ML20236W863
| ML20236W863 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1987 |
| From: | Pellet J, Whittemore J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236W850 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-OL-87-01, 50-482-OL-87-1, NUDOCS 8712080279 | |
| Download: ML20236W863 (8) | |
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- WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT No. 50-482/0L 87-01 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation P.O. Box 411 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42 OperatorLicenseExaminationsatWolfCreekGeneratingStation(WCGS)
Chief Examiner: t/ . / 87
. VfiitteAiore Date Approved By: ak (E!3[87 J. L. Pellet Date Summary Operator license examinations for seven (7) Reactor Operator (RO) candidates and seven (7) Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) candidates were administered at the WCGS facility during the weeks of October 26 and November 2, 1987. Four (4) of the seven (7) R0 candidates and all of the SR0 candidates passed these examinations and have been issued the appropriate licenses. The application for one (1) R0 candidate was withdrawn by the licensee.
i 8712080279 871203 PDT< ADOCK 050004G2 V PDR i
1 WCGS OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT !
Report Details i
- 1. EXAMINATION RESULTS License Examinations:
TYPE SR0 R0 TOTAL -l PA55 F 100% T- 66% TTT'B5% 'l '
FAIL 0- ~0% 2 - 33% 2 - 15%
One R0 candidate's' application was withdrawn by the licensee prior to completion of examination grading.
- 2. EXAMINERS J. E. Whittemore (Chief Examiner)
S. L. McCrory P. V. Doyle T. P. Guilfoil I. G. Kingsley K. L. Parkinson
- 3. EXAMINATION REPORT Performance results for individual candidates are not included in this report as it will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room,
- a. EXAMINATION REVIEW COMMENT RESOLUTION In general, editorial comments or changes made during the examination, the examination review, or subsequent grading reviews are not addressed by this resolution section. This section reflects resolution of substantive comments submitted to the NRC after review of the examination by the facility licensee. The modifications discussed below are included in the master examination key which is provided elsewhere in this report as are all other changes mentioned above but not discussed Derein. The facility licensee examination comments, less the supporting documentation, are included in the report immediately following the master examination key. Unless otherwise indicated in this section, the facility licensee coments ,
were incorporated into the answer key. 1 1.04.b Instead of describing how plant response would differ 5.04.b at E0L based on Tave and power defect, the effect could be shown to differ based on the 10 step insertion being significantly less at E0L as the flux shifts from the top to the bottom of the core. See attached AFD curves (BOL to E0L). There is very little " rod bite" at E0L. From the r.urves, it can be seen that 100 percent AFD went from +2.54 at BOL to
-4.53 at E0L during Cycle 2.
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- Resolution: This coment cannot be accepted as the question:did not solicit a reason for.the response, only the response itself, which'is not significantly different from the. conditions proposed above.
1.06.b Page.17 of LP0005-8 states other reasons for requiring overlap:;
1.. Increases reactivity near extremes of travel
- 2. -Makes reactivity more uniform-Resolution:. This coment>is not. accepted. as the question' requires the reasons as stated in Technical Specifications.
- 1. 07. c ' - The referenced training material has no hard' number for Xenon-free conditions; 0perators are taught that Xenon is mostly gone in-5-7 half lives (or 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />)
. but, like any decay process, some-Xenon is'always present. ;This'would make it difficult to state true or. false for." Xenon-free" after 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.
Resolution: - This coment is not acceptable as reactivity estimate and calculations always assume Xenon-free conditions after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
2.04.b The question said to ignore water sources. The key answers on b.2, c.1, and c.2 were all water sources.
Resolution: Not accepted. The question stated to ignore comon water sources.
2.05.a Recomend removal,'of Part a. The operators are 6.02.a trained to know air is needed to disengage so that on loss of air a fuel assembly would not drop. There is no objective and they were not trained as to whether the gripper could engage on a loss of air since that had no safety significance and fuel handling could not continue without air available.
Resolution: Not accepted. Demonstrated knowledge of refueling.
machine design capabilities is essential to public health and safety. Personnel handling previously irradiated reactor fuel must have complete knowledge H
of handling equipment features.
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'2.05.b Normally true; however, there is capability to 6.02.b ' manually (not from the console) position, so they-
.could have answered. false.
Resolution Not accepted. The statement as written is true.
2.05.c. True or false could be correct. One'of the.two core =
6.02.c index strips is monitored via' TV, so the answer would
-depend on which strip was:being considered.
- Resolut! ion: Not-accepted. The statement as written.is true.
3.01.6.3 'Auctioneered Tave did not decrease until. rods stepped in, so answer could be time dependent.
Resolution: The purpose of this comment is not clear.. Regardless a ' of any time restraints imposed by an examinee, the initial change is to decrease which is the only .
acceptable-answer.
3.08.b .By the question-stipulating "aside from care-protection,",RCP motor protection could be an
" acceptable answer. ,(All of the answers listed in the
.keyareforcoreprotection)
Resolution: -hotaccepted. Motor protection is not a design. goal of either trjp.:
3.11.c- Accept'also as a design function to replace the need of'long; runs of direct wired circuits.
Resolution: Not accepted. Attribute noted above is design criteria for the-system, not a design function. :k i
4.05.a In addition to 0FN 00-008 INSTRUMENT MALFUNCTIONS, .
0FN 00-012 R0D CONTROL MALFUNCTIONS also gives reasons for rod motion, which include secondary vs.
reactor power and inadvertent dilution. -These should also be included as acceptable answers.
Resolution: Reactor / secondary power mismatch is inherent in original key but will be specified as a stand alone correct answer. Inadvertent dilution is not acceptable as a valid reason for RAPID control rod motion as specified in the question.
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4.05.b Accept also the other control action required in the i reference listed, page 27, Step 1.2, which is.to select the nonfailed channels (to control charging flow).
Resolution: Not acceptable. The question specifically solicits knowledge of control- functions and not operator actions.
5.05 Add: 1. Minimize the effects of water hole peaking when the rod is withdrawn.
- 2. hiprove flux distribMion or better for flux shaping.
Resolution: Neither response can be accepted as they only represent small advantages gained.as a result of conceptual design requirements and implementation.
5.07.b The referenced lesson. plan says nothing about this topic, but we teach 5 to 7 doublings'to criticality.
Seven doubling is 25,600 counts, which would change the answer.
Resolution: Not U:cepted. Five doublings is 6400 counts. Thus criticality shocld be EXPECTED any time after exceeding this threshold count rate.
5.13.d This is only TRUE if the S/G with no RCP is not being steamed (S/G PORVs opened).
Resolution: NRC will normally accept answers outside key if assumptions are stated, and answer is supported by facility documentation.
8.02.a.2 Should also accept "boration flow paths" as an answer.
Resolution: Not accepted. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for the charging pumps, LCO 3.1.2.4 is different from the LCO for boration flow paths, LC0 3.1.2.2 and the boration flow paths do not have to be addressed for the scenario depicted.
f-l 5 8.04 Consider: Some surveillance are scheduled on a given i date each month and,"as-such, may be due prior to a 31-day expiration.
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If this is assumed, Part 2 may result in not exceeding intervals.
Resolution: This is only TRUE if the S/G with no RCP is not being steamed (S/G PORVs opened).
8.05 Should also accept Technical Specifications, since several reports are specified in Section 6.
Resolution: .Not acceptable.- The Technical Specifications can not be used to evaluate specific event deportability requirements.
8.06.a This question is based on the generic knowledge and-ability to have knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. It is inappropriate as the operator is never allowed to perform surveillance from memory and, as such, is.not job based or justified by the referenced K/A.
Resolution: The comment is not acceptable. The examinee is not asked to perform surveillance from memory but to state the generic tasks performed by operators to ascertain safety system operability.
8.07.d Should also accept planned maintenance group for scheduled work requested.
Resolution: Not accepted as the procedure does not support this contention.
8.08 This is an inappropriate question (not job based).
The operator logs component cycles and transient limits in the control room log and cyclic log. The group responsible to tabulate the events is irrelevant to the operator after he performs his required task.
Resolution: This conclusion is not acceptable as the Senior Licensed Operator must know where to obtain updated or modified transient / cyclic history information.
6 8.09.a Should include FPPs.
Resolution: Not accepted as a reference to support this contention could not be located,
- b. SITE VISIT
SUMMARY
(1) At the end of the written examination administration, the licensee was provided copies of the examinations and answer keys. Mr. Whittemore explained that region policy was to complete licensing or denial action within 30 calendar days of receipt of licensee comments.
(2) During the administration of the simulator portion of the operating examinations the following problems or indications of machine problems were noted:
(a) During a rapid down power maneuver, six of eight S/G steam flow indicators froze and failed to respond.
l (b) Due to simulator hardware problems the operator could not synchronize and parallel a diesel generator.
(c) The plant experienced a positive power rate reactor trip due to manual rod motion to compensate for a dropped rod.
(d) Could not insert Radiation Monitor Failure Malfunction RMS-1 SK04.
(e) Simulator " froze" near the end of the fourth mination set.
(f) Compressed air LP alarm cycled for no apparent reason.
(g) During 13 rapid power maneuvers, core delta I did not react as it would in the plant and was totally ignored by the operators as it changed very little and never approached limits.
(3) The following generic candidate strengths were noted:
(a) Team performance and communications on the simulator were better than normally observed.
(b) Instant SR0 candidates performed manipulations on the control boards better than normally observed.
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7 (c) Recognition of instrument failures and immediate action to mitigate problems associated with failure were excellent. However, scores on the written examinations reveal an overall weakness on instrumentation system capabilities,' interfaces with other systems, and effects of combined failures.
(4) The following generic candidate weaknesses or problems were noted:
(a) Use of annunciator response procedures was inconsistent.
Sometimes used as a last resort.
(b) Teams and individuals were inconsistent in the use of system operating procedures.
Ic) Turbine loading rate limitations were not considered or checked for increasing power maneuvers.
(d) Candidates could not locate Auxiliary Feedwater System emergency supply firehose connection.
(e) Candidates could not determine status of fuel as depicted
. on the control room refueling status board, nor could they find instructions for decoding information on the board.
(5) The Chief Examiner offered to conduct an exit briefing with the licensee. The licensee declined stating that there was no need if there were no action items to be discussed or preliminary operating examination results to be divulged. Mr. Whittemore informed the Manager, Nuclear Training that the cooperative attitude and demeanor of the simulator instructors was noteworthy and beneficial to operating examination process.
- c. EXAMINATION MASTER COPIES Paster examination and answer key copies are attached. The licensee comments which have been accepted are incorporated into the answer key.
- d. FACli.ITY EXAMINATION COMMENTS The facility comments regarding the written examination as received from the licensee are attached. Those comments which were not acceptable for incorporation into the examination answer keys have been addressed in the resolution section of this report.