ML20236T981
| ML20236T981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1987 |
| From: | Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-87-120 VPNPD-87-513, NUDOCS 8712020203 | |
| Download: ML20236T981 (7) | |
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1 wisconsin CillC POWER COMPANY 231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 (414)22).2345 VPNPD-87-513 NRC-87-120 November 25, 1987
')
l U.
S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Document Control Desk
)
Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/87018 (DRSS)
AND 50-301/87018 (DRSS) l POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 Your letter of October 14, 1987 forwarded Inspection Reports 50-266/87018 and 50-301/87018, which described results of a routine, announced inspection of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness exercise by members of your staff on September 14-17, 1987.
The letter requested that we advise you, within 45 days of the letter date, of corrective actions we have taken, or plan to take with regard to the weaknesses cited.
Although a written response regarding the exercise weaknesses is not normally required, we have prepared the attachment to this letter in response to the request.
Very truly yours,
(!h C. W. fa Vice President Nuclear Power Attachment Copy to NRC Regional Administrator, Region III, l
Attn: W.
D.
Shafer NRC Resident Inspector O
fh 8712O20203 871125 y
g PDR ADDCK 05000266 i
G PDR
. APPENDIX 1
1.
WEAKNESS:
"The. Medical Drill was inadequate.
The team.
responding'to the injured. man did'not take along'any.first aid equipment (first aid kit, trauma kit, stretcher).
Once the medical team arrived at.the scene of the: injury,-
no.first aid actions or concerns were demonstrated, and' the: team. members took no actions'for 30 to 35 minutes.
Excessive simulation of actionsi(simulated evacuation.of-victim,' simulated ambulance) further degraded the demonstration."
ITEM NUMBER:
266/87018-02 and 301/87018-02 1
i DISCUSSION:
.It should be noted that demonstration af a-medical emergency response was not selected as an n.ercise
. The medical emergency was incorporated into objective.
the scenario at the request of the public information.
representative on the scenario team specifically_to challenge the performance of exercise participants at the:
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).
Accordingly, the medical drill did in fact. involve considerable simulation.
This was consistent with the scenario design.
Since this.
exercise was a utility-only exercise,. response'by-appropriate offsite agencies was simulated..
The inspection report indicates that "the team responding.
to the injured man did not take.along any first aid equipment (first aid kit, trauma kit, stretcher)."
While the medical emergency response team did not carry first aid equipment, our exercise' records indicate that upon arrival at the scene the team did use its radio to request a trauma kit and stretcher from the.OSC.
The inspection report indicates that "no first aid actions.
or concerns were demonstrated, and the' team members took no actions for 30 to 35 minutes."
However, our records show that upon arrival, the team properly identified that because of the victim's immobility (a sprained ankle) offsite medical assistance was required and therefore requested an ambulance.
The. team also identified that because of the abrasion to the victim's head, minor first aid could be performed.~ The" team also properly recognized that the injured person was not in a hazardocs. environment
.and therefore retained the victim at the scene for later transport by offsite medical professionals.
An exercise controller and his vehicle were used to simulate the offsite ambulance crew.(EMTs) and the ambulance.
For the medical emergency. observed during this.
exercise, offsite EMTs would have been escorted to the.
scene of the. injury; they would have assessed the victim's
APPENDIX PAGE 2 medical condition and transported the victim (via stretcher or gurney) to the rescue vehicle.
In that regard, the exercise medical response team appropriately terminated their involvement with the victim upon arrival of the simulated EMT crew.
Although a medical emergency response had not been f
selected as an exercise objective, the failure to produce a first aid or trauma kit at the scene was a deficiency.
t
RESPONSE
In.the medical emergency response area, we have taken or will take the'following actions:
a.
Procedures, checklists, and lesson plans related to
]
medical response teams have been reviewed to assure i
that the teams are directed to carry first aid or trauma kits to the scene of the injury.
This action has been completed.
b.
Eleven Search and Rescue Drills have been conducted thus far in 1987.
Six more are planned for the remainder of 1987.
Prior to the conduct of each of the remaining drills, the details of this exercise weakness will be discussed with drill participants, i
c.
On October 9, 1987 a meeting was held with the Marager, PB"P; the Fire and Safety Coordinator; a Training Coordinator; the Emergency Plan Coordinator; and a member of the Nuclear Power Department Division Safety Committee.
The meeting was held specifically to discuss the perceived need to conduct additional first aid training and to consider offering CPR and/or "first responder" training to specified groups on site.
A decision regarding implementation of this 1
training will be made by January, 1988.
d.
First aid training (Red Cross multimedia or equivalent) will be conducted to increase the number of first aid qualified persons onsite.
Thirty-six onsite personnel became first aid qualified or were requalified thus far in 1987, and eleven training sessions are planned for the remainder of 1987.
The PBNP training group is evaluating incorporation e.
of medical emergency response, as described in the Emergency Plan, into first aid training.
Further action will be based upon the results of that evaluation.
APPENDIE
.PAGE 3 f.
Twelve search and rescue mini-drills (continuing training) will be conducted in 1988.
The medical response portion of several of these drills will be evaluated by a qualified first aid instructor (Red Cross or equivalent).
l Scenarios for Emergency Plan drills and exercises g.
conducted in 1988, for which demonstration of a medical emergency response he.s been selected as an objective, will be written and controlled such that 1
simulation is minimized and the victim's conditions are obvious to players.
At least two such drills or exercises will be conducted by the end of 1988.
2.
WEAKNESS:
"At times, information flow from the Technical Support Center (TSC) was inadequate.
The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff misunderstood aspects of plant status and the significance of the (scenario) fire for more than an hour after it began.
The EOF staff also
.i I
did not understand why the TSC escalated to a General Emergency condition.
This appeared to be caused by a lack of information from the TSC on the location of the fire i
and a related problem with the filter dampers.
Associated with this was the failure to recognize the significant I
increase in the release rates being measured by the auxiliary building vent monitor."
ITEM NUMBER:
266/87018-03 and 301/87018-03 DISCUSSION:
This weakness is summarized in section 5.f.
]
of the inspection report as a ".
lack of adequate j
information flow from the TSC to the EOF Specific j
examples cited in the report' included, " significance of 4
l the.
. fire," and " location of the fire and the problem with the filter dampers."
In order to address this issue, it is necessary to recount some of the scenario events and. player response:
0652 A limited plant evacuation of the Primary j
Auxiliary Building (PAB) was initiated, as a conservative measure, by the shift superintendent.
It should be noted that the action above, which was appropriate, had not been anticipated by t;1e scenario development team.
1007 A fire began in one of the cryogenic charcoal bed vessels.
i
APPENDIX
- PAGE'4 1009 A " Fire Protection and Smoke Detection" alarm was received'in the Control Room.
The limited plant evacuation of 0652 hours0.00755 days <br />0.181 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.48086e-4 months <br /> effectively prevented exercise players from obtaining specific information about the fire (7 cue cards in the scenario package) specifically, information about.the fire location, the systems impacted by the fire, and the fire magnitude.
1020 The Plant Operations Manager (POM) in the TSC declared a General Emergency.
This was based upon elevated radiation levels on'the auxiliary building vent stack and the fact'that the Control Room had advised the TSC that letdown had been secured.
Yet scenario data presented in the'TSC j
continued to show letdown flow.
Together, these facts led the POM to believe that the reactor i
coolant system had been breached, therefore warranting a General Emergency declaration based upon the breach of 3 fission product barriers.
1023 The TSC requested that the EOF and TSC both calculate offsite dose impacts based upon 2 E-1 uCi/cc measured at RE-214.
Personnel at EOF agreed.
1025 The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was f" Ally activated.
1026 Emergency Support Manager (ESM) at the Emergency Operations Facility-(EOF) was advised of the General Emergency and elevated radiation readings on RE-214 (auxiliary building vent).
1040 The EOF was advised by the TSC of a fire in the PAB, El. 8' north.
1041 The Site Manager advised the ESM of changing wind direction.
Both agreed upon sheltering'all sectors out to 5 miles.
i 1050 The fire and its location were verified.by actual observation.
The Fire Brigade Leader requested permission from POM tol fight fire.
Permission was granted.
1057 The Fire Brigade leader reported to the OSC that smoke was coming from the charcoal filter cubicle for the cryogenic system and that the fire appeared to be confined to the cubicle.
mm.___m_ _ _. _ _ _ __________ _ - _
l APPENDIX PAGE 5 1104 The EOF received a telecopy of the NRC Event Notification Worksheet which noted a fire in the PAB, El.
8',
north.
1120-Numerous telephone calls between the TSC and EOF 1150 discussed details of the fire, its location and 3
l status.
The inspection report stated that the EOF " staff misunderstood aspects of plant status and the significance
-l of the fire for more than an hour after it began."
When l
viewed in context of the events outlined above, the l
observation made by your inspector is understandable.
j Note that, even in the TSC, plait status and the i
significance of the fire were not fully understood until l
the fire location was actually observed; that occurred l
nearly one hour (50 minutes) after the fire began.
As noted above, the delay in the observation / confirmation of the fire was due to a precautionary limited plant evacuation which complicated the execution of the drill scenario.
Although the EOF was not formally operational until 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br /> (18 minutes after the fire was initiated), exercise documentation supports the fact that the EOF was kept apprised of known fire status during the first hour
)
following initiation of the fire.
More importantly, however, the EOF was apprised of changing radiological and l
meteorological conditions impacting calculation of offsite dose projections, regardless of the actual in-plant source i
of the radioactivity.
It should be noted that the inspection report did not suggest that the " weakness" was a continuous problem, but j
rather one which was observed "at times."
j l
In view of the scenario information which was available in the TSC, it is our opinion that information flow from the TSC to the EOF in regard to known conditions and events
)
concerning the fire location, equipment involved, and f
release rates at the auxiliary building vent stack was I
adequate and timely.
RESPONSE
The " weakness" observed is not a generic weakness; but rather, one which is unique to this scenario and which resulted because of appropriate conservative actions by exercise players that were not anticipated by the scenario development team.
In fact, it is important to note that, as a result of the failure of anticipated.
scenario flow, actions taken by both the TSC and EOF were conservative with respect to the protection of public health and safety as well as employee safety.
i
. O o
APPENDIX PAGE 6 Accordingly, we believe that no specific corrective action is required.
However, it.is our intent to monitor the situation by inclusion of an objective related to this matter in at least one Emergency Plan drill or exercise conducted in 1988.
3.
WEAKNESS:
"Various problems in the operation of the EOF were observed, due to inadequate staffing.. This resulted in the Radcon/ Waste Manager, the EOF Communicator, and the Assistant Radcon/ Waste Manager being significantly overburdened with functions and duties."
ITEM NUMBER:
266/87018-04 and 301/87018-04
~
DISCUSSION:
The problems cited in the inspection report include:
The " Emergency Support Center Status Board was poorly l
a.
maintained,"
b.
"The time of estimation was not changed when the new dose projection was entered.
" on the status
- board, c.
"The Coast Guard was not notified of.
[a plume traveling over the lake) until approximately 20 minutes after the recommendation to shelter had been j
)
made,"
d.
"The Emergency Organization Status Board was not corrected to show a change in the person acting as Security Supervisor for more than four hours," and e.
"The Offsite HP Director.
[was not)
. kept l
i up-to-date on the plume location."
1 The inspection report also included an open item (Nos.
I l
266/87018-05; 301/87018-05) which specifically suggested a redesign of status boards, relocation of maps, and a i
revision to the physical layout of the EOF.
We believe that the weakness (87018-04) and open item (87018-05) are related.
It is likely that these problems were caused by a variety of factors which negatively impacted offective use of EOF personnel.
A number of these problems had been identified during our own drill reviews and are already under review.
l
APPENDIX PAGE 7
RESPONSE
The following actions are being taken:
Five miscellaneous items related to the EOF have been a.
identified for improvement.
1.
Redesign status boards.
2.
Evaluate information flow in the EOF, revise procedures, and train as appropriate.
l 3.
Consider formalizing the position " Assistant Radcon/ Waste Manager" in EPIP 6.7.
4.
Assure that TSC, EOF, and SBCC managers are aware of the intended use of the TSC-EOF ringdown telephone circuits.
5.
Resolve whether the utility or offsite agencies should notify the U.S.
Coast Guard regarding l
recommended protective actions over Lake l
l Each of the items listed above will be addressed by August 1988.
b.
A request was initiated on June 16, 1987 to modify the EOF considering such factors as noise reduction, l
information flow, status board visibility, and.other l
" human factors."
The modification is planned for completion by September 1988.
An analysis of tasks performed by EOF support I
c.
personnel (e.g. engineers, DTAs, clerical staff, l
etc.) will be performed.
Performance guidelines will I
be provided for the support staff with the net result i
being more effective use of available personnel.
This action will-be completed by August 1988.
j c
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