite I individuals may become contaminated with radioactive ; material or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi- l ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is ! required as a prudent risk reduction measure for. those - 1 individuals. Since a range 'of ' accidents with _widely differing offsite consequences . can be postulated. .the 1 regulation does not depend on the assumption that _ a . particular type of accident may or will. occur. In fact i no specific accident sequences should be specified be- 1 cause each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree. Although the emergency planning basis .is independent of specific . accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to i reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and that emergency planning may satisfy NRC regulations even though the , potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been totally l eliminated. 1 Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his conclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his i memorandum require clarification. First, he goes too far in asserting that "it has been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by definition, occur" (Dignan Memorandum at 2; emphasis added). Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a major accident accompanied by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects. Rather, in some circumstances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects. Further, whether any such health effects occur, and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction , meteorological conditions , exposure durations , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response. Secondly, his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to limit any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonably possible, "given the facilities at hand" (Id . ) , possibly implying that additional ! r
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Fpence Perry, Esq. facilities will never be required to be built or installed to satisfy NRC emergency planning regulations. In support of this statement, Mr. Dignan cites the San Onofre decision, supra. However, that decision provides only limited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, and concluded that such extraordinary measures are not required. B. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period. The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicants must l demonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be l cvacuated in some specified time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approximately one-half (1/2) hour. It is Mr. Dignan's conclusion that NRC regulations do not require that an evacuation be assured within any 1 particular time (Dignan Memorandum at 2). We concur with Mr. Dignan's i conclusion as to this item. l In support of his conclusion on this matter, Mr. Dignan cites two decisions: l Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit j No. 1), ALAB-7 2 7, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983), and Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico l Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 I (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows: The applicants are . . . correct in their insistence that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specific time limits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which evacuation can be accomplished is left to be determined 1 on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of all rele- ! vant conditions prevailing in the specific locality. But l it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with which evacution might be accom-plished given the conditions under which it must take place [n. 16]. Indeed, the Commission guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-mental officials are to make an informed decision l respecting what is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available to them time estinates which are realistic appraisals of the minimum period in which, in light of existing local conditions, evacuation could reasonably be accom-plished. And, the nearer to the plant the area that might have to be evacuated, the greater the importance of accurate time estimates,
- n. 16/ Those conditions include, for example, the size and nature of the population , the available
, . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _~
I l, Epence Perry, Esq. transportation facilities , the existing road network, i topographical features and political boundaries. . . . Zimmer , supra, 17 NRC at 770-71. Similarly, in the Fermi decision the Ap-peal Board stated: , . . . [T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do not specify the time within which the plume EPZ must be evacuated in the event of a nuclear emer-gency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 8 IV, requires only that applicants provide "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the l plume exposure pathwsy EPZ for transient and perma-l nent populations." l Ferni, supra,17 NRC at 1069 n.13. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes. While some other functions r;ust be capable of being accomplished within that time frame , those functions generally involve the notification of appropriate governmental officials and notification of the public. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, l 9 IV.D. C. Planning for A Particular Type of Accident. l The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency ' plans must be designed to cope with a particular type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site." l Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard: (1) i that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of l accidents, they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or '
"any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4), and (2) that emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (Id. , et 9-3). While we agree with the first of these conclusions , the second lionclusion is incorrect and requires clarification.
First, Mr. Dignan is correct in stating that the emergency plans must be de-signed to cope with a spectrum of accidents, but are not required to address j any particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident . " The ! Commission has decided , on a generic basis , that compliance with its emergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a); accordingly, offsite emergency plans are not required to address particular accident sequences. In the Statement of I Consideration published upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows: 1 The Commission recognizes that no single accident l scenario should form the basis for choice of notification l capability requirements for offsite authorities and for ! l t j
l .' . l Spence Perry, Esq. the public. Emergency plans must be developed that will have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide ' spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potential accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the offsite notification capability. . . . Any accident involving severe fuel degradation or core melt that results in significant inventories of fission l products in the containment would warrant immediate ! public notification and consideration , based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the con-l tainment building. In addition, the warning time avail-l able for the public to take action may be substantially l iess than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which significant radioactive re-leases take placc. . . . The reduction of notification l times from the several hours required for street-by-street notification to minutes will significantly increase the options available as protective actions un-der severe accident conditions. These actions could include staying indoors in the case of a release that has ) l already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the l l case of a potential release thought to be a few hours l away. Accidents that do not result in core melt may l l also cause relatively quick releases for which protective I actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant i vicinity, are desirable. 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980). Similarly, NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1, ! provides as follows (at 6-7): No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant off-site radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re-gardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA i Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rath-er, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and release characteris-tics of a spectrum of accidents. Although the selected planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in the development of the guidance, including
l l Spence Perry, Esq. ! the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor j Safety Study [ WASH-1400) . l Accord, San Onofre, supra, 17 NRC at 533. In Long Island Lighting Co. l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 888 (1985) (cited in Dignan flemorandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be capable of coping with any worst j case accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board l stated, "NURFG-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst l possible accident' at Shoreham . . . ." In sum, these regulatory pronouncements and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning for a nuclear plant is not required to be designed to cope with any I particular accident sequence or a " worst case accident." In this respect, we concur with Mr. Dignan's memorandum. j 1 The Dignan Memorandum is ircorrect, however, in its conclusion that the l emergency plans are not req uired to be designed to cope with an early relecse of radioactivity (Dignan Memorandum at 2-3). This error appears to , have resulted by confusing the " worst possible accident" for any cecident ! , involving an early release. While the " worst possible accident" could involve l an early release of radioactivity, other less severe accidents might also l l result in early releases and were included within the parameters which j l established the Commission's emergency plening basis. The Statement of Consideration , quoted above, clearly recognizes that "early releases" may occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the licensee is required to notify , offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an ! emergency, and that responsible offsite authorities have a capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee of an emergency condition. The following guidance is provided in NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep.1 Rev.1 (at 13-14): The range of times between the onset of accident condi-tions and the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release). . .. [G]uidance on the time of release . . . has been used in developing the criteria for notification capabilities . .
. . (Other reasons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective actions are desirable and the need for sub-stantial lead times to carry out certain protective mea-sures, such as evacuation, when this is indicated by plant conditions.)
It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessarily required, in all cases, to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have
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Spence Perry, Esq. received notification by the licensee. Rather, the time in which the public is notified will range from immediate notification (within 15 minutes after i state and local officials are notified that a situation exists which requires l urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time { availtble for them to make a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public notification system. Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute , criterion refers only to the time in which the public is to receive d notification, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to be completed. In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notification of the energency situation within 15 minutes after the licensee has declared an l l cuergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the l public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licen see . Emergency planning for accidents involving "early releases" is required -- although the protective action recommendations may be issued be fore , during or after the occurrence of an offsite release of radioactivity. There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the licensee has declared an emergency. CONCLUSION l For the rennons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to the ma*ters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:
- 1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents ; however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur. j 1
- 2. The Commission's energency planning regula-tions do not require that the evacuation of all or part of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within any particular time.
- 3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commission's emergency planning regulations and there-by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plans are not required to be '
designed for any specific accident sequence or a " worst case accident."
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- 4. Accidents involving early releases are within l the Commission's emergency planning basis, however, l the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protective actions are to be completed.
Sincerely. Edward S. Christenbury. Director and Chief Hearing. . Counsel Enclosure DISTRIBUTION: E.Christenbury / Chron i cc: J. Taylor G.Cunningham E. Jordan E . Reis T. Murley S. Turk R . Goddard R.Perlis L. Mcdonald ELD FF (2) ELD Central File 1 l i l O \ b k. OFC _ OELQ* __._ _ _ _YInb _ _ _ l_h_: _Yd: : ELD :j}bELD : i NAME : SETurk:amb :.______________:sp_ DMatthews :} E Jordan: EChristenbury : GCunningham : ______________.______________.___________._________________:___y_/ DATE : 4//f/86 : 4/'30 /86 : 4/JO/86 : hf//7/86 : 47 /86 :
i i l I I l MEMORANDUM This memorandum addresses three misconceptions which . l have arisen as to the standards to which state and municipal j emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding. { t These misconceptions are: i A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no l-t adverse effects on the public health and safety i I will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs l at Seabrook.
- B. Thar it must be demonstrated that the plans will 1 assure that all persons located in the Emergency l Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be i l
! 4 ) evacuated in some certain time. In particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in approximately 1/2 hour. C. That the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope wi}th a particular type of accident --
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in particular, one involving an early release of radioactivity off-site. Each of these propositions is false as a matter of law. First, the issue of absolute safety: Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dealing with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of
I I I t perfe-t safety. Indeed, it has been recognized from the outset of the formulation of the current emergency planning regulations that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by definition, occur. The purpose of emergency planning is to have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as low a level as reasonably pessible given the facilities at hand. Southern 1 California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983). I Second, as to the proposition that the plans must be demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time: This simply is not the law. The Appeal Boards of the Commission have so held - flatly and without equivocation. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (Wm. H. Cimmer Nuclear P:wer Station, Unit No. 1, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983); The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atem c Power .lant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983) Indeed, the only activity which the regulations specifically require to be capable of accomplishment in one-half hour is public notification. And it is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in NUREG-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document. Third , the proposition that the plans will be judged as to adequacy against a certain type of accident and in particular one involving a release as soon as 1/2 hour:
l' l That preposition is not only bad law, it is directly contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning criteria. The theory upon which the regulations were based was that-the planners should consider a spectrum of accidents. The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable of reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible. The Commission itself has stated:
"Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact, no specific accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.
Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptions were considered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
"It was never the intent of the regulation to require directly or indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construction of additional hospitals or recruitment of substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents. The emphasis is on prudent risk reduction measures. The regulation does not require dedication of resources to handle every possible j accident that can be imagined."
CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533. i
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. .- 1 Furthermore, there is no requirement thatuit be demonstrated that a plan will cope with any worst case accident. NUREG-0654 simply does not require an adequate-response for the worst possible accident. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-12, i
21 NRC 603, ESS (1985). I In short, the standard by which any emergency plan is to i be judged is whether or not it represents the best efforts of knowledgeable people through the use of reasonably l available facilities to reduce to the maximum extent reasonably pessible the adverse effects on the public health i
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and safety which will result from off-site releases 4 resulting frer a spectrum of accident scenarios. The guiding princ ples, as recently stated by an NRC Licensing Board are: l "The purpose of emergency planning is to '
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ach: eve dose savings to the general public in the event that radioactive ! material is accidentally released off i site. There is no minimum standard of pub;;c radiation dose which must be met in emergency planning. l "Absciute protection of the public ; against all radiation doses cannot be l guaranteed and is not required for all { possible accident scenarios. I "The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific preconceived accident sequence. It should instead be framed to cope with a I spectrum of accident possibilities including the worst accidents. I. t
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,e . . . , ,4 "There.is no standard. time required to '
be met for evacuation _in airadiological' , emergency. Estimates are necessary to $ determine accurately,the actual time required for evacuation. LThese 1 estimates are needed to aid-in i protective action'decisionmaking. !
"No massive investment of resources (stockpiling of supplies or construction of hospitals) are required.for emergency i planning. We will apply a practical !
standard of efficience of, utilization of existing resources (such as~ roadways and manpower) in evaluating the l acceptability of the evacuation plan." LBF-85-12 at 782. . 1 I 1 l i l
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