ML20236B746
| ML20236B746 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1989 |
| From: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236B744 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-89-04, 50-295-89-4, 50-304-89-04, 50-304-89-4, NUDOCS 8903210261 | |
| Download: ML20236B746 (2) | |
Text
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Commonwealth Edison Company Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Zion Station - Units 1 and 2 Licenses No. OPR-39;;DPR-48 I
As a result of the inspection conducted on January 5,1989, and in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C - General Statement of Policy and Procedure.for NRC Enforcement Actions (1988), the following violations'were identified:
l 1.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B,' Criterion XI, requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to. demonstrate that systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed.
Test results shall be document'd and evaluated to assure.
e that test requirements have been satisfied.
Contrary to the above:
. 1 s
I a.
In May 1985 (Unit 1) and January 1986 (Unit 2), th'e licensee failed to adequately test the secondary undervoltage modification by testing the actual secondary undervoltage contacts that auto-close the 480V -
I transformer feeder breakers for.both units.
As a result', the licensee failed to detect the unconnected secondary undervoltage wires on Unit 2 480V transformer feeder Breaker No. 2484.
i In addition, the' licensee failed to demonstrate the operability of the Unit 2 2B motor driven AFW pump in the event of a secondary undervoltage condition.
b.
During the Unit 2 1985 refueling outage and the Unit 1 1986 refueling outage, the licensee failed to adequately test the Appendix R required emergency diesel generator (EDG) electrical isolation control switch modification.
As a result, the licensee failed to detect the original corsi.ruction wire that had been incorrectly left in parallel with the Unit 1 EDG 18 isolation switch contact 43/MCB (C6/D6). The failure to electrically isolate the IB EDG control power could have prevented the local startup~ of the 1B EDG in the event of a disabling control room or cable spreading room fire.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
2.
Technical Specification 4.4.2 requires that testing of safeguards instrumentation and control channels be performed as specified in Table 4.4.1.
l Table 4.4.1 requires the auxiliary feedwater (AFW), station blackout and I
secondary undervoltage actuation channel logics be functionally tested in
{
I..
accordance with Technical Specification Definition 1.9.b.
I 1
l l
8 3210261 e9030s pgi ADOCK 05000295 g
Definition 1.9.b states, in part, " Logics - the application of input signals, or the operation of relays or switch contacts, in all the combinations required to produce the required decision outputs including the operation of all actuation devices. Where practicable, the test shall include the operation of the actuated equipment as well (i.e.,
pumps will be started, valves operated, etc.)".
Contrary to the above:
a.
The licensee failed to adequately test the station blackout logic contacts that auto-close the 480V transformer feeder breakers.
This condition existed from initial plant construction to January 1989.
b.
The licensee failed to adequately test the secondary undervoltage logic contacts that auto-close the 480V transformer feeder breakers.
This condition existed from the time of installation of the contacts (May 1985-Unit 1; January 1986-Unit 2) to January 1989.
As a result, the licensee failed to detect the unconnected secondary undervoltage wires on Unit 2 480V transformer feeder breaker No. 2484.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation:
(1) the corrective actions that have been taken and the results achieved; (2) the corrective actions that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.
Wn n1udA~
Dated Hubgrf J. Miller, Director Di& ion of Reactor Safety
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