ML20236Q150
| ML20236Q150 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1987 |
| From: | Hunsader S COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 3821K, NUDOCS 8711190214 | |
| Download: ML20236Q150 (4) | |
Text
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' /^N Commonwealth Edison m
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~ / ~ One First N tional Plaza, Chicago, liiinois
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C 7 Address Reply to: Post Offic] Box 767 Nj Chicago,lHinois 60690 0767 November 10, 1987 Mr. Thomas E.'Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attn: Document Control Desk
Subject:
Braidwood' Station Unit 1 Fire Protection Program Fire Protection Seals and Structural Steel Fireproofing Work NRC Docket No. ~>0-456 Reference (a): September 9, 1987, S. C..Hunsader Letter to T. E. Murley
Dear Mr. Murley:
In reference (a), Commonwealth Edison (Edison) provided the schedule for completion of certain construction activities related to the Braidwood Unit 1 Fire Protection Program. At that time, twelve (12) penetration fire seals and approximately.3000 square feet of structural steel fireproofing were required to be installed. This letter provides an update on the completion of this work and serves-to notify you of additional areas of structural steel that require fireproofing, recently identified as incomplete.
Reference (a) indicated that eight (8) of twelve (12) penetration fire seals and the fireproofing with the exception of that in the Diesel Generator Vent Shaft, would be completed by September 25, 1987. These construction activities have been completed as scheduled.
The remaining four (4) fire seals and the fireproofing in the Diesel Generator Vent Shaft were scheduled to be completed during the Braidwood Unit 1 Surveillance Outage, which had been scheduled to be completed by December 8, 1987. This remaining work is still scheduled to be performed during the surveillance outage; however, at this time, the completion of this outage has been rescheduled for late January, 1988. As such, the remaining fire protection work as identified in reference (a), is scheduled to be completed by January 31, 1988.
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, l Upon performing a review of the remaining fireproofing work to be completed, three (3) additional cases of structural steel were identified as requiring fireproofing. Two (2) of these cases resulted from a i
misinterpretation of the design / installation drawing requirements and the third case was caused by a drawing omission.
The first case involves the fireproofing of hanger attachment plates, welded to structural steel beam flanges. These plates were added, to avoid cross flange welding the hanger directly to the beam flange. Originally, j
these plates had been considered by the Edison project Construction Department to be part of the hanger or the hanger auxiliary steel. Under this interpretation, the plates would not have required fireproofing. The current j
interpretation of this fireproofing detail calls for the application of l
fireproofing over the entire plate. Upon review, Edison's Project Construction Department identified approximately 600 such plates that require fireproofing.
(Attachment A provides the building areas in which these plates are located). The fireproofing of the plates in the upper cable spreading rooms has been completed. The remaining plates are scheduled to be fireproofed prior to the completion of the Unit 1 Surveillance Outage, to be completed in January, 1988.
The second case, not previously identified as requiring fireproofing, is located at the 401' elevation of Area 5 in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building between' column lines 10 and 15 and Q and V.
The structural steel supporting the 401' elevation concrete slab was shown on the structural design drawings as requiring a 2 hour-rated fireproofing. Edison's Project Construction Department, in reviewing the fire protection drawings, had noted that this slab was not a fire-rated slab, and as such, did not believe that fireproofing was required. This misinterpretation of the drawings was recently identified and the fireproofing is scheduled to be applied to this steel during the upcoming Unit 1 Surveillance Outage, to be completed in January, 1988.
The third case, not previously fireproofed, is also located in Area 5, in the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building on elevation 414'.
This approximately, twenty foot square area between column lines V and V.9, and 12.5 and 15 contains structural steel for which the design / installation drawings had not required the application of fireproofing. This drawing imission will be corrected, and fireproofing will be applied during the upcoming Unit 1 Surveillance Outage, to be completed in January, 1988.
To provide additional assurance that no other cases of missing or incomplete structural steel fireproofing exist, Edison has undertaken or will undertake three (3) corrective measures.
In the first of these, Edison's project Construction Department has re-reviewed the relevant fire protection drawings to assure that no potential j
ambiguities or misinterpretations, such as the ones resulting in the first two cases, have resulted in additional missed fireproofing. The result of this review has identified no other cases where fireproofing drawings were misinterpreted.
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- Also, Edison's Architect / Engineer, Sargent and Lundy, will perform a review to determine whether the drawing omission responsible for case three was an isolated case.
Finally, the fireproofing contractor, Krez-Duguid, will perform field walkdowns of installed fireproofing to compare the as-built condition with the j
fireproofing requirements of the design / installation documents. These walkdowns should assure that no additional cases of missing fireproofing in the Unit 1, category 1 areas, exist.
Upon completion of the Braidwood Unit 1 Surveillance Outage, Edison expects to be in full compliance with the fire protection requirements in this area.
As presentsd in reference (a), compensatory measures have continued to be in effect in the affected areas. These compensatory measures have included both roving, hourly and continuous, stationary fire watches, as required by the Braidwood Station Administrative Procedures. These measures will continue in the affected arecs as fire protection and/or fire detection system conditions warrant. The ongoing fire watches, being maintained in all areas of Unit 1, will continue to provide appropriate compensatory measures and an adequate level of fire safety, please address any questions concerning this matter to this office.
Very truly yours,
(.f
=+b S. C. Hunsader Nuclear Licensing Administrator cc:
S. Sands Braidwood Resident Inspector NRC Region III 3821K
ATTACHMENT A BRAIDWOOD STATION UNIT 1
. STATION AREA NO.
DESCRIPTION OF AREA 112, 113, 114, 115 439' Elevation Lower Cable Spreading Room 118, 119, 120, 121 463' Elevation Upper Cable Spreading Room 1
451' Elevation Switchgear Room 2
451' Elevation Switchgear Room 19 426' Elevation Switchgear Room 20 426' Elevation Switchgear Room 23 426' Elevation Corridor 12 - 18, M-Q 40 401' Elevation Diesel Generator 1B 41 401' Elevation Diesel Generator lA 43, 44, 45 401' and 414' Elevation Area 5 42, 46 401' Elevation 10 - 18, L-Q 401' Elevation 15 - 18, V-W 46 451' Elevation Auxiliary Electric Room Unit 1 75 383' Elevation, M-17 Oil Day Tank Room 73, 79 364' Elevation 15 - 19, Q-15 21 426' Elevation Laundry Room N-Q, 10 - 11 22 HVAC Equipment Room 426' Elevation 10 - 13, L-N 27*
426' Elevation High Level Lab, 12 - 15, L-P i
6*
451' Elevation L-Q, 13-23 Computer Room Unit 1 Control Room Unit 1 & 2 l
- - Area was inaccessible to view whether plates were completed.
1 3821K l
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