ML20235T439
| ML20235T439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1987 |
| From: | Demarco V, Lally W HAMPTON, NH |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235T353 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8710130088 | |
| Download: ML20235T439 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
October 5, 1987
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL
)
Off-site Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )
Planning Issues i
)
)
CORRECTED PREFILED TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT VICTOR DEMARCO AND DETECTIVE WILLIAM LALLY ON BEHALF OF TOWN OF HAMPTON l
REGARDING 7_QB REVISED CONTENTIONS III, lh yl
)
0 Please state your names, occupations and professional J
l backgrounds.
i A.
My name is Victor DeMarco.
I am a sergeant in the police department for the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire.
My training has included instruction in traf fic and crowd control.
A summary of my l
training record is attached. For 16 years, I have been employed by l
l the Hampton Police Department. For the first 15 years I served as j
1 patrol sergeant, and was routinely involved in maintaining traf fic l
ficw and keeping order among the tourist and beach population.
i Presently, my duties and responsibilities concern instructing new l
i officers for the Town.
i l
l My name is William Lally.
I am a detective in the police i
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o department for.the Town of Hampton, New Hampshire.
My training has
?
included instruction in traffic and crowd control.
A summary of my training record is attached.
For 2 years, I was in charge of the Department's street of ficers with primary responsibility *for traffic and crowd control in Hampton Beach.
Presently, I am a detective in the Hampton Police Department.
I am also President of the Hampton Police Association, the union representing the full time and seasonal, or "special", police officers in the Department, with the exception of the Police Chief, and 2 Deputies.
l Q.
Please briefly explain the general organization and structure of the Town of Hampton Police Department.
A.
The Hampton Police Department employs 27 full-time police officers, excluding the Chief and 2 Deputies, 4 dispatchers, and 5 support staff.
To be eligible for a position as a full-time police officer with the department, an efficer must successfully complete training at the State Police Academy, which includes training in all i
aspects of law enforcement.
Full-time police officers additionally
]
l must satisf actorily complete the department's own training program, j
which generally includes instruction in traffic and crowd control specifically regarding these problems in Hampton Beach.
l In addition to the 27 full-time police officers, the department employs approximately 50 special officers, who are hired on a
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seasonal basis, for approximately 12 weeks during the summer months.
Special police of ficers are only required to satisf actorily complete
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4 the department's training program.
Special officers are not required to complete training at the State Police Academy.
Virtually all d
special officers have no prior law enforcement experience.
Many of i
these special of ficers may work at the Hampton Po' lice Department for a month or two, and then leave to obtain f ull-time employment in j
police departments with other cities or towns.
The Hampton Police Department therefore has not been able to obtain, at any one time, a full complement of 60 special police officers, in view of the i
l substantial turnover.
During the summer months, the police personnel on duty, l
depending on shift, may be summarized as follows:
]
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Monday throuch Friday On/Off Duty l
On Duty Dependino-on Day 7:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m.:
2 full-time 3 detectives 9 special officers 2 prosecutors j
2 dispatchers 1 Chief
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4 support staff 2 Deputies j
1 Training
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l Officer i
l 6:0 0 p.m. to 11:0 0 p.m.: 3 full-time 10 special officers l
2 dispatchers j
2 detectives i
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11:0 0 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.: 3 f ull-time
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7 special officers i
2 dispatchers j
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Saturday 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.:
2 full-time-e 6 special officers 2 dispatchers 1 detective 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.:
- 2. full-time 18 special of ficers 2 detectives 2:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.:
8 special officers Sunday 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.'m.:
2 full-time.-
5 special officers 2 dispatchers 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.:
2 full-time i
5 special officers 1
2:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.:
2 full-time 5 special officers of the 27 full-time police officers, only 1 lives in Hampton-Beach.
Of the approximately.50 ' special police officers for the summer of 19 87, only approximately 5 lived in Hampton Beach, and 40 lived outside the Town of Hampton.
O.
What is the purpose of this testimony?
j A.
The purpose of this testi;nony is to address the Town of e
Hampton Contentions III, IV and VI.
Specifically, this testimony j
will concern whether the New Hampshire Radiological Em e rg e ncy Response Plan (NHRERP) provides adequate personnel, evacuation l
l vehicles, and other resources to reasonably and safely evacuate the
- town, including Hampton Beach, in the event of a radiological 4
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emergency and whether the NHRERP has properly calculated the time to complete this evacuation.
Our testimony is based upon our many years of experience with managing crowds and traf fic in Hampton Beach, and throughout the Town, and upon our observation of traf fic patterns, problems, and driver behavior.
We have applied these years of observation and experience in evaluating certain provisions of the NHRERP.
O.
Describe Hampton Beach, its road system, and the traffic normally encountered on a sunny, summer day.
A.
The Town of Hampton is located less than two miles f rom the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant.
The Town has approximately five (5) miles of coastline, most of which is comprised of the public Hampton i
Beach. Coastal Route 1 A, a two lane road, runs north / south, immediately adjacent to the beach.
Located directly across Route 1A from the beach are numerous motels, condominiums, seasonal l
residences, souvenir shops, eating establishments, and other small l
I businesses.
During the summer months, tens of thousands of residents, tourists, transients, beachgoers, and others seeking 1
l recreation crowd into Hampton Beach, i
l Extending West and South f rom the beach area, into the Towns of l
l Hampton and Seabrook, lies an area of marsh or wetland where the nuclear plant is located.
The marsh essentially divides Hampton Beach from the main area of town, creating an island of beaches, summer crowds, and traffic.
There are only a limited number of access roads from the beach, across the marsh, and into town.
In the 5
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event of an emergency at Seabrook, therefore, much of the evacuating traf fic must proceed west toward, by, and beyond the power plant.-
Many evacuees would be required to move closer towards a damaged
- reactor, the very thing f rom which they would be attempting to.
escape.
Additionally, the road system in Hampton Beach consists of narrow one-way streets and two lane roads.
Even the principal access routes into Route 1A in the beach area, Routes 101C, 101E and 51, have only two lanes.
A single accident, breakdown, or stalled vehicle on one of the limited evacuation routes could freeze a substantial portion of the evacuating traffic.
Vehicles within sight of the reactor would be unab]e to move.
In good weather, traffic.is routinely bumper to bumper throughout Hampton Beach.
Typically, traffic must proceed at a slow, 1
stop-and-go pace.
Hampton Beach is extremely congested with l
pedestrians and vehicles in transit.
It is common for traffic exiting the beach to be backed up f or 11/2 miles f rom the traf fic light on Landing Road to Hampton Beach.
.j In addition to the pedestrian and vehicular traf fic, vehicles are parked throughout the area of Hampton Beach, both in formal parking spaces and curbside, in back yards, on the shoulders of roads, and otherwise anywhere that a vehicle can physically be i
i placed.
During the summer months, therefore, Hampton Beach is a f' crowded and congested tourist resort, with pedestrians, beachgoers, l
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1 moving. and parked traf fic.
Obviously, on sunny days the beach itself
)
q is crowded with tourists and residents.
O.
Describe the principal evacuation routes f rom Hampton Beach j
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under the NHRERP.
A.
There are a limited number of two-lane access roads, princi-pally Routes 51,101C and 101E, connecting the beach with the main part of Town.
Under norma'l conditions, a vehicle in Hampton Beach can exit the beach by proceeding south down Route 1A, across the Hampton/Seabrook beach bridge. and into the Town of Seabrook.
Under the IERERP, however, this bridge will be blocked off, thereby barring-evacuation to the south.
(See NHRERP Vol. 6, App. I-1).
A vehicle on Hampton Beach may also leave the beach by proceeding north along Route 1A, and turn lef t onto Highland Avenue
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or Church Street, which merge into Route 51, heading west towards j
Town. (See NHRERP Vol. 6, App. I-2).
At the intersection with Route 1
1A, Church Street is only approximately 8-10 f eet wide, bounded by walls on either side.
A single accident at this intersection would block evacuating traffic from reaching Route 51, a principal l
1
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evacuation route under the NHRERP.
Even under normal-conditions,
- j l i approximately 2-3 accidents occur at this intersection. each sum'mer.
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Following west on Church Street, evacuating traf fic merges into Route 51.
Route 51, like Route 1 A, is a two-lane road.
During the summer months, beachgoers and transients typically park on the-
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i shoulders of both sides of Route 51, with parked vehicles extending back more than 1 mile f rom the beach.
The NHRERP relies on evacuees I
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i SH AINE S & Mc E ACHE RN.== ore ssiew.a6 noe..,.ew..to..a.s
to push disabled vehicles onto the shoulders of roadways to keep the routes clear (see e.g.
NHRERP Vol.
6, pages 12-3, 12-4).
If a vehicle on Route 51 stalls out, runs out of gas, is involved in an 1
i l
accident, or is otherwise disabled, however, there may be nowhere to push the vehicle to clear the roadway, since the shoulders are l
already blocked with parked vehicles.
During an emergency, there is l
a clear threat of increased congestion, even gridlock, for vehicles i
evacuating the beach on Route 51.
Under the NHRERP, vehicles that do not exit lef t onto church l
Street, may proceed further north along Route 1A bypassing 101E which l
apparently will be blocked, bearing west onto Route 101C or remain on lA north into the Town of North Hampton.
Both of these roads are only two-lane roads.
As with Route 51, these Routes are equally l
i subject to traffic jams and gridlock.
In our experience, accidents,
)
i breakdowns, or stalled vehicles in the Hampton Beach area roads occur i
on a daily basis during the summer months.
We would expect these roblems to increase substantially during an evacuation, given the l
j 1 creased demand on the road system by all vehicles attempting to exit simultaneously.
j l
0.
Under the NHRERP, persons evacuating from Hampton Beach are assigned to travel, along designated routes, to Manchester, New 1
Hampshire.
Do you believe that those evacuating t'ae beach will l
comply with this plan?
l A.
No.
We believe it is unrealistic that those in evacuating i
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SH AlNES 6 Mc E ACHERN. o.orassiosa, essoc.,.os a w.%r.s
i vehicles will adhere to the evacuation Routes specified in the NHRERP.
People choose routes based on their knowledge of the roads.
Direction is not the only consideration; other characteristics, such as congestion, the number of traffic lights and stop signs, and whether. a road is f amiliar are also considered.
During an evacua-tion, people will have their own perceptions of the "best" routes out of the EPZ.
Unless their "best" routes happen to coincide with those l
specified in the NHRERP, people are likely to t sregard the NHRERP 1
routes in favor of their own.
i For example, many people at Hampton Beach come from the south, i
including the Boston area.
The NHRERP would require these indivi-l duals to proceed west, bypassing Interstate 95, and on towards l
Manchester. We believe, however, that a substantial majority of these 1
i l
vehicles would ignore the route to Manchester, in favor of proceeding l
l south on Interstate 95, heading towards their own homes, f amilies and
- friends, i
1 We would also point out that the NHRERP evacuation time i
f estimates are based upon the unrealistic assumption that evacuees will fully comply with the evacuation routes specified in the NHRERP.
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l Since we do not believe this is likely to occur, we would anticipate li l
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l a significant increase in the evacuation time estimates specified in i'
the NHRERP.
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Additionally, as police officers, we commonly observe that i
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l whenever traffic is congested, some motorists will disregard I
established traffic patterns in an attempt to avoid the congestion.
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A common example of this occurs whenever traf fic is congested on Route 51 or Interstate 95.
Then, many motorists drive along the shoulders in an ef fort to avoid delays.
This occurs even though it is unlawful to drive along the shoulders and despite the f act that motorists know that police officers routinely patrol and actively enforce infractions of this nature along these routes.
It is also common for motorists to avoid pre-established routes in order to " find their own way".
Examples include shortcutting through residential areas and shopping centers to avoid congested intersections.
Suf fice it to say that whenever motorists perceive an advantage in taking a "dif f erent" route, they are likely to use it.
Thus, it is unrea]istic to assume that evacuees will adhere to the evacuation routes prescribed in the NHRERP.
O.
Doesn't the NHRERP establish mechanisms for controlling l
traffic and ensuring the evacuees adhere to prescribed evacuation routes?
i A.
The NHRERP calls f or the Town of Hampton and state olice to control traf fic in an attempt to "f acilitate" evacuees to adhere to l
prescribed routes, by using such techniques as blocked lanes, i
barricades, and cones.
In our opinion, these measures will still not enable state and local of ficials to " discourage" significant numbers of evacuees from deviating from the prescribed evacuation routes, who will seek alternative, familiar routes, leading home.
Nor will they l
prove successf ul in controlling traf fic and preventing congestion.
l l
10 i
SH AlNE S & M C E ACHE RN. entw e seno n5.nooc..ncm *"o**r v.
1 For example, 'under the NHRERP, access control' points (ACPs) on l
i the perimeter of the EPZ, and traffic control points (TCPs) located I
throughout the EPZ will be staffed by. personnel, including the state police and police from the Town of Hampton.
Even assuming the Town j
'l of Hampton were to participate fully-in s'taffing an evacuation, i
typically only 15 available police officers are on duty during a single shif t during the summer months. Under the NHRERP, however, approximately 30 traffic control guides _ are needed to staff the TCPs within the Town of Hampton.
Thi's. does not -include the additional I
staffing, even using the State's own estimates, required for Hampton's municipal security (6), EOC security (2), or EOC staf fing (4).
(See summary of Personnel Resource Assessment f or the NHRERP, August 1987, Hampton Table 2.2-4).
Many of f-duty Hampton Police officers would have to be located, notified, and be able to maneuver 1
through thousands of. outgoing evacuation vehicles to reach Hampton i
Beach or otherwise staff the TCPs.
At at minimum, there would be I
i substantial delay in acquiring this-necessary staffing.
These delays are not accounted for in the evacuation time estimates in the NHRERP, which assumes, unrealistically, that all ACPs and TCPs would be fully l
staffed immediately upon notification of an emergency.
(See NHRERP l
Vol. 6, p.10-7 0).
I t
Additionally, although the State has indicated it will i
compensate with as many as twenty-eight state police to act as TCPs I
for Hampton, Troop A in Epping, with approximately thirty-five 1.
I officers, is the only state police barracks in reasonable proximity j
11 SH AINES & McE ACHERN. paortse.owas assoc swm encase.
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I to the EPZ.
Virtually all of these State Police Of ficers would be required to staf f the ACPs, with none lef t to compensate for the lack of adequate local staf fing f or TCPs, both within Hampton, and the other sixteen New Hampshire EPZ communities.
(See NHRERP Vol. 4B, j
l Troop A Emergency Response Procedures, Vol. 6, App. L).
The New Hampshire Civil Defense Director himself has stated that it will take i
an additional three to four hours before state police, beyond those l
available in Troop A, could be deployed in an emergency.
l For all of these reasons, we do not believe that there will be adequate personnel to promptly implement the NHRERP, and that the evacuation time estimates contained in that plan are unreasonably low.
q 0.
Do you believe that the Department's 50 special of ficers would provide the additional personnel necessary to carry out the NHRERP?
l A.
No. As we testified, special officers have no police academy 4
i' training, and therefore lack in depth instruction in traffic and crowd control.
These special officers also lack experience.
In I
l 19 87, approximately 20% of the Department's special of ficers were
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new, and another 50% in their second season.
Theref ore, 7 0% of the I
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De pa r tm en t's special officers had less than 25 weeks of law I
enforcement experience.
i Without direct supervision by full-time, experienced of ficers, j
it is not reasonable to expect these special of ficers, with limited i
j experience, to maintain traffic flow of thousands of vehicles.
These 12 1
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officers would not be able to direct at least a reasonable percentage of evacuating vehicles along the routes prescribed in the NHRERP, when drivers may pref er alternative routes that lead more directly home or out of the EPZ.
During an emergency, however, the full-time officers even if available, would be spread throughout the Town, and would be unable to meaningfully supervise the special of ficers.
Even if adequately trained, or if supervision wer e available, most special of ficers, f or a given shif t, would be of f duty and not l
l readily available for an emergency.
As we testified, in 19 87, 80% of the special officers did not even live within Hampton and may have a l
temporary residence for the summer.
Many of these off duty of ficers may be reached by phone, if at all, through friends.
Finally, even if contacted, the special officers could not maneuver through evacuating vehicles to reach many TCPs or other lareasofneed.
Even under normal conditions, during the summer I
months, it is common to take 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> f or an of ficer to travel f rom 1
the western part of Town to Hampton Beach.
During an emergency, I
1 evacuation traf fic would likely prevent those of ficers travelling f rom out of town or the western part of Hampton f rom reaching the I
beach, the most critical area of need.
As we testified, this could l
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eliminate up to 80% of the special officers, j
0 In your opinion, what other consequences would result f rom a !
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lack of available personnel to immediately staff the TCPs in Hampton?
j i
A.
In addition to a substantial increase in evacuation time, the likelihood of substantially increased traf fic congestion, delays, 13 i
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i accidents, blocked roads, and similar problems would be enhanced, if there were inadequate traffic control guides to direct and route evacuation traffic.
For example, traf fic control Post #D-HA-05, in Hampton, at the intersection of Route 51, and Route 1 requires management by five traffic guides (see Volume 6 NHRERP, Appendix I)..Without a complete complement of traffic guides, it is even more likely that many individuals, for example, proceeding west along Route 51 would elect to enter onto Route 1 South rather than proceed west as directed under the NHRERP.
A similar problem involves traf fic control post # D-HA-02, in i
I i
j Hampton, at the intersection of Router 101C, 51, and 195, which l
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appears to discourage vehicles proceeding south on 195.
Frow our years of experience with traf fic control, however, we believe many j
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drivers, including many Massachusetts residents, would insist on i
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i proceeding south on I95.
These problems would likely occur at i
inadequately staffed, or unstaffed, TCPs throughout the Town.
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0.
If all access control points and traf fic control points were j immediately staffed as called f or in the NHRERP, do you believe that l
lthedriverswouldevacuatealong the routes prescribed under the I
i NHRERP?
A.
No.
In our experience, driver behavior is shaped by percep-l l
tions of the traf fic directions being given.
When such directions I
l are contrary to intended goals and, f rom a driver's perspective, are 14 1
e' SH AtNES & Mc E ACHE RN. aorresitw. assoc 4%os ancest.s m___________.__
e ill-advis'ed, ' drivers may deliberately disobey whatever directions 'are
,given.
As we testified earlier, certain of. the evacuation routes prescribed under the NHRERP will. be perceived as contrary to thel interests of evacuees, and. they will respond accordingly.
At best, evacuees will argue with or attempt to persuade traf fic guides that a
. mandated traf fic route is not the best way out of the EPZ.
This will cause traffic delays and congestion as traffic backs up_behind upset drivers.
Without question, a substantial number of evacuees will simply ignore the directions given by.the traffic guides and travel along routes that they believe provide a more direct way out of. the EPZ.
O.
Based upon the concerns you have expressed regarding the NHRERP, what conclusions have you made with respect to that~ tr.af fic control plan?
l l
A.
In our opinion, the NHRERP traffic control plan is inherently l
flawed.
It is a paper exercise and would not work.
Even assuming the NHRERP will prescribe the optimal evacuation routes for a particular evacuation, a substantial number of drivers i
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likely would not agree.
In our experience, many drivers would i
deviate from the prescribed routes, which will cause additional delay presently not accounted f or in the evacuation time estimates under the NHRERP, I
The NHRERP unrealistically assumes that all access control points and traffic control points will be immediately and fully staf f ed to implement that plan.
(See NHRERP Vol. 6 p.10-7 0).
This 15 l
SH AINES & Mc E ACHERN. eacwess.cw.46 associa*m 4"pa+e
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I assumption is not realistic.
As we testified, even assuming a full complement of Bampton's of f-duty police. of ficers. could be notified, j
8 many of these officers would encounter substantial delay in attempting to reach the various traffic control posts.
For example, officers attempting to proceed down Route 51 towards Hampton Beach
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would be conf ronted with literally thousands of westbound vehicles.
Even if an officer can reach Route 1A, even under normal conditions, it is of ten not f easible to proceed in a police cruiser, even with
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lights flashing, f rom one end of Hampton Beach to the other, due to traffic congestion.
For this reason, the Town of Hampton has a
i purchased several motorcycles, which have provided a reasonably reliable method to maneuver through the bumper-to-bumper traf fic.
None of these common and practical difficulties with reaching and staffing TCPs and ACPs is reasonably accounted for in the NHRERP.
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The NHRERP also unreasonably assumes that evacuation vehicles,
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including buses, will be able to enter the EPZ at between 40 and 50 miles par hour.
(See NHRERP Vol. 6 p.
11-20).
We believe these 1
l speeds are grcesly overestimated, and are not realistic even under 1
non-emergency conditions.
As we testified, tourists typically park
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i on the shoulders on either side of Route 51 f rom the beach extendir.g
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l west along 51 f or more than 1 mile.
A single breakdown or. stalled vehicle in this area would require other vehicles to proceed around l
and into the eastbound lane in an attempt to maneuver around the
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disabled vehicle.
We theref ore see a high likelihood of high speed l
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!i SH AINES & McE ACHERN. encressioma6 asem a'io= amon=rvs es.4,6
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accidents between incoming emergency vehicles and the thousands of outgoing evacuating vehicles.
Similarly, other principal evacuation routes out of Hampton Beach, including Routes 1 A and 101C, are only two lane roads, often without adequate shoulders for drivers to push aside disabled vehicles blocking the traffic flow.
We therefore believe, and it has been our common experience, that such disabled vehicles will routinely cause substantial delays, backups, even gridlock.
We would expect these conditions to be magnified under emergency conditions.
The NHRERP assumption that all roads will remain " passable"
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during an evacuation is not even accurate under normal traffic 1
conditions.
(See NHRERP Vo. 6 p.10-7 0).
0 In your opinion, are traffic accidents and automobile breakdowns likely to occur during an evacuation?
A.
Definitely.
The Town of Hampton has approximately 14 miles l
of roadway. In 19 86, the Town of Hampton Police Department responded to hundreds of accidents, breakdowns and stalled vehicles within the i
i j
Town.
Accidents and breakdowns occur every day, and during the emergency atmosphere of an evacuation, the number and severity of i
l these incidents would likely increase dramatically.
Of course, it i
I would not take a major accident or breakdown to cause heavy conges-4 tion and traffic backups.
Following an accident, some drivers would I
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l be unable to move their vehicles f rom the traffic lane, blocking l
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traffic behind them.
This would cause other drivers to change lanes, blocking incoming traffic, and increase the chances of other 17 SH AIN E S & Mc E AC HE RN
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accidents, including ' those. involving inbound. emergency vehicles.
Of
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course,- some accidents migh't result in injuries' to drivers or passen-gers that are severe enough that continuing out of the EPZ would be l
l' impossible.
Other f actors would also slow traffic.
Even without accidents, breakdowns will occur.
For example, cars will run out of gas.and will likely be abandoned.
In the heat of the summer, slow moving traffic results in some vehicles overheating and stalling in traf fic.. lanes.
Fog and heavy rain reduce traffic flow.and can cause congestion.
Winter storms, particularly-snow or ice storms, also result in reducing traffic. flow, causing congestion, as slow moving traf fic loses friction with road surfaces.
O.
Would the absence of shoulders on evacuation routes increase i
traffic congestion and delay traffic flow?
A.
Yes.
Most of the principal. evacuation routes out of.Hampton l
Beach, Routes 1A, 51, 101E and 101C have inadequate shoulders, or have shoulders which are routinely occupied by parked vehicles.. Most I
j shoulders are not paved, and in reality, the " shoulders" 'along these l
l routes are just strips of sand.
In certain areas, vehicles 1
l proceeding onto these shoulders could sink into the sand.
Thus many l
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vehicle breakdowns or accidents would block a substantial part of the
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- roadway, severely limiting traffic flow.
Along these roads, i
emergency vehicles would be severly hampered or even precluded f rom quickly responding to traffic accidents and of.her-- emergencies, since I
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there would be no route of access not blocked by evacuating traffic.
Q.
As a result of the problems and deficiencies that you have expressed regarding the traffic control plan f or the NHRERP, has the Hampton Police Association taken any formal position with respect to this plan?
A.
Yes.
On July 1, 1987, the Hampton Police Association voted unanimously that the NHRERP is " totally unrealistic, unworkable, and insupportable".
This statement f airly summarizes the position of all Hampton Police union members regarding the NHRERP.
l 0.
Does this conclude your testimony?
l l
A.
Yes.
Respectfully submitted, TOWN OF HAMPTON By Its Atto ys SHAINES &
ACHER Profess
- 1 Asso lation l
l By:
l Paul McEachern
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b, 19 87 By C
l Dated:
October Matthew T. Brock l
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d? TON POLICE DEPART:ST yyTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICER:
De Marco, Victor R.
' RANK:
Sergeant a
TIVIDUAL TRAINING RECORD:
.TE COURSE TITIFE AGINCY r
1/g173 Sir Woob Buie v.n. set. cot State Police
/7178 Report Writing Trooper Davy 1
Attorney Junkins 110/78 Const. Law & Town Ordin.
116/78 Prob. cause S Juv. Arrest Attorney Eldridge
,/23/78
' Communication Patroiman Cross
- /25/78 Rules & Regulations Chief Picucci
,/6/78 Court S Ct. Prep.
Attorney Graper
/8/78 Coman. Relat.
Dr. Call j
/13/78 Stress on P.O.
Dr. Seemans J41)/b 1/8/78 PatAolman & Part-time Juv. Of ficer's School St. ate Police
'l14/79 Police Civil Liabilitu Attorneu Frasier
- /3/79 Fingerotint 2 Trbover Sheeheu
- /10/79 Fire Medic Role Chief Stickney 1
'!15/79 Collect S Pres. of Evidence
. Captain Beaudoin -
5/24/79 Comunitu Relations Chief Cronin 5/29/79 First Aid CPR F.F. W.:ckle 3/1/79 Part-time Of ficer's School State Police
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- /29/80 Ollicen's Sunvival School Staic Pclice F51 Scecut Acent 4/6/80 Civil lichilitu Racer'Corke
~
19/80 -
6/13/80 Firearm's insttactor School SSW Academu hhhh?hN ~
DeadluForcelb?ficerReaction SSW Acadcmu
$0N0h SSW Armor.'s School SSW Academu
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j F.AMPTON POLICE DEPART! tit
- C N4CO' YAC#04 E' l
- -IAMPTON, NrJ KAMPSHIRE OFFICER:,
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INDIVIDUAL TRAnTING RECORD:
COURSE TITE 3 AGENCY DATE 1
avisaies-State Police 10/14/81 Stress Manacement 1
2/2/82 Civil liabilitu Seminar State Police 9/82 SSW Advanced Armor's School State Police F.B.T. Firearm's inst.. Course State Police 1
9/27/82
}
',,iaiu Defensive Driving Course l
State Pofice 12/5/82 12/10/82 Refresher Course: SSW Armor's School State Police l
1 Developing. S Using Delegating Skills State Police 9/6/84
~ 11/26/84 -
SSW Chemical Agent School State Police tsi7 gigs 10/23/85 Three Year Firearm's Inst. Cert.
State Police State Police hbhbhhh.
Crowd Contact & Chemical Acents Sound Leaden State Police 12/15/86 NH Law Uedate
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ElEPTON POLICE DIPARE'T l'II ' WilIAd* G*
V HAMPTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE OFFICER:.
~
RANE:
Detective I
INDIVIDUAL TRAINING RICORD:
DATE COURSE TITLE AGETOY 2/27l81 Full-Time Police Officer PSTC 2/81 PR-24 Certification PSTC
~3/29/82 -
4/2/82 Ollicen Sunvival School PCTC 4/2/82 Registered WRA Police Firearns Training Course NRA 11/8-10/82 Police Officer Strc.ss PSTC 11/29/82 -
12/5/82 Advanced DelenAive Dnivino P CTP 6/83 Stress Management for Police PSTC 5/23/84 Dannorous votc~cuc 8e nue s U.S.* Menshot*> So~vi-o 9/4/84 Draf tino Af fidavits/Marrants for Field Personnel PSTC 9/24-28/84 Sex Crime investigation PSTC 10/25/84 NE0A Narcotics N.E.0.A.
1/14-25/85 Drug Enforcement School PSTC 10/85 UE0A Narcotics N.E.0.A.
l 11/201g5 Comoosite identi-Kit School identi-Kit Co.. Inc.
5/86 NENE0A Narcotics (Crack)
NE0A 8/86 Homicide School 9/86 Hostage Ne9otiaticrs 12/18/86 Drug Enf orcement Uodate School PS C 1/12-18/86 Polict insttuctor School PSTC 4/2/87 DEA Task Force Con?crence D=1 l
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