ML20236F294
| ML20236F294 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 06/29/1998 |
| From: | Toelle S UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | Meyer D NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| FRN-63FR26630, RTR-NUREG-1600 63FR26630-00004, 63FR26630-4, GDP-98-0131, GDP-98-131, NUDOCS 9807020103 | |
| Download: ML20236F294 (5) | |
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A Global Energy Company ghy June 29,1998 GDP 98-0131 RULES & g.;. BisCH US NRC Mr. David L. Meyer Chief, Rules and Directives Branch Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration Mail Stop: T6D59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)
Docket Nos. 70-7001 and 70-7002 USEC Comments on NRC Enforcement Policy, Rev.1,63 Fed. Reg. 26630 (May 13,1998)
Dear Mr. Meyer:
On behalf of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), I am pleased to provide comments on the NRC's Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Actions, NUREG-1600, Rev.1.
The NRC Enforcement Actions Policy places Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) in the same base civil penalty category as nuclear power reactors (Category "a").
As discussed in the attached comments, placing the GDPs into the power reactor category is inappropriate and excessive. The primary GDP risks are not nuclear (i.e., resulting from radioactivity), but are in fact, primarily associated with hazardous chemical materials with consequences and risks similar to the non-nuclear chemical industry. Therefore, the GDPs should be included in Category "b" of Table 1 A along with licensed fuel fabrication facilities. This reassignment more properly recognizes the similar consequences of the hazardous chemical accidents at the GDPs and at other chemical facilities compared to the much higher potential radiological consequences associated with reactor accidents.
We would be pleased to discuss these comments with you. Please contact me at (301) 564-3250 or Ms. Amy Rebuck at (301) 564-3246.
9007020103 900629 PDR NUREG Sincerely, 1600 C PDR j
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Steven A.Toelle Nuclear Regulatory Assurance and Policy Manager 6903 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20817-1818 Telephone 301-564-3200 Fax 301-564-3201 http://www.usec.com Offices in Livermore, CA Paducah, KY Portsmouth, OH Washington, DC
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United States Enrichment Corporation Comments on USNRC Enforcement Policy, Rev.1
- 1. Base Civil Penalty Structure The NRC Enforcement Actions Policy (NUREG-1600) places the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs) in the same base civil penalty category as nuclear power reactors (Category "a"
$110,000). NUREG-1600 states that the structure ofcivil penalties " generally takes into account the gravity of the violations as a primary consideration and its ability to pay as a secondary consideration." It is USEC's opinion that the nuclear material inventories and the potential consequences to the workers and the public are more synonymous to those associated with fuel fabricators, Radiological Safety The principal risks associated with nuclear power plants are due to the large inventory of radioactive fission products and the decay heat generated. Neither of these characteristics exist at the GDPs. The potential radiological consequences of accidents at a nuclear power plant are more than 100,000 times those possible at a GDP.
The radiological effects of a UF release are discussed in NUREG-1140.8 The NUREG states, l
in part, " Accompanying radiation doses would not be of significance," and indicates that the harmful effects of a UF release are due primarily to the chemical toxicity of the UF and the products resulting from its reaction with moisture.
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The worst case consequences of an accident at a nuclear power plant are far worse than the worst case accident at the GDPs. It is clear that putting the GDPs in the same category as l
nuclear power plants is not supported by similarity in maximum accident consequences, either radiological or, as shown below, toxicological.
Chemical S tiety The majority of GDP on-and off-site accident risks comes from the hazardous, toxic and reactive chemical materials supporting the uranium enrichment operations, such as the fluorine, hydrogen fluoride, and chlorine trifluoride used in the process or bound chemically with the uranium. These materials, especially hydrogen fluoride, produced in the reaction of UF with atmospheric moisture, are the primary hazardous chemicals of concern at GDP i
l facilities. The NRC has also previously acknowledged that the types of potential accidents at enrichment facilities are similar to those at a conversion plant and fuel fabrication plant
' (NUREG-1140 at 2.2.4) and that the potential consequences of accidents at the GDPs "may be comparable" to other LEU facilities.2 USEC is aware of no analysis that shows that the
'NUREG-1140, "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees," 1991.
2Funches, J.L. (NRC) to Rifakes, G.P. (USEC), Denial of USEC Request for Exemption from FYl997 Annual Fees, March 23,1998.
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Mr. Divid L. Meyrr to GDP-98-0131 f-
- hme 29,1998 Page 2 of 4 i
b' risk associated with operation of the GDPs is greater than other fuel facility facilities.
l Because the potential GDP risk ofinjury to on-site workers or the off-site public is primarily from accidental hazardous chemical releases, it would be appropriate to assign a civil monetary penalty consistent with the statutory maximum penalty for fuel fabricators (i.e.,
$27,500).
Ability to Pay With regard to the secondary factor of the ability to pay, again it is inappropriate to single out the GDPs from other fuel cycle facilities whose financial resources are similar.
II. Modification to Enforcement Poliev Examnles of Violations In a number of places the enforcement examples in Supplement VI, " Fuel Cycle and Materials
. Operations" appear to parallel the words from Supplement 1, " Reactor Operations," but do so inaccurately. The effect is that the Supplement VI example is either vague, or implies a lower threshold to a given severity level for the GDPs than that used for reactors. Given the vastly greater risk to the public posed by a significant esent at a reactor, it is inappropriate to impose a higher standard on the GDPs for a similar violation. The following comments are meant to address such ambiguities and provide consistency where appropriate between the Supplements without altering the intent of the example.
Severity LevelI Examples Supplement VI.A - Examole 2:
Example 2 should be revised to be consistent with example 2 in Supplement I.A which states:
A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intender' tyfunction when actually called upon to work; Example 2 in Supplement VI.A. should be changed as follows:
A system designed toprevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being apcrabk able to perform its intendedsafetyfunction when actually called upon to work; rccparcd c pcepea;; ;;s des;ge;fi.;;c;lu;;;
Supolement VI.A - Examole 5:
Example 5 should be revised to be consistent with example 1 in Supplement I.A which states:
A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifications being i
exceeded; 1
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t' Mr, David L Meyu Attachment I to GDP 98-0131
' June 29,1998 Page 3 of 4 i
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- Item 5 should be changed to be consistent with its equivalent in Supplement 1:
A safety limit, as definedin 10 CFR 76.4, andthe TechnicalSafety Requirements, oHhe
,,plica:iuei being exceeded; Supplement VI.A - Examnle 6:
Example 6 should be revised so as not to imply NRC escalated enforcement action on alleged
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violations that are clearly within thejurisdiction of OSHA. Example 6 should be revised as follows:
Sigmficant injury or loss oflife due to a loss of control over licensed or certified l
activities, including chemicalprocesses involving radioactive materials that are integral to the licensed or certified activity, whether radioactive materialis released or not.
Severity Level H Examples Suoplement VI.B - Example 2:
Example 2 imposes a significantly lower threshold for availability of a safety system on the GDPs than on reactors. The language should be revised to be consistent with the language of
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Supplement I.B example 1 which states:
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A system designed toprevent or mitigate serious safety events not being able to perform y
l its intendedsafetyfunction; Example 2 should be revised as follows to be consistent with Supplement I.B example 1:
A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event bc;;;g i;;upcrablc not
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being able to perform its intended safetyfunction; Suonlement VI.B - Examnle 5:
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Example 5 should be revised so as not to imply NRC escalated enforcement action on alleged l-violations that are clearly within thejurisdiction of OSHA. Example 5 should be revised as i
follows:
1 The potentialfor a sigmficant injury or loss ofhfe' due to a loss ofcontrol over licensed
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or certified activities, including chemicalprocesses involving radioactive materials that l
are integral to the licensed or certified activity, whether radioactive material is released l
or not (e.g., movement ofliquid UF6 cylinder by unapproved methods).
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Mr. David L Meyer
- June 29,1998 ' to GDP-98-0131 Page 4 of4 Severity LevelIII Examples Sunplement VI.C - Example 5:
l Example 5 should be revised so as not to imply NRC escalated enforcement action on alleged violations that are clearly within thejurisdiction of OSHA. Example 5 should be revised as follows:
A substantialpotentialfor exposures, radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases, including releases of toxic materialfrom radioactive sources caused by afailure to comply with NRC regulations, from licensed or certified activities in excess ofNRC's
. regulatorylimits; I
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