ML20236F113
| ML20236F113 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1987 |
| From: | Corbin McNeil Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NLR-N87193, NUDOCS 8710300149 | |
| Download: ML20236F113 (6) | |
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Public Service Electric and Gas Cornpany Corbin' A. McNeill, Jr.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236.Hancocks 8 ridge, NJ 08038 609 339-4800 senior vice President -
October 26, 1987
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l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC ~ 20555 Gentlemen:
i PUMP AND VALVE INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM REVISION 0 - AMENDMENT 1 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) hereby submits Amendment 1 to Revision 0 of the Hope Creek Generating Station
-(HCGS). Pump and Valve. Inservice Testing (IST) Program previously
'provided in a letter from R. L. Mitti (PSE&G) to W. Butler (NRC) dated-July 12, 1985, which is currently implemented.
Attachment 1.contains the amended page deleting check valve LEA-V453, which, assjustified in Attachments 2 and 3, performs no safety function in either the open or closed position.
A similar amendment to Revision 1 of the-IST Program, submitted in a letter from C. A. McNelli, Jr. (PSE&G) dated September 21, 1987, will be forwarded separately.
IST, Revision 1 is currently under your1 review for implementation.
l Shouldcyou have any questions or comments,-please do not hesitate 9
to contact us.
Sincerely, I
Attachments
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i Document Control Desk 2
10-26-87 C
Mr.
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W. Rivenbark USNRC Licensing Project Manager i-Mr.
R. W.
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USNRC Senior Resident Inspector I
Mr. W.
T.
Russell, Administrator s
USNRC Region I l
l Mr.
D. M. Scott, Chief Bureau of Nuclear Engineering Department of Environmental Protection 380 Scotch Road Trenton, NJ 08628 j
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ATTACHMENT 2 SAFETY EVALUATION SUPPORTING INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM i-REVISION 0 - AMENDMENT 1 This safety evaluation demonstrates that check valve 1EA-V453 in the common service water discharge piping header downstream of l
the Reactor Auxiliaries Cooling System (RACS) heat exchangers does not perform a safety function nor is required for Station Service Water System (SSWS) or RACS operation.
This conclusion
-permits the amendment of the Hope Creek Generating Station's (HCGS) Pump and Valve Inservice Testing (IST) Program.
As f
discussed below, this safety evaluation addresses accident probability and consequences including the flooding calculation performed for the RACS heat exchanger rooms in the event of a pipe crack in the service water system.
The following discussion addresses the three questions raised in 10CFR50.59(a)(2).
Reference to P&ID M-10-1, Sheet 2 (reprinted as FSAR Figure 9.2-3) provides the visual details which support the descriptions provided below.
1.
Does the proposed action increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR?
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RESPONSE
The issue at hand is whether or not the operation of HCGS with check valve LEA-V453 inoperable would increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident.
The Station Service Water System is a moderate energy system and check valve V453 is located inside the reactor building at elevation 77'-0".
The SSWS serves, in part, the two RACS heat exchangers, flow from which is discharged into a common piping header and prior to exiting the reactor building on the way to the cooling tower header passes through a motor-operated valve (MOV), V452, and then a check valve, V453.
The function of check valve V453 is (i) to provide SSWS loop isolation in the event of maintenance on MOV V452 and (ii) to provide redundant SSWS loop isolation in the event of a Moderate Energy Line Crack (MELC) upstream of MOV V452.
Since MOV V452 automatically functions to provide isolation of the SSWS loop in the event of a MELC, the ability to isolate SSWS flow to/from the RACS heat exchanger under accident conditions is unaffected by V453 operability.
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,T A review of the mahilum stress values in Calculation C-1729-310, which accounts for Slhess inputs from deaikeig%t, thermal, pressure, OBE and S$E Nources, revealed a' maximum stre'ss value of 10,tU9 pei.
This value is well within the limiting criteria conthined in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.6.2, Branch
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Technical Posi$ ion (BTP) MEB 3-1 of 0.4(1.2(Sh) + Sa) which is 15,000 psi for the subject portion of the SSWS piping.
Therefore, no t hrough wall leaks need be postulated.
- However, for purposes ct 4 this argument it is assumed that a MELC will Envir'anmental Design Criteria, 10855-D7.5ddgntifiedwithinthe As currently Jr occur upstream of MOV V452.
u Bechtel Calculation 11-9240), operator action within 30 minutes for a worst-case SSWS line break which occurs upstream of the RACS heat exchangers in the 36-inch common header for the RACS and SACS results in room floodslevels from an intq% rial flooding source of no greater than 1.0 ft.
For breaks downstream of the RACS heat exchanger and ups tre'am of V4 52, the fit s out of a pipe crack wilP be less due to tbs 1 10wer pressure jp the SSWS downstream ofLthe RACS heat exchanger.
Opqrator acti6n will terminate th9 Isak within 30 minutes by isolating the SSF5 IHping to and f ron.. the RACS heat ordhanger.
As afi edditional consideration compounding the MELC, which is already cuiM.fd3 Che design basis, would be the highly unsikely 66tuatio'n in %ddch V452 could not be isolated. discusses the postulated flooding levels from an extJrnal source, i.ie.h the coo %ing tower basin.
From the discussion gresented, the consequences of a MELC, either isolatable within 30 minutes by operator action, or unisolatable in the short term'are bounded by the previously analyzed flooding scenarios.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed change does not increase the probability or cccurrence of consequences of an accident previously evsluated.
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2.
Does the proposed action create a possibility for an accide nt or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR?
RESPONSE
As discussed above, the possibility of flooding due to a MELC has already been analyzed = from both i nternal and external flooding sources and no new or different type of flooding scenario exists.
Similarly, the' type of accident considered, a M E LC,
although outside the design basis required by the SRP, has already been addressed in the referenced calculations above and no new failure mechanism has been introduced which has not been previously evaluated.
Should the check valve fail clored, flooding concerns are not the issue, rather SSWS flow through the
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RACS heat exchangers will be stopped.
As discussed in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 9.2.1 and 9.2.8, this scenario is already addressed.
Therefore.steel proposed change does not affect the operation of the SSWS VT. the RACS since the subject check velve does not perform a safety function in either its closed or open position.
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