ML20236B400
| ML20236B400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1989 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1720, NUDOCS 8903210066 | |
| Download: ML20236B400 (354) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:ffGKJfL/7@ O1G.\R UNITED STATES J 9 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ..........................................................J ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS GE REACTOR PLANTS SUBCOMMITTEE )
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Meeting on the Peach Bottom ) l Atomic Power Station Restart ) l l AFTERNOON SESSION O PAGES: 130 through 280 PLACE: Bethesda, Maryland DATE: March 8, 198 _ . . , .
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l . l l f 1 PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE
- 2. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 March 9, 1989
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7 The contents of this stenographic transcript of the l 8 proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9 Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), 10 as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions l 11 recorded at the meeting held on the above date. 12 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at 13 this meetfng accepts any responsibility for errors or 14 inaccuracies of statements or data contained in this 15 transcript. 16 17 18 19
$0 21 22 23 24 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202)628-4888 O
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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
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In the Matter of: )
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347th ACRS Meeting ) Thursday, March 9, 1989 Room P-ll4 , 7920 Norfolk. Avenue l Bethesda, Maryland The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m. BEFORE: DR. FORREST J. REMICK Chairman, ACRS Associate Vice President for Research Professor of Nuclear Engineering The Pennsylvania State University University Park, Pennsylvania () ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT MR. CARLYLE MICHELSON Retired Principal Nuclear Engineer Tennessee Valley Authority Knoxville, Tennessee and Retired Director, Office for Analysis
' and Evaluation of Operational Data U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
DR. WILLIAM KERR Professor of Nuclear Engineering Director, Office of Energy Research University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan Heritage Reporting Corporation
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l: 2 ACRS MEMBERS: (Continued) l
/~'d ' HR. CHARLES J. WYLIE T/ Retired Chief Engineer Electrical Division l Duke Power Company l g Charlotte, North Carolina '
JAMES CARROLL l Retired Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Pacific Gas & Electric Company San Francisco, California MR. DAVID A. WARD Research Manager on Special Assignment E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company Savannah River Laboratory Aiken, South Carolina DR. CHESTER P. SIESS Professor Emeritus of Civil Engineering University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois DR. PAUL G. SHEWMON Professor, Metallurgical Engineering Department Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio
.- ACRS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RAYMOND FRAILEY NRC STAFF MEMBERS BRUCE BOGER ROBERT MARTIN ERESENTERS CORBIN MCNEILL DICKINSON SMITH JAMES LINVILLE WILLIAM KANE Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I 1 t 3 1 PROCEEDINGS () 2 MR. REMICK: Good morning. The first item on the 3 agenda today is the question of Peachbottom Nuclear station 1 4 restart. And Dr. Kerr is the subcommittee Chairman. Bill? 5 MR. KERR: You will recall that almost two years 6 ago the NRC issued an order to the Philadelphia Electric i 7 Company which ordered the power operation of the two units 8 at the Peachbottom station be suspended until Philadelphia ! 9 Electric management could convince the Commission the 10 operations of the plant could be carried out without undue l 11 risk. 32 Since that time there has been a significant - 13 reorganization and a major change in staffing. .In addition 14 there has been a large scale effort to improve the physical 15 status of the two plants. Yesterday we, in our subcommittee 16 meeting, heard presentations from the staff and from the : 17 licensee which described what.has been done and which gave 18 the staff's evaluatio,n of the current status of the plant 19 and the organization. 20 I gather from comme'tsn made at the end of the i 21 meeting that members of the subcommittee were favorably 22 impressed. We asked for abbreviated presentations today of 23 the material that we looked at yesterday from both staff and 24 the licensee from this morning's meeting. I plan to prepare 25 a draft letter for consideration by the Committee at this Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
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- 4 1 meeting and vould ask that sometime after the presentations this morning that you give me in writing anything that you
) 2 3 would like to have included in the letter, i 4 I ask that the staff make a brief opening 5 statement. This will be followed by presentation by the 6 licensee and then a summation by the NRC staff. And I would 7 expect, therefore, that~ Mr. Boger of the NRC staff will open l
L 8 the meeting this morning. Before that, however, I would ask 9 if there are any comments from members of the subcommittee 10 who are present? I see none. Any questions that you 11 specifically would like to have either staff or licensee
- 12. deal with during the presentation? Mr. Boger? 4 13' MR._BOGER: Good morning. I am Bruce Boger from ;
14 the_ Division of Reactor Projects at NRR. With me today are 15 several members of headquarters in region one staffs that d( 16 have participated in the review and evaluation of the j 17 Peachbottom situation. We're here to present our activities i 18 related to the shutdown'and the proposed restart of the !
+i 19 Peachbottom atomic power station. As indicated we've been 20 asked to present a modified or shortened version of 21 yesterday's subcommittee presentation. So some of the 22 slides that are in your package may not be used in the 23 presentation and some of the information on the slides may 24 not be presented directly.
25 To start off we'll provide information on the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
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5 1 background of the shut down including the issues that were () 2 involved. As I understand it the licensee will then address
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3 the corrective actions that they've taken and thcn 4 afterwards the staff will return to provide information on 5 our assessment of the licensee's actions as developed 6 through our restart review process. 7 I'll start the background in June of 1986, but 8 acknowledge that there was a previous history of enforcement 9 actions and civil penalties prior to that time. In June of 10 1986 there was an incident where control rods were withdrawn 11 out of sequence. The incident involved senior reactor 12 operators, procedural non-compliance and resulted in a civil 13 penalty of $200,000 for the licensee. About the.same point 14 in time there was a -- we issued the SALP report and noted 15 that there were management weaknesses in that report. These 16 concerns, procedural issues, a complacent attitude, 17 personnel errors and management oversight deficiencies. 18 The region self initiated a diagnostic type 19 inspection and the results of that inspection was that they 20 confirmed the SALP findings. Later that summer, the EDO, 21 the Executive Director of Operations met with senior PECO 22 management to express the agency's concerns about the 23 situations that were developing at Peachbottom, and also as 24 evidenced in the SALP and the diagnostic inspection. In 25 response to that the licensee formulated the Peachbottom Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 6 1 enhancement program which was a broad based program that (() 2 addressed previously identified issues. 3 Then in March of 1987, on March 31st, 1987 an 4 order was issued suspending power operations after 5 -allegations were confirmed by the NRC which resulted in our 6 lack in confidence that the station could be operated in a 7 manner that reasonably assured public health and safety. 8 The specific issues identified in the order were licensed 9 operator inattentiveness, licensed supervision knew and 10 condoned the inattentiveness, and plant management knew or 11 should have known about the inattentiveness and failed to 12 take adequate action. 13 At the time of the order, one unit was refueling 14 and the other unit was operating at power. The order 1 (} 15- required that the operating unit be shut down within 36 16 hours and maintained in shut down condition until approval 17 from the NRC was received. Included a requirement for a 18 quick response on the licensee actions to maintain 19 compliance with requirements while shut down and also 20 provided for a long term plan to be developed by the company J 21 to assure safe operation in the future. ! i 22 I'll step through a few of the major items in the 23 development of that plan. Basically in August the licensee 24 submitted a commitment to excellence plan and the staff l 25 established a panel, a review panel composed of region I and i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O
l 7 1 headquarters personnel to coordinate the review activities () 2 for the SER and also to coordinate inspection and licensing 3 type actions related to the restart. We held public meetings 4 to review comments and our evaluation of the plan in October 5 led us to defer further review of the plan because of 6 deficiencies we thought were in the plan with respect to the 7 failure of the plant to address corporate weaknesses. 8 Subsequent to that time the licensee reorganized 9 to have a dedicated nuclear organization. The plant was 10 subsequently revised several times, first to address 11 corporate issues, then to address site issues, and then 12 finally to address philosophies of the new management team 13 that arrived in March of 1988. We subsequently held public 14 meetings to obtain additional comments on the revised plans i /^T 15 and also received comments from Maryland and Pennsylvania. O 16 In October of 1988 we issued our safety evaluation report
.i 17 and we approved the PECO plan at that time, including the --
1 18 and we included the response to public comments as an 19 appendix to that safety evaluation report. 20 I won't go through the members of the restart 21 panel, but let me note that it's significant in that it has 22 a very high level of management attention. We applied it 23 right from the start so that we could raise any significant 24 issues up to our mangers. As a result of the licensee's 25 investigation and evaluations several issues were identified Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
8 1 that confirmed and expanded the issues that were raised.in 2 the shut down order. In particular there were confirmed the
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3 inattentiveness of the operators and the shift management 4 and plant management knowledge and inadequate action. It 5 also identified the licensse's lack of effectiveness in 6 corrective actions and also lack of management involvement 7 and follow up in corrective actions. 8 These issues led to the licensee's development of 9 four root causes. One was that there was an inadequate 10 leadership to the Peachbottom site, a second.was that there i 11 was a failure to implement a timely licensed operated 12 replacement training program. The third root cause was that 13 there was a station culture that had not adapted to the 14 post-TMI change in nuclear requirements,.and finally there 15 was a failure of corporate management to identify and take 16 sufficient corrective action. ! 17 The last root cause was the one over which staff I 18 deferred its review. The early root cause that was in the l l 19 original plan indicated a slowness of corporate management j 20 to take corrective actions. We felt that the root cause was l 21 a little more fundamental than that and that resulted'in the 22 recognition that management failed to identify and take I l 23 corrective actions. l l 24 I believe the licensee is ready to address their , 25 corrective actions in response to these root causes. Are Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 O l _. __ __________________O
9 1 there any questions with respect to the background at this t( f 2 time?. 3 MR. KERR: I see none, Mr. Boger. Thank you. 4 MR. MCNEILL: Good morning. I'm Corbin McNeill'. 5 I'm the Executive Vice President Nuclear, of the 6 Philadelphia. Electric Company. I'd like to share with you 7 just a little bit, my background. I joined Philadelphia 8 Electric as a permanent employee in March of last year. 1 9 Prior to that I had been the Senior Vice President of 10 Nuclear for Public Service Electric and Gas company. And 11 for a short period in early 1988 I had been on loan for 12 Public Service Electric Gas to Philadelphia Electric in 13 order to provide some management assistance in the recovery 14 of the Peachbottom stations of which Public Service and Gas
/~T 15' owned about 43 percent.
t 'V 16 Prior to the three year -- or in 1985 I had joined 17 Public Service Electric and Gas. Prior to that I had been i 18 the plant manager for the James A. Fitzpatrick Plant, the 19 New York Power Authority for three years. Prior to that I' 20 had been 20 years in the United States Navy as an officer 21 and the last two tours I had, one had been four year 22 commanding officer of a nuclear submarine and two years 23 before that I had been the commanding officer of the Navy's 24 nuclear power school at Royal Oak, California. 25 As indicated, today is a shortened presentation of l Heritage Reporting Corporation g-) (202) 628-4888
10 1 one we gave to the subcommittee yesterday. And prior to 3 ggg 2 -starting that I'd like to introduce a few Philadelphia 3 Electric employees who are here, one of whom will continue 4 with the presentation along with me. On my right in the 5 read is Dickinson Smith who is Vice President of Peachbottom 6 Atomic Power Station. On his left is John Franz who is the 7 Station manager. On the far left is John Cotton, who is the 8 Operations Superintendent. Sitting adjacent to him is Tony 9 Wasong who is one of the shift managers, or one of the 10 senior shift personnel manger on shift. Next to him is Dave 11 Woodrow who is a shift supervisor for the station. I also 12 have Joe Kowalski who is the Vice President of Nuclear 13 Engineering and David Helwig who is until recently been the 14 General Manager of Quality Assurance. 15 You have in front of you copies of the slides that 16 we will be using today and I invite any questions as we go 17 along. Mr. Boger has pretty well described some of the 18 history from the standpoint of the Nuclear Regulatory 19 Commission. Some of that is duplicated here, but I would 20 also like to point out a few significant features from the 21 company's standpoint. 22 In January of 1988 the Institute of Nuclear Power 23 Operations forwarded a letter to the company that was very 24 critical of the response to shut down and to previous 25 findings that INPO had made with respect to the plant's Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 1 hl 11 : a l 1 operation. That had a very devastating effect upon the [k 2 company and its reputation resulted in the ultimate early-
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3 retirement of the President'and subsequently the Chief l 4 Executive Officer of the company....In March I-joined the 5 company as a permanent employee, as the Chief Nuclear 6- officer and at the same. time the company was fortunate to 7 have returned its former: Chief Financial Officer who 8 returned as Chief Executive Officer of the company.
.9 We withdrew upon our arrival, the restart plan 10 which was the second plan which had been issued in two.
11 . parts, one on corporate issues and the other on plant issue,. 12 revised them in accordance with some of our own thoughts and I i 13 policies and beliefs.and also incorporated some 14 recommendations'from the Institute of Nuclear Power l 15- Operations.and in March or April reissued those under our [} 16 own alma mater. And'it's that plan which has been the basis
]i i 17. for the actions that we've undertaken in the past year to
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18 correct the deficiencies that have been noted in the plant's ! 19' operation both by INPO, by the NRC and subsequent within our
, 20 :own assessment processes, problems that we have identified. .i 21 In September of this past year we completed.all of 22 the 138 action items that had been presented in the restart 23 plan itself. Subsequently the NRC had approved that plan.
24 We've had an INFO plant evaluation in the fall and a i 25 corporate evaluation in the fall. That plant evaluation l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
12 1 highlighted two sets of continuing problems where we did not One was on operator performance lll 2 meet industry standards. 3 and a simulator on emergency procedures, and secondly a set 4 of management effectiveness issues principally in dealing 5 with operations management but also in some areas such as 6 industrial safety. 7 INPO subsequently -- we developed a subsequent 8 action plan to correct those provided significant amounts of 9 additional training for operators in the simulator. INFO 10 came back and reevaluated those two areas in December and 11 January and it was given basically a clean bill of health. 12 That was followed up with two letters earlier this year, one 13 on January 31st which was a letter which basically removed 14 us from the lowest category rating that INPO applies to 15 plants, and secondly a letter on February 21st of this year, 16 which we have made public which summarizes all of the 17 interactions of INPO with Philadelphia Electric, vis-a-vis 18 Peachbottom over the last year and comes to the conclusions 19 that we, in fact, have satisfactorily addressed the 20 recommendations they made in the January lith, 1988 letter 21 and that we have satisfactorily addressed all of the issues 22 that have evolved from the various evaluations that they h'ad 23 made. 24 MR. REMICK: Mr. McNeill, up to what level of 25 management observes the exercises at the simulator when your Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
13 1 crews are in training?
.2 MR. MCNEILL: All the way to the Chief Executivo 3 Officer.in~this particular case. But in general we have-a 4 graded approach. It is my intent to get down probably once 5 a year. The Vice. President at the station will get down 6 probably once a quarter and the operations superintendent- ,
1 4 7 who was in almost continuous presence during this recovery 8 phase, but we expect him to be down there for at least one i 9 day of every training cycle for every shift crew. Our I 10 philosophy is_that operations management prescribes the l 11 ' standards, the training department, defines the content and< - 12 provides the training and the evaluation of individual f i 13 operators, but~then operations management comes in an 14 insures that the standards are proper for the whole training h 15 program. 16 The training department is accountable to the ! 17 operations superintendent for the quality of the training 18 that he is presented. 19 MR. REMICK: Thank you. 20 MR. MCNEILL: Any questions on this schedule at 21 all, or key events? As Mr. Boger had identified, there were 22 four root causes that came out of a diagnostic evaluation 23 that was conducted shortly after the shut down by management 24 analysis corporation. They came in and conducted a series of l 25 interviews at Peachbottom within the corporate management Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 _ _______ \
, 14 Il all the way.through the Chief-Executive' Officer and they
()\ 2 even went out to our Limerick generating station to compare 3 the two particular plants. 4 From that interview process and' diagnostic' 5 process, four root causes were' identified. First that there
'6 was a lack of adequate leadership and' plant skills on the 6 7. part of the senior management of the plant. Secondly, the 8 company had failed to initiate timely licensed' operator'
. 3 ' ,1 9 replacement training program. And that manifested itself by 10 excessive over time, lack of replacement operators, and also' 11 was an issue in the career path development of licensed 12 operators. Third, that the station culture which had.had I L13 its roots in fossil and pre-TMI operations had not adapted 14 to changing nuclear requirements, and fourth and ons that 15, Mr. Boger rightfully identified as being understated in the 7{} 16 initial recovery plar., and one in which we have concentrated
.17 much more heavily on than in the past was that corporate 18 management failed to recognize the developing' severity of
. 19 problems that the Peachbottom station and did not take 20 sufficient corrective action. And implied there, is a very 1 21 valid criticism on the part of both the NRC and INFO that 22 the company was relying almost exclusively on external l i 23 evaluation to ferret out problems and did not have a good l I
24 solid internal assessment and independent review program to 'j t 25 identify problems and develop corrective actions. f 1 i i i Heritage Reporting Corporation ; (202) 628-4888 i L -( ) '
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15 1 Early in our warning cycle there was very.little () fm , 2 defense in depth with respect to management programs. The
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3 rest of our presentation is to take each of those root , 4 causes to define them, some of the key elements on them, and i 5 to describe what actions we have taken. The first three 6 root causes which generally deal with the station will be 7 presented by Mr. Smith, the Vice President of Peachbottom. 8 I will come back and discuss the corporate actions. Mr. 9 Smith will then follow up and present some of the visible 11 0 evidence that we have that things have really turned around 11 at the station that we are in a position that we think we're l 12 ready to restart the facility. 13 MR. WARD: I have,a question. ' 14 MR. MCNEILL: Yes sir.
~T 15 MR. WARD: Were these root causes identified and (J
16 articulated in the MAC analysis or by PE or by the NRC? 17 MR. MCNEILL: They were done interactively by the 18 company and MAC. There was a degree of independence here 19 because the company itself was really did not have a great 20 deal of skills to go about doing this kind of work, they had 21 ,not been used to is. Now there were, just for your 22 information and to give you some historical parts because I 23 know a great deal more about this than might be assumed. 24 INPO in about May of 1987, shortly after the shut down, 25 offered a company accepted to the INFO's recommendation to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202} 628-4888 O
i 16 1 perform an industry advisory team of about five people. One lll 2 from INPO and four other utilities were represented with l 3 either the Chief Nuclear Officer of the company or a senior 4 level manager with plant operating experience. And I and 5 the other co-owners and myself representing Public Service 6 Electric and Gas had actually all Senior Vice Presidents 7 because of the financial implications of this whole shut , 8 down, as an advisory team who reviewed various steps. And 9 the January lith letter from INPO grew out of some 10 frustrations that Philadelphia Electric was not giving 11 import to the recommendations of those various advisory 12 ceams. So that although I have a high degree of confidence 13 in the four root causes being correct in their 14 identification. They are not properly weighted on the ggg 15 particular slide. We really wanted to put the most 16 important one first, take four and flip it up to the top 17 end. And there are a lot of things in there that have 18 received much more emphasis than the other ones. 19 But they did come out of the MAC evaluation, they 20 were interacted with the company, they do reflect a degree 21 of independence on the part of MAC in presenting them and 22 they reflect a large measure of validation from some 23 industry observers. 24 MR. WARD: Mr. Boger has the NRC -- did the NRC 25 independently arrive at this set of identification, or this Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 set of' things?y
'2 MR. .KERR: Mr. Boger, I'm sure that:I've talked to' 3 you yesterday because.I asked him the same. question.' But we 4 have not.'And since I have'not told him an answer,'Mr. Boger 5' MR. BOGER: .The answer,was no. What we did was !
6' based <nt our evaluation and previous :information available - 7- to us reviewed the root 1causes to see if they seem.to-fit. 8 with whatLwe saw wrong-at the facility. That's what led us a 9- to feel that the root cause number four was not one-of the J10 fundamental root causes and causes us to defer our review.
.11 But we-didn't1do what I call a classical-independent review.
12 MR.. WARD: You accept it?
-13 MR. BOGER: Yes sir.
14 MR. MCNEILL: I would point out that that was- l
-c 15 based on presentations by the staff. It was not -- we had
[ 16 to'make a' convincing presentation at some point. It was not 17 an automatic acceptance. We spent several meetings 18 discussing our. justification for arriving at those 19- particular root causes, i 20 MR. SMITH: Good morning. I am Dick-Smith, I am ! l 21 Vice President of the Peachbottom. Atomic Power station. I 22 was hired by Philadelphia Electric Company shortly-after the 23 shut down and came on board at Peachbottom as plant manager l l 24 in early May of 1987. My background is with the Navy. I 1 25 retired from the Navy in August of 1986 as a Rear Admiral i Heritage Reporting Corporation . (202) 628-4888 i i J i J
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18 l 1 with 31 years of service primarily in the Nuclear Submarine j
.() 2 force. I wiJ1 be talking to you this morning about the 3 first three root causes, which are the ones that primarily 4 concern.the Peachbottom Atomic Power Station and which were 5 written up in section 2 of our restart plan. As Corbin has 6 said this is a substantially reduced presentation from the 7 four hours that we spent discussing thie yesterday. So if I ;
8 seem to be glossing over something just interrupt me and 9 I'll go more in depth on those particular issues. I 10 The first root cause as pointed out was that there 1 11 was a lack of adequate personal leadership and management 12 skills on the part of senior management of the plant. The ! 13 elements of this root cause are listed here. The leadership 14 are inadequate to develop employee understanding of high l d {} 15 16 nuclear standards. Goals and expectations have not been communicated effectively, the accountabilities were not j i 17 clearly established, and there was poor communications among
'k 18 the site groups as well as between the site and the off site 19 groups.
20 This resulted in poor morale at the station. We 21 conducted a major reorganization in-the Philadelphia 22 Electric Company and at the station in the fall of 1987. 23 Prior to the reorganization, when I showed up at Peachbottom 24 I was a plant manager with two superintendents who reported 25 to me. There are many activities the station * .ich provided Heritage Reporting Corporation g (202) 628-4888 J s
19 1 support but did not directly report to me. The maintenance lll 2 and instrumentation controls craftsmen did not report to me. l 3 The nuclear security force did not report to me, the 4 training department did not report to me. They all had 5 bosses back at corporate headquarters. They provided 6 support but they were not directly under my authority. 7 With the reorganization a decision was made that 8 we needed a site director and I became that site director as 9 the Vice President in the fall of 1987. We then had to 10 design the station organization and recruit a strong 11 management team. We turned first to the people at 12 Peachbottom for assignment in the new management team and 13 then we turned to the rest of Philadelphia Electric Company 14 and then we turned to outside nuclear power industry to 15 recruit the proper people to fill the positions. gg 16 We are very fortunate in getting Mr. Franz who has 17 been introduced to you to come back from the Limerick 18 generation statien back home to Peachbottom. John had 19 joined Philadelphia Electric in 1962, had come to 20 Peachbottom in 1963. He was licensed in Peachbottom unit 1, 21 Peachbottom unit 2, Peachbottom unit 3 and left to go to 22 Limerick generating station in 1976 where he was licensed on 23 Limerick unit 1. He served as plant manger from 1986 to 24 1988 and then returned to be my plant manger at Peachbottom. 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
20 1 We recruited, as I said, from within Philadelphia () 2- Electric Company and from within the nuclear power industry. 3 If you look at our organizational chart for the station, 4 counting myself, my three mangers and my 10 superintendents, 5 are those 14 senior leadership positions at the station, 7 6 of us were not Philadelphia Electric Company employees at 7 the time of the shut down. Of the other seven who were 8 Philadelphia Electric employees, only three were at the 9 station at the time of shut down. And of those three one, 10 Mr. Cotton who was introduced to you as superintendent of 11 operations, was then the superintendent of services and was 12 not directly involved with operations at the plant. So in 13 fact the senior management of the station, there are only 14 two people that are in effectively the same position that 15 they were in at the time of shut down. 16 We think that the organization that we have 17 developed has provided more focused management direction and 18 accountability. We have written clear position descriptions 19 that have well laid out accountabilities for each l 20 encompassed. Those accountabilities have been clearly 21 communicated to the incumbents and they are understood by 22 them. We think we have a strong interactive management team 23 that demonstrates good team work and has very open 24 communications. We have particularly strengthened line 25 management of operating activities. All of the mangers in Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
21 1 1 the operations organization from the Chairman of our Board l () 2 of Directors, down to the reactor operators in the control 3 room are different than were in that chain of command before 4 the shut down. 5 Because of the reorganization there are lessor ) 6 number of layers-of organization between the Chairman and 7 the reactor operators. We have created a shift manger i 8' position to be in charge in the control room and I'm going ) 9 to discuss this in more detail in just a moment. And we have l 10 increased management positions at the senior engineer level 11 or above. j 12 One of the significant things that was done in 13 that reorganization was to define the activities that needed i 14 to be conducted, or under the direct control of the plant 15 manger to be those activities that were involved with the ! (-)) 16 safe generation of electrical power on a day to day basis. ; 17 We provided two other senior mangers at the station, a l l 18 manger of what we call support, and another manager of I 19 projects, to worry about such things as shown on this chart, ; 20 outage planning modifications and all the miscellaneous 21 activities that detract from the plant manager's attention 22 from operations. And we increased the number of senior 23 people reporting to him, the superintendent level, from two 24 to four. 25 One of the significant changes in the station Heritage Reporting Corporation 7s (202) 628-4888
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l 22 1 1 organization was the development of the shift manger () 2 position. The shift manger is the senior person on each of 3 the operating shifts. We operate presently and have for some 4 time and expect to in the future, for some time, with six ; I 5 operating shifts. These shifts before the shut down were 1 i 6' headed by a shift superintendent. This individual had come-7 up through the ranks as a non-licensed operator, a reactor 8 operator, a shift supervisor and a shift superintendent. Of 9 those six superintendents, five had served with us on our , 10 fossil side of our company before coming to Peachbottom. [ 11 All six had served on Peachbottom unit 1 before coming over 12 to 2 and 39' Of those six, three are still with us at 13 Peachbottom' involved in operations -- I'm sorry, involved in 14' the operation of the plant, not in the operations section. 15 We were determined after the shut down that since 16 these were the management on shift that they would be 17 replaced by shift managers. Our shift mangers are degree'd 18 engineers who have a senior reactor operator license. They 19 were on staff at Peachbottom with experience ranging at that 2,0 time from 6 to 13 years. We looked at this population and 21 carefully selected the six individuals we felt were best i 22 qualified to be shift managers.
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l l 23 I I 1 MR. SMITH: A program for those shift managers. l (M
,) 2 They have been on shift since~the 26th of October working i 3 with the same. shift teams. So they have developed the team 4 work and the shift team through on-shift operation and' 5 through simulator training.
6 They are the plant manager's direct representative , i 7 on shift. They are licensed. They are normally found in 8 the control room. They are not-an office manager. They are 9 an on-shift control room manager. 3 10 MR. WARD: Prior to the assignment they are in now l 11 --
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12 MR. SMITH: Yes. f 13 MR. WARD: -- they have been at Peach Bottom. 14 MR. SMITH: At Peach Bottom as staff engineers. 15 MR. WARD: Have any of them held senior operator i [} 16 license? 17 MR. SMITH: All had senior operator licenses ; 18 before the shutdown. Because of the time element involved 19 we did not have time to go through the licensing program. 20 We felt we needed to change out the shift superintendents in 21 the near term. ) 22 It took us about six months to go through the 23 selection process and the training that we felt was 24 necessary to put them on. Had we started off with people 25 who were not licensed and insisted that they be licensed it Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O i
24 1 would have been an extra year. 4 [)~ 2 DR. REMICK: Have any of those shift managers gone 3 through the INPO plant managers program? 3 4 MR. SMITH: No, sir, none of them have. 5 DR. REMICK: Will they, do,you know? 6 MR. SMITH: Not the-plant manager program very 7 likely, at this stage'of their career development. 8 Hopefully one or more of them may go.through as they advance 9 to more senior positions in the company. Some of them, at 10 least Tony Wasong who is here with us now has participated. , 11 with INPO in evaluation at another plant. So there is 12 interaction with INPO but not in the plant manager, 13 MR. WARD: Now, will the shift managers maintain 14 their licenses? 1 15 MR. SMITH: They do maintain their license.. They 16 are on-shift. 17 MR. WARD: Let's see, how many senior licenses do i 18 you have on shift now? l
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19 MR. SMITH: I'm going to get into much more detail
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20 of that and I think it will come clear at that point. l 21 The shift manager coordinates all the other group 22 activities during his shift and that is well accepted by the 23 other groups: security; health physics; maintenance, that he 24 is in charge. 25 Going to the shift manager has given us a higher Heritage Reporting Corporation I (202) 620-4888
25 - 1 level of management authority on each shift and has helped (} 2 us to address the past problem that the operators had a 3 feeling isolated from management, because they indeed have a 4 manager on their shift who has full access to all other 5 managers in the plant. They clearly have my supporti, John 6 Franz's support; John Cotton's support. They have the H 7 authority to control shift operations. l 8 I would also point out, this is not a career 9 position for these individuals. We anticipate them being in p L 10 this job somewhere from three to five years and then 11 returning to other management positions which does two 12 things for us: one, it will -- they won't be in the culture 13 that the superintendents were in before of having 20 years 14 of shift work and always being with the same people and
)
15 being on shift with the people they socialized with. 16 And secondly, it will get that valuable, valuable 17 operating experience back into other parts of the plant and 18 be a great value to the rest of not only Peach Bottom but 19 other parts of our company. 20 Turning then to the second root cause which was 21 that the company failed to initiate timely licensed operator 22 replacement training programs. I want to emphasize that we , 23 always had in the control room the required number of 24 operators for technical specification purposes. This is not 25 to indicate that we did not have a sufficient number of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 , 1 m
26 i 1 operators. We always met technical specification. r~
' (,)j 2 We always had a training program but it was not a 3 timely training program. We did not put enough people An in 4 a timely enough manner. And the elements under this root i
5 cause were that we did not have enough reserved licensed ! 6 operators or new replacements to cover turnover. 7 We would look downstream at a planned retirement 8 and we would train the precise numbers necessary to fill 9 that retirement. And someone else would quit the company 10 and we would have no one to replace them. We just tried to 11 keep up with the demand; we never got ahead. 12 This inadequate supply of licensed operators meant 13 that we did not have the flexibility of assignments. We had 14 difficulty handling the administrative work load. And to (} 15 assure the. supervision of floor activities. And by floor ! 16 activities we mean non-licensed operator activities out on 17 what we call the floor of the power plant. 18 In order to meet the technical specification 19 requirements with this number of operators excessive 20 overtime was required. And perhaps most painful of all, the 21 lack of numbers, sufficient number of operators meant that 22 those people on shift had no opportunity to pursue l 23 alternative career paths or to have relief from shift work. 24 It was part of the culture at Peach Bottom that 25 once you were on shift as an operator you were always on Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l \ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
( 27
, 1 shift as'an operator.
lT 2 DR. REMICK: Question on that. You indicate the U 3 type of things you would use these licensed people for, and 4 yesterday you did address the question of desirability of 5 rotating' people in your training. 6 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, i 7 DR.' REMICK: But you don't specifically mention 8 it, so I'm not sure how convinced you are of the importance 9 of rotating operations people. 10 MR. SMITH: Absolutely convinced. Our problem of J 11 course is that there is not one extra operator of the -- and 12 I will get into a little more detail -- but of the 12 shift 13 supervisors right now, one is a staff engineer whereas 14 normally that position is filled by non-licensed operators, (" 15 reactor operators who come up through the rank. Right'now
%)S .
16 we are one short of having that number of the types of 17 people we would like to have in that position. i 18 So we just have no way to put anyone off into 19 training. When we can start to break people loose and as 20 you will see that's in about two years, training is 21 certainly right near the head of the list, whether it's the 22 number one job or number two. 23 But it bothers me personally to see our operators 24 at the simulator not being trained by old hands that really 25 know the plant and know the simulator. They're trained by Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888 l ()
sg 26 I 1 bright trainers and instructors who have obtained their j gg) 2 knowledge, but it is not our plant experienced people. I 3 put that very near the top. 4 MR. McNEILL: I put it number one. 5 MR. SMITH: Some of the corrective actions we have 6 put in place, you can't go out and hire immediately 7 operators for your plant at the senior reactor operator 8 license or the reactor operator license that have that years 9 of experience that you would like them to have, so they 10 really know Peach Bottom. It takes time to develop the 11 numbers of operators. 12 We have improved our personnel policies and our 13 compensation practices such that now, since the shutdown, we 14 have been hiring entry level candidates into operation who 15 have a higher level of qualification than required before. 16 Previously, a high school degree was required. 17 Presently we require either two years of college or 18 experience in the Navy nuclear power program. Since the 19 shutdown we have hired some 35 new helpers into operations 20 and that's the starting point. We hired them at higher than 21 the entry level compensation. They have proceeded rapidly. 22 The two groups, the first group that we hired is working on 23 the second level of progression. The first group has 24 achieved the first level of progression. So they are coming 25 along very nicely. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
t 29 1 We have, as I say, higher standards'of screening l 1
-('.) 2 for candidates, not only at the entry level, but also going 3' into reactor operator training. For the class that has just 1
4 gone in now we conducted a 13 week course in reactor theory ' 5 which is one of the requirements of the license examination l 6 and is one that our people tend to stumble on more than the 7 other sections of it. j l 8 So we conducted that course for some 30 candidates ] 9 and of the people that passed that we have put seven into 10 advanced training as RO candidates. This is about another 11 40 weeks of training. But there is a high likelihood that 12 they will pass that examination. ] 13 14
-( ) l 16 1 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 !
24 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O 1 l l _ _ - _ - - - _ - _ - - J
'i a 30-JN 1L DR. SHEWMON :' Sir. !
r 4
..() 2 MR.. SMITH: Yes, sir. s 3 DR. SHEWMON:- You said a. couple of times that'you 4 have used more stringent requirements'or higher' standards. d 5 MR.' SMITH: Yes.
6 DR.-SHEWMON: Could you tell me what parameters or l
- 7. howfyou measure this.or what you look for?
8 161. SMITH: InLthe hiring process, for example? 9 DR. SHEWMON: Yes. , 1 Sif 10 MR. SMITH: We put into effect'about 3 years.ago ! 11 an operator's test that we have called a Pos Test to try to 12 screen people that were coming,in that would'have a higher 13 likelihood of succeeding in the progression. 14 However, we felt-that this', by itself, was not'
~
15 adequate. We were still having too many difficulties in
}
16 getting.the people up through the progression. We looked-- l 17 DR..SHEWMON: Now, is the Pos' Test a psychological l 18 test? j i 19, IGR. SMITH: The Pos Test is, in effect, an aptitude !
'20 test. Potential Operator Screening or'something like that.
21 DR. SHEWMON: Intellectual aptitude .cn a
.22 mechanical--manual aptitude?
23 10R. SMITH: I haven't taken the test myself.
-24 Corbin, do you know?
25 MR. MCNEILL: It's a mechanical manual aptitude Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
n.
~
3 31 p - a 1" test. g- - o I l( ) 2l DR. SHEWMON: Okay. } i 3
- MR. SMITHS' As far as the going to people with two I
4 i years of college experience or ex nuclear Navy, we felt that 5 by doing>this, we would have people that had demonstrated l
~
l 6 aptitude to go through' academic training'and to learn more 7 advanced material than necessarily a high school graduate. :
^
8 We have begun an aggressive license training 9 program. This obviously has started with adding a number of 10 ' helpers, getting them up to the senior non licensed operator 11 training level so that we can train reactor operators, so we 12 can train senior reactor operators and so we can get the 13 flow through and progression that we need. 14 I will talked briefly about operator staffing. When i (~N 15 the reactor was shutdown in March of 1987, we had 16 Senior
-A )
16 Reactor Operators on 6 shifts. We're required to have 2 17 Senior Reactor Operators on each shift, per technical 18 specification. We had recognized about a year and a half ; 19- before the shutdown, the desire to have a third Senior 20 Reactor Operator on each shift and were building towards I I 21 that point, but we had not achieved it at the time of 22 shutdown. 23 We are required by Technical Specifications to 1 24 have 3 Reactor Operators on each shift. At the time of I 25 shutdown, we had 16 Reactor Operators covering the 6 shifts. Heritage Reporting Corporation ; f~g (202) 628-4888 ) U
< in 32 l' ~ In other'words, we1were two shortoof the minimum number u 2 requirements and we were covering that requirement'on 3 overtime.. J 14 DR. REMICK: I assume when you' re talking about 2 5 or 3, that's per unit? .j 1 1 6 MR. SMITH: No, sir, these are totals. We are a ;
.1 7 single control room, two unit reactor, SDO, we are required, 1 i
8 for both units, to have 2 seniors and 3 Reactor Operators. 9 DR. REMICK: 'I somehow thought it.was 3 SROs for a 10 column, but I am apparently wrong. f 11 MR. SMITH: Two, sir. 12 As of the present time, again the technical 13 specifications are unchanged, our desires are to have 3
-14 Senior Reactor Operators on each shift and to have 4 Reactor
(} 15 . Operators on each shift. That extra Senior Reactor Operator 16' and extra Reactor Operator is not posted positions and not > 17 written into the technical specifications and not written ! 18 into our watch standing requirements,. gives us flexibility 19 for absences, overtime et cetera and we want to have that
.i 20 flexibility. l 21 As far a Senior Reactor Operators are concerned, 22 we have achieved that goal and should be able to maintain 23 it. j 24 We are training, as Senior Reactor Operators, 7 ;
25 more candidates but these are Staff Engineers and would not Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O : _____m_______. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
33 ! l' likely be Shift Supervisors. They are the group from which () 2 we will select our next generation of Shift Managers because ! 3 we will need to replace Shift Managers fairly soon.
. l 4 As far as Reactor Operators are concerned, we 5 presently have 24 Reactor Operators on three shifts. We.
6 have a 25th man who will be taking the Reactor Operator's 7 Exam within the next months and we should have the results 8 back on that 25th individual. 9 Of those, 13 have hot licenses. The others have 10 licensed since the shutdowns and did not have the necessary 11 number--necessarily the necessary number of reactivity ; 12 manipulations or. shift time above 20 percent power. So they 13 have restricted licenses. 14 We have a program set up for the Power Ascension rs 15 Program during which we will convert these cold licenses to
'b 16- unrestricted licenses. So by the end of power ascension on l 17 Unit 2 or shortly thereafter, if we are successful with this 18 other candidate that I mentioned, we should have 25 Reactor 19 operators.
20 We also have in training, 7 other candidates for ) 1 21 Reactor Operators who should come out late in 1989. 22 Now, by having more than the Technical 23 Specification Requirement and getting these licenses hot, it 24 will give us the opportunity to commence Senior Reactor 25 Operator training and down stream, with the 7 candidates Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 () i
e
,mv '
c : 3 s y; 34- 1 4 i' '1 that.are presently.in.ReactorLOperator~ Training coming out,- j l 2 'we would maintain our~12 Senior Reactor. Operators. . We would 3 ' start another class. In another year,.we'would be~well up q i 4 in the numbers of Reactor-Operators and we would continue an i 5 aggressive training program.. W 6' -Note that at this time,are would have in excess of ] 7 the' minimum number of Senior Reactor Operators;and.at this ] 8 time we canEstart to put them into training in other ! 9 locations at the plant. So we will achieve flexibility with 10 the Senior Reactor Operators in about a year and a half.-We i 11 will achieve our goal of'24 Reactor Operators sometime in 12 this time frame. We are at 24 now, but to be able'to j 13 maintain it and continue training, it will be next year.
]
14' DR. REMICK: Although your STAS are not licensed, j
/~T 15 do they participate in the Senior Reactor Operator Programs?
V 16- MR. SMITH: I'm gl'ad you-mentioned STAS. There is. 17 on each shift, in addition to the' licensed operators, an .i 18 STA, a degreed engineer, who has the requisite. training.. That' is.
~
19 They are not senior. licensed trained however. 20 something that we are looking to for the future.
.21 As we discussed yesterday, they do participate in l
)
L 22 all training sessions at the simulator and they do
- j 23 participate in the requalification training, but they are j i
24 not licensed. 25 DR. REMICK: How about your SROs, do they receive l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 Q-______-___ ._-
ru, ,
. I a
m
'35 N :1 any training.in what I.would call:the special STA functions .
'kh2 or do,you draw'the.line sharply.between an:S'RO and'an.STA?.
3 .MR.~ SMITH: I understand your question, .but1I just
.]
ll . don't have'the resident knowledge., 3 5- Mr. Cotton, could you answer.that? 6 MR. COTTON:- I.would say.we do not train the i
" ~
.7 .~ supervisor to-be ablelto swap into the STA position. We 8 make sure that'the Shift Supervisor.and the Shift Manager
-9 ' understand the responsibilities of the-STA.and therefore:
1 10 know/what to expect from him.: Perhaps he is-not formally 11 trained-in'what he does, althou'gh a lot of.that training'is 12' accident analysis which the Senior. Reactor Operators: receive " 13 'also.-
-14 DR. REMICK: Thank you.
15 MR. WARD: Another question about the STAS. 16' MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 17 MR. WARD: Are they part of the Shift Team, do l 18 they rotate with the shift?
- 19 MR. SMITH: Yes. We have 6 STAS'and,they rotate 20_ *.with the shift, with the exception of, I believe it's one--
21 and Tony can perhaps correct me, that.have been changed j i 22 since the shutdown, they have stayed--we have the same 6 l 23 that joined the Shift Team in October of 1986--5 of the 6 24 are the same and we have made a real point, since forming 25 those shift teams, of not mixing them up, so that the Shift l l Heritage Reporting Corporation ! (202) 628-4888 l O l I _ _ __- _ _ __-- - -- - --- _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ .-______J
36 1 Manager knows his STA, his supervisors, his Reactor V ,- (_) 2 Operators, his Floor Operators. 3 MR. WARD: So tho STA clearly reports to the Shift 4 Manager? 5 MR. SMITH: Oh yes, yes. He does directly report ! 6 to the Shift Manager. I recognize that there are some 7 plants where he is more or less a staff assistant, but not 8 here. He reports directly to the Shift Manager. ; 9 MR. WARD: When you say that you will have 3 SROs 10 on shift-- . 11 MR. SMITH: Yes. 12 MR. WARD: --that then includes the Shift Manager? 13 MR. SMITH: One of these--well this is Shift 14 Supervisors--this is Shift Managers, so we will have 3. Two (} 15 supervisors and 1 Shift Manager. Our Technical Specifications only require two 16 17 senior reactor operator licenses. So what that really 18 amounts to is that this number could go from 2 to 1 on a 19 case basis, if,necessary. 20 MR. MCNEILL: If I might interject a minute. 21 Our strategy is to position ourselves so that if 22 we have an unscheduled absence by illness, bad weather or 23 something else, we need not implement overtime to cover for 24 the misstag individuals so that if we have 4 reactor 25 operatoro, one does not show up. the three that remain Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
.O
1 . . a 37 L 1 there, are adequate to fulfill the technical specification
~
i 2 requirements and similarly, if one of the senior people does-3- notashow up. then we can make a judgment whether to replace 1 4 .him or not on a case by case basis. 5 MR.' SMITH: That's a very important point. We 6 clearly.have a-role for the Second Shift Supervisor,:but we i 7- have very carefully written that role such that it is not'a j 8 required to be filled position. It is 4 hen assigned he will 9 go these things and'so on. Now, he is normally there. 10 DR. REMICK: The question came up last night 11- during dinner discussion on the fact that an inadequate 12 number lof people were placed in the training in the past.. 13 Is there anything about the location of the plant-14 which makes it! difficult for you to attract competent people 15 into the operations area? 16 MR. SMITH: No. Right now, there are not--nuclear 17 power plants are not hiring that much. I still take Navy 18 Times and I caw an article last week, a letter from a wife 19 of a husband who said, gee, my husband joined the nuclear 20 Navy because he was going to get into industry and now I 21 understand that you have to have a college degree to get ; 22 into industry. What happened to those promises I had? 23 I didn't know that we hired the Navy to train our 24 operators. There is, no shortage of them. We hired nearly 40 25 ex Navy people in the last two years and Limerick took on, I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
38 i 1 believe 18, during that same time period. So, they are available. ll) 2 3 MR. MCNEILL: The restrictions, principally, were 4 corporate policies that did not acknowledge that outsiders j 5 could come into the organization and we have sort of broken 6 that mold over the last year and a half. 7 DR. REMICK: How about the work ethic culture of 8 that region, any difficulties there? Although if you're 9 hiring a lot of ex Navy nukes, they would come from all 10 over. 11 MR. SMITH: We have broken the mold, as Corbin 12 said, and we go out and hire where we need to. It is 13 desirable to hire someone, if he is the right quality 14 person, from that area, because that is his home and he 15 likes to live there and it's convenient for him to go back 16 and forth to work, but we are not restricting ourselves to 17 that area. 18 DR. REMICK: But how about the work ethic, is it 19 adequate in that region? 20 MR. SMITH: We could use some improvement. It's 21 helpful to get some blood in from outside. 22 MR. MCNEILL: I believe the worth ethic is set by 23 the expectations and standards of the company and that is 24 where, if there is improvement to be made, and there is, 25 that is where we're going to make the improvement. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
39 1 DR. REMICK: Thank you. l 2 MR.' SMITH: .This concludes my comments on the (]} 3 Second Root Cause. Again, it is not a simple and quick 4 matter to have those adequate numbers of licenses that will 5 allow the flow through that we need, but we are committed to 6 having them and to braking this mold in the future. 7 The Third Root Cause concerns the culture, the 8 station culture which had its roots in fossil and pre TMI 9 operations had not adapted to changing, nuclear requirements 10 and the elements in this include the following: ! 11 As I mentioned the 6 Shift Superintendents that ! 12 were in charge of the shifts, of those 6, 5 had come from ! 13 our fossil' plant. Several of our senior managers, 14 particularly in the formative years at Peach Bottom had come 15 from the fossil plants and they had obviously brought with 16 them that work experience. That was the only work 17 experience they had. They had come out of college or high 18 school and joined a fossil plant, worked there several years 19 and come to Peach Bottom. No one had set any other 20 standards for them. 21 The organizational structure and management ! 22 philosophy typical of the fossil plant, was transported into j 23 Peach Bottom and I think that highlighting that philosophy 24 was a policy of staying on the line and generating power. 25 The procedures were guidelines, procedures were Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
)
I J
s 40 p 1 not written, people stayed.in their jobs for many many years {} 2 3 and knew their jobs and they got it done and they kept the plant running and that was, perhaps, one of the key elements
-4 in the fossil mentality.
5 There was an inadequate response at Peach Bottom 6 to the increasing complexity and high standards of post TMI. 7 We were generating electrical power at Peach Bottom I early ; 8 in 'the ' 70's. We were generating power in Peach Botton II 9 and III in the mid '70's. We set world records for power 10 generation. We knew how to do it. We have done it well, we 11 were heralded in the industry, we did not respond'to the 12 increasing standards that were set to adopt the culture at i 13 Peach Bottom and in Philadelphia Electric to newer 14 standards.
- 15 Now, to affect cultural change is very difficult,
.\
16 and you don't do it in Lne short term. We couldn't do it in 17 the first weeks or months after shutdown, we haven't done it 18 in the two years since shutdown, but we have made, we think, 19 considerable progress and we recognize that this will be a 20 continuing process. We need to reinforce this and keep 21 working on it for years and years and years. 22 In order to affect the cultural change, we needed 23 to identify and communicate our cultural values throughout 24 our organization. Determining what they were, management 25 training, team building among management, employee training, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
41 1 communicating these values and standards throughout the () 2 organization and setting n place the management policies, l 3 the programs and the control systems to back up the culture, j 4 Because of the conditions of the shutdown order, Ii 1 1 5 we started with out emphasis in operations and particularly ' 6 with the Reactor Operators. We developed an attitude 7 assessment and training program for the operators. 8 After the shutdown, the potential of each one of 9 the Reactor Operators, licensed operators, was evaluated to 10 determine their attitudes, their ability to change their 11 behavior pattern and their willingness to do so. 12 I personally interviewed each of them, in an 13 extensive interview. They'were interviewed by psychologists 14 and then those of them that were selected for development,
's 15 for.the retraining program, participated in a program that
(\~) l 16 we call,. " People, the Foundation of Excellence." This 17 course was developed, primarily by management Analysis 18 Corporation and taught primarily by them, with involvement 19 of our own Training. Department and strong input from our own
-20 management.
21 The course was primarily in self awareness, inter 22 personal skills, dealing with stressful situations, 23 relationships with outside agencies and so on. I 24 This course, was for those that were on watch, or 25 licensed operators at the time of the shutdown, was a six Beritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
q kr , l l 42 1 week course. We have subsequently conducted it for other. j 2 new licenses and for-other people at the station and it has o: s 3 been a shorter course, but the. original course was an 4 intervention for the operators that had been in the Control-5 Room at the time of shutdown. I would point out here that 6 our Shift' Technical Advisors also attended this course. 7 So at the present time, all licensed operators and ~l l 8 the Shift Technica1' Advisors that were on watch at that 9 time, have been through PE or a similar course. We also 10 have a commitment to continue this type of training for i 11 people coming up to Reactor Operator'and also a refresher 12 type of training for the people that have received it !
'I 13 previously. That will continue in the' future.
14 Having put our emphasis on the operators, we then m 15 looked out to the rest of the nuclear group and we developed 16 the vision, the mission and the values of the nuclear group. I 17 Our vision at Peach Bottom is to once again be 18 recognized as a leader in the nuclear power industry. .Our , 19 mission, of course, is to generate safe, economical and 20 reliable power. 21 Then we sat down and we developed the values of 22 the nuclear group and here I want to point out that this is 23 not the values at Peach Bottom, this is the entire nuclear 24 group and these were developed under the leadership of Mr. l 25 Mc Neill, amongst about the top 30 people in the company in Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l O l J
43 1 the nuclear group spending several days in very detailed () 2 debate over what are our real values, what is inportant to 3 us and that subs aquently having identified these values, we 4 have communicated them, at the stations and through the 5 nuclear group and we have tried to live by these values and 6 make our decisions based on these values. 7 We have a document out that explains what each of l 8 these values mean and what the substances is behind it. I 9 would only emphasize that whenever we use the values, we 10 start with say, safety is our Number 1 value, the other 5 11 are co-equal to each other 12 On this chart and the next chart are several 13 things that we have done to try to make this cultural change 14 occur and I am not going to talk about each of them, I am 15 only going to highlight a couple. { 16 We developed a statement of philosophy for the 17 assurance of quality. This statement was put out in a nice 18 rmooth form, signed by Mr. Mc Kneel and all of the Nuclear 19 Group vice presidents, handed out to each of our group 20 employees. And, it is a pretty well considered document 21 which says, we have got to do it right the first time, we 22 have got to assure the quality. We are not talking about 23 quality control where you inspect to see if there was 24 quality or quality assurance where you audit to see if there 25 was quality, we're te.lking about assuring it in the first Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
44 1 place. () 2 In this philosophy we said, these are the things 3 that management will do for the employee body to assure l
)'
4 quality and these are the things that we expect the employee i 5 body to do to assure quality. i 6 This philosophy really was a significant departure 7 from what we have done in the past. 8 The bottom item on this chart, the inter group 9 meetings. There are numerous inter group meetings between 10 all the work groups, hecith physics and operations, security 11 and maintenance, to try to make sure that the groups can 12 work well together. 13 At a nuclear power plant no individual can do his 14 joo without the support of someone from another group, they 15 are so interlocked. 16 The next chart continues with some of the items of 17 cultural change and since I am the Vice President, I will 18 mention the "Tell it to Vice President" situation. I have 19 some suggestion boxes , whatever you want to call them, 20 around the plant, where people can put in any comments, 21 suggestions, criticisms, poison pen notes, "atta boy", 22 whatever they want to do, anonymously, put a code on it if 23 they want an answer, put the name on if they want me to know 24 who is saying it and I read each one of them, take action 25 where appropriate and respond in a newsletter at the station Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
45 i 1 1 to the comment that was made. l i 2- So everybody knows that while the chain of command-3 is there, I'll always listen to what to.they have got to 4 say. 5 We think that we'have strongly emphasized open 6 communications with the regulatory agencies and the auditor ! 7 and the comments that we get back from those outside s 8 auditors indicate that there has been.significant progress 9 in this area. 10 To support cultural change, we had to make a 11 number of changes in management policies and practices. !
'12 Again I won't go through the details of all of_these, but a' 1
13 couple that I would highlight: ) 14 The annual face to face performance appraisals. 15 We had a rating system that had fallen intol disuse because 16 nothing was made of it and people didn't know how to do : 17 performance appraisals. Since the shutdown, we have trained 18 supervisors in conducting performance appraisals in a 19 supervisor training course for all supervisor in the-Nuclear i 20 Group. 21 We have conducted yearly face to face performance 22 appraisals during 1988 and will continue in the. future. We 23 train the people on how to do it. I send a letter out to 24 the employee body of how they should react to it, what they 25 should expect from it and the practice is going on. i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
46 1 We have instituted a strong drug policy and just ( ) 2 recently issued an alcohol policy. The alcohol policy does 3 not include mandatory testing at this~ state, the drug policy 4 does. 5 We announce that between the period fr( .3 A.fgust 6 of last year, I believe it was 1 November, every employee I 7 that had unescorted access to the power plant would be 8 tested for drugs. 9 We then, in 1989, this year, are testing 125 10 percent of the population on a random basis. That program 11 has begun for 1989. The results in the 1988 testing at 12 Peach Bottom, we tested some 1.,200 Philadelphia Electric ! 13 employees. There were 2 positive drug indications. One was 14 a mobile maintenance worker'who was not on my payroll and l q 15 one was on my payroll. So my payroll of about 800 people,
)
16 there was one employee that tested positive with a drug. It 17 turned out that he had a drug problem. He is no longer in 18 the company's employment. , 19 DR. REMICK: Have you had any problem with false ( 20 positives? 21 MR. SMITH: We have not had any problems because 22 we do a two step screening. I would say the employee might 23 disagree with you and say he had a problem, in that he got a 24 positive on the first screening and he was embarrassed by it 25 until they could do the second screen. But, we have not had Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
_ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ = _ . . i, ' 47 1 any false positives on the second screening. () 2 In fact, from my point of view, we were coming in 3 so clean on this I was beginning to worry that the tests 4 weren't good until we finally started to get some positives. 5 It was amazing. We went through hundreds and hundreds before i 6 there were any positives. 7 I would also comment on the Operations Management 8 Manual, Plant Operator's Manual. This is an extensive volume 9 which we developed at the station and had a lot of input 10 from the operators and clearly sets for the expectations for 11 the operators. 12 An operator would frequently ask a question like, q 13 "What do you mean by procedural compliance? What do if there 14 is a fire and I have to do something that is beyond 15 procedure?" What do mean by this, what is meant by that? 16 The Operations Manual attempts to sp.',1 out all of 17 those things so that there are clear understandings of what 18 is expected of the operator and also what is expected of 19 operations management. 20 It is in this manual that you will find our Code j l 21 of Conduct. We call it our " Commitment to Excellence Action 22 Statement. This was developed by two reactor operators-- 23 Senior Reactor Operators from Peach Bottom, working with two 24 Senior Reactor Operators from the' Limerick generating 25 station who developed our Commitment to Excellence Statement i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 48 1 which has been ascribed to by all licensed and non licensed j () 2 operators and all management at the station. 3 We have reviewed it again, the INPO 4 recommendations for a Code of Conduct and it has more in it l 5 than the things tbst INPO says should be included. We have l 6 read Chairman Zeck's to 7t or the NRC's recent-7 pro'fessionalism srs.snent 'and I think generally it covers ! 8 that although we haven't done a one to one check. I 9 We took that statement and sent it out to all of I 10 our license operators with a cover note from management. 11 Now cultural change is not a go - no go thing. j i 12 You don't have a gauge to go out and measure cultural 13 change. So I have listed here just a number of indicators 14 of cultural change. 15 Significant to me, I think, are these outsider , 16 comments, INPO, NRC, other visitor comments. For the last 17 year, at least, I have gotten very positive comments. I say 18 almost every because 1 can't assure you that each and every 19 inspector has come to see me about it, but almost every 20 outside agency that comes to visit us.has let me know how 21 courteously they were treated, how positive the attitudes 22 are at Peach Bottom and those that have been here before, 23 over the course of the years, have made a special point of 24 saying how different it is than it used to be. 25 I mentioned the drug testing results. Plant l. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 I () I
)
I
49 I 1 housekeeping, I think is an indicator of the culture. People 2 now tend not to litter. They tend to clean up after ( }) 3 themselves and I say tend to because we're not a 100 ! 4 percent, but they are much better than they used to be. It 5 used to be accepted that the Maintenance Group would go in 6 and leave a mess when they left. Now they tend to clear it 7 up. We show a pride in station and a pride in self. 8 You see it in the professionalism, the demeanor, 9 the attire of the people, the team work among the groups. I 10 think that there are things that we can look at and say are i 11 indicators of cultural change, but I would re-emphasize this 12 as a process, we are devoted to it and we will keep working 13 on it. 14 DR. REMICK: How about voluntary personnel turn 15 over, is that a problem? Do you have any. feeling on the 16 percent? I realize with reorganization, it's probably had 17 to evaluate. 18 MR. SMITH: Philadelphia Electric Company has very 19 very low turn over. I mean, we are a good employer. We do 20 not have much turn over. On the licensed operators, we have 21 had one resignation since the shut down, a licensed 22 operator. Turn over is low and I think in the past two 23 years it has continued to be low. John-- 24 MR. FRANZ: I would say as a company, I believe 25 somewhere on the order of 35 percent of the employee body Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
50 1 has over 25 years. () 2 MR. MCNEILL: We have less than 1 percent, 3 company-wide, turn over. 4 DR. REMICK: Did the reporter get the name of the 5 person who spoke? 6 MR. MCNEILL: That was Mr. Franz, John Franz. 7 MR. SMITH: Low turn over company. 8 DR. REMICK: Please proceed. 9 MR. SMITH: That concludes my comments on the 10 firct three root causes that led to the conditions that were 11 behind the shut down order and I'll turn it back to Mr. Mc 12 Neill who will discuss the fourth root cause. 13 MR. MCNEILL: As we indicated earlier, the fourth 14 root cause did discuss corporate management's failure to 15 recognize the developing severity of the problem at Peach 16 Bottom and did not take sufficient corrective action. 17 The basic analysis here was there was a lack of 18 control, accountability and corporate direction for nuclear 19 operations. It was very diffused. We bsi multiple 20 organizations involved, highly matrixed organization. 21 As Mr. Smith had indicated earlier, all the 22 maintenance personnel worked for a different vice president. 23 The technicians worked for an even different vice president 24 than the plant manager, so there a lack of clear lines of 25 accountability and authority. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
51 m 1 There was weak management systems and managerial {} 2 skills to self assess and resolve problems and finally there was week independent assessment to provide feed back to 3 4 management on problems so that some action could, in fact, 5 be taken. i 6, The major action taken in terms of the 7 accountability issue was to form a dedicated nuclear 8 organization. This was done early in 1988. I had 9 subsequently become the head of that organization and we do, j i 10 in fact, have a very specific functional accountability 11 established. 12 There is a Senior Vice President of Nuclear 13 Construction who is responsible for the completion of the 14 Limerick II construction program and that, in essence, will 15 finish mid year, this year. 16 There is a vice president counter part to Mr. 17 Smith at the Limerick generating station who is the Site 18 Director and in charge of all the activities there. I 19 introduced Mr. Kowalski, who is the Vice President of .- 20 Nuclear Engineering, whose sole job is to maintain the 21 configuration management of our nuclear generating stations, 22 nuclear plants. 23 There is a Vice President of Nuclear Services who , i 24 has the role of consolidating and coordinating the training 8 25 activities in the company. He takes care of the support { Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-488G
52 1 functions such as licensing, radiological waste, 2 radiological protection. He'also has a large mobile {. 3 maintenance group which services our plants, both nuclear 4 and non nuclear and also has accountabilities for the l l 5 information resource management within the department. 1 6- We also brought three disparate quality assurance 7 programs into one quality assurance organization, ' 8 Engineering and Production. Production used to have a 1
, 9 quality assurance program. Engineering and Research used to 10 have one and our construction organization used to.have one. ;
11 They have all been brought into the sum of one. Yes, sir. 1 12 DR. SHEWMON: Would you tell me again what Mr. 13 Kowalski does? ; i
. 14 MR. MCNEILL: Mr. Kowalski is. responsible for 15 maintaining the configuration of our facilities.
16, DR. SHEWMON: What does that mean? 17 MR. MCNEILL: That means that he provides--he is ! 18 responsible to insure that the documentation reflects the 19 ASBET condition, that the documentation has been correctly 20 analyzed and meets all codes and standards and he also is 1 21 responsible for the physical modification of the facility. 22 DR. SHEWMON: Inspection then, at least would at 23 least interact with him? 24 MR. MCNEILL: When you say, " inspection," you're 25 talki'ng about-- Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i I 53 1 DR. SHEWMON: I'm thinking of Section 11 of the
'U(') 2 Code.
3 MR. MCNEILL: Yes, Section 11 gets its basic 4 information from him. Section 11 actually is in out Nuclear 5 Maintenance organization--in the ISI Group, but they get 6 their basic documentation as to what falls under Section 11 , 7 and Guidance. It comes from the Nuclear. Engineering 8 Department. ' 9 DR. SHEWMON: Any plant modifications interact 10 with him, how? 11 MR. MCNEILL: First, he does all the engineering 12 and design effort. He also has, at each station, and this 13 is the one deviant from the organizational concept of all 14 people'at the station reporting to the vice President at'the 15 station. We have a construction group which is about 30 16 professional and para professionals and about 40 craftsman 17 under' Philadelphia Electric and they either do the work 18 themselves or they are the contract agents to supervice the 19 contracting constructor. 20 DR. SHEWMON: Thank you. 21 MR. MCNEILL: We also have a full time Nuclear 22 Review Board Chairman which I will discuss in a little more 23 depth later and we have two support functions. This group 24 is about 3,600 people and is essentially a quasi business 25 unit in the company with a Business Unit Manager and we have Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
)
54
- a. 1 a Human Resource Organization which has a dotted line'into l
[}. 2 the corporate Human Resource Organization, but because of 3 the large cultural changes and we are taking a leadership 4 role in many of the human resource practices that are. going 5 to change in the company. We have a central organization 6 for support in the nuclear group. 7 As I mentioned earlier, one of the central 8 weaknesses that was identified was the-self assessment 9 capability and I want to describe for you our continuing 10 assessment' process which has been enhanced and is l 11' functioning fairly well now. i 12 The specific process that we went through the l l 13 determine our readiness for restart of the facility and the 14 role that INPO has played and I will just mention that 15 slightly, as opposed to the detail I went into yesterday. ( 16 Our self assessment process is conducted at four
' ' 17 levels. Th- first is and the principal element is the 18 responsibility and accountability of the line organization 19 and management for determining the health of the 20 organization and the corrective actions that should be taken 21 to improve that.
22 All elements of the organization have to be 23 involved there and the types of issues that we discussed or 24 the assessment process, is on the right hand side. There is 25 one incomplete statement down there, new. We have used the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i E ! 55 j 1 basically new people being in the organization as being able () 2 to' help us refine and view ourselves differently than we had 3 in the past where we were very inbred in the organization.
~
4 But we have, in-fact, had two teams of people go
;S to Sweden where the extensive boiling water reactor 6 experience at a-very high level. I have had two people over i i
7 there and we have, in fact, just as an example we, at } 8 Limerick, pulled the steam separator and the steam dryer out 9 in submerged conditions, which is the first time that, I 10 think, that that has been done in this country and involved 11 zero contamination of the refueling floor during that i 12 process, even though we have had extensive fuel leaks at the l 13 Limerick generating station. f 14 Second element of this is-the support evaluations 15 of plant oversight review committees, the nuclear support 16 organization that I talked about where we have corporate l 17 elements of radiological help and radiological waste and ! i 18 chemistry, they helped conduct evaluations of the plants and , l 19 we rely on our quality control organization and they do the 20 types of visits there. I 21 Again, I would point out that in INPO assist 22 visits, I think we've had something over a dozen INPO assist 23 visits in the nuclear group during the period of 1988. 24 The third level of assessment is our true 25 independent oversight. We use our Nuclear Quality Assurance i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
.O
. h
56 1 Organization and our Nuclear Review Board. They do conduct 2 the routine audits and monitoring inspections. We're 3 particularly proud of our Performance Assessment Group which 4 is an independent organization within Nuclear Quality 5 Assurance. It is a non technical specification to assign l l 6 roles and it looks at organizational effectiveness and l 7 productivity as opposed to compliance. It has very little 8 compliance role. It will note a non compliance, if it l 9 exists, but they' re to see that the organization's really l 10 are being effective in what they do. They use basic 11 documents such as INFO guidelines and some of the studies 12 that the NRC has done, for instance,'in helping to define i 13 independent assessment kinds of roles. j 14 Yes, Mr. Shewmon. 15 DR. SHEWMON: Could you tell me what the 16 background is of the people that are there? 17 MR. MCNEILL: Yes. There is a retired Navy 18 captain. There is a former INPO employee. There is a former 19 NRC inspector and--Dave, can you help me? 20 Mr. Dave Helwig who is the General Manager of 21 Quality Assurance. 22 MR. HELWIG: We have a gentleman from the Naval I 23 Reactor's Program and out of the Naval Prototype Program, 24 instructor background and two individuals from within the 25 company with diverse backgrounds. ! Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i l
57 1 One in maintenance that actually we just [} 2 transferred out and the other Engineering and Operations. DR. SHEWMON: Transferred out of maintenance or 3 I 4 transferred out of-- 5 MR. MCNEILL: He just left that organization, I 6 believe and we will replace him in that--replace his 7 position. 8 DR. SHEWMON: Thank you. 9 MR. MCNEILL: The fourth level, as Executive I 10 Management, the NCB is the Nuclear Committee of the Board. 11 We have a 5 member committee that has met 28 times, I think, 12 in 1988 and generally meets monthly right now and after the I 13 restart of Peach Bottom and start up of Limerick II, we () 14 expect them to go to quarterly. 7 15 Their basic role is to over view management of the 0 16 nuclear organization. They have two outside consultants, Sol 17 Levy of Sol Levy, Inc. and Dennis Wilkinson, President ( 18 Emeritus of INPO. Plus, I consider my role to be crucial to 19 this particular self assessment process. I have used 20 directed reports from Levels I, II and III that come up to 7 l 21 me of Commission special studies. We relied on INPO and the l 22 INPO evaluation process as input at this level and such 23 other items as the Joint Utility Management Audit, which is 24 an audit of the Quality Assurance organization. 25 Diagrammatically, these all come together such Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
58 1 that line management is inter acting at every level and then l () 2 we have inter reliance among the other elements which are 3 the support activities, the independent oversight and the 4 execu.tive management role. 5 We have found this to be very effective. It's 6 getting quite good reviews from INPO and the NRC has 7 recognized a significant improvement in our self assessment 8 process. We intend to continue this because we think it is 9 very crucial to the continued improvement in the 1 10 organization. 11 Specifically, with respect to restart, we had a 12 restart readiness review panel which censisted of myself, 13 the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Construction, the Vice
)
i 14 President of the Limerick Generating Station, the General 15 Manager of Quality Assurance and the Chairman oft the (] v 16 Nuclear Review Board. We have the consultants from the 17 Nuclear Committee of the Board and we had a third consultant 18 who, at that time, was with the Management Analysis 19 Corporation and subsequently has been hired by the Niagara 20 Mora Corporation to be their Chief Nuclear Office. 21 That group received inputs from structure reviews, 22 specifically associated with readiness for restart from the 23 Nuclear Review Board, Nuclear Quality Assurance. We had 14 24 functional managers present their analysis of historical 25 problems that had been identified either by the company, by Heritage Reporting Corporation
,_ (202) 628-4888 u)
l 59 , .o 1 INPO or by the NRC. The corrective actions that have been 2 undertaken, the improvements that have been noted and the j } 3 permanence, what was going to make those improvements 4 permanent. They had to make presentations and, in some 5 cases they--some of those people had to come back 3 times. 6 This whole process occurred over a 3 month period, resulted 7 in a report which came to the conclusion that the plant 8 would be ready for restart when certain elements of plant 9 requirements'were complete, all over due preventive 10 maintenance was complete, modifications that were in 11 progress or required to resolve certain technical issues ! 12 were completed and that all the corrective maintenance that 13 had been judged necessary for restart was completed. 14 We also had a series of more administrative items. ; 15 We acknowledged that we needed additional training on the 16 part of our licensed operators on the control room 17 simulator. We had reviewed something on the order of 134 18 specific weaknesses in configuration management and we had 19 to resolve those. 20 An example was that we had found that we had put l 21 in a approximately a 120 different parts that did not have 22 demonstrable quality assurance paperwork with them. We had 23 to either investigate, analyze and resolve those 24 administrative 1y and, in some cases, I think about 20 of l 25 them, we had go to in and take the part out and put fully Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
60 m , i 1 qualified documented partsLin. (} 2 We had a number of modifications to close certain 3 other technical issues ~such-as relays associated with the 4 degraded grid, logic and we had commitments that we had made 5 to the NRC or INPO and a continuing list of issues, findings 6 and NCRs that were generated _by nuclear quality assurance 7 organizations. 8 I would point out to you that this has been an 9 ongoing process in that as we have improved our self 1 10 assessment capability, we have found more problems from past i 11 practices and behaviors and we have undertaken the-12 correction of those as they have come along. 13 We have run into problemu of small bore pipe -! 14 stress-analysis, that we have had to undertake sampling -l i . 15 ' systems and analysis to determine whether they are a safety-16- ' issue or not and, in some case, we have had to make short 17 term corrections and implement long term re-analysis ; 18 programs. 19 MR. WARD: Now, I'm have a little trouble figuring 20 out what this chart is telling me. It says that it's a 21 process, it looks like it might be a set of organizations. 22 Should there be some arrows on that? 23 MR. MCNEILL: Well, let me--yes. 24' MR. WARD: What's going on here? 25 MR. MCNEILL: This Restart Panel considered inputs i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
\
61 1 from these 4 areas, evaluated whether the actions that were ) 1
/~h '2 taken were sufficient to justify' restarting the Peach Bottom '(/.
3 atomic power station. This is a one time review that was 4 done to justify restarting the Peach Bottom atomic power 5 station- prior to restarting the Peach Bottom atomic power 6 . station. 7 It occurred over about a 3 month period. That 8 panel came to a conclusion in a report the actions that the
- i 9 company had taken were adequate to justify restart as long ]
10 as these open items were, in fact, completed and we are,in 11 fact, working down a list, which we expect to complete and 12 Mr. Smith will give a little more detail on, in his final 13 segment of his presentation. 14 .It says when those items are complete, the plant 15 will be physically ready for restart. The people will be 16 ready for restart and the essential processes that are 17 necessary to control the station will be adequate for 18 restart. 19 MR. WARD: Thank you. 20 MR. MCNEILL: And at the conclusion of that, it is 21 the previous self assessment process that will be utilized 22 to maintain the organization as we go along. We do not 23 intend to go back and do a specific review again. 24 Just to review again the oversight of nuclear 25 operations, the Nuclear Review Board has been strengthened I 1 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
i I 62
.f 1 and its reporting relationships have been elevated. It has )
(} 2 a full time chairman'and has become, in my. opinion, a very l 3 very effective tool. In the three different organizations 1 4 that I have associated with over the last 8 years, this is, 5 by far, the most effective Nuclear Review Board that I have 6 seen. 7 Its membership has been strengthened. It has 3 8 outside members and we have stronger representatives or the 9 strongest representatives that we can find internally. 10 We also have a Nuclear Committee of the Board and 11 I mentioned earlier that the Nuclear Quality Assurance 12 organization has been consolidated and is again much more 13 effective than in the past. It had been restricted, in the 14 past, from looking at some areas that were'outside of 15 technical specification, such as operations, operations O
%/
l l 16 morale and it now takes a look at those particular issues. ' 17 That concludes this element of my presentation. 18 Mr. Smith will come back and attempt to describe for you 19 some of the physical changes that have occurred to 20 demonstrate that this whole collective action process has 21 been effective. 22 MR. WYLIE: You're Executive Vice President of 23 Nuclear. Are you a member of the Board? 24 MR. MCNEILL: No, I am not a member of the Board. 25 MR. WYLIE: You' re not a member of the Board? Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i i
.' Y
- si j. v j
63 ) 1 MR. MCNEILL: No. i.
]
()- 2' MR. WYLIE:' But you report. direct'ly to the-- ) 3 MR. MCNEILL: I report directly to the Chairman of ij l 4 the Board. l 1 5 MR. WYLIE: To the Chairman of the Board. > 6 MR. MCNEILL: Right. 7- MR. WYLIE: What about Mr. Gallagher, who was the 8 previous Vice President of Nuclear Operations? 9 MR. MCNEILL: He is now the Vice President of 10 Nuclear Services, independent of any association'with.that
.)
11 prior organization. He is retiring later this year, 12- MR. WYLIE: And he-reported to Mr. Kemper in the 13 old organization? 14 . MR . MCNEILL: Mr. Kemper and Mr. Kemper is now
~15 back in his earlier function prior--Mr. Kemper and Mr.
16 Gallagher had been'in those positions only 3 months prior to .) 17 the ordered shutdown. 18 MR. WYLIE: I see. 19 MR. MCNEILL: They had been short tenured people. 20 Mr. Kemper has gone back into the construction area, 21 directing the completion of Limerick II, which is his forte' 22 and Mr. Gallagher was reassigned as the President of Nuclear } 23 Services in the organization and he will be retiring here in 24 several months. l 25 MR. WYLIE: Those positions, however, I guess, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 - t 1
64 o i existed prior to' their n:oving into Lthose positions? . . f2 MR. MCNEILL: They did. Slightly different, but--' 3 MR. WYLIE: Was it still in the chain of command 4 that you showed on your chart?. , 5 MR. MCNEILL: No,_ it was not. Those did not-6 exist.-There was a Vice President of Engineering and 7 Production who had retired just prior to that, a Mr. Shields 8 Dahicroft who.had retired like in October of 1986 or , W 9 November of 1986, I believe. / 10 MR. WYLIE: Did he report to Mr. Everett? 11 MR. MCNEILL: No, he reported to Mr. Austin and 12 then to Mr. Everett. 13 MR, WYLIE: But substantially way down the line, 14 in the chain of command? 15 MR. MCNEILL: Oh yes, yes. Wo have cut a couple
,/ )
I 16 layers out of the chain of command. l') MR. WYLIE: About 3. 18 MR. MCNEILL: Yes. _ i
, 19 MR. WYLIE: Thank you.
20 MR. MCNEILL: Nuch more efficient communications .) 21 wise. I mean, Executive Management is seen on site ,
-1 22 routinely by making me accountable only for Nuclear j 23 Operations. I spend nominally a day at Peach Bottom and a
, l i
24 day at Limerick, almost every week, except weeks like this ! w l 25 where I have spent 2 days in Washington. j i I Heritage Reporting Corporation 4 (202) 628-4888
to65 1- MR. WYLIE: Part of the root cause--Number 4 Root (J
. 2 'Cause, Corporate Direction, I assume you fulfill that?
3 MR. MCNEILL: Yes, sir. My boss--I think it's a . 4 strength that the Chairman of our company was a civil 5 engineer, by education, had worked in that field, with this 6 company for about 4 years, had gone into financial and had ! 7 spent about 26 years in the' financial section of the 8 company, had gone off to Consumer's Power as the Chief 9 Financial Officer after their big shake up, when they had a 10 failed nuclear operation, had been promoted to be President 11 of Consumer's Power and then came back as Chairman of 12 Philadelphia Electric Comp'any. 13 He gets to our nuclear stations a minimum of once 14 a month right now add I expect that he will continue to do , p 15 that. , d 16 Three quarters of our assets and 70 percent of our ! 17 earnings are tied up in nuclear operations. 18 DR. KERR: I thought I saw him characterized in 19 one news report as a lawyer. Was that just a vile caline or 20 was-- 21 MR. MCNEILL: I have not seen that and I can't put 22 it in a perspective. 23 DR. REMICK: I suggest we take our mid-morning 24 break now, returning back at 20 minutes past the hour. 25 MR. MCNEILL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
66 1 (A short recess was taken.) () 2 DR. REMICK: Proceed, Mr. Smith. 3 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, genticmen, it's my 4 pleasure at this time to be able to talk about the actual 5 accomplishments at the station, other than the actions in 6 response to the root causes. Because of the actions that we 7 have taken, to respond to the root cause of the problem, we 8 have made substantial progress at the station and I will 9 discuss several of the areas. 10 At Peach Bottom, prior to the shutdown, we had a 11 large volume of RAD waste, radio active waste and this is 12 dry active waste. As estimate of some 1,600 cubic meters 13 had accumulated and it was stored in the power block and 14 outside and around the open areas because we had made a 15 corporate decision not to ship that for burial. 16 We commenced an aggressive program in '87 to start 17 shipping and getting that out of the way. We set as a goal, 18 600 cubic meters. We've gone well below that goal and will 19 maintain about the level that is shown--this is about one to e 20 one and a half shipments of dry active waste and is a 21 routine flow through. 22 DR. REMICK: A shipment is trailer van or a 23 trailer truck? 24 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, a truck load. 25 Liquid waste, the radio active drums, the 55 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 67 1 gallon drums, we had about 700 of them that had been I^'
. V) 2 collected from back in the mid '70's. Some of them are high 3 radiation liquid, some are not. We set as a goal a 100 4 drums. This is all liquids in the plant that are or could be 5 radioactive until they have been sampled and processed and 6 there will always be some drums of it.
7 We have just about achietud the goal, but we have 8 gotten it down to where the operators, in going on their 9 rounds in the power block, do not have to climb under and 10 crawl around drums. 1 Now, looking to tne future, in addition to getting 12 rid of that back log, we have to control the generation of 13 radio active waste and this is the chart, looking ahead to 14 1989, the red line is the Institute of Nuclear Power 15 Operations best quarter. They tell us for boiling water (V'T 16 reactor plants, the plants in the best quarter would , 17 generate this much waste. The median plant would generate 18 this much waste. 19 Our goal is to not generate more than 800 cubic 20 meters in 1989 and that would put us just above the INFO 21 best quartile and well below the INFO median. 22 DR. KERR: Is there any significance to the 23 horizontal position of the arrow just to the left of "is 24 better"? 25 MR. SMITH: We're trying to indicate and we do Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O V I ________U
e 68 1 this--this is one:-of our many performance indicators that we 2 use in our management meetings. On each of them we try to L(J. s J 3 indicate which direction is the better way. In this chart, J
. i 4 you would like to be at the bottom of the chart.
5 DR. KERR: Thank you. ,
)
6 MR. SMITH: And that is a shorthand that we use in j 7 the group. 8 We're also pleased with the progress that we have 9 made in decontaminating the surface areas in the plant. 10 Peach Bottom was a highly contaminated plant. There were i 11 many rooms that you could enter only in anti contamination 12 clothing and the levels of contamination were relatively 13 high within those contaminated areas. I 14 This is not an INPO measured number. We called i 15 around to other utilities in the industry to try and 16 determine what sort of contamination levels they had and, a i 17 little bit arbitrarily perhaps, set our best understanding 18 of the average in the industry, as about 18 percent of the 19 accessible surface area is contaminated. i i' 20 We set as our goal no more than 10 percent. We 21 achieved that goal late last year and we will maintain below 22 that goal. We're above that goal on Unit 3. This is Unit 2 1 23 in the common areas. We've above that goal on Unit 3, but 24 we expect to achieve it before the restart of Unit 3. l 25 As you get lower and lower and lower, it gets Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 I () l l I
69 1 harder and harder and harder because, obviously you attack () v 2 the areas that are easiest first. We have made great 3 progiess in this area. People in the plant go into areas 4 now that they have been abe to get into in 10 years without 5 contamination clothing. It frees up the work areas for the 6 maintenance workers. 7 Radiation exposure, for 1989, again the INPO best 8 quartile and the INPO median, our goal is to have no more 9 than 1,000 man rem of exposure throughout 1989. When we q 10 achieve this goal, it will only be the third time in the 11 history of Peach Bottom that we have been at a 1,000 or less 12 and the other two times were the first two years of 13 operation of the plant. 14 So far in 1989, that is January and February, we 15 have been below our goal line. Our goal line would have 16 been at 90 man rem and we are at about 80. We haven't got 17 the final results back for February. , 18 In 1988, as you can see, we were very high as 19 compared to our goal and I want to discuss that. That was , 20 because we did a major pipe replacement on Unit No. 3. As 21 shown on this chart, our comparable pipe replacement jobs 22 throughout the industry, the worst in terms of man rem of 23 exposure was Peach Bottom Unit 2, in the 1984 - 1985 time 24 frame, the best and clearly the best, by a considerable l l 25 margin, was Peach Bottom Unit 3, which was started in the Ileritage Reporting Corporation g- (202) 628-4888 O l 1 j
-5 h
(
- 70 1 : fall-of 1987'and continued on in.through 1988.
'2 .DR. SHEWMON: Is that changing out the'same pipe:
3 on two different plants? ,
-i 4 MR. SMITH:. Yes, sir. And, in fact,-there was a 5 'little more. scope in this job than this one. Now, counter 6 balancing that was this~ plant had been shut down~1onger 1
7 before we started than this plant had. We did chemical' 8 decontamination, but'we took extraordinary measures to get 4 9 .that done. It cost the company a great deal of money, but ; i 10 we did. bring that down. , 11 The job we did on Unit 3, the scope of that is 12' larger.than on any one of those others, not a' lot large, but. ! 13 it is larger. 14 So, in summary, on the health physics indicators, , 15 personnel exposure, we had set as a goal for 1988, 2,500 man 16 rem. We came in below that goal. Our goal for 1989 will be >
.j 17 a'1,000 and that is going to be a very aggressive goal and y l
18- difficult to meet. - l. 19 RAD waste production in 1988, our goal was 1,600 ', 20 and that was based upon the fact, expected to be operating j 21 in some of '88 and you generate resins when you're 22 operating. We did a good job and'came in at 800, but 23 frankly, I don't think that was a challenging enough goal, : 24 so I am not as proud of meeting that as I am of n.eeting this 25 even though it's closer over here. Heritage Reporting Corporation ] (202) 628-4888 i t
n 71 1 Our goal for 1989 is relatively the same because I lll 2 we will be operating in 1989 and generating resin. So the 3 '89 goal of 825 is a challenging goal. 4 - Overdue preventive maintenance. At Peach Bottom, 5 we had a--we allowed too low a level to defer preventive i 6 maintenance and they deferred it because it was difficult to 7 make the plant arrangements and do the maintenance when it 8 came due. It was too easy to defer maintenance. 9 In the fall of ' 87, we started trying to get our 10 hands around the size of this problem and this increase-- 11 MR. WARD: Was that caused by the modifica'. tons at 12 Peach Bottom in the past? 13 MR. SMITH: Yes, it was not considered that 14 essential to do. Also preventive maintenance is not that 15 old in the industry. It was an evolving program at Peach 16 Bottom, as it was throughout the industry and we allowed 17 almost anyone to defer maintenance. 18 MR. MCNEILL: And the matrix organization that we 19 had at that time were the maintenance craftsmen worked 20 somewhere else in the organization. It created a condition 21 of lack of clear accountability in many ways for getting 22 this done and there wasn't a good integration of the team to 23 do it. It's my opinion that that was one reason that this 24 one reason that this--another contributing factor in 25 allowing this to develop. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
72 1 MR. SMITH: I think a very important reason, the () 2 maintenance workers not working for the Plant Manager would 3 say these items are due and we should do them. The 4 operations people said it was too hard to make the 5 arrangements to do them, it wasn't the Plant Manager's 6 accountability, it was the Maintenance Group's 7 accountability and,.of course, that does not exist now. 8 This ' increase from December of ' 87 to February of 9 '88 is primarily our getting our hands around the enormity 10 of the problem and'really understanding what was overdue. 11 Then we started working these off, some of them we 12 engineered away by studying the vender's manuals and 13 requirements and determining what was not actually required. ) i 14 Most of them were actual physical work in the plant. l 15 Earlier this year, we actually achieved no overdue { 16 preventive maintenance. There is always maintenances due. 17 There are hundreds of items always due. 18 There are none overdue and we expect to be able to 19 maintain that through restart. 20 Corrective maintenance, non outage work, we ! 21 consider that a normal backlog is about a 1,000. The 22 industry counts this differently from plant to plant, but 23- this is a good number. We are below that number now and we 24 anticipate running at about 800 open items, non outage. 25 We'll do a rolling work schedule throughout all out systems Heritage Reporting Corporation gg (202) 628-4888 U
O.. , 73 1 as we' continue to operate the plant or as we operate.the 2 plant. There will always be some work to do. 1{ } 3 This number has come down from a very very large 4 number. Since the shutdown which was just before--the 5 shutdown of the unit, which was just before the shutdown 6 . order, we have accorolished over 15,000 work items on the 7 Unit II and common *.naterial, 8 As I sala, we'll run about 800 open items. We have l 9 reviewed the items that are open now through our operations 10 management chain to determine which ones are necessary for i 11 restart and we think there are somewhere in the order of 200 12 and the count changes day to day. But we will review all' 13 open orders before restart. We will be operable in the Tech 14 Spec definition and we will have our Operations Management 15 Agreement when the systems necessary for reliability are O 16 operable. q 17 There are several modifications which have been 18 done or are being done to Unit II, in common, before 19 restart, about 180 planned, either commitments to the NRC or 20 necessary for reliability or ones that our operations staff 21 has determined are necessary. The number still open is about 22 40. I think the actual number is 37. They may be open 23 because there is maintenance--there in insulation still to 24 do. They may be open because there is a procedure that 25 needs to be changed or that there is training that needs to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
.r S :
\-) )
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . J
74 1 be conducted. We don't call it closed until all of the
.() 2 paperwork is done and the modification is put to bed.
3 we would anticipate, looking through all these t 4 activities, that Peach Bottom Unit II would be physically 5 ready for restart on the first of April. 6 We are conducting weekly senior management a 7 meetings to gauge our approach to this. We do not see yet 8 any identified items that cannot be done by the first of 9 April. There is a lot of work left to be done, but L 10 everything should fall in by the first of April, 11 Assuming that that is done we, in Philadelphia 12 Electric, could be ready to support a Commission meeting as 13 early as the week of the 10th of April. If that Commission 14 vote were satisfactory, we would be ready to initiate power 15 ascension in mid April ! 16 That power ascension would follow the schedule 17 shown on this chart, which was submitted to the NRC with our 18 power ascension documents in early February. We would 19 slowly build up-- we would go critical and slowly build up ; 20 pressure. We plan an inspection at 500 pounds for leaks. If 21 there were leaks, we would shutdown the plant, fix those 22 leaks, come back up, build up the power, come up to going on 23 the grid to about 35 percent and, at that time, we would 24 have done some training evolutions during this transient 25 period. We would continue to do some training evolutions Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 o
3
~75 j l' and'our Management Assessment Team, which I will' head,_would 2 evaluate the performance to that point.
{) ' 3 We could then continue a steady state. operation to 4 evaluate the management processes and our ability to manage 5 an operating plant because we are new. There are a lot of 6 changes that we'have not operated since the shutdown. 7 We will stay at steady state andl continue that 8 evaluation and when we, the Management Assessment Team was 9 satisfied, we would recommend to Mr. McNeill that we
~
- 10. . continue up in power and we would then recommend that to the i'
11 NRC and we would hold at that point until the NRC agreed 12 that we could go up in power. i 13 We would go up to approximately 70 percent,-there .; 14 would be some transients, some testing that we want to do 15 enroute. We would again assess the transient performance. 16 We would again assess the steady state performance, inform 17 the NRC and wait for their approval to proceed to a 100 18 percent power. 19 Again we would assess the transient performance, , 20 the steady state performance and notify the NRC that we felt 21 that the power ascension program was completed. 22 MR. MARD: Mr. Smith, can I ask a question? 23 MR. SMITH: Sure. 24 MR. WARD: I just want your opinion on something, 25 What do you think about the relative safety of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
o PM' '~ 76
!~
1 operating a plant for extended periods at low power compared 2 with full normal power operations? (])
'3 MR. SMITH: I am actually not--
~
4 MR. WARD: We seem to have built into the system, 5 you know, oven 5 percent licenses for new plants'and so i 6 forth.. .Some of us question the wisdom of that. ; I 7 MR. SMITH: I am really not qualified to offer an j 8 . opinion. I would defer to Mr. McNeill. 9 MR. MCNEILL: One of the things, we certainly need 10 to recognize that the plants are designed to operate at full 11 power. There are provisions,-however, for intermediate l 12 steps. 13 One of the considerations that we're making here 14 is, in fact, to' lower some of the' set point on some of the es 15 trips to accommodate this lower power operation and the U 16 other thing that we are doing here is, in fact, to some 17 extent, going through some elements of the new plant start 18 up program and obviously the other plants have'gone through ! 19 those during their initial power ascension programs. We,'re 20 going to be testing feedwater transient response and things 21 of that nature. 22 So, to some extent, it's unavoidable and 23 circumstances of testing would put us in this condition. I , 24 personally don't think that the 4 weeks we're talking about 25 cr 5 weeks we're talking about at 35 percent power is that s Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 1
]
X 5 77-1 1. serious. () 2 DR. KERR: Do you know of anyone who has done a j
.3 systematic evaluation'of possible problems that.might arise l 4 from extended operation at low power?' I
- 5. MR. MCNEILL: No , I do not.. And let me ask~if any' .
i 6 of my people know that. They give a negative response on j
-7 that, Mr. Kerr, EL DR. KERR: Thank you.
l 9 MR. CARROLL: Just to add my two bits worth. I 10 think you have got to define low power, Dave and Bill. , 11 Thirty-five percent, you're on automatic feedwater and the 12 plant is really pretty stable.. Five percent is a different-13 kind of low power and tends to make operating people a 14 little more nervous. (} 15 MR. SMITH: I would chime in on that. We_do not 16' have a whole point at 5 percent because of that very reason. i 17 We made the case that 35 percent of the plant does achieve 18 stability at that point and that's why I say about 35 19' percent. We want to be at that stable point before we stop. 20 DR. SHEWMON: When you say you have checked 21 transient performance, is this something that is a regular i s 22 part of check. equipment, you actually perturb the plant 23 significantly t'o see how it responds or--
- 24 MR. SMITH: We will do some of that, and I don't 25 have all the details memorized but, for example, we intend i
Heritage Reporting Corporation i 4 f~s (202) 628-4888 l ty
l 78 1 to trip a feed pump at a point to observe the response, both lll 2 to check the capability of the plant to respond and for I 3 training evolution and we will do it with as many observers 4 as we can conveniently have in the control room. 5 We intend to trip or run back a resert pump, not a 6 violent transient of the plant, but operating transients. 7 Because many of the people have not been on the plant at all 8 at operation, many of the reactor operators and many of them 9 have not been recently. 10 We have developed a training program for 11 converting the coal licenses to hot licenses and also some 12 practical factors for refreshing the people who have, if you 13 would, a warm license. 14 DR. SHEWMON: This is all about Unit II. 15 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. gg 16 DR. SHEWMON: Can you tell me what your Unit III 17 plans are for restarting? 18 MR. SMITH: Our emphasis, of course, is on Unit II 19 to get it back up. There is no way, I don't believe, that 20 even if this were extended out that we would feel or the NRC 21 would feel comfortable with out starting Unit III until we 22 had completed this. 23 And one of the things I would think the NRC would 24 be looking for is demonstrated management to manage 2 plants 25 at power. This will demonstrate one plant at power. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
79 1 So I would think that, regardless of how long this (gg 2 interval actually takes, Unit III has got to be somewhere 3 beyond that. I would hope not too far beyond that. 4 The phyttcal work to do on Unit III is such that 5 we still think it will fall in the third quarter--late in 6 the third quarter, but our management emphasis and our , 7 maintenance activities have been concentrated on II and I 8 wouldn't want to go to the bank on anything I have told you 9 on III at this point. 10 DR. SHENMON: Fine, thank you. 11 MR. MCNEILL: If I could interject, Mr. Shewmon, 12 two comments. 13 One on your first question as to the transients 14 and intentional pertubation of the plant. We are attempting 15 to confirm the adjustments that have been made to a number 16 of systems such as the high pressure coolant injection 17 turbine control systems, the feed water controls and things 18 of that nature, to confirm that they are set to accommodate 19 unexpected--let me say, design upsets such as a trip of a 20 feed water pump and things of that nature. We're not doing 21 anything that would be a new test or anything of that 22 nature. It's things that you might normally expect to see 23 in the operation of one of these facilities over a period of 24 time. 25 Secondly, as projected here and assuming a restart Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
V . l 80 1 approval in April, you would finish that testing program 2 sometime in early July. We would expect, I think, towards
/()
3 September to see Unit III ready for restart which can 4 accommodate some slippage in this without any overlap. l 5 I would see a shortened--some of that white area 6 come out of the Unit III start up, where we would 7 demonstrate the operability of the unit, but would not ] i 8 necessarily have as long a time for training of people and j 9 things of that nature on Unit III. ) 10 It is our hope that the Commission will give the ; 11 staff approval to authorize the restart on Unit III when the 12 staff is convinced rather than coming back-for any 13 particular additional presentations to the Commission. 14 DR. SHEWMON: Thank you. (~ 15 DR. REMICK: Getting back to the question of the .)
%}/
16 35 percent. 17 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 18 DR. REMICK: At that level, wouldn't you be on 19 just rod control and not flow control? Doesn't this place a 20 greater load on the operators? 21 MR. FRANZ: John Franz. We would be on rod 22 control. We would be at minimum reactor recirculation pump 23 flow, but the 35 percent was chosen very specifically 1 24 because 35 percent is about the earliest time in the plant 1 25 evolution at which all the systems which are running at a l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I 81 l' 100 percent will also be_ running at.35 percent. We'll have-
.() 2 all the feed water heating in service and so forth and have 3 2 feed pumps in service, one on stand by, so that is a very 4 stable--that's the earliest very stable point on the way up 5 between zero and 35. So that is really.why it was chosen.
6 DR. REMICK: And you feel at 35 percent you are 7 stable? 8 MR. FRANZ: Yes, sir, absolutely. Any place 9 above 25, I personally feel very comfortable. 10 DR. REMICK: Thank you. Another question.
~
11 Mr. McNeil?. mentioned that you have inter action 12 with a Swedish utility. Do you have any inter action with 13 the Japanese BWR utilities like Tokyo Electric. 14 MR. MCNEILL: At the present time, no. I do intend {} 15 16 to send one group over there to look at some of there operating. I had done that when I was with Public Service 17 Electric and Gas and, in fact, the Hope Creek Station is the l 18 first facility in this country which has the semi automated l 19 control rod drive replacement equipment that dramatically 20 reduces the number of people under the vessel in the 21 conditions that--radiological conditions that exist under 22 the vessel and it is my intention to explore that for both 23 Peach Bottom and Limerick units also. 24 DR. REMICK: Thank you. 25 MR. SMITH: We have had visits at Peach Bottom from Heritage Reporting Corporation rs (202) 628-4888 L)
82 1 a Japanese utility firm interested in our radioactive waste lll 2 processing. 3 That concludes the briefing from Philadelphia 4 Electric on the root causes and on the progress of the 5 plant. 6 DR. KERR: Mr. Smith, since you have mentioned low 7 level, may I ask: Do you have plans for, say dry storage or 8 your spent fuel on site or are you already doing that? 9' MR. SMITH: No. We do wet storage and we have 10 adequate room in the fuel pool, so we have not actively 11 looked into the dry storage as yet, other than being aware 12 of what is being done in the industry. 13 DR. KERR: But you have no immediate plans-- 14 MR. SMITH: Not at the present time. ggg 15 MR. MCNEILL: No immediate plans, however, if--I 16 forget the MIRV for whatever the intermediate storage 17 facility is, does not come to fruition and the schedule for 18 the high level waste storage facility does not move forward, 19 we're obviously going to be faced with some alternate 20 storage. 21 Whether that is going to be rod consolidation 22 within the existing structure or some dry storage, we have 23 not yet made a determination. 24 But our strategy in that area is to begin to 25 pursue until that point at which, like time interval, we're Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
83 1 forced to make's determination as to an alternate. () 2 DR. KERR: Thank you. 3' MR. MCNEILL: I would just like to close on the 4 presentation by summarizing and saying that we have l l 5 presented you a history from our viewpoint of the shutdown, 6 the analysis of the root cause, a broad over view of the 7 corrective actions that have been taken and some of the 8 results that have been achieved. 9 We obviously feel that we are ready for restart of 10 the Peach Bottom atomic power station and I want to provide j 11 you our corporate assurance and my personal assurance that 12 that activity at start up and subsequent operations will be 13 carried out with the highest regard for safety and quality 14 and not at the expense of schedule or cost. 15 We have a great deal involved in our nuclear . 16 operations, as I indicated, about 70 percent of our earnings 17 in the company come nuclear. If a similar situation were to 18 happen at a Limerick generating station, it would be an even 19 more devastating financial affect upon the company. 20 There are two issues from yesterday that I would 21 like to address. One of the letters that you have received 22' - comes from Ms. Barbara Rysecker who is a councilwoman in 23 Hartford County, which is the Maryland county adjacent to 24 the plant. She has asked that you explore the issue of 25 containment and vessel internal integrity, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
1 V i 84 1 At yesterday's' meeting,.I did address the fact () 2 that of the four issues that the staff has recommended, we 3 have comparable equivalence already in existence. That is a l 4 containment vent. We have a hard pipe vent capable of l l 5 approximately 200 pounds pressure. It has valves that will 6 open up to about 130 pounds differential. It is a ground 7 level release, not an elevated release and if we feel that l 8 that fulfills the requirements right now, lacking some more l 9 specificity on the part of the Commission as to what the 10 requirements might be. 11 But we have alternate water sources from the 12 diesel driven fire system that we can put into the facility. , 13 We are implementing this year, the Revision for of the 14 Emergency Guidelines and we have, on the record, indicated 15 thrit we have an enhanced automatic depressurization system 16 reliability by providing back up air and then a connection 17 for long term air supplies. 18 In the area of vessel internals-- 19 DR. REMICK: Excuse me, before you go into that. 20 MR. MCNEILL: Yes, sir. 21 DR. REMICK: What is the status of the Station 22 Blackout upgrade? 23 MR. MCNEILL: We are preparing our Station 24 Blackout response to the NRC. I do not know the exact status 25 of it right now. I would tell you that from a design Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O v
85 1 standpoint, we have a--the Conowingo Dam is down stream of l () t 2 the plant and we have a pump storage plant which is about 4 j 1 3 miles away. The Conowingo Dam has a direct input to the l 4 plant and we hava methods to bring the pump storage facility , 5 power over also so that depending upon the definition of on j 6 site capability, we do have a fairly reliable power source. 7 We are, however, a shared diesel facility which 8 does give you some negative impact, vis a vis the later 9 designs where you have 4 diesels per facility such as at 10 Limerick we have 4 divisions and 4 diesels per plant. We 11 only have 4 diesels overall at Peach Bottom. However, only 12 three are required for normal tech spec reliability. 13 DR. REMICK: So you haven't decided on a time 14 table for that? rs 15 MR. MC EILL: It has not been presented for my x-) 16 review yet by the Engineering Department. 17 With respect to vessel internals, we have, back in 18 the 1985 '86 time frame, fairly aggressively pursued a 19 study of all of the internal parts of the vessel and we 20 split it into two parts. Those which, if failures occurred, 21 there would be a great deal of effort to conduct repairs or l j 22 where there was significant safety implications. And then j ! 1 23 we grouped them into all others and I am going to give you 24 an example of all others. 25 The control rod drive stub tubes are welded inside Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
-- 9
86 1 the vessel with the weld inside-the vessel, however,'there () 2 is a procedure if that weld leaks, to do an external weld on 3 -the tube, so we feel that that is a potential repairable 4 situation. 5 For those that are safety significant and/or are l 6 very-difficult, we have' developed and implemented an 7 inspection service program that covers, we believe, all of' 8 the elements and we have done'that inspection on one unit l 9 and we will continue to-do on some periodic basis that l 1 10 inspection. j
. i 11 It was through that inspection process that we l 12 discovered cracking in the man way covers that allow
'l 13 entrance underneath the vessel and we were there to do 14 repairs on one of the units because of that inner granular j 15 stress corrosion crackins.
16- We have, for instance, inspected all of the weld l 17 material on the top' guide, on the boiling water reactor. In ! 18 all of those that we have looked at the core spray headers, 19 and things of that nature. So we have a pretty aggressive 20 program. Probably--we only know'of one other utility that 21 has even come ciose to the level of inspection that we have 22 undertaken. This issue is being further pursued in the 23 Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group as a continuing study. 24 DR. SHEWMON: Is that an inspection that you have 25 to do with the fuel removed or can you do it from outside? i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 ! (). ! 1 i
87~ e l' MR. MCNEILL: I aun not fully cognizant of the H 1 2'
' l{f
'f-
. details and I do not know whether anybody here is~ cognizant.
l 3 , We have, in fact, _made a practice of-doing full' 4 core off loads. Mr. Zr'n.may be'able to-- 5- MR. ZAWN: Which-particular question-- 1 4 6 DR. REMICK:- Would you state.your name? ! 7 MR. ZAWN: Robert Zawn, Nuclear Engineering. 8 We have an inspection program. Some of it can be .; l 9 done with fuel in, some can't. Now, it depends on where the 10 inspection is. Obviously we can go down below the core with i I 11 remote magnification video and we have done that when fuel-i 12 was out or we can remove segments of fuel and go down j 13 through one of the bundle holes. 14 DR. SHEWMON: Is this all visual or can you do l 15- ultrasonics down there too? l Ov l 16 MR. ZAWN: No, we cannot do ultrasonics. The ! 17 ultrasonics, any part where it is attcched to the vessel, 18 a lot of that can be looked from the outside, but we cannot j 19 do ultrasonics down there at this time. 20 Now on the man way cover which Mr. McNeill 21 mentioned, that was done with remote ultrasonics. There was 1 22 a remote device that was lowered own, positioned and then 23 scanned that weld. 24 DR. SHEWMON: But that was done then with the fuel i i 25 removed or-- i l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 ,- O
1 l l 88 l 1 l' MR. ZAWN: That was done with the fuel removed. 1 I A~,) 2 It could-- l l 3 MR. SMITH: It was done while the fuel was out. ( 4 4 It's outside the core area. It's in the down cummer region i 5 on the border where the jet pumps come into play. l 6 DR. SHEWMON: Let me shift then to a different l ' 7 one. This is a Mark I, so this means that you also have 8 trouble and may never have inspected the pressure vessel 9 itself from the outside or the welds in the pressure vessel. 10 Where are you on that problem? 11 MR. ZAWN: We have--with Peach Bottom we have 12 limited access at present. During this long duration of 13 time down, we have examined for accessibility to do 100 14 percent on the outside of the welds. We are working with 15 - our contractor for this inspection study, General Electric
.{}
16 who, at this time, does have a magnetic inspection device l 17 which can crawl on the vessel and we are working with him on 18 miniaturization to be able to get into the clearances that 19 we have. 20 Roughly speaking, I don't have numbers exact, but i 21 comparison, at Limerick we have about a 5 inch--5 to 6 inch 22 clearance between the thermal insulation and the vessel. At 23 the time of construction of Peach Bottom, we had varied 24 clearances and it varies--some of it runs from 4 down to 2 25 inches. We did make an effort to hang the insulation during Heritage Reporting Corporation
. (202) 628-4888
, i i
89 a-1 ~ construction on the shield wall outside the vessel and 2 provide some clearance, but it wasn't enough for the present (~)) u. 3~ devises. 4 DR. SHEWMON: I understand. But, have you--the 5 plant is more than 10 years old, 6 MR. ZAWE: , Correct. 7 DR. SHEWMON: So in the first 10 years did you 8 inspect what welds you could get at, at the top and bottom L 9 part and perhaps where there were penetrations for pipes? 10 MR. ZAWN: We did not inspect at the bottom of the 11 vessel, but we did inspect at the top and we had 12 accessibility to 10 percent of the welds through ports where 13 there is an intersection between a vertical and a 14 horizontal weld. They were looked at during the 10 year r~ 15 cycle.. (>) 16 DR. SHEWMON: Ultrasonically? 17 MR. ZAWN: Yes. 18 DR. SHEWMON: Pine, thank you. 19 MR. SMITH: There is one other clarification, for 20 the record, from yesterday that I would like to bring in. 21 The question came up as to what is the status of l 22 the hold down beams on the jet pumps. We have replaced 100 23 percent of the hold down beams and hold down bolts on both 24 Units II and III. We did not know that answer yesterday, j 25 but have determined it overnight. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l \ I)
, 1 90 1 1 DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Mc Neill.
i,( } 2 Is someone in your organization aware of the core 3 melt prediction frequency for Peach Bottom that appears in q 4 NUREG 1150? 5 MR. MCNEILL: Yes, they are. Mr. Maree is here. f i 6 He is the head of my PRA Secticn, but we are knowledgeable { s 7 through the IDCOR--we were an IDCOR model plant for the IPE l 8 issue and we are developing a full PRA for Peach Bottom this I 9 year. ! 10 DR. KERR: Do you have any reason to agree or 11 disagree with the frequency of core melt predicted in 1150?- 12 MR. KRIEGER: My name is Greg Krieger. I'm from 13 the Engineering Division. Mr. Maree isn't here today. 14 We have worked extensively with Sandia who is the 15 contractor for 1150. The new results of the Peach Bottom 16 PRA come out to be about 4 x 10 (-6) and we tend to agree 17 with that result, yes. 18 MR. MCNEILL: These are the revised ones-- 19 MR. KREIGER: The revised results. 20 MR. MCNEILL: They are not the ones that were 21 published in 1150 initially. I 22 DR. KERR: I was interested in whether you 23 concluded that it was that low. You're convinced that it is? 24 MR. KRIEGER: Yes. i 25 DR. KERR: Thank you. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i _-__.-_.m --___ _ _ _ _ _
91 l 1 MR. MCNEILL: Are there any other questions? r (s) 2 MR. WARD: Yes. The PRA section is in--I'm trying 3 to figure out which organization-- ' i 4 MR. MCNEILL: It's in our Nuclear Engineering ; 5 Department. 6 MR. WARD: Thank you. 7 MR. MCNEILL: And it is composed of approximately 8 5 individuals full time and we intend to maintain full PRAs 9 as living elements of both Limerick and Peach Bottom. We 10 already have one established for Limerick and we have 11 various elements of it that were done as part of NUREG 1150, 12 the IPE IDCOR process, Peach Bottom was the model plant for 13 that and we are now expanding that to a full PRA for Peach 14 Bottom. (^) 15 MR. WARD: I guess it would take more than 5 V 16 people to do a-- 17 MR. MCNEILL: Oh yes. For the development, yes, 18 for the long term maintenance, we think 5 people is about 19 the right amount. We are bringing--it will be a shared 20 responsibility for the development, about 50 percent 21 Philadelphia Electric and 50 percent contractors and we're 22 going to bring operations people into that process and some 23 other support organizations in. It is not strictly an 24 engineering effort on the development. 25 DR. REMICK: A question I neglected to ask Heritage Reporting Corporation g- S (202) 628-4888 U
l 92 l i J' 1 earlier. Who teaches your supervisory observation training
;{ 'J 2 program as part of the fitness for duty program? Do you do
- 3 that within the company or do you have an external ~
4 consultant? 5 MR. MCNEILL: Yes, we do that from within the 6 company. We have, as part of our--we have a Management 7 Development Group that takes care of that. They are a 8 corporate organization because we are attempting to put in 9 place this fitness for duty through the whole company, not 10 just--our drug policy is applicable to the whole company. 11 The testing program is--the random testing program applies i 12 to applies to nuclear but we are considering expanding it to I 13 some other high. risk segments of the company. 14 DR. REMICK: Thank you. 15 MR. MCNEILL: That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. 16 DR. KERR: Any further questions? l 17 (No response. ) ! 18 DR. KERR: We'll now hear further from the NRC 19 staff and in connection with one of thp items which Mr. 20 McNeill has just been discussing, since we discussed this , 21 and had presentations from the staff yesterday, I asked Mr. 22 Boger not to prepare a presentation for todays meeting, but 23 to be prepared to respond to questions that anybody might 24 have on those issues. 25 MR. BOGER: We would like to proceed now with Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 m,-_ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _
93 l 1 information on how the staff conducted its review effort in () 2 response to the changes made by the licensee. 3 Again, I would like to indicate that due to the 4 press of time, we will be leaving out some of the details of 5 what I consider an extensive review, however, we will touch 6 on the major issues and we'll be available for questions as 7 the committee desires. 8 Basically we'll start with the Safety Evaluation 9 Report, discuss the systematic assessment and licensing 10 performance, special inspections conducted by the staff, 11 including the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection. We'll 12 talk about staff activities following any recommendations 13 for restart by the Commission and finally we'll reach some 14 conclusions and finish there.
'T 15 At this time, Bob Martin, who is the NRR Project (G
16 Manager for Peach Bottom will discuss the staff's SER, 17 MR. MARTIN: Good morning, I'm Bob Martin. I am 18 the NRC Project Manager for Peach Bottom activities in 19 Headquarters. i 20 The staff Safety Evaluation Report was issued in 21 October, 1988 and it presented the results of the staff's 22 review of the licensee's programmatic plan for restart. 23 So although it did have the results of some 24 specific inspection activities in it, on Shift Team 25 Evaluations, it was principally a review of the licensee's Heritage Reporting Corporation w (202) 628-4888 (J
94 l 1 paper program of its plan for restart. The staf'f's () 2 verification ~of those activities will be reported in later 3 portions of our presentation here. t 1 4 Basically the responsible licensee dealing with a i l 5 plant which has been shut down for safety reasons, such as 6 Peach Bottom was, must begin with an acknowledgement of the i 7 shut down issues, followed by the identification of the 8 appropriate root causes of the issues at hand and followed j 9 by satisfactory implementation of adequate corrective 10 actions to address those root cause issues. e 11 In Peach Bottom's case, the shutd.own issues were 12 identified in the shutdown order itself. They were i 13 recognized and incorporated into the plan for restart. We 14 went over them briefly on an earlier slide this morning. 15 ("} The licensee also identified the four root causes j 16 which have been discussed in detail previously. Our safety 17 evaluation report format follows the root causes. I will 18 comment on them briefly at this point in time and present 19 our safety evaluation's overall conclusion. 20 With respect to the corporate management based l 21 root cause, the licensee reorganized their staff, both on 22 the corporate and the plant staff level, to provide for 23 increased control, accountability and corporate direction of i 24 nuclear operations. The licensee also developed management 25 systems and skills to improve line management, self l f Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L _____________n
95 1 assessment within the overall-nuclear organization, The _( ) . 2 licensee also strengthened independent processes to increase 3 upper management involvement. i 4 I might add that where I have the Nuclear Quality 5 Assurance Item coming under Independent Oversight, IO should 6 have put it one group up in the Line Management Self 7 Assessment Group it does represent self assessment I 8 activities within the nuclear organization. ! 9 There are a number of individual subject areas 10 listed there. I won't go into each one of them. I think 11 some of the prominent-ones are the presence on site of 12 Corporate Management involvement. The improvement in 13 establishing, defining authoritative authorities and 14 accountability for organizations, programs and : v3ividual 15 positions. The enhancement of licensing programs in the
-{ )
16 operating experience assessment program area and also in the 17 commitment tracking program area provides a much more 18 systematic way of defining and keeping up with those types l 19 of activities. 20 The licensee has also launched an initiative to 21 establish a nuclear performance management program, defines 22 goals, performance standards, performance indicators and so 23 forth, many of which you saw presented earlier in Mr. 24 Smith's presentation. 25 With respect to independent oversight, the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O
96 4 1: licensee has. strengthened the Nuclear Review Board functions '( ) 2 and has also added outside expertise to the Nuclear Review , 3 Board.. 4 The Nuclear Committee of the Board is a committee 5 of the Board of Directors and the staff found that it was a ! 1 6 very useful adjunct to the board. 7 In Summary, with-respect to corporate assessment, 8 we made individual conclusions as we discussed those issues. l 9 I think a general statement is that we found that what the 10 licensee proposed was consistent with their identified 11 corrective action objectives for dealing with this root 12 cause. ! 13 With respect to the Station Management Based Root i 14 Cause, the licensee sought to establish a team with strong 15 leadership and management skills and it also sought to (} 16 increase the resources available to accomplish the i 17 objectives and to revise the organizational structure to 18 facilitate the use of those resources. l t 19 This is reflected in the on site management team j 20 which is now comprised of the on site corporate officer with 21 his four direct reports. As mentioned earlier, that allows 22 for more focus by the Plant Manager on the specifics of day 23 to day plant operation duties as well as allows more focus 24 on the other disciplines by those other 3--other 2 managers j 1 25 and one superintendent for training. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O
I 97 1 The size of the staff on site, overall on sito, () 2 has been increased from a number of about 23 management 3 positions before to about 54 in the present organization. A 4 sub set of that is the Plant Manager's staff. His reports 5 have been increased from 12 to 22 in the present 6 organization. 7 Part of this organization was increased management 8 positions, the revised functional responsibilities and the 9 higher management authority on shift, by implementation of 10 the shift manager concept and also the addition of the floor 11 foreman position.
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12 Overall the staff concluded, with respect to this 13 area, that a strong team of 5 senior managers had been 14 established on site and that the operations area, as well as (-) %) 15 other organizations, had also been infused with well 16 qualified personnel. 17 With respect to the operator resources root cause, 18 the licensee responded to that by insuring the availability 19 of sufficient operators to restart the plant by maintaining 20 an adequate reserve of resources to fill vacancies as the 21 occurred by providing opportunities for off shift rotation 22 in alternate career baths and by taking action to keep the 23 pipe line full. 24 This was the description of the plant for restart 25 as it has been discussed earlier. Various of these items Heritage Reporting Corporation g- (202) 628-4888 %)
b + l 98 ! 1 are in at various points in their stages of implementation. () 2' At the present time the licensee has one more SRO 3 (n) staff than is required by the technical specification 4 requirements. In the near future they will recognize the f i 5 addition of.one more fully qualified reactor operator to 6 bring them up to an interim goal of 42 licensed shift ; 7 personnel. l 8 MR. WARD: Let's see--there is a Tech Spec 9 requirement for the total number of licensed operators or is l 10 it the number of per shift-- 11 MR. MARTIN: The Technical Specification, minimum 12 staffing requirements for the two unit common control room 13 would be 3 Reactor Operators and the Shift Supervisor and 14 the' Shift Manager., 15 MR. WARD: What I am driving at: Is there really a 16 Technical Specification requirement for the total numbers on 17 the staff or simply the numbers that must be on duty on a 18 shift? 19 MR. MARTIN: The Technical Specification numbers 12 0 are focused on the minimum shift staffing. They do not--the 21 Technical Specification, at this point in time, does not 22 reflect the goal of 42 which the licensee is striving toward 23 so that they will had the additional resources to fill q 24 vacancies and so forth in their minimum shift staffing 25 requirements. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O
99 1 The staff's conclusion on this area was that the IT A/ 2 licensee's plans, at the present time, satisfy 10 CFR 5054 l ! 3 and the Technical Specification requirements for one unit, I l
- 4 for the Unit II and that the licensee's plans for the second 5 unit are adequate.
6 With respect to the culture based root cause, the 7 licensee approached this by establishing a set of cultural 8 values and communicating them by implementing team work 9 training and by insuring that human resource practices were 10 consistent with achieving these cultural values. 11 Our SER contained a number of sub sections in this 12 area. I'll highlight just some of them. 13 In the SER we noted the cultural values that the 14 licensee had identified. We noted how they planned to
~
15 communicate them and we found that the values in the plan 16 had been identified and that a reasonable plan had been 17 described to communicate these values. The earlier 18 presentation to the licensee went into this in much more i 19 detail as to exactly how it was done. 20 Likewise, with respect to management training and
\
21 team buildingr a number of training activities, team 22 building activities, were described and the staff reviewed 23 those and found that the actions by the licensee were i 24 responsive to the need for managers to reinforce new ! 25 behaviors, improve communication in management, discipline i I l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 1 1
l 100 j l' .and administrative. policies. f({) 2' Shift team evaluations.were discussed:in the SER. 3 .They reflected the progress on that issue at the time. 4 There has since been additional progress and we will cover 5 that in more detail later in our presentation. 6 ' Employee trainings and communications was'also' 7 covered in the SER, a description of the activities that 8 were offered under that area is also provided. The staff 9 reviewed these and found that many of them were appropriate. 10 We noted that we would' continue--the NRC would continue to 11 monitor the activities to determine the results and this 12 also is discussed in our presentation on later activities 13 and things like the IATI discussion. 14 Human resource practices and policies. A number I of these are listed in the SER including, for instance, the 1/~'h %s .15 16 establishment of personnel evaluations among the licensee 17 staff, the establishment of the personnel evaluations as 18 well as the training for the managers to carry them out. 19 The evaluation the licensee took in its 20 disciplinary policies to insure that management had the 21 authority to require performance standards consistent with q 22 its newly defined nuclear requirements. Training has also 23 been provided for management which has the responsibility 24 for implementing that. 25 Overall the staff found the response acceptable Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
,O
101 l 1 and recommended that the licensee should follow up over time lll 2 to insure implementation in these. areas. 3 With respect to shift rotation, I would note that 4 the licensees change to a forward rotation schedule. The 5 staff found that response acceptable and noted that this 6 schedule has generally been found to be less fatiguing for 7 personnel over long periods of time. 8 On the issue of control of overtime, the current 9 staffing provides the extra RO, as I noted earlier--excuse 10 me , provides the extra SRO, they' re soon to have the extra 11 RO. In the long term the licensee has plans to further 12 increase its resources. The staff found those plans, as 13 described in the plan for restart acceptable, however, we 14 noted that we would continue to monitor this situation. 15 Our overall conclusion of the safety evaluation g 16 report was that we found that the plan for restart meets the 17 requirements of the shutdown order which was to submit a 18 detailed and comprehensive plan and schedule to insure safe 19 operation and compliance with all requirements included 20 station procedures. 21 That concludes my comments, unless you have 22 questions. 23 DR. REMICK: Question. In your SER, you address 24 the station and not separately Units II and III. What is 25 the staff proposed course of action with respect to Unit III Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
102 'j l 1 versus II? You do not in anyway differentiate. (} 2 MR. MARTIN: I think, right now we have addressed 3 the corporate and site changes on the two unit basis. The 4 other aspects of the review with respect to the physical , l 5 readiness of the plants would be addressed separately. 6 I guess I would say that we have really 7 concentrated on Unit II right now because that is the one l l 8 that was estimated to be the first to restart. 9 DR. REMICK: Would you be issuing a supplemental 10 SER or not? 11 MR. MARTIN: I don't know. We haven't decided 12 yes. 13 DR. REMICK: I see. j 14 MR. MARTIN: One posefble alternative is that we
- 15 would deal with the--most of the plan For restart applies 16 equally to the two units of the station. Certain specifics l
17 of it. such as the completion of physical plant items and so 18 forth are particular to Unit III, but one option that might 19 evolve is that those issues might fall within the scope of 20 the inspection program and their resolution be identit ' ad in 21 inspection reports. 22 DR. REMICK: But basically this OER closes out the 23 causes of the shutdown order? 24 MR. MARTIN: That's correct. The organizational 25 changes that were necessary. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
103. .!
.1 DR'. KERR: Further'. questions? I
.2 (No response.) ,,
3 DR. KERR: Thank you, Mr. Martin. 1 4 1 5 6' 7 8 , I
. l 9 ?
10 11 i 12 l 13 3' 14 15 O 16 17 j 18 -
)
19 t 20 21 t 22 ' t 23 l' 24 ! 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation . (202) 628-4888 i O
w ,
.k 104,
.i i 1 MR. LINVILLE: I'm Jim Linville,'the Project'
[() 2; .Section Chief in Region I responsible for theloversight of 3_ the Inspection Program at the Philadelphia Electric 4 Facilities. That's both Peach Bottom and-Limerick. 5 , I've been in this position since shortly after the 6 shutdown April of 1987. Prior to that I had a different~ j
, i i
7 section. And for several' years was a. Senior Resident 8 Inspector.at the Salem and Fitzpatrick facilities prior to 9 the Section Chief Job. I 10 Bob has focused on the Safety Evaluation Report l l 11 which was our review of the program that was required by the 'I 12 Order to address the root causes and corrective actions l 13 proposed by the licensee to fix the issues identified in the 14 order. i 15 I'd like to move now to our review of~ ongoing. j 16 activities at the site in conjunction with our normal 17 inspection program and the point made very specifically by 18 the Chairman and the September 15th '87 comments to the L 19 licensee that we needed to see results in performance. 20 And this discussion will cover the systematic 21 assessment of licensee performance and the Special Team-22 inspections that we've done during the past couple of years. 23 The second ingredient in our restart 24 recommendation would be the systematic assessment of 25 licensee performance which looks at the performance of this j i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
105 1- new organization since its been evolving over the period I 2 following the shutdown. j} 3 And I don't plan to go inte all the functional 4 areas.shown on this slide, but at the time of this shutdown j 5 this period covered February of ' 86 until May of ' 87. The 6 shutdown was in March of ' 87. And at the time of the 7 shutdown two areas, plant operations and assurance of l 8 quality, were rated as unacceptable. j i 9 During the subsequent period, June of ' 87 until 10 July of ' 88, our evaluation was that those areas had 11 improved to a Category 2 rating in plant operations, and we 12 subsequently combined the licensing activities and assurance 13 of quality into a new section called Safety Assessment, 14 Quality Verification, which had also improved to a Category l 15 2 rating. That was not done particularly for Peach Bottom. I \ 16 That was just a routine change in the way we do the SALP 17 evaluations. 18 Our conclusions in the assessment from the June of 19 '87 to July of '88 period were that the strengths indicated I 20 were the new nuclear-dedicated organization which the 21 licensee spoke at some length about which is focused on j 22 nuclear operations. The strength of the new independent 23 oversight organization, the Nuclear Quality Assurance 24 Department and consolidated previously fragmented groups 25 provided a stronger say in overseeing of operating l l Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 l l l
5 106 1 activities, real-time monitoring of what was going on in the 2 plant, improved root cause analysis. And the Performance ggg 3 Assessment Group that the licensee has mentioned. 4 We also noted the strength being the presence now 5 of new managers on sits with demonstrated management skills. 6 A number of them coming from outside the company and others 7 coming from within the company at the other facility, 8 Limerick facility, which had a strong operational 9 performance record. 10 And lastly, the efforts the licensee had made to 11 enhance a number of operators to cut down on overtime and 12 the situations which led to low morale and the 13 inattentiveness of the operators in the Control Room. And, 14 in fact, they increased the number of operators by about 15 eleven during that time period. 16 You'll note there was one area--backing up on the 17 slide a little bit--there is one area where the performance, 18 in fact, declined. That was in the area of security and 19 safeguards from a 2 to a 3. And I'll talk a little bit more 2C about further review that we've done in that area subsequent 21 to the shutdow:1. 22 Our conclusion was that there was inadequate 23 oversight of the licensee security contractor during the 24 period which led to declining performance associated with 25 oversight during the refueling outage where there were a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 107 l 1 1 large number of people on the site, and a lot of new people. (} 2 Moving next to some of the inspection activities. 3 One last comment there before we move onto the inspection . I 4 activities, i 5 This systematic assessment of licensee performance 6 evaluation covering about a one-year' period was assessing 7 the inspection activities at the site that resulted from 8- about six thousand hours of inspection activity, which is 9 about two and a half times the amount of inspection that we 10~ do at a normal facility over that period of time. 11 Now I'd like to move on to some of the .special 12 inspections that have been performed since the shutdown, and 4 13 first I'd like to focus on a number of inspections that were 14 related to reviewing the training that's been provided by 15 the licensee to the operators, the effectiveness of those j 16 training programs. 17 Between September of 1987 and January of 1988 we 1 18 evaluated the operator attitude improvement training which 19 the licensee described to you as the Performing 20 Perfectiveness Course provided for the previously licensed 21 operators and the Managing for Excellence Course provided to 22 the new shift managers. 23 In performing this evaluation, we structured it 24 with interview teams which were composed of human factors 25 analysts from NRR with backgrounds in psychology and Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
J 108 1 management. And they were paired with Senior Resident ,
}' 2 Inspectors who were former licensed operators in order to go 3 over structured protocol and look for common threads in the 4 responses of the operators.
5 In addition, they interviewed the management, the 6 trainers, and the psychologists who evaluated the~ operators 7 for entry into this training program. And they also 8 reviewed the training program itself and sat in on a number 9 of the training activit'ies. , 10 DR. KERR: What was the purpose of their interview 11 of the psychologists? Was that just to get the information l 12 from them or to see if the psychologists-- 13 MR. LINVILLE: It was to determine how they went 14 about evaluating the operators' suitability for entry into-- p 15 for continued license duty and entry into this training
.Q) 16 program.
17 DR. KERR: I was trying to find out whether it was 18 an.information-gathering interview or an evaluation 19 interview. 20 MR. LINVILLE: They weren't evaluating the 21 psychologists. They were evaluating the approach taken to 22 the evaluation of the operators. 23 DR. KERR: Okay. 24 MR. LINVILLE: And the overall results of those 25 evaluations. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
r , l 109 1 DR._KERR: Thank you.
' As has been mentioned earlier, the
_2 MR. LINVILLE: ([ 3 training program focused on the self awareness of the 4 -individuals. Communications, improved' communications 5 techniques. L 6 DR. KERR: What is self awareness in this context? I 7 MR. LINVILLE: They gave the operators some 8 insight into their own personality type and how that ! 9- personality type interacts most effectively with other types 10 of' people, and the fact that other people may have different 11 personality traits and they can interact. How they can get 1:2 along with those people more effectively, using things like 13 a Miters Briggs personality profile. 14 The conclusion of this training program was--or (^g 15 this evaluation was that the training had a positive impact
%)
16 on the attitude of the operators, but that continued 17 management support was essential to long-term effectiveness 18 aas a program as well as follow-up training. 19 I think when we got-to the end of that we 20 concluded the operators knew what behavior was expected of 21 them, but they weren't completely convinced that they had in 22 fact done anything unsafe in the past. 23 I think subsequent to come of the other training 24 that went on they have developed a further understanding of 25 that situation. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i . ... . _ _ ___ _ ______ - - - _ _ _ . _ l
l m H I 1 110- U i 1 DR. KERR: From the NRC Report which, as I 2- . remember, didn't say the plant was unsafe, it just-said that ( ).
,3 the NRC staff did not have confidence that it was.
4 MR. LINVILLE: Right. An operator. 5 DR. KERR: An operator reading that might have 1 6 wondered if it was just a lack of confidence on the part of 7 the NRC. staff or really unsafe behavior. 8 MR. LINVILLE: I'm not sure.I'm following you. 9 DR. KERR: Well, my reading of the reason for 10 shutdown was that the NRC staff no longer had confidence 11 that the plant could be-operated safely. There's some ; i 12 difference in not having confidence that it can be, and l 13 being certain that it was being operated unsafely. l 14 MR. LINVILLE: I think our view is if the 15 operators, if they are not attentive, they are not in a (~)) 16 position to be-- i 17 DR. KERR: I'm not talking about what happened. 18 I'm talking about the NRC wording of why the plant was shut 19 down, and if I remember it--I think I'm quoting it fairly 20 accurately--the reason given was that the NRC staff no 21 longer had confidence that the plant could be operated 22 safely. Which means it was shut down because of a lack of , 23 confidence on the part of the NRC staff. 24 MR. LINVILLE: Okay. 25 MR. BOGER: Let me provide a little insight to l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
111' i 1 where I think you'are' headed, Dr. Kerr. -() 2 One of the items that we haven't discussed here is j 3 the enforcement conferences that we held with the individual 3 4 licensed and formerly licensed operators at Peach Bottom. 5 -Juld one of the specific items that we asked those 6 operators during those enforcement conferences was whether 7 or not their behavior, their behavior, was unsafe. And if 8 so, why. 9 And I think every one of them identified that 10 their own behavior of inattentiveness was uncafe. So each
]
11 of the operators has recognized their individual role in the 12 safety of the plant. 13 MR. LINVILLE: And I think that was several months , 14 after we completed this evaluation of the training program. 15 And one of the weaknesses we found in the training program 16 was that these were general issues that were covered by the 17 program and they didn't relate it specifically to the 18 expectations of how a power-licensed operator would behave. 19 They subsequently did some training in that area, 20 as was discussed yesterday and that appeared to have been 21 effective at the point at which we did these enforcement 22 conferences. 23 So it's a long-term process bringing about this 24 change in attitudes. 25 Between December of 1987 and January of 1988 we l l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
e 112 1 performed' shift crew evaluations at the Limerick simulator {} 2 facility.. At that point in time there was not an 3 operational Peach Bottom simulator. And the purpose of 4 these evaluations was to assess the effectiveness of the new . I 5 shift crew teams with new shift managers who had not 6 previously been performing license duties, although they had 7 been licensed, and their interactions with the formerly 8 licensed operators who had been on shift at the time of the 9 shutdown. ! 10 Our conclusion as a result of that evaluation was 11 that their technical performance was satisfactory, although 12 this was not a plant-specific simulator so we didn't get a 13 clear indication of how they would actually manipulate the 14 controls of the Peach Bottom plant itself. 15 So in September of ' 86, after the Peach Bottom 16 simulator had been operational for several months, we did an 17 evaluation of the Licensed Operator Requalification Program 18 and observed the performance of the shift crews on the Peach 19 Bottom simulator in Columbia, Maryland. 20 The purpose of that program was to assess the 21 effectiveness of the program in preparing operators to start 22 up and operate the facility. Keeping in mind that at this i 23 point in time the plant had been shut down for a year and a l 24 half and the operators had not been operating the plant J 25 During that evaluation, performance weaknesses l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 L
u 113-1 were observed with respect to the implementation of the EOP () ' 2 procedures. .After subsequent training, we did another 3 evaluation in December and' subsequently evaluated.two crews 4 that had had weaknesses at that point in time in January.: 5 By'the end of the January evaluation, we' concluded l 6 that the crews were ready to start up and' operate the 7 facilities safely. ! I 8 DR. REMICK: What type of deficiencies were noted i 9 with the Shift 1 shift crew? t 10 MR. LINVILLE: It was coordination and use of the 11 EOP flow charts during the transient situations which were 12 provided to the crews. i 13 We'used our own' scenarios which we had developed. I 14 Unlike the previous evaluation where we had been observing , 15 the licensee implementing their own scenarios. Because they 16 were different scenarios that operators had specifically 17 trained on. 10 DR. REMICK: When you say coordination, do you 19 mean teamwork or what do you mean by coordination? 20 MR. LINVILLE: Don, would you like to--Don was the 21 Team Leader for that particular evaluation. I think he can 22 explain that. 23 MR. FLORICK: My name is Don Florick. I am a 24 Senior Operations Engineer from Region I. Also a Certified 25 License Examiner. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
114 1 The difficulty we had with'the crew in the
] ). 2 December evaluation was--again, .in the relationship of 3 teamwork at the SRO level. The ability to make decisions..
4 The ability to look at the big picture. And how they 5 actually interrelated with each other to make the decisions
-6 that they needed to make for the scenarios. So that 7 effectively required additional time working together as a 8 team to develop those skills.
9 DR. KERR: Thank you. 10 MR. LINVILLE: In addition to the evaluations that i 11 we did of operators, which covered about five hundred 12 inspection hours, then a number of other team inspections, 13 the ones that I listed on this Viewgraph--it's about-2500 14 hours of inspection. In July of ' 88 we did a maintenance l 15 team inspection that was one of the first three pilot [ 16 inspections. And it was done because of concerns about the 17 large backlog of maintenance items which had developed prior 18 to and during the Peach Bottom shutdown. Our review of that 19 indicated that the licensee at that point in time had an 20 effective program and was working off the backlog 21' effectively. 22 In August of 1988 we did an Emergency Operating 23 Procedures Inspection where we evaluated the REV-3 EOPs 24 which the licensee currently has in place. Concluding that 25 they were acceptable, capable of being implemented and ; Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
115 1 understood by the operators. () 2 An inspection has been done at all the--or is 3 being done at all the reactor facilities. It was not
, 4 special to Peach Bottom. This was just the time we chose to 5 do it for Peach Bottom.
6 September-of 1988 there was an Emergency Response 7 Exercise with an NRC team observation and regional 8 participation in that exercise. The conclusion was that 9 they were able to protect the health and safety of th3 10 public. 11 In November of 1988 an evaluation was done of the 12 Philadelphia Electric Self-Assessment Vanel. Out 13 conclusions at that time were that the licensee had 14 adequately reviewed previously-identified weaknesses but {) 15 16 there were some emerging weaknesses noted that had not been fully identified by the licensee. One that I've just 17 discussed is the operator performance weaknesses which were 18 being identified in the middle of that Se f-Arsessment Panel 19 process that they were performing. 20 In January of 1989 we evaluated the Security 21 Program due to the degrading performance in th(. SAU!. This 22 evaluation was done after the licensee replaced the senior 23 security specialist on site and after they replaced the 24 contractor the previous August and had an opportunity for 25 this new organization to function effectively. And our Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
116 1 conclusion was that there was substantially improved () 2 performance under the new contractor and the new 3 Philadelphia Electric oversight at the facility. 4 At the end of January and early February a Special 5 Electrical Team Inspection was performed. There were 6 several findings that came from that inspection which the 7 license is currently evaluating and need to be resolved 8 prior to a restart decision. 9 The last inspection, the most recent one, is the 10 Integrated Assessment Team Inspection. This inspection 11 involved 1200 hours of inspection activity. The purpose of 12 this inspection was to assess the effectiveness and 13 durability of the implementation of the restart plant 14 improvements. And the readiness of management controls, 15 programs and personnel to support restart and safe operation 16 of the facility. 17 The approach taken was a performance-based 18 inspection. Early in the inspection we did three days of 19 around-the-clock coverage by two inspector teams. We also 20 observed twenty surveillance tests while we were there. 21 Maintenance activities, numerous interface meetings among 22 groups throughout the site and in the corporate offices. 23 The other portion of the inspection involved a 24 structured interview approach very similar to the one taken
,25 in the operator evaluations about a year ago with interview Heritage Reporting Corporation 7s (202) 628-4888 O
117
- 1. teams combining human factors analysts and inspectors with
(} 2 expertise in the discipline of the interviewee. In this 3 case we took a cross section of the organization, including 4 the entire line management.- A cross section of the 5 operating. staff, including operators that we had previously 6 interviewed and some that we had not. And representatives 7- from other interfacing organizations cn1 the site. 8 We structured interview protocols and in this 9 interview process attempted to or identified common themes 10 which I'll talk about as I relate to some of the findings. 11 The licensee indicated their readiness for this
'12 inspection on February 2nd. At the time we were doing
.13 preparation in the Regional Office for.it. It was conducted 14 from the:3rd to the 17th. The exit meeting with the 15 licensee being on the 17th and the report was just issued on O,
16 Monday. j 1 17 Next slide. 18- This slide just indicates the composition the 19 team, Bill King, my Division Director in the region, l 20 Division Reactor Projects, was the Senior Manager present at 21 the entrance and pre-exit and exit meetings that we had. I l 22 was the Team Leader. Among the other team members were five 23 boiling water reactor senior resident inspectors, two human 24 factors analysts, and a number of other specialist 25 inspectors. Heritage Reporting Corporation I (202) 628-4888 ( ). l J
V V . 118
'l Next 's13 de .
j) 2 Here we have the functional areas that were 3 covered by the Integrated Assessment Team. We focused on 4 the four root cause areas that the licensee indicated in 5- their plan and which we had reviewed. And then.we also had j 6 coverage of the other SALP functional areas to assess any. 7 changes in performance since the end of the previous SALP '! 8 period which had been in July of 1988. 9 In the area'of site management and leadership, we 10 noted. strong leadership by the shift managers, improved-11 material condition of the plant, which seemed to flow from ; 12- the Management-by-Walking Around Program which the licensee 13 had. implemented and was indicated both by a review of a long 14 history of records of their findings on those activities and 15 also Inr the' observation that those things were ongoing in [ ' 16 the plant while we were there on site. 17 One weakness we noted in this particular area was 18 the schedule for implementation of the New System Operating. 19 Procedures. The licensee described the procedures that 20 they'd been developing for some time which more fully 1 21 integrate the operation of each individual system through l 22 start up through any abnormal situations to the shutdown of f 23 the system. Previously the procedures had been more j 24 segregated and not effectively integrated. 25 We noted that the new procedures were its strength Heritage Reporting Corporation I (202) 628-4888
119 j 1 and we wanted to see all of those procedures that were g 2 required for support of the start up of the first unit to be 3 in place prior to start up and the licensee agreed with this 4 and has committed to complete the implementation of those 5 procedures required to support start up of Unit 2. 6 The next area was the Licensed Operator Resource 7 Development Area. One weakness we noted in this area was 8 the progress towards the career rotation paths and the 9 educational programs for operators to make them able to get 10 beyond the point where they'd be on shift operators 11 indefinitely. 12 As the licensee indicated, that's a long-term 13 action and in that sense we've asked them to indicate their 14 progress in those areas as their programs continue to 15 develop. However, we did note, of course, that they have, 16 as they have indicated, sufficient operators to support 17 start up and operation of the first unit until they get some 18 of the licensed operators with restricted licenses, license 19 for hot operations, to support two unit operation. 20 In the area of cultural change, we noted improved 21 shift communications both among the shift crew and with 22 other groups in the facility, and the turnover process 23 between the various shift crews as a strength. 24 Also the clear definition of what the expectations 25 of the licensee management are relative to the performance Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
j 120 1 of operators as Ldescribed in the Operations. Management-(); 2' Manual and the Operations Manual, which they described /in' 3 some. detail-earlier'in their presentation.-
- 4. The-area of corporate oversight, we noted active t
5' involvement of senior management up to Executive Vice. 6 President on the site during our presence there. There was- j 7 a routine shift or station review meeting which are 'e 8 conducted on a monthly basis as well as numerous.other ; l 9 activities which there was a corporate presence on site.. 10 We also noted as a strength the effective' problem-11 identification in. root cause analysis that has been 12 developed by the Nuclear Quality Assurance organization. 13 One weakness'that we observed here related to a 14 finding on instrument air tubing installation which had been i 15 performed during-the shutdown period. There was an _ () 16 improperly installed support and that had not been 1 17 identified by the QC Program. 18 In response to that, the licensee is. reevaluating 19 their root cause analysis which they had done in the ; 20 modification area to assure that this type of thing is ; 21 encompassed by that and also all of the tubing and support 22 installations that have been done at the facility. 23 In the other areas, radiological controls. We i 24 noted a significant improvement in reduction of contaminated 25 areas. The inspector who looked at this area had been at 1 Heritage Reporting Corporation gg (202) 628-4888 U l
121 1 the plant for an inspection two years earlier. And was very 2 impressed by the licensee's improvement in reducing [ 3 contaminated areas and improved use of engineering controls 4 to minimize the spread of contamination. As well as the 5 strong corporate and station management support for the 6 ALARA Program. 7 One weakness in this area we noted was the need 8 for training of relatively inexperienced health physics 9 technicians with respect to having been at the site for 10 Peach Bottom operations. They had been hired during the 11 period since the shutdown. It was a significant portion of 12 the population, about 30 percent of the health physics 13 technicians were new people, and there was a need for them 14 to be trained in what to expect during plant operations with gs 15 respect to radiological conditions. The licensee is O 16 planning to perform such training. 17 In the area of maintenance and surveillance, we 18 noted a particularly effective program with respect to 19 surveillance tracking and scheduling, such that intervals 20 for performance of surveillance are not exceeded and the 21 entry into a limiting condition for operation due to such an 22 oversight is minimized. 23 In the area of engineerii., and technical cupport-- 24 a particular strength we noted there was the modi:!ication 25 team approach which the licensee has recently implemented, ! Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
122 1 which involves getting both site and corporate personnel () 2 such as the System Engineer and the Operations group at the 3 site involved actively in the development of the mod early 4 in the process in order to assure that the types of l 5 oversights, which I mentioned earlier with respect to the i 6 support, don't come up in the future. 7 One weakness noted there was the fact that 8 acceptance criteria were not clearly called out in.the 9 modification acceptance tests. And the licensee has 10 reviewed that in their audit of modifications. 11 The last area of security. We did.not have 12 security specialists there, because as I had indicated 13 ' earlier, we had just completed a detailed review of the j l 14 security program with.a separate team just preceding the 15 Integrated Assessment Team Inspection. But we did look at
)
16 the interactions of the security group with respect to the 17 other groups on site and concluded that there were 18 strengths. The new Nuclear Security Specialist on site was 19 very aggressive in assuring that his organization was being 20 effectively integrated into both the shift team and the 21 overall plant activities. 22 One weakness noted in this area was a couple of 23 instances of interface problems between the security and 24 health physics group which the licensee responded to very 25 effectively. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O i
123 1 DR. KERR: What is an. example of an interface 2 problem between security and health physics? ( ]) 3 MR. LINVILLE: One was with respect to a situation 4 where there was a high airborne area close to a security 5 door and every time the door was being opened the security 6 guard was having to cor.e down because of an alarm that was 7 occurring on the door due to the delays associated with the 8 dress-out requirements in getting out of the area. And for 9 a number of--seven times during that particular day there 10 had been a problem with this, and it requires a guard to get 11 dressed out and including a mask to go into the area to 12 verify there's no one in there when the problem could have i 13 been solved by moving the step-off pad and that type of 14 things. So that's an example of an interface weakness. r~T 15 The last slide presents the overall conclusions of V 16 the Integrated Assessment Team. They were that the 17 Corporate Action Plan is in place and being effectively 18 implemented. That performance is improving in all SALP 19 functional areas. And that subject to completion of 20 identified weakness, correction of identified weaknesses and 21 other physical work that has to be completed as the licensee 22 indicated, they track on their Master Open Items List, the 23 licensee is ready to support restart and safe operation. 24 Any questions? 25 DR. KERR: On the basis of what I heard yesterday Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
124 l l 1 about what " improving" means, does that mean that as a 1 (~') 2 result of this inspection I can take the previous SALP %) 3 Report and raise.each one of those numerical ratings by one 4 number? I 5 MR. LINVILLE: This was not an actual SALP Board )
'l 6 evaluation. I don't think it's used in that same context.
7 We're seeing continued improvement, but whether we could 8 conclude they'd be the next higher grade in each functional 9 area, is not appropriate to that conclusion, I don't think. 10 DR. KERR: Thank you. 11 DR. REMICK: Any. questions for the staff? 12 Does that complete the staff's presentation, Mr. 13 Boger? 14 MR. LINVILLE: Mr. Boger has some concluding r,g 15 remarks? U 16 MR. BOGER: I did want'to address where the staff 17 is headed from this point in time before I draw the summary 18 conclusions. 19 We are with you today and yesterday to provide 20 you the information that we have. Before we make our final 21 staff recommendations, we'd like to receive the ACRS 22 comments. Back our assessments based on those and 23 commitments that the licensee has made that the plant is 24 really physically ready to operate. 25 Once we've reached that conclusion as a restart Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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. l 125 1 panel, we will relay those recommendations through the O2 Regional Administrator who in turn will relay them to the 3 Director of NRR and to the EDO for final submission to the 4 Commission.
5 We will hold a Commission meeting, and, of " course,. 6 we will respond to the Commission's directives at that time. 7 If restart is approved, we will be monitoring the j 8 Power Ascension Program. As the licensee has indicated the 9 steps in the program, it will be an NRC-approved Power 10 Ascension Program. , l 11 .I think yesterday we kidded about what enhanced 12 inspection coverage will be. We will have additional 13 inspectors on site certainly during certain. critical periods 14 of the Power Ascension Program. And we will continue our 15 NRC inspection activities with three resident inspectors on 16 site as we have now and will until the foreseeable future. 17 In summary, we found that the licensee's plan for 18 restart adequately addresses the root causes as we've 19 identified in the Safety Evaluation' Report. We find that 20 the plan is being effectively !mplemented per our 21 inspections and the Integrated Assessment Team Inspection. , 22 We've determined that the Operating Staff is ready for our 23 inspections and evaluations. 24 Finally, before we make our final restart 25 recommendation, we'll have to verify that the physical plant Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
126 1 items have been' completed, commitment satir, 'ed. In ( : 2 particular, there are some items relateda <he recent 3 electrical team inspection that we've earmarked as restart 4 items. 5 And that concludes our presentation. 6 'DR. REMICK: Any questions for.Mr. Boger? 7 DR. KERR: Mr. Boger, one of my responsibilities 8 will be as preparer of a draft letter to try to characterize 9 the staff's . current position. Let me see if the language 10 that I have written is a fair characterization. 11 What I would say on.the basis of what I've heard ~ 12 is that the staff is prepared to conclude that subject to i 13 completion of certain well-defined commitments to revisions l 14 of equipment and procedures, that the plant can, with the 15 organization now in place, operate Peach Bottom Unit 2 16 without undue risk to the public health and safety. ; 17 MR. BOGER: Yes, sir. I think that's where we 18 stand right now. 19 DR. REMICK: Any further questions of Mr. Boger? 20 Any concluding remarks from the licensee? 21 MR. McNEILL: Only that I'd like to thank the 22 staff and the Committee and the Subcommittee for their 23 at: ention over the last two days. And I thank you very much 24 for our ability to come and present our program to you. 25 DR. REMICK: The Subcommittee has made a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
127 1 recommendation that the Committee write a letter favorable l () 2 to restart. 3 Is there anybody on the Committee that objects to 4 that general approach? And I'm sure the Subcommittee 5 Chairman would appreciate any points that individual members 6 would like to see considered in that letter,. reminding you 7 that we'll take up the letter tomorrow afternoon, so that 8 you get them to Dr. Kerr as soon as possible. 9 I'd like to thank the staff and the licensee both 10 for concise presentations, very thorough presentations. And ! 11 I think that concludes this morning session with a reminder 12 that there is a video that will be shown on the USSR visit. 13 I would suggest, Dr. Savio, that the staff, the ACRS staff, 1 14 plans to start that about ten minutes past the hour, giving ; 15 members a chance to grab a sandwich if they do wish to come l (J-) N 16 back and watch that video. 17 Thank you very much. 18 (Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m.,there was a recess for , 19 lunch.) 20 21 22 23 24 j 25 ) Heritage Reporting Corporation (~ (202) 628-4888 (-)/ i
128 1 AFTERNOON SESSION l () 2 DR. KERR: I have received a draft Pre-decisional 3 Severe Accident Research Program Plan, February 1989, which 4 is a Severe Accident Research Program Plan in draft form and 5 which has been reviewed on a preliminary basis by a 6 Subcommittee that met on the 7th of March of this week. The
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7 Subcommittee, I think I can say, was favorably impressed by 8 the Program Plan on the basis of some cursory review. We 9 simply didn't have time in the schedule to go over it in 10 more detail, and we hope to do that later. 11 And because the staff has asked for at least a 1 12 preliminary reading before they go to the Commission with i 13 this Proposal, we agreed to bring this to the full Committee 14 with the hope that the Committee would agree to make some ('S 15 preliminary comments. U 16 Those responsible for drafting and implementing 17 this Plan are here today to make a presentation and it will, 18 of course, be made within the limitations of time and space l 19 available. 20 And I have no more, but will ask those who may 21 have been present at the Subcommittee if they have any 22 additional comments. 23 I would guess Mr. Sheron is going to lead us off. 24 If so, I will turn things over to him. , 25 MR. SHERON: Thank you. I am Brian Sheron, in the f l Heritage Reporting Corporation l 7- (202) 628-4888 v l
129 1 Division of Systems Research in the Office of Research. And () 2 today myself and Frank Costanzi, Chief of the Accident 3 Evaluation Branch, will try and run you through in about, I 4 guess, an hour's time, the main elements of this revised 5 Severe Accident Research PJsn. 6 Just a quick background about how we got where we 7 are. About a year ago the staff recognized, and I would 8 point out also, that the ACRS and I think Mr. Stello himself 9 recognized there were about a dozen or so programs floating 10 around the Commission dealing with various aspects of severe 11 accidents. 12 The question was to put to the staff is how do all 1 13 .these programs relate and is there some way that they all 14 fit together to make a cohesive overall program. 15 You may remember there was a meeting of senior ' 16 management involved in this area from Baltimore a year ago 17 February led by Mr. Stello which resulted in the charge to 18 the staff to put together a Severe Accident Integration Plan 19 and, as you know, that was ultimately sent down to the 20 Commission in SECY 88-147. 21 The Plan had--if you remember, there were three 22 elements to the Plan that were identified that would achieve 23 closure for the industry. These were performance of the 24 IPE, putting in place a framework for a Severe Accident ! 25 Management Program, and then also carrying out the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
s 130 1 containment performance' initiatives that the staff was going (). 2~ to come up with. 3 The other key elements of the Plan were listed. 4 .One of them was the. Severe Accident Research Program, which 5 .was the main supporting element of the closure process. I 6 One of the objectives of that closure plan, if you 7 remember, was to look.at the generic containment performance 8 issues and basically those issues were those that led to
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9 high risk which were those that 1ed to'early containment l 10 failure. 1 11 What we've done with the Research Program now is
;12 to go through it and to try to refocus it and to make sure 13 that there was proper emphasis on trying to resolve or gain 14 substantia 1'more knowledge in those phenomena that are a 15 driving risk which have large uncertainty. Which are 16 basically those which--the phenomena which can lead to early 17 containment failure.
18 There is also, as you know, other elements of the 19 program. We tried to characterize these as short-term and 20 long-term elements. The short term being basically the 21 issues that were a driving risk right now were high up on 22 the front burner of the Commission. Things like direct 23 containment heating, liner melt-through, ice condenser 24 containments, accident management type of issues. 25 And then there was a longer-term program. And I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
131 l i 1 don't want to think that we do the short term first and we (gg 2 do the long term second. What it is is we have the short-3 term program going on but there's more or less a longer term 4 or s base research prog;'m 1.'. 2t will continue. 5 DR. SICSS: The short-term program has an end to 6 it, the other one doesn't. Is that the difference? 7 MR. SHERON: Yes. Right now we're hopefully 8 trying to see if we can complete that in about three years' 9 time. 10 DR. SIESS: And th9 long-term program? 11 MR. SHERON: The long-term program is still--I 12 don't think we've identified a definite completion date, but 13 what we have identified, if you remember, in the short-term 14 plan is to try and identify criteria which can be used to 15 determine whether we've done enough long-term research. 16 The objectives of doing this research, as the 17 slide shows, three basic ones. One is to develop a 18 technical base of severe accident information which the 19 Commission can use in any and all actions that it deems 20 appropriate related to severe accidents. 21 Another objective is the developing of a technical 22 base of severe accident information to confirm that this is 23 not the discussions but decisions related to severe 24 accidents. 25 If you remember in the Severe Accident Policy, the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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'1 Commission did conclude that-there was no reason for them to' j{ } 2 believe that the plant got their procedure for any undue 3 risk and that is based on their clear understanding of the 1
4 severe accident response to these plants. l l 5 One of the things we want to do is make sure'that 6 we a strong technical base to-support that understanding. l 7 And lastly, which is sort of looking under the 8 rocks, as I call it, the developing and understanding of the y 9 most-likely planned response to severe accidents, and 10 basically ensuring that there are no unexpected phenomena 11 that wo61d change our perception of risk, that there's 12 nothing out there that's going to bite,us. In other words, 13 we've hopefully looked at the spectrum of the phenomena that^ 14 would be expected and that there's no new and exciting 15 things out there that are going to surprise us. 16 Now, I want to go through in a little more detail 17 here some of this restructuring of the Research Program. l 18 In addition to restructuring it, we are trying'to 19 have new total objectives and also longer term objectives 20 and longer-term programs. 21 We are also revising the research approach to 22 severe accidents. Let me go through these real quick. 'One 23 is that special increased emphasis on scaling rational i 24 experiments which is going to be looked at. Class Novak i 25 Zuber, and whatever, will head this issue up. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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i 1 The real question here is that we, as you know, l l () 2 our approach to severe accidents on the basis that.it is not i I 3 really feasible to run any large scale integral system type 4 tests. We're not going to build an equivalent of loss and 5 melted down and the like. And the approach has been 6 basically one of small-scale separate effects testa linked 7 together'by the curves. 8 And I guess the question that I really raised and 9 stuck it my mind was that how well do all these small scale 10 separate effects facilities scale? When I looked into it, I 11 really didn't see anything jumping out at me that told me I 12 had a warm feeling that there was a good scaling rationale i 13 for all of these. 14 So I've asked Novak to head up this area. He has 15 a task group he's already organized and had a first meeting 16 of which consists of I guess internationally recognized 17 experts on the issue of scaling and severe accidents and I 18 think sometime maybe he can give you a more detailed 19 description of that overall program. 20 The next one is late phase melt behavior. What 21 we're finding out is that everything regarding ex vessel 22 core melt--in other words, how the containment responds, 23 what the containment loads are, pretty much is hinged on 24 what comes out of the core when the vessel fails. How much 25 molten core comes out, what temperature what super heat it's l
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,1 at. What the composition of it'is. And how it comes out.
() 2 This is the late phase core melt area. I think 3 that the problem we have right now is that because we don't 4 really understand it very well, we've been tailoring our 5 Research Program to look at the very broad spectrum of the I
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6 consequences, j > t > 7- For example, on core concrete interactions in the 8 SERC series of tests, we're looking at melts that range from 9 pure metallic to pure oxidic melts and the reason is you ask 10 the experimenters and they say, "Well, the in-vessel people 11 won't tell us what's going to come out of the vessel. So 12 we' d have to look at the whole range. " When you look at the 13 direct containment heating experiments in the Syracuse 14 facility, they look at 100 percent melt ejection, and you 15 ask the question, "Well, gee, obviously 100 percent of the 16 melt won't come out. Why are you looking at that?" And 17 they say, "Well, the in-vessel people won't tell us what's 18 really going to come out." 19 DR. REMICK: Do you have any in-vessel people? 20 MR. SHERON: What? 21 DR. REMICK: Do you have any in-vessel people? 22 MR. SHERON: I think there are people that are 23 knowledgeable in this area. 24 One of the things that we want to do is to see 25 what do we do to get a better handle and maybe to reduce !
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135 l 1 this range of uncertainty associated with what comes out of () 2 the vessel. 3 I've seen some promising--just almost like hand 4 calculations from Idaho, for example, on -- crust 5 formation in the core. Understanding that, you know, one 6 may be able to work some analyses and hand calculations or 7 just applying good common sense and the like to bound the 8 amount of core that would relocate to the lower head to, 9 say, within perhaps no more than 50 or 60 percent of the 10 core. 11 I think if we could do stuff like that, we might 12 be able to conclude much more readily that even if, for 13 example, one could get high pressure melt ejection, that 14 with that amount of core ejected, you would have a very high l 15 probability of not exceeding the containment pressure ("] v 16 limits, and one could probably make a pretty strong 17 argument, perhaps, that DCH is not a big problem. 18 But before, we have to get a handle on what's 19 coming out of the core. 20 Increased emphasis on understanding the expected 21 lower-head failure mode. Right now people will talk to you 22 about, well, it may eject any control rod. Or an instrument 23 tube penetration. And then come out. Or the whole lower 24 head may let go. 25 One consideration is that when the fuel relocates Heritage Reporting Corporation
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l 1 ; 136 1 the lower head, it could actually freeze on the lower head ) and it might even fail the lower head structurally before it ( )- 2-3 heats up.to the point where it's molten again, and there is 4 no ejection because there is no liquid core to come out. 5 One of the things that we want to do is better 6 understand how this lower head is actually going to fail. 7 The next one, investigating this stochastic nature 8 of severe accidents. 9 MR. SHEWMON: Before you leave that one-- 10 MR. SHERON: Yes, sir. 11 DR. SHEWMON: It has always bothered me that 12 'nobody ever had to demonstrate that indeed this whole 13 scenario wasn't nonsense. That is, there's no physical way 14 to get a stream in this stuff started through the. bottom. j ('T 15 Somehow we got sucked into this thing of starting- '
\-)
16 considering it when we've got this stream coming out of that 17 nozzle. And it seems to me I used the words " sucked in"
~ 18 advisedly. That this borders on something I can't 19 understand why we don't ever go back to see whether the 20 whole thing is--you know, whether the emperor has any l
21 clothes at all. { l 22 MR. COSTANZI: Frank Costanzi, Office of Research. 23 Dr. Shewmon, we indeed, as part of this revised
'24 Severe Accident Research Plan, tend to;1ook at that question 25 very directly. Namely, how does the bottom head of a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
137 1 reactor vessel fail? ggg 2 DR. SHEWMON: And part of that failure would be 3 this nozzle that's required for any of the direction-- has 4 any real significance or risk? 5 MR. COSTANZI: No , that's not going to be a 6 presumption of this work. 7 DR. SHEWMON: My question is will you consider 8 whether or not a nozzle--where you could ever spray it out. 9 MR. COSTANZI: No. 10 DR. SHEWMON: Do you have to spray it out? 11 MR. COSTANZI: No. I don't think that we would be 12 considering that question because I don't think that we 13 believe that that's a credible scenario. 14 DR. SHEWMON: What, that it would never spray out? 15 MR. COSTANZI: No , not that it would spray out of 16 a nozzle. The work that has been done to date has been 17 trying to look at the question of under what conditions 18 would a nozzle be ejected from the bottom head. And the 19 presumption is that the melt would come down under the 20 bottom head, fail to weld, differential expansion between 21 the nozzle and the bottom-- 22 DR. SHEWMON: Why does the weld fail? It melts at 23 the same point as everything else down there. 24 MR. COSTANZI: That's been the presumption. I 25 didn't say I i. greed with that. That's been the presumption. Heritags Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I 138 1 DR. SEEWMON: Okay. And my question is, are you I 1 g 2 going to go back to that on physical presumption? h 3 MR. COSTANZI: No. 4 DR. SHEWMON: Pardon? 5 MR. COSTANZI: No. 6 DR. SHEWMON: Well, I think that's irresponsible. 7 Because you are presuming that this whole-- 8 MR. COSTANZI: No, no, no. You misunderstand me. 9 We're not going to pursue that assumption. What we're going 10 to do is look to re-examine the question of how does the 11 bottom head fail. We're not going to start out with any 12 preconceived notion. We are going to try and look at what 13 is the range of composition and timing of melt arriving at 14 the bottom head. What are the physical properties of the 15 bottom head? And what is the likely interaction there? We 16 are not going to presume that it's going to be either 17 failure of a large area by creep rupture, nor are we going 18 to presume that the nozzle is going to be ejected, nor are 19 we going to presume that the melt is going to somehow travel 20 down the opening of the nozzle and melt the instrument tube 21 beneath. 22 We're going to look at the questions, starting 23 essentially de novo. 24 DR. SHEWMON: And failure here includes then 25 penetrations of any width, whether it's-- Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 139 1 MR. COSTANZI: Whatever happens happens, jgg 2 DR. SHEWMON: Okay. Thank you. 3 MR. SHERON: I was talking about looking at the 4 stochastic nature of severe accidents, I think there's an 5 argument that can be made that even though the codes that we
'N 6 use model everything and the computers will spit out numbers 7 to four decimal places with no problem, that in fact I think 8 that.some aspects of severe accidents may be somewhat random 9 or arbitrnry, you might say, in the way they would occur.
10 For example, a crust formation and where the crust 11 fails ultimately may be just happenstance on the way the 12 crust developed. If one section was a little thinner than 13 others, that may be the place it fails as opposed to trying 14 to come up with a rigorous calculation that says it will 15 fail at, you know, 2.4 feet above the bottom of the 16 crucible. 17 So we want to basically take a look at this, 18 because I think there are some areas that there's going to 19 be an inherent uncertainty, I would call it, in the behavior 20 of the core or the plant that's not really going to be very 21 amenable to trying to get better models. And I think we 22 want to at least try and factor that in to our Research 23 Program. 24 MR. CATTON: Not knowing how to calculate it 25 doesn't mean it's stochastic. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
. i 140 l i
1 MR. SHERON: That's correct. l
.() 2 MR. CATTON: I don't understand the stochastic 3 nature. You have to calculate the thickness of the crust.
4 It might be stochastic whether it fails or not. But it's 5 thickness deterministic. 6 MR. SHERON: Except if you don't know the exact 7 thermal hydraulic conditions, for example, on the outside. 8 If you have a crucible it's warranted. I s 9 DR. KERR: That's sort of like saying that when a 10 coin comes up heads or tails it's deterministic. It i 11 certainly i's if you know all the details. But it's also 12 used as a prime example of a stochastic process. I 13 MR. CATTON: That's certainly true. But on the 14 other hand, if you have bad models and you do something 15 different and make the statement that it's stochastic, l 16 that's kind of silly. 17 DR. KERR: No. But if you don't know how to model 18 it deterministically, you may be able to make some comments 19 about probabilities and get some indication of what is 20 likely to happen. 21 MR. CATTON: Well, that's an interesting approach. 22 I'd like to see it sort of laid out for me. I don't believe i 23 it. 24 DR. SIESS: Maybe you can do a deterministic 25 calculation with a range of variables. And end up with 1 Heritage Reporting Corporation j 7-.s (202) 628-4888 I b I i
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> 1 141 l 1 almost the same as what he's say-- i f'N O
2 MR. CATTON: I find that more comforting. 3 MR. WARD: It seems that that's it.- And you might 4 even find it dependent on the boundary conditions, there's 5 more than one calculation you should make. , 1 6 MR. CATTON: But I think it depends on where you 7 step into the problem. 8 DR. KERR: Yeah. 9 MR. CATTON: If you step in at the point and say, 10- "I have a crust," whether it fails or not is stochastic. To 11 me , that's too far downstream. If you back up and say, "I 12 don't know whether it's going to be cool to some level at 13 some point" because of something else that may b'e 14 indeterminate, I can understand that. And there's some rs 15 range on these conditions that will lead to a range of ! t.J 16 thicknesses on the crust. I can understand that. But that 17 the failure of the crust all by itself is stochastic, I 18 don't buy that. I don't understand it. 19 DR. KERR: That's what stochastic indicates. If 20 you don't understand it. 21 MR. CATTON: If that's the definition of 22 stochastic, then I don't understand it. 23 MR. WARD: Well, Brian, the chart says stochastic. 24 But the words you used were referendum. And I think those 25 are two different-- Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
142 1 MR. SHERON:. .Yes. I didn't mean-- (')
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2 MR. WARD: You may have to end up treating them as 3- random but what it really is is stochastic relation. 4 , MR. SHERON: Yeah. I am just saying that I think 5 there are boundary conditions that we're never ever going to A be able to get our hand on. 7 For example, I mean if you are looking at, you 8 know, if you are melting down and you have an. accumulator j 9 injecting or something, obviously there could be sloshing 10 into lower head, which would put preferential steam. flow 11 maybe on one side of the crust as opposed to the other which 12 would cause more cooling and a thicker crust on one side or 13 whatever. You'are never going to get there with the models 14 that we have. i 15 And I'm not claiming that this is going to have (q/ f 16 any great hope of success, but I think it's something we 17 want to really try and factor in and make sure that we don't 18 beat our heads against r wall trying to get some exact model 19 when we know in fact thac the process in itself is never 20 that exact. 21 This bullet here says that hopefully if we can 22 carry out the above type of approach--I think my objective 22- here is to try and knock down these large uncertainties in 24 the ex-vessel behavior that are driving a lot of these 25 experiments, like I said, like the SERC test and the SERC Heritage Reporting Corporation 7 (202) 628-4888 V _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ l
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-1 facility and try and'just get some better bounds on what we m l
() V 2 really have to look at and understand in that area. ! 3 And as I said before, the near and long-term 4 programs are not two separate programs. But basically it's 5 the same program. The near term is only to identify those 6 issues that need to be resolved in the near term. 7 Let me talk about the codes in general here for a 8 minute. 9 Code development, and you know there's a lot of 10 codes right-now out there for severe accidents. 'We want to 11 slow that down. Right now if you look, we develop a code. 12 We have Version X. While it's still being assessed, the 13 developers are already thinking about and almost completed 14 with version X+1 and ready to release it. And they already rg 15 have planning going on for Version X+2 and maybe even U 16 version X+3 before they've even finished assessing Version 17 X. 18 The documentation of these codes, quite honestly, 19 I don't think is very good in terms of us being able to 20 stand up and say we know exactly what's in them and we know 21 that the equations that are coded in there actually 22 represent the equations that are supposed to be there. 23 So we want to slow it down, put it on a more 24 structured approach. We want to get these codes documented. l 25 We want to get the degree of QA established so that we know l Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 O r - _ _ _ _ _ _
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'1 1 what we are dealing with, i
[) 2 Another area that at least I know I'm troubled l sa l 3 with,'and I think Mr. Costanzi is, is there are four core I 4 melt progression codes that exist right now. There is l 1 5- MELPROG-TRAC, RELAP-SCDAP, BWRSAR, and the MELCOR code. 6 When I first got on the program what I found is 7 that everytime_there was.an experiment run, I would see 8 requests to verify all four of these codes against every l 9 experiment. And I guess I asked a question, why do I have l 10 to verify four codes against the same experiment? And I 11 really haven't gotten a real good answer. There may be a j 12 reason why we need one to perhaps even three codes. I don't 13 know. But I think we want to take a step back and ask 14 ourselves the question of what do we really need in the way i eg 15 of codes in order to do core melt progression. l (./ j 16 And if one of these codes or two of these codes j i 17 don't stand up, then I think we'll probably stop the funding ] 18 to it. 19 MR. CATTON: What would be your criteria for both 20 standing up or not standing up? 21 MR. SHERON: I'm not real sure yet what it's going. 22 to be. I' i say, gee, you know, I'd like to maybe have one 23 of these old code beauty contests, find some standard 24 problem. The trouble is there are very few experiments 25 around that one could argue would challenge all aspects of Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
145 1 the codes.
.( j 2 MR. CATTON: There may not be any.
~3 MR. SHERON: It may have to be a very arbitrary I 4 decision, okay. If I have two codes that are doing the same 5 thing.and I only need one, then raybe I close my eyes and
'6 flip'a coin. I don't know. 1 7 The point is that I don't know--
8 DR. SHEWMON: Even though it should be 9 deterministic. 10 MR. SHERON: I think we would very much like if it i 11 came down to that, we would probably have to look at the 12 codes, how they are structured, their usability, and the 13 like, and try and make some sort of a judgmental decision on 14 which one.
/"3 15 But the real question is, is I'm very interested
(/ 16 in trying to see what the justification is for carrying this 17 many codes right now. And I guess basically, you know, 18 whoever makes the best story wins. I don't know. , 19 DR. SIESS: Do the codes all give the same answer? 20 MR. SHERON: Unfortunately, no. ] 21 MR WARD: It would be interesting if they do. 22 DR. SIESS: Either they are all wrong or three of 23 them are. 24 MR. CATTON: What's bothersome is when there are 25 three models but the answers were not the same. i i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l 1 1
l 146 1 MR. SHERON: Well, suffice'it to say right now, is 2 that there's a concern and I think in this revised program fv) 3 this is one of the key elements that we want to get-our 4 hands around and address. 5 In terms of the code improvements, and putting I 6 them on a more structured basis, one'erea would be the need 7 to justify improvements to the code based on their 8 importance. The importance of these improvements to 9 understanding risk. 10 This is similar to what we're doing on the thermal 11 hydraulic codes right now. Of TRAC and RELAP. Basically 12 we've told the. labs that are developing those two codes that l 13 if you think another version of the code is necessary, we 14 would like you to come in and make a formal proposal as to l 15 why it's necessary indicating exactly what needs to be 16 changed, what's deficient in the code, what you propose to l 17 do to improve it, and why this is going to change our l 18 perception to safety and make the world a better place to 19 live. 20 MR. CATTON: Will they do that in writing? 21 MR. SHERON: If they want money to do it, yes. 22 MR. CATTON: Good. 23 MR. SHERON: And I would expect to see our 24 contractors in the severe accident area start to do this now 25 too. Rather than just send in a laundry list of here's what Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
147 1 we're going to fix in the code this year. I' d like to see a () 2 little more detail as to why. It's an attempt to 3 And this one ought to be fun. 4 get a better handle on code accuracy criteria. What I 5 really want to do is put a stop to the endless code 6 development. The code that never ends. As I said, you get 7 in a "do look" because they issue Version N. They are 8 already preparing and ready to issue--or they are assessing 9 Version N. They are ready to issue Version N+1 but they are 10 thinking of Version N+2, which will incorporate all the good 11 stuff they learned from the assessment of Version N. 12 And therefore, then when they start to assess 13 Version N+1, obviously they are ready to release Version N+2 14 and the only way they can incorporate all the good stuff 15 they learned from the assessment of Version N+1 is to put it 16 in Version N+3 and you can see it just goes on. 17 So somewhere along the along the line we have to 18 decide how good is good enough. What's good enough for 19 government work with theso codes? I'm not sure what that 20 criteria is yet or how we're going to do it. But it's 21 something that I really want to make a very noble attempt to 22 do. 23 Now, whether it has to do with numerical accuracy 24 or just an ability to calculate the phenomena correctly or 25 what, but it's something that we're going to have to try and Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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'148 l' get a handle on.
(} 2 Let me just conclude by saying that.the major 3 areas of emphasis in the near term are going to be to get.a 4 handle on direct' containment heating. Probably like to come 5 down and talk to the Subcommittee a couple of months from 6 now when we have our detailed program for addressing this 7 better fleshed out. I think it has to be because I've-8 committed myself to write a paper for a meeting in Germany 9 in June on this, so I've got to put it down'on paper 10 sometime soon.
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11 It's going to be I guess a multi-phase approach 12 here. One is the question of depressurization. The' 13 efficacy of depressurization of the primary system. What j 14 are the downsides to depressurization? And there are 15 drawbacks to it. 0 16 And then the other is the question of what'is the 17 probability--I have a problem in the first place. In other 18 words, what is the probability that if I did indeed have a 19 high pressure. melt ejection event that it would lead to 20 direct containment heating that would exceed the capability 21 of primary systems. 22 I know for one that at the Accident Management 23 Commission briefing we had, one of the Commissioners 24 specifically pointed out that--at least I interpreted it 25 that he didn't want to hear any solutions to direct Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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149 1 containment heating, and-so he knew whether there was a > 2 problem. 3- So we're going to try to put together a good 4 assessment of to what extent there is a problem. And also 5 look at to what extent we think there's a solution. We're { 6 going to try to do this all in about a period >of within 1 7 three years. And we'll make a recommendation to the 8 Commission at that time on what we think is the best course i
-l 9 of action.
10 Most likely that may involve telling them that at 11 this stage we have a certain likelihood that there will be a 12 containment failure from direct containment heating. 13 Whether that number is 10 percent or 50 percent, I don't 14 know. We most likely will also tell them that if they want l 15 to reduce that further, here's how much longer it will take 16 in terms of research and here's how much more money it will 17 take. And I think probably you have to make a decision on 18 whether it's worth it to go forward and do more research or 19 make a decision a decision on the information at hand. 20 Similarly, for the MARK I liner melt-through ;
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21 issue, we're trying to define a program that will give us a I 22 much better handle on what is the likelihood that a high-23 pressure--I'm sorry, not a high pressure--but a melt-through 24 of a BWR vessel will result in spreading of the melt and hit ! 25 the liner and cause the liner to fail. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
b l 150' , 1 There's a lot'of other questions involved. For' I (). .2 example; if there's water in the dry well, in the lower part L 3 of'the dry well, and the molten material comes down, you
-i 4 have steam explosions to contend with inside the pedestal l i
5 region. There's question of melt attack on the pedestal 6 itself. , l L 7 And we hopefully will have programs that'will.look l 8 at all of that and try and reach some sort of a conclusion. 9 Effective water.on a molten core. This is 10 basically a question of accident management. The question 11 continually keeps coming up that if you have a molten core 12 or if.you're melting down, the core is in the. vessel. Or 13 even in the lower cavity. And you restore a water source 14 and start putting water in, what happens?
' 15 I don't think the question is so much of whether 16 or not it's actually coolable, because we don't really know l i
17 that much about the geometry to make any conclusions. But I 18 think what we really want to know is what are the side 19 effects? Would one get, for example, steam explosions from 20 reflooding a molten core? Or dumping water on a molten core t 21 that's down in the lower cavity? Is there a problem with 22 the increased hydrogen generation that would occur by 23 putting the water on this hot core? Should there be--for 24 example, should an operator take precautionary measures, for 25 example, like ignitore--turning on ignitor systems and stuff I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 _____________________ m
151 1 .before they do it? 2 But basically, to get a better understanding of f')\ 3 the whole issue. i 4 Impact of in-vessel steam explosions on core melt j 5 progression. That one--I think we've pretty much put to bed ! 6 the question of whether an in-vessel steam explosion causes ! 7 an Alpha mode failure. And for the most part I think that i 8 most people agree that that's a very low probability, and 9 therefore we're not spending a lot of time on it. 10 But the question is is that if you do have a. core 11 relocation into a waterfill lower head, a lower pressure, j I 12 you still may get a steam explosion. And the question is 13 does that do anything to the core melt accident itself? The 14 progression. Does it disrupt the core? Does it cause any 15 other failures in the primary system? Something we need to 16 look at. 17 Containment failure modes for ice condenser 18 containments. The ice condensers are a unique animal right i 19 now. We've had some calculations that show when you have a I 20 high pressure melt ejection in these plants you can actually 1 21 have the molten core lodging up by the seal table in direct ; 1 22 contact with the containment and perhaps a direct 23 containment failure just by a burn-through mechanism. 24 And then there's the question, obviously, because 25 of the smaller volume, the direct containment heating is Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
152 1 probably much more severe for them. So we need to focus in (} 2 on the ice condensers. 3 containment failure modes for the MARK II 4 containment, the ex-vessel steam explosion. That is a 5 question that we need to look at. 6 As I said before, scaling, in general, I think is 7 something that we want to really focus in on to make sure 8 that these experiments that we're running are indeed going 9 to be applicable to a large-scale plant. 10 And finally, as I said before, the accuracy goals 11 for the codes. What are we going to do to convince 12 ourselves when these codes are developed well enough and we 13 can stop development on them. 14 That's all I had. Unless there's any questions, 15 Frank Costanzi will give you more details of the program 16 itself. 17 DR. REMICK: Any questions? 18 I suggest we take our break at this point. 19 DR. KERR: That sounds like an excellent 20 suggestion to me. 21 DR. REMICK: All right. 22 (Whereupon, there was a short recess.) 23 DR. REMICK: We're ready, Mr. Constanzi. 24 MR. CONSTANZI: I'm Frank Constanzi, Chief of the 25 Accident Evaluation Brsnch in the Office of Research. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
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153 ) l 1 And what I would like to do this afternoon is talk 2 a bit.about the details of the Revised Severe Accident (~ } 3 Research Program Plan. And begin'with how we got there, how 4 we came to revise this Plan. What is in the Plan with the 5 goals'which we're trying.to achieve by implementing the l l: .6 Plan, both in the-near term and the.long tern. 1 7 And then'briefly discuss, if.there's time, the 8 comments that we've received on the Plan. 9 The impetus for revising the Severe Accident 10 Research Plan came in the letter from Mr. Becgorge to Dr. 11 Sheron saying that we now have the Staff Integration Plan 12- for closure'of severe accident issues, SECY 88-147. There 13 are certain things which the Research Office is called to do 14- to support those activities and we would like to see the l 15 plan for the severe accident research to do its part to 16 support the staff efforts along those lines. 17 Specifically provide the technical base for i
.i 18 assessing containment performance over a range of risk 19 significant core melt events. Provide a capability to 12 0 evaluate the efficacy of generic containment performance 21 improvements. And provide a better understanding of the 22 range of phenomena exhibited by severe accidents including 23 the impacts of generic accident management strategies.
24 In order to do this, we decided that we couldn't 25 do it alone, that we needed help. And there were a number Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888 i - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1
154 1 of experts who have been working in the severe accident
~T 2 field and that we ought to ask for their help. - (J 3 And the way we decided to do that was by bringing 4 in experts to look at the program as it existed. What kind 5 of research we were doing at the time and question how those 1
6 research activities related to the 88-147 Plan. And how to l 7 focus the research so that the results would be supportive 8 of making regulatory decisions and then how to rank the 9 research that we know we would have to be doing over the 10 long term, so-called base program or as Dr. Ross sometimes 11 like to refer to it, the mortgage you have to pay doing 12 future research to confirm decisions that you make now. 13 One set of the experts in which we brought in 14 consider the detailed technical issues, trying to define gS 15 where we were on those, how much we knew. And what we V 16 needed to do to further resolve those issues. 17 Those experts were asked very explicitly to not 18 try and so much comment on whether or not this particular 19 research needed to be done. But rather assuming that a 20 particular area needed to be investigated, what was 21 technically required to do that investigation? What kind of 22 experiments? What kinds of analyses? 23 A separate collection of experts was asked then to 24 look at the input from this first collection and help the 25 NRC staff sort through and prioritize and determine what Heritage Reporting Corporation p_ (202) 628-4888 l (>
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, 155 l 1~ research is appropriate to taking care of the near-term i'"]
b-2 questions which primarily are directed at what we' call early 3 containment failure. What research is.more appropriate for 4 a long-term or ongoing program? And what research.would be 5 nice to do but probably isn't very practical either because 6 it's gong to take too long or cost too much money or the 7 likelihood of success as to say that when you've'done the 8 research you will significantly reduce uncertainties or have 9 significantly greater insights into the progress of a core 10 melt accident. And hints because the likelihoods are not so 11 good that it's probably not worth doing. 12 We went through this exercise. We developed a 13 draft Revised Severe Accident Research Program Plan. And in 14 February we sent it to those experts who had helped us in em 15 both phases of the production of the document as well as the () 16 National Laboratories, the other experts in the area. We 17 sent it to EPRI. We also sent it to the Nuclear Safety 18 Research Review Committee. And, of course, to the ACRS. 19 In general I can say, just briefly, that the 20 comments that we have received now have been largely 21 favorable. I don't think we've gotten any comments that 22 said we were way off base and were going completely in the 23 wrong direction. We got a couple of comments which were 24 neutral. That is to say, they said do this differently, or 25 this area you need to do something or other. But by and l l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
t 166 1 large, the comments we received said, "This is the right o 2 . sort of thing to be doing. This is the right direction in
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3 which to go." So we've taken a good deal of encouragement 4 -from that and we're proceeding. 5 Now, the goals. The program as a result is 6 divided into two parts. A near-term program and a long-term 7 program. h t 8 I want to emphasize that the near-term program is
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9 not something which is really separate from the long term. i 10 It's not a case where we're going to do near-term research 11 for the next three years. That's over and done with. And 12 then we turn our attention to the long-term issues. 13 Rather what we have tried to do is take those 14 issues which an be dealt with in the next few years, call gc3 15 that the near-term program. And focus our resources on
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16 trying to resolve those issues, recognizing that there are 17 certain portions of the program which are more of a long-18 term nature. That is to say, we don't expect to get the i 19 same kind of answers in the three-year period that we do for 20 the near-term elements. But the activities, the research, 21 are still going to be going on during this time. So it's 22 not a question of coming to the end of a three year period 23 and switching gears. 24 Basically what we're trying to achieve in the near 25 term is two goals. One, providing the technological base l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 157-
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1 for assessingfcontainment performance _over the risk 2 - significant core melt events. Risk.significant core melt { 3 events--the main source for that is NUREG-1150, 4 And the what we're really worried about.here is. 5 early; containment failure. That's the primary; concern. 6 And develop the capability to evaluate the 7 . efficacy of generic containment performance improvements. 8 That is :o 'say, if there are performance improvements which 9 are recc aanded that we will be able to determine whether or 10 not that kind of improvement in the containment'will be 11 worth doing. And whether a significant change in the risk 12 profile will result. 13 Accordingly, the near-term research focuses on 14 direct containment heating, the MARK I-containment-shell
- 15 attack. Molten fuel coolant interactions in MARK II's and
( (' '16 MARK ~III's. Hydrogen. combustion in MARK III's_and ice l-
.17 condenser plants.
18 Also the near-term research is going to address 19 the question of verisimilitude which we call scaling now to 20 make it a little bit clearer. 21 There are two aspects of this. One is whether or 22 not you are looking at the right phenomena in the first 23 place. And that's handled essentially on a case-by-case 24 basis with the individual tasks. l 25 The other question is whether the experiments that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
158 1 you are doing ostensibly to investigate some phenomena or l {} 2 other are really going to investigate that phenomena, j 3 Those involve questions of not just geometrical 4 scaling, since we're obviously doing our experiments in 1 5 small scale and we have to extrapolate to full-size reactor 6 accident, but also whether the phenomena that's being ; I 7 investigated to small scale is going to behave in a way 8 which we understand can extrapolate to behavior in a large 9 scale. 10 MR. CATTON: But you already know you are not 11 going to be able-to do that. Exact similitude and the kind j 12 of things that you are looking at is impossible. Do you 13 have anything-- , i 14 MR. COSTANZI: Well, in some areas, that's right. 15 Chemical processes, for example, don't scale directly. 16 MR. ZUBER: Mr. Catton, we intend only to address 17 the important phenomena for a particular scenario. And then 18 in.a top-down approach obtain the significance. It's merely 19 to get an indication--there are distortions--what are the 20 effects of the distortions on a full scale. 21 MR. CATTON: But you are still going to have to do 22 a lot of extrapolation. 23 DR. KERR: Excuse me just a minute. , 24 Did you get the name of the speaker? 25 MR. ZUBER: Excuse me. My name is Zuber from l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
159 1 Research. 2 What is the question for me?
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3 MR. CATTON: You are still going to have to do a 4 lot of extrapolation, which means that you had better have 5 properly planned small-scale bench-top type experiments, 6 which as near as I can tell, you don't have. 7 MR. ZUBER: This is definitely the task of this 8 scaling program group, to first analyze what we have and 9 then define what we need. And at what scale and at what 10 initial boundary conditions these experiments are going to 11 be run. 12 So that we have full confidence that we can carry 13 them to the full scale. 14 MR. CATTON: So has this been budgeted? I didn't
- 15 see it anywhere in the Research Plan. That this would be a 16 fallout.
17 MR. ZUBER: It is budgeted for this fiscal year. 18 And we have assurances that if we need more-- 19 MR. CATTON: What you are going to do is budget it 20 for this year. But at least as far as I can tell, a lot of 21 the experiments that have been done that were supposed to l 22 have done this- you know, you pour molten material into a 23 bucket and expect to be able to get something from that for 24 pouring it on the floor. And they are very, very different. 25 MR. ZUBER: No. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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1 DR. KERR: 'Since these experiments arefnot yet-2 planned, should we try_to plan'them today_or-- L(]) 3 MR. .CATTON:- Well, I just want.to note that:if-- 4 MR.'ZUBER: Let me_tell you. At the.next. meeting
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5 we have in April the first agenda of the' meeting is'to. o 6 review all-the scaling criteria and submit it on which guide-7 that'they design in the, running of these experiments. .If 8 there are other criteria used, then we_can not document it. 9 'And plan for the next series. 10 MR. SHERON: Ivan, if you ask any contractor, 11 they'll tell you that they've scaled their experiments. 12 MR. CATTON: I understand that. l 13 MR. SHERON: The approach we're taking is that if 14 Novak's group comes up with something that says there's an q 15 experiment that's either inappropriately scaled or there's
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16 another problem with this area, you know, we are going to 17 fix it. We are going to stop the experiment if we have to. 18 MR. CATTON: And maybe plan for experiments that 19 would be done right that would replace it? 20 MR. SHERON: Yes. If necessary. 21 MR. COSTANZI: I might mention at this point that 22 the tasks which are outlined in the Revised SARP are not 23 intended to be statements of work. They are intended to be 24 general directions and approaches to solving a problem-- 25 first of all, a statement of the problem, and then ; Heritage Reporting Corporation j (202) 628-4888 ! O
.__.______.m. _ _ . . _ - . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.161 1 approaches to. solving a problem. And from that what ]
l 2 analyses and experiments need to be conducted will be
'( J 3 determined. ]
4 So we're not--you know, when the plan-is '! l 5 published, we're not finished with out work. We now have'to .j } l 6i implement it. And part of the implementation will be 7 deciding what experiments are necessary and at what scale, 8 'or what scales, if more than one is necessary. 9 MR. CATTON: I guess I was just looking for i 10 assurance. In the past, it's been a policy of " write a i 11 code." Use a code to assess it. And then do some i 12 experiment and hope to hell everything comes together. 13 MR. COSTANZI: I think our philosophy is reverse 14 of that. 15 MR. CATTON: Oh, I like that. 16 MR. COSTANZI: Your new philosophy differs with 17 that. 18 MR. COSTANZI: . Yeah. That's what we are trying to i 19 do. ; 20 MR. CATTON: That's-a pleasure to see. . 21 MR. COSTANZI: That's what we're trying to put in 22 place. Yeah. l 23 Okay. With regard to the scaling questions. The 24 first question, as I mentioned, is correct phenomena being 25 investigated. That's a hard problem. And that's got to be i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
162 1 looked at time and time again. (} 2 MR. CJTTON: MR. CO 3TANZI: Could you pronounce that word? Verisimilitude? 3 4 The ditttortions of scale with regard to the 5 scaling particularly--the distortions of scale is important 6 to the process under investigation. You might be looking at l 7 the right phenomena, but the scale may mask what you are 8 really-- 9 DR. KERR: I want to point out to Dr. Catton that 10 Andrew Jackson said it was an ignorant person who could only 11 spell a word one way. 12 (Laughter.) 13 MR. COSTANZI: Okay. Our distortions characterize 14 understood and counted for when using the codes. The
- 15 experiment might be fine but the code may not translate 16 properly.
17 MR. CATTON: Or the code might be all right and 18 the experiment is the wrong one. 19 MR. CONSTANZI: Yeah. Very true. That's right. 20 I'll talk a bit more about codes and where we' re 21 at with the codes since that's one of the issues-- 22 MR. CATTON: Are you going o make the same 23 request of the code developers that you would of an 24 experimentalist? 25 MR. COSTANZI: Yes. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
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.1 'MR. CATTON: That they have to come in:and-before-2 ~they--
!3 MR.;COSTANZI: We.already have.
4 MR. CATTON: You have?- Good. i 5 MR. COSTANZI: Every statement of work that went- ]
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6 .out this fiscal year to our contractors that involved 7 development of'a code, were in experimental program, as' q 8 -opposed to just using a code to analyze data, required the'
. I 9 contractor to come in with a Task I report which basically !
10 asked them to address why they need to further develop.the I 11 ' code. Where is it now? When they finish the proposed work,- 1 12 where is it going to be? What problems will have been 13 solved? Or.what greater capabilities relative to the 14 confidence that you have in being able to assess risk?--will 15' result and what will still yet to be done? 16 We are reviewing those right.now.. And on that and :j 17 on'the basis of some other work--for example, a grant that i 18 we just awarded to look specifically at some of these large i 19 integrated codes, we're going to be making. judgments as to
-20 what code and what kind of schedule we ought to proceed.
21 MR. CATTON: You asked the code developer to give 22 you the basis for his confidence? 23 MR. COSTANZI: Yes. They have to explain why they 24 are going to do it. And in fact, we've gotten some of these , 25 in and we've turned around and said, "This isn't good Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
, 1 i 164 l enoughi Do it again."
} 2 MR. SHERON: .This was not a very popular program.
3' MR. CATTON: I.can tell.. But it's long overdue. 4 MR. COSTANZI: Okay.- Well, the question of 1 5 depressurization and DCH. ]
.)
6 Like all' of the issues in the near-term part ofs 7 the program, we have certain questions which'we are going to fl 8 attempt to answer. 9 I might-mention at this point that we constructed 10 the plan by first coming up with the questions.and'then 11 tried to figured out what we needed to do to fit the 12 questions. So the prioritizing and selecting of what 13 research task needed to be done was really predicated on 14- first coming up with what questions we needed.to answer to 15 implement the SECY 88-147. Deciding what are those l J 16 questions we think we had a good shot at answering. Then ' l 17 selecting the research tasks that we thought were I 18 -appropriate to answering those questions. 19 So the questions we're trying to answer in the DCH , l 20 pressurization, what is the likelihood that the reactor l 21 coolant system will fail by natural circulations, since that 22 seems to be an important issue with regard to DCH, albeit 23 the whole thing. 24 MR. CARROLL: I don't understand those words. 25 What does that mean? Heritage Reporting Corporation g (202) 628-4888 V l
165 1 MR. COSTANZI: There have been calculations which (} 2 suggest that in an accident, such as a station blackout accident, that natural circulation will set up within the 3 4 reactor coolant system and will fail the hot leg, either at 5 the surgeline, the exit nozzle, or the steam generator tube, 6 depressurize the reactor-- 7 MR. CARROLL: Okay. 8 MR. CONSTANZI: Another question, is there a low-9 pressure cutoff below which there's no DCH threat? That is 10 to say, that is there a reactor coolant system pressure 11 below which, even though you get an energetic ejection of 12 melt from the bottom head by whatever mechanism, there is 13 not sufficient energy in that ejection to thrust the melt up 14 into the upper parts of the containment. And essentially 15 stays more or less in the cavity and doesn't threaten or 16 challenge the containment integrity. 17 If such a cutoff pressure will exist, the question i 18 is, well, is it going to be achieved? Achieved by the 19 natural circulation failure or the RCS? Or by intentional 20 depressurization on the part of the operator? 21 If the operator action is necessary, is the 1 22 operator going to have time available to do it? Is the 23 information that the operator is going to have at his or her 24 disposal going to be sufficient in sufficient time to allow 25 them to take sufficient action? Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
166 1 Then other adverse consequences. The way we (} 2 phrase that perhaps is prejudicial. The point is that just 3 opening the PORV isn't necessarily going to have no other 4 consequences that depressurize the reactor. You're probably 5 going to start damaging fuel a lot earlier than you would 6 have otherwise. What else it might be as a result of a 7 consequence of intentional depressurization. 8 And lastly, what is the nature of the DCH threat 9 altogether. Are there ex-vessel means which can mitigate or 10 obviate it? 11 The next issue we're going to deal with is the BWR 12 Mark I containment shell melt-through. 13 One of the major questions here is what is the 14 relationship of the mode of the bottom head failure to the 15 way the melt comes down. 16 Now, the codes which have been used to assess BWR 17 accidents to date postulate the way the melt arrives on the 18 bottom head. And there are two schools of thought when it 19 comes down pretty much in a coherent melt, the crucible and 20 the TMI dump down to the bottom head. 21 The other one is that you don't get any crucible 22 or crust forming and melt just dribbles down. l 23 The question we're asking here is so what? Does 24 that really make a significant difference on what happens to 25 the rest of the accident? In order to answer that question Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
167 1 we have to focus on how does the bottom head fail in the igg 2 first place? How sensitive is the bottom head failure mode [} ' 3 to what comes down? And how sensitive and what happens to 4 the mode of bottom head failure? 5 DR. KERR: Do you also plan to look at the y 6 influence of melt progression inside the vessel to the t I 7 possibility of cooling and maintaining it within the vessel? . 8 MR. COSTANZI: Yes. If I understand your 9 question, let me rephrase it the way I think I understand 10 it, and that is, are we going to investigate what happens , 11 when you try and pour water on a damaged core. Assuming in 12 the course of the accident the operator has the ability to 13 try and reflood. 14 DR. KERR: Well, not so much that, but you just 15 reminded me you are talking about the rate at which the 16 stuff enters the containment and how much influence that 17 would have on your ability to cool or whatever. 18 It strikes me that the same question maybe could 19 be answered in-vessel if you assume, as sort of an upper 20 limit, that everything melts and falls in the bottom of the 21 vessel. This is one thing. But if it comes in gradually, 22 particularly when water is in the bottom of the vessel, it 23 may be that you'll get cooling crusting and possibly a 24 coolable-- 25 MR. COSTANZI: That's exactly what we intend to Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 a _ m__ ___--_m___.____._.___m_ . . _ _ _ . .____mm_ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
168 1 approach by_trying to answer that first question. So we say-2 what is the relationship to failure to the variation of
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3 pouring--composition, temperature and timing. 4 DR. KERR: All right. You do prejudice the 5 question a.little bit by saying the bottom head is going to
- 6. fail 1I think.
7 MR. COSTANZI:- Yes. I understand that. I think 8 that reflects the difficulty in the way of trying-to convey 4 9 what we' re trying to do as opposed to any intent of a 10 preconceived notion as to what the result will be. 11 We really are--you know, I am not going to claim 12 that we are going to be completely successful in this. But~ 13 we really have tried to take this from the point of 14 questioning where we are in terms of what do we really know 15' as opposed to what we think, based on inference from 16 experiments or extrapolation from experiments by.a 17 calculation. And examine the assumptions that are 18 underlying'those extrapolations and those inferences. And l L 19 say, well, how well have these been tested? 20 MR. CATTON: You need a Type B question added into 21 A. What's the effect of water, the lower plentum, as melt 22 pours out from the core? i 23 MR. COSTANZI: I think our next issue which- yes, 24 adding water to the degraded core. 25 MR. CATTON: Well, what about water that's already Heritage Reporting Corporation L (202) 628-4888 l
169 1 there? 3 1 2' MR. COSTANZI: There will be some assumptions and l ('"%]
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3 one of the assumptions in dealing with this first question 4 is that you've got water,.at least to the core plentum. 5 Moving on. The third one in question is, you 6 know, the answer to those' questions depend on the initial 7 conditions. And that's something which we'll still need to 8 be looking at, I suspect, in the long-term program as well 9 is the question of core melt behavior. 10 And lastly, under what conditions does the crust 11 form the initial contact between melt and.shell be stable? 12 When the melt first comes in contact with the dry well shell l 13 it's going to freeze for at least some time. And under what 14 conditions is it going to remain frozen?
- 15 The next issue is adding water to the degraded %) 16 core. Questions that we are going to address here, what is 17 the potential for in-vessel core cooling interactions? This 18 pertains particularly to--or has particular relevance, I i 19 should say, to the depressurization question of DCH since 20 current thinking seems to be that steam explosions are more l
21 likely under low pressure than they are in high pressure. l l 22 You might be setting up a different kind of accident if you 23 intentionally depressurize. 24 What is the hydrogen generation rate during melt 25 relocation? The melt comes down. An ancillary question I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l w_-
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170 ! 1 which'was-pointed out the other-day which we ought to be. 2 , addressing here'as well is what happens to the hydrogen j} 3 generation rate when we reflood? l
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4 DR. KERR: Is the rate'important or-is.it the J 5 total hydrogen generation that's important? Or,do you know? 6' I1certainly don't. j i L 7 MR. COSTANZI: I really don't know the-answer to l 8 that. 'Certainly the total' hydrogen generation is important 9 because that'is another source of-energy for failing the 10 containment ultimately. 11 It has usually been spoken of in terms of the 12 hydrogen generation rate as being the relevant parameter. 13 But that may be a term of convenience. I honestly don't 14 know. ! 15 MR. ELTAWILE: I'm Farah Eltawile from the staff.
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16 The rate can be important too because if you 17 produce hydrogen at the fast rate, if you.have equipment l 18 flag ignitor, it might not be able to function under these 19 conditions. So you want, in addition to the. total 20 accommodation, the rate of -- , 21 MR. COSTANZI: Okay. The last question, is there i 22 a possibility of-- ) 23 DR. KERR: This is--just talking about the Mark I. 1 24 This is outside the Mark I situation? ,l
.25 MR. COSTANZI: Yeah, yeah. This is outside--well, i
Heritage Reporting Corporation l (202) 628-4888 ) () l _ _ _ _ A
171 1 yeah.- It's not explicitly Mark I. (~T 2 Is there a possibility of recriticality if there, k.) 3 is a core damage accidents? So what will be the 4 consequences? 5 Incidentally, I might mention that that last issue 6 is one which, although it's in the Severe Accident Research 7 Plan for completeness, the Accident Evaluation Branch is not 8 going to be doing that. 9 DR. KERR: I guess I would be inclined to reword 10 that slightly and ask what is the probability. Because it 11' seems to me you can almost immediately answer the question 12 as to whether there's a possibility. 13 MR. COSTANZI: Point taken. 14 Okay. The last issue is codos. We call it models 15 here. What we need to be looking at in the area of model O 16 development, questions of how well do the mechanistic models 17 reflect the phenomena believed to be important to severe 18 accidents? How well does the interactive program of code 19 advancement / experimentation achieve the objective implied 20 above? Is the level of detail in the codes appropriate to 21 their use? That is to say, are we going off spending a lot 22 of money developing very finely detailed codes to reduce a t L 23 uncertainties which are masked so much by uncertainties in 24 the initial conditions that it doecn't make a hill of beans 25 worth a difference? Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
L ' i l l 172 l 1 What stages of an accident need to be modeled and 2 detailed? Are the experimental and code development efforts {}_ 3 synchronized? Are the codes running away from the 4 experiments or are the experiments too far ahead of the I 5 codes to really be able to understand what we're seeing? I l 6 Since, indeed, the codes are a. tool. They help us ] 7 understand what we observe. 8 Is the level of accuracy needed for regulatory use 1 9 being considered in the code development programs?. That's . r 10 one of the questions which we're'trying to grapple with. 11 And is; the level of accuracy needed from a given l 12 code consistent with the expected overall level of accuracy 13 required of an integrated analysis package? Especially for j 14 uses like accident management. 15 That includes things like how much information is 16 going to be available for people who want to use these 17 things. And when they want to use them. 18 A might rention as an aside here that the 19 forthcoming Severo Field Damage Partners Meeting in April at ! 2 Idaho Falls, one of our partners, U.K., have been using some 21 of these integrated codes and is going to be talking about 22 their experience using them. Their experience means not I 23 only the very practical natter of how to set up the code and j 24 run it, and difficulties or ease with which that's done, but 25 also the results, how believable they are, how sensitive to Herftage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4688
4 173 1 code operator manipulations the results might be. 3 2 That is something which we are actively pursuing L(J 8 . 3 now. 4 Under.the long-term program our goals are to 5 provide an understanding of the range of phenomena in severe 6 accidents. Develop improved methods for assessing fission
- 7. product behavior and availability for release.
8 These goals are really consistent and quite 9 frankly are taken from the Callis Panel Report which was 10 done a few years ago. It focused on what is uncertain in 11 calculat' ion of the source term. It remains an area that is 12 important to the Commission. And it's an area which we're 13 still going to pursue. 14 , Hopefully, what we're going to be learning by, gg 15 one, restructuring and implementing the revised SARP,
\-) \
16 especially in the near term, is how to do a more focused job 17 in the long term. 18 These same questions that I've been talking about 19 earlier about whrtner or not we're pursuing an avenue of 20 research which is, one, appropriate to an accident; and, 21 two, as a likelihood of payoff, will also apply to what l 22 research we do in the long-term program. l I 23 DR. KERR: You referred to improved methods. 24 Improved compared to what? L 25 MR. COSTANZI: Pardon? I'm sorry. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-48SP l C:) .
174 1 DR. KERR: You referred to improved methods. r 2 Where it says " fission product-behavior." Improved compared l
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3 to what? 4 MR. .COSTANZI: The question here is reduction and i' 5 uncertainties, again. Now, it's still part of the program, 6 the question of-- 7 DR. KERR: It implies that you are going to 8 improve something and I'm wondering what it is that you are 9 going to improve. 10 MR. COSTANZI: There are-- 11 DR. KERR: I mean there are a lot of methods being ; 12 used for assessing fission product behavior. Which of them 13 are-- 14 MR. COSTANZI: Well, what we're referring to here ! 15 is the level of accuracy for residual uncertainty in the L 16 calculation of source term. 17 DR. KERR: Okay. So first you are going to try to 13 decide what the level of accuracy is and at that point 19 you'll have to decide where the need is improving, I assume? 20 MR. COSTANZI: Yes. 21 DR. REMICK: I note we're about an hour and i 22 fifteen minutes into our hour and a half time allotted and I 23 cee there are quite a few slides ahead. So you might have 24 to make some decisions along the way. 25 MR. COSTANZI: Okay. Well;. I think I can go Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 O v
k 175 l 1 through the remnant of these pretty quickly. 1
~
(T 2 In the long-term program, as I said, we're really
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3 directed at reducing uncertainties and estimate of risk. 4 Trying to put together a broadly based Severe Accident 5 Research Program that focuses on the six following areas. J 6 Again, the modeling severe accident phenomena. The in-7 vessel core melt progression and hydrogen generation. 8 Again, fuel coolant interactions. Molten core concrete 9 interactions. Fission product behavior and transport. And, 10 finally, fundamental data needs. We need to do the kinds of 11 calculations involved in these phenomena. 12 Now I'll just briafly go through the comments. 13 Actually, in your handouts we kind of summarized l 14 the comments that were received overall and on each issue. 15 The comments, as I mentioned earlier, overall are U<~s 16 really pretty much favorable. The commenters indicated that 17 they felt we were pretty much on the right path, thought it l 18 was a good approach. l 19 DR. KERR: Excuse me. Do you plan to try to 20 explain the comments, because it seems to me as I read them 21 they are fairly straightforward. I would suggest that you 1 22 just sort of--if you can give a general summary-- l 23 MR. COSTANZI: Yes, I a g r e e:. That's what I shall 24 do. 25 With regard to the detailed--as I said, the l l l Heritage Reporting Corporation g (202) 628-4888 i
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176 1 overall comments were favorable. The. detailed comments are [ }; 2' the specific issues and on the long-term program'were 3 generally as follows. With~ regard to scaling, there was-a 4 good' deal of skepticism of whether or'not we were going to 5, be 'able tua pull it off. I understand that and there may be 6- some question of whether we can pull it off or not, but I-- 7 EDR . KERR: Dr. Zuber's head is on the. block. He ; 8 has confidently stated that he can'do it. 9 MR. COSTANZI: Well, I think that we're. going to 10 learn a lot by going through the exercise regardless. So I J 11 feel pretty comfortable with pursuing that avenue of g 12 investigation. 13 With regard to some of the other comments that we 14 received and some of the other things,.there were some. 15 comments that we were perhaps focusing too much on the 16 question of DCH and we might be putting the cart before the 17 . horse a bit by not addressing, as a first point, of whether 18 or not DCH is a real problem. 19 As we explained in the SARP, that perhaps is the 20 ideal way of doing it,, but we don't think that we have the 21 time that we can afford to do it sequentially and we really l 22 have-to try to explore the problem pretty much on several 23 avenues. 24 Overall other comments that we received are that g L 25. perhaps we were optimistic on both the schedule and the Heritage Reporting Corporation _ (202) 628-4888
177 1 level of resources needed to address some of these questions l 2 and we're certainly taking that under advisement. 3 I might mention that we are now revising the plan
'4 and we are scheduled to produce a final revised plan and 5 submit it to the Commission by the end of the month. !
6 I don't think that I need or that it would be 7 useful to go through the rest of the comments since you have 8 the comments on each of the issues in the handout. ! 9 So I think I'll just conclude my presentation at ; 10 this point. If that's all right. ! 11 DR. KERR: Any further questions or comments? 12 DR. REMICK: What is the intent then? That 13 they'll be a revision of the plan and the staff will come 14 back? Is this an informational type of--
,g , 15 DR. KERR: We hope to schedule another review V
16 session fairly soon because the Subcommittee did not have 17 time enough to go over the proposed plan thoroughly. So 18 what I would propose that the Committee consider doing is 19 make some general comments on the direction that the 20 proposal seems to be taking, with a caveat that we expect to 21 continue our review as our schedule and the staff's schedule 22 permits. 23 DR. REMICK: Okay. So you do foresee a letter i 24 then this month? l 25 DR. KERR: Yes. l. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
178 1 DR. REMICK: I did not mean to, you know, cut you- l (~j- 2 short. I'just wanted to remind you,that.of.the scheduled-
. \.) .
13 time there was fifteen minutes. So I did not want to-- 1 4 MR. COSTANZI: No. !
)
5 DR. KERR: I thought he cut you short very j I 6 effectively, didn't you?
'7 DR. REMICK: We~ started at 2:00 on-this subject 8 and I have no objection to going on if the Committee wants.
9 I just--
- 10. DR. KERR: I think probably.for the purpose of.the 11 meeting that the presentation has been fairly complete,
'12 don't you?
13 MR. COSTANZI:- I'm satisfied, yes. 14 DR. SIESS: I shouldn't'be confused, but I guess I 15 .still am. And this is--for the next three years will there c 16- be a simultaneous short-term and long-term program-- 17 MR. COSTANZI: Yes. 18 DR. SIESS: So the short term is superimposed on 19 the long term? 20 MR. SHERON: Yes. Basically we're taking the 21 Research Program and we're picking out those elements that 22 we think need to be addressed on a much shorter schedule. 23 We put them into what we call a short term and we're going 24 to put increased resources and effort to try to reach 25 resolution on them. Heritage Reporting Corporation (P.02) G28-4888 Os/ ! o 2
l 179 1 DR. SIESS: You are going to take portions of the , I (')
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2 long-term goal, put them into what you call a short-term - q 3 program with a three-year cutoff-- l 4 MR. SHERON: Roughly, yes. 5 DR. SIESS: Other portions of the long-term 6 program that aren't this important will continue in their 7 bungling way. And after three years, these items, if they 8 are not settled, will continue on as confirmatory research. 9 MR. SHERON: No. The thought is that these items 10 will be settled one way or another. If the Commission 11 decides.that they don't like the answer and that they i I. 12 instruct us to go forth and do more research, then, yes, 'i 13 they'll go on. But-- I i 14 DR. SIESS: I guess what I can dig out of the 15 plan, I guess, but one of the slides listed the six or seven 16 items that were the subject of the short-term program. That 17 looked pretty much to me like the whole program. But other l 18 parts outside of it that we can-- 19 DR. KERR: Let me interpret, Mr. Siess. 20 The short-term program will unquestionably raise 21 issues which haven't been thought of before. And the long-l 22 term program will be addressed in trying to resolve those 23 issues. 24 DR. SIESS: Oh, come on. Now you are confusing l 25 me. l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 b, i l l
j 100 l c ! 1 MR. CATTON: The answer to the DCH question will 2 eliminate it and take a big chunk outlo-fsthe long-term' 3 program. 4 DR. SIESS: That's what I'm trying to find out. 5 Does it, you see? 6 MR..COSTANZI: Perhaps I can answer your question 7 by giving you an example. I 8 In the near-term program we are not going to try 9 and focus on the question of core melt progressio:. per se. 10 We are going to try to focus on what is the effect of the , 11 range of melts arriving at the bottom head and how does that 12 affect the rest of the accident. 13 Part of the long-term question will be trying to 14 understand core melt progression. Now, we're going to try 15 to. focus that question so that we're doing experiments and 16 analyses which really are going to try and get at that 17 question and assure ourselves that we're doing the best we 18 can to have research that focuses on that. 19 If at the end of this period, this three-year 20 period, there are questions with regard to bottom head 2J failure or DCE or whatever, that we have made decisions on 1 l 22 or the Commission has made judgments on, but still have some ' i 23 uncertainties that in prudence you would want to go back and 24 confirm, those will go into the long-term program. 25 If on the other hand the possibility is that after l 1 h i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) G28-4888 1 1
181 1 the end of this initialed delayed-to-rest and the particular 2 ' question like the detailed core melt progression, for [} 3 example, are really not important, then it's over. 4 DR. SIESS: That's helpful. You used the word 5 " prudence," and I sincerely hope that prudence will guide l 6 the extension of that program and not simply the desire for j 7 truth in severe accidents curiosity. 8 MR. COSTANZI: No. 9 DR. KERR: Any further questions? 10 I turn things over to you, Mr. Chairman, with my 11 thanks. 12 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 3:42 13 p.m. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 j 23 24 25 l 1 Heritage Reporting Corporation ! (202) 628-4888 l
7, 1 CERTIFICATE 1 3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter 5 of: 347th ACRS Meeting 6 Name: 7 8 Docket-Number: 9 Place: Bethesda, Maryland 10 Date: March 9, 1989 q 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 13 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and, 14 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the {} 15 direction of the court reporting company, and that the 16 transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing 17 proceedings. 18 /s/ L" 17 n & /2d?M t 19 (Signature typed) : IRWIN L. COFFUWERRY XA ( l 20 official Reporter 21 Heritage Reporting Corporation 22 23 < 24 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 (]) 2 i I . I ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .
~mm NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE
, ACRS I
SUBJECT:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station DATE: March 8, 1989 s PRESENTER: B. Boger, NRR J. Linville, Region I O PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: Assistant Director, Region I Reactors, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Chief, Projects Section 2A, Region I PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: 492-1404 (8)346-5122 SUBCOMMITTEE: CE Reactor Plants Subcommittee e f# Stet ~
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S'., TO ADVISORY' COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION.
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e I BACKGROUND OF SHUTDOWN ISSUES INVOLVED LICENSEE ACTIONS n V e s [ O 1
W%, BACKGROUND OF SHUTDOWN O ; JUNE 1986 CIVIL PENALTY, OUT OF SEQUENCE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL DURING A UNIT 3 STARTUP ($200,000),
-JUNE 1986 NRC ISSUES SALP REPORT AND NOTES PLANT MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES, JUNE-JULY 1986 REGION I DIAGNOSTIC TEAM INSPECTION, REPORT ISSUED SEPTEMBER 2, 1986.
AUGUST 1986 ED0/PEC0 SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING. DECEMBER 1986 PEACH BOTTOM ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM - INITIAL MEETING AT SITE FEBRUARY 1987 CIVIL PENALTY, DISMISSAL OF EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN PROTECTED ACTIVITIES ($50,000), !
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MARCH 1987 AN ORDER WAS ISSUED ON MARCH 31, 1987 SUSPENDING POWER OPERATIONS. l
,. ~nme . O j NRC ORDER SHUTDOWN OPERATING UNIT WITHIN 36 HOURS, MAINTAIN BOTH UNITS IN COLD SHUTDOWN 7 DAY RESPONSE (PLAN TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WHILE SHUTDOWN)
PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SAFE FACILITY-OPERATION TO REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR APPROVAL i a & e i l O 3
RESTART PLAN DEVELOPMENT O AUGUST 7, 1987 PECO SUBMITTED COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE PLAN AUGUST 11 NRC ESTABLISHED PANEL TO C0 ORDINATE STAFF REVIEW 0F LICENSEE PLAN TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF SER AND RESTART DECISION SEPTEMBER 24 NRC MEETINGS HELD TO RECEIVE PUBLIC COMMENTS'0N PLAN OCTOBER 8 NRC DEFERRED REVIEW 0F PECO PLAN BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO ADDPESS CORPORATE WEAKNESSES ' OCTOBER 9 PECO ANNOUNCED CORPORATE RE0 ORGANIZATION NOVEMBER 25 PECO SUBMITTED PORTION OF REVISED PLAN WHICH ADDRESSES CORPORATE ISSUES FEBRUARY 12, 1988 PECO ISSUED REVISED SITE PLAN MARCH 13 NEW PEC0 PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT-NUCLEAR ASSUME DUTIES APRIL 8 PECO SUBMITTED REVISED PLAN REFLECTING NEW MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY MAY 16 ,, MEETINGS TO RECEIVE PUBLIC COMMENTS ON REVISED PLAN OCTOBER 19 NRC ISSUED SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT APPROVING PECO PLAN INCLUDING RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS O
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V . PEACH BOTTOM RESTART REVIEW PANEL CHAIRMAN WILLIAM KANE, DIREC' TOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS, REGION-I y_I_CE CHAIRMAN BRUCE B0GER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, REGION I REACTORS, NRR MEMBERS WILLIAM REGAN, CHIEF, HUMAN FACTORS ASSESSMENT BRANCH, NRR EDWARD WENZINGER, CHIEF, PROJECTS BRANCH 2, REGION I > g ROBERT GALLO, CHIEF, OPERATIONS BRANCH, REGION I RONALD BELLAMY, CHIEF, RADIOLOGICAL PRGTECTION AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS BRANCH, REGION I JAMES LINVILLE, CHIEF, PROJECTS SECTION 2A, REGION I M VISORS TO PANEL TOM JOHNSON - SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR . B0B MARTIN. - PROJECT MANAGER
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n~y 73 ISSUES INVOLVED U SHUTDOWN ISSUES l l OPERATIONS STAFF INATTENTIVENESS P00R ATTENTION TO DETAIL, PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE, COMPLACENT ATTITUDE SHIFT MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE OF INATTENTIVENESS PLANT MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE AND INADEQUATE ACTION , FAILURE OF QA LICENSEE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS n V - LACK OF MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT ; ROOT CAUSES PLANT MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP t LICENSED OPERATOR RESOURCES STATION CULTURE
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kO SAFETY EVAL.lfATION DEP00T i REVIEW 0F PLAN FOR RESTART TO ADDRESS ROOT CAUSES CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
.i INCREASED CONTROL, ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORPORATE DIRECTION NUCLEAR DEDICATED ORGANIZATION ONSITE CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
() - IMPROVED LINE MANAGEMENT SELF ASSESSMENT PHILOSOPHY COMMUNICATED f
- 0EAP, CTP, NPMP RESTART READINESS SELF ASSESSMENT INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT NUCLEAR-REVIEW BOARD NUCLEAR COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD NUCLEAR QUALITY ASSURANCE r,
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REVISED FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ! HIGHER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY ON SHIFT . 1 OPERATOR RESOURCES CURRENTLY SIX SHIFT ROTATION WITH'1 MORE SRO THAN REQUIRED FUTURE ADDITIONAL R0 ON SHIFT PLANNED - 0FFSHIFT ROTATION AND ALTERNATE CAREER PATHS CULTURE . COMMUNICATION OF CULTURAL VALUES TEAMWORK TRAINING HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES o l !
-?gg SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE DURING SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONAL RATING RATING AREA 2/86-5/R7 6/87-7/88 TREND PLANT.0PERATIONS UNACCEPTABLE 2 u
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 2 '2 MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE 2 2 IMPROVING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 2 2-SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS 2 3 ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL- 2 1 SUPPORT l O SAFETY ASSESSMENT /00ALITY NEW AREA 2 VERIFICATION (SA/0V) LICENSING ACTIVITIES 2 PART OF SA/QV ASSURANCE OF QUALITY UNACCEPTABLE PART OF SA/QV STRENGTHS (6/87 - 7/88)
- NUCLEAR DEDICATED ORGANIZATION
- STRENGTHENED INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATION
- MANAGERS WITH DEMONSTRATED LEADERSHIP SKILLS
- ADDITIONAL LICENSED OPERATORS l 1
WEAKNESS (6/87 - 7/88) !
- INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY CONTRACTOR 11 l
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- SELF AWARENESS, COMMUNICATIONS,,
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- POSITIVE ATTITUDE WITH NEED FOR CONTINUED .
MANAGEMENT SUPPORT DECEMBER 1987 - JANUARY 1988 - SHIFT CREW EVALUATIONS
- SHIFT MANAGER LEADERSHIP AND SHIFT CREW TEAMWORK I
- SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE S$PTEMBER1988 -
LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION O - EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAM IN PREPARING OPERATORS TO STARTUP AND OPERATE THE FACILITY
- PERFORMANCE WEAKNESSES OBSERVED DECEMBER 1988 -
SHIFT CREW EVALUATIONS
; - SHIFT SUPERVISION ip- PROFICIENCY AND SHIFT TEAM PROFICIENCY
- 1 SHIFT CREW AND 1 SR0 NOT SATISFACTORY JANUARY 1989 -
RE-EVALUATION OF SHIFT CREW AND A PORTION OF ANOTHER WITH A NEW SR0 O 2 SATISFACTORY l
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JULY 1988 MAINTENANCE
- GENERALLY EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AUGUST 1988 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOPS)
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- E0PS CAPABLE OF BEING. IMPLEMENTED
- E0PS UNDERST0OD BY OPERATORS SEPTEMBER 1988 EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE
- ABLE.T0 PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY g NOVEMBER 1988 PECO SELF ASSESSMENT PANEL EVALUATION
- ADE0VATE REV!EW 0F.PREVIOUSLY. IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES
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JANUARY 1989 SECURITY PROGRAM i h 1 - IMPROVED PERFORMANCE UNDER NEW CONTRACTOR JANUARY-FEBURARY ELECTRICAL , 1989 5 O l
[ .g O- SPECIAL ELECTRICAL INSPECTIONS REGION I INITIATIVE ;
., I THE PURPOSE OF THE INSPECTIONS ARE TO CONFIRM THE ADEQUACY OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS TO RELIABLY SUPPLY SAFETY RELATED LOADS THROUGH THE ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRICAL PROTECTION AND COORDINATION, i
THE INSPECTIONS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT LICENSEES HAVE NOT ADEQUATELY MA!NTAINED CONFIGURATION. MANAGEMENT AND THE DESIGN 3 BASES FOR THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, ) INSPECTION METHODOLOGY:
- SELECT ONE ELECTRICAL DIVISION OF THE AC AND DC SYSTEMS, ,
O - COMPARE THE AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION TO THE DESIGN DRAWINGS, VERIFY CALCULATIONS AGAINST CAPACITY AND' ACTUAL SETPOINTS
- REVIEW PROTECTION, COORDINATION AND EQUIPMENT CAPACITY l'
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[g ';'??na N~ 4 O-HIGHLIGHTS 3 0F PEACH BOTTOM SPECIAL ELECTRICAL INSPECTION FINDINGS l l INADEQUATE 13 KV.SWITCHGEAR INTERRUPTING CAPACITY, l INADEQUATE ELECTRICAL PROTECTION FOR 25 SAFETY RELATED CABLES, i QUESTIONABLE' STATION BATTERY CAPACITY T0-SUPPORT EMERGENCY DC
' LOADS, O FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DC VOLTAGE AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL.,
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ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS AND DURABILITY OF l IMPLEMENTATION OF RESTART PLAN IMPROVEMENTS ASSESS READINESS 0F MANAGEMENT CONTROLS, PROGRAMS AND PERSONNEL TO SUPPORT RESTART AND SAFE OPERATION OF THE FACILITY l SCHEDULE: PECO READINESS LETTER FEBRUARY 2, 1989 PREPARATION FEBRUARY 1-2, 1989 INSPECTION FEBRUARY 3-17, 1989 EXIT MEETING FEBPUARY 17, 1989' i REPORT ISSUED MARCH 6, 1989 l l 4.
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,~.wmg - ;. o IATI TEAM COMPOSITION LO SENIOR MANAGER: W. KANE, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS TEAM LEADER: J. LINVILLE, CHIEF, PROJECTS SECTION 2A ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER: T. JOHNSON, SRI, PEACH BOTTOM INSPECTORS:
SITE MANAGEMENT: T. KENNY, SRI, LIMERICK LICENSED OPERATOR RESOURCES:. D FLOREK, SENIOR OPERATIONS ENGINEER l STATION CULTURE: I, SCH0ENFELD, HUMAN FACTORS ANALYST D. MORISSEAU, HUMAN FACTORS ANALYST CORPORATE OVERSIGHT R MARTIN, PB PROJECT MANAGER NUCLEAR CA: D. CAPHTON, SENIOR TECHNICAL REVIEWER RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS: A. WEADOCK, RADIATION SPECIALIST L MYERS,.RI, PEACH BOTTOM ; MAINTENANCE / W. SCHMIDT, SRI, FITZPATRICK SURVEILLANCE: J. GADZALA, REACTOR ENGINEER ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL G. MEYER, SRI, HOPE CREEK SUPPORT: H. WILLIAMS, PROJECT ENGINEER SECURITY: R, URBAN, RI, PEACH BOTTOM ADMINISTRATIVE B, MILLER, CLERICAL AIDE ASSISTANT: i 17
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TATI CONCLUSIONS CORPORATE ACTION PLAN IN PLACE AND BEING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED PERFORMANCE IMPROVING IN ALL SALP FUNCTIONAL AREAS LICENSEE READY TO SUPPORT RESTART AND SAFE OPERATION AFTER RESOLUTION OF DEFINED GROUP OF OPEN ISSUES O l 19
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l Dk/ STAFF FOLLOWUP DN RESTART PIIRPOSE: RESTART POWER TESTING PROGRAM TO CONFIRM THAT UNIT-2 CAN SAFELY STARTUP AND OPERATE CONFIRM ABILITIFS AND ATTITUDES OF PERSONNEL TO PERFORM AS A TEAM TO NEW STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS VERIFY OPERATIONAL CONDITION OF PLANT E0llIPMENT CONFIRM THE ABILITY OF THE NEW PLANT MANAGEMENT TEAM TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS PROBLEMS IN A TIMELY-FASHION PROVIDE REQUIRED TRAINING OF COLD LICENSE OPERATORS AND l THE JOB REFRESHER TRAINING FOR OTHER LICENSED PERSONNEL FOUR MONTH SCHEDULE WITH PEC0 APPROVAL AND ASSESSMENT POINTS AND l (]) NRC APPPOVAL PAINTS l PECO PLANT MANAGER APPROVAL POINTS PECO MANAGEMENT OVERSITE TEAM ASSESSMENT POINTS 1 NRC APPROVAL POINTS FOLLOWING APPROVAL TO RESTART l 20
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!GSCC CONCERNS RECIRCULATION SYSTEM PIP!NG AND REACTOR VESSEL SAFE ENDS REPLACED SHROUD ACCESS HOLE COVERS REPAIRED FOR PB-3 AND INSPECTED FOR PB-2 I OTHER REACTOR INTERNALS CRACK!NG POSTULATED AND EVALUATED ISSUE APPLICABLE TO ALL BWRS {
INDUSTRY INVOLVED O
- FURTHER ISI REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERED ;
I i
1 O MARK I CONTAINMENT ISSUES 1 i NRC APPROACH TO CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE j DESIGN BASIS BALANCED APPROACH TO BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS ACCIDENT PREVENTION , ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT j' ACCIDENT MITIGATION NRC EVALUATION OF MARK I CONTAINMENT DESIGN I STAFF STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS O - ALTERNATE WATER SUPPLY IMPROVED VENTING CAPABILITY ENHANCED ADS RELIABILITY : l EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND TRAINING ACRS REVIEW COMMISSION CONSIDERATION p C" i - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - 1
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CONTINUING. ACTIVITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR' SAFEGUARDS FINAL NRC-STAFF RECOMMENDATION COMMISSION MEETING MONITORING OF POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM WITH NRC HOLD POINTS CONTINUED NRC INSPECTION r'
SUMMARY
PLAN FOR RESTART ADDRESSES ROOT CAllSES PLAN BEING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED OPERATING STAFF READY PHYSICAL PLANT ITEMS TO BE COMPLETED
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