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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20211H5111999-08-31031 August 1999
Non-proprietary Rev 1 to MPR-1820(NP), TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis
ML20210R4791999-08-13013 August 1999
Update 3 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage SAR, for TMI-2
ML20210K7651999-07-0909 July 1999
Rev 2 to 86-5002073-02, Summary Rept for Bwog 20% Tp Loca
ML20209G0071999-03-31031 March 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Three Mile Island,Unit 1 Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion)
ML20236W9961998-06-0909 June 1998
1998 Quadrennial Simulator Certification Rept
ML20210P4461997-08-31031 August 1997
Update 2 to TMI-2 Post-Defueling Monitored Storage Sar
ML20210T3411997-08-31031 August 1997
Rev 0 to TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis
ML20199E5841997-08-18018 August 1997
Limited Liability Company Agreement of Amergen Energy Co, LLC Among PECO Energy Co,British Energy PLC & British Energy,Inc
ML20133D8771996-12-23023 December 1996
Rev 2 to TMI-1 Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers
ML20137F1301996-08-27027 August 1996
Rev 0 to Auxiliary Bldg Sump Sludge Prevention (Regulatory Required)
ML20117H6621996-07-20020 July 1996
Rev 1 to TR 094 TMI-1 Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers
ML20129G9291996-06-17017 June 1996
TMI-1 Reload Design & Setpoint Methodology
ML20148F0831996-04-0202 April 1996
Rev 0 to EDG 1B Air Start 2 Reservoir Tank
ML20148F0611996-04-0202 April 1996
Rev 0 to SQ-TI-EG-T-0001B-1, EDG 1B Air Start 1 Reservior
ML20098B1291995-09-19019 September 1995
Rev 1 to Pages 3 & 30 of TMI-1 USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Rept
ML20100L6581995-05-25025 May 1995
Div 1/2 Mod Design Description for New TMI-1 Radwaste Demineralizer Sys Three Mile Island Unit 1,Nuclear Generating Station, Rev 2
ML20087J5281995-05-11011 May 1995
Nonproprietary Page 2 of TMI Unit 1 USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Rept
ML20082G4191995-03-22022 March 1995
Rev 0 to Topical Rept 093, TMI-1 Reactor Bldg Twenty Yr Tendon Surveillance (Insp Period 6)
ML20082Q8051995-03-10010 March 1995
TMI-1 Core Thermal-Hydraulic Methodology Using VIPRE-01 Computer Code
ML20082G4441995-02-22022 February 1995
Vols I & II 20th Yr Physical Surveillance of TMI-1 Containment Bldg
ML20100L6321994-08-0303 August 1994
Shipment of Miscellaneous Waste Evaporator Concentrates
ML20059M2181993-11-30030 November 1993
Amend 19 to Pdms Sar
ML20148F0931993-10-28028 October 1993
Rev 0 to Air Accumulator for FW-V-16A
ML20148F1011993-10-28028 October 1993
Rev 0 to Air Accumulator for FW-V-16B
ML20059F0471993-08-31031 August 1993
Amend 18 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (Pdms) Sar. W/Rev 2 to List of Pdms Requirements & Commitments
ML20056E5921993-07-31031 July 1993
Conservative Design In-Structure Response Spectra for Resolution of USI A-46 for Tmi,Unit 1
ML20059D7351993-02-0707 February 1993
Review of Offsite Response to Site Area Emergency Incident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station
ML20126D2831992-12-18018 December 1992
Criticality SAR for TMI-2 Reactor Vessel
ML20114B9631992-08-0808 August 1992
Rev 3 to Criticality Safety Evaluation of TMI Fuel Storage Facilities W/Fuel of 5% Enrichment
ML20058F6561992-07-31031 July 1992
Companion Sample Exams
ML20058F6481992-01-31031 January 1992
Metallographic & Hardness Exams of TMI-2 Lower Pressure Vessel Head Samples
ML20066K3591991-01-31031 January 1991
Rev 0 to Rept on 1990 Eddy Current Exams of TMI-1 OTSG Tubing
ML20216K1251990-10-31031 October 1990
Amend 9 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage Sar
ML20217A4251990-09-11011 September 1990
Rev 3 to Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Pool Mod of Pool a: TMI Unit I
ML20058M7251990-08-0101 August 1990
Rev 2 to Div Technical Evaluation Rept for Processed Water Disposal Sys
ML20056A0091990-07-26026 July 1990
TMI-1 Trust Agreements
ML20043A2341990-05-0202 May 1990
Rev 0 to TMI-1 Reactor Bldg 15-Yr Tendon Surveillance (Insp Period 5).
ML20055C9461990-03-31031 March 1990
Final Rept, TMI - Unit 2 Safety Advisory Board, for Mar 1981 - Dec 1989
ML20247R6371989-09-12012 September 1989
Submerged Demineralizer Sys
ML20246H9401989-08-25025 August 1989
Corrected Pages 5-10 Through 5-18 & 5-26 to Rev 1 to Defueling Completion Rept,Second Submittal
ML20246E1021989-08-18018 August 1989
Portion of Rev 1 to, Defueling Completion Rept
ML20246G1161989-08-15015 August 1989
Rev 0 to SER for Removal of Metallurgical Samples from TMI-2 Reactor Vessel, Safety Analysis
ML20247J2251989-07-31031 July 1989
Rev 7 to Div Sys Description for Auxiliary Bldg Emergency Liquid Cleanup Sys (Epicor II)
ML20246E3481989-07-0505 July 1989
Rev 0 to TMI-2 Defueling Completion Rept
ML20245K0151989-06-30030 June 1989
Amend 4 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage Sar
ML20246P8081989-05-31031 May 1989
Rev 12 to Defueling Water Cleanup Sys
ML20244E3241989-04-30030 April 1989
Rev 7 to Technical Evaluation Rept 15737-2-G03-107, Waste Handling & Packaging Facility
ML20235G5761989-02-0101 February 1989
Rev 0 to Criticality Safety Evaluation for Increasing TMI-2 Safe Fuel Mass Limit
ML20155G5581988-10-10010 October 1988
Rev 0 to Technical Evaluation Rept for Processed Water Disposal Sys
ML20154F6941988-09-0909 September 1988
Rev 0 to SER for Completion of Upper Core Support Assembly Defueling
1999-08-31
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K4701999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for TMI-1.With
ML20211H5111999-08-31031 August 1999
Non-proprietary Rev 1 to MPR-1820(NP), TMI Nuclear Generating Station OTSG Kinetic Expansion Insp Criteria Analysis
ML20211Q3551999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With
ML20210R4791999-08-13013 August 1999
Update 3 to Post-Defueling Monitored Storage SAR, for TMI-2
ML20210U4791999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for TMI-1.With
ML20209G0011999-07-0909 July 1999
Staff Evaluation of Individual Plant Exam of External Events Submittal on Plant,Unit 1
ML20210K7651999-07-0909 July 1999
Rev 2 to 86-5002073-02, Summary Rept for Bwog 20% Tp Loca
ML20209H8251999-07-0101 July 1999
Provides Commission with Evaluation of & Recommendations for Improvement in Processes Used in Staff Review & Approval of Applications for Transfer of Operating Licenses of TMI-1 & Pilgrim Station
ML20209H1421999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for TMI-1.With
ML20195H0751999-06-0808 June 1999
Drill 9904, 1999 Biennial Exercise for Three Mile Island
ML20195H9261999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for TMI-1.With
ML20209G0351999-05-31031 May 1999
TER on Review of TMI-1 IPEEE Submittal on High Winds,Floods & Other External Events (Hfo)
ML20207B6621999-05-27027 May 1999
SER Finding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Periodically Verify design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at TMI-1 & That Util Adequately Addressed Actions Required in GL 96-05
ML20206R0571999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With
ML20206D4201999-04-20020 April 1999
Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption from Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2.c for Fire Areas/Zones AB-FZ-4,CB-FA-1,FH-FZ-1,FH-FZ-6,FH-FZ-6, IPSH-FZ-1,IPSH-FZ-2,AB-FZ-3,AB-FZ-5,AB-FZ-7 & FH-FZ-2
ML20209G0071999-03-31031 March 1999
Submittal-Only Screening Review of Three Mile Island,Unit 1 Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion)
ML20205K6851999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Tmi,Unit 1.With
ML20210C0161999-03-0101 March 1999
Forwards Corrected Pp 3 of SECY-98-252.Correction Makes Changes to Footnote 3 as Directed by SRM on SECY-98-246
ML20207M8461999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for TMI-1.With
ML20196K3561999-01-22022 January 1999
Safety Evaluation Concluding That Although Original Licensee Thermal Model Was Unacceptable for Ampacity Derating Assessments Revised Model Identified in 970624 Submittal Acceptable for Installed Electrical Raceway Ampacity Limits
ML20207A9291998-12-31031 December 1998
1998 Annual Rept for TMI-1 & TMI-2
ML20196G4661998-12-31031 December 1998
British Energy Annual Rept & Accounts 1997/98. Prospectus of British Energy Share Offer Encl
ML20196F6861998-12-0202 December 1998
Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Second 10-yr Interval ISI Program Plan Request for Alternative to ASME B&PV Code Section XI Requirements Re Actions to Be Taken Upon Detecting Leakage at Bolted Connection
ML20198B8641998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for TMI-1.With
ML20195C6921998-11-12012 November 1998
Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-73
ML20195J8591998-11-12012 November 1998
Rev 11 to 1000-PLN-7200.01, Gpu Nuclear Operational QA Plan
ML20196B7191998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for TMI-1.With
ML20203G1211998-10-30030 October 1998
Informs Commission About Staff Preliminary Views Concerning Whether Proposed Purchase of TMI-1,by Amergen,Inc,Would Cause Commission to Know or Have Reason to Believe That License for TMI-1 Would Be Controlled by Foreign Govt
ML20155E7511998-10-15015 October 1998
Rev 1 to Form NIS-1 Owners Data Rept for Isi,Rept on 1997 Outage 12R EC Exams of TMI-1 OTSG Tubing
ML20154L5541998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for TMI Unit 1.With
ML20153A9941998-09-16016 September 1998
Safety Evaluation Denying Request to Remove Missile Shields from Plant Design
ML20151U8821998-09-0808 September 1998
SER on Revised Emergency Action Levels for Gpu Nuclear,Inc, Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2
ML20151V2811998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Tmi,Unit 1.With
ML20237A8331998-08-12012 August 1998
Safety Evaluation Accepting USI A-46 Program Implementation at Plant,Unit 1
ML20237C6411998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Tmi,Unit 1
ML20236R2201998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for TMI-1
ML20236W9961998-06-0909 June 1998
1998 Quadrennial Simulator Certification Rept
ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998
Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
ML20249A1061998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for TMI-1
ML20247G0761998-04-30030 April 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1
ML20212A2191998-04-22022 April 1998
Rev 3 to Gpu Nuclear Post-Defueling Monitored Storage QAP for Three Mile Island Unit 2
ML20248H6991998-04-0808 April 1998
Requests,By Negative Consent,Commission Approval of Intent to Inform Doe,Idaho Operations Ofc of Finding That Adequate Safety Basis Support Granting Exemption to 10CFR72 Seismic Design Requirement for ISFSI to Store TMI-2 Fuel Debris
ML20216K1061998-03-31031 March 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1
ML20217E0811998-03-24024 March 1998
Rev 0 to TR-121, TMI-1 Control Room Habitability for Max Hypothetical Accident
ML20212E2291998-03-0404 March 1998
Rev 11 to 1000-PLN-7200,01, Gpu Nuclear Operational QAP, Consisting of Revised Pages & Pages for Which Pagination Affected
ML20216F0981998-02-28028 February 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1
ML20202F8121998-01-31031 January 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for TMI Nuclear Station, Unit 1
ML20199G8371998-01-22022 January 1998
SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1
ML20198N2901998-01-12012 January 1998
Form NIS-1 Owners' Data Rept for Isi
ML20199J3251997-12-31031 December 1997
Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
- _ - . -_ __
Nu2Isar SAFETY ANALYSIS sA a 4240-3257-87-0169 Rev. # 0 Page I '
4 of TITLE USE OF NON-B0 RATED UATER IN THE i
CANISTEP. LOADING DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM 8712090174 871202 PDR ADOCK 05000320' P PDR origi t., AAi O. S all dd# o t, iaA /e7-CONCURRENCE t e z.,t ra m a te th [6.7 as ) ,,,,fd2/37
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SA 4240-3257-87-0169-
.USE OF NON-BORATED. WATER H IN THE CANISTER LOADING DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM 1.0 _ PURPOSE'AND SCOPE This evaluition addresses the modification to the Canister Loading Decontamination;(CLD). System to allow use of non-borated water for-
.can' ster decontamination prior to shjpment. The purpose of-this moc' .fication is, to provide' the' capability'to' stabilize the Fuel Transfer Ca al (FTC)/ Spent Fuel: Pool (SFP) baron concentration. Boron
-concentration in the fuel pool has been increasing due_to borated water additions and evaporation.
The Canister Handling and Preparation,for Shipment (CHAPS) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) requires that the CLD System utilize
' demineralized water that has been borated to a minimum baron concentration of 4350' ppm. In addition,-the Boron hazards Analysis (BHA) requires that non-borated or~1ess than 4350 ppm borated water sources be.
. excluded from use'in systems, such as the FTC/SFP, which could conynunicate with the Reactor. Coolant System (RCS).
'2.0' SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS The proposed modification utilizes tne Bora'.2d Water Batching Tank
- n. (SPC-T 5) as a non-borat,ed, hot uter source for canister ' . .
decontamination. SPC-T-5 was originally insta;.lec as part of the Standby Reactor: Coolant Pressure Control System and.is presently used as a mixing tank to provide borated water for various plant uses. When used for.
canister decontamination, the SPC-T-5 drain line will be connected to the suction side of a positive displacement pump. The discharge of this positive displacement pump will be routed via hose to the CLD System and connected to the system et CLO-V0ll. To accomplish this connection, quick disconnects will be added to the line upstream of CLD-V0ll. In addition, this modification will isolate the CLD System from the Defueling Water Cleanup System (DWCS) by cutting and capping lines to ensure that the CLD System does not communicate with the DWCS.
'The C.LD System is contained.within areas that have controlled ventilation and area isolation capability. This limits the environmental impact of the system during normal system operations, snutdown, or postulated accident conditions.
3.0 BORON DILUTION Since the.CLD System could communicate with the RCS via the DWCS,'the approach identified ir the BHA for preventien of deboration will be required for operation of the CLD System using non-borated water. Thus, physical isolation will be provideo between the CLD and DWC Systems when using non-borated water. This physical isolation consists of cutting and Lcapping all lines associated with the CLD System th9t tie-in to DWCS, thereby eliminating the possibility of non-borated water from the CLD System being inadvertently introduced into the RCS. Additionally, the potential for inadvertent hose connections will be minimized by existing
- administrative controls and physical'walkdown prior to system operation.
2.0 Rev. 0/0274P
- __ _ _ _ _ _=__ --- _ _ - _ - _- __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - __- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-_ ___
SA 4240-3257-87-0169 During canister decontamination using non-borated water, a localized deboration of the SFP will occur in the vicinity of the cask loading station. The only credible means of obtaining a critical mass of fuel in this location during canister decontamination would be the result of a canister drop while lifting a canister from the cask loading station into the Fuel Transfer Cask. The results of a canister drop during Fuel Transfer Cask loading is analyzed in the CHAPS SER, Section 6.1, " Heavy Load Handling." This analysis states that if the canister and grapple were to drop while lifting a csnister into the FTC, the canister would fall back into the loading station canister guides and no unacceptable consequences to the equipment would occur. Furthermore, the drop height when the canister is in the full up position in the FTC is less than the designed drop limits for the canister. Therefore, should a canister drop occur in this position, the canister will remain intact and fuel debris and poison material will remain in a stable configuration within the canister.
4.0 CRITICALITY CONTROL Subcriticality.is ensured by establishing the Technical Specification required boron concentration during the defueling process and ensuring that this is maintained by monitoring the boron concentration and !
inventory levels and by isolating potential deboration pathways. The boron concentration and inventory level of the FTC/SFP will be monitored in accordance with approved procedures to ensure that Technical Specification limits for boron concentration and inventory level are satisfied. Additionally, subcriticality is also meintained by the canister engineered safeguards and their storage arrays.
5.0 10 CFR 50/>9 EVALUATION It is concluded, based on the evaluations presented in this safety analysis, that the proposed modification to the Canister Loading Decontamination System may be implemented without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
10 CFR 50.59 permits the holder of an operating license to make changes to the facility or perform a test or experiment, provided the change, test, or experiment is determined not to be an unreviewed safety question and does not invclve a modification to the Plant Technical Specifications.
A proposed change involves an unreviewed safety question if:
- a. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased; or
- b. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in a safety analysis report may be created; or
- c. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications, is reduced.
3.0 Rev. 0/0274P !
w_-__-___
SA 4240-3257-87-0169 i The BHA identifies methods of isolating the RCS which provide a high degree of assurance that a dilution event will not occur. One of these methods is to provide physical isolation between the RCS and less than 4350 ppm borated water sources. To ensure compliance with the BHA, physical isolation will be provided between CLD and DWC Systems when non-borated water is utilized in the CLD System. Furthermore, the NRC Amendment of Order dated April 23, 1985, recognized that maintaining the required boron concentration in the RCS, FTC, and SFP minimizes the potential for boron dilution of any of these water volumes in the event that these water sources communicate due to a leak or valve misalignment. 4
- In addition, the consequences of a canister drop while raising the canister into the FTC during decontamination has been analyzed and determined to result in no unacceptable consequences. j Subcriticality is ensured by establishing the Technical Specification required baron concentration during the defueling process and ensuring that this concentration is maintained by monitoring the boron concentration and inventory levels'and by isolating potential deboration pathways. Additionally, subcriticality is also maintained by the canister engineered safeguards. ;
Based on the above analysis, GPU Nuclear concludes that the proposed
! -change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any addressed in a previous NRC-approved safety evaluation.
I Technical Specification safety margins at TMI-2 are concerned with criticality control and prevention of further core damage due to overheating. As demonstrated by this safety analysis, Technical Specification safety margins will be maintained throughout the decontamination process. Thus, the proposed change does not reduce the j margin of safety.as defined in the basis for any Tecnnical Specifications.
! Based on the above analysis, GPU Nuclear concludes that the proposed modified configuration of the Canister Loading Decontamination System does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined by l 10 CFR 50.59.
l ,
l i
4.0 Rev. 0/0274P l
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