ML20237C762
| ML20237C762 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/21/1998 |
| From: | Haisfield M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036F268 | List: |
| References | |
| FRN-63FR32600, RULE-PR-71 AF59-2-001, AF59-2-1, NUDOCS 9808240144 | |
| Download: ML20237C762 (14) | |
Text
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 0001 4
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MEMORANDUM TO: Nuclear Document System (NUDOCS)
FROM: Mark Haisfield 2/
Rulemaking and Guidance Branch Division of Industrial and Medical Nucif ar Safety, NMSS
SUBJECT:
REGULATORY HISTORY (63 FR 32600)
Attached for your processing are the regulatory documents (PDR and CF) comprising the regulatory history of the Notice of Final Rulemaking entitled " Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste" which amended 10 CFR Part 71 (AF59-2). This notice was published in the Federal Reaister on June 15,1998 (63 FR 32600). r if you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please call me at 415-6196.
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Attachment:
Regulatory History Documents for the Final Rule (AF59-2)
(including this cover memo)
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4 9808240144 980821 PDR 71 63FR32600 PR PDR )&Y
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. ATTACHMENT l AF59-2 PDR j
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1 gjgy-2 Summary of Public Comments and Changes from Proposed Rule The purpose of this section is to present the principal public comments on the proposed rule, " Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste"; an NRC staff response to the comments (where appropriate); and a summary of the principal changes that were made to the proposed rule.
The Commission received seven comment letters from six commenters on the proposed rule. One was from a member of the public, two were from national laboratories, one was from a transportation cask designer, one was from a consulting company, and one was from DOE. In addition, DOE submitted a subsequent letter commenting on one of the other comments.
Overall, five of the six commenters supported the proposed rule and the remaining commenter, while not specifically opposing the rule, proposed changes regarding the performance of the canister and limiting its contents. A list of commenters is included at the end of this document.
l Pat 171 Section f 71.63(b) Specialrequirements forplutonium shipments Proposed Rule: For shipments of plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci), vitrified high-level waste (HLW) that meets the design criteria of 10 CFR 60.135(b) and (c) would be added to the list of solid forms of plutonium which are exempt from the separate inner container requirements of 10 CFR 71.63(b).
Comment 1: Most commenters (Nos.1,2,3,4, and 5) agreed with the proposed rule.
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Response: None.
Comment 2: Most commenters (Nos.1,2,3,4, and 5), while also agreeing with the proposed rule, believe that a technical basis does not exist for 10 CFR 71.63 and that the NRC should evaluate elimination of 10 CFR 71.63 entirely.
Comment 3: Most commenters (Nos.1,2,3,4, and 5) alternatively believe that if 10 CFR 71.60 can not be eliminated, then it should be restructured to a more performance based approach. This performance based approach would include specific criteria for identifying which forms of plutonium require double containment, rather than the current rule which specifies the forms of plutonium that do not require double containment.
Comment 4: A commenter (No. 4) believes that the Department of Energy and other interested parties have usefulinput for the Commission on the issue of elimination of 10 CFR 71.63, which is currently being evaluated by the staff under an SRM on SECY-96-215.
The commenter believes that an advance notice of proposed rule making (ANPR) would afford interested parties an opportunity to fully participate in the planned broader look at 10 CFR 71.63 and facilitate the exchange of information on this subject.
Response: The staff believes that those comments to evaluate the technical basis for 71.63, to revise @ 71.63 (other than for vitrified HLW in canisters), or to eliminate the rule, are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The NRC staff recently reviewed the technical bases for S 71.63, as directed in the SRM to SECY-96-215. The NRC staff concluded, in SECY-97-218, dated September 29,1997, that the technical bases remain valid, and that the provisions 2
provide adequate flexibility for current and future technologies. Except for the changes made in this rulemaking for vitrified HLWin canisters, the NRC staff concluded that the provisions in S 71.63 should remain unchanged. The NRC staff will further consider potential modifications to S 71.63 in its response to a petition for rulemaking, dated September 25,1997, (Docket No.
PRM-71-12) The NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition in the FEDERAL REGISTER (63 FR 8362, dated February 19,1998).
Comment 5: A commenter (No. 3) objected to tieing certification of a transportation package, under Part 71 requirements, with design criteria for HLW packages that will be emplaced in a high-level repository under Part 60 requirements, because this establishes a specious relationship between two separate sections of the regulations. These regulations were formulated separately, have separate technical bases, and combining them may lead to ur' forseen and unnecessary entanglements in the certification and licensing process for transport on the one hand, and waste disposalin geologic repositories on the other. The commenter believes that any performance criteria for transportation of HLW canisters should be contained in Part 71.
Comment 6: A commenter (No. 4) believes that tieing canistered waste approved for transport under 10 CFR 71.63 with rules for disposal of HLW under 10 CFR 60.135(b) and (c),
assumes that the shipments will not take place until a repository or interim storage facility becomes available. Further an application for certification of a transport package may be pursued prior to submission of a license application for a repository or interim storage facility.
Consequently, th's commenter was concerned that such a situation could complicate and impede progress on the HLW cask certification process. l 3
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Response: The NRC staff has reconsidered the need to reference Part 60 criteria for canistered vitrified HLW in the amended regulation. The staff agrees that it is best to avoid incorporating into Part 71-which contains standards for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials-requirements referenced from Part 60 which are intended for the ,
permanent disposal of HLW in a geologic repository, The staff has analyzed the requirements
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contained in 60.135(b) and (c) and has determined that the intended requirement-that the canistered vitrified HLW maintain its integrity-can be achieved by reliance on existing Part 71 l 1
requirements and language from the proposed rule for all of the Part 60 requirements, but one.
That one requirement is to design the canister to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. This has been added to the final rule. Additionally, the staff I has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements by referencing -
appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code l criteria. i The design criteria in @ 60.135(b) require that the waste package shall not contain explosive, pyrophoric, or chemically reactive materials or free liquids in amounts that could j cause harm; that waste packages shall be designed to maintain waste containment during l
handling; and that waste packages have unique identification numbers. The design criteria in j
@ 60.135(c) require that the waste be in solid form and placed in a sealed container; that any i
particulate waste forms be consolidated into an encapsulating matrix; and that any combustible !
J radioactive waste be reduced to noncombustible form. As noted, the Commission believed that by referencing these criteria in the proposed rule, it could assure the integrity of the canistered )
l vitrified HLW.
l The staff now believes that the integrity objective can be achieved by relying on requirements in the final rule and other requirements in Part 71. First, as stated above, the final 4
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i l rule has added language that the canister be designed to maintain waste containment during l
l handling activities associated with transport. Second the rule requires that the HLW be vitrified, l
and thus be in a solid form for encapsulation. Vitrification of HLW uses molten glass and this high ternperature process will reduce any combustible radioactive waste into a noncombustible form. Finally, the Part 60 requirement that a unique identification number be attached to the HLW canister is not relevant for transportation.
l Third, the staff believes the integrity objective can be achieved by relying on other j requirements in Part 71. Part 71 already requires that the transportation packages must not l
l contain explosive, pyrophoric, or chemically reactive materials or free liquids. Section 71.43(d) requires that:
A package must be made of materials and construction that assure that there will l be no significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging components, among package contents, or between the packaging components and the package contents, including possible reaction resulting from inleakage of water, to the maximum credible extent. Account must be taken of the behavior of j materials under irradiation.
The existing requirement in S 71.63(a) that the plutonium be in a solid form also will assure that l
the waste will be in solid form and that the waste package will be free of liquids.
Additionally, the staff has included one acceptable method for meeting the canister design requirements for handling by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria. Use of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code would ensure that the canister would be designed to maintain waste containment i
during handling, including normalloading and unloading activities. Certain criteria of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill, are excluded because they are not appropriate for a sealed canister containing vitrified HLW. For exarnple, the criteria to include a pressure relief device and openings to inspect the interior are unnecessary and could compromise the 5
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i long term integrity of the canister. Specific alternatives to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria may be considered and approved without resorting to exemptions from the regulation.
Final rule: The final rule has been revised to read as follows: Vitrified high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. As one method of meeting these design requirements, the NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is designed in accordance with the American Soc d./ of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill,1995 Edition l
(earlier editions may be used in lieu of the 1995 Editior). However, this canister need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill, Parts UG-46, UG-115 through UG-120, UG-125 through UG-136, UW-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 and the canister's final l closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vlli, Parts
- UG-99 and UW-11. The Director of the Federal Register approves this incorporation by reference in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill,1995 Edition, may be purchased from the American 1
! Society of Mechanical Engineers, Service Center,22 Law Drive, P.O. Box 2900, Fairfield, NJ 07007. It is also available for inspection at the NRC Library,11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 or at the Office of the Federal Register,800 North Capitol Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC.
l Comment 7: A commenter (No. 6) suggested that the proposed rule be changed to y require HLW canister design, fabrication, test, and fill be conducted under a quality assurance 6
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program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71, Subpart H.
This commenter also suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to canisters of HLW in shipping packages which have been demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the HLW canisters without allowing canister failure under the hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71, Subpart F, when considered as a transportation system.
Responso: The technical basis given in the DOE petition for an exemption is that a separate inner container is unnecessary because of the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and the non-respirability of the solid, plutonium-bearing waste form. In support of its petition, DOE submitted a Technical Justification which included a description of a representative HLW canister together with the results of 7-meter and 9-meter drop testing of the canisters and a description of the standards used for canister fabrication and filling.
The technical review performed by the NRC staff to certify a HLW package would include the sealed canister as well as the radioactive contents in the form of vitrified HLW. It is expected ,
that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitrified HLW contents with characteristics and integrity comparable to those described in the DOE petition. The DOE HLW canisters will be subject to an NRC approved quality assurance plan.
The final rule has been revised to specify that the vitrified high-level waste be contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. These standards would apply to all canisters comaining vitrified HLW 7
transported under this provision and will provide reasonable assurance that the package design adequately protects public health and safety.
Comment 8: A commenter (No. 6) suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to vitrified HLW from which plutonium has been removed prior to transfer to HLW storage tanks. The commenter suggested the vitrified HLW be restricted to no more than 3.7 TBq (100 Ci) of plutonium.
Response: The Statement of Considerations for the original rule (39 FR 20960) did not cMscuss activity limits (quantity limits); nor did the Commission adopt activity limits on the other forms of plutonium that are exempt from S 71.63(b). Rather, any limitations on the quantity of plutonium that can be shipped in a transportation package-for any exempt form of plutonium-are due to the inherent design features of the specific transportation package being used. These design features are reviewed by the NRC as part of the package certification process. The commenter has not provided any technical basis for requiring activity limits on this form of plutonium. The final rule does not specify a quantity limit for this exemption.
Comment 9: A commenter (No. 6) suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to canistered HLW in shipping casks which have been l
demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the canisters without allowing canister
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failure under the hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71, Subpart F, when considered as a l
transportation system.
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Response: Under current Part 71 requirements, the transportation package, not its contents, must be demonsiiated by test or analysis to meet the hypothetical accident conditions of Subpart F. Consequently, requiring the vitrified HLW canister (i.e., the transportation package's contents) to pass the conditions of Subpart F is inherently contradictory from the intent of Part 71 and the intent of the exemptions listed in 71.63(b).
Observation 1: Commenter (No. 6) made the following observations on the proposed rule and suggest they should be considered by the NRC before the final rule is issued.
- a. No transportation package has been proposed, even as a conceptual design.
- b. Unlike nuclear reactor fuel, HLW canister desi0n, fabrication, test, and fill is not directly subject to NRC quality assurance requirements of Part 71, Subpart H, nor does the NRC directly evaluate HLW canister design, fabrication, or testing.
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- c. Department of Energy, Environmental Monitoring (DOE /EM), has considered different configurations for immobilization, storage, and transportation of vitrified HLW and spent nuclear fuel, none of which has been subject to safety analysis or public review and comment.
- d. DOE's Waste Acceptance Systems Requirements Document (WASRD) does not establish minimum canister thickness criteria and other requirements. The canisters 1
l have not been designed to undergo the Part 71 accident conditions.
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- e. The drop tests performed by DOE were on a limited number of samples and were not conducted under a program meeting DOE's Quality Assurance Requirements and Description. The commenter is unsure if the test data is qualified to NRC standards and i can be applied to all of DOE's proposed shipments.
- f. The leak tightness of the HLW canisters is not low enough.
i l g. DOE has not, to the most economic extent practical, removed plutonium from the waste l
stream before it is vitrified.
l Response: Commenter No. 6 has misunderstood the purpose of this proposed rule as well as the NRC's process for reviewing and certifying packages for the transportation of radioactive material.
l While the original petition was submitted by DOE, the scope of this rule is not limited to DOE but is applicable to any person who intends to ship vitrified HLW. Consequently, the staff has written the final rule in broad terms laying out general requirements. The detailed and specific design features, referred to by Commenter No. 6, which demonstrate that an applicant has met the requirements of Part 71, not just section 71.63, are provided in the safety analysis report (SAR) submitted by the applicant. The SAR and any supporting material are then reviewed by the NRC to determine if it satisfies the requirements of Part 71. The results and l conclusions are documented in a safety evaluation report (SER). If the NRC determines that the applicant has successfully demonstrated that the transportation package meets the requirements of Part 71, then a Certificate of Compliance is issued.
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! Based on the structure of the final rule, none of the forms of plutonium exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 71.63(b) are required to demonstrate that the package contents barriers (i.e., spent fuel cladding) have met the requirements of Part 71, Subpart H. Rather, the applicant must demonstrate that the transportation package, as an overall entity, has met the requirements of Subpart H.
Public comment on DOE's waste form and other DOE matters is beyond the scope of this rule. Further, Part 71 does not provide a process for public participation in the review and certification of transportation packages.
The thickness of canister walls is not necessarily relevant to the question of whether the j transportation package will meet the requirements of Part 71. For example, the transportation package may require and rely upon interior grids or spacing arrangements to meet nuclear criticality safety requirements; rather than relying upon the integrity (i.e., thickness) of the canister walls.
Part 71 has not placed any limitations on the total plutonium activity (curie content) for transportation packages used to ship reactor fuel elements or metal. Rather, any limitations on the maximum activity which can be shipped in a specific package is a function of the design of that packege. Consequently, this final rule has not imposed any activity limits. The question as to how DOE has processed its waste streams before the waste is vitrified is beyond the NRC's purview.
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LIST OF COMMENTERS
, 1. General Atomics l
l 2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory
- 3. International Energy Consultants, Inc
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l 4. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
- 5. .Sandia National Laboratory
- 6. Sidney Crawford '
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12 L__________--- - - - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ekhi NLuttn 00?lU fSfj' lJ PROPOSED RUI.E b N ..
(7590-01-P]
f/eAN4) 78 MY 21 AD:13 OF-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION F;u ,
' ADa l 10 CFR Pad 71 RIN 3150 AF59 Requirements for Shipping Packages Used to Transport Vitrified High-Level Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to add
- vitrified high-level waste (HLW) contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport to the forms of plutonium which are exempt from the double-containment packaging requirements for transportation of plutonium. This amendment responds to a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management tDOE/OCRWM). This final rule j
l grants the petition for rulemaking, with modifications, and completes NRC action on the petition.
This final rule also will make a minor correction regarding the usage of metnc and English units, 1
!- to be consistent with existing NRC policy on such use.
l$jl198 EFFECTIVE DATE: (30 dyr %m d M ^'yubkai~ii . i6 IE0iEA REGim s). The incorporation by reference of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Botter an M.mulwl98
-o ~ ~ ~ < c.- d cavamw
- Pressure Vessel Code. Section Vill, editions through the 1995 Edition. is approved by th Director of the Federal Register as of (30 days from the date of publication in the FEDER REGISTER).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton [ telephone (301) 415-852 EXE@nrc. gov] or Mark Haisfield [ telephone (301) 415-6196, e-mail MFH@nrc. go Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
in 1974. the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) adopted the special requirements in TBq) 10 CFR 71.63 that regulate the shipment of plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels
[20 Curies) per package. These requirements specify that plutonium must that packages used to transport plutonium must provide a separate inner contain ;
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" double-containment" requirement). In adopting these requirements, the AEC specific excluded from the double-containment requirement plutonium in the form of reactor elements, metal or metal alloys, anJ, on a case-by case basis, other plutonium-b that the agency determines do act require double containment. The Statement of Consideration for the original rule (39 FR 20960; June 17,1974), specifies th plutonium tha' are essentially nonrespitable should be exempted from the requirement."
On November 30,1993, DOE /OCRWM petitioned the NRC to amend S 71 vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister to the forms of plutonium which ar 2
.L the double-containment packaging requirements of Part 71 The NRC published a notice of 18,1994 receipt for the petition. docketed as PRM-71-11, in the FEDERAL REGISTER on February (59 FR 8143). Three comments were received on the petition.
Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA). DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administenng a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear fuel. DOE plans to ship the vitrified HLW in sealed canisters frcm four storage locations: Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford, Washington; West Valley, New York and Idaho Falls, Idaho; directly to the geologic repository in transportation packages certified by the NRC. Cun...tly this HLW exists mostly ,o the form of liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor fuels. DOE proposes to encapsulate the HLW in a borosilicate glass matrix. The HLW is added to molten glass and the mixture is then poured into a stainless steel canister and allowed to solidify (i.e., vitrify). The canister is then seal-welded shut. The canisters will eventually be placed inside Type B transportation packages for transport to the geologic repository or an interim storage facility.
The beneficial aspect of this amendment would be the elimination of an unnecessary requirement that DOE transport vitrified HLW in a separate inner container (i.e., a second barrier which is subject to the leak testing requirements of @ 71.63(b)). The Commission believes that the vitrified HLW form in its sealed canister provides sufficient defensa-in-depth for protection of public health and safety and the environment, when transported inside an N certified Type B transportation package. The Commission agrees with DOE's assertion that shipments of this form of plutonium are comparable tr -hipments of (irradiated) reactor fue l
l elements which are exempt from the double-containment requirement. Therefore, the l
i Commission agrees that the double-containment requirement is unnc essary. Additional beneficial aspects of this amendment would be a reduction in DOE's costs associated with the 3
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transportation of HLW from production sites to'the geolog:c repository or an intenm facility: and the simplification of the NRC staffs review of DOE's application 1
transportation package. 1 l
Although, in most other types of shipments, DOE is not subject to the req Par 171, the NWPA requires that DOE's transport of spent nuclear fuel or HLW to repository or a monitored retrievable storage facility be in packages certified
' packages used to transport vitrified HLW contained in sealed canisters will NRC as Type B packages. Type B packages are designed to withstand the norm The canistered vitrified HLW also will be l' hypothetical accident conditions spec. ,ad in Part 71 subject to the special transport controls for a " Highway Route Controlled Q l
l U.S. Department of Transportation regulations contained in 49 CFR Part 397 NWPA requires DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to train emerg along the planned routes.
DOE asserted that shipments of vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister adversely affect public health and safety and the environment if shipped witho containment. DOE stated that a separate inner container is unnecessary b l
degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister and t f
nonrespirability of the s.'!d, plutonium-bearing waste form. In addition, DOE !
f vitrified HLW in sealed canisters provides a comparable level of prctectio '
I reactor fuel elements, which the Commission previously determined sho double-containment requirement (39 FR 20960).
3 On June 1,1995, the NRC staff met with DOE in a public meeting to disc a petitioner's request and the possible alternative of requesting an NR '
$ 71.63(b)(3) to exempt vitrified HLW contained in a sealed canister fro l
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containment requirement DOE informed the NRC to a etter ::ated January 25 1996 of as intent to seek an exemption under } 7163(bH31 The NRC received DOE's exemption reauest l on July 16.1996. in which DOE also requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held
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in abeyance until a decision was reached on the exemption request In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission paper (SECY-96-215. dated October 8.1996) l outlining and requesting Commission approval of the NRC staffs proposed approach for
! making an exemption under % 71.63(b)(3) However, in a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) dated October 31,1996, the Commission disapproved the NRC stafi's plan and directed ihm this policy issue be addressed by ru;emaking rather than by exer.ption l
The NRC published a proposed rule in the FEDERAt. REGISTER on May 8.1997 (62 FR 25146)in response to DOE's petition The Statement of Considerations for the proposed rule contains a complete discussion of DOE's petition, comments received on the l
!' petition, and the NRC's analysis of those comments Discussion I
The NRC is amending 10'CFR 71.63 based on its evaluation of the petition submitted by l
f the DOE; the attachment to the pet, tion, Technical Justification to Support the PR" by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b)" (Technical Justification); the three public comments received on the petition after its publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER 1 l
seven comments on the proposed rule. In amending @ 7163. the NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE. for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs. I i
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in the early 1970's. the AEC anticipated that a large number of shipme This raised nitrate liquids could result from the spent fuel reprocessing anticipated at th a concern about leakage of liquids because of the potential for a larg i ed (probably of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing I possibility of human error resulting from handling this expanded shippi In 1973, the AEC proposed a rule which would deal with this problem i d form, and that shipments of plutonium containing greater than 20 curies be shipped i d t "special (b) requiring that the solid plutonium be shipped in an inner container )
form' requirements as they then existed; La., not only would the - h I
Part 71 requirements but the inner container would separately have to me i that requirements. One alternative to the proposed rule the AEC considered i t This shipments of plutonium be in nonrespirable form. either in a single or d
- l to use alternative was rejected, apparently because fuel fabricators did not have i l
plutonium in a nonrespirable form.
In 1974, the AEC published a final rule which contained two sign i proposed rule:
(1) The AEC abandoned the "special form" requirement and l
L " double containment"; i e., the inner container was required not to l tt ts of when the whole package was subjected to the normal and hypotheti Part 71, but no separate tests were required for the inner container.
containment was required to take account of the f act that the A l.
i require that the plutonium be in a nonrespirable form; and d
(2) The AEC exempted two forms of plutonium altogether-rea "
d metal or metal alloy-on the basis that these forms were ' essen 6
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i therefore did not require double conta:nment The exempbon provision placed in the regulation also indicates that the AEC saw the possibility that other forms of plutonium would be similar enough to these two fornis to also qualify for exemption from the i in double-containment requirement because they were also essentially nonrespirable the statement of considerations accompany:ng the final rule. the AEC stated that f
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" solid forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be exempt from the double containment requirements" (39 FR 20960)
DOE's petition argues that a particular form of plutonium-vitnfied high-level waste contc.. ,Jd o a sealed canister-is s- 'er enough to .rradiated reactor fuel elemerts to qualify for its own exemptica from the double-containment requirement This is because of (1) the material propertier of the vitrified HLW. (2) the high degree of confinement provided by the stainless steel waste canister, and (3) the NRC-approved quality assurance program implemented by DOE makes it highly unlikely that any plutonium would be released from an NRC-certified transportation package under the normal or hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71. The NRC is required to certify the transportation packages used for vitnfied HLW pursuant to Section 180 of the NWPA and every transportation package for vitrified HLW will b required to meet the standards for accident-resistant packages (i e., Type B packages) set for in Part 71.
The tests desenbed in DOE's Technical Justification demonstrate that the canisters containing the vitrified HLW provide an additional barrier to the release of radionuclides and l
compare favorably to the cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor fuel elements The comparison is based upon physical drop tests, upon the material properties and dimensio the sealed canisters, and the effects of radiation dr rnage to matenals 7
l DOE's analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of plutonium in the HLW canisters than in irradiated reactor fuel elements However the DOE has no upper limit on plutontum concentration for these vimfied HLW canisters, and the NRC is basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double-containment requireme on the plutonium's concentration.
In its Technical Justification, DOE described the physical characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capa of withstanding a 7-meter drop onto a flat, essentially unyielding surface, without breaching o dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's " Waste Acccptance System Requirements Document (WASRD)," Rev. O, which is referenced in the Te Justification. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test, onto an essentially unyielding surface, which is required by the hypothetical accident conditions of $ 71.73 9-meter drop test is performed on the entire transportation package under the Part 71 certification process. The 7-meter drop test standard only applies to the canistered HLW.
The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant to the demonstra that the canistered HLW represents an essentially nonrespirable form for shipping plutoniu The NRC believes that the 7 meter canister drop test is a more severe challenge than the I
9-meter drop test for an f,3C-approved Type B package. This is because the Type B pa and the impact limiters will absorb much of the energy which would otherwise be expe against the canister.
i' In some of DOE's tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9 meters-2 meters above DOE's 7-meter design standard-and portions of the testing included dehberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in the canisters' walls. For those HLW canisters t the 0.95 cm holes, the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes w 8
than 0.74 TBq (20 cunes) This review of DOE's Technical Justification has provided the NRC staff confidence that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitnfied HLW in a sealed canister is essentially nonrespirable.
The NRC does not control the requirements in. or changes to. DOE's WASRD.
Because of concerns that DOE's WASRD could be changed in the future, the NRC added the requirement in the proposed rule that vitnfied HLW contained in a see?d canister meet the design criteria of 9 60.135(b) and (c). However, in response to comments received on the proposed rulemaking, the Commission has reconsidered its proposed imposition of referencing Part 60 des!;n enteria. The final rule, instead, inc'orporates one of the design requirements from Part 60 into this rule The other Part 60 design requirements are satisfied by other existing Part 71 requirements and other language in the final rule, Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements for handling by referencing appropriate American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code criteria. The explanation for this change is discussed below. Further, the NRC staff does perform technical reviews to certify package designs. For a HLW package, the review would include the sealed canister as well as the radioactive contents in the form of vitrified expected that an application for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitnfied HLW c mtents v.ith charactenstics and attributes comparable to those described in the Technical Justification.
9
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Comments on the Proposed Rule This section presents a summary of the principal comments received on the p rule, the NRC's response to the comments, and changes made to the final rul these comments. The Commission received seven comment letters the proposed rule. One was from a member of the public, two were from nat one was from a transportation cask designer, one was from a consulting company, a was from DOE. In addition, DOE submitted a subsequent letter commenting on one l
other comments. Overall, five of the six commenters supported the proposed rule an 1
remaining cornmenter, while not specifically opposing the rule, proposed chan performance of the canister and limiting its contents. Copies of these letter l
public inspection and copying for a fee at the Commission's Public Docum 2120 L Street, NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
l Comment. DOE and another commenter objected to the proposed rule's use o l
criteria from Part 60. DOE noted that basing canistered waste approved for trans l
S 71.63 upon the rules for disposal of HLW under 5 60.135(b) and (c) a approval for transport packages wil; not take place until a repository or in becomes available; and that this may not be the case. The commenters are certification for transport packages under the proposed rule is sought before a licens application for a repository or interim storage facility is submitted, this s and impede progress on the HLW cask certification process. One comme use of Part 60 criteria.
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mong R The Commission has recensideteo 're need to reference Part 60 critena for canistered vitnfied HLW in the amended regulation Tre Commission agrees that it is best to l
avoid incorporating into Part 71-which contains standards for the packaging and transpodation of radioactive matenais-requirements referenced from Part 60 wnicn are intended for the i
The NRC staff nas analyzed the permanent disposal of HLW in a geologic repository requiremen's contained in @ 60.135(b) ar,a (c) and has determined that the intended requirement-that the canistered vitrified HLW maintain its integnty-can be achieved by reliance on existing Part 71 requirements and language from the proposed rule for all of the Part 60 requirements. but one. That .. e requirement is to desigi, .ne canister to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport This has been added to the final rule Additionally. the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting these design requirements by referencing appropnate American Society of Mechanical I Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code enteria l j
!' The design criteria in @ 60.135(b) require tha' the waste package shall not contain explosive, pyrophoric, or chemically reactive materials or free liquids in amounts that could cause harm; that waste packages shall be designed to maintain waste containment during handling; and that waste packages have unique identification numbers The design enteria in
@ 60.135(c) require that the waste .e in solid form and placed in a sealed container; that any particulate waste forms be consolidated into an encapsulating matnx; and that any combus radioactive waste be reduced to noncombustible form. As noted, the Commission believed that by referencing tnese entena in the proposed rule, it could assure the integnty of the cani vitnfied HLW.
The Commission now believes that the inteanty objective can be achieved by relying on F:rst as stated above. tne final requirements in the final rule and other requirements in Par
- 71 11
- ' a a /,aste n-'a -e"* / -;;
- rule has added ianguage .nat ?e :ar ste' ce :e3 r Se:cnn e o e requ res that the HLW ce v i ed
. handkng activities assoc;ated weh trar socr*
V: ' ^ 3?or cf HLW uses mo. ten g; ass and inis and thus be in a solid form for encapsulation high temperature crocess wul reduce 39 ccr"cus50 e "aaicactwe waste into a noncomb form Finahy the Part 60 requirement *nat a umaue ::ent,6catron number De attachea to tne HLW canister is not relevant for transportation Third, the Commission beheves the integrity objective can be achieved by relying on Part 71 a: ready requires that the transportation packages must other requirements in Part 71 not ct ..ain explosive pyrophoric. o- emically rea' Dve matenals or free liquids Section 71.43(d) requires that-A package must be made of matenals and construction that assure that there will be no significant chemical. galvanic or other reaction among the packaging components. among package contents. or between the packaging components and the package contents. including possible reaction resulting from inleakage of water, to the maximum credible extent Account must be taken of the behavior of materials under irradiation The existing requirement in s 71.63(a) that the plutonium be in a solid form also will assur the waste will be in solid form and that the waste package will be free of liquids.
Additionally, the Commission has included one acceptable method for meeting the canister design requirements for handhng by referencing appropriate Amencan Society o Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code entena. Use of the ASME Boile Pressure Vessel Code would ensure that the canister would be designed to maintain waste containment dunng handhng, including normalloading and unloading activities Certain enten of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section Vllt. are excluded because they a appropnate for a sealed canister containing vitnfied HLW For example, the cnten l
pressure rehef device and openings to inspect the intenor are unnecessary and cou I
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compromise the long term integnty of the canister Speof4c alternatives to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code cntena may be considered and approved without resorting to exemptions f"om the regulation Final Rule The final rule has been revised to read as foHows- Vitnfied high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport. As one method of meeting these design requirements, the l
NRC will consider acceptable a canister which is designed in accordance with the Amencan Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section Vill.
x....ans through the 1995 Edition. However this canister need not b- designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill, Parts UG-46. UG-115 through UG-120. UG 125 through UG 136, UW-60, UW-65. UHA-60, and UHA-65 ana the canister's final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill Parts UG-99 and UW-11.
Necessary language to incorporate by reference the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code I
has also been added. i Comment. Four of the six commenters stated that the NRC should evaluate the technical bases for 71.63, or referred to a Commission SRM to SECY-96-215, dated October 31,1996, which directed the NRC staff to 'acdress whether the technical b: 3is for 10 CFR 71.63 remains valid, or whether a revision or elimination of portions of 10 CFR 71.63 is l
needed to provide flexibility for current and future technologies." One of the commenters noted l
I that the International Atomic Energy Agency standards do not impose a double-containment requirement. Four of the commenters recommended that if the NRC retained the double i
containment provision, that the rule use performance-based enteria for dispersibility and respirability as a basis for exemption. or that double containment only be required for " highly 13 t
dispersible matenalsJ' One of the commenters recommended that S 7163 oe enmirated entirely One commenter expressed an interest in any Commission action on S 7163. and recommended that the evaluation of @ 7163 take the form of an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Resp.gngg The Commission believes that those comments to evaluate the technical basis for S 71.63, to revise 71.63 (other than for vitnfied HLW in canisters), or to eliminate the rule, are beyond the scope of this rulemaking The NRC staff recently reviewed the technical bases for @ 71.63, as directed in the SRM to SECY-96-215. The NRC staff concluded, in SECY-97 c a dated September 29,1997 that the technical bases remain valid, and that the provisions provide adequate flexibility for current and future technologies Except for the changes made in this rulemaking for vitnfied HLW in canisters. the NRC staff concluded that the l
provisions in 71.63 should remain unchanged. The NRC staff will further consider potential 71.63 in its response to a petition for rulemaking, dated September 25,1997.
modifications to (Docket No. PRM-71-12). The NRC published a notice of receipt for the petition in the FEDE l
l REGISTER (63 FR 8362, dated February 19,1998),
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Comment. One commenter suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that HLW canister desigr., Sbrication, test, and fill be conducted under a quality asssance program that meets, to the satisfaction of the NRC, the requirements of Part 71, Subpart H This commenter also suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require that the exemption will only apply to canisters of HLW in shipping packages which have been l
demonstrated by analysis or test to adequately contain the HLW canisters without allowing
. canister failure under the hypothetical accident conditions of Part 71, S"bpart F, when considered as a transportation system.
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Re_sponse The technical cas:s gwen in the DOE cet tion ter an exemption :s tnat a separate inner container is unnecessary because of tne nigh degree of confinement provided I- by the stainless steel waste canister and the non respirability of the solid. plutonium beanng l
waste form In support of its cetition DOE submitted a Technical Justification which included a desenption of a representative HLW canister together with the results of 7-meter and 9-meter i
drop testing of the canisters and a description of the standards used for canister fabncation and filling.
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' The technical review performed by the NRC staff to certify a HLW package would include the sealed canister as well as th? tadioactivt contents in the form of vitnfiad HLW. It expected that an app;ication for approval of a HLW package design would include a canister design and vitnfied HLW contents with charactenstics and integnty comparable to those described in the DOE petition The DOE HLW canisters will be subject to an NRC approved quality assurance plan The final rule has been revised to specify tha' the vitrified high-level waste be contained I in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment during handling activities associated with transport These standards would apply to all canisters containing vitnfied HLW transported under this provision and will provide reasonable assurance that the package desig'1 adequately protects pub. . nealth and safety.
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Comment. One commenter suggested that the proposed rule be changed to require I
that the exemption will only apply to vitnfied HLW from which plutonium has been removed poor
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to transfer to HLW storage tanks The commenter suggested the vitnfied HLW be restncted to no more thar 3.7 TBq (100 Ci) of plutonium.
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Eg3Ronse Tre Statement of Cons:ceranors 'c ne ongmai Ne <39 FR 23960, dio not i
discuss activity limits muantity limits) nor d.a ine Comrmssion adopt activity l mits on the otner forms of plutonium that are exempt from s 716310) Ratner any I;mi'ations on the quantity of plutonium that can ce snipped in a transportation cac=.dge-for any exempt form of plutonium-are due to the inherent design features of the specific transportation package being used. These design features are reviewea by the NRC as part of the package certification process. The commenter has not provided any technical basis for requinng activity limits on this form of plutonium The final rule does not specify a quantity limit for this exemption.
l Regulatory Action The NRC is amending 10 CFR 7163 based on its evaluation of the petition subm:tted by DOE; the attachment to the petition. 'Tecnnical Justification to Support the PRM oy the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 7163(b)," the Stree comments received on the petition, and the seven comments received on the proposed rule. Section 71.63(b) specifies special :
l provisions for shipping plutonium in excess of 0 74 TBq (20 cunes) per package, including a separate inner containment system. except when plutonium is in solid form of reactor fuel elements, metal. or meta, alloys ! . amending 7163(b). the NRC is granting. with modification, the petition submitted by DOE to eliminate these special provisions when transporting vitnfied HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste containment duiing handling activities associated w.th transport. The final ule completes NRC action on PRM-71-11 In the proposed rule. the NRC would have required that the HLW canister meet design entena contained in % 60135(tn and (c) ine final rule. instead, incorporates these requirements into Part 71 16
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J in addition. the NRC has corrected the usage of units in 7163 The metric units are
[
used first with the English units in parentheses ;
Criminal Penalties For the purposes of Section 223 of tne Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the Commission is issuing the final rule under one or more of sections 161b.161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful l
l violations of the rule will be subject to cnminal enforcement.
Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations Under the "Pohey Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs" approved by the Commission on June 30,1997 (62 FR 46517), this rule is classified J
as compatibility category "NRC." This regulation addresses areas of exclusive NRC authority.
However, a State may adopt these provisions for the purposes of clarity and communication, as long as the State does not adopt regulations or program elements that would cause the State to regulate these areas.
Finding of No Significant EnvironmentalImpact: Availabihty The Coinmission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, j
as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51. that this rule will not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
and therefore, an environmentalimpact statement is not required. The final rule change 17 l
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t n waste
. exempts shipments of vitnfied HLW contained in a sealed canister designed to main ai The purpose of the double containment dunng handling activities associa'ed with transport containment rule is to ensure safety by requinng plutonium to be shipped as a solid. under double containment. thereby minimizing the likelihood of leakage dunng transport as a possible packaging errors The Commission believes that the plutonium within vitnf contained in a seated canister is essentially nonrespirable and this form of plutonium prov level of protection comparable to irradiated reactor fuel elements-which are exempt fro doubie-containment requirement. Therefore, double containment is unnecessary for vitri MLW contained in a sealed canister designed to maintain waste conP.inment during handl activities associated with transport.
The final environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington. DC. Single copies of the environmental assessme and the finding of no significant impact are avai!able from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nucle Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Reg.[latory Commission, Washington 0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
Papeiwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requiremen l
! subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.
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Public Protection Notification l
if an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
Regulatory Analysis l
ine Commission has preparem . final regulatory analysis m tNs final regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission.
The analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street NW.
(Lower Level), Washingtc.n nC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Mark f
Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Matenal Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
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l Regulatory Flexibility Certification commission As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. DOE is the only transporter of vitnfied HLW. No other entities are involved.
j DOE is not a small entity as defined in 10 CFR 2 810.
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Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairr,ess Act f
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in accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.
f i
the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has venfied this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Office of Management and Budget.
Backfit Analysis l
The NRC has determined that u1e backfit rulc 10 CFR 50.109. does not aoply to this i
ru!e, and therefore, a backfit analysis is not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1)
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, incorporation by reference, Nuclear materials. Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeepinq requirements.
For the reasons ;t out in the preamble and under the authonty of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended' the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U S.C.
552 and 553; the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.
20 I
t PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL i
! 1. The authonty citation for Part 71 continues to read as fonows.
AUTHORITY: Secs.53.57.62.63 81 161 182 183. 68 Stat 930. 932. 933. 935.
948,953.954 as amended, sec 1701.106 Stat 2951 2952. 2953 (42 U.S C 2073. 2077.
2092,2093,2111,2201,2232,2233,2297f). secs 201. as amended. 202. 206. 88 Stat 1242, as amended. 1244,1246 (42 U S.C. 5841. 5842. 5846).
I Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301. Pub. L.96-295. 94 Stat. 789-790.
I
- 2. Section 7163 is revised to read as follows' )
9 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.
(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be shipped as a solid.
(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) cer package must be packaged in a separate inner container placed within outer packaging thLt meets the requirements of Subparts E and F of this part for packaging of matenalin normal form. If the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in @ 71.71 I" Normal conditions of transport"). the separate in l container must not release plutonium as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10~' 2 A /h !he entre package is subjected to the tests specified in S 71.73 (" Hypothetical accident conditions" separate inner container must restnct the loss of plutonium to not more than A in 1 week. 2 Solid plutonium in the following forms is exempt frcm the requirements of '.his paragraph (1) Reactor fuel elements-.
(2) Metal or metal alloy, 21 i
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(3) Vitnfied high-level waste contained in a sealed canister designed to ma As one method of meeting containment during handling activities associated w.th transport '
these design requirements, the NRC will consider acceptable a cantster which i accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and !
Vessel Code, Section Vlli, editions through the 1995 Edition. However, this caniste be designed in accordance with the requirements of Section Vill, Parts UG-W-60, UW-65, UHA-60, and UHA-65 and the canister's
, UG-120, UG-125 through UG-136, U final closure weld need not be designed in accordance with the requirements of Sl Parts UG-99 and UW-11. The Director of the Federal Register r; proves this inco reference in accordance with 5 U S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies of the and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Vill, editions through the 1995 Edition, ma i from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, United Engineering Cente St., New York, NY 10017. It is also available for inspection at the NRC Libra Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738 or at the Office of the Federal Register,800 N Street, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC.; and i
t 22 w__-______-_________-_________________-_______-_______ .--__ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
4 (4) Other plutonium beanng schas that tne Comm.ss;on aetermines should oe exemct from the requirements of this section Dated at Rockville. Maryland th's - day of May 1998 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
l ,
y'/ 'iv John C. Hoyle.
_ apretary of the Commission.
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