ML20235T844
| ML20235T844 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1987 |
| From: | Brey H PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| P-87246, NUDOCS 8707220284 | |
| Download: ML20235T844 (33) | |
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I PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION i
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ANNUAL REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS NOT REQUIRING PRIOR COMMISSION APPROVAL PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.59 January 23, 1986, through January 22, 1987 4
8707220284 870722 PDR ADOCK 05000267 R
PDR T
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l I TABLE OF CONTENTS I
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Section Title a=4 Page Introduction.
3 1.0 Public Service Company Change Notices (CN)..
.5 2.0 f ublic Service Company Document Change Notices (DCN)..
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3.0 General Atomic Company Field Change Notices (FCN)
. 23 1
4.0 Public Service Company Tests (T-Tests)...
............... 24 l
5.0 GA Technologies Requests for Test (RT-Tests).....
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6.0 Procedures..
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. l INTRODUCTION l
This report is submitted to comply with the requirements of Part 50.59 of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50.59) as they apply to Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1.
It includes the period.of January 23, 1986,- through January 22,1987.
The following definitions of major terms used in this repo-t may be helpful:
Change Notice - A. document containing installation,.
inspection and testing requirements, design background information, and design document updating requirements which specify the design control requirements applicable to a plant modification and authorizes changes to "as-built" l
plant design documentation.
i Document Change Notice - A document which, when approved, authorizes a change to design documents utilizing the following as a minimum: a design input statement, a design i
analysis statement, a document update list and the document update information, Field Change Notice - A document by which General Atomic Company proposed modifications which were installed by Public Service Company.
"T" Tests - Tests proposed and conducted by Public Service Company of Colorado.
"RT" Tests - Tests proposed by GA Technologies and conducted by Public Service Company of Colorado.
In this report, the safety evaluation for the changes, tests, and experiments is summarized.
The terminology used in these i
summaries is defined as follows:
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1 Safety Related Items Those plant. systems, structures, equipment and components which are ider.tified in the FSAR and as detailed and supplemented by applicable P & I, IB and-IC diagrams, E and E-1203 schematic diagrams, the Cable Tab and SR-6-2 and. SR-6-8 lists to include the.following:
a)
Class'l per the updated FSAR, Table 1.4-1.
b)
Safe shutdown components per the updated F.SAR, Table 1.4-2.
c)
Alternate cooling method (ACM) equipment.
Safety Significant Change Changes to the ' facility, systems, components, or structures as described in the FSAR that may do any' one of the.
following:
a)
Affect their capability to prevent 'or mitigate the consequences of accidents described in the.FSAR.
1 b)
Could result in ' exposures to plant personnel in excess of occupational limits.
j Changes in the safety. related systems which-involve the-addition, deletion or repair of' components, structures, equipment or systems such that the original design intent is-changed (i.e.,
changes in redundancy, performance characteristics, separation, ci rcuitry logic,
- control, margins of safety, safe shutdown, accident analysis or any change that would result in an unreviewed safety ~ question or require a Technical Specification change).
Unreviewed Safety Question i
Any plant modification or activity that is deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59.
a)
The probability of occurrence.or the consequences of'an accident or malfunction of equipment :important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR may be increased.
b)
The-possibility of an' accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the-FSAR may be
- created, c)
The margin' of safety as defined in.the basis for any Technical-Specification is reduced.
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4 1 1.0-PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY CHANGE NOTICES l
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All CN's will be listed in the following order:
First - CN number.
Second - system / component number.
I Third - description of the change.
Fourth summary of safety evaluation.
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CN-1373 Systems - Various l
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authorized activities reflect the as-built state of the plant and present operating procedures.
There were no physical changes associated with this activity.
The existing plant conditions were checked and verified to' meet all-applicable standards.
FSAR Figures 1.2-5, 1.2-13 and 1,2-5, and Section 9.1.2.2.4 nave been revised to reflect actual plant conditions.
This activity.
was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
i CN-1394A j
1 System 70 and 90/ Structures - General and Computer Systems This modification installed the primary and secondary plant data logger systems in Building 10 and relocated the existing plant data logger computer to Building 10. Also, two sources of power were provided for the plant data logger system.
This modification had no adverse effects on any plant system.
I FSAR Section 1.2.2.2 has been revised to mention the data logger ar.d power supplies. This modification was treated as safety related per FSAR Section B.5.2.1 but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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. CN-15908 System 46 and 47/ Reactor Plant Cooling Water System, Purification Cooling Water System The original issue of this CN (1590) authorized connecting the chiller unit, S-4602, to the front-end cooler of each helium purification train.
However, the modification was only performed on the "A"
train.
CN-1590B installed control circuitry associated with valving and switches, a recirculation valve between the supply and return piping of the chilled water loop, and tied in the "B"
train front-end cooler.
Neither the operability nor the integrity of the systems involved is affected.
FSAR Section 9,
and Figures (including new Figure 9.7-4) have been updated as appropriate.
This activity was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1611A System 21/ Primary Coolant System This modification authorized the relocation of the sense line for PT-21105, backup bearing water header pressure transmitter.
Control of pressure in this header has been difficult due to normally low flow conditions and location of the sense line in i
relation to the pressure control valve. This modification will allow the system to operate as it was designed.
FSAR Sections 4.2.2.3.4 and 4.2.2.3.7 have been revised to indicate the correct pressure as sensed downstream of the backup bearing water filters.
FSAR Figure 4.2-12 has been revised to show the modification to the sense line.
This modification was not safety related, not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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i CN-1692 System 2/ Plant Site l
1 This' change notice authorized the remodeling of Building #12 (f:rmerly the Contract Security Building) to make it compatible as the new Security Administration Building. The modification does not alter the design or affect the operation of any plant I
system.
FSAR Figure 1.2-4 has been revised to reflect the building title.
This activity was not safety related, not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1779 System 70/ Structures'- General This change notice shows the revised office layouts for the l
mechanical maintenance shop as shown on the plant general i
arrangement drawings.
The activity did not change the design characteristics of any-plant system. This change notice is a 1
document update only.
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FSAR Figure 1,2-18 has been revised to show the modification to 1
the maintenance shop office.
This activity was not safety related, was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
. CN-1864,' A '
i System 75 and 78/ Turbine Building, FSV Security System This modification involved removal of an existing block wall and installation of a new block wall, firedoors and bullet resistant doors in the Control Room to provide Control Room Operators access to the 3rd floor walkover structure (El.
4829 feet) to l
Building 10.
This allows Control Room Operators to check l
Building 10 fire protection panels.
The function of the Control Room / Control Room Systems is not adversely affected by these modifications.
1 FSAR Sections 1.2.2.2, 7.4.1, and Figures 1.2-17.and 1.2-18 have been changed to reflect these modifications.
The modification was safety related but was determined not 'to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1898 System 75/ Turbine Building This change notice is a result of the Control Room Design Review effort to take into account human factors engineering considerations.
The normal and eme cency lighting systems in the Control Room have been replaced with a design which reduces
- glare, increases illumination levels, provides -for an auto-transfer to another source of power for the emergency lighting system, and reduces the load on the essential buses.
FSAR Figures 1.2-19, 8.2-15, 8.2-20, Table 8.2-8 and Section 8.2.6 have been revised to reflect the Control Room lighting design changes.
This activity was safety related but was i
determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
4 CN-1937 Systems - Various This change notice was for document update purposes only.
The authorized activities reflect the as-built state of the plant and present operating procedures.
There were no physical or procedural changes associated with this activity.
The existing plant conditions were checked and verified to meet all applicable standards.
FSAR Figures 1.2-20 and 7.1-16 have been corrected to indicate actual plant conditions. This activity was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1945A System 72/ Reactor Building This modification installed a 20 ton crane and runway above the Reactor Building Truck Access Bay.
Primarily the crane will be used to facilitate the installation of helium circulators and other equipment below grade level in the reactor. building.
Design and installation methods; ensure the crane's stability during steady state or credible accident conditions.
The crane and runway are Class II, but were treated as Class I with respect to Quality Assurance for the fabrication, assembly and installation.
This crane was included in PSC's Heavy Load Study
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in accordance with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants."
FSAR Section 9.2 has been revised to discuss the addition of the new crane.
FSAR Plant Arrangement Figures 1.2-7, 1.2-11, 1,2-12, and 1.2-15 have been updated by adding the crane as' appropriate.
This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed Safety question.
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. CN-1957 System 11 and 24/ Reactor Vessel and Internal Components and Helium Storage System This modification installed a knockout pot, moisture indication and alarm instrumentation, and an independent backup source of dry helium for 'the control rod drive purge line and reserve shutdown system.
The new instruments and associated hardware will reduce the probability of moisture.in the header from entering control rod drive penetrations / reserve shutdown hoppers.
New FSAR Figure 9.5-2 has been added, Figure 9.5-1 and Sections 3.8.1 and 9.5 have been revised to indicate the added electrical load, describe the sources of helium flow, and consequences of using the new backup source of helium at different plant conditions.
This modification was determined to be safety related and safety significant, but it did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1958 System 21/ Primary Coolant System This modification installed pneumatic positioners on the High Pressure Separator (HPS) drain valves.
The intent of the positioners is to improve the reliability and maintainability of the system. The design intent of the helium circulator auxiliary system has not been changed.
FSAP Section 4.2.2.3.4 has been revised to indicate separation of the HPS drain and circulator main drain piping.
This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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. CN-1963 System 45/ Fire Protection System This change notice was a document change only. -The purpose was to develop an identifier in the component data bases for the Fire Protection System components which are not classified safety related, but which require certain portions of the FSAR, Appendix B, QA Program to be applied.
There were no operational or design changes to any plant systems.
FSAR Sections B.5.2.1 and 8.2,7.1 have been updated to indicate how non-safety related Fi re Protection System components are treated with respect to the QA Program.
This activity was prepared and reviewed as if it were safety related, but was determined not be.to safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-1964 System 78/FSV Security System This change notice was a document change only. The purpose was to develop an identifier in the component data bases for the FSV Security System components which are not classified safety related, but which require certain portions of the FSAR, Appendix B,
QA Program be applied.
There were no operational or design changes to any plant systems.
FSAR Section B.5.2.1 has been updated to indicate how certain
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non-safety related FSV Security System components are treated with respect to the QA Program.
This activity was not safety related, and was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ CN-2056 System 22 and 93/ Secondary Coolant System, Controls and Instrumentation This modification removed the feedwater latch (the latch i
maintained feedwater flow at a constant, pre-trip value after a high hot reheat temperature scram) ci rcui try so as to allow feedwater runback instantaneously upon a high hot reheat temperature scram.
An analysis of this modification was performed by GA Technologies, Inc. and is documented in Report 907217, Issue A.
This report concluded, based upon the transient analysis program (TAP) computer code, that significant reductions in the rates of change of core outlet and steam temperatures could be realized with the feedwater latch removed.
Therefore, the possibility of. core support block er steam generator tube damage is diminished.
FSAR Figure 7.1-14 has been revised to delete the high hot reheat steam temperature " Reset at 975 degrees F".
FSAR Section 4.2.4.2.2 has been revised to add a paragraph of discussion on this modification.
FSAR Section 14.2.2.6 was revised to indicate a time for reheat steam temperature scram (caused by rod withdrawal accidents) from 105 seconds to 8B seconds to be consistent with the current analysis.
This modification was safety related and safety significant, but did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2069 System 16/ Auxiliary Eauipment This modification installed a second manipulator system in the Hot Service Facility including all interfacing control equipment and cables necessary for remote operation The second manipulator can assist the first in difficult / awkward situations, thus reducing the likelihood of an undesirable occurrence.
FSAR Figure 9.2-2, and Sections 9.2.9.2 and 3.8.3.2 have been revised to indicate the existence of more than one mani pul ator..
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This activity was not safety related, not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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, CN-2092 System 92/ Electrical Power System This modification installed an auto-transformer (at Fort Lupton) which segmented'one of the five outside 230 KV lines -supplying Fort St.
Vrain.
Since this reduced the line impedance new relaying-was-also installed.
New tagging in the Substation-Control Building was accomplished via this CN. This change will not compromise the availability of.outside power.to the plant.
FSAR Sections 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.2 and Figure 8.2-3 have been updated to indicate the name changes.
This modification was not safety related, not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2119 System 92/ Electrical Power System This change notice re-established the EHC Cabinet 120V power supply'to its original location on Non-Interruptible Bus 1B (following the Loop Split Project). Also, various valve sections
.in several turbine plant and reactor plant MCC's'have been fused separately to enhance reliability.
Non-environmentally qualified circuit breakers. were replaced. with qualifiable ones, and electrical bypasses were added around thermal overloads on motor operated valves.
Neither operational-nor design function requirements are adversely affected by these changes.
FSAR Figures 8.2-15 and 8.2-16 have been revised to reflect changes in power feed assignments.
This activity wcs safety-related 'but was determined not to be safety'significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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. CN-2136,A,B System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation This modification installed a
Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation System (SLRDIS) in the turbine and reactor buildings.
The system is designed to detect and automatically isolate high energy line breaks in the secondary coolant system.
This action will ensure building environments do not exceed tne environmental qualification of. Class IE equipment. This is one of several CNs asscciated with SLRDIS.
This CN only installed hardware.
Connection to the PPS was accomplished by another CN.
As a result of this modification various FSAR Sections and Figures have been revised to describe and show the actions and location of the SLRDIS. This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed sEfety question.
CN-2142 Systems 21, 23, 45,46/Prinary Coolent System, Helium Purification System, Fire Protection System and Reactor Plant Cooling Water System This modification involved three piping changes as follows:
1)
Replacement of two spool pieces in the supply and return lines of each High Temperature Filter Adsorber (HTFA) with permanently connected piping, 2) Replacement of a spool piece in the Emergency Water Booster Pump discharge line with permanently connected piping, and 3) removal of two check valves in fi rewater supply lines for emergency cooling of the HTFA's and the ~ Fuel Storage Facility.
Replacement of the spool pieces ensures a leak tight flow path which is more readily available.
Removal of the two check valves eliminates the possibility c3 a malfunction caused by the check i
valve sticking in either a open or closed position.
Existing manual valves serve the same purpose as the check valves.
FSAR Sections 8,2.8.4, 9.4.2.2, 9.4.3.3.2, and D.1.1.2 have been updated to delete any reference to the spool pieces.
This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
! CN-21658,0 Systems 42, 46 and 48/ Service Water System, Reactor Plant Cooling Water System and Alternate Cooling Method This change notice updated the safety related data bases and schematic diagrams to incorporate changes required by the ongoing Equipment Qualification Program.
The changes reduce the probability of failure of unqualified components and increase the overall margin of safety for the plant for a steam line rupture.
FSAR Table 1.4-2 and Sections 5.9.2.5, 10.3.9. 14.4.2.2 and 14.11 have been updated in accordance with the approved change notice.
This activity was safety related and safety significant, but did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
1 CN-2172 Systems - Various This change notice (including reissues) updated design documents to establish the proper environmental qualifications on safety related and non-safety related equipment whose malfunction could adversely affect safety related equipment.
- Also, the proper seismic category was established for this equipment.
This activity increases the overall margin of safety for the plant i
during a steam line rupture accident.
FSAR Section 1.4.6, has been revised to reflect these environmental and seismic criteria.
This activity wcs safety related but was determined not to be safety'significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed' safety question.
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CN-2178 System 21/ Primary Coolant System This change notice modified the helium circulator brake and seal solenica valves to meet or exceed the postulated environmental conditions resulting from a major steam pipe rupture. The change to environmentally qualified soleniod valve seat and seal materials permits reclassification of the helium' circulator brake and seal s3' tem to Class I, Safe Shutdown as opposed to Class I only.
~This modification does not change the operational or functional requirements of the solenoid valves.
FSAR Table 1.4-2 has been revised to include the Brake and Seal System as a Class I, Safe Shutdown System. This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2204,A,B System 98/ Shock Suppressors - Snubbers This change notice authorized the change out of Class I mechanical snubbers with appropriately-qualified hydraulic snubbers.
Replacement hydraulic snubbers and parts are presently in production and available from the manufacturer.
Load carrying capabilities of the hydraulic snubbers are greater than that of the mechanical snubbers.
The function and operation of the l
supported components or the shock suppressors is unchanged.
FSAR Sections 10.4 and 10.5.4 have been updated to delete the distinction between hydraulic and mechanical snubbers.
This modification was determined to be safety related and safety significant, but it did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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This modification installed a check valve in each of the helium circulator High Pressure Separator drain lines to prevent possible back flow from the bearing water surge tank or cross flow from an operating helium circulator to a non-operating helium circulator.
This modification will aecrease the
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malfunction probability of a helium circulator.
FSAR Figure 4.2-12 will be revised (FSAR Revision 6) to indicate the addition of a check valve in the High Pressure Separator drain line.
This activity was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2226 System 21 and 92/ Primary Coolant System and Electrical Power System This modification authorized replacement of the Emergency Water q
Booster Pump motors (2) with motors qualified-to meet the 1
requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 for environmental conditions.
The
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function of these direct replacement motors is unchanged and their reliability during an accident creating a harsh environment is enhanced.
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i FSAR Figures 8.2-9 and 8.2-10 have been updated to indicate the motor horsepower and breaker trip rating. This modification was.
safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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CN-2235 System 92/ Electrical Power System This change notice was for the purpose of updating plant documents to reflect as-found conditions per an inspection of power feed to the PSC Main Warehouse (Building 8).
The as-found design is in conformance with all applicable specifications and' I
standards.
FSAR Figure 8.2-11 has been revised to show the correct breaker
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trip rating. This activity was safety related but determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2270,A System 45/ Fire Protection System i
i This modification installed piping and valves to provide an additional flow path from the firewater header to the emergency i
condensate header.
This allows alignment of firewater to the j
helium circulator water turbine drives and steam generators from l
a mild environment, for safe shutdown cooling following an HELB.
Integrity of the firewater and emergency condensate systems-has been maintained in accordance with applicable specifications.
l FSAR Figures 9.12-2, 10.1-1 and 10.1-2 have been revised to reflect the additional firewater flow path.
This modification was safety related and safety significant but did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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1 CN-2281 System 92/ Electrical Power System This modification sealed the open ends of conduit containing-f l
essential and/or E0 related cables.
The sealing, with Cerafiber as a filler and RTV Caulk, will provide a non-combustible barrier for prevention of water ingress.
This will prevent common mode l
failure of various electrical components caused by water ente-ing open conduit ends. The margin of safety for the plant c.
.all has been increased due to prevention of a common mode failure.
FSAR Section 9.12.3 has been revised to indicate the use of sealant on open conduit ends.
This modification was safety j
related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2351 i
System 31/Feedwater and Condensate System This modification permanently installed a three inch, schedule 40, carbon steel pipe between the condensate storage tanks and the mobile demineralized hookup (Truck Bay - level 5).
This change will not adversely affect the condensate storage tanks, but will add a new line with which to fill them.
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FSAR Figure 10.2-2 has been revised to show the new line.
This modification was not safety related, not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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! CN-2396 System 92/ Electrical Power System This modification removed the non-safety related lock-out relays from the Standby Diesel Generator (SDG) start circuitry.
These relays were originally incorporated into the start circuitry to have the SDG's auto-start and be in a standby mode in the event of electrical transients or loss of major equipment items (Unit Auxiliary Transformer, Reserve Auxiliary Transformer, Main Generator).
The required auto-start functions are being performed by the Class IE 480 VAC Essential Bus undervoltage protection relays.
The removal of_ these relay contacts will increase the margin of safety and reliability. of the SDG's by
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eliminating unnecessary system challenges and potential adverse failure mode effects.,
FSAR. Sections 8.2.2.1 and 8.2.3.3 have been revised to delete the start of the SDG as a precautionary measure.
This modification was determined to be safety related and safety significant, but it did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
CN-2470 Systems - Various j
The activity associated with this change notice identified in the Cable Tabulation Report (90-I-9301-700) those cables connected to equipment required for safe shutdown and routed through a harsh environment. This permits the proper QC and maintenance on cables that could affect safe shutdown components.
The activity performed documentation changes only.
FSAR Section 8.2.7.1 has been revised to identify additional cables requiring separation classifications.
This activity was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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l-4 2.0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY DOCUMENT CHANGE NOTICES (DCN)
DCN-3 I
System 72/ Reactor Building-This document change notice upgnded the crane rail, Helium Transfer Compressor Trolley (G-7209), from a one ton capacity to two tons.
No change was required for the trolley beam itself.
The design criteria safety factor is maintained.
There is no affect on any plant systems.
l FSAR Figures 1.2-10, 1.2-13, 1.2-15 and 1.2-16 have been revised j
to indicate the crane rail capacity upgrade. This activitiy was I
not safety related or safety significant, and did not favolve or create an unreviewed safety question.
I DCN-9 System 92/ Electrical Power System As a result of research and investigative activities, errors were discovered in various drawings and documents.
This document I
change notice authorized correcting the errors to reflect the as-j built configuration of the plant.
The change makes no I
construction or physical change to any plant system or component.
I FSAR Figure 1.2-20 has been corrected by deleting reference to two instrument power inverters (reference CN-1937 described in this report).
This activity was not safety related or safety significant, and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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p 3.0 General Atomic Company Field Change Notices (FCN)
FCN-4143 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation This change notice revised the PPS ' trip setting for the Programmed Low Feedwater Flow trip point. The change was brought about as a result of the redefinition of " normal" circulator speed as detailed in FSVA:377:77, GA Memo, V.
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Barbat.to C.
Rodriguez, dated October 25, 1977. This change did not affect Safe' Shutdown Cooling capability of the helium _ circulators since the water turbine drives were not subject to these trips.
FSAR Figure 7.1-11 was corrected to reflect these changes.
This modification was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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4.0 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY TESTS (T-Tests)
T-257 System 12/ Control Rod Drive and Orificing Assembly To determine the true speed of a control rod drive shim motor scram test in an equipment storage well or the hot service facility.
This test obtained plots of shim motor speed versus time.
The plots showed both the frequency of the Back EMF electrical frequency and the. angular velocity of the rotor as measured by the shaft encoder.
The values are almost indistinguishable, indicating that measurements of Back EMF voltage and frequency provide a very accurate indication of actual rotor angular velocity.
This test was determined to be safety related, but it was not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-297 System 13/ Fuel Handling Equipment (Fuel Handling Machine Camera)
To verify repair of the fuel handling machine 35mm camera' system and determine suitable film types at several aperture and speed combinations.
This test determined the exposure information needed to allow good pictures to be taken, and evaluated two types of film, the Kodak Surveillance 400 film and the Panatomic-X film.
No fuel blocks were moved by the test and the test was not done over the core.
Both. films were found acceptable with a preference given to the Panatomic-X film due to the quality of the pictures.
This test was determined not to be safety related, and was not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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System 11/ Reactor Vessel and Internal Componente l
i To collect data to determine the effectiveness of repairs made by Destruction Corporation on sealing bottom cross head tendons to j
maintain a nitrogen environment in the tendon tubes.
The test checked the leakrate for three tendons after injecting a I
low viscosity methacrylate monomer into the micro crack structure and sealing the surface of the concrete with a two component epoxy binder. The tendon tubes were pressurized to 10. psi with I
nitrogen and the leakage calculated as the pressure decayed to 2
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psi. A soap bubble test was performed at 2 psi and the leak rate
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calculated again.
These leakrates were compared to the values obtained on T-265 (reported in the 1986 report) prior to repairs.
1 There was no significant decrease in the leakrate following i
repairs of tendons
- BORM4, and BIRM3 (5.4%
and 9.3%,
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respectively).
The repair reduced the leak rate of BORM3 by 40.9%.
This repair procedure was determined undesirable because of the poor results and because the repair covered the area around the tendon bearing plate interfering with the PCRV crack 4
mapping surveillance. The test was determined to be safety I
related, but was not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-304 and T-308 System 12/ Control Rod Drive and Orificing Assembly To obtain control rod position data as a function of time during the performance of Interim Specification SR 4.1.1.D-X, Full Stroke Scram Test.
Control rod position data was obtained from the analog position indicators on I-03 in the Control Room and stored on an IBM j
PC/XT.
The data will provide a baseline performance profile of the rod velocities as they insert into the core.
The data is being evaluated in an attempt to simplify the weekly 10 inch scram test, Interim Specification SR 4.1.1.B.1/2-W.
this test was determined to be safety related, but it was not safety significen: and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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! T-306 i
System 22/ Secondary Coolant System To verify that thermocouple wiring for TE-22136 and TE-22145 (Hot i
Reheat Steam) is properly installed.
The test lifted the red lead of the thermocouple and verified an i
open circuit then replaced the lead and verified a closed j
circuit.
This process was repeated for each thermocouple.
The l
test was performed because of discrepancies found in the latest wiring list, electrical drawings and terminal board labels. The leads were found properly installed and only a labeling error existed.
The thermocouple labeling was corrected.
This test was determined to be safety related, but it was not safety-significant 'and dici not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-309 System 21/ Primary Coolant System To evaluate the performance of the Emergency Bearing Water Makeup Pump (P-2108) after its overhaul.
The pump discharge was throttled and simultaneous readings of 950 PSIG discharge pressure and 53 GPM were observed.
These values are above the required 800 PSIG and 50 GPM required for a successful test. Minimum horsepower was calculated to be 29.37 which was above the acceptance criteria specified by QA.
This l
test was determined to be safety related, but it was not safety I
significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety l
question.
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T-314 System-Miscellaneous i
To test the effectiveness of different sealing materials for water tightness in conduit.
A test stand was made.up consisting of various sizes of conduits all in a vertical position with various numbers and sizes :of-conductors in each.
Then one of two types.of sealant was applied, Dow Corning RTV adhesive / sealant #96-081 or Dow Corning Silicone RTV foam #3-6548, and allowed to cure for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The pieces of conduit were then filled with water and checked for
. leaks from the bottom end. The results of.the test indicate that both materials will effectively seal against water 'when applied l
properly, but the, adhesive / sealant was more versatile than the-foam due to the simplicity of application, and -is therefore recommended for applications where sealant must be' injected up into a' conduit.
This test was determined not to be safety related, and was not safety significant and did not involve.or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-315 System-Miscellaneous To obtain dropout voltage data for ' Westinghouse 120 VAC industrial control relays.
The test was performed on Westinghouse model AR/ARB 4A relays (taken from the warehouse) which are from the same relay family as the AR 440 relay used on the helium circulator bearing water pump control circuit.
Dropout voltage was determined to be in the 31 VAC range and pickup voltage in the 48 VAC range. The relays are nc,t designed to be undervoltage relays and can be expected to trip on some undervoltage ' transients and not on others. The trip is dependent on how long the transient la,ts
. and how low the voltage gets. This test was determined to t.e safety related, but was not safety significant 'and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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. T-318 System 21/ Primary Coolant System To determine whether the static seal on "D" helium cir'culator was actually leaking, and if leaking, flush the sealing surfaces to remove the foreign material fouling it.
Following a
normal shutdown of "D"
helium circulator an abnormally high buffer-mid-buffer flow reading was obtained indicating a leak.
Various surveys were taken to determine whether any radioactivity was present in the helium circulator auxiliary systems. All results were negative indicating no leak existed.
(At one point a second radiation detection device was used to insure the first one had not failed).
It was concluded that the static seal was not leaking and the most probable cause of the high buffer-mid-buffer reading was water in the instrument sensing lines.
The lines were blown down and indication returned to normal.
This test was determined to be safety related, but was not safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-321 System 18/ Reactor Core-Fuel To measure actual reactivity changes as a function of core temperature at low powers to permit analysis of predicted core reactivity changes.
Steady state conditions were verified prior to taking the data.
The test was completed satisfactorily and the data was analyzed to yield four values of the temperature coefficient at various l
fuel temperatures.
These values were compared with the values l
predicted by SOP 12-02, Reactivity Control System Control Rods.
i The data points agreed ve ry closely with predicted values supporting the validity of the temperature dependent correction to the base reactivity in 50P 12-02.
This test was determined to be safety related, but was net safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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System 45/ Fire Protection System System 22/ Secondary Coolant System To determine the flow rate of firewater (simulated with the use of condensate) through the reheater section of one steam generator under cold plant conditions, and to verify some flew through all six reheater modules.
The feasibility of reheater cooldown in the manner described above was neither proven nor disproven by this test.
Several factors contributed to the test not proceeding as had been expected. They were: (1) the state of disassembly of the plant during the EQ outage, (2) the presence of noncondensibles in the Loop 2 reheater, (3) lack of motive power for large steam valves, etc.
The test was terminated and a more sophisticated test may be proposed and ran when the plant is in a more normal configuration and more realistic test conditions can be obtained.
This test was safety related but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
T-327 i
System 22/ Secondary Coolant System To determine the energized temperature of Parker Hannefin solenoid valve coils and butt splices at the solenoid pigtail to Rotkbestos SIS conductors.
A towel was placed over the test setup to eliminate convection paths and to simulate ambient operating conditions.
After the solenoid had been energized for a period of - two hours the q
measured temperature of the solenoid coil was 149 degrees F and I
the butt splice was 97 degrees F.
A maximum temperature of 190 d
degrees F is the limiting factor of the insulation at-the butt splice.
The temperatures recorded were well within this limit.
This test was safety related, but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
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.1 l 1 T-333 System 93/ Controls and Instrumentation To determine the operating temperature of the GA Electronics Channel.3 amplified case.
A towel was placed over the test setup to eliminate convection paths and to simulate ambient operating. conditions.
AfterL two hours had elapsed the operational. temperature of the' amplifier enclosure was 93.6 degrees F and the ambient temperature was 87.7 degrees F.
The amplifier enclosure temperature was well below the maximum safe operating temperature of 131 degrees F' for the
-l GA amplifier.
This test was safety related.
It.was. determined.
j not to be safety significant and did not : involve. or create an' I
unreviewed safety question.
I T-334 System 45/ Fire Protection System To demonstrate the adequacy of existing inside firehose stations and outside fire hydrants in reaching.all areas of Building 10.
During the test, hoses were routed.from stations on each of three-levels of the Turbine Building and from one outside hydrant.
As a result, coverage was demonstrated from two different directions I
on each level.
All areas on each level of Building 10 were j
easily reached using a maximum of 150 feet of-hose, and no appreciable difficulty was'noted in maneuvering the pressurized hoses in the space available.
This test was safety related, but was determined not to be safety significant and did not involve or create an unreviewed safety question.
O e 5.0 GA TECHNOLOGIES REQUESTS FOR TESTS (RT-TESTS)
None j
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- 6.0 PROCEDURES None
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0 >ubiicservice 1
e nipany f colorado 2420 W. 26th Avenue, Suite 100D, Denver, Colorado 80211 July 16, 1987 Fort St. Vrain Unit No. 1 P-87246 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Docket No. 50-267 i
StBJECT:
10CFR50.59 Annual Report Submittal QEFERENCE: Facility Operating License I
No. DPR-34 Gentlemen:
Enclosed please fin 1 the Annual Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Not Regt tring Prior Commission Approval Pursuant to 10CFR50.59, in accvrdance with Part 50.59(b) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations for the period of January 23, 1986 through January 22, 1987.
If you have any cuestions concerning this report, please contact Mr.
M. H. Holmes at (',33) 480-6960.
Very truly yours, YmmS H. L. Brey, Manager Nuclear Licensing and f
Fuels Division 9
HLB /DLF/imb l
Enclosures cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV ATTN:
Mr. J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactar Projects Branch
]
l Jose A. Calvo, Director j
Profisct Directorate IV i
Mr R. E. Farrell Se:*ior Resident Inspector
]
Fort St. Vrain M> d
,\\
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