ML20236F546
| ML20236F546 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/26/1998 |
| From: | Rosano R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Sedano R VERMONT, STATE OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9807020204 | |
| Download: ML20236F546 (4) | |
Text
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June 26, 1998
' Commissioner Richard Sedano '
Vermont Department of Public Service 112 State Street Montpelier, VT 05620-2601
SUBJECT:
FINAL REPORT ON INCIDENT INVOLVING CARL C. DREGA
Dear Mr. Sedano:
In August 1997, Cari C. Droga was involved in an incident in which he shot and killed several people in New Hampshire and Vermont before being killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforcement officers. Preliminary information on the incident revealed that Mr. Drega had been employed at, and had unescorted access authorization to, three NRC-licensed power reactor facilities: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Massachusetts, Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant in New York, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Vermont. A team of NRC inspectors was dispatched to visit these sites and determine whether any violations occurred relative to the granting of access authorization to Mr. Droga. Mr. William Sherman o.' Vermont's Department of Public Service accompanied the team on its visit to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant. In a follow up to the inspectors' visit, Mr. Sherman requested that a copy of the NRC's report on the matter be forwarded to the State of Vermont.
I am enclosing a copy of the NRC's Final Report on incident involving Carl C. Droga, which describes results of the inspection visits, the staff's consideration of generic issues raised by the incident, ano the conclusion that additional requirements would not have identified Mr. Droga as potentially violent before the inddent and that, therefore, regulatory changes are not appropriate at this time, if you have any questions on this report, you may contact me at (301) 415-3282.
Sincerely, Original signed by Richard P. Rosano, Acting Chief Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j
Enclosure:
As Stated cc: William K. Sherman Dept. of Public Service State of Vermont
[g 112 State Street Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 Distribution:
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i Final Report on Incident involvina Cad C. Dreaa
- 1. Overview .
On August 19,19g7, Cari C. Droga was involved in shootings in New Hampshire and Vermont that left four people dead. Droga was subsequer.tly killed in a confrontation with Vermont law enforr.,ement o?ficers.'
When it was discovered that Droga had been granted unescorted access to Vermont Yankee l (1992 and 1995), Pilgrim (19g7), and Indian Point 3 (19g7) as a temporary employee, NRC dispatched an inspection team composed of a senior inspector from Region I and a senior prograni manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's (NRR's) Safeguards Branch I (PSGB), Division of Reactor Program Management, assisted by an investigator from the Office of investigations' (Ol's) Field Office in Region 1.8 The objective of the visits was to determine through inspection, interviews, and records checks whether (a) the licensees' access authorization programs were properly implemented and administered, (b) the licensees' access control equipment was proper 1y installed and operated and the appropriate procedures were implemented, (c) the licensees' fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs were property implemented and administered, and (d) the licensees conducted adequate bacliground investigations of Droga, considered the information developed during that investigation, and acted properly in granting him unescorted access.
The inspections did not identify violatiorts of regulations or licensee commitments with respect to the access authorization programs, access control equipment, or FFD programs. Furthermore, ,
the inspectors concluded through interviews and records checks that the individual had not exhibited aberrant behavior that would have warranted a denial of unescorted access authorization by any of the three licensees for which he worked.
Following review of the inspection findings, PSGB initiated a study of the potential programmatic implications of the incident. Specifically, in light of the finding that there were no violations, the staff considered the two program:netic components of access control, that is, access authorization and entry controls, to determine whether additional requirements might reduce the !
' in earty reports of the investigation into this matter, comments made concoming the possibility that Droga had been stockpiling explosives, or components useful in constructing explosives, at his house in a search of his residence, bomb-making materials were found.
According to comments made to NRC's Office of Investigations Field Office in Region I, the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not find any indication of what Droga had planned to do with the explosive devices.
2 During the inspection effort, it was reported that Droga had worked at Seabrook. The inspectors determined that although Droga had applied for employment at Seabrook, he v/as asked to leave the property and was ultimately not hired after he attempted to live in his trailer on company grounds. The licensee did conclude, however, after completing the a : cess authorization process that it had begun, that Droga would have been granted authorization for unescorted access at Seabrook but for the incident involvir'g living in his trailer on company
{ grounds.
ENCLOSURE
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2 likelihood that a person who might pose a threat to the public health and safety could gain unescorted access to licenseJ facilities.
II. Renulatory Basis Since Droga worked at a temporary employee, the regulations concoming granting of unescorted access authorization to temporary employees were examine 3 Regulations in 10 CFR 73.56(c)(2) allow licensees' access authorization programs to specify conditions for permitting temporary access. Regulatory Guide 5.66 (RG), Section B, incorporates the guidelines for temporary access in the appended NUMARC 89-01, " Guidelines for Access Authorization Programs," to which all commercial power reactor licensees have committed, as
' discussed in Section Ill.B.2, below.
111. flDiudSE 1
inspections were conducted at the three facilities at which Droga worked: Vermont Yankee _
(Inspection Report [lR) 50 271/9707, August 26,1997), Pilgrim (IR 50 293/9709, August 27-28, 1997), and indian Point 3 (IR 50-298/9708, August 29,1997). With respect to licensee commitments at each site, the inspection team -
reviewed the cccess authorization program commitments and procedures, tested the acetass control equipment (metals and explosives detectors, x-ray machines) reviewed the FFD and behavioral observation programs and procedures, and audited the training program records for supervsors (to ensure that required FFD and behavioral observation training had been conducted).
With respect to Droga, the inspection team -
interviewed his former supervisors and co workers, reviewed the licensees' records of backgrourid screening coaducted before granting unescorted access authorization to Droga, ant
- reviewed Droga's general employee training records and FFD chemical testing records.
A Inspection and Compliance issues
- 1. Access Authorization Program The inspectors examined components of the licensees' access authorization programs, including procedures for background screening, psychological evaluation, processing of criminal history information, and decisionmaking. Special attention was paid to the processing of Droga's appimation for unescorted access authorization. No violations were found in the implementation of the access authorization programs at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.
- 2. Access Control Equipmerd and Fiocedures The inspectors reviewed the licensees' installation instructions, operating procedures, I and testing procedures for access control equipmerd in place at the prirnary access l
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portals through which personnel are processed onto the site. Security force members were interviewed and observed carrying out tests of the equipment. The inspectors found no violations in the installation or operation of the access control equipment and {
found adequate testing procedures and schedules of testing at each of the licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.
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- 3. Fitness-for-Duty Program The inspectors reviewed procedures for chemical testing and also reviewed general employee and supervisory training for fitness for duty. Special attention was paid to Droga's experience (for general employee training) and to his supervisors (for supervisory training). The inspectors found no violations in the implementation or management of the FFD programs or in the conduct of training at the three licensed facilities at which Droga had been employed.
- 4. Granting of Unescorted Access Authorization in reviewing the information found by the licensees in conducting background screening for Droga, the inspectors did not 0.nd sufficient reason to expect a licensee to deny unescorted access for him. Furthermore, after reviewing records of Droga's performance and interviewing his supervisors, the inspectors concluded that there was no basis for a licensee to revoke Droga's unescorted access authorization.
B. Programmaticissues
- 1. Current Requirements l
Current NRC requirements would not have prevented Droga from gaining authorization for unescorted access. This conclusion is bome out by the fact that licensees that complied with their commitments and the NRC's expectations concoming the granting of access authorization appear to have had an adequate basis to grant Droga unescorted access.
1 The decision to grant unescorted access is intertwined with the decision to employ an '
individual. Consequently, the NRC has established no disqualifying criteria for licensees to use in deciding whether to grant unescorted access and expects the i licensees to rely on required information in making their own decisions. The staff is j satisfied that the three licensees did what would be expected sad complied with current ;
requirements and commitments in their physical security plans. The staff is also ;
satisfied that the 13censees made reasonable decisions in deciding to grant Droga unescorted access, considering the information available to the licensees when the decisions were made.
- 2. New Requirements The staff considered whether additional background checks would provide a higher 2 level of assurance as to an individual's integrity, such as contacts with local law l enforcement, review of driving records, and telephone interviews withthe applicant's j
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4 neighbors or associates. These additional checks could uncover personal data not found in more formal records (such as employment records, psychological evaluations, and existing criminal records) and could provide the hiring licensee with new tools for evaluating personal traits and judging the appropriateness of granting unescorted access to an individual. The staff decided that such additional checks would require the expenditure of additional resources by the licensees with no resulting quantifiable increase in assurance concoming the individual's integrity. The staff also determined that licensees might face complex legal challenges in using such information to deny access, an action that, in practical terms, would effectively deny employment.
Therefore, requiring such additional checks would not be appropriate at this time.
The staff also considered whether the conditions for granting femporary unescorted access should be changed. The granting of temporary access, that is authorization for unescorted access before a complete background investigation is completed, carries with it certain implied risks. However, licensees experience periodic fluctuations in site population, including large-and short-term-increases in the site workforce during outages that necessitate quick tumeround in granting access, a need that is satisfied by the granting of temporary access by the licensees to the new hires. NUMARC 8g-01, the appendix to RG 5.66, states that temporary access authorization will be based on (a) verification of identity, (b) psychological evaluation, (c) credit check, (d) one daveloped reference, (e) the initiation of a criminal history check, and (f) a check of the applicant's employment history for the past year. When the licensee has completed those steps and considered the information obtained, it may grant temporary authodzation for unescorted access to the applicant for not more then 180 days pending completion of the checks required by the access authorization program.
The staff met with Nuclear Energy institute officials to discuss the Personnel Access Data System (PADS), a computer-based system for recording b&ckground information on employees who have worked with temporary access authorization at one or more nuclear power facilities. PADS provides a corps of" pro approved" nuclear employees whose unescorted access authorization can be granted by successive licensee employers who subscribe to PADS and who access it for a record of the applicant's history in the industry. This system, when it is fully operations! and reaches 100 percent subscription by the nuclear power industry, could provide substantial savings in time and money in the access authorization program, as well as an increase in the overall assurance that ten.porary employees are trustworthy and reliable.
Cons;dering the progress being made to implement PADS, the staff recommends no changes to the agency's approach to grants of temporary unescorted access at this time. If PADS does not reach full sWscription, if future incidents in temporary access warrant, or if conditions in the industry's application of access authorization change, the staff will reconsider this position and determ'ne whether new requirements are l necessary.
IV. Recommendations A. Curror$t Requirements ka
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The sta# rammmends no changes to current requirements at this time.
B. New Requirements l The staff recommends no new requirements at this time. i 1
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