ML20236X470
| ML20236X470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/04/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
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| References | |
| ACRS-T-1628, NUDOCS 8712090226 | |
| Download: ML20236X470 (233) | |
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1 PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE 2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S 3-ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS i 4-5 6
i 7
The contents of this stenographic transcript of the 8' proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9
Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS),
10 as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions 11 recorded at the meetistg held on the above date.
12 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at 13 this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or 14 inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
O)
(- 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
() Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY ColiMISSION 2 -ADVISORY COMMITTEE CN REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3 )
In theLMatter of: ) I 4 )
332nd, GENERAL MEETING ) Volume 2 i 5 )
6 Thursday, December 4, 1987 7
Room 1046 8 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington., D.C. 20555 9
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, 10 pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.
11 BEFORE: DR. WILLIAM KERR 12 Chairman Professor of Nuclear Engineering 13 Director, Office of Energy Research University of Michigan 14 Ann Arbor, Michigan 15 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
16 DR. FORREST J. REMICK Associate vice-President for Research 17 and Professor.of Nuclear Engineering The Pennsylvania State University 18 University Park, Pennsylvania 19 DR. DADE W. MOELLER Professor of Engineering in Environmental Health 20 and Associate Dean for Continuing Education School of Public Health 21 Harvard University Boston, Massachusetts 22 DR. CHESTER P. SIESS 23 Professor Emeritus of Civil Engineering University of Illinois i 24 Urbana, Illinois 25 O
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(:)
1 MR. CHARLES J. WYLIE. .
. Retired Chief Engineer 2 Electrical Division Duke Power Company 3 Charlotte, North Carolina 4 MR. JESSE C. EBERSOLE Retired Head Nuclear Engineer a 5 Division of Engineering Design J Tennessee Valley. Authority 6 Kncxville, Tennessee 7 DR. HAROLD W.. LEWIS Professor of Physics 8 Department of Physics University of California 9 Santa Barbara, California 10 'MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON Retired Principal Nuclear Engineer 11 Tennessee Valley'Authcrity.
Knoxville, Tennessee, and.
12 Retired Director, Office for Analysis a,nd. Evaluation of Operational Data 13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (7}
bi . Washington', D.C.
14 MR. GLENN A. REED 15 Retired Plant Manager Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant 16 Wisconsin Electric Power Commpany Two Rivers, Wisconsin 17 DR. PAUL G. SHEWMON 18 Professor, Metallurgical Engineering Department Ohio State University 19 Columbus, Ohio 20 DR. MARTIN J. STEINDLER Director, Chemical Technology Division.
21- Argonne National Laboratory Argonne, Illinois 22 MR. DAVID A. WARD 23 Research. Manager on Special Assignment E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company 24 Aiken, South Carolina 25 O
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143 1 DR. CARSON 11 ARK Retired Division Leader 2 Los Ala.tos Scientific Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico 3
ACRS COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBER:
4 Raymond Fraley, Executive. Director 5
NRC STAFF PRESENTERS:
6 Jerry Hulman 7 Wayne Houston 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O
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1- I 11 D E K 2 Items _ Discussed Pa.ge_
3 . Briefing by EPRI representatives 5 4.
Containment Performance--
5 -BWP, Mark I 127 6-7 1
8
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 i
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. 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 CHAIRMAN KERR: Requirements for advanced light 3 water reactors, subcommittee chairman, Wylie 4 MR. WYLIE: Thank you,.Mr. Chairman. If you recall,.
- 5. the subcommittee met last. month, and reviewed the Chapter'l'of 6 'the advanced light water reactor program at EPRI and then we 7 made a report at the last ACRS meeting at which time the 8 Committee requested the presentation by EPRI and the full 9 Committee meeting today.
10- EPRI was requested to prepare that presentation and 11 they have representatives here to do that, and we:have 12 representatives from the staff for answering' questions that 13 might come up as'they have told Mr. Les Rubenstein who'is the
(}-
14 branch chief responsible.for standard plans, and Paul Leech 15 who is the project manager for'the EPRI advanced light water 16 reactor project.
17 So with that, I will call on Mr. Carl Stahlkopf of 18 the EPRI to intrr, duce the program.
19 MR. STAHLKOPF: Thank'you, Mr. Wylie and Mr.
20 Chairman. My name is Carl Stahlkopf.
21 (Slide) 22 MR. STAHLKOPF: That's about as good as we are going
- 23. to be able too do. My name is Carl Stahlkopf. I am director ;
1 24 of the Materials and Systems Development Departrent at EPRI
(:) 25 and have overall responsibility for the advanced light water HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 I
146 1 reactor program.
O 2 As you can see, our schedule this morning is already 3 off by just a little bit. We thought we were starting about 4 five minutes earlier, but that's all right. We will press to 5 make up for the difference in our perceived starting time and 6 our starting time.
7 I would like to introduce our team today. Mr. Ed 8 Kintner, Executive Vice President of GPU, will lead off our 9 presentation giving the perspective of the utility industry 10 and the major objectives that the utility industry have for 11 the light water water program. Then I will come on and give 12 some of the program structure.
{} 13 DR. SIESS: Excuse me, please. Are you wearing a 14 microphone?
15 MR. STAHLKOPF: No, I am not. I don't see one up 16 here.
~17 DR. SIESS: Put one on him, please.
18 MR. MICHELSON: What is your affiliation?
19 MR. STAHLKOPF: My affiliation is EPRI. Ed Kintner, 20 Executive VP of GPU, will give the program opening statement, 21 and speak about the utilities involvement, and that of the 22 utility steering committee of which he is e e.irman.
23 Jack DeVine, who has, who is our program manager, 24 and has direct line responsibility, will speak about the 25 requirements documents. Mr. Bill Sugnet will talk about the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
147.
li passive' plants, and-finally Mr. DeVine will be back again to O 2 speak specifically on comments to Commissioner Zech's letter.
1 3 I'also would'like to note that-with us today is Dave McGoff'of' 4 .the Department of Energy. DOE is very closely involved with 5' EPRI in both the requirements document work and particularly-i 6 in.the passive plant work, so it is possible that he may want 7 to field some of.the' questions that come out of your 8 quer,tioning on either or both of those subjects.
9 So with that, and because of the shortness of time, 10 I will' turn this'over to Ed'Kintner, Executive Vice President 11 of GPU. Ed?
12' MR. KINTNER: It is a long time since I have been in 13 this room, but I have been here a number of times and I see a
{}-
14 few familiar' faces. This is a different subject than the one 15 I was' talking about in this room before. At that time we 16 didn't have microphones an unfortunately I never learned to 17 use one.
18 MR. McCRELESS: Let me help you with that. ;
l 19 MR. KINTNER: About five years ago, EPRI canvassed 20 the utility senior executive level on the subject of nuclear 21 power. As'you can imagine, there is not a great deal of 22 enthusiasm in the utility industry at the senior levels for 23 spending money on nuclear power designs for the future. As a 24 ' matter of fact, very, very few utility executives these days 25
~
want to spend money on nuclear generation, but in particular HERITAGE _ REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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- l. 148 j i 1 in this country at least they are not anxious to do so on 2 nuclear plants.
3 On the other hand, there was a sense'that some. spark .
H 4 had to be ke . alive, that there should be'some. work going i
5 forwsrd 'to set the stage for the future because the future in 6' this matter was so unpredictable, and with a'hundred, more 7 than a hundred light water reactors in.this country and 200 8 more world-wide, experience gained over 15 years, there was.a 9 consensus that at some low level there should be an effort' 10 made to look back over the experience and try to do better the 11- next time around, 12 It was clear, at least seems clear, somehow one way !
13' or another in the United States, we got off.the path somewhere
}
14 between the original idea of the nuclear power, and the final 15 marketplace. And so the attempt we are trying to make is to 16 determine what can we do with that base of experience now to 17 . r e c o t,. .ruct the, a program from a conceptual point of view 18 which will produce a base for future plants.
I 19 The program is not a large program. We are spending 20 about $4 million a yeer of EPRI money. That's all that we l 21 could scrounge from the EPRI budget to carry it out, but I 22' think it is about as effective an expenditure of $4 million i
l 23 for development in the nuclear power area as I have seen. We 24 are getting a lot of support from our contractors, and there
(:) 25 is in fact as you will see before the day is over, momentum HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
149 1- ' building and interest building up in Europe and from some O 2
~
individual parts of-the United. States which is being very 3 helpful to us.
4 MR. MICHELSON: Yes -- the S4 million is the EPRI i
5 . budget, but the total expenditure on this work is much greater !
6 because the utilities'are' supplying considerable effort,.is 7 that right?
8 MR. KINTNER: No, not the utility supplying very 9 much effort; in addition, there are some sharing with the 10 contractors working with the architect-engineers and so forth, H 11 and the Department.of Energy is providing funds which'are 12 supporting-funds.to--
(} 13 MR. MICHELSON: I thought utilities were reviewing 14 your work and so forth, and that cost money. I 15 MR. T.INTNER: Represent a. group,- there are about 19
~16 different utility executives, experienced executives'in the 17 nuclear field,-who form this subcommittee, which reviews the 18 work and tries to provide an overlay of guidance policy on the 19 whole matter, but there is very little money associated with 20 that. It is not, it is not really a design effort per se.
21 So these are the overall goals of the
.22 program--establish utility leadership and effect positive 23 program toward a revitalized nuclear option. I want to 24 emphasize utility leadership. In the past, the way the 25 industry developed, it was industry leadership that the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
150 )
1 General Electrics,. Westinghouse, CEs and'so forth operating in L
i O 2 very intense, competitive way and that I believe is some of 3 the part of'the problem we have had. The utilities now have
-4 the experience and certainly the events of the last few years.
5 prove that' utilities bear the responsibility of, both from the 6L standpoint of' safer, and from the standpoint of financial 7 aspects and responsibilities to their customers and.
8' stockholders and we believe-the utilities now have the base of' 9 experience which'ought to be; plowed back into the lesign.
10 effort. And we wanted to formulate a credible foundation for 11 the next generation should one become needed. l 12 (Slide) 13 MR. KINTNER: The objectives within those goals.are
}'
14 to get a stabilized regulatory basis. I am sure that we all 15 understand how often the argument is made that the problem 16 with the nuclear industry in this country is we didn't have a-17 stable regulatory base, so what we would like to do is proceed 18 as far as we can to an understanding with the necessary 19 regulatory officials, that what we are doing is appropriate 1
20 and correct, and can in fact be licensed with minimum 1
21 difficulty.
22 We want to establish a set of design and performance 23 requirements based on the experience which I mentioned earlier 24 which could be used by any customer in this relationship with 4 O- 25 any suppli.er, as a basis for the design and supply, and then
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151 j
E 1: we wanted to look at some fundamental changes that might be 9 2 made to return the designs of these plants into'what could be a 3 considered a, a more reliable, more stable,-safer kind of' 4 design.
5 Let me aay there that it is, it seems to me that the 6 competitive aspect which the industry lived i.n is what forced-7: us to higher TH, higher and higher power densities, to higher.
8 and higher overall power levels before there was an 9 opportunity to learn from the smaller earlier plants with-10 lower characteristics. And therefore, a number.of. mistakes 11 -were made and forcing the plants up to higher power levels and 12 temperatures, and lower margins. Those' mistakes then were
~13 compounded by adding additional systems which had to be
}
14 provided to protect them under those circumstances. l
-15 We are trying to turn that process back. A 16 fundamental reason for that error if it should be called an l
17 error is that there was an understanding or acceptance of the h l
18- fact that what we were really looking for was thermal j
19 efficiency, and thermal efficiency means one thing in a fossil '
20' plant and another thing in a nuclear plant where the fuel 21 cycle costs are much less part of the overall total, so we are 22 trying to look at this subject again, and especially trying to 23 look at it in. terms of smaller plants; 600 megawatt plant is 24 just the nominal figure we have used, but we believe that 25 there are things that can be done or at least conceptualized, HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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. . 1 . engineered in.a smaller. plant which will have an influence on 2 the whole industry and youwe will see some of that before we 3 are through with our presentation this morning.
4 The premise is that we now have the knowledge and 5 experience.to'look in a statesman-like way at what has 6 happened and as owners and licensees, we. Pave the j 7 -responsibility to do so.
8: (Slide) 9 'MR. KINTHER: Very little interest in suppliers in-10 spending their own money > look at truly advanced designs',
11' .truly'different designs. 4 a matter of fact,- considerable 12 reluctance .a e early days of the program to do-so because 13 if you in fact take a Westinghouse or.GE plant and now you say j}
14 representing GE or Westinghouse that you can do something 15 better or different, now you have lessened the opportunity'to 16 sell the present design plants either here or abroad, so there.
17 was reluctance to face up to this question. To some degree H 18 that reluctance is disappearing, but the initiative had to 19 come from somewhere in the utility industry and EPRI was the, 20 was the mechanism by which it could come.
21- Then we have set up this utility steering committee 22 to try to bring the experience base directly into the program 23 from senior executives of the major nuclear 24 utilities--Commonwealth Edison, Consolidated Edison, Duke, O 25 Florida Power, Alabama Power, Northeast Utility, GPU, and so l
l
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- 1. .forth. All are represented on this committee. It is an (L 2 active committee.. It' meets every two to three months lfor two 3 to'three days. They,are meeting next week in Hartford to 4 spend.three days reviewing the entire program, and it is,-it 5 is self-signing off on each one of the submittals which is-6 made to the NRC on behalf of the program.
7 DR. SHEWMON: What is self-signing off? I B understood you to say it was'a self-signing off.
9 MR. KINTNER: It is self-signing off. The committee 10 is signing off. Okay.
11 .DR. SHEWMON: Okay.
12 MR. KINTNER: Okay. And I might say, too, that we
{} 13 are providing from within the nuclear utilities ~some key 14 . program managers and Jack DeVine is in fact the GPU nuclear 15 person, spent many years, did the planning over the whole 16 early stagep of the recovery of TMI 2, and has a considerable 17 experience frcm that as to what he ought not to do again.
18 Basic principles which design, which we are trying 19 to follow in the development of these requirements are 20 enumerated here. First, we want this plant to have a 21 significant safety advantage over anything which is now on the 22 market, and we want to be able to demonstrate that.
V l
L 23 Demonstration is, one way of demonstrating it is to use the l:
24 PRA in as solid a way as we can. We recognize its l -
O 2S limitations. We are going to try to use it in guiding the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
154 1 design and in demonstrating that we have in fact reached the j O 2 -higher level of safety.
3 We are trying to make.these plants simpler. We 4 believe that the complexity of'the plant has contributed to
~
5 its lack of safety, and in the contrary, if we can make it 6 simple, straightforward from an_ operational point of view, 7 that the safety will be improved, but also the costs and 8 maintenance costs are going to be improved. I think you'all 9 know these horror stories about five times the feet of pipe 10 and calculate three times the' concrete per kilowatt of i 11 capacity which has, is said to have brought the present plants 12 to their high cost, and difficulty of operation.
13 We would like to turn that back. Design margin I
{
1-4 mentioned previously, in terms of not pressing the technology 15 to the absolute limits, and you are going to see that we have 16 limited TH. We have set a new requirement for margin on 1
17 thermal margins in the core, and so forth. Various places in' l 18 the design we have said we don't want to go beyond this in 19 terms of design margin. We want to use proven technology with 20 all this background. LWRs, we don't think it is necessary.to 21 change the coolant or the clading or the fuel type or the
~22 basic structural materials or design codes, so we want to stay 23 with proven technology, and that means to us that this plant, 24 whatever it is, will not need a prototype. There may be a l
.O 25 developmental aspect on some individual components, but they
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155 1 will_be also not1large extrapolations from what is known, and
'(:X :2 when you build it, you can be assured .that when you started 3 that, it was started and it'is going to run.
4 Finally, the human factors, which of course-have-5 been much more discussed since TMI 2, we are trying--one human 6 factor obviously is simplicity, and another one is margin 7 which gives you more, larger time constants. We are trying to-8 factor.the human element, the operator's viewpoint, into these 9 designs as we go along.
i 10 The word simplicity is what came through when EPRI' 11 made its canvass of utility people and asked-them what would 12 they l'ike to see in a future plant. They said we would like 13
{J to see it significantly simpler, and so we have tried to keep 14 that1as a major objective in every aspect of our plant 15 designs up to this point, and we think the simplification is a-16 key to achieving a very significant number of other q 17 objectives, only a few of.which I have listed here. And the 18 idea of simplification is aimed at the operator. There are .j l
19 ways you can make things simpler--have one fuel element and 20 one control rod, and one pump. That's not the kind of 21 simplicity we are talking about. We are talking about the 22 simplicity here which makes it, this plant easy to build and 23 operate.
24 And the other key word in our program is margin. We 25 want to put back margin which has been taken away over the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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- 156 l' .
1 years.by reaching for higher and higher power levels', and O 2 higher and higher steam conditions.
3 ,
And that, of course, I need not tell this group has 4 significant safety implications, 5 (Slide) 6 DR. SHEWMON: Are you going,to.get on to an example 7- of.some of these margins later?
8 MR '. KINTNER: Yep. One of the subjects which is 9 near and dear to the heart of the utilities and in particular
~10 my.own, is the question of protection not only for people, but-11
~
for investment, and if you can, if you protect the investment, 12 then it seems inevitably that you protectzthe people. If you !
{} 13 take the case of TMI 2, people were protected but the 14 investment was not. And that's going to cost us a billion 15 dollars. We are into the last year of that, and but that's 16 not the--the plant is still not cleaned up obviously.
I 17 So the' major emphasis is on the prevention of core 18 damage, on the basic of that this does protect investment, and 19 in series protects from all'the other kinds of safety i 20 considerations of public, and after we have done the best we 21 can do in any reasonable sense, in those two areas, then we i
22 are still going to go back and look for accident mitigation 23 capability and provide those wherever it is reasonable and I'
24 proper to do so, but we are not going to do the mitigation
-O 25 first. That's the last step, not the first step.
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1 MR. EBERSOLE: Does that'maybe mean the-domestic Y
2 plants will be less efficient, less desirable from an i
3 ' efficiency standpoint than the foreign plants? j 4 MR. KINTNER: Could.well.be.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: So they will have less of incentive j 6 to be-sold abroad than the hot rods that they are making 7 there?
8 MR. KINTHER: Could well'be. But I would point out 9 that the' biggest factor in costs is first of all, capital, and 10 second', availability, and in both-those areas, the United 11' States is in very poor shape today and I think that has'to be 12 approached first before you start worrying about the last one 13 percent of efficiency and thermal efficiency.
{}
14 Now I have mentioned these all except the last one.
15 We are working with the= staff to select the important generic 16 unresolved safety issues and see if we can't come to closure 17 on them as a part of the ALWR program. And so far, 18 considerable progress has been rade in that regard. We are a 19 a long way from home. I mentioned the use of proven
-20 technology. We want to use the successful experience we have 21 had. We want to use the unsuccessful experience we have had 22 in order to avoid those kinds of difficulties in the future, 23 and we are working on the basis that there will be no 24 prototype for these designs.
25 That is the end of my introduction to the program as HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
's a 158' 1 a:whole,.and I will be glad to answer some questions on this.
_2 aspe.ct of it'if;you would like.
.3 MR. REED: It seems to me you mentioned simplicity, l.
L 4 and':certainly that's important, and it'seems to me that there L
l 5 .are four important issues with respect to. assuring ~that i
L
.6 nuclear reactor core doesn't have a public problem or
- l. 7 investment problem.
l l:
l 8 Those four. issues are sub-criticality control, l 9 control of criticality; containment is a' big issue. And if l
10- you talk.about a criticality containment, you'will find that 11 you have not only redundancy in'present designs, redundancy-12 with respect to components and systems, you have diversity on 13 those, too.
14- Now we go over to the reactor' vessel, the pot that t
l 15 maintains the geometry.so that you can maintain 16 sub-criticality and so on, and don't harm the containment. We 17 don't.have redundancy or diversity in the vessel. We can't
! 18 get it. We test the hell out of it. Now we get to the real 19 key issue, key issue, decay heat removal, or assuring all heat 20 removal at ell times, power or otherwise.
21 Now do you think that since the other vessel 22 containment ~ and criticality are diverse and redundant, do you 23 think that decay heat removal should be diterse as well as 24 redundant components?
25 MR. KINTNER Let me answer your question in stages.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
159 1 First, with regard to what Paul said, the questions that Paul O 2 asked, one of the things we have done, and surprisingly it 3 wasn't done before, we have written down requirements for 4 reactivity coefficients--you do not go below this. He was 5 surprised to find U.S. reactors which are operating in some 6 plants with positive power coefficients. We have ruled that 7 out, straightforward, kind of I consider that margin.
8 Another one is we are placing larger inventories of 9 water over the core in the reactor vessel, which is giving us 10 very much additional time and safety with regard to keeping 11 the core cool, and that one of the things, you know, I am sure 12 you are familiar, we are just now .etting
- down to the botton 13 of the reactor core in TMI 2 and where there was water, the 14 water level, almost throughout the entire core, these 15 subassemblies are essentially untouched. So if you can keep, 16 not just circulate, but if you can keep the fuel covered, you 17 have a very significant benefit with regard to safe, and the 18 last point which is one which we are working on, we hope to be 19 able to carry out, we haven't yet proven--my view is it will 20 be. If people want to do it, they can do it--is to return the 21 use of gravity for decay heat removal. And that was done in 22 hundreds of plants. Works fine. As long as you have got 23 gravity, it works. You have to have redundant systems to 24 carry it away so 'fou have to have more than one, but you can O 25 surely depend on gravity when you can't depend on a lot of HERITAGE REPORTIIIG CORPORATIOli -- (202)628-4888
160.
1 other things like diesel engines,1so all of those kinds of-2 things we are~ attempting to work into'these designs--long way l
3 'from finalizing them, but they are part of our objectives, but
.4 we think when we do those and make-those kinds of changes, we1 j 1
5' have done something fundamental withLregard to nuclear safety.
6 MR. REED: I guess what you are saying is yes,'you 7 do believe in diversitv for removal of decay heat. I hope you '
'8 win on the gravity issue, but I don't ree any way with the
'9 light water. reactor.
10- MR. KINTNER: Why is that?
11 MR. REED: You are talking huge costs in water-12 ' holding vessels and so cn1 and high pressure design in order-to q 13 get the kind of quantities that you would n'eed.
)
14 MR. KINTNER: So far, it doesn't look that way. We
-15 haven't engineered it.out. It doesn't look like we are 16 talking about huge costs. I would point out the early GE 17 designs had natural circulation decay heat removal on the 18 primary side, isolation condensers. They are not huge at all.
19 MR. REED: I am thinking of PWRs.
20 MR. KINTNER: Okay. But we are trying to engineer 21 these systems out, and they do not look forbidding. Now they
~. 2 2 are new. But you know, by the time you have redundant diesel 23 trains and all that goes with them, you have got one hell of a 24 lot of structure as well, especially if you are now going to O 25 protect them against earthquakes and various other natural HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
161 1 events. We are tying to do-that, .Glenn. That's'all:I can
'O 2- .tell you. It looks like it in engineered,. feasible from an L 3 engineering point:of view.
l 4 MR. REED: It is a very interesting-thing. You'were 5 on the first PWR. We won't name it. You'also know that the 6~ first PWR had a problem of natural circulation with respect to
- 7. emergency heat removal on the port side.
8 MR. KINTHER: You are talking about Nautilus now?
9 MR. CREED: Talking about prototype. So there was a
'10 peeping configuration. Now it is interesting to see:this, you 11' are senior executive vice president at a facility that has.a 12 similar configuration in the piping. i 13 MR. KINTNER: Well, it works. That's one of the 14 things that people always like very much.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: .You mentioned void cot.fficient. j!
16 :Every time you do that I remember the particular GDC about 17 negative void coefficient, but the problem that comes when you 18 collapse void on turbine trip and boilers, and therefore the I i
19 absolutely imperative requirement somewhat more so than PWRs 20 is that you get the reactor shut down in the face of 21 collapsing void. I guess.you are going to do something to 22 improve the status of the present concept of doing that.
23 MR. KINTNER: Yes. That is one of the questions I
24 that has to be taken into consideration on the 600 design, and
'( ) 25 Dr. Sugnet is going to be talking to you on that subject HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
'162 1 before the morning is over.
2' DR. STEINDLER: You indicated that the' program is l
- 3 about $4,million?
4' MR. KINTNER: Yes,.of our EPRI--
l' 5 DR. STEINDLER: Is DOE involved'in this,,
6 ' contributing?
7 MR..KINTNER: DOE is expending in the various-8' aspects of.the advanced light water reactor program, 9 certification GE and Westinghouse designs and so'forth, and 1
10 some research--Mr. McGoff who handles this program inLthe 11 Department of. Energy is here I.believe--it is $18.million this 12 year.
=
13 MR. McGOFF: Correct.
14 CHAIRMAN KERR: Would you identify yours, please, ;l 15 sir?
16 MR. McGOFF: David McGoff, DOE. 'j 17 CHAIRMAN KERR: Thank you.
)
18 MR. REED: One more question -- you mentioned 19 smaller reactors, 500, 600, and that you have enough on this.
20: I have been wondering about that effort. ,
21 Today one of the most expensive things is the cost 22 of regulation or' regulatory activities which seem to multiply 23 daily, and team inspections and this, that, and the other, and 24 the red tape.
O 25 Isn't it probably the case that the regulatory costs HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
163 1 would make smaller sizes uneconomical?
2 MR. KINTNER: I can't answer that. It seems to me 3- maybe Dr. Rubenstein can answer that better than I can. 'The, 4- there is considerable debate with regard to you want something ;
, '5 two megawatts or like to have something 600 megawatts, and the f.
6 many people in the utilities'who are involved in this effort, 7 believe that any next nuclear plant has to be smaller because 8 of the question of total cost and risk to the, to the 9 companies.
'10 Then comes the argument if. you had a simple 11 straightforward plant, could'you in fact convince the NRC or 12 anybody else'that you don't have to have a thousand people to !
13 run it? These are questions which we cant answer, but what 1
)
14 we are trying to do is to look at this from a straightforward 15 technical engineering point of view and do the best we know .!
16- how. And the world will have to accept it or not as it sees 17 fit.
i 18 MR. REED: Thank you. ,
19 MR. STAHLKOPF: I think Mr. Kintner has really said :
20 most of what I have in my initial vugraph. I just want to say 21 that from the part of EPRI, and workir.g with both the venders 22 and the architect-engineers, it is very clear that this 23 program is focused on utility leadership. The whole purpose 24 of the program is to use the experience that our utilities O 25 have had in operating these some hundred four reactors we now HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
164 l
1 have on the line to feed back both'the successes and the 2 failures of that operation into the design of the large active 1
3 plants, which is one' segment of our work, and as well as using '
4 that experience and extrapolating it down to the passive 5 plants which are centered around hundred megawatts in size.
6 Since, of course, we assume that the current NSSS 7 venders, architect-engineers will be involved in the building 8 and sale of any new reactors that are utilized in the U.S.,.we 9 have the involvement of all four of the U.S.' current light 10 water reactor venders as well as major architect-engineers.
11 As you can tell by Mr. Rubenstein's presence here today, we 12 are working very closely with NRC and continue to work with 13 them in what in my experience has been very pleasantly one of'
[}
14 the most non-confrontational interactions we have had with 15 NRC. We have been able to work with them certainly not 15 without disagreement, but in a collegial and effective way, 17 and we feel that the requirements documents'and the companion 10 work going on on the passive plants has a long way to 19 establish a sensible starting point for standardization, and 20 that's being carried through with the companion DOE programs 21 which Mr. McGoff is in charge of to go forth with l
22 certification of two large 1300 megawatt plants both, one 23 boiling and one pressurized water reactor.
24 The program itself has three separate elements. The O 25 first is regulatory stabilization, and by that we mean the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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.c i '\ h,b /a s 1 determination of the sa!.hty and licensing basis br the n[;t : ,
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2 generation of reactors bcth active and passive, and I will r
,,[,rV f 3 speak to 9ach one of those, points in a litt 5 p. more detail in ,
7 4 just a moment. ,
5 The second major portion ck the'prccram i:; the
)
> \j 6 development of the utility requirements documents, and that's )
.l 7 a set of comprehensive design requirements for the advanced 8 light water reactor covering both active and pessive system '
'I' 9 design plants.
i i 1
10 And finally, since the passive @rsigns are still' in
/;
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11 a conceptual stage, further work i{ going on to bring these 12 passive design concepts to a level of maturity that will ,
} i.
Gj 13 hopefully allow them to start forward in certificate n 4 g ,w 14 sometime in the 1990 tineframe. f ( s s
15
, 9a R'
4 (Slide) i 's /
16 MR. STAHLKOPF: This progran actually has quite a i
17 long history. It has been under war sinm 1982, and in 1982, 18 EPRI being a utility R and D organization, we meet on 19 three-time a year basis with senior executives in the nuclear i
} ?O utilities throughout the United States, and they came to EPRI j J 21 with the request that we look at undertaking , at program which [l
/, i 22 would ensure the availability 'f nuclear genFs'ty['% in the \s <
23 mid-90s when they anticipated tha* significant New ord.2rs
\
24 would be coming in. i 25 Also they came ta us with the s t rictur e' thM the l . /
\
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4fh3
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165 l (! .
q I first. step that you need to take is to ensure that you can
. @.y 1.
y l
2 understand'what the licensing basis for this is, and try to l1 3 'get some rationale for stabilization of that licensing process I h p.
l g., 4 4 because without that, .i t is useless.to go forward with the-
, r t 5 design. You can't design to'a constantly changing. target, l ,
l 3* 6 '. 'With that charge in mind, we worked with the Nuclear l
7 @ Regulatory Commission staff to define what the regulatory.
ps: ,
Q 8 licensing basis would be for,the new set of light water 3
h;h u
[ 9 reactors that would be designed to meet the utility
>.1 f-
, 3. 0 ' requirements documents.
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- 11 What we did back in '82 and '83 was take a look at
./
- 12- the unresolved' safety issues, and the medium a'nd h'igh priority
$ 1?' generic safety issues, trying to understand whien ones of
- p' 14 these would be applicable to the ALWR program and itt.
2 15 requirements. Our first compilation showed some 588 issues 16 which fell in the category of unresolved safety and licensing 17 issues and medium and high generic safety issues. Since the t.
18 beginning in 1982, we have defined some 727 of these potential 19 issues, but as you know, many of these are procedural or apply a ,
20
- r. _
e to one specific vender plant type. Some issues actually
.y 3 1 21 appear several times on the list and can be subsumed into 22 others. In short, in working with the Commission, we have now-g 23 brought this list of issues down to a potential 62 which serve
( ,
, 24 as the design licensing basis for our effort.
'O f 25 And to that end, this effort is documented in NUREG q y
, 3 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ . . . . . - - - - - - . --. - - _ . - = - - -
166 1 -1197, .and 1197 really summarizes the' program that we have had 2 .with NRC to develop this' list ~of 62 issues. It does several a 3 other things which we think are quite important. It also 4 establishes a-certain stability.of these issues in that we 5 have reached agreement with NRC-that for a new issue r.o be put 6 on that list of 62, it basically has to fall.through or fall
'7- through the screening criteria. It must either show that 8 .there is an increase in core melt frequency, an increase in 9 off-site radiological consequences, or that sequence or 10 accident or issue would cause the current design under 11 consideration.to exceed NRC safety goals.
12 -In addition to that, it establishes-the concept of-13 what we call regulatory optimization issues, and these are
)-
14 ' issues which we feel have promise for significant improvement 15 in regulatory' requirements based on the-changes which are 16 coming f er'ch in the design.
17 MR. WARD: May I ask you a question at this point?
18 MR. STAHLKOPF: Sure.
19 MR. WARD: You seem--I don't know to what extent it 20 was considered and rejected, but there seems not, there has 21 been no effort to, to relook at, at regulatory requirements 22 other than try to get things finally levoled out and stable, l
23 But the technical basis for many of the regulations 24 is'at the present time, is not particularly sound. For
- Y ;
25 example, the design basis accidents that form, you know, the !
I HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
, 167 1 1 underpinning'of a lot of regulations seemed'like a good idea a 2 generation ago,;but just as you know a lot mere about the, you 3 know, from experience of designing, building and operating 4 plants, you'know a lot more about some elements.of the plant 5 design, we, I mean the utilities and the NRC also know a lot 6 more about the safety performance of plants, but that doesn't 7 'seem to have been considered at all.
8 MR. STAHLKOPF: I don't, I don't think that's really 9 a fair characterization. Certainly in terms of the ]
10" optimization issues, and I just brought this along as a 11 back-up slide, these are some of the issues that we are 12 looking at in the sort of depth that I believe you are 13 referring to.
14 (Slide) 15 MR. STAHLKOPF: And these are issues that we are 16 looking at to see if it is appropriate at least for the 17 requirements document effort to look at changes in regulatory 1
18 position and these are the optimization issues that I was 19 referring to. I think that there is potential for others 20 cropping in as we go through this, and certainly I think one 21 of the' major challenges tP - stands before us is trying to l 22 understand how the current licensing regulations will apply to 23 the passive safety system plants which are really a 24 significantly different beast.
'O 25 Now we haven't, we haven't gotten into these issues 1
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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I 168 .
I 1 yet-with'Mr. Rubenstein and his staff at NRC because the O- 2 design has'not been sufficiently mature to address them, but I 3 think certainly over the next year, we will start raising somo-4 issues concerning the applicability of current NRC approaches 5 to the. passive safety systems. These all apply to questions 6- surrounding the active safety systems and that licensing 7 basis.
8 MR. WARD: Well, for example, have you considered I 9 mean the-large break? The, some elements of the plant are 10 designed to accommodate present definition of the-large break 11 LOCA. What would it mean in the design of the plant and 12 capital cost'if there were mechanistically definition of that 13 accident?.
[}
14- MR. STAHLKOPF: I think certainly the, one of the
'15 aspects that we are going in for is leak before break 16 methodology which' bears very strongly on the large break LOCA 17 question, and we are asking for a. position which in essence l
18 would accept leak before break for all class one systems about 19 shich we have chosen not to go after the question of 20 containment design loads as a result of that leak before 21- break, so it wou)4 have to do with general impingement shields 22 and snubber reduction, but because of the relatively finite i
23 resources that we have for this program, we have not chosen to i 24 go after containment design, also feeling that it is
~( 25 appropriate to have'some margin in con ~ainment design l~
n HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
168A:
1 because---
.2 MR. WARD: Not just containment design but it is'the 3' ECCS design.
4 MR. STAHLKOPF: ECCS designs as well.
5' CHAIRMAN KERR: It is your view that containment
-6 design should consider only design basis accidents?
7 MR. STAHLKOPF: At this time, yes.
8 (Slide) 9 MR. STAHLKOPF: Just a few words on the requirements 10 document to set up with the presentations which will follow' 11 later.
12 .Again, the.whole purpose of the requirements 13 document is to ensure that what we have learned with the
)
'14 ' operation of our reactors is fed in a very effective way back
.15 -to the venders for the next generation, and the things that, 16 that very clearly come out are that, unfortunately, in the 37 early days of reactor sales in the United States, we were not 18 only competing with coal, but there was also fierce internal 19 competition among reactor venders which often led to reliance 20 on low first cost perhaps at the expense of low life cost. We
- 21. have, very clearly want to assure that this sort of a heated 22 race doesn't happen again and I think Mr. Kintner referred to 23 this in his openi'ng remarks.
24 We hope that the document will achieve a utility and
.O. 25 NRC agreement on advanced lice. sing requirements, and we look HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 p
169 1 1 for it to be' endorsed by NRC by way of the initiation _and the A:
V- 2 issuance'of safety evaluation report. Presently there are-I i
'3 thirteen chapters to'.this document. We are getting a draft 1 4 SER for each chapter. Then-subsequently to ensure internal- 1 5 consistency, we will go back and go through all these thirteen 1
6 chapters in draft form. That will'be,.some things will change !
7 from the first chapter to the 13th, Changes will affect.those 8 in the fir:t, and we.will roll this document up into a sample l
9 one and overall SER will be issued which in essence will say
'i 10 that a plant designed specifically to these requirements 11 should see no outstanding safety and licensing issues, and 12 that's really the purpose of our effort with NRC. And of 13 course, this document serves as the starting point for the 14 detailed design of e5vanced light water reactors, and to this 15 end, we are coordinating with Mr. McGoff and DOE, and as I 16 have already stated, two plants, CE plant and GE plant, have 17 started down that certification route, using the draft SERs 1 18 coming out from NRC as their guideline, and we have executed a 19 three-way memorandum of understanding between the venders, DOE 20 and ourselves that the requirements document in fact will 21 serve as the basis for those designs.
22 The scope of the document is quite obviously 23 covering PWRs and BWRs. It covers the entire plant. Our firm 24 belief is that you can't decouple the BOP from the NSSS and O 25 you look at it in any intelligent integrated way. We have two HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
..t' 170 1 efforts going on'of one, lookinc at active safety systems and
'O . -2 active safety systems has as a reference 100 megawatt plant, 3 but is_able to go up or down in size as appropriate. We have 4 a 600 megawatt reference plant for the-passive safety systems.
5 Again, the requiremen;s look at overall plant performance, 6 component functional requirements, conceptual design 7 requirements necessary, at the level of detail adequate to 8 illust' rate what is necessary'for the designers to take the 9 next step to go to implementation.
10 M R". EBERSOLE: May I ask a question? It seems to me' 11 if I were a utility executive that came-in from outer space
- 12. and 1 wanted to ask you a question about how to get started in.
{) 13 this business., one of the first things I would ask is.why 14 should'I'have-a BWR over a PWR or vice-versa since I have no
'15 institutional bias, no political bias, no business-oriented .
I 16 bias,-and I'want a technical differentiation of these to be 17 explained to me, in both their normal and their emergency 18 modes of operation.
19 I am trying to get the focal point I think EPRI 20 would be where you would localize it. What ought to be the 21 nuclear work horse for this country? Should it, in fact is it 22 a peculiar aspect of the plant where we strike a balance with 23 the fascinating differences between those plants especially in 24 their emergency states?
O 25 MR. STAHLFOPF: lt is a very good question, and to HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
. .. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
- 171 1- that.I would. answer that with the, with the present st' ate of {
'O .2 development of the requirements documents, we can see
'3 advantages.and disadvantages to both.
- 4. '
MR.:EBERSOLE: True.
5 MR. STAHLKOPF: But we cannot see any overriding 6 advantages or disadvantages to both.
7' MR. EBERSOLE: I.am at sea. I don't know how to 8 treat these things. I would think EPRI.would have'to tell me.
9 -MR. STAHLKOPF: No. I think EPRI's position is that 10 unless we see an overriding advantage to one system over the 11 other, we . feel.it is appropriate to make both systems 12 available since one clearly do not show itself to be supet'ar 13 over the other. i
[
14 MR. EBERSOLE: You wouldn't. help me make that 15- choice?
16- MR..STAHLKOPF: I would not help you make that ;
17 choice. You would have to make that choice on your own.
18 (Slide) 19 MR. STAHLKOPF: The third major component of our I
20 program is the development of conceptual designs. Again, in
]
21 this effort, we are coupled very closely with the Department 22' of Energy program. The EPRI wcrk has focused around both the 23- utility requirements and preliminary conceptual designs. The 24 DOE program has been taking on the larger fiscal 25 . r?1ponsibi"ity of doing the major component tests that go l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 i
172
.1 ' along'to prove out these designs.
b 2 We'have completed a. Phase 1. study in which initially 3 all four reactor manufacturers and their partners had an
?" 4- opportunity to' bid. .Two were, from these Phase 1 studies, two.
5 teams were chosen--GE, Bechtel team, and they.have now. brought
~
6 MIT.in as e third partner in this effort, and a team of 7 Westinghouse / Burns and Roe, and'they have also added'a third-8 partner,' Avondale Shipyards, to look at some of the 9 modularization questions concerning their design.
10- We have commenced. Phase 2 work on this effort this 1 11- fal1~which'is continuing to refine the conceptual designs 12 working further with the requirements documents for the 13 passive safety systems. The idea is that the results will be
)
14- incorporated into the requirements documents so that when they 15 are completed,.we will have requirements for both passive and 16 -active systems for the designer, subsequently move toward 17 certification.
l 18 MR. MICHELSON: You will run both active and passive i
19 systems?
20 MR. STAHLKOPF: No. Those are two different design 21 philosophies from which designs will go forward. Presently, l 22 there are active designs going toward certification on the 23 1300 megawatt level from both CE and GE which are going in a 24 parallel but with the slight time lag to the requirements j 25 documents. As we produce the chapters of the requirements HERITAGE REPORTING CORPOR1 TION -- (202)628-4888 f 1
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[ 173 1 ' documents, there is a lag of some'60 to 90 days and then the 1- '
, 2 licensing information'is producea to the NRC on the
- 3. certification program.
! ( MR.-MICHELSON: Maybe I: don't make myself clear ~.
5 The question is, is your-requirements document going to l i
6 require passive systems? !
i 7 MR. STAHLKOPF: No. Our requirements document gives '
8 the option of.two plant designs, one an active design which is i t
9 predominantly based on the types of systems we are used to-10 seeing today,-the other a passive design which is 11 significantly different. It covers both these eventualities. :
12 MR. MICHELSON: You will get an SER on both aspects
]
13 hopefully?
- 14 MR. STAHLKOPF
- That is correct, hopefully. j J
l 15 CHAIRMAN KERR: ' Earlier the statement was made you 16 were going to depend on proven technology. Is the passive 17 system a plan, one that is in that category?'
18 MR. STAHLKOPF: Yes. We feel it is in that !
19 category, and Mr. Sugnet who is the second speaker after i
20 myself, will show you that in some detail today, but cortainly j 21 from our original looks at this, we feel that no prototype ,
I 22 will be .ecessary to prove out the designs. And it is, 23 although it is a departure from the current active system j 1
24 designs, we feel that large-scale engineering tests should be l
'O 25 sufficientito prove out the designs without the necessity of a 1 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 l J
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f 6
- 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Passive designs carry a basic
~
J3 efficiency penalty,. intrinsic-feature of them?
4 MR. STAHLKOPF: Ho. They don't. They don't have an 5 intrinsic downmark because of deficiencies.
6 This gives you some feel for what our schedule looks 7 like. I think the final end mark is the issuance of the SER 8 for NRC review by the end of 1990. And this schedule we feel 9 _both we can meet and I believe that Mr. Rubenstein from NRC j 10 believes that his reviews will be in practice able to support i
11 such a schedule and as well it supports the presently designed '
12 schedule of DOE for design certification for the active plant i
13 program.
- { }.
14 (Slide) 15 MR. STAHLKOPF: I am pleased to see that we have had 16 considerable foreign interest in this effort. And right'now 17 we are receiving both financial and technical support, i 18 financial support in terms of fortunately something to do to 19 quell the rather large negative balance of payments coming
- 20 into the country. We are finally getting some Asian money in 21 the United States as well as technical support from the 22 standpoint that we have staff members from Taiwan Power j
23 Company, Korea Electric Power Company, and Kansai Electric I 24 Company of Japan with our house aiding with the requirements 25 documents.
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175' 1
e 1 I have just recently completed a trip to Europe
) -
2 where we had extensive discussions with ENEL, CEGB, actually 3 TVO,'IVO, and the newly founded PYO which.is.the entity which ;'
I 4 is looking at balancing Finland's next' nuclear power 5 generation capacity, VDEW, which is, which is an umbrella l- 6 organization of European utilities, and Kema in Holland which l
7 is also an umbrella organization of Dutch utilities about 8 their interest in joining in participation particularly in the 9 work on the passive plant. I would say that our, reception was
- 10. .relatively warm, and I have great expectations we will be ;
11 joined in the next several months by CEGB and hopefully, i
12- sometime in the first quarter of next year several more 13 European countries will join in this effort.
14 .MR. WYLIE: Have you factored in your program as far 15 as---
16 CHAIRMAN KERR: Charlie', could you get close'to the ;
17 microphone, please? ;
i l
18 MR. WYLIE: Have you factored-into your program the l 19 experience of the foreign reactors? ,
20 MR. STAHLKOPF: It is one of the reasons that we are 21 very interested in having them come into our program. We are-22 certainly getting excellent input from our three Asian !
i-23 utilities that are coming in, and particularly pleased with 24 the Japanese and Taiwanese input because they have an
- O 25 excellent track record. we very much hope to get similar l
l HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 L-_--__-_-__---_.
l'76 1 ' sorts of inputs'from'the Europeans as well.
O 2 MR. WYLIE: So far that has really'not been' factored-3 into youriprogram?
4 MR. STAHLKOPF: Well, this has.been factored into 5 our program. The European aspects have not.been factored into 6 the program. They are not officiully members yet. As.I say, 7 we are in a recruiting drive to get them. I have some feeling 8 we will be successful. l 9 DR. SHEWHON: The Japanese have completed their I 10 design of an advanced reactor, BWR and a PWR. Have you gotten 1
11 that information relatively in the open yet? Are there the I
12 venders in this country or-- -
i 1
13 MR. STAHLKOPF: The~ answer to that question is yes.
[
14' We'have, as we started the program, we entered into an 15 agreement with Tokyo Electric Power and General Electric .j i
16 Company to get full access and disclosure of their ABWR 17 information, and as a matter of fact, have used that as sort
)
18 of a start 4.ng point for our program.
19 In addition, Westinghouse has opened up their APWR q 20 files to us for potential utilization in the PWR side, and of 21 course, Kansai Electric is the company in Japan who is the !
l 22 leader in the development of the APWR so we have that very i
23 well factored into our program.
1' ll 24 MR. MICHELSON: On your previous slide there was ;
}
.O 25 some bars at the bottom dealing with external interf aces which.
l 4
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 j i
1 ,
177 l' you didn't appear to comment on but which I would like to hear 1 -. ~
3 -
_2- a little comment.- My concern'is that many of the vender.
'3 certification processes are proceeding ahead of the EPRI 4- requirements document, or appear-to be.
5 MR. STAHLKOPF: No, they are not proceeding ahead of 6 the EPRI-requirements document. I'm sorry. I didn't make
~7 myself clear on that.
8 MR. MICHELSON: The bar seems to say that. I don't' 9 know. i
.l 1
10 MR. STAHLKOPF: Yes, and perhaps again it-is the.
11 imperfectness of human communications-and graph makers, 12 There is a joint ~ memorandum of understanding which E 13 has been signed between DOE'and each of the two venders going W
l 14 through the certification process, and EPRI, that the venders l 15 going through certification, that being GE and CE, will use 16 the requirements document as their basis fori t heir designs 17 going into certification. And there is a' specific time lag 18 between the time that EPRI submits a particular chapter to 19 HRC, and the time that the vender subsequently then submits 20 similar ir. formation on certification on those same systems.
21 MR. MICHELSON: For the certification, not 22 necessarily for the FDA then? But unfortunately FDA'is the 23 end point-of technical review pretty much. 1
'~ _ -. -
24 MR. RUBENSTEIN: For the FD.i 2, the certification is l 1
- 25. the end point of the process, the FDA is the milestone in the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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178 L. = ..
1 review process which saysfyes, we have examined the process.
l' :. '
2 MR. MICHELSON: I look"at this' schedule-out at 1990 3= and then I look at the whopper schedule I'think ending about 41 '89, and I wonder how'this can be.
5 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Well, the WestinghouseEschedule as 6- it is in-house now is for a PDA. .
l 7 MR. MICHELSON: Not FDA? I 8 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Not yet.
9 MR. MICHELSON: GE is for an'FDA which also I think 10 ends in about.1990 I think.
11 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Let me -- Westinghouse indicated.to l
l 12 the Commission briefing on Tuesday, and of course to the !
13 staff, that they.showed us both your schedule for the 1300
{
14 megawatt and the 600 advanced passive design', and all three 15 . designs are in the process of having FDA's which would. meet 16 the design' certification onset in'91 or '92. I 17- In fact, the indicated Westinghouse schedule and 18 their intent to submit it in the middle of next year for the ,
19 advanced passive-600 shows perhaps a year, year and a half lag 20 between the large plant and going to design certification, so 21 we view it as a uniform moving forward toward design 22 certification, although Westinghouse did say in, both in the 23 remarks to the open house we had at the Hyatt on October 20th 24 'to talk about the standardization policy and the new rule, O 25 thet they thought they should also have the alternative to get 1
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5 179
'1 it alone'as opposed to go through the design certification 2 process, but they didn't indicate that they were going to
.3 . approach it-this way. So I see all three at this: time, 4 including the smaller plants, starting hearings after, for the 5 design certification about '91, '90.
6 Now one other thing is that Mr. Stahicopf was 7 careful to say they had agreement which excluded Westinghouse 8 but we-have been pursuing this with Westinghouse, and have 9 looked at the degree of conformity of their1 design with the 10 EPRI requirements and we have such a comparison and'I believe 11 that they talked about a close follow.
12 MR. MICHELSON: But the real. intent then is'that the
- p. 13' EPRI document in a given area should be available and reviewed
.v 14 before you-would write off on the comparable Westinghouse 15 boiler?-
.i' 16 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Either GE or Combustion will tie 17 themselves down to that. It was a firm, but they say that 18 they are participating in the writing of the EPRI document and 0
19 whether if it gets in on , time and reviewed by.the staff in 1 20 time, they intend to meet the substance of it. ;
21 MR. MICHELSON: So really.I think what you are 22 saying is that they may or may not be in synch with the EPRI 23 document?
24 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Well, they are date-wise on the l
() 25 ' review and approval of the document. They might not be I j
1 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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180 1
(
l 1 ' totally: in synch, but they are adopting the design
/~T:
l' -2 requirements, and'the submittals of the SER in the case of CE I i
3 says we will submit it two. months after the EPRI submittal.
4 If in fact it is one month, or something like it, it should be.
5 a consistent document. Their chapter on the reactor, for 6 example, should be consistent with the EPRI requirements.
7 MR. MICHELSON: I was thinking of the Westinghouse 8 SP 90 whichLI.think you got in-house already, and I think a
- 9. scheduld--
10 MR. RUBENSTEIN: For a PDA.
11 MR. MICHELSON: For-the PDA; you won't keep it and 12 send it all necessarily with the EPRI work.then?
13 MR. RUBENSTEIN: They have yet'to formalize the
}
14- arrangement.
15 MR. MICHELSON: Because the schedule seemed --
16 MR. STAMLKOPF: We have not formalized an 17 arrangement between ourselves and Westinghouse, but'have 18 between ourselves and GE and CE.
19 MR. RUBENSTEIN: I would only add I have explicit 20 comparison of the EPRI requirements and the Westinghouse i 21 design as it exists today, item by item.
22 MR. STAHLKOPF: An6 I would also say that i
23- Westinghouse is working very closely with EPRI in the j 24 development of the requirements documents, and although we
.25 have not formalized an agreement with them, they have HERITAGE REPORTING' CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
181 1- expressed the fact that it-is their intent to follow the
'E 2 substance of'the. document, but we have'no formal agreement to 3 that.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: .In that connection, you made early 5' and strong point about the advantage of simplicity.
6 MR. STAHLKOPF: Yes.
7 HR. EBERSOLE: From what little I have seen of the 8' PWR, BWR and large size I would not call them simple.
9 MR. STAHLKOPF: I would take issue-with the, on the 10 ABWR. I think the ABWR, I think the ABWR is a significant 11 simplification.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: I wouldn't fight that too much, but 13' the APWR is an absolute massive complexity.
)
14 MR. STAHLKOPF: I think that,-I think that you would
'15 have to talk to Westinghouse about how they plan to meet the 16 intent of the requirements documents with the APWR.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: I thought maybe you were oriented, 18 the smaller plants toward the simple concept.
19 MR. STAHLKOPF: We hope to see simplification in 20 both and simplification remains a very strong standard in both j
l 21 of these efforts. I think the simplification is more dramatic I
22 in the small plants, because you hatre the elimination of the 23 . pumps tid valves required with the active safety systems, but 24 we certainly are trying pretty hard to achieve some of that on O- 25 the active plants as well.
l i
s HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION --.(202)628-4888 1
} A 182
'1 -(Slide)
- 2 MR. STAHLKOPF: 'With-that, I will turn it over to 3 Jack DeVine who will talk about--
4 CHAIRMAN KERR: May I ask'a couple of questions, S. please?
6 MR. STAHLKOPF: Oh, I'm sorry.
7 CHAIRMAN KERR: I am told-by people who are more 8 familiar with valve conformance than I am that many of the 9 difficulties in existing pumps have to do with performance of 10 valves. You have not eliminated valves from your design I 11 presume?
12 MR. STABLKOPF: We are certainly trying to eliminate
-l
. 13- not all valves but part of our simplification program is '
14 reduction in the number of valves.
15 . CHAIRMAN KERR: Are you doing anything to try to 16 . design, sp'cify or procure valves that are more reliable than 17 'one see' in existing kinds of plants?
18 MR. STAHLKOPF; Not specifically within this 19 p* scram; within the overall EPRI-based program there is a 1
20 significant effort on valve reliability which we hope would be
- 21. fed back intt the procurement of valves for any such design.
2; CHAIRMAN KERR: It would seem to me to be a rather !
.3 perious omission if something can be done in.the next
? ]
24 generation of plants about valve conformity:
25 MR. CHAPIN: Doug Chapin from MPR Associates--I work l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 j i.. .
l 183 1 with the EPRI folks and we actually write a number of first O 2- draft of the-chapters with, specifically with respect to the i
)
3 ; valves. The chapters are organized by systems. Chapter 2-is 1 4 the balance of plant system, steam feed condensation, Chapter 5 3, reactor coolant system, et cetera.
6- For valves that have particular applications'in 7 those systems, we have written requirements which are lessons 8 learned about'those particular valves so we have tried, for 9 example, in the case of main steam isolation valves, to 10 identify the good PRAs,_ and impose those requirements. For 11 valves in radioactive service, we have specific requirements.
12 We_ don't have things about developing new valves, or those
. i
{} 13 sorts of things explicitly in the book, but there are'a number 14 of requirements which are related to valves and their 15 applications and specific systems and in that a sense, we do 16 have explicit recognition _of experience in the form. We have i
17 .got copies of books with us here we can show you. I 18 CHAIRMAN KERR: I would certainly hope that'you 19 would.
20 MR. REED: Mr. Chairman--
21 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question before you sit 22 down? In particular, there is a horrible absence of 23 _ statistics on valve performance under emergency conditions, on ;
24 how they perform with open flow, flow runout, the stream O 25 pressure differentiation, all the pressures they are supposed i i
r HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
l 184 '
il to face-under meeting emergencies.
'k1 2. Are you'taking a count of the specifications and 3 tests, statistics of valve performing under these rare and' 4 difficult ~ provisions?
5 MR. CHAPIN: Statistics, I would'not-say we have
- 6. specific things, statistics in that. Let me again answer with !
7 a couple of examples. There are two programs which are going 8 on right now at EPRI. One'has to_do with preparation of check 9 valve void lines, which is what problems have occurred with 10 chech valves in various service conditions, and a good example 11 of-that is the RHR check valve in the PWR which normally R12_ operates in the very low flow and the flaps and then when the 13 accumulator comes, the valve is supposed to open up.
14 .MR. EBERSOLE: What about the rare challenge such as H 15 on PWR main feedwater where the possibility _of a rupturing 16 pipe presents a challenge to the valve, on impact damage and a 17 whole host of other things?
10 MR. CHAPIN: We have tried by using the results of 19 programs like the check valve program which looks at a wide ,
20 variety c2 owner-operator valves, another one, loader-operator 21 conditions and matching and the motor operating valve steam 22 service conditions. There is another specific EPRI activity 23 which is developing utility guidance to address that j 24 particular problem, and each case, we specifically look the O 25 results of those programs, and we incorporate that guidance HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
185 1 into the book.
O 2 In general at this point, it has been on a ,
1 3 system-by-system basis, and one of the criticisms, one of the 4 suggestions that has been made--this is going back through all 5 the chapters--is maybe it might be appropriate to go extract 1
I 6 all of that system-by-system valve information and put it in a 7 section called valves, and put that somewhere in the book.
8 But yes, we are trying to learn those explicit lessons, and 9 put them in.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: I guess you will never reclly get I
11 very good statistics on valves because the challenges don't .
1 12 come very often. i l
l 13 MR. CHAPIN: That's one reason the statistical l
14 approach I am not sure is valid. For example, check valve is 15 perceived to be a major problem, but the, other than leakage, 16 if you go through the data base--we just went through this, 17 tiny percentage of, one percent of the valves has a problem.
18 And so you have to look hard and that's the reason to go and 19 look at problems that have occurred and lessons learned, and 20 put those explicitly in where we find them.
21 MR. REED: I would like to just make a quick 22 comment, no answer or reply necessary -- just recently, an 23 internal pilot operator relief valve on a boiling water 24 reactor exploded internally and damaged because it would not 25 close, and I guess there was some evidence that other valves HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
.186 1 had done-something similar, but they had perhaps closed.
l 2 Now valve testing and valve evaluation is very 3 subtle. .It has to do with the. fluid, the vapor, the hydrogen, 4 the oxygen, and the boric acid crystals that are involved.
5 Now EPRI did some testing on relief valves some ten
- 6. years ago. I criticized the tests because they were not done 7 with the. appropriate environment of borated hydrogenated water.
8 or borated or oxygenated water with gases that had been '
~
9 stripped off and filling up pipes'and so on and so forth, and l
10 I think that EPRI has to be very careful in these valvt 11 . judgments they make. -There are very, very complex, j 12 condensation, stripping. actions that can take place in snub 13- lines'and these are important to develop performance as just.
14 happened in Germany.
15 CHAIRMAN KERR: I believe you'said in response to'my-16 question that your containment design was going to take into 17 account all the design basis accidents.
18 MR. DEVINE: Be covering more of this later.
19 MR. STAHLKOPF: In both Mr. DeVine and Mr.
20 Sugnet's --
21 CHAIRMAN KERR: I will wait. Thank you.
22 MR. RUBENSTEIN: The current regulatory presentation 23 of severe accident policy try to deal with requirements in 24 this area and Research has, actively is working on a policy O 25 paper for that.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
'187 1 CHAIRMAN KERR: I had only Mr. Stahlkopf's response
-i 2 .as information.
3 MR. DEVINE: Good morning. My name is Jack DeVine.
4 My job is senior program manager with EPRI. As Ed indicated,
-5 I am actually an EPRI person in disguise.
I am a.GFU nuclear.
6 person on loan-to the EPRI ALWR program for a three-year 7 period. In that capacity, I manage both the requirements 8 document efforts-and the passive plant effort, and also the 9 regulatory stabilization efforts, although I have, I think you 10 have gotten sense from Carl's presentation and Ed's 11 presentation that we really are trying~to make sure these'are 12 cohesive sub-programs all contributing to a single goal. .
13 For this segment of the presentation, I will be 14 talking about the require,ments document. A lot of questions 15 have ome out which~ indicate that you have interest in some 16 specifics on the requirements document,_and I will try to give 17 you a smattering of that, although please understand that this 18 effort is a, is a rather huge one, and obviously we can only 19 touch on a few selected points. In that respect, if you have 20 questions, we will certainly try to answer them on the fly, or j 21 get back to you with, with better answers.
22 I think you have met everybody here with perhaps one 1
23 exception. Joe Idia is here also representing the EPRI q 24 program. ' Joe has been monitoring the regulatory stabilization O 25 portion of the program. Doug Chapin who contributed to the
, HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 I u__ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
188 1 . valve answer aLfew minutes-ago, has been working with us on 2 the requirements document efforts extensively, and-Bill.
3 Sugnet, who:will be talking about the passive plant' subject in 4 a moment, also has been working on the requirements document, 5 specifically in Chapter 5, safety systems area, so among the 6 group of us, I think we can try to give you some more complete 7 picture.
8 (Slide) 9 MR. DEVINE: .You saw this slide before. I won't 10 belavor it, but just for a tip-off, I would like.to leave you 11 with the impression that this requirements document effort is 12 not a trivial undertaking e,t all. In fact, it is a pretty .
-13 monumental task. As an example, this is' Chapter 1 of.the 163-14 chapters These:are rather detailed specific compendia of 15 requirements. We have wrestled quite a bit in developing this-16 requirements document with the question of how much detail is ,j 17 necessary, and our conclusion endorsed by our steering 18 committee is that if we don't take this requirements document 19 to the point of a fair degree of specificity, then it won't be 20 a crodible document. We simply can't command that the plant 21 is going to be safe and reliable, and last forever, and 22 inexpensive, all those things. We have to lay out a clear 23 path to accomplish that.
l 24 Consequently, we are assembling a great deal of C:1 25 information. That brings with it a companion difficulty of i
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L71 lMR2 EBERSOLE: 'Your requirements are more or'less.
Ay w.
8- ambiguous than say the GDCs or. regulations and you.will' .
' 9' ' Jremember we:have this' problem of'if we go'too far, we are l101 . accused of being--what is the proper wor'd--prescriptive.e. And Ill. ;then when'we-don't'go far enough, we.are accused'of-not'>
12 : telling, people what We wa'nt, .so there'is an accordian process.
sh NOJ '
13 ;Where do'you find'it?
$hd' 1.4 ' ' MR.7 DEVINE: .That'sta very thoughtful question and
, .i
,'. ' 15 - we wre'stle with that.one on every turn and the way we try to
~
'16 R answer the question generically is that we want to provide, ws
~
17 .- 'try to provide.enough specificity to ensure that o u r --
18' requirement is' achievable'and credible. We want to show a 19 -clear path to accomplish it. By the same token, we try not to 20 'go.so far as to define requirements which are not central to 21 achieving our top, tier criteria, and which really properly
- u 22- belong in the. domain of an architect-engineer, so we try to
'O 2
'23{ answer that' question in each case by examining ,our degree'of
, 124 detail against that criteria.
,m-25' MR. EBERSOLE: To pick a classic case on GDC 19 4
L HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 k < ..
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, 1. about the control of the reactor from points other than the
. f. s .
2 control room, how did you refine'that?
Or did you?
3 MR. DEVINE: We haven't yet. We are working on it 4 .right'now. I expect we will have a fairly, a very specifi:
5 answer to that in terms of requirements for control room 6 operation and requirements for rem ^ote shutdown areas. We are 7 working on that today.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: All right.
9 MR. DEVINE: I will discuss it very briefly.
10 We have had the same response Ed mentioned at my last job 11 which was at TMI 2 in planning, and continually face that 12 problem with the technical plans, either too specific or not
/~T 13; specific-enough. I even took it to the point of creating a G.
14: facetious' comment sheet'for the commenters so they could check 15 off too detailed or not detailed enough, and they gave us back 16 th.' answer I don't think there is ever a right answer, but we 17 try.to balance that.
18 A little bit more about requirements document .
1 19 scope -- at this point, our requirements document is broken 20 into thirteen chapters. It is, as Doug indicated, they are 21 more or less oriented toward groups of or related groups of 22 systems with Chapter 1 being umbrella-type document covering 23 the things which are common to the whole plant such as 24 materials, maintainability, operability, et cetera.
o 25 Also as Doug mentioned, we would expect that in the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
192 1 final roll-up'of the requirements document, the section on 2 valves will be incorporated. In fact, we have begun to q 3 compile that now. That-is.not.just a.wish.
4 The bulk of these are related packages.of mechanical 5 systems which are with a couple of exceptions-Chapter 6--this ,
1 6 is incorrect. That's plant arrangements and structures, not' 7 just PWR arrangements and. structures, and covers the plant 8 structural systems to be employed in the containment building, 9 and other buildings.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: uneJe are the safety-oriented 11 auxiliary systems?
12 MR. DEVINE: Chapter 5, engineered safety systems.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: Local mitigation assigned and they
-14 don't include essentially raw cooling water, all the support
~ 15 functions?
~
16 MR. DEVINE: You are right. The scope of Chapter 5 17 and 6, I got an outline for it that will you show you in a few l 18 minutes systems which are necessary to provide accident l
19 prevention or core damage prevention and mitigation, so it 20 covers the functional requirements for those hardware systems 21 and in the containment, the support systems for them in'two 4
22 areas, site support systems and plant cooling water systems, l 23 and we have--
i 24 You don't have a package there that MR. EBERSOLE:
O 25 you can call safety support systems?
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
193 1 MR. DEVINE: No, we don't have a package' called 0 2 safety, system safety.
3 MR. EBERSULE: ECCS only contain LOCA. mitigation; 4L you run all over the place looking for safety support.
5 MR. DEVINE: It does cover more than LOCA. mitigation 6- certainly~.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Didn't have aux feedwater, case in 8 point.
9 MR. DEVINE: Has emergency feedwater; we have made a 10 distinction. In getting to that directly, we have made a 11 conscious judgment that the feedwater' system that way provides 12 feed for the plant. Normal operation should include a
(} 13 start-up feed system and normal main feed system. That is 1 14 covered in Chapter 2. Power generation systems, emergency l
l 15 feed system should be separate, and in addition that' safety' 16 grade system, requirement for that is covered in Chapter 5.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Now Chapter 57 18 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir. They are in there.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: DC system not'there, essential raw 20 water?
21 MR. DEVINE: Power system is in Chapter 11, water 22 systems in Chapter 10.
23 MR. EBERSOLE: Chapter 10 must be a fascinating i 24 chapter. In Chapter 10, do yea present the rationale-- 4
(
25 CHAIRMAN KERR: Mr. Ebersole, why don't you let him 2
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 l
194-1 finish his presentation?
O.
\' 2 MR. EBERSOLE: I-think he is going to throw'this 3 thing-away in a minute.
4 MR. MICHELSON: Before you throw it.away--
5 MR. EBERSOLE: I.was going to say in Chapter 10-have L 6 you found an answer to when you should automate and not 7 automate a system?
8 MR. DEVINE: You put your finger on--this afternoon 9 Dr. Chapin is going to ponder that question. We are 10 assembling now to give you a--Chapter 10 includes those 11 fundamental issues. In fact, to at least tell you our heart 12 is in the right place, a month ago this chapter was called 13 instrumentation and control systems. And we decided it.really 14 has'to be broader than that, really have to address the 15 spectrum of things that how this plant is operated from a ,
l 16 philosophy and policy standpoint, implemented hardware 17 control, room layout, man / machine interface, so we renamed the ,
18 the chapter. We structured these chapters such that--and this 19 tas been part of the learning process, that we try to 20 iirticulate, we do articulate as best we can the technical 1
21 philosophies that are to be followed rather than simply
.l 22 starting out and laying out a lot of prescriptive 3 l
23 requirements.
24 We have identified in Chapter 10 right now, we have O 25 created, it is in draft form, the first step of the chapter HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
195-1 which is called chapter baseline, and that in that step, we
.0 2 lay out what the issues are that we want to' grapple with. 'One
~
3 of those-top tier issues that shows up right'in the first 4 section of Chapter 10 is degree of automation. We had' drafted 5 up a fundamental strawman policy statement and'Doug.and I'both 6 had a lot-of heartburn with it because it doesn't say very 7 much. So we have got that on our agenda. It is;very timely 8 question. I would guarantee you that the chapter'that you.see 9 when it is done, will answer that question, and in a specific 10 way.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: May be a marker-type chapter.
12 MR. DEVINE: That's our charter.
13 MR. MICHELSON: Question--you-mentioned a couple of.
14 times the so-called roll-up document. Is that going to be 15 Chapter 147 16 MR. DEVINE: No. Let me talk to that in minute. !
17 MR. MICHELSON: Fine.
18- MR. DEVINE: The last slide I have will be the same 19 outline that Carl described, and I will talk about the roll-up 20 document in more detail. I will try this slide. If there 21 aren't anymore questions, this is intended to, simply to show 22 you the rack-up of the system to be covered.
23 This is our near-term schedule for the creation of 24 the original issues of the thirteen chapters, and I guess it O 25 is probably a good time for me to try to make the connection l'
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
196 1 between that and the roll-up chapter.
2 This is our schedule.for production of, in.each case 3 of a chapter in a form such as this, which has been through 4 our development process, a lot of synergism with the, all of 5 our contractors on the team. We have got fourteen contractors 6 who contribute to the document, to every chapter, in eur 7 current set-up, and then interaction with the steering:
8 committee and the delivery of approved chapter to the NRC.
9 The game plan beyond that is for the NRC to go 10: through a comment and review process, culminating in the 11 issuance of a draft SER. Normally that is six months after-12 the delivery.of the chapter. We haven't' met that date so'far, 13 but NRC, like EPRI, has been in a learning process to create 14 that, and we think we are getting close to it.
15 We understand.very clearly that one does not design 16 a plant or develop a requirements document by starting at, you 17 know, in the turbine hall and finishing that and moving to the 18 aux building and moving on to the safety systems, et cetera.
19 There is a great need for integration. We also need to pick 20 up loose ends, some of them significant, which come out of the 21 comment process. NRC identifies things in the chapter we 22 should do. We have tried to avoid getting into an endless 23 reprocessing, refinement, resubmittal process, so we have 24 chosen instead to go through, to create these products 25 relatively discretely, at the same time, keep book on what the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
p l'
l.
197 1 open issues are.
O 2 [Atithe termination of these thirteen chapters we 3 have thirteen draft SERs involved. Our. intent and reallyLthe 4 next two' years of the program in that overall. schedule that 5 Carl described, is to do.two things--one, pile this whole 6 thing together, evaluating it, evaluate the composite'against 7 the top tier criteria that we have-laid out in. Chapter 1.
1 8 Secondly, incorporate all of the loose ends, make 1
9 sure there is a gazetta for every gazeeta, the whole thing 10 meshes and fits, and then create a one-time revision of the i
11~ . entire' requirements document and resubmit that, and that will 12 be the subject of a final review and a final SER, 13 Recently, we have also decided, and actually it is 14 not recently. It.has been a growing interest on the part of 15 the steering committee, to incorporate the. work that is being 16 developed in the passive plant work and to incorporate that in 4
17 the final roll-up document as well, the main line of interest 18 in these individual chapters have been created so for top tier 1 19 criteria and then specific reference criteria against the 1100 20 megawatt relatively evolutionary plant as Carl described the--
l 21 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you have separate packages for the 22 boiler, and the PWR?
23 MR. DEVINE: The general organization of a chapter 24 is an opening section with top tier requirements applicable to O 25 any ALWR and then subsequent chapters or section which apply 1
i HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 ;
i
u 198 1~ to the boiling water reactor and pressurized water reactor.
.q v' 2 The document as a whole_ covers both, but the bowels of11t make 3 a clear. distinction between B and P. ,
4 MR. MICHELSON: Roll-up then is just~ reworking of 5- this thing at a point in time?
6 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir.
7 MR. MICHELSON: You talked earlier about' valves as 8 an example. You were going to, you talk.about1 gathering all 9 the various parts maybe into a new part, but that" won't be' a-10 new chapter, but just a-- I 11 MR..DEVINE: Anticipate that it will be an overall, 12 new section in Chapter 1 that is an appropriate place for it.
- 13 MR. MICHELSON: Okay. Thank you.
14 MR. DEVINE: A couple of other things about this 15 ' schedule -- there are a couple of.real biggies among these 16 chapters. That is why the schedule shows a longer period of 17 time. Cert". inly reactor safety chapter, if you looked at the.
18 schedule--I'm sure some of you did--a year ago you would have 19 seen oar early plan was to build three, four and five in 20 parallel, and produce them all at the same time. And we have 21 difficulty doing that, but I think it is worthwhile because we 22 have created a much better Chapter 5.
23 Chapter 6, which covers arrangements, it is the 24 most, the single most influential chapter when it comes to O 25 plant construction time, and that's the most influential HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
199.
1 . chapter with' respect to capital costs, so we expect that--we
,O. 2 are working hard on it now. We expect that to be a major 3 effort.
4 Chapter 10', instrumentation control which:I alluded 5 to is a super chapter, so it is going to take a lot of etfort.
6 These chapters in this schedule ': acknowledge looks rather 7 unrealistic because it is, most of us as project managers see 8 that as a project comes to an end, things spread out instead' 9 of truncate at the end, but some of these chapters involve a 10 significantly smaller amount of work than those big chapters 11 that I mentioned. Our intention is to finish these 12 influential chapters by the end of next yetr in order'to make 13 sure that we have got plenty of time to do a thorough 14 integration and evaluation in the following two years.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: Is the arrangements chapter where you 16 accommodate the compartmentalization process for safety?
17 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir and we have, what we have done 18 is identified those, that segregation, functionally in Chapter i
19 5, and then we kick it over to the Chapter 6 guys to make sure 1 20 that they demonstrate--
21 MR. EBERSOLE: You have abandoned the old concept 22 which was wrong of very compact, tight, no space type thing?
l 23 MR. DEVINE: Absolutely. There is some tradeoff 24 there, but I mentioned this idea of starting top tier O 25 principles, top tier principles. Chapter 6, if you look at HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
200 1 it, talks about designing for safety, and this includes
~
2 compartmentalization, operability, and tnat includes access 3 and designing for constructability. All'of those lead you 4- toward a relatively spacious building, and we don't believe 5 that there is a significant cost penalty involved in~that 6 because it leads one to be able to-use structural systems that 7 - are straightforward and not try to develop--
8 MR. SBERSOLE: Are you using the Japanese experience-9 in that connection?
10 MR. DEVINE: We are using the Japanese experience in 11- that connection, although they do have a different working 12 situation obviously with their manpower, and labor, et cetera, 13 but we have some Japanese participation in the program, and we
)
14 have been studying their work.
15 MR. MICHELSON: Could you explain just-briefly how 16 you can do a plant layout before you have done your kicking 17 off of the electric power supply?
18 MR. DEVINE: That's very good question and we have 19 broken Chapter 6, and it really doesn't show on this schedule, 20 sort of in two phases. The first phase provides the bulk, and 21 it is the one that will be incorporated. The layout drawings l 22 which will company this baseline chapter that goes to NRC will 23 have substantially more detail in the containment area, and in 24 the auxiliary building with safety systems, and conceptual
'O 25 detail blocks of space allocated, and special relationships f
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
201 l
1- and that sort of . thing. .
1 2 MR. MICHELSON: Connections.
I
-3 MR.'DEVINE: Not at this point; that will be picked j
.i 4 up'at the final roll-up station, because that's part of the .l 5 integration of these and it is another' illustration of what I 6 described which is the, you simply can't--there is-a chicken I
7 and egg process here. You simply.can't finish one chapter and.
8- move on to the next one.
9 MR. MICHELSON: Just going to reserve space?
10 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir. And the charter for the 11- contractors has been to do'that.
12 DR. REMICK: To what extent is your arrangement 13 considering safety? Is physical security incorporated into 14 that? Critical type of things that you might get a benefit,- i 1
15 physical security as well as straightforward reactor safety, {
16 any consideration at all discussed?
17 MR. DEVINE: We are just now putting that together. 1 18 That is one of the specific factors that was identified in the 19 charter to the people doing the conceptual layout. We think 20 that a security and maybe more specifically, sabotage i i
21 protection, is heavily influenced by layout, and our 22 preference is to lay the plant out in a very logical way that 23 provides that, and physical, you know, separation among safety 24 systems, control room located in a place where it is not l
25 accessible to the outside and those kinds of things, and that I
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1 is a specific factor in'the layout.
2, Let me talk next about document' statutes. I am 3 running way over time, so what I am going to try to do is 4' speed up through these questions, and of course our time is 5 your time. If you would like to hold us over, we are 6 available.
7 Just in terms of where we'are, Executive Summary and 8 Chapters 1 through 4 completed and in'the hands of NRC.
9 Chapter 5 is being finalized. This is it. And Mr. Kintner is 10 going to get a letter this afternoon which we are hoping he~is 11 going to sign which will submit it to Les. Certainly in the- .
12 next week or so we expect that to be in their hands. It has 13 been through extensive review. We are very excited about this 14 nhapter. This was a major challenge to us, took us twice as 15 long as we expected. First time out of the box, we turned it 16 loose to the steering ccmmittee and got 1100 comments, which 17 is good news and bad news. It shows they are paying 18 attention, but plus it is a lot of agony, but we think this f
19 chapter is a real solid chapter and we will have it in your I 20 hands certainly as a Christmas present.
21 DR. REMICK: Sounds like you are learning from the 22 NRC!
23 MR. DEVINE: Same people who complete it. Chapter 24 6, the baseline has been created. We have got some studies in O 25 progress. We have got chapter draft work in progress at the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
203 1 i
1 same time. That's an active program. We expect first rough-
~
2 draft to be available around the endLof-January, and to have 3 the chapter together the' tail end of the second q'arter u in 4 1988.
5 Chapter 10 is a little, behind that schedule a 6 little bit, but we have got a draft of the baseline in hand, i
7 and in parallel with that, beginning to work on the various J 8 sections of the text, a number of big meetings coming up in 9 the next couple of weeks on that chapter.
10 The cumpanion schedule shee* or status sheet I 11 should say--wait a minute. I'm sorry. I missed a slide.
12 Looking at the balance of chapters, as my bar chart would .j 13 indicate, they are not yet started. All of those are intended i
[
14 to be prepared and submitted,in '88. Post-submittal work we 15 talked about, basically evaluation and roll-up in an 16 integration effort to come up with a comprehensive document. .
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Let me ask you a question about the j J
18 engineered safety system chapter. The old classic content of 19 that was what do you do when you have a LOCA? Where is the l
20 equipment that takes care of the small or large? And it was 21 bounded by that. There was nothing in there that says what do 22 you do when you don't have any AC power or any DC power or any 23 service water or any essential or component cooling, nothing 24 there? Yet those are the more likely things that are going to O- 25 happen, so are you finding places to put these recovery HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
204 1 processes other than engineering safety systems? How do you 2 get out of trouble? For instance, where do you put feed and 3 bleed if you have it at all?
4 MR. DEVINE: Feed and bleed is in Chapter 5.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Is it?
6 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir.
7 MR. EBERSOLE: Expanding the general scope of 8 Chapter 5?
9 MR. DEVINE: It is expanded--I want to say it is not 10 expanded in candor to the comprehensive degree you are 11 describing because the cooling water, loss of cooling water, H 12 and V, dependent on it, et cetera, electrical power supply, 13 they are functional requirements there, but the details are in 14 other chapters.
15 MR. EBERSOLE: Accommodate a lot of redundant 16 functions and then invoke the need for diverse functions.
17 MR. DEVINE: Diverse functions are covered in 18 Chapter 5.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. Good. You heard him.
20 MR. P.EED: Oh, I didn't hear him, but I am always 21 hoping.
22 MR. DEVINE: We will be very interested in your 23 reaction to Chapter 5. It addresses four square some of the 24 things you talked about. Certainly not completely to your O 25 satisfaction, but I think you will find that it, it covers HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
205 1 some of those issues pretty thoroughly.
- q(/- 2 As far as;MRC is' concerned, we have in hand a draft 3 SER on Chapter 1. Chapter 1 was a tough' chapter. It was our 4 first try. And there are a lot of things we would'like to do 5 differently and.will do differently when we hit the roll-up, 6 but I think all of us have gone through a
- learning process ,
j 7 and we are satisfied that, right'now that there is an l
l i
8 agreement in the main with NRC. The SER support, it says that )
9 chapter is basically sound, some points of debate, which we 10 will continue to react to and the'; final roll-up will pick up. .
11 We think this has been, it was a painful, but successful l 12 process.
I 13 Chapter 2, NRC givun us comments; this really isn't 14 much of a safety chapter. There are some comments that 15 certainly is related to safety. We don't want to pull the 16 punch there because the TMI accident started with a secondary 17 plant system. We tried to do a lot on reliability, et cetera.
i 18 We are in the process of resolving those comments with NRC.
19- Three and four we have got initial set of comments.
20 We are reviewing them right now, targeting to respond to NRC 1
21 by the end of this year.
j 22 Chapter 5 will be submitted to NRC in the next week 23 or so. We have tentatively scheduled a session with them to 24 kick off the period early in January.
25 (Slide) 1 4
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-1 MR. DEVINE: Next package 1of slides, we really could
)' 2- spend many hours on'this. I will try to spin through them 3' quickly. Next package of slides shows.a scattergram of-4' requirements.from what is now probably a foot deep pile of 5 requirements' documents, some of the things that we thought 6 would illustrate the kinds of questions you have had; the 7 Executive Summary in Chapter 1, lay out some top tier 8 requirements. And we cringed a little bit, call these--I 9 shouldn't say that. We had some hesitance in calling these' 10 things requirements because until we have developed a detail 11 to support them, we can't say with assurance.that we can 12 command them, but we, at the same time we wanted to put tough
'13 targets on'the table, and then use this as a basis for
)
14 developing the rest of the document. And these are the ones l 15 that were selected.
16 Includes core damage frequency of ten to the minus 17 five events per year' depending on whose study you look at.
18 External events, by the way, that would appear to be perhaps a 19 factor of ten improvement over current plants. We look at 20 that, by the way, as investment protection objective for the 21 reason that Ed described.
22 CHAIRMAN KERR: What do you mean by severe core 23 damage?
t 24 Do you mean loss of cooling capability, or the core O 25 having penetrated the vessel and being --
II HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 i
207 1 MR.'DEVINE: .We are'not talking about vessel-breach.
2 We are talking about significant damage to the point that the 3 core would not be usable again.
4 CHAIRMAN KERR: Okay.
o 5 MR. DEVINE: Severe accident criterion is
-6 limitation at a nominal half mile boundary dose for_ events'of 7 ten to the minus 6 frequency. This was assembled before NRC 8 had a policy statement. That's, this is perhaps a bit more 9 conservative than the NRC's policy statement, but that's the !
10 target that we established and that's a clear public safety 11 goal.
12 DR. REMICK: Within one half mile, should this be 13 beyond one-half mile?
14 MR. DEVINE: That's at one-half mile. That's the 15 measured dose at the site boundary.
16 DR. REMICK: Within meaning anywhere between the i
17 containment and --
18 MR. DEVINE: You are right. That's not the intent.
19 We tried to compress the paragraph of words. Didn't do it; 87 20 percent availability, very tough target. Ed pointed out, this 21 is a, one of the real keys to economic viability of the plant, 22 and we think that's achievable, and. Europeans have done it.
23 Japanese bave done it, built in a two-year refueling 24 capability. Try to knock inadvertent trips to fewer than one O 25 per year. Guidelinen.is many fewer than one per year, like HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (2021628-4888
'208 l
.1 try zero. We are trying.to get this down to very low number.
2 MR. EBERSOLE: The word inadvertent has got lots af.
3 interpretations. For instance, it suggested that a trip 4 shouldn't have occurred, just a, some instrument mechanic 5 caused it.
6 MR. DEVINE: I think we.were really thinking beyond 7 that. For example, we tried to eliminate in the power S generation systems trips which on the surface might add to 9 plant safety, but in fact, end up challenging the safety 10 systems.
.11 MR. EBERSOLE: If it is inadvertent trips., as I' 12 understand it, it ought to also say that a every one of such gg 13 trips should be, put the. plant in more safe-- in other words,
.Q 14 it should be a benevolent trip rather than a challenging trip.
15 Are you going to make that requirement?
16 MR. DEVINE: Well, not exactly in that way. I think
-17 the way we tried to address that--
18 MR. EBERSOLE: For instance, aux feedwater pumps 19 have to do their things as a challenge every time you have.a 20 trip because some mechanic caused a trip? Are you going to 21 say oh, no, all I have just done is stop the fission i
22 generation? I have got, still got a normal heat synch, i 23 everything is going to run along.
24 CHAIRMAN KERR: You are quarreling with less than 25 one per year or-- j l
j HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
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209 1 MR. EBERSOLE: I am quarreling with the connotation
~\
2 that inadvertent trip may be a safety challenge. I don't 3 think it should be.
4 MR. DEVINE: I think we are looking at it from a 5 slightly different viewpoint. Our thinking is--well, let me 6 say a couple of things. One is our thinking is that we are 7 not sure there is anything called a benevolent' trip. You 8 cycle the whole plant unnecessary, you are opening the door 9 toward bad things. And we are try.ing to cut that down.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: Ought not to ask any number of safety 11 systems.that have to jump up, do their thing.
12 MR. DEVINE.: We are also try to identify 13 specifics, what really has to happen bc h from an equipment
)
14 operations standpoint and analytical standpoint. As an 15 example, if you look at the source term question, the 16 assumption is that you have immediate release of all these 17 fission products. Consequently, everything got start-up in 18 seconds, and that just cycles equipment and makes a design 19 very difficult, and equipment--
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Notably the Westinghouse plants 21 command the aux feed pumps to do their thing. CE and GE 22 don't.
23 MR. DEVINE: I don't know the answers. I don't 24 believe we have stated what the emergency feed system has to O 25 do in the, on a trip. I don't think it has to do anything.
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l i< 210-l ,
1 Or Bill?
L O. 2 MR, SUGNET: Bill Sugnet from EPRI--we are going to l
3 . require that the emergency feedwater system not have to come 4 out automatically after a trip.
l 5 MR. EBERSOLE: Good. Thank you.
1 6 MR. CHAPIN: Also going to design the plant to ride 7 thrcugh without tripping a number of events which in the'past 8 have resulted in trips; for example, loss of a major pump in 9 the power generation system, if it is the pump, condensate 10 pump, booster pump, we want the plant to stay on line, and l 11 deal with those plants, those kind of trips, not challenge the-12 safety system.
13 MR. EBERSOLE: Then you are.trying to create-14 benevolent trips instead of challenging trips.
15 MR. DEVINE: Trying to eliminate trips, and if we l 16 cause them, make them been equivalent then in that sense.
17 Sixty-year design lifetime, that seems to be l 38 achievable based on this life extension work at EPRI.
f 19 MR. EBERSOLE: Is there a hinge point in that i
l 20 problem area?
21 MR. DEVINE: Steam generators, but our feeling is it 22 is foolish to believe that a steak generator is going to last 23 60 years. We are requiring steam generators to be replaced 24 and the reactor vessel integrated exposure is a hinge point.
O 25 We have established fabrication requirements in the reactor, HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
215 1 fluence- limitations such that the reactor vessel will clearly O 2 be suitable for 60 years, and I think those are really the 3' ones. The rest'is a matter of good layout for. accessibility
'4 and maintainability, replacability of components, that sort of 5 thing.
6 These are cost. targets, and stated in terms of cents 7 per kilowatt hour. Obviously we are looking hard at this 8 number because depending on--there is a tremendous spectrum of 9 costs, of capital cost of power plants in the United States, 10 some of them very high. This is a low figure compared to 11 current best practice in the United States. It is not a low 12 figure compared to some offshore practice, and could be we'can 13 do better than that, so we are looking at that number.
)'
14 Constructability, plant construction in 54 months, 15 which is basically a 48-month period from first structural 16 concrete to the beginning of start-up program; six months 17 start-up and test program, through initial operation, and 18 this. This is an achievable figure, and it is a necessary 19 figure because of this is the thing that drives the capital l 20 costs, particularly when you add the cost of money.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: Do you get the same distribution for l 22 those costs for the boiler in the PWR? Looks like some ,
23 difference in distribution costs like, for instance, fuel 24 costs would be less for the PWR because it was the--
(:) 25 MR. DEVINE: I don't think there is a significant l
i HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-48BB
212 1 difference, but'I may be wrong. Somebody help me with that.
0' ' 2 MR. EBERSOLE: PWR has higher material efficiency in 3 the core. You know, it has got lots of transfer coefficient.
4 I should think the fuel costs of the boiler would be higher.
5 I don't know.
6 MR, DEVINE: I don't know the answer to that. We 7 will try to find out.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: I wouldn't be surprised to find it 9 different.
10 MR. DEVINE: Got targets on rad waste, which is 11 certainly less than average in the United States, achievable 12' number, really'trying to tackle that by doing a lot of things 13 to minir.ize generation of rad waste. Also have a chapter that 14 addresses the rad waste processing systems, but would improve .
15 efficiency of current plants, and occupational exposure, less 16 than hundred manrem per year, low figure compared to U.S.
17 plants. Japanese have done better in their plants. Those are 18 are all numbers that we put up in the--there was some judgment 19 call involved. We think we have made them aggressive, and we 20 are going to satisfy ourselves we have made them. If we 21 decide that we can do better in some respects, we will cover 22 this as well.
23 Slides that just trip through some of the issues in 24 each chapter; Chapter 1 really is a cover-all chapter with ten O 25 sections, covers topics such as those listed here. It HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
213-1- establishes very aggressive requirements regarding design
- k- 2' completeness prior to construction, and that's in the 3 constructability area. .This has beenLa rather controversial 2 s
4 issue., but it is one that there seems to be agreement that in ;
5' some fashion has to be dealt with.
6 Common practice in this country has been, as you 7 know, to have a design proceeding with construction in 8 parallel. There are a lot of reasons for that, not the lowest i
9 of which is uncertainty in a long process and requirement.for 10 change. Also the process for procuring equipment and the 11 timing for procuring equipment and that sort of thing, but the 12 bottom line seems to be quite clear, which is that it is very 13 difficult to accommodate changes as you go in something as 14 complex as a nuclear plant design, and therefore, we think it i
15 is worthwhile to put a very high premium to have design 16 finished before you start. We have tagged a number of 90 17 percent which is a major penalty, but one which we think is 18 cost justified and we are using that as a entry point into the j 19 constructability issue.
20 MR. MICHELSON: Ninety percent of what?
21 MR. DEVINE: Of all documents required to build the i
22 plant, that will have been issued in a complete form. I 23 MR. MICHELSON: Ten percent of the design work j 24 remains to be done?
O 25 MR. DEVINE: That's what the document says.
I HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 i J
7 214-1 MR. MICHELSON: That's pretty high level of 2 completion.
3 MR. DEVINE: It is an extraordinary level of 4 completion.
5 MR. MICHELSON: I am not thinking APWR and so forth 6 is. coming through.with numbers enything even approaching that, j 7 MR. DEVINE: I have not said--it has been a. point of l
8 some confusion Because let me try to put this in context. ~
9 It is difficult--it is a good point. There is always 10 difficulty dealing with percent completion because first of 11 all, it is too simplistic a number to describe something very 12 complicated, but also there are different incentives and 13 perhaps different answers for percent completion.
14 The number 90 percent refers to constructability 15 only. We are not talking about a licensability issue. We are 16 saying if you arc going to have smooth construction process, 17 not a lot of reworks, bulk of engineering done first. That 90 18 percent is certainly not necessarily, at least I am speaking 19 personally, not necessary to license the plant. You are 20 talking 40,000 drawings. NRC doesn't want--
21 MR. MICHELSON: Construction drawings you are 22 talking about, 90 percent of all--
23 MR. DEVINE: Termination drawings, hardware 24 drawings, impediment drawings, all of that kind of stuff.
25 MR. WYLIE: Are you going to say something about the l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
215 1 percent complete-for certification?
2- HMR . DEVINE: -I am not planning to, Les, I see you 3- grabbing the microphone.
4 MR. RUBENSTEIN: Well, the three designs-vary. The 5 presentation-by Westinghouse just recently to the Commission 6 said that they will design a hundred percent of the safety 7 systems, and I think in the large plant, and they were talking 8 about the whole, the entire plant that would be responsible 9 for, and the advanced passive 600.
10 And to add to what Jack was talking about, the 11 Commission is quite interested in the scope of the design, and 12 the percent of completion of, for a variety of reasons. As 13 you remember, the' standardization policy is looking toward 14 early site review one-step licensing, so we need a design 15 which we can really come to grips with to meet that one step 16 requirement.
17 Further, if the certification process is to be 18 meaningful, we want to capture all those essential elements, l 19 particularly as regarding safety, into the rulemaking so that 1 20 we go forward with a plant which is essentially complete, and i
21 will not have to be backfitted or readjusted or reintegrated 22 or be reviewed as a change, so both from the economy of the 23 review process, and the stabilization of the process, both the )
i 24 scope of supply and completeness of the design is very O 25 important to us. And we are trying to come to grips with that HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 !
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l:
216 1' in'the policy statement. Maybe the words might not say it as 2 explicitly as I do, but we have that interest.
3 MR. MICHELSON: Does Westinghouse mean a hundred
[ 4 percent of the engineering required for construction?
l 5 MR. RUBENSTEIN: On the advanced passive, on the 6 600.
7 MR. MICHELSON: That's very interesting.
8 MR. DEVINE: Last item on Chapter 1, there is 9 appendix to Chapter 1 which is a very fat list of what we 10 think are the current licensing requirements applicable to a 11 plant. It was a point of some discussion with NRC in their 12 review, and we are going through that. We think this is.a 13 useful exercise, although it is difficult, to identify just 14 what is required in the licensing arena right now. We are 15 going through that document right now and trying to sort out 16 those 900 plus regulatory requirements in terms of the degree 17 to which they are addressed in the requirements document, so 18 that we will end up with a fairly, I think a very clear 19 statement of licensing scope addressed in the requirements 20 document, and applicable to the ALWR.
I 21 DR. REMICK: Proposing anything innovative in the 22 quality assurance area over the past?
23 MR. DEVINE: We are not at this point. We have had 24 some discussion, one of the proposals on the table was a very O 25 comprehensive review of quality assurance, and we chose not to HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -
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217 1 do it really as a matter of resources. We may pick that up.
2 Right now it is fairly straightforward set of requirements in 3 quality assurance, nothing very different.
4 (Slide) 5 MR. DEVINE: Chapter 2 covers the secondary plant 6 power generation feed condensate main steam, that sort of 7 thing. It has got lot of interesting stuff in it. I won't go 8 through this in detail,' just to give you an example of the way
,9 we tried to implement--this was an interesting chapter because 10 it was the first time that we, the first chapter in which we 11 tried to deal with the guidance from the steering' committee 12 about simplification and margin and proven technology and that 13 sort of thing, and we found as you would expect that.one has
)
14 to struggle with some tradeoffs in those areas, but we came up 15 with we thought good resolutions in most of the areas, and 16 much simplified feed heating system with future stages of 17 heating and less cross-connection.
18 MR. EBERSOLE: That second bullet, how do you, what 19 does that second bullet really mean? Are you going to use 20 some of the new systems?
21 MR. DEVINE: That's a good question. Yes. The 22 answer is yes. We struggled with that because there are a few
'23 systems, one could argue they are prototypical for large 24 adjustable speed motor. We went to visit one that had only O 25 been operational a couple of months, had a lot of down time HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
218 1 getting tweaked up. However, as you look at that system, that
( 2 appears to really be a positive step to improving a lot of the 3 hardware in existing plants in the controllability of feed 4 systems, so we put a provision in there, said listen, nobody l 5 is going to build this plant in the next couple of years, so l
6 the lead approach in the document is to use adjustable speed 7 motor-driven feed pumps.
8 There a back-up pump, by the way, with respect to 9 a motor-driven pump requirement for an engineer to examine the 10 actual performance, actua] statistics available at that time 11 and confirm that that is in fact a proven technology, 12 technique. The other thing I should have mentioned is that in 13 Europe, as of a year ago, there were some 30 of these pumps 14 being referred to various stations, so we felt in the next 15 five years there is going to be good data base.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: What are the highest speeds for 17 driving them with the straight shaft? I would think 7,000 or 18 something like that.
19 MR. DEVINE: We did it a year ago. I was going to 20 say about half of that. But I 'dc.n ' t want to say.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: 'It is 600 already I thought you 22 were going to multiply that.
23 MR. DEVIDE: I honestly don't remember what--
24 CHAIRMAN KERR: Adjustable speed motor or O 25 transmission?
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219
.1 MR. .DEVINE: Adjustable speed motor.
2 MR. WYLIE: Variable frequency.
3 MR. DEVINE: Variable frequency, got a huge--
4' MR. EBERSOLE: I thought that would take it high 5 shaft. speed.
6 MR. DEVINE: I honestly don't remember. I will find 7 out for you.
8 MR. MICHELSON: Is this considered superior to using 9 - a constant speed in the throttling valve?
- 10. HMR . DEVINE: Yes.
11 MR. MICHELSON: From a simplicity viewpoint, it is 12 not necessarily superior.
- 13- MR. DEVINE
- What you raise the debate, you get into 14 steering comnittee says make it simple. You say well, what 15 does that mean? Make is simple over here and more complicated 16 over there, pick up lots of wear, lot of inefficiency trying 17 to throttle a lot, if you look at outage causes among plants, 18 feed reg valves are notorious, so adjusting the speed is the 19 straightforward way to do it, but it creates a new machine.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Some of translation of complications.
21 MR. DEVINE: It is difficult to do that. A few 22 other things, we specified, for example, a condensate 23- polishing system. This is an economic tradeoff. We think it 24 is important, is no regeneration. Change resins, don't O 25 regenerate resins, things like condensate, protect steam HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
220 1 generator. Most upset chemistries conditions resulted-from 2 screw-up in regeneration. But it, there is an operating. cost 3 penalty there.
4 11R . MICHELSON: ' Wait a minute. This is' boiling 5- water as well, isn't it?
6 MR. DEVINE: Yes, sir.
7 MR. MICHELSON: You are going to throw-the resins 8 away?
9 MR. DEVINE: I would have to refresh myself, 10 MR. MICHELSON: Trying to get this rad waste down to 11 a minimum amount. That's a lot of rad waste right there.
12 MR. DEVINE: There is the potential for regeneration 13 off'line, which would be the way to ao this would be in the 14 processing. What we didn't want to do is get on line, then 15 the valve line ending up putting crapped-up water in the 16 plant.
17 DR. SHEWMON: Not more radioactivity, but more 18 radioactive material.
19 MR. MICHELSON: Yes. It has to be handled as 20 radioactive waste.
21 MR. CHAPIN: Excuse me. The use of throw-away resin 22 is expected to reduce the volume of rad waste'for the plant 23 significantly because you just throw away the resin. You 24- don't wash the resin and end up with the wash, and so both the O 25 PWR and BWR venders have indicated to us that part of the gain j t
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
221 1- that you get from this, you make a~ cost loss because you are-2 throwing away resin, but you make a substantial gain in the 3 rad waste area because you generate so muchfless rad waste.
4 MR. MICHELSON: I thought you could concentrate the 5 waste way down?
6 MR. DEVINE: That's a point, Doug. This did come 7 out in discussion. EPRI, separate from the ALWR program, did 8 a fairly comprehensive study of this' subject before it came up l 9 with that as a. lead recommendation. We.really latched on to 10 it. It was right in the middle of the simplification 11 objective.
12 MR. EBERSOLE: Last line, that you are getting into 13 the load rejection, does that suggest you are not going to 14 have load rejection at full power?
15 MR. DEVINE: That's right. We wrestled with that 16 one and came up with 50 percent as the right kind of number.
17 Most of the outage time resulting from load rejection events 18 have been in the start-up mode at low power. There were few, 19 if any, at high power. And that seemed to be the 20 cost-effective tradeoff was to have a plant that could. ride 21 through a load rejection event up to 50 percent power, but not 22 have the penalty of being able to accommodate the stream 23 transient at hundred percent.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Clear turbine generator at a high O 25 power load rejection.
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222-1 MR. DEVINE: That's right.
r 2 MR. EBERSOLE: Won't carry house loads.
I 3 MR. DEVINE: That's the way it looks. Haven't~done 4 the turbine generator chapter.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: What percent bypass are you going to 6 put in? What percent safeties?
7 MR. DEVINE: The numbers, the bypass and r,afeties, 8 Doug, do you remember?
9 MR.'CHAPIN: It is, I think. bypass turns out to'be
.10. about 40 percent. Depends on the vender design and the like.
11 You don't have to bypass a hundred percent in order to get the 12 capability to ride through a hundred percent load rejection.
13 As I recall the numbers, it is about 40 percent bypass for 14 both the B and PWR design. That was specifically looked at 15 and studied.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: Going to refuse safety trips? Full l
17 load rejection going to bypass without safety trips?
18 MR. DEVINE: At full load rejection, the safety !
19 picks up part of it and the bypass picks up part I believe.
20 Again, we have got Chapter 2 right there. It has been a year.
'21 MR. EBERSOLE: That's in detail. I wouldn't pursue 22 it.
23 CHAIRMAN KERR: We have a fairly clear cutoff time 24 of 12:30.
25 MR. DEVINE: I promise to go faster. I will zip HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
223 1 through the rest of these, find then we will move on and i O 2 -hopefully leave some time'for questions. -And you have these -
l 3I in your handout.
. . I 4 Chapter 3 covers--that's the reactor coolant system 5 chapter. It covers a number of important issues, including 6 very importantly a reduction for the PWR and too hot which j 7 protects steam generators, also starts fuel off at a lower i 8 point in terms of reaching any safety limits; improved
)
9 transient performance, bigger steam generators. There is no-10 core function in the pr essurized water reactor. BWR-side 11 really-endorsed with the fairly extensive look at the ABWR 12' approach of internal resource pumps add complication in the :
1 13 maintenance area but eliminate two large loops, reduced load 14 vulnerability, that nort of thing.
15 Fire capacity reactor wate: lean-up system and the 16 other. kinds of things you have seen here; lot of attention and 17 details on reactor coolant pump system performance. )
i 18 MR. EBERSOLE: The thing that sticks out, there is -
19 no PORV function. That suggests you are picking up the CE g 20 design. How do you get the bleed / feed?
21 MR. DEVINE: There is no PORV function in the sense 22 that--
23 MR. ELERSOLE: Glenn is back out.
24 MR. DEVINE: There is a depressurization system, two O 25 valves, but they are not PORVs in the sense they are-required HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
224 1 .to come into play to clip the pressure peak in a transient. I 2 That is a very important distinction we think. That is why
-3 you get into trouble.
4 MR. EBERSOLE: Safety valves?
5 MR. DEVINE: Safety valves, and has a relief valve, 6 not a PORV. Relief valve provides capability to depressurize, 7 to get into feed and bleed cooling and also to depressurize 8 the reactor as a reaction to the severe accident protection 9 event'in uhich you would, you like to avoid containment 10 heating.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: That you have that valve design?
12 MR. DEVINE: Do not have that valve design we can 13 see. Done study to figure out what sizing needs to be for 14 reference size plant in order to get the pressure down in a 15 reasonable timeframe to a few hundred PSI.
16 DR. SHEWMON: What is the, how much are you talking
, 17 about dropping the temperature? I think this is a fuel hot 18 channel.
19 MR. DEVINE: Six hundred degrees compared to 615 to 20 625 in rest plants; if you look at plants that open at 600 21 degrees, they had virtually no steam generator problems. That 22 also picks up perhaps 6, 7, 8 percent margin in overall fuel 23 design.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: Feed /b7eed under depressurized O 25 conditions, correct?
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l 225-1 MR. DEVINE: The feed'and bleed will-be under O 2 depressurized. conditions. _They have depressurization 3 capability, and then ejection capability and just continue 4 to--
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Blow secondary down, when you are 6 'doing that, keep it from being a. feeder?
7 MR. DEVINE: Yes.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
9 MR. MICHELSON: Do you somehow rule out once-through 10 generators or is that conceivable one could have once-through 11 generatos do this?
12 MR , DEVINE: We have really danced around that. The 13 chapter as written, uses resurge generators as reference.
)
14 There is a paragraph to the effect that in order to prevent us-15 diluting resurges we have not addressed once-through cooling.
16 If a_ designer wanted to propose that, he would have to 17 demonstrate that the intent of all these were met. That's as 18 far as we took it.
19 MR. MICHELSON: You have ruled it out?
20 MR. DEVINE: We didn't cover it. We didn't say, we 21 didn't command that no one ever use one again.
22 MR. REED 3 I am surprised you said stean generators 23 were the reason you knocked doun the temperature.
24 MR. DEVINE: Was one of the reasons.
O 25 MR. REED: You don't feel that steam HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
226 l' generators--when they first created steam generators, all they
( 2 did was take a feedwater-heater and reverse the flow process, 3 which was absolutely asinine. But we~have gone a long way 4 from.that. We have-designed-the. steam generators on the job 5 over the period of 30 years. And finally, it appears to me 6 that many of the U tube steam generators have reached a point l 7 they can accept these temperatures that we have been giving l
8 them.
9 You don't feel that they have improved enough so l
10 that they wouldn't be a factor in reducing temperature?
111 MR. DEVINE: I don't underr- nd the thrust of your 12 question. Today's new steam generators are not doing well 13 enough.
14 MR. REED: Lets say tomorrow's new steam generators 15 they have not yet put on the market.
16 MR. STAHLKOPF: I think,'Glenn, we feel that we see 17 enough corrosion process and have had enough new problems crop 18 up with steam generators that we feel uneasy about saying that 19 we can only, that it is not a prudent thing to do to provide 20 further margin, so the idea is to provide further margin for 21 corrosion as well as for maximum temperature.
22 As Jack said, and it is because of the unknown, we 23 feel certainly that no steam generator is going to last 60 24 year lifetime of the plant, so we are designing for steam O 25 generator replacement. We would like replacement only to be l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
227 1 once during the. plant' lifetime. To do this, we are trying to 2' be prudent,.give margin at, stay at hundred degrees. There 3 are too many unknowns at this point.
4 MR. REUD: It is not a big-job to increase the set 5 temperatures and raise it up if you run for.40 years and find-6 no scale.
7 MR. STAHLKOPF: I would love to see that happen.
8 MR. WARD: I have some I will trytree to~make it.
9 quick questions about the PORV.
10 I :mean one of the original .PORV f unctions was to 11 intercept pressure transients before the safeties,.and I guess 12 you felt that is not needed. Why is that?- Because you are 13 confident safeties recede?
l O.
l 14 MR. DEVINE: We have larger pressurizer, and we 15 have, so we have the capability of dealing with the, with that 1
16 surge.
17 MR. WARD: Frequency of that sort of transients 18 is -- okay. The other question, for the bleed valve or low.
19 pressure relief valve, depressurizing valve, did you consider
- 20. -whether a location other than the top of the pressurizer would
-21 be more optimum for that?
22 MR. DEVINE: That's a good question. I don't 23 remember that discussion and it would just seem that's where 24 it belongs.
.O- 25 MR. CHAPIN: There was some look at that, and HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
- - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ . J
228.
1 consensus of the designers was that the top of the pressurizer
- 2. was the preferred location. One of the major problems with
'3 the design of the blow-down valve is that when you open the 4 valve, it blows,:on the PWR, tends to want to blow water. l 5 instead of steam. In fact, thermodynamically'to depressurize i
6 PWR you have to blow a lot of water out of the plant and so I
(
7 the idea ~was that, the consensus was to put the valve as high 8 in the plant'as you could. The valve would clear its throat 9 earlier, and you have to make sure the surge line is designed 10 properly so you can get it then, but it looks like not 11- detailed study was made. It was discussed and.it looks to us 12 'like the best place to put it is on the top of the
- 13. pressurizer.
14 MR. WARD: You have got that whole nice big fat 15 inventory of liquid in the pressurizer and you have to get rid 16 of that.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Hot water, too.
18 MR. WARD: Okay. It is not obvious co me that 19 that's the best place to put it, but go ahead.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Did you put in requirement for less 21 ambiguous determination of where the primary inventory is, 22 level devices or whatever?
L 23 MR. DEVINE: Yes.
l 24 MR. KINTHER: What you are attempting to do is O 25 design a plant that is, the relief valves don't lift.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
229 1- Operating transients, no. valve lifts. That was the important 2 point,.and it is consistent. That's what we are attempting to 3 achieve.
4 MR. REED: .I don't think you'have to go very long 5 way for that. My experience with the plants.that I was on, I 6 don't know we even, in Point Beach I don't know we ever lifted 7 a relief valve on the primary system.
8 MR. KINTNER: I don't know how far we had to go. We 9 made this requirement. We wish we had it on the TMI 2.
10' DR. SHEWMON: We all agree.
11 MR. DEVINE: Go through with you quickly a couple of 12 other chapters; Chapter-4, reactor systems, and that includes 13 the reactor, reactor vessel, internal, fuel, that sort of
.O.
14 thing. After great debate, ended up with requirement that the 15 fuel design of a 15 percent thermal margin. It basically 16 means that the designer has got to go through all the 17 calculations tricks he normally does to figure out how to stay 18 below established core limits. Got to stay 15 percent below 19 them, can't reach them, and that's margin available to the 20 operator. That is not the guy at the switch but through the 21 plant operator, to basically provide the operator much higher
- 22. confidence that ultimately he will not encroach on any safety 23 limits; also to allow for potential changes in the rules for 24 calculation and all of those things that happened that have O 25 caused people to have to go through derating.
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230
- 1. CHAIRMAN KERR: What is that 15 percent of?
O 2 MR. DEVINE: That is 15 percent of whatever that
- 3. limit is. If it is temperature limit, it is'15 percent on 4 that. It is basically a 15' percent across the board cut, the 5 limited condition of operation. And read the chapter when you-6 see it,. but basically they spent a lot of time trying to 7 describe that and describe--obviously for different kind of 8 limit you would have to come at it different ways. The idea 9 is to provide a buffer.
10 A number of other things like that that really 11 provide a beefier, more stable, more resistant core' design, 12 higher burn-up, longer life control rods, those kinds of
{) 13 things, in each case specific requirements based on what we 14 think are best proven experience. In a number of cases, for 15 example, controlled blades, it appears that there are some q 16 advances in technology that are really breakthroughs and we 17 prescribe them with the same kind of caveat we use for-j 18 adjustable speed motor. At the time the designer has got to 19 verify that they are working as anticipated. .
20 MR. EBERSOLE: What paragraph did you forbid the I
21 dump volumes and in the BWR?
22 HR. DEVINE: We picked up the ABWR design which does 1
23 I think eliminate thc dump volumes, yes.
24 MR. ESERSOLE: You don't specifically forbid it?
l.
.O 25 You just took the ABWR as you saw it?
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 i
231 1 MR. DEVINE: Yes. And'there are requirements 2 specified in the document that. define basically that 3 performance for the ABWR.
4 (Slide) 5 MR. DEVINE: Chapter 5, again Chapter 5 is, I still 6 have to call it a draft chapter, although I think we'are at 7 the point that the steering committee is satisfied with the 8 number of requirements for direct vessel injection for PWR, 9 and BWR. No fuel damage for LOCA up to 6 inch' diameter, this-10 is, basically comes out of the Chapter 1, but it is set up 11 such that with the 6 inch break and target for 12 inch break, 12 with all equipment working, one can demonstrate that there 13 won't be any core damage. Otherwise, in other words, you 14 could reuse the core after that, that kind of a challenge.
15 I just saw that, I guess in the BWR submittal.that 16 they are claiming they have met the 12 inch requirement there, 17 so it is an example of being in synch.
18 Increased design pressures and temperature of the 19 decay heat removal system, we looked at the feed and bleed and 20 decay heat removal. There was a camp that said what you 21 really want to do is the RHR system has a capability to 22 operate at full pressure. And others say you really want to 23 do, be able to feed and bleed, and to make a long story short, 24 we ended up doing both to a reasonable degree--significantly O 25 higher decay heat removal system capability, to give you a lot j HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
l 232 1 more room to operate that system rather than being always a
'( 2 few, few pounds or hundred degree away from'being able:to 3 operate that system. And the the feed and bleed system that I 4 described, which gives the operator the capability to blow 5 down the primary system, get into a feed and bleed mode and at 1
6 -the same time, have pressure down low enough you can'use RHR; 7 Glenn, to get back to your questions, you know, I think'this 8 is responsive.
9 With respect to redundancy of decay. heat removal, we 10 have got substantially upgraded the emergency feedwater 11 system. We have ~ jot a feed and bleed capability designed to 12 the plant and we have higher pressure RHR system, and each of 13 those systems has redundancy built in and among the'three they 14 are quite diverse, so we think we have really hammered the RHR 15 question.
16 MR. EBERSOLE: 'iping--you mean system, don't you, 17 in that third bullet?
18 MR. DEVINE: I don't see- yes, you are right. It is- j 19 a system of heat exchangers. It is a system.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: The whole works?
21 MR. DEVINE: That is correct; operabilityEat those 22 temperatures.
23 MR. EBERSOLE: Deny putting system in containment or 24 where?
O 25 MR. DEVINE: Very good question; right now the
' HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
233 l' chapter'does does not specify. We have bunted that to Chapter 2
6 people and the Chapter 6 people are judging the diagram.in 3 the, in Chapter 5, which is not a requirement per se. The:
'4 illustration shows that equipment outside.the containment 5 buildincs. We haven't gone so far as to make that 6 requirement. Obviously there are tradeoffs in each direction.
7 A hydrogen spec on containment such that 13 percent 1
8 concentration and non-combustible concentration based on 9 reaction.of 75 percent of the Zercaloy and active fuel 10 cladding limit, we would like to achieve that. number by L 11 containment. For very large plant, that would be, require 12 some active way to make sure that hydrogen is dealt with 13 aside from simply diluting it to non-combustible rate, but 14 that is the standard in the Chapter 5. Blackout capability of 15 eight hours on best estimate basis, and at the same time, 16 there are functional requirements established for reliability 17 of the AC power system, independent sources of off-site AC 18 power which will be incorporated in a later chapter but 19 identified functionally here.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: Within that 58 hour6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br /> limitation'you 21 are going to attempt to define where that limit will occur?
22 MR. DEVINE: I am not sure what would be the 23 controlling issue. Reactor coolant pump seems has been a 24 major piece of that in the PWR.
O 25 MR. EBERSOLE: Seened like it would be important to HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
1 1 34
'l examir.e what is going to fall out first, consider whether you
-p'1 l v 2' .could do something about it. j q
1 3 MR. DEVINE: That was how'we came up with the
- 4. eight-hour number. We asked each of our contractors to tell 5 us wha.t would it take to get to, and what would it take to get 6 to eight, and the general sense is that if you make some 1 l
7 realistic estimates of what is going to happen in that period.
)i B of time- and not be excessively restrained by you know, some 9 ultra-conservative estimate, that is, those numbers are 10 achievable, and I think Doug, you might want to chip in. I 4
11 think that the hardest part of that was the reactor coolant 12 pump seals in the PWR, and achieving the eight-hour blackout l
13 survival capability 14 MR. CHAPIN: I honestly don't remember what it ,
15 was, Jack. The other candidate was the batteries. I don't 16 remember which one it was, but the pitch was to get to eight 17 hours. If you started at the beginning, that you wanted to 18 get to eight hours. It didn't look like it was that l 19 difficult. So we didn't worry about what the particular limit 20 was but asked everybody to make sure --
- 21. MR. WYLIE: Talk about them when we get to Chapter 22 5.
J l
23 MR. EBERSOLE: Let's go.
24 CHAIRMAN KERR: Gentlemen, we are very much behind O 25 schedule. )
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235-1 MR. DEVINE: That iS' correct. On that note,'maybe I 2 should stop. I brought a few more slides from Chapter 5 that 3 maybe I can talk.about'them later, address che questions.
4 MR. WYLIE: Want to take about ten-minute break?
5 MR.-DEVINE: To get back on schedule, I. guess ~we 6 should proceed through the program.
7 CHAIRMAN KERR: I guess we should. Let's take a i 8 ten-minute break.
9 (A brief recess was taken.)
a 10 CHAIRMAN KERR: You may proceed at will.
11 MR. DEVINE: We are going to shift sequence a little 12 bit. Charlie indicated that there is interest in our response 13 or our positions on the ACRS recommendations to Chairman Zech.
14 I think I have covered a lot of these things already, so I 11 5 will truly try to go through these quickly, but our thought 16 was we would give you this part of the presentation first, and 17 then go back and spend as much time as available on the 18 passive plant. I would like to make a brief statement for the 19 passive plant, and that is that-there have been quite clear in-20 our interactions with our steering committee, and with other 21 utilities over the last year, that there is a rapidly growing, 22 a real groundswell of interest to that approach, so we are 1'
l 23 adjusting our attention in the program accordingly, and we 24 would suggest that you spend as much time as you can listen to O 25 that, and if we won't have another session sometime, we would i
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
236 1 be happy to support it. It'is becoming more and more the 2 centerpiece of the ALWR program.
3 The big picture on your recommendations to the 4 chairman, and our position with respect to them, is we sent l 4
5 you a letter on March 27th that summarized--we sent it to the i
6 staff, that summarized our position, and our letter outlines ;
-7 philosophy--yot heard all the philosophy this morning,-and it 8 also outlined a real rough position, conceptual position, in ;
I 9 each item, what it really said is that we are just getting 10- started in the requirements document and we haven't taken i
11 these on yet, don't have good answers.
12 To a degree, that's the same position that we have 13 today, although we are a year, almost a year down the track, 1
O. 1 14 and we have much clearer picture of where we are going to come 15 out on each one of these things as we go through, but I really 16 + tant to characterize what follows as maybe an emerging picture 17 as opposed to a final definitive view, and I think you will 18 see this as you go through the answers.
19 The general points, I don't need to belabor 20 those--heavy emphasis on simplicity, margin, those kind of 21 things. Also as Ed said, what we really want to do is provide 22 a safety by minimizing the potential for upsets in designer 23 rule defense in-depth rather than providing protective 24 features to deal with the accident once it happens.
25 (Slide)
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L 237 l-1 MR. DEVINE: We talk--the following slides is I 2 think a slide on each of the topics in.your initial letter.
3 First, on decay ~ heat removal -- the bullet shows what we have 4 incorporated in the draft' of Chapter 5 right now which we 5 , expected to be in the final vision which' addresses' decay heat 6 removal.
7 Let me be very specific. We have not specified 8 . bunkered RHR system, and the reason we didn't, and we spent a 9 lot of time talking about-it, we really tried to examine what 10 has been done here and what has been done elsewhere, what the 11 philosophical needs for that system are, all the functional 12 things which you would like it achieve. We came to the fg 13 conclusion that what makes sense is to make sure that the RHR V
14 system in aggregate meets all those functions. It didn't seem 15 logical to us to start off by prescribing a bunkered system as-16 a solution to an undefined set of objectives. Rather we 17 wanted to start off with the set of objects and lay out a 18 system which would provide that.
19 The system, we have incorporated a great deal of 20 diversity, and a great deal of redundancy. It is protected in 21 the plant. The functional requirements for the layout chapter 22 which have not yet been implemented are to provide spatial 23 separation and physical separation and protection among those, 24 those sections, and our feeling is that if the systems we have O 25 laid out are properly or the systems we specified in Chapter 5 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
238~
1 are properly laid out, that that will provide certainly a 2- vastly higher degree of RHR capability than has been the case 3 so far in existing plants, and that is very responsive to your 4 request, although not responsive:by providing separate islands 5 over there called bunkered safety system.
6 CHAIRMAN KERR: Mr. DeVine, I think from our 7 previous conversations with others, it is worth emphasizing 8 that our letter did not, our letter did'not recommend 9 installation of everything mentioned in the letter. What we 10 recommended was a consideration be given to that because we-11 thought each merited consideration. I hope you understood 12 that.
13 MR. DEVINE: I appreciate that, and I think we took 14 it in that context, but--
15 MR. WYLIE: Also we did not recommend bunker, 16 neither.
17 DR. REMICK: That's right.
18 MR. RYLIE: We said protected.
i 19 MR. DEVINE: The word wasn't bunker. We read it as 20 bunkered and perhaps it was an over-reaction.
21 MR. WYLIE: Basically that is what you are doing.
22 You have got redundant trains separated and individually 23 protected.
l l 24 MR. MICHELSON: Let me ask, you say you have got l
25 dedicated. This means it is used for no other purpose.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
239 1 MR. DEVINE: That's, that's largely correct. That's
- - 2 largely-correct.
3 MR. MICHELSON: Not used for safety injection, or 4 low pressure injection or whatever--just for decay heat 5 removal; I don't know that you r.ean that.
6 MR. DEVINE: That is correct across the board. What 7 we mean--that's a good question. We toss the word dedicated 8 around, and in general what we mean by dedicated is that is a 9 system which has a single function and not multiple function 10 and/or is not cross-connected with other systems. Taking the 11 HRH functions, the emergency feedwater system is just that, 12 andwespecificallytookstepstoseparate this from the main 13 feedwater.
14 MR. MICHELSON: Residual heat removal, used only for 15 that on the ABWR or also the pumps are used for low pressure 16 injection?
17 MR. DEVINE: They are combined.
18 MR. MICHELSON: I think so.. Therefore, they are not 19 dedicated to decay heat removal. I am not sure that you are 20 really--I just, ye a ought to go back and look at it. ,
)
21 MR. LEVINE: Your point is well taken.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: The ABWR, was it not, does it not 23 include features of GSAR 2 which is invoked, what they call 24 the UBPS system? And I think this was one of the criticisms O '25 when we last saw that. They didn't use the last invented HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
1 1
240 1 system for'GSAR 2. That appears to be the most simple system
)- 2- it open venting. That was one of the peculiar aspects of the q
- 3. ABWR which is still floating.
'4 MR. DEVINE: Okay. -
5 MR. EBERSOLE: Physical separation-of trains, I 6 would like to ask you, that always.it is' ambiguous. You say .j I
7 physical separation, but you--and I know you penetrate !
8 separated areas bit in ducting you put in pipe, you put in 9 wires. There is all sorts of penetrative influences, so it. j 10 doesn't mean anything until you get into the fine structure as 11 to what that means.
11 2 MR. DEVINE: You are right. Certainly one has~to 13 implement the big philosophy. What we have tried, you know, 14~ in the conceptual work on Chapter 6, the PWR and meeting on
'15 this the other day, expression of my mind, the lead concept 16 was basically to come in to establish four direct conduits for I 17 quadrants, coming in with these systems to provide a maximum J I
18 capability to separate them up to the point of their 19 functional use. Now obviously they all come together at some 20 point. And you can't keep them separate forever,-but we are 21 trying to get as much as we can in the form of real j 22 separation.
23 MR. MICHELSON: Do you write criteria on what J 24 constitutes a barrier wall? For instance, what kind of 25 penetrations would be allowed?
4 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
241 1 MR. EBERSOLE: What is the boundary characteristics?
2 MR. MICHELSON:
How hard is it? How hard do you 3 physically separate?
4 CHAIRMAN KERR: If we go into this in that much 5 detail;we are just not going to cover very much.
6 MR. MICHELSON: I was thinking in the global sense.
- 7. Is there a criteria document or will I find it somewhere?
8 MR. DEVINE: Yen.
9 MR. MICHELSON: That will be there?
10- MR. DEVINE: Right. I think I mentioned the other I
11 features of DHR in my earlier presentation. For safety train 12 redundancy, I think the guidelines in the letter were N plus 13 2, and we don't specify N plus 2 per se, but we do specify in 14 each of the safety areas, a degree of redundancy in the form 15 of numbers of components or divisions necessary to accomplish 16 a various function. It turns out to be N plus 2 in most 17 places.
18 In the BWRs, three independent divisions, and that 19 really is-N plus 2 pretty much across the board right back to 20- the diesels. The PWR is kind of a, more of a four by two 21 system. There are two or four functions across the board.
22 Most functions have four mechanical ways of accomplishing 1
23 anything, but it ties back to two electrical systems. Two l
. 24 electrical systems haven't been designed yet, but on the O 25 diesel side, our thinking right now is there would be two HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
242 1 diesel generators supporting these systems so that those 2 aren't N plus 2 across the board, but in the mechanical aspect 3 of the systems they are.
4 We have not yet designed support systems, the 5 cooling water systems, et cetera, and the intention is that 6 the functional requirements laid out in Chapter 5 are such 7' that those would be clearly separate and dedicated systems to 8 support each of those mechanical trains, so it is not a common 9 . mode or cross-connection weak link in the, in those safety 10 systems.
11 MR. MICHELSON: Do you have some particular 12 rationale you could tell us quickly why you still think it'is 13 all right just to have two trains of power supply, even though 14 you might put in four trains of mechanical pumping systems?
15 MR. DEVINE: I really can't give you one at this 16 point. It was recommended by all the participants, and that ,
i 17 probably reflects their current practice rather than a true 18 thoughtful examination.
I 19 MR. MICHELSON: Future plants all to contain rather I 20 than what current practices mi;ht be, so then you people are I 21 assume doing the same and debating what it ought to really be 22 versus what current practice is.
23 MR. DEVINE: At the same time, we are also trying to I
24 balance a lot of considerations, trying to balance ]
( 25 simplification, trying to balance improved capability across l l
HEidTAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 L
243
~
l' the board,' minimize threats, higher response capability, and
~f 2- not trying to solve the problems' simply by adding more 3 components, and I think that's where people got in trouble.
'4 Bill?
5 MR. SUGNET: I would like just to add we are also 6 evaluating, as we showed you,-the top level goals, that the 7 overall safety level of the plant in terms of core damage 8 frequency and. release frequency, and if we became convinced l
9 that insufficient redundancy in any of those areas was the i
10 cause of an excessive contribution, that would probably 11 change.
12 MR. MICHELSON: I was thinking of plant 13 availability. Clearly one diesel uproots you in a bad way.
14 And I thought, that's why I thought mayce I would exceed three i 15 idesels on this plant instead of two.
16 MR. SUGNET: We haven't done electric power yet.
17 You might see two2 diesels plus something else. ]
- 18. MR. DEVINE: Yes. Absolutely. I am glad you made 19 that point, Bill, which I should have made this at the outset.
20 I implied it at the outset I guess that we have set those top 21 tier criteria and then we are trying to develop systems to I
22' support them. Obviously the step then is to satisfy ours that l
23 we met them. And where we didn't, we are going to have to go 24 back and iterate, and electrical power is not yet started.
O 25 MR. WARD: Has much thought has been given to gas HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
244 1- turbins as alternative?
D 2 MR. .DEVINE: Yes. .EPRI has done some work in gas j 3 turbins, both as a replacement and as supplement-to emergency 4 power systems, rind we are considering both.
5 (Slide) 6 MR. DEVINE: Containment-systems with respect'to, 7 really the cateaory was containment systems, but the words in 8 the letter implied a broader interest :ba severe accicent 9 ' protection. Chapter, this is really covered in two places.
10 Cnapter 5 establishes'the functional requirements for i
11 containment. The broadest 2, of course is to meet the 25R 12 at site boundary for prevention of probability higher than ten 13' to the minus 6 per reactor year, and beyond that, there are,
)-
l 14 we didn't have time in the last session to get into this, and l
l 15 it might also be a subject for further discussion, but we laid 16 out for severe accident protection a hierarchy of design i
17 requirements such that the designers first address what is 18 required by regulation currently. They then evaluate that 19 design against a family of potential severe accident. scent.rios 20 using best estimate methods'to satisfy themselves that it is, 21 that that containment is acceptable, and at the same time, we 22 are also including provisions, limited provisions for features 23 which we think provide for a better containment that will be
]
24 able to deal with an event, and I think TMI is an excellent O 25 example, recognizing the realities of an inaccessible l
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ - . - - - - - _ ____-._________--------------_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______a
245 1 containment after an accident, hostile environment inside, 1 ~
2 high activity in the cooling water and all kinds of things.
3 There really is a family of requirements, some of them in the 4 licensing design basis and some of them beyond the licensing 5 design basis, which apply to the containment and provide we 6 think-a sensible and properly balanced approach to r;evere 7 accident protection.
8 I guess those last points are summarized on the 9 slide here; design regulatory requirements, put emphasis on 10 prevention of core damage. In other words, meet that ten to 11 the minus 5th criterion. Analyze selected dominant severe 12 accident sequences, verify that there is adequate design 13 margin, and one part of that, for example, is looking at 14 containment building and how it can deal with pressures higher 15 than the certified design pressure.
16 (Slide) 17 MR. DEVINE: Protection against sabotage, I have to 18 say this is really a later item, although it is one we have 19 established as a clear objective in the baseline document for 20 Chapter 6, from the standpoint of layout and physical J 21 protection. That for all intents and purposes will be covered 22 in Chapter 6. Primary focus obviously is ability to achieve 23 and maintain safe shutdown conditions under threat from 24 external events, including sabotage. Separation of trains is O 25 a very important part of that, as well as location of trains HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
1 1- -
246, s
i I
1 within, within structure.s in tbs' design for structures. Ya j
, lh 2 are concernedEsbedt creating something that is mo sanotage 1
1 3 proof that that jeopardizes safe operation of the plant, and i 4 we have also included some guideline words ih the ceginnings 5 of Chapter 6 in that respect also.
6 MR. 28ERSOLE: Ar,e you giving any att.cdtion to the 7 interna?,sehoteur by sensitizing equipment to make it go to 8 the safe state or.whatever?
9 MR. DEVINE: We have not ar of yet. I think the 10 Chapter 10 will probably address this for a layout chapter to 11 an extent as well. 1 i
12 (Slide) 13 Mk 'DEVIFE: Fire protection, covered in Chapter 1, 14 again, Chapter 1 and containment of, physical separation of 4
15 barriers, we" t3(ink is a primary means of providing a good 16 safety-related fire protection. Protection of structures from 17 damage caaved by fires is addressed in Chapter 1, commitment 18 to Appendix R in Chapter 1.
19 MR. MICHELSON: You realize that Appendix R has 20 nothing to do with future plants?
21 e'R. dEVIDE: We realize that, but the prescription 22 is there. That is why it was addressed specifically.
23 HE. RUE 2HOTEIh: SRP 591.
24 MR. MICHEL50N: That does address it.
25 MR. OEVINE: Ant 1cipated transients without SCRAM, i
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPOPATIOd -- (202)628-4888
r 247 h Chapters 3 and!4. cover the reactor and reactivity. control, 90 s- 2 except for the' instrumentation systems associated with that.
dif N 3 As Ed indica'ted, specified negative power coefficient
'N ti 1 ,
J ' 4 ' throughout the life of the plant, and at all power levels;: for 5' BWRs, a negative coolant void coefficient'throughout the core 6 region has-been specified. GE1 confirms. FWRs, non-positive O 7 moderator temperature coefficient,specified in all conditions.
8 Beginning of life power levels above 50 percent and for entire.
9 power range later in life, and I don't have exact definition 10 of beginning of life. I understand from the fuel designers, 11 that they are really talking about a very short period.of time-12 like in a few months, before the power, the moderator je p 13- coefficient is negative and of course the power coefficient 14 will be negative at all times as indicated by the first 15 bullet.
16 Depressurization capability without pressurizer
- 17. sprays we mentioned before Chapter 5, BWRs designed, they 18- indicate that they will provide at least 100 percent relief 19 capacity which was mentioned in the letter although that is 20 not a specific requirement in the requirements document.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: That hundred percent is, still 22 implies a degree of excess pressure that is going to increase 23 power above normal. So you know, in other words, that's 24 voiding along at high pressure. It doesn't, it doesn't O' 25 accommodate ATWS very well.
L l HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 w________--______-_______ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
248 1 MR. DEVINE: I can't answer that because I don't 1O 2 know how they have dealt with ATWS.
3 Systems interaction, again a lot of th'ings to 4 address syst' ens interaction; we think the real key to systems 5 interaction is going to be in the,'at.the verification stage 6' when we have a'PRA tool to exanine the overall integrated 7 design and how well isola, ion and prevention of systems 8 interaction has been addressed. There are a number already in 9 Chapter 1, a number of specific steps prescribed to be 10 satisfied that systems interaction will not be a problem, 11 including the things mentioned here--separate isolation of 12 -power systems, spatial separation.. We have talked about.these 13 plant PRAs as a required t"'1 for the designer. Let me just 14 clarify that FRA issue here because it has been mentioned a 15 couple of times.
16 We have been working with the contractor to create 17 a, if you will a conceptual PRA suitable for analysis of our 18 requirements document level of detail, conceptual engineering 19 level of detail, to use as a way of verifying that we have met 20 the top tier criteria that we have established, and also to 21 influence certain design decisions with respect to selection l 22 of components and how many, how much redundancy is necessary 23 it. a certain areas and that strt of thing, Bill referred te 24 that in answering the electric power question.
O 25 I would like to be clear on that, on that point,
\
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249-1- 'because we are.not simply punting that issue to the downstream 2- designer of the plant and suggesting.that when his plant: ;
3 design is finished then he will be able to look at a complete 4 plant PRA and find out what the_right answerfshould have been.
5 We are creating a tool so we can make logical decisions in 6 that respect at the conceptual design stage, u
7 MR. EBERSOLE: That number.
8 CHAIRMAN KERR: I am not sure how PRAs detect 9 potential systems interaction. I can see how they'might 10 describe them.
11 MR. EBERSOLE: Process them.
12 MR. DEVINE: They have to describe the physical 13 configuration of plant, that a weak link that as a' result of a 14 systems interaction would show up there. It certainly is not 4
15 going to detect one. It is a dumb system. It requires a 16 correct characterization of the plant.
'17 MR. EBERSOLE: I think you are talking about if you 18 turn PRA business, that system interaction over to PRA expert, l 19 he will never even accept spatial interactions or anything 20 else until he has a physical cognizance of the plant. I 21 iaean --
22 MR. DEVINE: Bill is putting together our PRA. Why 23 don't you come--
l 24 MR. SUGNET: First of all, I think that the
' ( 25 structure of the PRA analysis lends itself to asking the right HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
l 250 ,
1 l' questions,'and secondly, that anybody who is worth-his salt
\I 2 when he does this kind of work does look at the physical b .
plant. And to the extent that we can do it, we will be
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3 :
4 .looking at the layout drawings, and the arrangements, and i 5~ the--
, 6 MR. MICHELSON: You won't have that level of detail?
l 7 MR. SUGNET: Not have that level oflevel detail.
8 MR. MICHELSON: Well, if I knew all this, I could do 9 a PRA, and the methodology exists, and just the-information 10 doesn't exist.
11 HR. SUGNET: We will do it down to certain level of 12 detail, not find all the subleties of the final detailed-13 design.
14 MR. DEVINE: But the big actors are there at the 15 conceptual engineering level. Interaction among support 16 systems, cooling water systems, main redundancy of components, 17 diversity of different methods to deal with upset conditions, 18 those kind of things, show up at the conceptual level, and we 19 are creating a PRA tool that deals with that conceptual level 20 and I think.would be very useful in analyzing these questions, 21 won't be particularly useful in giving us the final number as 22 to the core damage, the absolute by God core damage frequency, 23 but it is very useful in evaluating the relative effectiveness 24 of these systems and where the weak links are.
O 25 (Slide)
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251-I l' ER. DEVINE: Electric power systems,- as we said i i 2 before, really haven't gottenoto the electric power systems 3 question yet. .The specific recommendation for continuousiand 4 unswitched supply of power to auxiliary and safety from the 6 low side'of the step-up transformer, the electrical guys at 6 EPRI are pessimistic [ about this as being a practical 7 approach, but'we are examining it and it will be addressed 8 specifically in Chapter 11.
9 MR.:WYLIE: I would just like to say I note 10 Westinghouse.says they are going to do it.
11 MR. DEVINE: That's very interesting.
12 MR. WYLIE: All it is, it is use of generator 13 circuit breaker, and Westinghouse in their meetings.with es 14 last month, I think it was last month, said that.
15 CHAIRMAN KERR: I can't believe EPRI is going to lag 16 behind Westinghouse that far. I am certain they will step up 17 and -- we will Just assume that they are going to change their 18 mind about that.
19 MR. DEVINE: I probably should not have given you a 20 prediction here. We are just stepping up to it in this area.
21 Early conversation with the guys in the electrical department 22 was gee, we don't want to do that.
23 MR. WYLIE: I just make one comment. In your 24 direction of reducing SCRAMS and improving environment, that's O 25 a better way to do it.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 ,
i
.252 i 1- MR,'DEVINE: Okay..
1
[2 DR. REMICK: There are some plants that have that
.3 now? d 4- MR. WYLIE: Yes. All two power companies, later 5 plants have.it.
6 MR. EBERSOLE: Implicit in that, do you have.the 7 system that you need to carry house load on the main turbine,- 1 8 which they are not doing?
9 MR. WYLIE: Well, I don't know about that.
10 MR. MICHELSON: That's a different issue. 3 11 CHAIRMAN KERR: Please continue, Mr. DeVine. J j
12 MR. DEVINE: I think we have talked all of.these 13 other items. I mentioned the run-back capability.before, and.
14 right now it is specified Chapter 2, 50 percent, although we 15 are going to address it in Chapter 13 when we talk to the 16 turbine.
17 MR. WYLIE: You are running -- we will be. On your .;
18 two or more separate independent connections off-site power, 4
19 now is that for ncrmal auxiliaries?
20 MR. DEVINE: Yes.
'21 MR. WYLIE: Or safety systems?
22 MR. DEVINE: Well, that's for normal auxiliaries, 23 but available for safety systems as well, as an initial source- ,
'24 of power, two separate sources; got to lose two sources of I 25 off-site power before you have to rely on diesel generators.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
253 1 MR. WYLIE: My' point is that I think that if you 2 plan.to run supply and all the time from that, you are opening 3 yourself up to problems.
4 MR. DEVINE: I see what you mean in: terms of how 5 they.are connected and whether they are both on line'or both 6 available?
7 MR. WYLIE: Yes. Well, I mean, people do it 8 different ways, but if you are going to run normal 9 auxiliaries, normal safety systems of off-site power, .then you 10 are vulnterable to all your lightning surges and all your 11 switching and everything on the transmission system.-
12 MR. DEVINE: We have not dressed how that will be 13 latched up, but the thrust of that action was,.really-stems
[
14 out of the functional action, spins off Chapter 5, is two 15 available off-site sources, period, not. relies on ens which is 16 considered, you know, acceptable for some response.
17 MR. WYLIE: Some plants do. If you look at LERs you 18 will see they get into trouble.
19 MR. DEVINE: The letter addressed probabalistic 20 seismic design, and Chapter 1 laid out, right now it is really 21 a conventional approach, which is seismic categories are 22 defined, and seismic response values to which the equipment is 23 evaluated are deterministically spacified that the numbers are 24 intended to be reasonable envelope numbers that satisfy a bulk lO 25 of U.S. sites using a PFA technique as we have talked about to HERIThGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
254 1 evaluate overall service performance.
t
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2 We have not intended to use probabalistic methods to 3 apply a graded scale to the seismic design of safety systems.
4 That was implied by your letter, and in this area and also in 5 the discussion of the RHR requirements, we suggested a higber 6 level of seismic protection to the protected RHR system. We 7 have been uncomfortable with that because--
8 CHAIEMAN KERR: What is the safe shutdown earthquake 9 which you are examining?
10 MR. DEVINE: .3 G.
11 MR. t1ICHELSON: When specifying seismic, what you 12 are concerned about is the response of the device to the 13 seismic stimulation.
14 Are you going to require that there be no change of 15 electrical state, for instance, at these particular 16 acceleration levels? Or are you going to allow change of 17 state? Very important in buying the device whether you--for 18 instance, contacts, are they going to be allowed to chatter?
l
)
l l 19 MR. DEVINE: I don't know the answer to that l
20 question. It will be covered.
21 Primary system boundary is covered in Chapter 4, is 22 well covered, and I think without question, the requirements I i
l 23 which you suggested are incorporated.
24 DR. 9HEWMON: Is Chapter 4 in our hands? I have 25 never seen a discussion.
1 l HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
'255
- 1. MR. DEVINE: It is in NRC's hands. I' don't knowLif I- 2 itJis in your hands or not.
3 DR. SHEWMON: -Tell me--this talks about the pressure 4; vessel. Is the rest of the piping going to be half as good as 5 at German Convoy, or as good or where are we in that regard?
6 MR. DEVINE: I don't know about the German Convoy.
7 Carl, you probably--
8 MR. STAHLKOPF: I think it is safe to say that it is 9 the best available, shouldn't be as good as the. German Convoy 10 system.
11' DR. SHEWMON: Part of theirs was fine and that 12 certainly where you put them and how many you put, new welds--
13 MR. STAHLKOPF: I think we are certainly lookiNg in 14 both the active design, and you really see a, if you like the f
15 German Convoy system, you really will like seeing what Bill 16 Sugnet has to say if he gets an opportunity to say it 17 today--minimization of number of welds in piping runs.
18 Certainly it runs low on our list.
19 DR. SHEWMON: I will wait and hope.
20 MR. DEVINE: General philosophy, and we really have 21 tried to apply it, is not to scrimp at all on material 22 requirements, fabrication requirements, that sort of thing, 23 and we accepted a lot of hints from the manufacturers on that.
24 We hammered them hard on eliminating welds in the belt line O' 25 region. They said you shouldn't require this, you should HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
256 1 leave itias option to the vender based on the spec,-and our 2 statement on those kinds of issues was no way, that the small 3 amount of loose change.that you are going to see compared.to 4 the total cost of plant by scimping in those areas is simply 5 not worth it.
6 The secondary plant, we specified premium materials 7 in the condenser, extraction piping every place that people 8 had eronion problems, and corrosion problems. We did those 9 with the understanding that it does counter our pretty 10 restrictive cost objectives, but that's not the placa to save 11 money. The place to save money is in the constructability 12 issues.
13 MR. WARD: Is where?
14 MR. DEVINE: Constructability issues; if you find a 15 way to build this: plant in'a shorter period of time, you can 16 compensate a hundred times over for the cost of using premium 17 materials and that's the right way to have your cake and eat 18 it too. That is really what we are trying to do. The answer 19 on control room is that--too many words says later. Chapter, 20 Chapter 9 and Chapter 10, all the issues will be covered. Our 21 intent is to accomplish what you are describing.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Severe accidents here could mean 23 minor core accidents with loss of containment, couldn't it?
24 MR. DEVINE: Well, that's not the definition of O 25 severe accidents, but in terms of functional design for the HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
257 1 , . control room, that's right.
2 MR. MICHELSON: What-is a severe accident?
3: MR. DEVINE: Severe' accident is, NRC's--it is a. mix 4' by my. definition--is an accident that involves core damage and
~
5 substantial release of' radioactivity to the environment.
6 That's roughly those kind of words.
7 MR. SUGNET: Not to the environment--significant.
8 damage to the core, whether or not it is released to-the 9 environment.
10 MR. EEERSOLE: Here the context, it is severe source 11 term.
12 DR. SIESS: TMI was a severe accident.
13' MR. EBERSOLE: TMI wasn't a burden on the control 14 room.
15 MR. DEVINE: It did pose a burden on the control' 16 room. Operators were in respirators.
17- MR. EBEESOLE: There was no source term out of 18 containment to speak of.
19 MR. DEVINE: The aux building was significantly H 20 contaminated and there was fairly high airborne in the control 21 room.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Really mean here high source term, 23 something in the atmosphere.
24 MR. DEVINE: That is correct.
O 25 MR. RUBENSTEIN: We agree future control rooms HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
258 1 -should be habitable following large release from any reactor l= 2 on site.
-3' MR. EBERSOLE: That says it. Thank you.
4 CHAIRMAN KERR: That must be a pretty important step 5 that you are going to tell us about when it does that!
6 MR. EBERSOLE: What do you say about 7 cross-connections which are supposed to augment safety rather 8 than just share for economy? Anything?
- 9. MR. DEVINE: We do. We A, we say that 10 cross-connection be minimized. I think more importantly we 11 lay out conceptual flow diagrams for those systems and we show.
12 specifically which cross-connects are acceptable and which'are 13 not, and we have cut way,'way down en cross-connections.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: You do allow them for increased 15 flexibility?
16 MR. DEVINE: Yes. with restrictions; for example, 17 cross-connection between the RHR and the containment spray, 18 but it is a, specifically a lecked close connection.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure.
20 MR. DEVINE: Permits realignment during maintenance 21 or that sort of thing. It is not an automatic switch or 22 anything like that.
23 I left three minutes for Mr. Sugnet to do passive 24 plants.
O 25 MR. STAHLKOPf: Mr. Ch airmai. , at this point I think HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
259
'l' it'is'quite' clear we are not going to get very much said on I '2 our smal' e'ts. I thin} hat you will find the information- l 3 on small plants very interesting, and I would like to offer 1 1
4' 'that.we would be very pleased to come back at a future 5 session, 'nd present this information in some' detail. i 1
6 CHAIRMAN KERR: We would like to hear it, and I'm k 7 sorry this schedule worked out this way this morning. If you l i
8 are willing to come.back, we would be delighted to schedule 9'
~
further consideration. I think this is an extremely important 10 topic., and the presentation has been well done and 11 interesting. MR. STAHLKOPF: We will work with your staff to 12 set up the earliest convenient date to come back and fil1~you 13 in in more detail.
14 MR. SUGNET: I would like to just show you one 15 chart.
i 16 (Slide) 17 MR. SUGNET: Because that's all the time I have, but 18 they embody the spirit of everything we are doing. I am going 19 to go right to very last chart of the presentation. I want to 20 show you we are aimed at simplifying the plant, and not only l
l L 21 because it will make it better, and safer, but also because we
, 22 think it can substantially go toward making it cheaper.
L 23 We have evaluated the potential simplification, 24 comparing typical two loop Westinghouse plant to the AP 600 25 plant. And Me show we think we can get rid of about 80 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - _ - - - - - _ - - - - . - _ - - - . _ . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - _ - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - _ _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - -
260 1 percent of valves in nucleer power. block area, about 65 2 percent of the pumps. We can' cut the seismic building volume 3 by about 40 percent, and the total building volume by about 20 4 percent,'and I want to emphasize.this is not by scriaping and 5 squeezing. This is because we have gotten: rid of a lot of.
6 equipment <that we. don't'have to house ~any more.
7 DR. SIESS: Smaller containment? I am not sure what 8 you mean by the seismic building.
9 MR. SUGNET: I mean primarily auxiliary building, 10 fuel handling building areas.
11 MR. RUBENSTEIN: But'it is a smaller containment as 12 I understand it?
13 MR. SUGNET: In volume, it is not smaller, not 14 smaller than a typical 600; .about the same size. So we think
'15 that the use of passive systems has a major potential for 16 simplification. We are aggressively pursuing it, and we would 17 love to come back and talk to you sometime in the future about 18 it.
19 CHAIRMAN KERR: Thank you very much We do 20 appreciate the presentation. It was very well done.
21 We will recess until two o' clock.
22 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the meeting was receased, 23 to reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.)
24 0- 25 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
261 1 .A"F T E R N O O N SESS ION 1 2. ' CHAIRMAN'KERR: The'next item on the agenda is a.
3 description of containment performance. 'Mr. Ward is the 4 subcommittee chairman. Mr. Ward? l 5 MR. WARD:- Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the last 6 ' couple of years, there has been some questions raised and'some
]
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7 continuing discussion of the capability of BWR Mark I-8 containments, and.the staff has done some work on the issue. l l
9 We haven't heard en awful lot about it except what we read i
10 occasionally in the press. I 11 We wrote a letter to the commissioners just a year i
112 ago witn some comments, and there have been a-number of 13 personnel changes in the staff over the'last year or so, as >
\ .
14 you know, and I think that may have influenced the, well, 15- perhaps' wha't has been a bit of a failure in communications, 16 but at any rate, the staff this month has o.tfered to come in 17 and give us what I understand is to be a report on the status 18 -of the work on a, to address the concarns about the Mark I 19 performance, and I don't really have anything further to say.
20 MR. EBERSOLE: I want to ask a question. There is 21 always a wonderful confusion attendant to this topic where the 1
22 point of differentiation is whether you are talking about 23 venting prior to core damage or subsequent to core damage, and 24 the last time I heard the staff has refused to allow what was O. 25 it, Pilgrim to vent under any circumstance, and that removes HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
262 1 an' escape route for the' operators which'is there at least by; 2 inference, if not actual mechanical presence, to escape the,
~3 what~it recognizes is a characteristic problem of throwing too-4' mucir heat and don't have enough place to put it.'
5 I'think all BWR operatore, the old doughnut, they 6 might be faced with that, just to get'the heat out and prevent.
7 core damage, yet I. understand that the staff is saying, has 8 turned down that opportunity to get out of trouble, and that 9 kind of bothers me. 4 10 Now venting after--
11 MR. WARD: If you understand that, you know more 12 about it than I do. I have been waiting lto hear what.they 13 have had to say.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: Core damage is another cat. So all I 15 want to do is hear how you distinguish these two deeds.
16 MR. WARD: Anybody else have anything? Let's go to 17 the staff then. Who is going to--Dean has passed out a copy 18 of I guess Jerry's slides and also the letter that the ACRS 19 wrote a year ago on this.
20 MR. HULMAN: My name is Jerry Hulman. I am from the ;
1 21 Office of Research, and I want to brief you today on what we ]
1 22 are planning on doing and the status of the analysis of Mark I ,
1 23 containment performance.
24 If you remember from the letter that you wrote on O 25 Mark Is, you said you believed we had to do some more work on l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
263
- 1. .the. technical bases for the improvements that were suggested
.2 last year.
3 Well, this progress that I am going to tell you 4 about today is just that attempt, to get at some of the 5 technical bases and to see whether some of the improvements 6 are justified.
7 (Slide) 8 MR. HULMAN: The purpose of this. work is, and idea 9 that I have written out here on this vugraph, to basically 10 close out the issue that was identified as a result of draft 11 NUREG 1150, on the high conditional containment failure 12 probability from Mark Is as evidenced by the staff review and 13 contractor review of Peach Bottom.
14 (Slide) 15 MR. HULMAN: What we have got in our plan then,.let 16 me tell you about the plan a little bit before I go through it 17 to tell you what the status is.
18 We have drafted a Commission paper deacribing our 19 plans. My understanding is that the EDO is to sign it out 20 today or Monday and it will describe to the Commission how we 21 intend to close on this issue of high conditional containment 22 failure probability estimates for Mark Is.
23 What we have got basically is a two-step process.
24 First, we want to identify and narrow the important ]
) 25 phenomenological and improvement issues. Now we know we !
l l
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_ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -- . _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _. _- _ __ = _n
264 1 believe what many of those issues are today so there is not
) 2 much work associated with identifying the issues,'but there is 3 some work associated with looking at the improvements, what we
.4 can gain from these improvements, what the down sides are, 5 what the potential negative safety benefits are of some of the 6 improvements.
7 We intend to bring together our researchers, 8 interested members of the public, and irJustry in a group in 9 which we are going to try and focus on these issues, narrow 10 them if we can, and wind up with a consensus on others.
11 We are then going to go through an evaluation 12 process of those issues.
13 The evaluation process will be basically to putLthe 14 issues into three baskets -- those that are not important, 15 those which we think we can resolve with a regulatory i 16 assessment, either they are warranted or they are not 17 warranted improvements, that is, and the third category is 18 those issues for which we don't have enough information to 19 even make an assessment, basically those issues we need to 20 conduct more research on.
21 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask a question? Already I'm at 22 sea because you haven't differentiated between containment l
l 23 venting for one purpose versus another. As we all know, you 24 run heat into the containment on a BWR and one of the highest 25 risks it has, it isn't able to get heat out in front of any I.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
h 265 1 ' radiological damage at all,-but if you allow'it to accumulate, 2 you will sufzer containment damage'and then that will produce-3 core damage. That leaves you within a compounded area of-4- difficulty.
5 So the first stage of considering venting is whether 6 you do it before you have any core damage to save the core.
7 That's one part of piece of work.
8 The second one is if you have already had core 9- damage, and it is about to get out of the containm'ent because 10 of overheating or direct heating, or temperature rise, what 11 are you going to do now? That's a different kettle of fish 12 and I want to know how you are going to differentiate between
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1 13 those two issues?
14 MR. WARD: Is that--I haven't even heard him mention 15- venting yet.
l 16 MR. HULMAN: I haven't got to it yet.
t 17 MR. EBERSOLE: You are inevitably going to get to 18 it. I 19 MR. HULMAN: Let me take on his question right now 20 if I can. Venting can be effective before any core damage 4
21 occurs, or it can be effective after core damage occurs.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: Right.
'23 NR. HULMAN: Depends upon a number of factors.
24 However, there are sequences that if you vent, you can make 25 things worse.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
266 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Sure, right. I agree.
2 MR. HULMAN: Now my understanding is that every'BWR
'3 in the United States has venting procedures in place today.
4- MR. EBERSOLE: What machinery? At what pressure, 5 with what instructions?
6 MR. HULMAN: Every BWR has in place procedures with 7L variable instructions, and variable equipment. Some of.the 8 procedures include dry well venting in order to prevent core 9 .damagezin the first place.
MR. EBERSOLE: You are saying that every BWR has 11 that in place and the equipment to do it with now?'
12 MR. HULMAN: That is correct.
13 MR. MICHELSON: Equipment will perform the function?
O.
14 MR. EBERSOLE: At what pressures do you specify that 15 will occur?
16 MR. HULMAN: Which question do you want me to take 17 on first?
18 MR. EBERSOLE: I don't care.
19 MR. MICHELSON: I don't care.
20 MR. HULMAN: Let me take your question. Staff has 21- reviewed the equipment. My understanding is there is some 22 assurance that the equipment will work to open the vent.
23 There are questions in our minds as to whether you can close 24 the vent later.
O' 25 MR. MICHELSON: Open the vent at the pressures that HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
't >
267 1 are prescribed:in the procedures?
2 MR. HULMAN: In the procedures, that is correct.
3 Now as to'your question, Jesse, .on what are the pressures, 4 they vary as I understand it, from slightly less then the 5 design-pressure, to as I remember 10 or 15 percent over'the L
l 6 design pressure.
i 7 CHAIRMAN KERR: Did you say every BWR or every Mark 8 I?
9 MR. HULMAN: Every BWR, as I understand it.
10 MR. EBERSOLE: Did the operational procedures then 11 establish bases.for controlling water inventories in the 12 suppression-pool and means to --
13 . CHAIRMAN KERR: Mr. Ebersole, I really think this 14 sort of detail, although it is very important, is something l
l 15 that we don't have time ~for. .
1 16 MR. EBERSOLE: All right. I agree.
17 CHAIRMAN KERR: Really should-look at this. I 18 agree.
19 MR. HULMAN: Let me see if I can answer it in 20 general because one of the things we have as part of this work 21 is an assessment of venting. The pluses and the. minuses of 22 existing procedures and hardware, plus what might be done to 23 improve it, and we intend to come back to you and tell you the 24 answers to those questions as best we can. It is a little O 25 premature.
l l
l HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
268 1 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.- I'll buy:that.
( 2 MR. MICHELSON: . Ar e : these vent paths presently 3- designed then for the pressures at which the procedures say 4' you will open the vent valves?
5' MR. HULMAN: No. I understand they are based on 6 existing' penetrations and valves which--
7 MR. MICHELSON: May be venting in the duct work for 8 all you'know? By duct work I mean very low pressure design 9 systems.
10 MR. HULMAN: My understanding is that the: valves'and
.11 the short piece of pipe downstream of those valves, that the l'
- 12. containment will take the pressures, but downstream many.of 13 the.BWRs have the normal kind of air-conditioning duct work 14 which would be blown away in an accident.
15 MR. MICHELSON: So really there is no viable venting 16 even though procedures exist for using it?
17 CHAIRMAN KERR: Again, these things certainly need 18 exploration.
19 MR. MICHELSON: The information may be judged to be 20 misleading if it isn't fully understood, too. ;
21 CHAIRMAN KERR: I certainly agree.
l L 22 MR. HULMAN: There are some key issues that we want 23 to address. And these are the key regulatory issues as I see 24 them. How important basically are some of the issues that one 25 can think about in terms of if a Mark I fails during a severe 4
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
'l 269 j
1 . accident, how important are some of these things from a JO- .2 regulatory perspective? And I have listed'three on this- !
l l 3' vugraph, and there are two more on this vugraph. .
-4 (Slide) [
5 MR. HULMAN: Those are-the kinds of questions we j 6' hope to come back to you and answer when we finish this study.
7 Now when you were briefed I believe the first time last year 8 on the Mark I initiative, there were a number of things that 9 were proposed as potential improvements. This list contains- 1 10 the same kind of improvements but with a couple of' 11 modifications, and one addit-ion. The.first one is hydrogen 12 control. And what was raised last year was whether the period 13 of deinerting and reinerting the containment for Mark Is was 14 too long.
15 Pilgrim on their proposed improvements decided that 16 they should modify their nitrog:n system for long-term station 17 blackout. They believed they didn't have sufficient nitrogen, 18 so one of the questions we want to look at is is that 19 necessary from a regulatory standpoint to be able to have 20 sufficient nitrogen for a long-term station blackout?
21 Sprays and water supply, there was a two phase 22 proposal on sprays and water supply. One was to provide an 23 alternative source.of water for station blackout basically 24 using diesel-driven fire pumps, and the other was to modify O. 25 the spray headers in containment so that you would get a spray
' HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
270 1 of water rather'than a-dribble.
2' 'On debris. control, there were proposals.to provide.
3 curbs in the dry well to try and direct any core debris away 4 from the steel liner or the steel shell. There was also a 5 proposal to put curbs in the room underneath the suppression 6 pool basically as a way to trap water if there is a.
7 melt-through of the shell, and trap the core debris and scrub 8 it.
9 There is. a question on whether an enhancement to the- 3 10 ADS. system is warranted in terms of mitigation. If you-can 11 ' avoid a station blackout, for example, in high pressure i 12 ~ melt-through of the vessel, you may be able to mitigate it.in 13 containment more easily at least.
14 Then there is the question of venting and the kinds
.15 of questions that were raised on.this side of the table on 16 when you should vent, what kind of equipment you'need to vent, 17 and what kind of procedures and training are necessary for 18 venting, all of those kinds of questions have been raised.
19 Now I want to try and see if I can correct an 20 apparent misconception. The staff has not told Boston Edison I
l 21 they cannot vent. The staff has told Boston Edison that their- j l
22 proposal for new venting, their proposed hardware.and their ]
l 23 procedures, raises a number of questions, not only procedural i l
24 questions, but negative potentially safety impacts. What, for 25 example, do we have in the way of assurance that somebody l 1
_ - _ _L********"**$'""*^*"~'22'***~#***
- )
271 1 :wouldn't inadvertently open the vent in error if'the pressure ,
I
- ( -) . 2- was beginning to turn around in the containment, and you have i
3 got.back your pumps in a station; blackout, if you reach that l 4 venting pressure, would you still vent? Those are the kinds:
5 of questions that are being raised that we are trying to 6 assess.
'7 MR L. EBERSOLE: There is pre-core damage?
8 MR. HULMAN: Some cases, pre-core damage, some .j 9 cases, post-core damage. Suppose in the station blackout, for j i
10 example, I have melted the core, but I have gotten-back my- l 11 pumps, and I find out that my containment pressure rate of-12 increase is slowing? -Should I vent when I reach design i
i 13 pressure or not? If I open that vent, the gases that I get' 4 O 14 out could b'e dangerous to the public off site. I.might not i
15 want to do it. The way I understand Boston Edison has made i
16 the proposal is to open the vent at about the design pressure: L 1
17 of the containment regardless.
j
)'
18 CHAIRMAN KERR: Mr. Hulman, you said earlier.I i
19 bclieve that all the PWRs had venting procedures in' place l
20 which presumably means that they would vent under certain I i
i 21 circumstances, and I take it that these procedures either have 22 .the NRC approval or at least they don't have NRC disapproval.
23 This could lead me to conclude that had Boston 24 Edison not asked for your approval, they could have gone ahead 25 and vented, but the fact that they asked for your approval i
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)6;8-4888 -j t 1
I 272' :
1 caused question. Is that a valid interpretation? '
2 MR.'HULMAN: That's a valid interpretation. 'My l
'3l understanding is that the emergency procedure guidelines, the
. j '
4' so-called ElGs for boilers, have been approved previously with q
i 5 " . venting in them. For some co'.1 temporary operating; licenses, !
M the' staff has reviewed the bases for,the procedures, not the
- ., 3
/. procedure guidelines, and has agreed to venting at certain /
^, y j- 8 pressures, but in several of those cases, there were the v
9 issue,~(the issues were raised on what do you do if the e
10 pressure rate o't, increase is beginning ,
y to decline?- ,.
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).,e CHAIRMAN KERR:
ll If everybody except Boston Edison 7 s ,. ?! >
12 has vgit ng procedures-in place, I guess I'm puzz1Ol as[to whgf
.if .
J'y 13 e Boston Edipon'found .such a roadblock present in even trying? ,
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HE.."h0LMAN: They have new hardware /they are rs , , '
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7 -15 proposing to $nstall. //
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y - f 16 < CHIIRMAN KERR: But does thil hardwareM ave anything c
17 to do with the fact that they vent or'do not vent? < .
,.j m 18 ME HU[ FAN: No. My understanding is todiff they 19 have procedures ha place to use existing pen'etrations to vent. h, 29 CHAIRMAN KERR: but the factsthat they propose new,, d
, I e ,- r 21 hardware 8$nvinged you it would be worse than if tlRY~tNdn,'? '
I a
22 have new hardware?
y ,
23 'MR. HULMAN: Possible.
24 CHAIRMAN t ?. ERR : I'm sorry?
O 25, MR. HULMAN: Po.ss ibly, could>be.
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3 f .
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273-
'l CHAIRMAN KERR: I don't. understand that comment.
2 MR. WARD: He means possibly could be worse.
3 MR. HULMAN: The staff as I understand it generally 4 does not review emergency procedures. Staff has reviewed the
-5 emergency procedure guidelines.
6 CHAIRMAN KERR: It war, my understanding the staff
'7 had disapproved what Boston Edison proposed or something.
8 Otherwise I don't see why Boston Edison would have backed off.
9 Am I mistaken?
10 MR. HULMAN: Yes. The staff has not disapproved it.
11 The staff has only asked questions.
.12 CHAIRMAN'KERR: We are playing with words.
je 13 MR. HOUSTON: Mr. Chairman, I am Wayne Houston from 14 the. staff',' I think I can clarify it by addressing I think Mr.
15- Ebersole's question.
16 CHAIRMAN KERR: Sure would appreciate it. <.
17 MR. HOUSTON: As you recognize, having met on this 18 subject over a year ago, the initiative in dealing with Mark I
'19 issues started well over a year ago and before the 20 phenomenological publication of 1150. Prior to that time, the
/ (.
l 21 staff had required pursuant tc TMI action plan requirements s 22 reviews of emergency procedure guidelines, a step on the way 23 of developing major operating procedures.
'24 The BWR owners group had on their own initiative O 25 proposed some venting guidelines that are addressed in the l
, i< HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
1 -
'1 ! s
. j.
274 1- ,, first~of the two issues that Mr. Ebersole directed as tbe
( 2 .preventioilof core damage. It.is my understanding that! the i i 3' guidelines approved by the staff'were' directed towar6,the-
' 1
.t . 1; 4 matter of vedting to Yrevent core damage.
'c 1L >9 5 ;In contrast to that, the initiative taken with the 6 Mark I issuesLe. bout acyear ago, a li6tle over a yearjago now, 7 are explicitly directed to, towards, d!E matter of preservation 8 of the suppression poril as,a cooling medium in the' event'that i 9
9 one has a full core melt. accident with core on the floor, and
'\
10 it is that containment venting at the Pilftrim pl.pnt that 11- Boston Edison w:*a attempting to address ard had in fact 12 proceeded with installation of, most of the installation f$r 13 that) purpose. And'it f.s that type of veting whirh has not in
) 1 14 effect,been approved by the staff at this paint in time.
15 'MR . EBERSOLEh First mode.is approved?
,8 16 MR. HOUSTON:
)}es . ;
17 HR. EHERSOLE: First mode has a couple of riaks,.
18 that one, if'you,have equipment thaVLcan't cl o s e ., you enter a 19 region of questionable operability and you may want to close 20 later, even though you were trying'tc prevent core damage in
- 21 the first plar
- t but you failed. '
21 MR. HOUSTON: Correct.
23 CHAIRMAN KhRR: What you are t'ellinq1ne is that if 24 Boston Edison has said we are going to vent the, vent the same 25 sort 6f action that the other people are venting, that would a- .s s HERITAGE g-REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
275-t, 1 have been okay?- The guidelines would have been approved, but 2 Lthe fact that they told you they were going'tofvent for some 3 other purpose, changed things?
4 MR. HOUSTON: Yes. I am not quite clear, but my 5' impression is that they still have the same approval that 6 other BWRs do through the mechanism of the staff approval of
'? the emergency procedure guidelines.
8' CHAIRMAN KERR: Even if they put on the hardware 9' they are proposing.which probably is hardware to make things 10 better?
J 11 MR. HOUSTON: Again, my understanding is that was 12 intended for venting in the event of core on.the floor.
13 MR.:EBERSOLE: Advantageous-for core not on the 14 floor apparently.
15- MR. HOUSTON: I think it probably would be, yes, 16 because I think it is a larger vent line.
17 MR. E3ERSOLE: Positive move?
18 MR. HOUSTON: I believe they.still have a smaller 19 line venting capability.
20 CHAIRMAN KERR: I must say that what you are telling 21 me nay reem logical to you. Perhaps if I lived with it long 22 enough it would seem logical to me, but I don't understand it.
23 MR. HOUSTON: The distinction I think Mr. Ebersole .
24 has made-- 4 0 25 DR. REMICK: I think I am close to understanding, l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 l av I
276
'1 and I need a'little bit of additional help -- Boston Edison 2 had approval for' vent under certain circumstances prior. That 3 still exists?
4~ MR. HULMAN: It is my understanding.
5 DR. REMICK: They proposed modification with 6 equipment for vent under other circumstances, and it is that 7 one that the staff has asked questions. Therefore, they 8; haven't got permission? Is that a correct characterization?
9 MR. HOUSTON: I believe that is correct, yes.
10 CHAIRMAN KERR: So other BWRs cannot vent if they 11 wait until they hit core escaping from the vessel? Is this a 12 valid interpretation?
13 MR. HOUSTON: They are not authorized to.
14 CHAIRMAN KERR: They are not prevented from doing 15 it, are they?
16 MR '. HOUSTON: To the best of my knowledge, they are 17 not.
18 CHAIRMAN KERR: I don't really see what is different 19 between them and Boston Edison.
20 MR. HOUSTON: You have got the wrong members of the 21 staff here I think with respect to the details or. the Pilgrim 22 case. You need somebody from NRR here.
23 MR. WARD: The other BWRs dor.'t have procedures in 24 place to vent after core on the floor. They do have O 25 procedures in place to vent as a, as a preventive measure, and HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
277 1 those. procedures'were approved,.you know, at least the outline
'2 of them, through the NRC approval of the EPGs or whstever you 3 call them.
4 CHAIRMAN KERR: Unless they have specific c 5 ' disapproval of venting for core on the floor, and they have 6 got these approvals which almost certainly speak to pressure 7 at which one vents, I bet you there is nothing that prevents 8- everything and indeed I was told earlier that normal rules 9 don't apply under the extreme emergency and that one therefore 10 could vent.
11 MR, HOUSTON: You may be referring'to the factithat 12 licensee, it has been indicated a licensee, that under 13 emergency circumstances, they can violate tech specs. I 14 believe that's the condi 'on without --
15 CHAIRMAN KERR: Ttese emergency procedures are 16 probably part of tech spec.
17 MR. HOUSTON: I don't think they are identified as 18 such.
19 MR. WARD: I don't think sny of then have emergency 20 procedures for core on the floor, how what they decide to do 21 in the ad hoc manner I guess is another question. I don't 22 know.
23 CHAIRMAN KERR: I won't pursue it. I don't think I 24 am going to understand it any better.
25 MR. HULMAN: I think the representative from General j HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
_ _ _ _ , _ - _ __-.-_____-______-___P__. .. I
278 1 Electric.may be able to shed some light on the subject.
O. 2' CHAIRMAN KERR: You people make light bulbs!
3 MR. GIFFORD: I am Larry Gifford with General 4 Electric.in Bethesda. I don't have all'the answers to your 5 questions. However, I think that what has'been approved by 6 the emergency procedure guidelines, to be imp 1rmented at 7 plants, these have to be turned into so-called. emergency l
8 operating procedures by the individual utilities, and I am not l 9 sure that this is. This'has.been done at Boston. I can't 10 speak either to whether they have the physical capability at 11 all' plants.
12 What they have is apprcval of the emergency 13 procedure guidelines which include venting, but it is, it has' 14 been in the state of transition for sometime, and I am not 15 really sure,that it is a fact that every-plant has either 16 procedures or equipment to vent. I am not saying they don't 17 but I am just not sure that they did.
18 These questions have been bandied about in countless 19 meetings for the past year or so, and it is still not very 20 clear what each individual plant's capability is. I agree 21 with the statement that was made that I believe what Boston i 22 Edison was trying to do was to put something in to vent with
)
l 23 core on the floor, and that has not been approved to the best 24 of my knowledge by anybody. As a matter of ftet, questions O 25 have been raised by people like Dr. Murley and others that it l
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-48F8
279 1 is not clear'that NRC's approving of. venting in a1 situation
- 2. like that is all it is going to take. There are.other 3 agencies.thatlwould1have to be con'sulted in a situation like 4 that.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: May I ask the question, you are 6 telling us emergency procedures guidelines areLpresent'in each 7 plant? And they--
8 MR. GIFFORD: No, sir, I'did'not say that. I said--
9 MR. EBERSOLE: Just the guidelines?
10 MR. GIFFORD: Emergency procedure guidelines forithe-11 boiling water reactors have been approved by the staff.
12' MR. EBERSOLE: I presume every operator has got --
13 MR. GIFFORD: Well, yes, they certainly have a. copy
.O.
14 of the guidelines, but before they can be translated into 15 procedures at a plant, they have to be turned into emergency 16 operating procedures by the individual utility.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Wouldn't that result in the operator 18 saying all right, I must turn these into procedures, where is 19- the equipment?
- 20. MR. GIFFORD: I can't answer that question. I don't 21 work for the utility.
22 MR. EBERSOLE: It sounds like I have an emergency by 2? that time and no compatible equipment to go with it.
4 24 Therefore, I will run up against the absolute barrier of being
) 25 then unable to develop emergency procedures because I don't j l
)
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- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ __ _ _-__-__-_ - _a
280 1 have the equipment to operate. This seems to me to be a --
() 2 CHAIRMAM RERE: You and I need to get better 3 information.
i 4 MR. EBERSOLE: } want to hear that there is 5 equipment with which to apply the procedures or rather the q l
l-l 6 guidelines for those procedures.
l 7 UR. GIFFORD: I did not say that the equipment aoes 8 not exist. I am just not sure in my own mind as to what 9 exists at each individual plant.
10 MR. WARD: Aren't you saying when the BWR owners 11 group developed the EPGs, there must have been a presumption 12 that there was equipment there provided?
13 MR. GIFFORD: Either equipment there or equipment 14 under development.
15 MR. WARD: For this sort of early venting all you 16 are saying is you don't know whether this has actually been 17 realized at eacn and every BWR?
18 MR. GIFFORD: That is correct.
19 MR. EBERSOLE: I think that ought to be called out.
20 MR. WARD: I think so, too. You know, I don't see 21 what is so confusing. The status I don't think is not 22 understandable. You might not understand why everything isn't 23 finished.
24 MR. EBERSOLE: It is just irrational.
25 MR. WARD: That's nothing new!
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
281 1 MR. HULMAN: On the subject of venting,.we have L 2 asked INEL to undertake a study of the positive'and negative 3' aspects of venting based on the; work they did on Peach-Bottom 4 for 1150.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: This is post-damage?
.6 MR. HULMAN: For both preventing. core' damage is,well 7- as post-core. damage.
8 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay.
9 MR. HULMAN: Now this list of potential improvemen'ts 10 also includes the use of fire protection devices in the 11 reactor building outside containment. It is conceivable that 12- if the containment is violated in a severe accident, that the
'13 use of sprays in the reactor building can dive down that 14 fission and product inventory before it gets off site, and the 15 . simple use of-fire streams with. spray nozzles could be 16 effective, and that's one of the things we want to look at.
17 And last on the list was the use of procedures and 18 training of the operators to cope with severe accidents.
19 JR. EBERSOLE: Is part of this process going to 20' solve the problem of continuously pumping water into the 21 containment without taking it out somewhere? It is going to 22 fill up if you do. And after a while it will act like a wet l 23 bag, and breach.
l l 24 CHAIRMAN KERR: When you have this situation, a O 25 situation in which you don't have any electric power--
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
282 1 MR. EBERSOLE: He is just going to do it with' fire .I 1
2 pumps.
3 CHAIRMAN KERR: .If you don't have any electric 4 power, you are~not going to be able to pump water.
5 MR. EBERSOLE: With fire protection. pumps he is 6 going to pump it in. They will be diesel-driven pumps.
'7 CHAIRMAN KERR: Maybe we should let Mr. Hulman 8 answer it. Go ahead.
9- MR. HULMAN: One of the suggestions has been to use 10 a diesel-driven fire pump rated somewhere between 750 GPM and 11 1500. You would put water into the vessel preferentially if 12 you could prevent core melt or prevent the vessel from 13 failing. Once this had happened, you would probably put it
.O 14 into containment, and you are right, that the more water you 15 put into containment, gives you a problem with your so-called 16 wet bag. That's one thing that has to be looked at.
17 MR. EBERSOLE: Yep.
18 MR. HULMAN: That's one of the things wo intend to 19 look at.
l 20 MR. EBERSOLE: Okay. j 21 MR. HULMAN: Now I want to try and focus on a 22 schedule for you, and to tell you that as soon as the EDO 23 signs out the plan, I would like to send it down here and .
/
24 solicit any comments that the Committee might care to offer on O 25 the plan.
l l HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888 j l ___________________--__--_--_________--__---_-_-----__----------.---__---~-_---_J
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j 283 1- (Slide)
( -2 MR. HULMAN: -But that's not the end of it. We 'are-3 going to be back. By January 15th we are' going to --
'4 MR. WARD: Jerry, what do you mean as soon as the j 5 EDO sends? l 4
6 MR. HULMAN: We have a plan and I am trying to:
7' describe today an overview of that. plan. As soon.as the.EDO f a
8 cigns out'the Commission paper, presumably he will today or 9 Monday--
10 MR. WARD: You have prepared that and are' waiting?
11 MR. HULMAN: It has.been prepared. It has NRR 12 concurrence. As soon as it is signed out, I intend to send it-13 down here, and if the Committee cares to offer any comments, O.
- 14. we would be happy to have them, but you are going to get 15 another. crack at it, so see me through this. January 15, wo 16 are going to issue a meeting. invitation to key researchers, 17 industry representatives, interested members of the public, to 18 come to a meeting the end of February to try and narrow and 19 focus on the issues.
20 We will also be doing some research on some of the 21 phenomenological issues and improvement issues in preparation 22 for that meeting. .After the meeting, about March 1st, we are 23' going to complete the calculations and the evaluation of some 24 of the performance issues, and some of the phenomenological 25 issues, and by April 30th, we are going to try and send to the
. HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
284 1 Commission interim recommendations for improvements of Mark
( 2 Is, either-recommending no improvements, recommending specific-3 improvements, or saying we can't make up our mind until we-
'4 finish this study. But we are going to finish it. We are 5 going to finish it by the end of August. That's our intent at 6 this point is to finish the question of Mark I containment 7 performance by the end of August.
8' Now with that interim report to the Commission and' 9 the final-report to the Commission, I want to come back to the:
10 Committee. I would like the. Committee's views en the-11 completeness of our evaluation and the' conclusions, so I am
- 12. hoping that you will give us some constructive comments as 13 well as your conclusions on the issues yourself, so I intend' 14 to be back at least twice more.before the end of August, one 15 with the interim' recommendations, and finally with the final 16' recommendations on this issue.
17 Now the kinds of things we were going to do I have 18 discussed in general. We are going to look at the 19 phenomenological issues. One of the principal ones is liner 20 melt-through, We are going to look at the improvement issues.
21 We also have under way a development of a so-called white 22 paper on filtered venting. Everything we know about filtered 23 venting we are going to try and put into that paper along with 24- -what we don't know about filtered venting, and a list of what 25 we think may be the regulatory issues associated with it.
HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
285 1 I understand the Committee has asked'for some work 2 in that area. To the extent that we can help or share 3 information, we will be more than happy to.
4 With that, that winds up my presentation. I will
- 5. try and take questions.
6 CHAIRMAN KERR: Thank you, sir. Questions? Mr.
7 Hulman',-it is my impression from what I have seen and. people L 8 with whom I have talked that much of what hr.ppens once you get -
9 the core debris material penetrating the vessel depends on'how i
10 much and how soon the stuff gets-into the doughnut. If it l
11 comes in, most of it, in one large glob, you have one 12 situation. If it dribbles in, the situation may be different.
13 It may be much more nearly coolable, for example.
O. 14 Again, my impression is that if you use the March 15 code, you almost inevitably have most of the core dropping in 16 almost in a very short time.
17 It therefore seems to me that looking at the 18 phenomenological problems as you put it, that you want to at 19 least be of, some give some consideration to constraints on 20 the modeling that you use to arrive at conclusion.
21 MR. HULMAH: You are exactly right, and in fact that 22 is what we have done. Oak Ridge has basically modified the l
1 23 March code into a new version that they are calling BWR SAR in i 24 which they have attempted to improve the modeling of the core O 25 melt progression. Some of their preliminary calculations, for HERITAGE REPORTING. CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
).'
286 1 example, indicate that in a core melt accident in which you
(); '2 are able to depressurize, that the core debris might come out 3 : penetrations in the bottom head over a-period of six hours, I
4 and potentia? ly be more coolable -if you depressilrize, so we 5 have made progress in those areas that you are concerned I
6 -about, and you will hear about those when we come ~back 'and 7 talk to you.
i 8 CHAIRMAN KERR: 'Other questions? Well, thank you i
9 very much.
10 (Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the recorded portion of 11 the meeting was adjourned.)
12 (U) 14 k
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25 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION -- (202)628-4888
1-REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 j' 3 DOCKET NUMBER: s
%- 4 . CASE T%TLE: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 5 HEARING DATE: December 4, 1987 I 6 LOCATION: Washington, D.C. 'I ]
7 I hereby certify that the proceedings.and evidence .
8 are contained fully and accurately on the tapes and notes 9
reported by me at the hearing in the above case before the {
10 l
11 12 13 iM Date: December 4, 1987
~O t4 i
15 l
COfficial
& wReporter
'S ]~
17 /
33 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION 1220 L Street, N.W.
gg Washington, D.C. 20005 20 .
21 f 22%
27 23 24 0 25 HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION '
, (202)628-4888
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r--r-a i DISCUSSION OF ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS
~
l ... .ON IMPROVED SAFETY FOR FUTURE ALWRs '
l I
i I
O A PRESENTATION TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS l i
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4 i ,
J. C. DeVINE, JR.
SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER, ALWR PROGRAM h 4 DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C.
i
ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVED
' O SAFETY FOR FUTURE ALWRs i
l -
THE ALWR PROGRAM POSITION ON THE ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS WAS PRESENTED IN MR. E. KINTNER'S LETTER TO T. SPEIS, DATED MARCH 27,1987. 1 GENERAL POINTS OF EPRI'S POSITION:
THE ALWR DESIGN SHOULD REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF UPSET EVENTS AND MINIMlZE RELIANCE ON HUMAN AN MECHANICAL !NTERACTION.
O FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENA, SUCH AS GRAVITY, THERMAL INERTIA AND REACTIVITY FEEDBACKS, SHOULD BE RELIED UPON TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE.
SIMPLICITY IN SYSTEMS AND COMPONENT DESIGNS, MARGIN IN THERMODYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS AND THERMALLY- DRIVEN CIRCULATION FOR REMOVAL OF DECAY HEAT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED IN THE DESIGN.
- ADDITIONALLY, THE EPRI LETTER ADDRESSED EACH OF THE 12 ACRS RECOMMENDATIONS.
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- - - - - - - - - _ _ - - )
DECAY HEAT REMOVAL FUNCTION g THE ALWR TOPIC PAPER ON USl A-45, STATES THE PROGRAM POSITION ON DECAY HEAT REMOVAL.
CHAPTER 5 OF THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT IMPLEMENTS THAT POSITION AND PRESCRIBES THE FOLLOWING FOR RHR SYSTEMS:
MAXIMUM USE OF NATURAL CIRCULATION SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED EMERGENCY FEEDWATER CAPABILITY DEDICATED SYSTEMS WITH REDUNDANT TRAINS g' PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF TRAINS 1
PHYSICAL PROTECTION AS PART OF AN INTEGRALLY-PROTECTED PLANT (NO SPECIAL BUNKERS)
SEISMIC DESIGN IMPROVED RESISTANCE TO COMMON CAUSE FAILURES
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CAPABILITY TO TOLERATE EVENTS BEYOND LICENSING l DESIGN BASIS I INCREASED RHR DESIGN PRESSURE g
1
i O SAFETY TRAIN REDUNDANCY CHAPTER 5 INCLUDES REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY SYSTEM REDUNDANCY AS FOLLOWS:
FOR BWRs:
THREE INDEPENDENT DIVISIONS, EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING CORE COOLANT INVENTORY CONTROL AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL FUNCTIONS FOR TRANSIENTS AND LOCAs FOR PWRs;.
O SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM CONSISTING OF FOUR
' REDUNDANT MECHANICAL TRAINS, EACH TO PROVIDE 50 PERCENT OF THE MINIMUM FLOW RATE TO SATISFY LOCA REQUIREMENTS I l
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DESIGN OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS g (INCLUDING SEVERE ACCIDENT PROTECTION)
WITH RESPECT.TO CONTAINMENT DESIGN, CHAPTER 5 PRESCRIBES THAT:
THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM IS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS TO THE EXTENT THAT RELEASES AT SITE BOUNDARY (0.5 MILES)
WOULD BE NO GREATER THAN 25 REM FOR ANY ACCIDENT OF PROBABILITY HIGHER THAN 10-6 PER REACTOR YEAR THE OVERALL ALWR PROGRAM APPROACH TO ACHIEVING INCREASED PUBLIC SAFETY AND IMPROVED PLANT g INVESTMENT PROTECTION INCLUDES THREE MAIN ELEMENTS:
- 1. DESIGN THE ALWR TO SATISFY APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
- 2. PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON PREVENTION OF CORE DAMAGE IN THE ALWR DESIGN,TO ASSURE ADEQUATE UTILITY INVESTMENT PROTECTION (GOAL OF <10-5 CDF PER REACTOR YEAR)
- 3. ANALYSES OF SELECTED DOMINANT SEVERE ACCIDENT SEQUENCES TO VERIFY THAT ADEQUATE DESIGN MARGIN EXISTS g
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O PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE J
ALWR PROTECTION AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS, INCLUDING SABOTAGE, WILL BE ADDRESSED PRIMARILY IN REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT CHAPTER 6 (PLANT ARRANGEMENT AND STRUCTURES).
PRIMARY FOCUS WILL BE ON ABILITY TO ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS UNDER IMMINENT !
THREAT.
4 O
SEPARATION OF TRAINS SHOULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE.
AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS TO AVOID THE TRAP OF HAVING SECURITY DEVICES IMPEDE PLANT OPERATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT PLANT SAFETY WILL BE JEOPARDIZED.
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FIRE PROTECTION O THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTINCLUDES REQUIREMENTS FOR:
PHYSICAL SEPARATION AND BARRIERS TO PROTEC'i AGAINST FIRE DAMAGE PROTECTION OF STRUCTURES FROM DAMAGE CAUSED BY FIRE (APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER 1)
SYSTEM DESIGN FOR FIRE PREVENTION, FIRE SUPPRESSION AND FIRE FIGHTING (CHAPTER 9)
APPLICATION OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS -
APPENDIX R TO 10CFR50 O
g ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) 1
'THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (CHAPTERS 3 & 4) l ESTABLISHES REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTIVITY CONTROL:
A NEGATIVE POWER COEFFICIENT THROUGHOUT THE LIFE OF THE PLANT AND AT ALL POWER LEVELS HAS BEEN )
SPECIFIED )
- FOR BWRs, A NEGATIVE COOLANT VOID COEFFICIENT THROUGHOUT THE CORE REGION HAS BEEN SPECIFIED l
Q . FOR PWRs, A NON-POSITIVE MODERATOR TEMPERATURE l COEFFICIENT HAS BEEN SPECIFIED: AT BOL FOR POWER LEVELS ABOVE 50% AND FOR THE ENTIRE POWER RANGE LATER IN LIFE l
PWRs WILL BE DESIGNED TO HAVE DEPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WITHOUT PRESSURIZER SPRAYS BWRs WHICH WILL BE DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ,
THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT WILL HAVE AT LEAST 100% RELIEF CAPACITY O
SYSTEMS INTERACTION $
CHAPTER 1 OF THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT DEALS DIRECTLY WITH THE ISSUE OF SYSTEM INTERACTION l (SECTION 2.2.F.7). ALSO, A TOPIC PAPER ADDRESSING ISSUE A-17 WAS PREPARED BY THE ALWR PROGRAM AND SUBMITTED FOR STAFF REVIEW (LETTER DATED 12/3/85).
SPECIFICALLY, THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED:
- 1. SEPARATION AND ISOLATION OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS-
- 2. SPATIAL SEPARATION BETWEEN SYSTEMS
- 3. PLANT PRAs TO DETECT POTENTIAL SYSTEMS INTERACTION O
- 4. COMPUTER SIMULATION DURING THE DESIGN PROCESS
- 5. WALKDOWNS DURING PLANT CONSTRUCTION, TO CONFIRM CORRECT SPATIAL SEPARATION
- 6. PREOPERATIONAL AND HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTS TO CONFIRM LACK OF SYSTEMS INTERACTION
- 7. INTEGRATED APPROACH TO FIRE PREVENTION AND MITIGATION O
l 1
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS O j i
l THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT WILL SPECIFY' ,
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS IN CHAPTER 11.
IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT CHAPTER 11 WILL FOLLOW ACRS' q RECOMMENDATION FOR A CONTINUOUS AND UNSWITCHED I SUPPLY OF POWER TO AUXILIARY AND SAFETY SYSTEM FROM THE LOW SIDE OF THE STEP-UP TRANSFORMER.
ON ISSUE A-44 (STATION BLACKOUT), THE ALWR TOPIC PAPER INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS OF RESOLUTION:
A MINIMUM COPING CAPABILITY OF EIGHT HOURS OF O STAT' " 8'^ K UT (INCLUDING PUMP SEALS)
TWO OR MORE SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CONNECTIONS TO OFF-SITE AC POWER DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY OVER FULL RANGE OF PLANTTEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES, FOR ALL PLANT CONDITIONS, INCLUDING' STATION BLACKOUT ALLOW AT LEAST 20 SECONDS FOR ON-SITE POWER STARTUP AND AT LEAST 40 SECONDS FOR LOAD SEQUENCING A REQUIREMENT THAT THE ALWR TURBINE SYSTEM BE DESIGNED TO BE ABLE TO RUN BACK TO HOUSE LOADS WILL BE CONSIDERED IN PREPARATION OF CHAPTER 13.
O
PROBABILISTIC SEISMIC DESIGN OI THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT SPECIFIES SEISMIC AND DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION CRITERIA FOR MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. SEISMIC CATEGORIES ARE SPECIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAFETY PERFORMANCE EXPECTED FROM THE EQUIPMENT. THE SEISMIC RESPONSE VALUES TO WHICH THE EQUIPMENT IS EVALUATED ARE DETERMINISTICALLY SPECIFIED.
PROBABILISTIC METHODS (PRA) WILL BE USED IN EVALUATING OVERALL PLANT SAFETY PERFORMANCE.
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PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMEtlT INCLUDES SPECIFICATIONS AIMED AT MINIMlZING THE NUMBER OF WELDS IN THE PRIMARY SYSTEM.
IN PARTICULAR, THE REACTOR VESSEL IS REQUIRED TO BE FABRICATED OF FORGED SHELL SECTIONS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE INCLUDED IN CHAPTER 4.
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u fy g CONTROL ROOM PROTECTION FOR l I SEVERli ACCIDENTS "- ,,
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SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERAT{ONS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMErlT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO T, HE CONTAINMENT DESIGN. THIS WOULD HELP ALLEV1 ATE CONCERNS ABOUT
.;<... a tca . /.
,z CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY. CHAPTER 6 (PLANJ ARRANGEMENT, CHAPTER 9'(SITE SUPPORT SYSTEMS), AND i,
CH APTER 10 (MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE) WILL COi1TN!N g REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING CONrfROL ROOM HABITABILITY INJHE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT.
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DEDICATED SYSTEMS AND SHARING f
.THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT SPECIFIES THAT SHARING OF EQUIPMENT, FLOW PATHS AND SUPPORT FACILITIES AMONG NOMINALLY SEPARATED SYSTEMS i SHOULD BE MINIMlZED. THIS PRINCIPLE IS MOSTLY APPARENT IN THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS, i INCLUDED IN CHAPTER 5.
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THE ADVANCEdlLIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM i
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' OPENING REMARKS TO TliE Pd -
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 0 +
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i E E .KINTNER-CHAIRMAN,'ALWR UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE ,
' 4 DECEMBER 1987 .
WASHINGTON, D.04 f
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O- l THE OVERALL GOALS OF THE ALWR PROGRAM I
. TO ESTABLISH UTILITY LEADERSHIP AND EFFECT POSITIVE PROGRESS TOWARD A REVITALIZED NUCLEAR POWER OPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
' ' """"'^'"^""^^'^" ""'"
O FOUNDATION FOR THE DESIGN OF ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTORS FOR THE NEXT DECADE O
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ALWR PROGRAM OBJECTIVE IN SiJPPORT OF THESE GOALS, THE ALWR PROGRAM .
OBJECTIVES ARE:
i A STABILIZED REGULATORY BASIS, VIA COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH NRC TO IDENTIFY AND RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF NUCLEAR PLANT SAFETY DEVELOPMENT OF A SET OF DESIGN .AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADVANCED LWR (THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT")
AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT DESIGN POSSIBILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF GREATLY SIMPLIFIED, PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS, APPLIED TO SMALLER (<600 MWe) PLANT SIZE 4 O
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UTil_lT_Y INVOLVEMENT AND SUPPORT O
PREMISE:
U.S. UTILITIES NOW HAVE THE EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE TO ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR PLANTS. MOREOVER, AS OWNERS AND LICENSEES, U.S. UTILITIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR CUSTOMERS, THEIR STOCKHOLDERS AND THE PUBLIC FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF THESE PLANTS.
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UTILITY INVOLVEMENT AND SUPPORT (CONTINUED)
IMPLEMENTATION:
THE ALWR PROGRAM IS AN INITIATIVE OF THE U.S. UTILITY q INDUSTRY, IN EVERY RESPECT:
THE PROGRAM IS SPONSORED FINANCIALLY BY U.S. ,
UTILITIES, VIA. EPRI THE PROGRAM IS DIRECTED BY A UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE (USC) 19 SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF U.S. UTILITY COMPANIES WHICH OWN AND OPERATE NUCLEAR PLANTS USC IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE PROGRAM, BOTH ON POLICY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES USC APPROVES ALL SUBMITTALS TO NRC KEY ALWR PROGRAM MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN UTILITY EMPLOYEES, ASSIGNED TO EPRI O
O ALWR PHILOSOPHY !
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THE UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE HAS ESTABLISHED BASIC PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALWR REQUIREMENTS,IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
NUCLEAR SAFETY SIMPLICITY r
DESIGN MARGIN i O -
USE OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY t
HUMAN FACTORS ,
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_ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - ]
SAFETY g
. ALWR MUST BE VERY SAFE, COMPARED TO EXISTING -
PLANTS DESIGN MUST CONSIDER PEOPLE PROTECTION AND INVESTMENT PROTECTION MAJOR EMPHASIS IS ON PREVENTION OF CORE DAMAGING ACCIDENTS, BY ENSURING THAT ALWR IS INHERENTLY RESISTANTTO ACCIDENTINITIATING EVENTS AND BY PROVIDING HIGHLY RELIABLE, EFFECTIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS g
- IN ADDITION, ALWR PROVIDES ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITY IN BALANCE WITH ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND WITH ALWR OVERALL SAFETY OBJECTIVES l
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SAFETY (CONTINUED)
. IN ALL RESPECTS, SAFETY IS ENHANCED BY DESIGNS WHICH ARE:
SIMPLE PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN ADDRESS HUMAN FACTORS ARE BASED ON PROVEN TECHNOLOGY SAFETY MUST BE DESIGNED IN: ;
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) TO BE USED O AS A TOOL TO DEVELOP ALWR DESIGN AND '
TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SAFETY PERFORMANCE RESOLUTION OF GENERIC AND UNRESOLVED SAFETY I ISSUES IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ALWR SAFETY DESIGN I
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SIMPLICITY O ALWR IS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMPLIFIED, COMPARED TO EXISTING PLANTS SIMPLIFICATION IS A PRIMARY MEANS OF ACHIEVING ALL >
ALWR CRITERIA:
SAFETY COST OPERABILITY MAINTAINABILITY
-ETC.
PRIMARY EMPHASIS IS ON SIMPLIFICATION FROM AN OPERATOR STANDPOINT, (i.e., OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE UNDERSTANDABLE AND PREDICTABLE IN OPERATION) 1 l
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. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ . _ __ _J
i O. MARGIN
' ALWR IS TO BE A RUGGED, FORGIVING DESIGN, AS EVIDENCED BY:
ADEQUATE TIME FOR OPERATOR DIAGNOSIS AND
RESPONSE
PLANT ABILITY TO RIDE THROUGH ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT CHALLENGlNG SAFETY SYSTEMS L
O -
SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN TO CORE DAMAGE LIMITS, LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION, ETC.
i O
USE OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY O ALWR REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON PROVEN, l SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR PLANTS (OR COMPARABLE TECHNOLOGIES) 4 BY DEFINITION, AN ALWR PLANT PROTOTYPE IS NOT.
REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE DESIGN ACCEPTABILITY O
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O HUMAN FACTORS
.THE ALWR IS TO BE DESIGNED WITH VERY HIGH ATTENTION TO THE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE THE DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES OF SIMPLIFICATION AND MARGIN ARE TWO KEYS TO SUCCESS IN THIS AREA ALWR WILL EMPLOY STATE-OF-THE-ART I&C SYSTEMS (WITHIN CONSTRAINTS OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENT)
ALWR WILL CONSIDER EXPERIENCE FROM OTHER l TECHNO'..OGIES (e.g., AIRLINES)IN ESTABLISHING REQUIREMENTS l
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EPRI Advanced LWR Program y PASSIVE PLANT -
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! William R. Sugnet t
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t i i Meeting of the l
- Advisory Committee Reactor Safeguards ! ;
December 4,1987 i l
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%.) EPRI ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM PASSIVE PLANT ;
OBJECTIVE IS TO EXPLORE OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED BY SMALLER PLANT SIZE TO EFFECT MAJOR SIMPLIFICATIONS, PROV!DE MORE PASSIVE SAFETY l
GYSTEMS, IMPROVE CONSTRUCTION SCHEDUi E VIA i EXTENSIVE MODULARIZATION, ETC.
PHASE I STUDIES COMPLETE 2 TEAMS (GE/BECHTEL AND WESTINGHOUSE / i BURNS & ROE SELECTED FOR FURTHER WORK)
O -
PHASE 11 WORK COMMENCED IN FALL 1987 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN STUDIES COMPARISON WITH REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALL, PASSIVE PLANT DESIGNS UTILILTY REVIEW OF DESIGN CONCEPTS '
I' RESULTS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT IN " ROLL-UP" PHASE M AJOR INTERACTION WITH/AND SUPPORT FROM DOE ALWR PROGRAM O
t REASONS FOR INTEREST IN SMALLER PLANTS $
BETTER MATCH TO UTILITY NEEDS LOW AND UNCERTAIN LOAD GROWTH INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF JOINT OWNERSHIP SMALLER CAPITAL INVESTMENT TO GENERATE FIRST INCREMENT OF POWER HISTORICAL HIGH CAPACITY FACTOR FOR SMALLER SIMPLER PLANTS 1
OPPORTUNITY TO MORE EASILY APPLY PASSIVE SYSTEM CONCEPTS O
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EPRI Advanced LWR PASSIVE PLANT PROGRAM SCHEDULE !
85 i 86 i 87 i 88 89 i i y EPRI Phase 2 l Phase 1 i
DOE ALWR l 600 MWe Projects t 1 JAPC m Future Offshore ASBWR Projects O y ;
NRC Technical j 'l
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Passive Plant Requirements Development
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Safety and Reliability Passive ease or operation
. $ygtgm and reduced dependence -
gg on supporting systems Removal of active components
.O Simplicity-1
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Passive system design leads to improvedsafetyandreliability majorsimplification O
g EPRI ALWR PASSIVE PLANT-SBWR PLANT FEATURES NATURAL CIRCULATION FOR CORE FLOW DURING FULL POWER OPERATION ISOLATION CONDENSER, LOCATED IN ELEVATED SUPPRESSION POOL, REMOVES DECAY HEAT BY i
NATURAL CIRCULATION AT FULL PRESSURE /
TEMPERATURE STEAM INJECTOR PROVIDES PASSIVE SOURCE OF
~ MAKEUP TO RCS O .
GRAVITY DRAIN COOLING SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES OPEN TO REDUCE SYSTEM PRESSURE ELEVATED SUPPRESSION POOL DRAINS TO COOL THE CORE ;
l PASSIVE CONTAINMENT COOLING PROVIDED BY WATER-FILLED WALL 1
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EPRI ALWR PASSIVE PLANT O
AP-600 PWR PLANT FEATURES STREAMLINED RCS CONFIGURATION UTILIZING CANNED-MOTOR PUMPS NATURAL CIRCULATION HEAT EXCHANGER REMOVES DECAY. HEAT AT FULL PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE -
GRAVITY-DRIVEN ECCS FULL PRESSURE CORE-MAKEUP TANKS KEEP CORE COVERED WHILE SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZES O
DEPRESSURIZATION VALVES VENT PRESSURIZER TO INCONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE. !
TANK (IRWST)
STEEL CONTAINMENT WITH NATURAL CONVECTION AND EXTERNAL WETTING PROVIDES PASSIVE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL O
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-- Q -Q 1600 25 Passive-cooling PWR Passive-cooling PWR 1400 Typical PWR Typical PWR g
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Safety System Auxiliary System Safety System Auxiliary System Pumps Pumps Valves Valves l
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et Simplicity Pays Of f The impact of simplification and passive safety systems can be seen clearly in the possibility for reduction of components. Over 60% of the pumps and 80% of the valves required for moving fluids in a conventional LWR can be eliminated in advanced designs that employ gravity feed and other passive concepts. Th>s rutuction is expected to simplify operation, increase system reliability, and enhance safety beyond that of conventional designs. In addition, for each valve and pump removed, a mountain of support equipment and operation and maintenance services are also eliminated, significantly reducing cost.
EPAl JOURNAL Juiv/ Auoust 1986 11
_ .r . .
t POTENTIAL FOR SIMPLIFICATION TYPICAL 2-LOOP AP 600 PLANT PLANT BEDUCTION VALVES 2,200 400 80%
PUMPS ,
40 14 65 %
SElSMIC BUILDING VOLUME 274,100 m3 157,700 m3 VOLUME 40%
O' TOTAL BUILDING 452,300 m3 350,200 m3 20 %
Use of passive system design has maior potential for simpillication
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EPRI O
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I E* THE ADVANCED LIGHTWATER REACTOR PROGRAM I
I OPENING REMARKS TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS O
l E. E. KINTNER CHAIRMAN, ALWR UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE 4 DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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THE OVERALL GOALS OF THE ALWR PROGRAM i
I TO ESTABLISH UTILITY LEADERSHIP AND EFFECT POSITIVE PROGRESS TOWARD A REVITALIZED NUCLEAR POWER OPTION IN THE UNITED STATES i g .
TO FORMULATE A PRACTICAL AND CREDIBLE FOUNDATION FOR THE DESIGN OF ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTORS FOR THE NEXT DECADE l
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ALWR PROGRAM OBJECTIVE E '
i IN SUPPORT OF THESE GONLS, THE ALWR PROGRAM l OBJECTIVES ARE:
A STABILIZED REGULATORY BASIS, VIA COOPERATIVE I
EFFORT WITH NRC,TO IDEN'nFY AND RESOdiE OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF NUCLEAR PLANfSAFETY ,
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t DEVELOPMENT ,,
OF A SET OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE
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k REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADVANCED LWR (THE REQUIREMENTS DOCbMENT")
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AN ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR PLANT DESIGN POSSIBILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF GREATLY j SIMPLIFIED, PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS, APPLIED TO SMALLER (<600 MWe) PLANT SIZE ,
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U.S. UTILITIES NOW HAVE THE EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE q I TO ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NEXT GENERATION
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' NUdLEAR PLANTS. MOREOVER, AS OWNERS AND LICENSEES, U.S. UTILITIES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR CUSTOMERS, THEIR STOCKHOLDERS AND THE PUBLIC FOR THE SAFE !
OPERATION OF THESE PLANTS. I i
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i UTILITY INVOLVEMENT AND SUPPORT (CONTINUED)
IMPLEMENTATION:
THE ALWR PROGRAM IS AN INITIATIVE OF THE U.S. UTILITY INDUSTRY, IN EVERY RESPECT: )
l THE PROGRAM IS SPONSORED FINANCIALLY BY U.S.
UTILITIES, VIA EPRI
)
THE PROGRAM IS DIRECTED BY A UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE (USC) 19 SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF U.S. UTILITY COMPANIES WHICH OWN AND OPERATE NUCLEAR PLANTS USC IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE PROGRAM, BOTH ON POLICY AND TECHNICAL ISSUES USC APPROVES ALL SUBMITTALS TO NRC KEY ALWR PROGRAM MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL HAVE i BEEN UTILITY EMPLOYEES, ASSIGNED TO EPRI O\
-O ALWR PHILOSOPHY THE UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE HAS ESTABLISHED BASIC PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALWR REQUIREMENTS,IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
NUCLEAR SAFETY SIMPLICITY DESIGN MARGIN- i O -
USE OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY HUMAN FACTORS 1
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SAFETY g
- ALWR MUST BE VERY SAFE, COMPARED TO EXISTING PLANTS DESIGN MUST CONSIDER PEOPLE PROTECTION AND INVESTMENT PROTECTION MAJOR EMPHASIS IS ON PREVENTION OF CORE DAMAGING ACCIDENTS, BY ENSURING THAT ALWR IS INHERENTLY RESISTANTTO ACCIDENTINITIATING EVENTS AND BY PROVIDING HIGHLY RELIABLE, EFFECTIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS g
- IN ADDITION, ALWR PROVIDES ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITY IN BALANCE WITH ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND WITH ALWR OVERALL SAFETY OBJECTIVES OI l
SAFETY (CONTINUED)
- IN ALL RESPECTS, SAFETY IS ENHANCED BY DESIGNS WHICH ARE:
SIMPLE PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN ADDRESS HUMAN FACTORS ARE BASED ON PROVEN TECHNOLOGY SAFETY MUST BE DESIGNED IN:
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA) TO BE USED O AS A TOOL TO DEVELOP ALWR DESIGN AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS SAFETY PERFORMANCE RESOLUTION OF GENERIC AND UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ALWR SAFETY DESIGN O
1 SIMPLICITY Ol l
ALWR IS TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMPLIFIED, COMPARED TO EXISTING PLANTS SIMPLIFICATION IS A PRIMARY MEANS OF ACHIEVING ALL ALWR CRITERIA:
SAFETY COST OPERABILITY MAINTAINABILITY
-ETC.
PRIMARY EMPHASIS IS ON SIMPLIFICATION FROM AN OPERATOR STANDPOINT,(i.e., OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE UNDERSTANDABLE AND PREDICTABLE IN OPERATION)
O l
h O MARGIN ALWR IS TO BE A RUGGED, FORGIVING DESIGN, AS EVIDENCED BY:
ADEQUATE TIME FOR OPERATOR DIAGNOSIS AND
RESPONSE
PLANT ABILITY TO RIDE THROUGH ANTICIPATED I TRANSIENTS WITHOUT CHALLENGING SAFETY SYSTEMS O -
SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN TO CORE DAMAGE LIMITS, LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION, ETC.
O
4
_USE OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY ALWR REQUIREMENTS ARE BASED ON PROVEN, SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR PLANTS (OR COMPARABLE TECHNOLOGIES)
BY DEFINITION, AN ALWR PLANT PROTOTYPE IS NOT '
REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE DESIGN ACCEPTABILITY ~
O O
b O HUMAN FACTORS
- THE ALWR IS TO BE DESIGNED WITH VERY HIGH ATTENTION TO THE MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE
- THE DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES OF SIMPLIFICATION AND E MARGIN ARE TWO KEYS TO SUCCESS IN THIS AREA 1
- ALWR WILL EMPLOY STATE-OF-THE-ART l&C SYSTEMS (WITHIN CONSTRAINTS OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGY O REQUIREMENT)
- ALWR WILL CONSIDER EXPERIENCE FROM OTHER TECHNOLOGIES (e.g., AIRLINES)IN ESTABLISHING REQUIREMENTS l
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'I i THE EPRI rmm g$h,:m,qg I
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PRESENTATION TO ACRS l WASHINGTON, D.C. j l
- DECEMBER 4,1987 l
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KARL E. STAHLKOPF i
O
AGENDA O EPRI PRESENTATION TO THE ACRS DECEMBER 4,1987 9:15 A.M. TO 12:00
- 1. INTRODUCTION OF ALWR TEAM K. STAHLKOPF 9:15 AND DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA
- 2. OPENING STATEMENT E. KINTNER 9i30 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM UTILITY INVOLVEMENT & SUPPORT BASIC PHILOSOPHY
- 3. THE ALWR PROGRAM K. STAHLKOPF 9:50 PROGR AM STRUCTURE, SCHEDULE AND RESOURCES HISTORICAL BACKGROUND NRC INTERFACE AND REGULATORY STABILIZATION ACCOMMODATION OF FUTURE Q REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS, COMPLETENESS OF DESIGN FOR CERTIFICATION ROLE OF PASSIVE PLANT AND EVOLUTIONARY PLANTIN ALWR PROGRAM FOREIGN PARTICIPATION
- 4. THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT J. DeVINE, JR. 10:10 STATUS, SCOPE & SCHEDULE CHAPTER 1 (OVERALL REQ'TS)
CHAPTER 2 (POWER GENERATION SYSTEMS)
CHAPTERS 3 & 4 (REACTOR & RCS)
CHAPTER 5 (SAFETY SYSTEMS)
BALANCE OF CHAPTERS CONFIGURATION CONTROL FUTURE WORK
- 5. PASSIVE PLANT DEVELOPMENT W. SUGNET 10:40
- OVERVIEW SBWR IN CONCEPT SPWR IN CONCEPT
LETTER TO CHAIRMAN ZECH
i O
THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM PROGRAM APPROACH
- ENSURE UTILITY FOCUS, LEADERSHIP l
- EXAMINE EXPERIENCE, BUILD ON SUCCESS INVOLVE NSSS VENDORS AND A-Es, APPLY THEIR TALENTS; INCORPORATE THEIR BEST PRODUCTS ,
ANDIDEAS
\
WORK WITH NRC IN A CONSTRUCTIVE, Q -
NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EFFECT SYNERGISM WITH OTHER U.S. AND FOREIGN ,
NUCLEAR POV'dR INITIATIVES ESTABLISH A SENSIBLE STARTING POINT FOR STANDARDIZATION O
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THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM PROGRAM STRUCTURE !
THE PROGRAM CONSISTS OF THREE SEPARATE BUT RELATED MAJOR ELEMENTS:
i
- REGULATORY STABILIZATION COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH NRC TO IDENTIFY J AND RESOLVE OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF NUCLEAR PLANT SAFETY UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT Q -
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ALWR PASSIVE PLANT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN THE INVESTIGATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS !
l O !
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O THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM REGULATORY STABILIZATION WORK UNDER WAY SINCE 1982 SPECIFIC FOCUS ON:
GENERIC AND UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES-OPTIMIZATION ISSUES (i.e., POINTS OF EXCEPTION TO EXISTING REGULATORY POSITIONS)
NR HAS MA E R ANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT TO
.O WORK WITH EPRI AND THE UTILITIES TO REVIEW THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
. GOOD SUCCESS SO FAR, BUT REAL CHALLENGES ARE ;
STILL AHEAD l
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__.-_.m_-___m ____.__.__..----__. __--_____----
O 800 -
PROGRESS ON REMAINING ISSUES
- 1 700 - .
(727) .
~
. (700) (703)
- TOT Al ISSUES .
(670) 600 - (638) (649)
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M AINING ISSUES
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1983 1984 1985 1986 YEAR -
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O I THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM i
REGULATORY STABILIZATION WORK (cont'd) ,
~
- NUREG-1197 1 SUMMARIZES THE NRC/EPRI COORDINATED EFFORT j TO DEVELOP DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR A STANDADD! ZED ALW7 .
ESTABLISHES SCREENING CRITERIA FOR NEW ISSUES BASED ON THEIR POTENTIAL TO: i O --
INCREASE CORE MELT FREQUENCY INCREASE OFFSITE ACCIDENT RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES EXCEED NRC SAFETY GOALS ESTABLISHES A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION OF OPTIMIZATION ISSUES WHICH HAVE PROMISE FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN REGULATORY l REQUIREMENTS l
O )
l
O THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT IS AN EXTENSIVE COMPILATION OF THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND PeHFORMA!;OE GEQU;RZr.12MTC OF THE ADVANCEO LWii AS ESTABLISHED BY THE U.S. UTILITY INDUSTRY.
l THE DOCUMENTWILL ACHIEVE UTILITY /NRC AGREEMENT ON ADVANCED LWR LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, AND WHEN COMPLETE WILL BE ENDORSED VIA AN NRC-ISSUED SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT.
i THE DOCUMENT IS THE STARTING POINT FOR SUBSEQUENT DETAILED ENGINEERING FOR AN ADVANCED LWR AND WILL BE A BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS.
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THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM 1 l
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT SCOPE PWR AND BWR COVERS ENTIRE PLANT 1
1100 MWE REFERENCE PLANT FOR ACTIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS,600 MWE REFERENCE PLANT FOR PASSIVE <
SAFETY SYSTEMS O -
HIERARCHY OF REQUIREMENTS OVERALL PLANT PERFORMANCE 1 SYSTEM / COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS I CONCEPTUAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND l FEATURES LEVEL OF DETAll ADEQUATE TO ILLUSTRATE REQUIREMENTS IMPLEMENTATION ,
PRIMARY FOCUS ON DESIGNER l
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. . )
O THE ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR PROGRAM PASSIVE PLANT CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OBJECTIVE IS TO EXPLORE OPPORTUNITIES Ar.'ORDED.
BY SMALLER PLANT SIZE TO UTILIZE PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS, IN ORDER TO ENHANCE OVERALL PLANT SAFETY, EFFECT MAJOR DESIGN SIMPLIFICATION, IMPROVE CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE, ETC.
PHASE I STUDIES COMPLETE 2 TEAMS (GE/BECHTEL AND WESTINGHOUSE /
BURNS & ROE SELECTED FOR FURTHER WORK)-
O -
PHASE 11 WORK COMMENCED IN FALL 1987 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN STUDIES 1 COMPARISON WITH REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT ' I DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR PASSIVE PLANT DESIGNS l
UTILITY REVIEW OF DESIGN CONCEPTS l .
RESULTS WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO REQUIREMENTS J DOCUMENT l
MAJOR INTERACTION WITH/AND SUPPORT FROM DOE ALWR PROGRAM O
1 O ALWR Program Schedule 87 88 89 90 l l l l l
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Regulatory ' '
Stabilization Resolution of USl, GSI, Optimization issues ; ;
/. 3,4 s 6,10 Balance
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PRA Methods & Approach ;
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- Requirements Evaluation / Verification {
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External EPRI Support of industry Initiatives interfaces f.f ,
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j . TPC Req'ts Use O
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THE ALWR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
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I A PRESENTATION TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS ;
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I J. C. DeVINE, JR.
SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER, ALWR PROGRAM 4 DECEMBER 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C. ,
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_.-______-_____________-__-___a
ALWR UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT THE REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT IS AN EXTENSIVE COMPILATION OF THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADVANCED LWR AS ESTABLISHED BY THE U.S. UTILITY INDUSTRY.
THE DOCUMENT REFLECTS UTILITY /NRC AGREEMENT ON ADVANCED LWR LICENSING REQUIREMENTS, AND WHEN COMPLETE WILL BE ENDORSED VIA AN NRC-ISSUED SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT.
O THE DOCUMENT IS THE STARTING POINT FOR SUBSEQUENT DETAILED ENGINEERING FOR AN ADVANCED LWR AND WILL BE A BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD PLANT DESIGNS.
i O
ALWR UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT $
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
ALWR CONCEPT, TOP-TIER REQUIREMENTS CHAPTER 1 OVERALL REQUIREMENTS
- INCLUDING DESIGN BASES, MATERIALS, CONSTRUCTIBILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, OPERABILITY, AVAILABILITY, ETC.
CHAPTER 2 POWER GENERATION SYSTEMS CHAPTER 3 PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM AND NON-SAFETY AUXILIARY SYSTEMS g CHAPTER 4 REACTOR SYSTEMS INCLUDING FUEL CHAPTER 5 ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS CHAPTER 6 PWR ARRANGEMENTS AND STRUCTURES CHAPTER 7 FUELING AND REFUELING CHAPTER 8 PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS CHAPTER 9 SITE SUPPORT SYSTEMS CHAPTER 10 MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE CHAPTER 11 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS CHAPTER 12 RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEMS CHAPTER 13 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEMS g JCD/ACRS-1 I __ - - - -
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ALWR UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT STATUS FOLLOWING CHAPTERS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, APPROVED BY USC AND SUBMITTED TO NRC:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
CHAPTER 1 - OVERALL REQUIREMENTS CHAPTER 2 - POWER GENERATION CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR AND FUEL CHAPTER 5 - ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS BEING FINALIZED SCHEDULED FOR SUBMITTAL TO NRC g
IN NOVEMBER CHAPTER 6- ARRANGEMENT AND STRUCTURES BASELINE DOCUMENT COMPLETED, ACCEPTED BY USC LAYOUT STUDIES IN PROCESS CHAPTER TEXT IN ROUGH DRAFT FORM TO BE COMPLETED IN SECOND QUARTER '88 CHAPTER 10 - PLANT CONTROLS BASELINE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DRAFTED INITIAL VERSION OF TEXT IS BEING DRAFTED gl CHAPTER TO BE COMPLETED IN THIRD QUARTER '88 1 J
ALWR UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT O REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT STATU_S (CONTINUED)
BALANCE OF CHAPTERS (7,8,9,11,12, & 13) NOT YET STARTED; ALL TO BE PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN -
1988 POST-SUBMITTAL WORK INCLUDES:
INTERACTION WITH NRC (REVIEW, COMMENT RESOLUTION)
MAJOR EVALUATION TO VERIFY THAT DETAILED REQUIREMENTS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTTOP-TIER CRITERIA MAJOR INTEGRATION AND FINALIZATION REPORT O
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ALWR UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT g.
ALWR UTILITY STEERING COMMITTEE-l STATUS OF INTERACTIONS WITH NRC STAFF:
CHAPTER 1 - DRAFT SER HAS BEEN PREPARED BY NRC ,
AND ISSUED IN SEPTEMBER '87. IT REFLECTS AGREEMENT IN LARGE MEASURE BETWEEN NRC STAFF AND EPRI PROGRAM. SOME OPEN ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED IN ROLLUP DOCUMENT CHAPTER 2 - NRC SUBMITTED COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS, AND ALWR PROGRAM HAS RESPONDED.
THERE ARE VERY FEW TRUE SAFETY ISSUES IN THIS CHAPTER CHAPTERS 3 & 4 - NRC SUBMITTED COMMENTS AND ,
QUESTIONS IN MID-NOVEMBER; ALWR PROGRAM l RESPONSES ARE BEING PREPARED (TARGET DATE FOR RESPONSE TO NRC IS 31 DECEMBER '87)
CHAPTER 5 - CHAPTER WILL BE SUBMITTED TO NRC IN DECEMBER '87; A MEETING TO DISCUSS THESE CHAPTERS l WITH NRC STAFF HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 12, '88 I i
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
- ALWR TOP-TiliB REQUIREMENTS
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- SAFETY TARGETS, a' *
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i CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY < 10-5 EVENTS /RY '
SEVERE ACCIDENT EVENTS WITH PROBABILITY <. !
OF OCCURRENCE a 10-6/RY WOULD CAUSE DOSE LESS THAN 25R WITHIN ONE-HALF MILE / i
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't e AVAILABILITY .i O
87% AVAILABILITY, AVERAGE OVER PLANT + !
LIFETIME /'.
~ 2-YEAR REFUELING INTERVAL CAPABILITY INADVERTENT TRIPS FEWER THAN ONE PER YEAR '
31
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LIFETIME g
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60-YEAR DESIGN LIFETIME, WITHOUT REQUIRING EXTENDED OUTAGE f; ,.
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- ALWR TOP-TIER REQUIREMENTS (CONTINUED)
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> COST TARGETS ( LEVEL.lZED FOR 30 YEARS DEFLATED
[ TO 1985 DOLLARS) ,
CAPITAL -,. 7 4.5c/KWH c, ,
frJEL r 1.2c/KWH
- O&M 0.8c/KWH r
LIFE CYC13' 'i <
6.5c K W H f /.
, CONSTRUCTIBILITY
<l - FIRST ALWR PLAff r CONSTRUCTION IN 54 MONTHS
', ' (STR.UCTURAL CONCRETE TO INITIAL OPERATION)
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RADWASTE ,/
LESS THAN 2500 Fi3 / YB (SHIPPABLE FORM)
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( CHAPTER 1 OVERALL REQUIREIV!ENTS' o
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KEY TECHNICAL FEATURE:
DIVERSE " UMBRELLA" CHAPTER WITH 10 SECTIONS !
OVERALL COVERAGE OF TOPICS APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE ALWR, INCLUDING j DESIGN / DESIGN METHODS j PERFORMANCE CRITER A- 4 CONSTRUCTION O -
QUALITY ASSURANCE LICENSING ,
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AGGRESSIVE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED REGARDING ,
DESIGN COMPLETENESS PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION ALWR LICENSiblG REQUIREMENTS TABULATED 3
CHAPTER 2 - POWER GENERATION SYSTEM O KEY REQUIREMENTS:
S!MPLIFIED FEEDWATER HEATER SUBSYSTEM ADJUSTABLE SPEED MOTOR-DRIVEN MAIN FEED PUMPS SIMPLIFIED CONDENSATE POLISHING SYSTEM SINGLE STAGE MOISTURE SEPARATOR / REHEATER DEAERATOR FEED TANK (PWR) g
. VALVE AND ACTUATOR STANDARDIZATION, IMPROVEMENT
- PIPING AND COMPONENT DESIGN,. MATERIALS REQUIREMENT SELECTED FOR MAXIMUM RELIABILITY HIGH INTEGRITY MAIN CONDENSER l
EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INDEPENDENT OF MAIN FEEDWATER REDUCED PLANT TRIP FUNCTIONS (EXAMPLES: LOSS OF ONE CONDENSATE, FEED OR FEED i BOOST PUMP, LOAD REJECTION AT LOW POWER) g
l I
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V CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM I 1
l KEY REQUIREMENTS:
PWR: -
REDUCED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE LIMIT i
IMPROVED TRANSIENT PERFORMANCE LARGER PRESSURIZER (NO PORV FUNCTION)
STEAM GENERATOR SIDE INVENTORY
- IMPROVED RCP SEAL PERFORMANCE PRESSURE RELIEF FOR PRESSURIZER UNDER O LOW TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS
- NON-SAFETY GRADE CVCS BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION LIMITED TO 2.5 WT%
BWR: -
USE OF INTERNAL RECIRCULATION PUMPS ELIMINATION OF RECIRC PIPING IMPROVED PLANT PERFORMANCE, CONTROL REDUCED LOCA VULNERABILITY IMPROVED MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES O HIGHER CAPACITY REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM i
CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR SYSTEMS ,
1 KEY ALWR REQUIREMENTS:
)
BWR .
ROBUST FUEL DESIGN WITH 15% THERMAL AND MARGIN; ENHANCED ABILITY TO MANEUVER, PWR ACCEPT OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS AND AVOID LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATION
. CORE DESIGNED TO INHERENTLY OPPOSE REACTIVITY EXCURSIONS
. LONGER LIFE CONTROL RODS FUEL DESIGNED FOR HIGH BURNUP AND LONG FUEL CYCLES O
REACTOR VESSEL CAPABLE OF 60-YEAR LIFE WITHOUT OPERATING PENALTIES UPGRADED VESSEL FABRICATION METHODS (MINIMlZE OR ELIMINATE WELDS IN CORE BELTLINE)
BWR -
LARGER REACTOR VESSEL, PERMITTINb.
INCREASED WATER INVENTORY, LOWER RPV WALL FLUENCE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED CONTROL ROD DRIVES (FINE MOTOR DRIVE SYSTEM, WITH BACK-UP ELECTRIC MOTOR DRIVE, SIMPLER O HYDRAULICS)
CHAPTER 5 - ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS KEY REQUIREMENTS:
DIRECT VESSEL INJECTION FOR BWR LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION AND PWR SAFETY INJECTION-SYSTEMS
- NO FUEL DAMAGE FOR LOCA UP TO 6-INCH DIAMETER (BEST ESTIMATE, ALL EQUIPMENT WORKING)
INCREASED DESIGN PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE OF DHR 4 PIPING (BWR: 500 psig/3600F; PWR 900 psig/4000F) TO PROVIDE FURTHER ASSURANCE AGAINST AN INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA
- CONTAINMENT CAPAEILITY TO MAINTAIN HYDROGEN
'O CONCENTRATION BELOW 13% (OR RENDER ATMOSPHERE NON COMBUSTIBLE) FOR ZlRCALOY OXIDATION ,
EQUIVALENT TO REACTION OF 75% OF THE ACTIVE FUEL CLADDING CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH STATION BLACKOUT (INCLUDING PWR PUMP SEALS) FOR AT LEAST 8 HOURS ON A BEST ESTIMATE BASIS (ALONG WITH NUMEROUS l ENHANCEMENTS TO THE RELIABILITY OF ac POWER) 4 THREE DIVISIONS TO PROVIDE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL FOR BWRs IMPROVED EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (TWO DIVISIONS EACH WITH MOTOR AND TURBINE PUMP) AND BACKUP SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION AND VENT SYSTEM ,
FOR BLEED AND FEED COOLING FOR PWRs O
i
ALWR Program Schedule 9 87 88 89 90 l
Resolution of USl, GSI, Optimization issues f f Stabil zation
/. 3,4 s; e,10 Balance l l
/ U W W W ;
Chapter Prep / Submittal ' '
Requirements - -
Document /y y { y M. l l (Base NRC Review, Draft SER lssuance Program) f f
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(Base Program){' NRC Interaction f f l 1
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Requirements Evaluation / Verification ;
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- NRC Review, Comment, SER Prep.
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External EPRI Support of Industry Initiatives interfaces f.,
Vendor / DOE Certification Programs
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Vendor / DOE 600 MWe Programs ;
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l TPC Req'tc Use (Rov.12/1/87)
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PROPOSED MARK I ?ERFORMANCE PROGRAM
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O DECEMBER 4, 1987 ACRS MEETING O
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O PURPOSE: TO CLOSE OUT THE RELATIVELY HIGH MARK I CONDITIONAL CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITY .
ISSUE AS REPORTED IN DPAFT r:UREG-1150. THAT IS, ARE ADDITIONAL MITIGATION CAPABILITIES WARRANTED AT MARK I PLANTS?
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O MARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 2 12/04/87
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TWO STEP PLAN
- 1) IDENTIFY & NARROW IMPORTANT PHENOMEN0 LOGICAL &
IMPROVEMENT ISSUES
- 2) EVALUATE ISSUES & MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMMISSION, IF WARRANTED 9
O MARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 3 12/04/87
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O SOME KEY ISSUES l
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- 1. WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY CONTAINMENT FAILURE EVALUATIONS, INCLUDING BY LINER MELT THROUGH7
- 2. WHAT IS iHE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF LATE CONTAINMENT FAILURE EVALUATIONS?
ll) 3. HOW MUCH IMPROVEMENT IN EARLY AND LATE FAILURE LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS CHANGES IN H CONTROL, VENTING PROCEDURES, CONTAINMENT SPRAYS, DEBRIS 2
CONTROL, ADS, AND USE OF REACTOR BUILDING FIRE SPRAYS.
O MARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 4 12/04/87
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_ SOME KEY ISSUES (CONTINUED)
l 5. IF SOME IMPROVEMENTS ARE NOT COST EFFECTIVE IN THE TRADITIONAL .
SCNSE, SHOULD THEY NEVER-THE-LESS BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL 0F SAFETY?
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F. ARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 5 12/04/87
,r~- 1 O) i IMPROVEMENTS (ADVANTAGES & NEGATIVE SAFETY IMPACTS)
H CONTROL 2
SPRAYS / WATER SUPPLY DEBRIS CONTROL (IN-CONTAINMENT & EX-CONTAINMENT)
ADS ENHP4 CEMENT VENTING i
USE OF FIRE PROTECTION DEVICES l
PROCEDURE & TRAINING n
MARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 6 12/04/87
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KEY MILESTONES
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l JAN. 15 - ISSUE MEETING INVITATION TO KEY RESEARCHERS, INDUSTRY & MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WITH A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF ISSUES MAR. 1 - TREATMENT OF PEACH BOTTOM CONTAINMENT ISSUES FOR FINAL NUREG-1150 AVAILABLE AND RESULTS ,
0F ADDITIONAL PARAMETRIC STUDIES e l APR. 30 - PREPARE AN INTERIM REPORT WITH l
RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMMISSION l
AUG. 30 - FINAL REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMMISSION '
O MARK I PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 7 12/04/87