ML20235V458
| ML20235V458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/09/1987 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Parler W, Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO), NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 M871001, NUDOCS 8710150169 | |
| Download: ML20235V458 (5) | |
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. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Mf W ASHINGT ON, 0.C. 20555
- . g October 9, 1987-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MEMORANDUM FOR:
Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Directo for Operations i
William C..Parler, General Counsel 4
d ' %amuel J. Chilk, Secretary S
FROM.
SUBJECT:
STAFF REQUIREMENTS - AFFIRMATION / DISCUSSION AND VOTE, 3:30 P.M.,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1987, COMMISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, D.C.
OFFICE (OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE) j i
I.
SECY-87-231 - Alfred J. Morabito's Request for Modification j
t of Order Granting Him a Hearing on Denial of a Senior Reactor Operator's License at Beaver Valley, Unit 1 The Commission, by a 5-0 vote, approved an order denying a request'that it modify a, July 1, 1987, order which granted Alfred J. Morabito an informal hearing on the NRC's staff's-denial of his application for a senior operator license.
(Subsequently, on October 2, 1987, the Secretary signed the Order.)-
II.
SECY-87-213.- Final Broad Scope Rule to Modify General I
Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50 The Commission, by a 5-0 vote, approved the final rule which i
modifies GDC 4 to allow exclusion of dynamic effects of postu-lated pipe rupture in all high energy piping meeting rigorous j
acceptance criteria subject to the attached modifications.
l The revised Federal Register Notice should be revised as noted and forwarded for signature and publication.
(EDO)
(SECY Suspense:
11/16/87) hadO2 871009
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- .,, The Commission believes that this rule change'is an. excellent example 7of how the NRC can enhance safety by eliminating overly conservative and unrealistic requirements.
There are possibly other areas which could benefit from expanding the leak-before-break concept and simplification of requirements such as environmental qualification and ECCS.'The staff should review i
other areas.for possible modifications and solicit public input through a Federal Register Notice requesting detailed suggestions on changes which could be made to the Commission regulations to enhance safety by application of-this concept.
(EDO)
(SECY Suspense:
12/1/87)
Attachment:
As stated
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Chairman Zech Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner'Carr Commissioner Rogers GPA PDR - Advance l
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This -proposed rule contained a sumary of the acceptance criteria which the Comission had developed. A 60-day public coment period was allowed. Twenty-l eight written ' comments were received from utilities, reactor vendor 2, archi-tect-engineering companies, industry groups consulting firms and a citizens-group. There was no overt opposition to the proposed rule; each corsenter sup-j ported the proposed rule or its intent either in part or entirely.
- However, l
l the citizens group expressed certain legal reservations which are addressed i
below in issues 20 and 21.
A compilation of the twenty-one issues raised as a result of public comments and the accompanying Comission response is given under Issues Analysis. -The text of the final rule is identical to the text of the proposed rule.
The final rule should be applied consistently with the i
guidance in this Supplementary Information.
i BACKGROUND Background to this rulemaking can be found in the limited scope modification to GDC-4 published as a proposed rule in the Federal Register on July 1, 1985 (50 FR 27006).
Research performed by the NRC and industry, coupled with operating experience, has indicated that safety can be negatively impacted by the place-ment of protective devices such as pipe whip restraints near certain piping.
The Comission adopted a two-step approach to the modification because safety 4
b cc:::: S h r:9 could be quickly realized withcut extensive and time cen-Iuming review and discussion if the scope were initiall'y limited to the primary main loop piping of PWRs.
The Comission decided not to defer the limited i
application of leak-before-break technology while the detailed provisions of I
l the acceptance criteria were being reviewed and approved.
Many near tem
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For existing PWRs, considering primary coolant loops only, cost savings of $186 million and reductions of 34,000 man-rem are estimated for a population of 85 PWRs.
These figures do not include savings resulting from redesign of heavy component supports.
One licensee taking advantage of the limited scope modi-fication of GDC-4 has estimated a per plant cost savings of $20 million and -
reduced worker exposures of about 2000 man-rem associated with a redesign of reactor coolant pump supports.
The above-mentioned value-impacts were realized under the already published limited scope amendment to GDC-4.
Additional benefits which can be achieved under this broader amendment are discussed below.
For existing BWRs, considering only recirculation loop piping, cost savings of
$30 million and reductions of 8,600 man-rem are estimated for a population of l
38 plants.
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risk is estimated to be insignificantly im-
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i pacted, or if credit is taken for improved inservice inspection and enhanced
. safety, to be reduced by an unquantified amount.
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1 The Comission has not quantified situations in existing plants other than those discussed above; however, it is believed that other high energy piping will also indicate favorable value-impacts.
Value-impacts resulting from this rule are greatest for future plants, where estimated costs can be reduced approximately $100 million per unit.
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d sum, about $30 million are direct costs 'and the balance stems frym reduced financing costs and improved scheduling.
Reduction in worker radiation ex-5@from plant to plant, but is in the range of 3Q0 to 800 man-posures va hy an ua994d fied %eud-
. _o risk c:..:: p.... Lt R. ts believed to decreasefdue to improved ef-furtiveness of inservice inspection and enhanced safety.
The above quoted figures are based primarily on the elimination of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers and do not treat other facility changes that -could result from this rule.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
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The Commission has developed a new Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.3 which gives more detailed information or. how applicant and licensee submittalt will i
be evaluated.
This document is being issued for public. coment prior to being l
adopted by the Cognission. The Commission may also develop at some future time a Regulatory Guide after experience is gained with the use of SRP 3.6.3.
INVITATION TO COM ENT Comment was invited on the following topics in the proposed broad score amend-I ment to GDC-4.
Value-impacts associated with this expanded modification to GDC-4, with 1.
particular reference to experience with the use of pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shield! near nuclear reacter piping.
(The value-impact analysis prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is 9
)