ML20236H450
| ML20236H450 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1987 |
| From: | Garde B Citizens Association for Sound Energy |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4749 OL, NUDOCS 8711040135 | |
| Download: ML20236H450 (26) | |
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UNITED STATES OF_ AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION If. g,,y khIhY Il G
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BRANCH
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y In the Matter of
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Texas Utilities Electric
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Co., et.al.
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Docket 50-445/6 - OL'
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(Comanche Peak Steam Electric) i Station Units 1 and 2)
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CASE'S PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE l
PLAN AND ANSWERS TO THE BOARD'S QUESTIONS The Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) hereby files its response to the October 8, 1987, Conference Plan which requested that the parties address, in writing, three specific i
Board questions, and file a proposed format for the pre-hearing
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i conference.
As stated herein, CASE submits that it does not know what.
documents Applicants intend to rely on to establish the adequacy of the design and construction of the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant.
Further, CASE believes, as it has repeatedly asserted throughout this case, that the Board must make a factual determination about the extent of the historical breakdown in QA/QC for design and construction of the nuclear plant; and, should there be a finding of a pervasive QA/QC breakdown for design or construction the Applicants would have to show that they could demonstrate the same degree of safety as would have been achieved pursuant to adequate initial implementation of all l.
8711040135 871029
_1 PDR ADOCK O g5 y) o L
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l 10 CPR 50, Appendix B criteria.
CASE asserts that the Board is required, as a matter of law, to reach determinations as to the breadth of the breakdown, and l
whether Applicants have demonstrated the same degree of safety as had they adequately implemented all 10 CFR 50, Appendix B q
criteria.
BACKGROUND On August 20, 1987, Applicant Texas Utilities Electric (TUEC) filed a " Motion for Establishment of Schedule" that proposed a schedule for commencement and completion of the operating license hearings.
Responses were filed by CASE on September 28, 1987, and the NRC Staff filed its response on October 2, 1987.
The Board then scheduled a pre-hearing conference and asked
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l for further development of the questions stated below:
l (1)
What documents do Applicants rely on to establish the adequacy of design and construction?
(2)
Whether or not the Board must make factual determinations about the extent of the historical breakdown l
in OA/QC for design and construction.
Discuss the " holding" l
of cases cited as precedent in detail, including the significance of the factual setting.
1 (3)
Should there be a finding of historical inadequacy (breakdown) of QA/QC for design or construction, would Applicants have to show that their "get well" program achieved the same degree of safety as would have been achieved pursuant to adequate initial implementation of Appendix B?
The Board also asked that the parties propose a plan for the pre-hearing conference itself, scheduled for November 2 and 3, 1987, in Dallas, Texas. ___
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RESPONSES TO BOARD-QUESTIONS I.
WHAT DOCUMENTS DO APPLICANTS RELY ON TO ESTABLISH THE ADEQUACY OF DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION?
This question must obviously be answered by the Applicants themselves. CASE has no knowledge or information-which_would enable it to respond to this question.
However, CASE intends to rely on all relevant and material documents to prove their case.
II.
THE BOARD MUST MAKE A FACTUAL DETERMINATION ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE HISTORICAL BREAKDOWN
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IN QA/QC FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION.
It is CASE's position that the Board must, as a matter of law, make a factual determination about the extent of the historical breakdown in QA/QC for design and construction.
The Applicants do not address this question directly in the context of their Motion for Establishment of Schedule, however, implicit in their motion is the position that the Board is not required to make a determination of the extent of the historical QA/QC breakdown for design and construction.
Further, CASE understands that it is the position of the Applicants that if they choose not to rely on the historical implementation of the QA/QC program for the purpose of obtaining an operating-license, i
then the Board would,have no right to make any findings on its adequacy.
(The Applicants have collected and discussed the authorities which they believe are relevant to this issue in their January 31, 1986, Applicants' Memorandum in Response to Board Memorandum (Statistical Inference from CPRT Sampling), at 18-23.)
The Staff's position, as articulated in their response to the Applicants' Scheduling brief, is that:
(t)here is no reason why litigation should focus on the adequacy of the historical QA/QC program.
Applicants' corrective action initiatives are intended to provide the information necessary upon which to base a reasonable assurance finding.
Thus the adequacy of the historical QA/QC program is irrelevant, since the reasonable assurance.
finding will not be based upon the work conducted under the historical program.
The Staff stands on the Appeals Board rulings in Callaway and Byron to support its position.1/
CASE relies on these two cases, as well as the Appeals Board directives from the Diablo Canyon case,2/
and other Commission decisions and similar authorities in which the Commission has had to analyze the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and apply it to troubled nuclear power facilities. (See, In the Matter of Cincinnati Gas and Electric (Zimmer), CLI-82-33, 16 NRC 1489 (1982);
In the Matter of Consumer Power Company (Midland Plant, Units l'and 2), DD-83-16,. 18 NRC 1123 (1983), Aff'd CLI-84 __,
NRC (1984); In the Matter of Duke Power Company, et.al, (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, NRC (1985); " Improving Quality and the Assurance of Quality in the 1/ In the Matter of Union Electric Co. (Callaway), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983). In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-770, 19 NRC 1163 (1984).
2/ In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571 (1984).
Aff'd CLI 84-14, 20 NRC 285 (1984).
j,
Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants," A Report to Congress, NUREG-1055, May, 1984.)
Comanche Peak is not the first plant to face a licensing challenge to the adequacy of its QA/QC program, or the problems l
of a end of construction discovery of a quality assurance / quality control breakdown.
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board (ALAB) has laid out directives for all Licensing Boards and parties to licensing proceedings on how to approach litigating the difficult issues raised by quality assurance breakdowns in construction and design.
To understand how to approach the problem the Appeals Board has set forth clearly the standard that must be met by an j
applicant for an operating license.
The Appeals Board, quoting j
federal law, has stated:
A condition precedent to the issuance of a license for a nuclear power facility is a finding that there is reasonable assurance that the facility has been properly constructed and can be operated without endangering the public health and safety.
Catawba, pp.
3-4, citing 10 C.F.R. 50.57(a).
The Appeals Board went on to state that to meet that end the utility "must establish and carry out a QA program designed to provide ' adequate confidence' that those systems, structures, and components having safety-related functions 'will perform satisfactorily in service'." (Id. at 4)
The Appeals Board then scrutinized the Catawba Licensing Board's decision against their analysis of construction QA/QC program defects as articulated in their earlier Callaway decision.
The Appeals Board concluded that albeit there had been _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
evidence of a limited breakdown in Catawba's construction QA/QC program in the welding area, it was not indicative of a pervasive construction QA/QC programmatic breakdown in part because the utility identified and responded to the information relatively promptly, and because the welders testified that they had fixed all the problems.3/
As is clear from the analysis of the Catawba case the Appeals Board expects an application of its earlier Callaway l
l ruling to QA/QC issues.
l A.
The 1983 Callaway Decision.
i The key statement of the Callaway decision, although dicta in that case, was that:
Thus, in examining claims of quality assurance deficiencies, one must look to the implication of those deficiencies in i
terms of safe plant operation.
Obviously, this inquiry' necessitates careful consideration of whether all ascertained construction errors
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have been cured.
Even if this is established to be the 1
case, however, there may remain a question whether there has l
been a breakdown in quality assurance procedures of j
sufficient dimensions to raise legitimate doubt as to the overall integrity of the facility and its safety-related structures and components. A demonstration of a pervasive failure to carry out the quality assurance program might well stand in the way of the requisite safety finding.
(emphasis added.)
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The Callaway case was before the Appeals Board for consideration of an appeal by the Joint Interveners of the Partial Initial Deci'sion of the Licensing Board.
The Joint 3/ The issue of defects in the Catawba welding QA/QC program surfaced in discovery with the identity of complaints of harassment of welders by the project QA manager.
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Interveners challenged the ASLB's ruling on five discreet hardware issues, and several other generic concerns which the 1
Interveners claimed left doubts about the safety of the facility l
because of inadequate technical solutions and implications of the I
technical problems on the adequacy of the quality assurance l
program.
1 The five discreet technical issues were all identified l
1 outside of the " normal" QA/QC program channels.
For example, one issue was identified by an anonymous pipefitter, one was identified by the NRC in the course of an inspection, and so on.
The Licensing Board, after hearing evidence on each of the discreet issues raised and the evidence offered by the Applicant i
stemming from some type of reinspection / reanalysis effort, that the. technical "fix" to the identified problem was acceptable to j
prove that the hardware problem had been resolved, and that the discreet incident did not indicate a " pervasive" breakdown in the quality assurance / quality control program at the Callaway site.
l The Appeals Board upheld the Partial Initial Decision because it found that there was sufficient evidentiary support in the record to uphold the Licensing Board's finding that the Applicants' Quality Assurance program "had functioned properly" and that the technical / hardware problems were " isolated incidents" or breaches of the program which did not infect the entire program, and had been properly addressed.
In short, in Callaway the ASLB reviewed all of the evidence and reached two separate conclusions on each item raised by the Joint Intervenor in support of its quality assurance contention. _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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1 First, it determined that the technical "fix" was acceptable to I
insure that the public health and safety was protected, and I
second, that the existence of each defect did not indicate that there was a pervasive failure of the entire QA/QC program.
Significantly, the ASLB held that the "no significant failure of the Applicants QA program had occurred," (page 24) that the QA program was not demonstrated to be inadequate, and/or that the "overall effectiveness had not been called into question." (Page 40) The Appeals Board agreed. (ALAB-740, slip, op. at 39.)
They further agreed with the ASLB that the Applicant had l
l taken "all necessary steps to correct the QA deficiencies as soon as they were uncovered." (Id. at 40.)
Thus, the Callaway case is not. clearly on point when there has been a " pervasive breakdown,"
and the flaws are fundamental.
As seen in the Byron' case, the Appeals Board is not solely concerned with the undetected / uncorrected deficiencies.
B.
The 1984 Byron Ruling.
In 1984 the operating license for the Byron nuclear plant l
was denied by the Licensing Board after it determined that the applicant had not demonstrated, in the terms of the con'ention t
itself, its ability or willingness to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, to maintain a quality assurance and quality control program, and to observe on a continuing and adequate basis the applicable quality control and quality assurance criteria and plans...
l ALAB-770, at 2, citing Licensing Board order, slip opinion at 297.
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The basis of the Licensing Board's denial was its conclusion that there were serious deficiencies with respect to the " quality assurance activities of several of the contractors...." There were no unidentified defects at Byron, nor was there a pervasive breakdown of the OA/QC program; there was only doubt based on a fundamental flaw in the program that the inevitable defects had been found.
Specifically, the Byron ASLB found as to the electrical contractor, that the deficiencies found to exist with regards to the quality assurance activities were so serious that, " standing alone, they necessitated a ruling against the applicant on the interveners' quality assurance contention."
(ALAB-770, at 12, citing slip opinion of ASLB at 302.)
The ASLB explained:
[The Board] does not have confidence that the quality of the work at Byron by Hatfield Electric Company is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the Byron facility can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety, i
(Slip op. at 299.)
i In its initial decision, the Byron licensing board addressed individually numerous deficiencies in Hatfield's quality assurance program.
The Appeals panel only considered two of the most significant incues, quality assurance inspector capability and document control.
T.he Appeals Board also looked at, albeit briefly, the recurring theme of these problems at another contractor.
Commonwealth Edison maintained in its appeal that the principles of Callaway should have prevented the Licensing Board from denying the license " inasmuch as (1) there was no - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
a
' widespread breakdown' in quality assurance procedures on the part of either itself or its contractors; and (2) the Licensing Board did not find any actual uncorrected construction defects of potential safety significance."
(ALAB-770, at 19-20, citing Applicants' brief at 36-46.)
The Appeals Board flatly rejects that interpretation of Callaway, and spells out exactly what Callaway does and doesn't mean in the face of programmatic QA/QC deficiencies that potentially infect the entire plant:
The fatal difficulty with this line of argument is that it ignores the fact that one of the principal deficiencies with regard to both Hatfield and Hunter related to the absence of adequate certification procedures for quality assurance personnel.
Given that absence, a legitimate question arose respecting whether the quality assurance inspectors examining safety-related structures, systems and components were, in actuality, competent to perform their assigned functions.
And, so long as that doubt lingered, there also remained an uncertainty as to whether construction defects of potential safety significance had gone undetected.
We find nothing in Callaway that suggests, let alone holds, that an operating license can issue despite the presence of a cloud overhanging the adequacy of safety-related construction. (emphasis added)
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The Appeals Board also addressed the argument by the Applicant on appeal that, since there was a reinspection and decertification program underway, that the staff should finish the review of the program outside of the litigation forum.
The Appeals Board held that "(b)ecause the efficacy and outcome of the remedial programs are central to a finding of reasonable assurance of proper facility construction, the interveners are plainly entitled to have their day in court prior to possible resolution of the quality assurance matter in the applicants favor." (Id. at 22) __
The Byron Appeals Board directed that the licensing board hold a "...further hearing to permit a full exploration of the significance of the program in terms of whether there is currently reasonable assurance that the Byron facility has been properly constructed."
The Appeals Board directed that:
the focus of the inquiry should be upon whether, as formulated and executed, the reinspection program has now i
provided the requisite degree of confidence that (the inspectors) were competent and, thus, can be presumed to have uncovered any construction defects of possible safety consequences. (footnote ommitted)(Id., at-28)
The Appeals Board then sets forth the minimum questions and issues that must be addressed by the further hearings in evaluating the adequacy of the reinspection program.
I The Byron Appeals Board told the Licensing Board that the l
proper course of action it should have followed in the face of the circumstances before it, instead of outright denial of the license, was to reach a preliminary decision, advise the parties of that preliminary decision, and hold further hearings to l
determine the acceptability of the solution.
The Appeals Board's instructions cannot be ignored at this juncture of the Comanche Peak proceeding.
Fundamental flaws j
l exist in the historical implementation of the QA/QC program, a cloud hangs over the adequacy of the construction and design, doubts abound as to what the Applicant is doing under the cover of "in process" exceptions to discovery and a lack of staff controls, and the massive reinspection effort of the CPRT is not even going to be the official record to license the plant on.
Yet, the Staff cites the Byron case only for the proposition that "even if litigation were to continue to conclusion and the t
Board were to find that the QA/QC program was inadequate, the Applicants are entitled to show that any deficiencies or uncertainties in design or construction attributable to the historical QA/QC program have now been corrected." (Staff brief, j
l at 9.)
The Staff, however, ignores the factual context that the reinspection program played in the Byron case, First, the
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t Licensing Board analyzed the evidence presented on discreet allegations and specific non-compliances.
The Board reached individual conclusions on those issues raised by the intervenor, and, after listening to all of the evidence presented by both sides on the validity of the allegation or concern, the Board then reached an evidentiary conclusion on each of the allegations or deficiencies.
Based on the preponderance of the evidence, the Board concluded that the Applicant had not carried its burden of proof under the contention, and decided that an operating license could not issue.
The question of unidentified deficiencies was not raised, it was the potential that such deficiencies existed and that the evidentiary foundation laid by the Applicants did not eliminate the possibility that led to the denial of the license.
The Appeals Board recognized that in order to overcome the initial denial of an operating license there must be a finding that the reinspection program was adequate to resolve the concerns that led to the denial in the first place, and insure that the hidden defects were either identified or likely to be identified or compensated for. (ALAB-770, pg. 21, 28-29).
i The Staff apparently misses the point that it was not in dispute that there were, at the time of the denial, no known undetected or uncorrected deficiencies in the~ record.
- Instead, there was a programmatic breakdown that was fundamental to the.
reliability of the program -- in that case, inspector qualifications.4/
CASE asserts that, as to construction at Comanche Peak, the fundamental flaws in the implementation of the QA/QC program are pervasive.
Assuming that to be true, CASE believes that the
" pervasive breakdown" standard of Callaway is or would be met.
Thus, the focus turns from the quantitative element of pervasive to the qualitative.
At Byron, the breadth of the reinspection was dictated by the type of-deficiency.
Comanche Peak has been the victim of both a total quantitative and qualitative breakdown.
Thus, the scope of a reinspection program that would resolve the doubts raised both by the number and extent of the I
actual deficiencies, and by the type of deficiencies, turns on what those deficiencies are.
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A reinspection program that probes only the necessarily random allegations brought fo:: ward by workers, or found by the TRT, or even found during a random sample of hardware components and documentation is inadequate to resolve the qualitative l
l questions raised by a pervasive programmatic breakdown, l
i 4/ Indeed, a known undetected deficiency is an oxymoron, if its known it has been detected by someone, the question is has the I
deficiency been recorded so that it can be tracked and trended.
The Applicants are entitled to try to prove the plant is safe regardless of the magnitude of the breakdown.
However, we are entitled to prove the breadth of the breakdown in order to l
demonstrate the inadequacy of the proposed solution.
For instance, we might demonstrate that there actually are more undetected and uncorrected deficiencies through documents or i
witnesses, or we might demonstrate that there are flaws or l
1 consequences of flaws that the Applicant has not acknowledged.
The Applicant cannot rob us of our opportunity to demonstrate l
that this plant has been the subject of a total breakdown such that the only way for this plant to escape license denial is to seek a 2.758 exemption to meeting the Commissions regulations.
C.
The 1984 Diablo Canyon Decision.
Both Byron and Callaway deal, exclusively with breakdowns in the QA/QC program for construction only.
In 1981 the Commission addressed the breakdown in the QA/QC program for design at the Diablo Canyon plant.
1 In March, 1984, the Appeals Board, sitting as the licensing board issued its decision on the reopened issue of design quality assurance.
The Appeals Board had reopened the record on design QA issues after the Applicant and the Staff had identified serious weaknesses i.n the implementation of the applicant's l
quality assurance program, which led the Commission to suspend the previously granted low power license. The license suspension was to be in effect until the satisfactory completion of an independent design verification program focusing on certain seismic design processes for safety-related structures, systems l l l
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l and comp)onents." (ALAB-763, Slip Op. al,3).
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i Thepreliminarydecision;in\\'thecase, mad,efbythe J
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1 Commission, was that the applicant's quality assurance program had not been adequately implemented such that there was i>
reasonable assurance that the,public. health and safety would be pl <l te protected. In this case' the licensing hearings: were reopened on' l
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theissueoftheadequacyoftheapplicant'sdaalityassurance t
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v program'for design.
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1 The appeals board noted in its March, 1984, decision that, l
l
"(a)1though the motions,to rebpen were predicated on
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deficiencies in the applicant's design quality assurance' l
e program and the applicast's failure to ecmply with 10 CFR j{
.i 50, Appendix B, the rpal issue in the proceeding moved beyond that; point. jfootnoteincluded)
Indeed, as the applicant's counsel stated at the argument on the motions to('
reopen,,
[whiare willing to stipulate that there -- that there are,,nuy have been, and have been deficiencies in design OA.
That.is behind us.
There is no sense;in litigating design OA.
Where does that get anybody?,
It doesn't accomplish anything.
In. setting theilssues for the reopened hearing the Board set forth th'e appr'oach it,' as going to take in the face of
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"significant evidence" that the design quality assuance program was faulty'{1.ep, it failed to comply with 10 CFR Par;t.50,-
1 Appendix B).'
It recognized that there was " substantial i
e
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4 l
uncertainty whether any particular structure, syntem otVcompo'nent was designed in accordance with stated criteria and commitments."
(footnote cite.ommitted, pg. 7 slip opinion)
The Board then indicated that'it whuld take its lead from
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i the Commission and permit the applicants various verification efforts 'to substitute for, supplement,.the applicant's design-c ' 'l..
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I t
i quality assurance program in order to demonstrate that Diablo l
Canyon is correctly designed.
The Commisison stated that the real issue...has, in effect moved beyond the question of what deficiencies existed in the applicant's Diablo Canyon design quality assurance program to the question whether the applicant can demonstrate that ite verification efforts) verify the correctness of the Diablo Canyon design. (Id, at 6.)
i The Board understood its responsility in these circumstances as the following:
(w]e must independently determine whether the verification programs and their results placed before us in the reopened operating license proceeding are sufficient to verify the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon design.
To do this, the applicant's efforts must be measured against the same standard as set forth in the Commission's quality assurance criteria, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, whether the verification l
program provides " adequate confidence that a safety-related structure, system or component will perform satisfactorily in service."
If the applicant's verification efforts meet this standard, then there will be reasonable assurance with respect to the design of the Diablo Canyon facility that it can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. (Id, at 11.)
The Board then held hearings, took evidence, evaluated that evidence and issued findings on contested issues on the question 1
l of "...whether, in view of the conceded weakness of the Diablo j
Canyon design quality assurance program, the applicant's verification efforts demonstrate that the safety-related structures, systems and components of the properly designed (i.e, conform to the various licensing criteria for the facility)".
(emphasis added)(Id, at 19.)
In reaching its conclusions the Board determined that the seismic design work was done under a reinspection program that met the provision of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and that the work was done with sufficient independence to assure its credibility. l
(Slip.op., at 39, 71.)
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The Board held that:
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...the scope and the executionLof the applicant's
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verification programs have beca sufficient to establish that l
Diablo Canyon Unit I desiga. adequately meets its licensing l
criteria.
The applicant's verification efforts, provide j
E,duquate confidence. that the Unit 1 safety-related structures, systems, and components are designed to perform I
satisfactorily in service and that any significant design I
deficiencies in that facility resulting from defects in the applicant's desiyt quality assurance program have been remedied.
Accordingly,, we conclude that there,is reasonable assurance that the facility can be opertaed without endangering the health and safety of'the public. (Id, at 101.)
Diablo Canyon does not stand for the proposition that no 1
preliminary finding on the scope of an alleged QA/0C breakdown is necessary.
It follows all of the cases discussed herein in which l
l I
a breakdown is' conceded, adjudicated, declared, or admitted, and then bounded by the relevant facts.
Only after this step is the Licensing. Board able to assess the adequacy of the breadth and j
the depth of the reinspection program, or the hopelessness of pursuing reinspection..
Thus, all of the cases cited and discusssd herein have approached a difficult problem from a simple,' rather straight forward proposition, that in order to determine if the solution is adequate it is necessary to understand the whole problem.
CASE proposes nothing different.
III.
THE APPLICANTS MUST SHOW THAT THEIR GET WELL PROGRAM ACHIEVED THE SAME DEGREE OF SAFETY AS f
f WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED PURSUANT TO THE ADEQUATE s
INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF APPENDIX B.
There seems little dispute among the parties what the l
federal law and the Commission's regulations reguire and what,
l l
l applicable case law is available to provide direction and 1
guidance in this case.
The regulations provide that an operating license may issue upon a finding that:
(1) Construction of the facility has been substantially l
completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and l
(2)
The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the l
rules and regulations of the Commission; and (3)
There is reasonable assurance i
(i) that the activities authorized by the operating licnese can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations in this chapter; and (4) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authoprized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter....
(5) The applicable provisions of Part 140 of this chapter have been satisfied; and (6) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the public health and safety of the public.
10 CFR 50.57 (a) (1 - 6).
According to 10 CFR 50.34(a)(7) the preliminary safety analysis report must contain "...a description of the quality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction, and testing of the structures, systems, and components of the facility."
The application requirements and licensing criteria are spelled out in various documents i
comprising the operating license application including, most prominently, the Final Saftey Analysis Report (FSAR).
The FSAR contains all of the licensing criteria, whether saftey-related, seismic criteria, and non-safety significant licensing criteria.
Appendix B to Part 50, Quality Assurance Crietria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel reprocessing Plants, sets forth the requirements for quality assurance programs for nuclear power plants.
The description of the QA program must discuss how the requirements of Appendix will be satisfied.
Appendix B lists 18 separate quality assurance criteria which must be met in the construction and testing of a nuclear power plant.
t As stated above, the Commission has in the past several years come to grips with whether the confidence in a plants saftey could be provided by a post,, construction verification program.
They concluded that it was possible in the face of QA/QC breakdowns in both design and construction.
The Commission first faced the design QA/qC breakdown problem in regards to the Diablo Canyon facility in 1981, then they faced it in regards to construction at the Zimmer facility in 1982, Similar situations, stemming from notably different circumstances, have arisen at Midland, the Tennessee Valley Authority plants, South Texas, Marble Hill, Byron, and Braidwood, and other smaller projects or contractors.
The Commission articulated in Diablo Canyon that the purpose of the quality assurance program is to provide adequate confidence that a safety-related structure, system or component will perform satisfactorily in service. In each case identified _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
above the Commission, through its licensing boards or the staff I
concluded that the historical QA/QC program was unreliable to 1
assure safety of the facility and the public.
J However, in none of the cases identified above did the Commission determine that a lesser degree of safety was permissible as a result of the construction or design QA/QC breakdown.
To the contrary, in each case the Commission reached a conclusion that the same-or greater-degree of safety was l
achieved through a reinspection program as would have been, had i
the plan been implemented as originally committed to.
i In short, once it has been established that there is no adequate reliability on the historical implementation of the QA/QC program, the standard by which an Applicant's program is to be judged is the conformance of the design and construction to that plants significant and substantive safety requirements and j
the licensing criteria for that plant.
The result of that j
judgment must still be the same, i.e.,
that there is reasonable assurance that the facility has been designed and built in a manner that provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected.
To the knowledge of Intervenor's counsel no plant has ever l
had such a total qualitative and quantitative breakdown as Comanche Peak.
It is Intervenor's intention to prove that.
To i
date, no applicant has been in such special, albeit undesirable circumstances, that he needed a completely different post-construction / post-design verification of the plant.
l The Commission has a procedure to deal with this problem. r
l Commission regulations provide that an applicant may apply under 10 CFR 2.758 for a waiver or an exemption of one regulation in i
order to meet the regulations purpose in a different manner.
f The sole ground for petition for waiver or exception shall be that special circumstances with respect to the subjet matter of the partiu:lar proceeding are such that application of the rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or l
regulation was adopted.
j CASE believes that, on the face of the evidence available, Comanche Peak cannot meet the purpose of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B without getting a waiver or an exception.
The purpose of the regulation is to insure that the massive construction effort is a controlled process such that the inevitable construction errors 1
are found.
Without the concurrent functining of a QA/QC program plan there is virtually no way to insure that work done years ago was'done properly.
In short, the'OA/QC program becomes its own
" hearsay exemption" to first hand evidence.
Without that evidence, and without the exemption provided by the QA/QC program that provides the requisite reliability to the evidence there is no evidence, and thus no reliability to the evidence. The Commission has provided another exemption, 2.758, but it is the only other exemption available to the Applicant.
CONCLUSION The Applicants' stated in their April 17, 1986, Response to Case's Objections To Motion For Establishment of a Hearing Schedule, that "a QA/QC program is, in an operating license
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proceeding, a means to an end." (pp. 5).
We agree.
The l
Applicants state that the Commission has accepted alternative j
]
i
means to achieve that and, "where the final conclusions of a licensing adjudication include that either the construction or the design QA/QC program failed." (Id.)
We agree.5/
However, the Applicants apparently believe that the Commission has determined that if a facility is free of undetected and uncorrected safety significant deficiencies, no matter how pervasive a breakdown, that the facility must be given j
i a license. We disagree.
The evidentiary standard is still whether there is l
reasonable assurance that the plant was designed and constructed in a manner that the public health and safety is protected. The method by which the Applicant has committed to meeting that standard is the execution of a QA/QC program dictated by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
If the evidentiary record establishes that Phere l
was a limited breakdown in discreet areas, or a significant breakdown in one area, such that a limited reinspection / rework program will provide adequate assurance than the Board has the freedom to accept that evidence before issuing an initial decision.
l l
i l
l l
5/
We do not imply that the reinspection route is applicable in' these circumstances.
p - -
D
However, if the interveners can-prove that there is a " cloud hanging over the adequacy of construction," or a " pervasive breakdown" such that an affirmative finding cannot be made on the record before it than the plant shall not be licensed.
Respectfully submitted, i
(W Billie Pirner Garde, Esq.
i I
104 E. Wisconsin Avenue - B Appleton, WI 54911 Attorney for CASE
{
(414) 730-8533 j
l Anthony Z. Roisman Suite 600 1401 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C.
20005 (202) 628-3500 Attorney for CASE l
(Mrs.) Juanita Ellis. President Citizens Association for Sound Energy 1426 S. Polk Street Dallas, Texas 75224 (214) 946-9446 Representative for CASE cc: Service List Dated:
October 29, 1987 _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. n' UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CHETED Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board USNHC In the Matter of
)
17 10V -2 P4 :32
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY,
)
Dkt. Nos 50-445/6-OL et al.
)
0FFICE Of SECatIAp v
)
DOCKEilNG A SEnvlCL (Comanche Peak Steam Electric
)
BRANCH Station, Unit 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of CASE'S PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE PLAN AND ANSWERS TO THE BOARDS QUESTIONS were served today, October 29, 1987 by first class mail and Federal Express, upon the following:
Administrative Judge Peter Bloch
- U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 E/W Highway - 4th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 1
Dr. Walter H.
Jordon
- 881 West Outer Drive Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Dr. Kenneth A.
McCollom
- 1107 West Knapp Stillwater, OK 74075 Elizabeth B. Johnson Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O.
Box X, Building 3500 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Gear; S.
Mizuno, Esq.
Office of Executive Legal Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Maryland National Bank Bldg.
Room 10705 7735 Old Georgetown Road Dethesda, MD 20814 Thomas G.
Digan, Jr.
Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110
Robert Wooldridge 2001 Bryan Tower Suite 3200 Dallas, TX 75201 Renea Hicks
- Environmental Protection Division State A.
G.
Office (P.O. Box 12548) 1124 S.
IH 35, 2nd. Floor Austin, TX 78704 Juanita Ellis
- CASE 1426 S.
Polk Street Dallas, TX 75224 William G. Counsil Executive Vice President Texas Utilities Generating Company Skyway Tower, 25th Floor 400 North Olive Street Dallas, TX 75201 Anthony Z.
- Roisman, P.C.
1401 New York Avenue, NW Suite 600 Washington, D.C.
20005 Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Robert Martin Regional Administrator / Region IV U.S.
Nuclear Regulartory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Dr. - Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 Robert A.
Jablon, Esq.
Spiegel & Mc Diarmin 1350 New York Ave., NW Washington, D.C.
20005-4798 William H.
Burchette, Esq.
Heron, Burchette Ruckert & Rothwell 1025 Thomas Jefferson NW - Suite 700 Washington, D.C.
20007 James Bailey P.O.
Box 7000 Bryan, TX 77805 l
l l
1
~
J Nancy H. Williams Project Manager Cygna Energy Services 2121 N.
California Blvd.
Suite 390 Walnut Creek, CA 94596 Mr. Herman Alderman Staff Engineer Advisory Commission for Reactor Safeguards /"MS H-1016" U.S.
Nuclear Regulartory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 1
i 1
Dated this 29th day of October, 1987.
1 1
'&\\
BILLIE PIRNER GARDE, Esq.
1 1
. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _