ML20236D944
| ML20236D944 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236D928 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707310139 | |
| Download: ML20236D944 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 j
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68 GEORGIAPONER1 COMPANY,ETAL DOCKET NO. 50-424 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1 l
INTRODUCTION 1
By letter dated July 7,1987, Georgia Power Company, et al., (the licensee) submitted a license amendment request to. change the Technical Specifications w
(TS) for Vogtle Unit 1.
The change proposes to delete references to phase "A" containment isolation on a containment area high-range radiation signal
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fromTS3/4.3.2(Tables 3.3-2, 3.3-3, and 4.3-2) and also correct references
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to TS 3/4.3.2 in TS 3/4.3.3.1 (Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-3) which would no longer be applicable as a result of the first change.
Subsequently, in a letter dated July 22, 1987, the licensee requested that the proposed TS change be granted on an emergency basis and stated that this submittal supersedes the earlier July 7 request. One of the containment area high-range radiation monitors was declared inoperable on July 16,1987, at i
10:40 pm EST. Unless this monitor is returned to service by 10:40 pm EST on July 23, 1987, the unit would have to cool down to hot standby followed by hot shutdown and cold shutdown. The requested change would delete this re-p T
quirement from the TS by deleting the containment isolation function of the
{f containment area high-range monitors.
j EVALUATION Two containment area high-range radiation monitors are located inside the containment building as part of.the Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS).
In addition to this purpose, these monitors function as part of the Engineered t
Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) by initiating phase "A" containment isolation upon actuation.
The Technical Specifications contain limiting conditions for operation.(LCO) and surveillance requirements for the two containment area high-range radiation monitors (monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006) for the ESFAS function TS 3/4.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, require that both channels be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
With one channel inoperable, Action 27 requires that the inoperable channel be restored to operable status.within 7 days or that the plant be in at least hot shutdown-within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, at least hot standby within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and cold q
shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. TS 3/4.3.3.1. Radiation Monitoring-L for Plant Operations,. lists monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 in Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-3 which reference the ESFAS specification for LCO and surveillance requirements.
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4 The proposed TS change would remove references to phase "A" containment iso-lation on a containment area high-range radiation signal, thereby deleting the associated Action Statement requiring the unit to initiate shutdown if one of the two monitors is inoperable for 7 days.
Besides the above contain-ment area high-range radiation monitor signals, phase "A" containment isolation can also be initiated by any signal.which initiates safety injection such as:
manual actuation, high containment" pressure, low pressurizer pressure, and low steamline pressure. There is sufficient diversity' among these parameters for the initiation of containment isolation even without the high radiation signal, and the other parameters would initiate phase "A" isolation prior to the high radiation signal. The staff finds that the licensee will continue to comply with the requirement of NUREG-0737 Item II.E.4.2, " Containment Isolation Dependability," upon deletion of the ESFAS function of monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 because of the diversity of the other parameters which initiate con-i tainment phase "A" isolation. The containmt.nt area high-range monitors'
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function as part of the ARMS remains unchanged by the proposed amendment.
Furthemore, containment purge and vent valve isolation on high containment radiation does not rely on monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006; instead, the purge w
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and vent valve isolation function is provided by radiation monitors RE-0002, j
RE-0003, RE-2565A, RE-25658, and RE-2565C which remain in the Technical Specifications. Moreover, the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications i
(NUREG-0472) do not require the containment area high-range radiation monitors to actuate phase "A" containment isolation, i
Based on the above discussion, the staff concludes that the proposed TS change
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to remove radiation monitors RE-0005 and RE-0006 from being referenced as phase "A" containment isolation actuation instruments is acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment involves a change to the use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has made a final no significant hazards consideration finding with respect to the amendment. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant I
to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The State was infomed by telephone on July 23, 1987, of the staff's no significant hazards consideration determination. The State contact had no comments on the determination.
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The staff has reviewed the licensee's request and has determined that should this request be implemented, it would (1) not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Con-tainment phase "A" isolation on high radiation is not used as a basis in the-FSAR Chapter 15 accident analyses. The high-range radiation monitors are redundant means of initiating phase '.'A containment. isolation because iso-lation is initiated by any signal Whicheinitiates safety injection. These sigt.als, each of which would initiate high-range radiation monitors,-are (1) phase "A"isolation prior. to the manual. safety injection actuation, (2) high containment pressure,-(3) low pressurizer pressure, and (4) low steamline pressure..
Also,thelicensee'sproposedchangeswouldnot(2)createthepossibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated' because no new or novel features would be added to plant design. Finally, the licensee's proposed changes would not (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because adequate diversity for initiation of phase "A" containment isolation still exists with deletion of.the ESFAS function of the 23
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containment area high-range radiation monitors and the other features would initiate phase "A" isolation prior to the high-range radiation monitors.
Accordingly, the Commission finds that the changes involve no significant hazards consideration.
FINDINGS OF EMERGENCY WARRANTING AN AMENDMENT WITHOUT NOTICE The licensee's application for the Technical Specification change has been timely. The licensee states that monitor RE-0006 was declared inoperable due' to an intermittent " low fail" alarm on the Safety Related Display Console on July 16. This indicates a possible interruption of current through the monitor loop, The channel was placed in bypass and current monitored overnight.
Current readings indicated an intermittent loss of continuity. On July 17, components in the monitor loop located outside containment were tested in an attempt to locate the fault. A faulty cable connector at a pre-amplifier assembly in the control building was found'and repaired. On July 18, entry was made into containment to test cables for continuity, with satisfactory results. On July 19, as a cable was being teminated at its inboard contain-ment penetration, a mechanical failure of the connector occurred.- Since that time, the licensee has directed its efforts at developing a procedure, locating the necessary parts, and preparing the connector for repair.
On-site sources, as well as vendors and other utilities.were' contacted resulting in the parts--
being obtained by Wednesday, July 22.
Repair of the connection will be attempted on July 22; however, the licensee estimates that the LCO may expire before the repair and the required functional testing can be completed.
The inability to repair the radiation monitor results in the existence of an exigent situation. Without this amendment, the monitor would have-to be returned to operable status by 10:40 pm EST on July.23,1987, or the unit would have to be cooled down to Mode 3 and ultimately Mode 5.
The proposed change would. delete the ESFAS function of the containment area high-range monitors thereby deleting the associated Action Statement requiring the unit to initiate shutdown if one of the two monitors is inoperable for 7 days.
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1 The staff finds that failure to grant the proposed change in a timely manner would result in unit shutdown. We also find that the licensee could not reasonably have avoided this situation, that the licensee has responded in a timely manner, and has not delayed its application to take advantage of the Emergency License Amendments provisions of 10 CFR 50.91. According'ly, the staff concludes that the licensee has satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), and that a valid emergency sexists.
CONCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will.
not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 1
security or to the health and safety of the public.
w Principal Contributors: Melanie A. Miller, PDII-3 Change Li, SPLB Dated: July 24, 1987 i
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