ML20236D848

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Annual 10CFR50.59 Rept 1988
ML20236D848
Person / Time
Site: Byron  
Issue date: 12/31/1988
From: Pleniewicz R
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
References
BYRON-89-0209, BYRON-89-209, NUDOCS 8903230309
Download: ML20236D848 (45)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ 4 i l l i 6 l 1 l l BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION ANNUAL 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT 1988 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY NRC DOCKET NO. 50-454 AND 50-455 LICENSE NO. NPF-37 AND NPF-66 I l l t. i i i 8903230309 891231 ty 4 DR ADOCK 0500 I: $

q r v l D '.,.. \\ t-1 MODIFICATION M6-0-82-011 DESCRIPTION l This modification installed a pressure gauge on instrument panel 0PLO52J.in the Circulating Water Pump House to monitor Fire Protection System header pressure. Existing pressure gauges are mounted inside the discharge check. l valves and do not provide system pressure when the pumps are not running. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the modification does not change the fire protection system operating information and is i not regulred for system operation. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the added pressure gauge does not effect the fire protection system operation. L 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technlcal Specification, is not reduced because the fire protection system function is not effected and the additional systemtoperating information is not related to any Technical Specification requirements. l + l l 1 1 1 l

- ~ < \\ h. i l MODIFICATION M6-0-84-043 DESCBIPTIQH This modification relocated the pressure-controller for valve 0FP608, a pressure controlled recirculating valve on the discharge of the OA-Fire Pump. Originally, the pressure controller was mounted on the valve and' subjected to excessive vibration which effected its performance. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because no components j importent to safety have been modified and the function of the valve and controller remain the same. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FdAR is not created because the function of the fire protection system remains the same. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the reliability of the pressure. l controller is increased due to its relocation to an area not subject to excessive vibration. 2

v s' 4 I I MQQ1FICATION M6-0-84-300 and M6-0-85-0Q3 DESCRIPTION These modifichtlons involved the-installation of piping in the Radwaste-tunnel, Auxiliary Building, and Radwaste Building truck bay to enable the use of a portable Radwaste (WX) E, tem. This enhances the operability of the existing system and provides system backup. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an-accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in l the FSAR.is not increased by these modifications because the use of I portable radwaste equipment provides redundancy to the system without J changing the function of the system. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the design basis and function of the system remain unchanged. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis-for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because addition of portable radssste equipment provides a backup to the existing system which increases system availability. l 1 i l i l l 3

l t 4 l F10DIFICATION M6-0-84-307, M6-0-85-305 and M6-0-85-503 I DESCE121LOM These modifications add a new Regeneration Waste Drain tank'and convert the existing Regeneration Waste Drain tank to a dual purpose Chemical / Regeneration waste Drain tank. Also provided are an additional Chemical Drain Tank pump and two Regeneration Waste Drain Tank pumps, as well as piping, valves and instruments required to interface this new equipment with the existing radwaste system. l .These modifications also reroute the drain piping from the Release Tank pump ( drains to the Auxiliary Building Floor' drain system. The piping from the Release Tank pump discharge to the Regenerative Drain tank inlet header allows Release tank effluent to be returned to the liquid radwaste processing system j if the effluent quality is not adequate for off-site release. The routing of 1 the Release tank overflow piping and the Release tank pump drain piping to t.he liquid radwaste processing system prevents contamination of the Turbine Pullding drains if the Release tank contents were to become contaminated. Dur!.ng operation of the existing system, the Regeneration Waste Drain and the i Chemical Drain tank inlet valves are closed while the contents of the tank.are f being mixed, analyzed, adjusted and discharged. The tanks cannot accept any other effluent input during this time which aids in the prevention of system' ] backup. SAEETY EVALUATION SUMMARI 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by these modifications because the quality of the Liquid Radwaste system effluent is enhanced by the addition of more holding capacity and allowance of additional processing time. l 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the modifications allow processing non-safety related equipment effluent, provide additional pumping and storage capacity, and do not effect safety l related equipment or components. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because these modifications allow increasing the quality of effluent and reducing the potential of contaminated effluent. l 4

1 c I tiQDJFICATIQti M6-1-84-175 DIS.CRIP21Dti This modification replaced the Steam Generator Blowdown (SD) Condenser Hotwell pumps with higher capacity pumps to allow pumping to the Condensate Storage tank when SD blowdown is at the maximum. Overpressure protection is also provided at the supply header to the Blowdown Mixed Bed Demineralizers due to th'e higher capacity pumps. The modification also provided cooling water to the new SD pump bearing housings. l SAEEIX_EEALUATION

SUMMARY

l 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not-increased by this modification because the new pumps provide the capability to pump hotwell water to the Condensate Storage tank in accordance with the system design criteria. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because system function is not changed.- The system' remains a moderate energy system and non-safety electrical loads are within appropriate limits. Over-pressure protection is added to protect the Blowdown Mixed Bed Demineralizers. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this modification does not impact or degrade the operation of any Technical Specification related equipment, or components. ) i I l 5 1

l MODIFICATION M6-0-85-235 i I DESCRIPTIQH This modification revised the River Screen House HVAC system to provide better temperature controlled natural ventilation and improve winter ventilation i ( operation. It provides independent temperature control of dampers and louvers, deletes existing damper interlocks with the fans (with the exception of one louver section). The return air dampers will lock in the open position, the outside air louvers and relief dampers will f ail open to provide adequate ventilation in the event of an electrical power loss. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMA 8X l 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in 1 the FSAR is not increased by this modification because evaluation of temperature control showed that effected equipment is maintained within its temperature limits. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the modification improves the operation of the system during low temperatures. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical, Specification, is not reduced because the River Screen House Ventilation system is not addressed by the Technical Specifications. I l 8 l l l i 6 l

i MODIFICATION M6-0-85-357 DESCRIPTION s ' This: modification added a release" tank (0NX26T)land its cross ties to the ) existing release tank (0WX01T). Also added was a chemical (a'id.and caustic) c addition system and tank mixers for the two releaseLtanks. These additions allow flexibility in radweste system operation by providing parallel processing flowpaths to increase the processing capacity of the system. 9 SAGTY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an acciden, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by.this modification because.these additions allow a parallel processing path which decreases the potential.of equipment malfunction from effecting plant operation. 1 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than l any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the system function remains unchanged. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the capability of the system to process effluent is increased, thus decreasing the off-site release levels. 1 ) l l 1 i t e I 7 i .-__._..m.

y i# d 1 MODIFICATION M6-1-85-358 DESCRIPTION .This modification revised the.intilation system serving the Unit 2 Remote' Shutdown Panel (RSP) room due to installation of block walls.used to separate the Unit 2 RSP from the Radwaste Control panel room. A ducted, water cooled air condition) unit has been added to provide adequate ventilation and temperature control to the Unit.2 RSP. SAFETY EVALUATION SUt9fABI 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequencelof an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the' effected.HVAC system is non-safety related and does not Interact with equipment or components important to safety. ( 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the PSAR is not create'd because the modification provides additional cooling which will keep the associated Remote Shutdown Room equipment within its design rating. i 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical i Specification, is not reduced because the Remote Shutdown Panel HVAC does I not effect,any Technical Specifications.or bases. l 1 i i I 8 L

MODIFICATION M6-0-85-412 DESCRIPTION This modification provided a smaller release tank discharge line to the circulating water blowdown line in parallel with the existing discharge line. These changes ensure the accurate control of Release tank discharge flow when flow rates of 0-150 gpm are required due to the presence of higher than normal radioactivity levels in the discharge effluent. Tlie existing control valve is capable of accurate flow modulation between 180 gpm and 720 gpm flow rates. The isolation valve is interlocked with the other flow loop to prevent using both at the same time. SAf3))LJjlALilATION SUMMAll1 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the system function and system design basis remain the same, 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the isolation valve interlock prevents using the system in a manner different than the original design basis. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the modification increases the ability to monitor low flow rates. A Technical Specification revision was approved to address the addition of a parallel, low flow process j effluent monitor. I i 9 s

MODIFICATION M6-.0-85-466-DESCRIPTION This modification provides connection of the 50,000 gallon outdoor fuel oil storage tank (OD0127) to the Fuel'011 Storage system. Included'are the q associated level instrumentation 'and pump interlocks. EAEEH EVALUATION StTt9dAEX 1. The probability of an. occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the Diesel Oil j system function remains the same. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a differenE type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created-because the additional fuel oil tank is provided with fire detection and suppression, located within a separate berm, and operated.the same as the existing fuel oil tanks. 1 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the additional fuel oil capacity. will ensure sufficient quantitles of fuel oil during winter heating months. j i I l 10 1

r MODIFICATION M6-1-85-488 nzscaIEIIon l This modification abandons in place fan IVXO7C and the associated controls, instruments and alarms.--This fan is unnecessary after removing the lower, cable spreading room from the Control Room Ventilation Pressure Boundary during modification M6-0-84-242. j SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

) 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence.of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the fan did not serve any safety related function after revision of the Control Root 1 l Pressure Boundary. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because-the temperature evaluation of the area indicated no temperature control limitations associated with elimination of the fan and abandoning it in. place did not create any additional safety hazard. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the rooms effected by fan IVX07C' have been evaluated for temperature control and the fan is no longer l t associated with any Technical Specification limit. i l } l 11 1 1 l 1 l

c MODIFICATION M6-1-85-644 DISCRIFIIQH This modification rerouted Process Sampling System tubing from both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Liquid Sample Panels (LSP) to common lines feeding the Unit 1 Chemical Analysis Panel (CAP). In addition, air-operated valves were installed to provide for the isolation of one unit's effluent while the other unit's, effluent sample is being analyzed in the CAP. This dual service is required due to the unavailability of sufficient shielding space at the front i of the Unit 2 CAP. l SAEETY EVALUA H ON SUMMARI l l 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction o0~ equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the affected components are non-safety related and not required for safe shutdown of the reactor. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than 4 any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the modification will not effect safety related systems or components needed j for safe reactor shutdown. I 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical j Specification, is not reduced because systems or components effected by this modification are not ir.cluded in the discussion of the basis for any safety limits as described in the Technical Specifications. l l l l l 12

BQDIFICATION M6-0-86-054 RESCRIPTIDH This modification moved four station heating fan units from the Radwaste Building to the area between the Radwaste Building truck bay doors. This will improve temperature control in the area when the truck bay doors are opened. l SAFETY EVALHATION

SUMMARY

l 1. The probability of an occurronce or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the system function is not changed, the fans provide comfort heating and do not effect safety-related equipment. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the new location of the fans outside the radwaste building will reduce the potential of an airborn radiation hazard. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the fans do not effect equipment or components addressed in the Technical Specification bases. 13

t - ) HQDIFICATION M6-0-86-149 DESCRIPTlQt{ This modification added a third Prime computer to the Technical Support Center (TSC). Also included is, expansion of the TSC computer room and additional air conditioning to handle the resulting increased heat load. This provides increased margin to allow one air conditioning compressor to act as a stand-by j unit. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the added computer I and air conditioning does not perform a safety related function and its a addition does not effect any equipment important to safety. l 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because loss of the additional computer and air conditioning does not effect operation of the plant. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical i Specification, is not reduced because the TSC computers and HVAC systems do not effect any Technical Specification bases. 1 l l 14

4. '. ~. ' ' MODIFICATION M6-0-86-179 DESCRIPTION This modification provides a process radiation monitor (OPR41J) to monitor the radiation level in the Condensate Polisher high and low conductivity, sumps.= Tha-radiation monitor isolaten the sumps by tripping the high and low, conductivity sump pumps (OCPO4P and OCP05P), initiates a shutdown of the condensate polishing' system, and provides an alarm on the Condensate-Po11 sher. j control panel in.the event of=a high radiation alarm or monitor, operational-failure. SMETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety.as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the process-radiation monitor will stop and/or prevent an effluent release from the high and low conductivity sumps if the effluent is above the radiation monitor high radiation setpoint. 2. The possibility for'an accident or malfunction of a'different. type than any previously evaluated in the~FSAR is not created because the monitor will isolate the effluent release from the high and low conductivity sumps if the high radiation setpoint is exceeded on the process radiation monitor. The radiation monitor does not interface with any safety. related equipment and its failure does not degrade any safety related-equipment or components. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the addition of the process radiation monitor will ensure effluent release limits'are not exceeded. l ) l 15

I MODIFICATION M6-0-86-20D 1 DESCRIEIIDH The existing Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralized did not provide sufficient Evaporator flow rate'to' adequately clean the Blowdown Evaporator distillate. The resulting effluent was discharged via the Blowdown Release tank. This modification allows the water to be pumped through a Blowdown Demineralized at the required flow rate so that it can be reclaimed. SAFETY EVALUATION _SU191AEX .j 1 \\ 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or 6 malfunction of-equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in -l the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the water in the .) Blowdown Monitor tank can now be cleaned sufficiently to minimize i off-site discharges. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than ] any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because this I modification reduces the amount and potential for discharging contaminated waste.. q 3. The margin of safety, La defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the ability to process additional waste decreases the potential for discharging contaminated waste. l i l l 16

d MODIFICATION M6-0-86-214 DESCRIPTION This modification enhanced the fire protection program by installing fire dampers in the ventilation ductwork and a fire door in the wall. separating the 1A Residual Heat Removal pump _ and 1A Containment Spray pump room from the IB Residual Heat Removal pump and 1B Containment Spray pump room. The existing wall and fire seals between these rooms were also upgraded to provide a 1 1/2 l l hour fire rated barrier. l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

i 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the probability of redundant equipment being affected due to a fire is decreased. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because this modification does not affect system operation. l 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the system reliability is increased due to the enhancement of the fire barrier separating redundant equipment. j 1 l 4 17 L--- --- --- - ---------------------.------- - -------- -------.--.

v MODIFICATION M6-0-86-227 DESCRIPTION This modification replaced the Recycle Evaporator Concentrates pumps with non-ASME, section III pumps. The previous pumps were unreliable in meeting design operating conditions due'to difficulties in pumping liquids containing concentrated boric acid. SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMAEX 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of. equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the application of i the new pumps does not change the system function. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the declassification of the Recycle Evaporator Concentrates pumps is within the guidelines of Reg Guide 1.29 with respect to offsite doses created due to a failure of a component. Failure of any portion of the Boric Acid Evaporator system does not impact the design basis for safe shutdown of the plant. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Recycle Evaporator Concentrates pumps are not addressed in the Technical Specifications or bases. 18 l

MODIFICATION M6-0-86-285 DEECRIPTIOd This modification was an enhancement to the Halon Fire. Suppression system to comply with NFPA 12A and provided detectors and solenoid operated valves for the upper cable spreading rooms. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as-previously evaluated in i l the FSAR is mot increased by this modification because the modification _j adds supervision of the Halon firs Suppression system and does not effect the operation of the system. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because'the. coverage of the Halon Fire Suppression system is extended to the upper cable spreading room. 3. The margin of safety, as defined.in the basis for any Technical l Specification, is not reduced because monitoring of the Halon Fire Suppression system increases the margin of safety by providing immediate indication of component malfunction within the system. l 1 l l l I 19

-v MODIFICATION M6-1-86-041 and M6-2-86-041 i ' DESCRIPTION The installation of fire, flood, ventilation and radiation seals required for Unit 1 and Unit 2 ~ operation was completed by these modifications. SAFETY' EVALUATION SUMMABX 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence'of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in ' the FSAR-is not increased by these : modifications because the modifications were in accordance with the design basis for the fire protection system. 2. The possibility for an accident or' malfunction of a different type than. any previously evaluated.in the FSAR is not created because these modifications ensure compliance with the system design criteria. 3. The margin of safety, as~ defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the modifications conform to the requirements of the Technical Specifications and their bases and complete the original design requirements. l 20

v l l l l l l l MODIFICATION M6-1-86-048 DESCRIPTIQ[i l 1 This modification installed upgrades to improve the operation and reliability I of the Liquid Sample Panel. These included: l a. Installation of an "Orbisphere" dissolved oxygen monitor and cell, l l b. installation of "Rosemount" flow transmitters and associated indicators, i y c. replacement of various flow isolation valves, and i d. replacement of Variable Rod-in-Capillaries (VREL's). SMITY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the effected components are non-safety related and are not required for safe shutdown of the reactor. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the modification will not ef fect any safety related systems or components i needed for safe reactor shutdown. l l 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the systems or components effected by this modification are not included in the discussion of the basis for any safety limits as described in the Technical Specifications. l l 21 I

v- - I tiQp_lflCATION M6-1-86-113 and M6-2-87-032 J 1 DESCRIEIJRN ] These modifications replace the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump st'ction pressure ( switches with pressure transmitter loops and satisfy 10CFR$0 Appendix R 3 requirements by rerouting and insulating system cables. The pressure transmitters correct problems with setpoint drift associated with the original pressure switches. SAFETY EVALUAIIDH_SUMMARI i I 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by these modifications because the Auxiliary Feedwater System pump suction pressure design basis is maintained. l 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than i any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the function j of the Auxiliary Feedwater pump low suction pressure trip is maintained. Cable separation is maintained as required by 10CFR50 Appendix R l requirements, i I l 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical f Specification, is not reduced because the low suction pressure setpoint drift is eliminated which increases the reliability'of the system. The 1 availability of the Auxiliary Feedwater pump is increased since unnecessary low pump suction pressure trips are eliminated. 1 1 1 a 4 i 1 i i 1 l l 1 l l 22 l 1 l l l

TI ~" I l FQ9IFICATION M6-1-86-138 f DESCRIEIIQH ) 1 1 This modification rerouted the Post Accident Hydrogen Monitor sampling lines j to remove the previously existing water traps. The revised lines utilized < l different containment penetrations to eliminate the original loop seals and prevent low flow to the monitors. SAEETY EVALUATION SUMMAEI 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or j malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in l the FSAR is not increased by this modification because it enhances the l ability of the Post Accident Hydrogen Monitoring system to perform its f design function. 'l 1 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than I f any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the modification does not effect any equipment which could result in an occurrence which has not been previously analyzed. 1 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical l Specification, is not reduced because this modification maintains the l containment penetration portion of the Post Accident Hydrogen Monitor l system within the Technical Specification limitations. l l l l l 23

we .n - L. s v f MODIFICATION M6-1-86-189'and M6-2-86-189 DESCRIPTION 'These modifications added a 2 inch layer of thermal. insulation plus protective alwninum lagging to the Unit'l and Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank walls. ) Also, heater controls were modified to assure freeze protection. Plant 'l operating status and tank condensate level is unaffected by these modifications. SAFETY EVALUA'IION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or:the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the increased freeze protection' ensures that Condensate Storage Tank volume and-Auxiliary Feed pump suction are not effected during cold weather. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.in the FSAR is not created because the modifications do not change the design basis of the system. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the possibility of freezing in the Condensate Storage. Tanks is reduced, which if it occurred could effect the margin of safety related to the required Condensate Storage Tank volume and Auxiliary Feed Pump suction. i l l 24

y- .;i MODIFICATION M6-1-86-230 I i DESCRIEIl0E i j irhis modification installed a check valve in the Unit I containment floor drain sump discharge line. This prevents pumping water-from the Unit 2 containment to the Unit 1 containment floor drain sump and prevents possible contamination of the Unit I containment floor drain' sump. A valve and drain pipe have also been installed to facilitate local leak rate testing of valves 1RF026 and 1RF027. j i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to. safety as previously evaluated'in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the modification j is not safety related and will prevent false' indication of unidentified leakage. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated.In the FSAR is not created because this modification does not change the intent-of the system design. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this modification reduces the possibility of false indication of unidentified leakage due to water l being introduced from the Unit 2 containment floor drain system. 1 i l 25 i

s- .I o 1 1 l MODIFICATION'M6-1-86-247-l 1 DISCRIEILQN l ThismoNificationenhancedtheconditionoffireratedbarriersbyadding.new checkered plate covers and seals to hatches in the Auxiliary Building, and new seals to existing hatches and removable concrete plugs. 1 f SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. 'The probability of an occurrence or 'the consequence of,an accident,' or malfunction of equipment important to safety.as previously evaluated in ~ the FSAR is not increased by this modification because this modification improves the quality of the affected fire barriers within the limits of-previous evaluations.- l 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because fire barrier ratings were not changed as a result of this modification. j l 3. The margin of safety,.as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because this modification does not effect the fire detection or suppression systems or the. ability to achieve and maintain sufe shutdown in the event of a fire.. I I J l 'l 26

,7 j i; M !) / ' L-I r s-

d C MODIFICATION M6-1-86-256 l

DESCRIPTION ] This modification. enhanced the condition of fire seals in floor openings by* l filling unused ejectrical penetrations. I SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l.; 1. The probability of an occurrence, or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment.important to safety as previously evaluated in j the FSAR is not' increased by this modification because the modification i enhanced the continuity of the applicable fire barrierr.. j 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created,because the fire barriers continue to meet their required fire ratings,. 3. The matain eof safety, as defined in the basis forl any Technical { Specification, is not reduced because the modification ensured compliance with required design criteria and conformance io the Technical-Specifications and their bases. t i I 1 27

9 p 's x u l MQDJFICATION M6-1-86-294 d DESCIllPILQN This modificati.on provides emergency lighting and associated battery packs to illuminate valves 1AF005A through 1AF005H and the passageways necessary,for an operator to reach these valves during a loss of offsite power event. The battery packs are fed from a non-ESF power supply in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. SAE.ETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. .The probability of an 6ccurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the operation of. /j, the valves is not effected. The lights and battery packs will not effect y the operability of any safety related equipment. I 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than l any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because a failure of i j the lights or battery packs will not degrade or effect the operability of l any safety related systems. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical l Specification, is not reduced because a failure of the lights or battery packs will not ef fect the operation of any equipment required to be operable by the Technical Specifications. t R l l l 28

0 MODIFICATION M6-0-87-011 DESCRIE21DF This modification altered several automatic sprinkler systems in the Auxiliary l Building stairwells as a result of further evaluation of the 3 hour fire l barriers. The enhanced design increased the density of the sprinkler l discharge and provided sufficient flow density at the stairwell openings' to l prevent fire spread between elevations otherwise separated by fire rated l barriers. SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malf unction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because this modification improves the quality of fire rated barriers between elevations in the Auxiliary Building. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the fire barrier ratings and locations remain the same. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced.because the fire barrier effectiveness is j increased while maintaining the same rating. ? L 29

v l MQDiflfAILON M6-0-87-015 RESCRIEIl0U 1 l This modification makes revisions to the Control Room Ventilation (VC) system l control circuit to provide for separate and redundant Process Radiation I monitor interlocks to the Control Room isolation logic. The modified design provides independent actuation of the Emergency Mode of the Control Room HVAC on air intake radiation monitor high radiation conditions by a normally functioning detector circuit when the second circuit may have f ailed or experienced loss of control power. Additionally, the ability to realign the CV system following a high radiation signal using the reset circuit has been eliminated. This ensures that the VC system is not inadvertently realigned to the bypass mode. The Control Room offices HVAC (VV) system is also modified so that it is shut down in the event of a high radiation signal from the ( Control Room intake radiation monitors. l l SAIETY EVALUATION SilEtiARI 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment importan' to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because it enhanced the l l original system design and eJiminated the potential for undetected l failure in the actuation circuitry, while increasing the redundancy required for actuation. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the system function is not changed. System reliability is increased by correcting possible system malfunctions. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basic for any Technical i Specification, is not reduced because the system continues to meet the design criteria and applicable Technical Specification and bases. l l 30 I

v- ,.f MODIFICATION M6-0-87-103 l DESCE1EIlOE l 1 This modification provides an isolation valve and flanged connection to the l primary water (PW) _ Vacuum Deareator. ' supply header for future connection to the PW Recycle l I j SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the portion of the ~ PW system affected has no design safety analysis in the-FSAR. The PW system is non-safety related. This modification was used to provide ASME N-stamp decertification. For this purpose,-the portion of the PW system' effected by this modification was upgraded to safety related, ASME class 1. ] i 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than I any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the impacted system is non-safety related and has no impact on equipment important to safety. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is'not reduced because the PW system is not included in the basis discussion of any Technical Specification limitations nor does l this modification effect any other bases. 31 p I i ____m __m__.__.__a__ _. - _ _ _

_-y-._-_____ r - j HQRIFICATION M6-1-87-059 DESCRIP110ti This modification revises the minimum flow and temperature purge permissive interlocks for Feedwater Isolation Valves-1FWOO9A, B, C, and D. This allows the valves to be' opened manually, as necessary, for the prevention of. water j hammer. Also provided, are new low flow alarms and separate control panel- ' windows on panel 1PM.04J.for steam generator loop high/ low flow alarms. 5AFETY EVALUATI(M E MMARY 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because no safety function is affected by.the incorporation'of water hammer prevention measures into plant operating procedures. l j 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a'different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because automatic isolation is removed.. Water hammer protection is provided by the remaining temperature permissives and administrative procedures, j l . _3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the safety function of the Feedwater Isolation valves is not changed. 1 l f 8 1 l-32 l.

1 -{ 1 l l MODIFICATION M6-1-87-102 ) onclutnan This modification installed' auto make-up capability to the Component Cooling system surge tank. Air operated valves and the associated level control function were added to the primary and demineralized water systems surge tank make-up sources. -j SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

l l. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evalunted in I the FSAR is not increased by.this modification because the function and l operation of the Component Cooling system surge tank are not effected. Automatic maintenance of surge tank level decreases the probability of malfunction of equipment. 2. The possibility for an accident.or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the function l of the Component Cooling Water system is not effected. Level indication and monitoring of the surge tank level is not effected by failure of any equipment added by this modification. Manual control is still available. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the incorporation of automatic make-up to the Component Cooling Water surge tank increases the availability of sufficient cooling capacity and rollability of the Component Cooling Water system. ) l l l I i l r 33 l l

m \\ MOIU"TIATION M6-1-87-117 / EESCRIPTlDH This modification involved rewiring the reactor protection circuitry to change the reactor trip on turbine trip permissive from P7 to P8. Previously, a turbine trip caused the reactor to trip if power was above 10% (P7). The modification results in a turbine trip causing a reactor trip only if reactor power is above 30% (P8). The modification also revises steam dump control actuation from turbine trip to reactor trip, so that on. turbine trip below P8 the ' steam dumps are controlled by the load rejection controller. The modification ellmates reactor trips upon turbine trips which occur between 10% and 30% power, which reduces the stress to the plant upon turbine trips ar.d protection systems. SAELTX_JYALUATI9tLSU191ARX 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because' turbine trip initiation of reactor trip is not credited in the FSAR. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because safety systems remain unchanged. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because safety systems remain unchanged. i ) I i 34 i

v 3 4 s l MODIFICATION M6-1-87-131 l l f RESCELEllON { i This modification removed the interlocks connecting the transformer water i spray (fire protection) systems with the trip relays on the Main Power l transformers. The spray transformers and System Auxiliary transformers. The 1 I spray header pressure switches were also disconnected from the deluge initiation circuits to remove the trip interlocks with the transformer coolers due to deluge pressure switch signals. SMETY EVALUAllON SUMMAEX 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an. accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR IG not increased by this modification because the modification will not alter the operation of the transformers or the deluge syatems. The removal of the interlocks eliminates the potential for inadvertent J trips of the transformers during deluge system testing. 1 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than j any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the systems ) are still operated in accordance with their design bases. In the event i of a fire, it is not necessary to remove power to the effected l transformer prior to initiating the deluge system. l 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the modification does not change { the operation of any Technical Specification related system. 1 l l l l l i l l 35

m et 'O f MODIFICATION M6-1-87-134 DISCRIPTI0ti This' modification prevents the. inadvertent 1 start of the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump during maintenance and testing activities. The S5 switch has been rewired so that 1) the pump starting and fuel shut-off relays. will not energize when the S5 switch is placed lln the "OFF" position and 2) a ~ ~ ground connection is provided for. components on the control panel to prevent electrical noise. SAFETY GVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,.or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the modification f does not change the safety function or design of this system... The ' modification prevents inadvertent starts of the diesel while testing is, 1 in progress and increases the accuracy of the tachometer readings by ~ reducing electrical noise. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than-any previously evaluated in the FSAR is notocreated because the system operation is enhanced by minimizing spurious starts during maintenance and testing. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis'for.any" Technical: Specification, is not reduced because potential system l damage is i minimized by reducing the potential for inadvertent starts. Reducing ] electrical' noise 1.screases the accuracy of the tachomater circuit during j system operation. 1 8 I O f i 1 36 1 s k

l a t i i \\ MODIFICATION M6-1-88-030 DESERIEROM This modification effects the fire detection system by removing several potential causes of spurious suppression system actuation.

1) One train of ionization detectors in each of the cable spreading rooms and the cable tunnel was replaced with a train of rate-compensated heat detectors.

2) Each train of rate-compensated heat detectors was cross connected with the opposite train of ionization detectors to provide automatic suppression system actuation. i

3) A back-up power supply (battery) was added to the Fire Detection Panels.
4) A time-control relay was added to the detection panels to limit the duration of a power interruption during detection panel reset.

SAEETY_EYALUATIoli SUMMM11 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the level of detection and suppression capability is maintained as originally designed l while increasing the detection capabilities and decreasing the potential for spurious actuation. I 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the operability of the Fire Detection System is not effected. I 3. The margin of safety, an defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the ability of the Fire Protection System to respond to a fire has not been reduced. Additional detection capability has been provided while minimizing spurious actuation and potential personnel safety hazards. s l t 37

,a l e 1 1 MODIFICATION M6-1-88-040 DES.CRIEIIDH During initial startup testing and continuing through power operations,- improper feedwater flow splits were observed between the main feedwater nozzle l and auxiliary feedwater nozzle on the steam generators. Limitations on main nozzle flow have resulted in power restrictions during plant operation. Analysis and testing indicated that the likely cause of the feedwater flow split anomaly was erratic performance of the controlled closure check valves -(1FW078A, B, C, D) in the feedwater bypass lines. This modification replaced these check valves (1FWO78A, B, C, and D) with piping spool pieces and eliminated the LOW T AVERAGE Interlock with reactor trip. I This modification provi/ 6 both the reliability and simplicity of the original j design intent of the co. r,11ed closure check valve while improving the I feedwater flow split between the upper and lower stem generator nozzles. Elimination of the LOW T AVERAGE Interlock with-reactor trip results in feedwater isolation with all reactor trips and allows the' safety related functions of the controlled closure check valves (1FWO78A, B, C, D) to be assumed by the feedwater bypass isolation valves (1FWO39A, B, C,.D). SAEEILIV_ALUA1 ION

SUMMARY

1. Tho probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as prev!Ously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the ability of the ( Main Feedwater (FW) system to perform its design function as described in l chapter 10.4.7 of the FSAR is not impaired by deleting the controlled closure check valves from the FW bypass lines. Deleting the check valves will allow the FW bypass line to perform its design function of delivering a minimum of 10% of total FW flow to-the upper nozzle of the steam generator. The ability of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system to perform its intended safety function as described in chapter 10.4.9 of the.FSAR is not impaired. Deletion of the LOW T AVERAGE interlock concurrent with reactor trip from the FW isolation initiation is consistent with the design intent of protecting the reactor Coolant (RC) system from an excessive cooldown following a reactor triu. 38

s-I MQQIFICATION M6-1-88-040 (Continued) The risk of unacceptably high stresses in the FW bypass line due to water hammer following a feedline break upstream of the check valve is reduced j since the closure time of the FW bypass isolation valve is slower than j the closure time of the controlled closure check valve. ] The steam generator preheaters are adequately protected against the introduction of cold auxiliary feedwater and potential bubble collapse j water hammer, j I No new scenarios result from this' modification that would exceed the bounds of prior LOCA, non-LOCA, LOCA-related, or Feedwater System Pipe Break analyses. In all evaluations, the effect did not result in exceeding any design or regulatory limit pertaining to the FSAR analyses. r The equipment required to isolate a main steam line break outside of j containment was evaluated. The modification does not decrease the j capability of the required equipment to mitigate the consequences of a main steam line break outside of containment due to environmental effects. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the F5 7 is not created because the FW and AF I systems will still perform their :espective intended safety functions as described in FSAR chapters 10.4.7 and 10.4.9. The use of the main FW isolation valves (1FWOO9A, B, C, D) and FW bypass line isolation valves { (lFWO39A, B, C, D) will prevent backflow of auxiliary feedwater to the j steam generator preheater section. The effects of auto-start of the 1A/2A pump due to undervoltage on bus 141/241 were evaluated for conditions associated with reactor start-up and operation. No conditions were found that resulted in unacceptable flow to the steam generator preheater section or unanalyzed AF flowpaths as a result of this modification. The performance of the AS system is not impaired and the formation of bubble collapse water hammer in the steam generator preheater section is precluded. Feedwater isolation is currently actuated following most reactor trips, therefore the duty on all valves that receive a feedwater isolation signal will not be significantly increased due to the elimination of the LOi T AVERAGE interlock. Sufficient redundancy exists in the instrumentation and controls associated with FW isolation such that a single active failure will not result in an unanalyzed accident. Since both the main FW isolation valves (1FW009A, B, C, D) and the FW bypass isolation valves will be used to isolate the AF flow to the steam generator preheater section, a single failure of either valve to close will not result in an unanalyzed AF flowpath. 39

1 l i 1 0 i i MQQIFICATION M6-1-88-040 (Continued) 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the'AF system will still be capable of removing decay heat and reducing the RC system temperature to less than 350'F from normal operating conditions (basis for Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.2). The.FW. isolation valves will continue to function as 1 designed to meet the, intent of the basis for Tech Spec 3/4.6.3. The Reactor Trip system and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System. Instrumentation will continue to function as designed to meet the intent of the bases for Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2. A revision to these bases has been submitted to clarify the newly defined function of P-4 on page B3/4.3-3. In accordance with 10CFR50.36, the ~ bases are not considered part of the Technical Specifications. Therefore, NRC acceptance of this revision was not required prior to implementation of this modification. The margin of safety as defined in the bases for Technical Specifications 3/4.7.1.2, 3/4.6.3, 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 is not reduced by this modification. i 1 40 l

s s. l liECHANICAL ALTERATION MA-86-0-174 DESCRIPTION This change added an ultrasonic resin cleaner (URC) to the Condensate Polishing (CP) system to remove iron, increase the resin life and improve 3 secondary side chemistry during plant startup. This change included a URC tank, a flow adjustment panel and an electric control. console. Ultrasonic i l resin cleaning is the first step of the condensate polisher bed regeneration j l process. 1 SAEETY EVALUATION SUMtiABX 1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is_not increased by this rechanical alteration because the Condensate Polishing system is not equired or analyzed for accident conditions in the FSAR. 2. The possibility for.an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the ultrasonic resin cleaner (URC) does not change the function or operation of the existing CP syGtem. I 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical' I Specification is not reduced because the URC is not included in the discussion of the basis for any safety limits as described in the Technical Specifications. 41

l SPJCIAL PROCEDURE / TEST EXPERIMENT SPP 88-84 (UNIT ONfd DESCRIPTION This procedure sequenced the implementation of setpoint changes corresponding to revision of full load Tavg to 580'F. This was done to maintain the optimum throttling position of the forth turbine governor valve at full power. This operation is bounded by analyses done for the T hot reduction program. Setpoint changes were implemented for full power Tavg; steam dump loss of load controller, steam dump controller dead band for load rejection, steam dump Hi-1 and Hi-2 bistables, pressurizer full load and no load level, steam ) generator narrow range level, and turbine loading stop and remote dispatch defeat (C-16). These setpoint changes were required as a result of changing Tavg to 580*F. ) i SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by these setpoint changes because operation at full load Tavg of 580'F is bounded by reanalysis and evaluation of all LOCA and non-LOCA transients. All transients met their acceptance criteria. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because operation between full load T hot of 618.4*F and 600.0*F has been determined to be acceptable based on analyses in WCAP 11386. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the only applicable Technical Specifications are for Over-Power-Delta T and Over-Power Delta P trip setpoint equations. These refer to nominal full load Tavg to be.1 588.4'F, which is met by full load Tavg equal to 580'F. 42 E -- _ _ -- -- ------ ---- ------------------ ----- ----

TECHNICAL EVALUATION 88-167 DIECBLETION Technical Evaluation 88-167 was performed to allow charcoal filters to be purchased or refilled using the requirements of ANSI N509-1980 instead of ANSI H509-1976. b SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

1. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased by this modification because the requirements of ANSI N509-1980 ensure that charcoal quality is sufficient to maintain the system design basis and remove radioactive iodine as required. 2. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the charcoal supplied in accordance with ANSI N509-1980 will perform the same or better than the originally supplied charcoal. 3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, is not reduced because the Technical Specifications do not specify the quality requirements of the charcoal filters at the time of purchase. All periodic testing required by the Technical Specifications remains unchanged. 43 Final

s '. - ~ Commonwealth Edison Byron Nuclear Station mZ. 4450 North Gerrnan Church Road V Byron, Illinois 61010 March 7, 1989 LTRI BYRON 09-0209 Dr. Tomas E. Murley, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Murley:

Pursuant to requirements to report on an annual basis, as stated in 10 CFR 50.59, Byron Station (license RNPF-37 and NPF-66) is submitting the enclosed report. This report consists of item descriptions and their respective Safety Evaluation. Included also as part of this report, are changes made to features of the fire protection program, not previously approved by the commission. Sincerely, k'R. Pleniewicz Station Manager Dyron Nuclear Power tation RP/PV/tm (2457M/0248M) Enclosures cc: L. N. Olshan, NRR Project Manager Fegional Administrator 11RC, Region III NRC Resident Inspector, Byron M. C. Parker, IDtiS CECO Distribution List '[/ >}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20236D848&oldid=3941007"