ML20236S551
| ML20236S551 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1998 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Lochbaum D UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236S553 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9807270022 | |
| Download: ML20236S551 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WA'SHINGToN, D.C. 20555-0001 L
E tE July 16,1998 CHAIRMAN Mr. David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Engineer Union of Concerned Scientists 1616 P Street, N.W., Suite 310 Washington, D.C. 20036-1495
Dear Mr. Lochbaum:
I am responding to your letter of April 10,1998, regarding the U.S. Nuclear Regu6 tory Commission's (NRC) regulatory oversight of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (Maine Yankee). In your letter, you suggest that the staff has acted inconsistently in its oversight of Maine Yankee, in particular that the apparent violations issued to Maine Yankee on December 19,1997, were inconsistent with the findings of the 1996 Independent Safety Assessment (ISA) of Maine Yankee and the " Confirmatory Order Suspending Authority for and Limiting Power Operation and Containment Pressure (Effective immediately), and Demand for Information"(Order) of January 3,1996. As explained below, the Order and the apparent violations identified in the staff's letter of December 19,1997, are consistent with the findings of the ISA. Moreover, the staff's actions regarding Maine Yankee, when viewed in context, represent appropriate measured responses to the issues as they were identified. When warranted, in 1996 and in 1997, the facility remained shut down in order to address identified
' deficiencies that could affect safe operation of the facility. In addition, you suggest that issues at Maine Yankee during the Lst several years may indicate opportunities to improve the NRC staff's processes in both timeliness and effectiveness. We agree and, as discussed below, the staff has taken several actions to identify and take advantage of such opportunities.
The Order issued in January 1996 addressed apparent inadequacies of the Maine Yankee small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) analysis by reducing the authorized power level from 2700 MWt to 2440 MWt to provide margin in the SBLOCA analysis to ensure that for continued operation the large-break loss-of-coolant accident (LBLOCA) would be bounding.
Therefore, pursuant to the Order, the core operating limits for Cycle 15 at Maine Yankee (which
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began in January 1996) were based on the results of the LBLOCA analysis. On that basis, safe operation of Maine Yankee with respect to postulated LOCAs was assured. The apparent
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violations aoncerning the RELAP5YA SBLOCA evaluation model, which were cited in the December 19,1997, letter from Hubert J. Miller (NRC) to Michael B. Sellman (Maine Yankee),
did not adversely affect public health and safety.
'In January 1996, the NRC Office of Investigations (01) initiated an investigation of potential wrongdoing related to the SBLOCA analysis. Ol's investigation included substantialinterviews c
with a significant number of employees and former employees of both Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and Yankee Atomic Electric Company. At key junctures, the investigators met with cognizant NRC technical staff to ensure an appropriate understanding of the technical and regulatory issues involved and to ensure that the investigation remained focused in appropriate 9307270022 990716' N
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directions. Periodically, the Director of 01 briefed the Commission on significant open investigations to keep them informed. Therefore, the Commission was aware of the status at
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. regular intervals throughout this investigation. Following completion of the investigation in September 1996, the results were thoroughly reviewed by NRC technical, legal and enforcement staff, as well as the U.S. Department of Justice, to determine the appropriate course of action. The investigation and the staff's subsequent evaluation were conducted in a I
reasonable time frame considering the complex issues surrounding the development and implementation of the RELAP5YA SBLOCA evaluation model for Maine Yanwe and the need to coordinate activities with the Depadment of Justice.
During the summer of 1996, the ISA was performed, which identified a large number of deficiencies. The facility was shut down during the ISA to address several of those deficiencies.
After correcting those deficiencies that affected the operability of safety-related equipment, the licensee restarted the facility. Viewing the remaining defHencies in the aggregate, the ISA concluded that "overall performance at Maine Yankee was considered adequate for operation of the facility." This conclusion pertained to operation as authorized by the Maine Yankee license at that time (i.e., up to 2440 MWt).
During the ISA, the licensee committed to conduct further evaluations and corrective actions to address the specific deficiencies remaining from the ISA and to address the broader implications of the ISA findings. In the first week of December 1996, the licensee identified certain cable separation problems (cable separation was not inspected by the ISAT) and shut down the facility, as required by the facility Technical Specifications. In the next few days, as the licensee
. acted to address the identified problems, it became apparent that additional effort was required L
. to define the nature and extent of the problems. The staff, therefore, issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) No. 1-96-015 on December 18,1996, to ensure that the scope of the problem would be adequately defined and that appropriate corrective actions would be taken before restart of the facility. On January 30.1997, the staff issued a supplement to the CAL to address additionalissues that had arisen. In February 1997, the staffinitiated for Maine Yankee the Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval," process for review and inspection of facilities preparing to restart from extended outages. This process provides assurance that identified issues potentially affecting safe operation of the facility have been appropriately addressed before restart of the facility, it also provides for public input, which was obtained at 3 meeting between the NRC staff and the public iri the vicinity of Maine Yankee on April 3,1997. The staffissued its restart action plan for Maine Yankee on May 23,1997.
Subsequently, the Board of Directors of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company decided in late May 1997 to cease recovery activities, and, in August 1997, to decommission the facility. In its announcement to permanently shut down the facility, the licensee attributed its action to economic considerations. As a consequence of the licensee's permanent shutdown decision, the staff's restart action plan was never implemented.
The staff took other actions due to concerns over licensee performance. Specifically, the staff placed the Maine Yankee facility on the Watch List in January 1997 due to significant regulatory concerns over safety equipment operability, testing, safety evaluations and corrective actions.
As a result of this decision, additional management attention ar.d inspection effort was directed toward the plant in the subsequent months. Region I management also provided testimony to the Maine legislature regarding the plant.
3 Regarding your contention that the NRC was negligent in its oversight of Maine Yankee, the Commission does not believe that a violation identified by anyone other than the NRC staff, or the fact that apparent violations occurred necessarily represents a failure on the part of the NRC staff. To the contrary, the Commission's regulations at Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," require, in part, that " Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality.. are promptly identified and corrected." Therefore, the Commission expects that licensees will implement effective problem identification measures that will routinely identify noncompliance before the NRC staff does. This is also taken into consideration in NUREG-1600, Genera' Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (Enforcement Policy)," which gives the staff discretion to mitigate enforcement sanctions in cases where the licensee has identified the violation. In addition, the Commission recognizes that allegations can be a valuable source of information in identifying potential violations. Accordingly, the staff responds promptly to address the safety significance of allegations following guidance contained in Management Directive 8.8, " Management of Allegations," and in headquarters office letters and regional office instructions that implement 3s precepts.
Notwithstanding these expectations, in view of the nature of the concerns raised regarding NRC staff performance with respect to the Maine Yankee SBLOCA analysis in December 1995, several reviews of staff activities were initiated. The NRC's Office of the Inspector Genera!
conducted an Event inquiry (96-04S) and made the results publicly available in a report dated May 8,1996. In addition, the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) initiated a review of its policies and procedures regarding the review of licensing codes and power uprate amendments, and its practices in reviewing and closing the Three Mile Island Action Plan items related to SBLOCA analysis. NRR also reviewed policies regarding internal coordination, delegation of signature authority, and tracking and verification oflicensee commitments. The ISA report of October 7,1996, identified several regulatory issues to be addressed by the staff.
Several of these issues overlapped areas already considered by the Maine Yankee Lessons Learned team in NRR. The team submitted its findings and recommendations to NRR management in a report dated December 1996. That report was sent to the Commission as an attachment to SECY-97-042, " Response to OlG Event inquiry 96-04S," dated February 18, 1997. Recommendations for improving staff processes are being implemented.
In summary:
1.
While a period in excess of 2 years was required from the start of the subject investigation until the predecisional enforcement conference, I do not find that period of time excessive given the complexity of the issue, the required coordination between 01 and the technical staff, and the need for the NRC to interface with the Department of Justice. Further, no decisions relative to protecting health and safety of the public were delayed due to the length of the investigation.
2.
The
- charges" which were the bases of the predecisional enforcement conference related to actions and conditions which occurred before the 1996 time frame. The actions directed by our January 1996 Order provided the basis to conclude that facility operating limits would not be challenged.
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3.
Your characterization of the NRC as " flip-flopping" on safety issues is a misleading one. Throughout 1996 and 1997, the agency acted on the basis of information available to us (whether through our inspection efforts or the licensee's activities). The January 1996 Order was required to bound uncertainties in the facility SBLOCA analysis to ensure that LBLOCA would be bounding and would determine the applicable operating limits. The ISAT concluded, based upon their inspection activities in other areas, that the facility was safe to operate. As I am sure you are aware, our inspections are sampling in nature and we base our conclusions on the results of those samples.. The Region i Administrator's letter to the plant's management (asserting apparent careless disregard) referred to conditions that preceded our investigation in 1996, and do not imply a change in position relative to ISAT results.
4.
Your letter compares NRC oversight of Maine Yankee in terms similar to the staff's predecisional enforcement conference letter to the licensee regarding vendor control. As you know, our regulatory structure places responsibilities for safe operation upon licensees. The NRC verifies, to the extent practicable and on a sampling basis, that licensees faithfully discharge their responsibilities. We fully expect that licensees will identify problems that NRC does not and that those problems will be corrected. Notwithstanding this, as you point out and as NRC has acknowledged, the Maine Yankee experience has highlighted a number of areas for improvement in the NRC and we are moving to capitalize on those opportunities.
I trust this discussion gives you a better understanding of the context of various NRC decisions with respect to regulatory oversight of Maine Yankee during the past 2% years.
Sincerely,
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