ML20235T199
| ML20235T199 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1989 |
| From: | Bradham O SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| FRN-53FR47822, RULE-PR-50 53FR47822-00020, 53FR47822-20, NUDOCS 8903080190 | |
| Download: ML20235T199 (3) | |
Text
_
Sogth Caro ins Electric & Gas Company 01 e S. Bra ham xinsv 11 So 20065 Nuchat Op; rations SCE&G Tecstice Lwr February 22, 1989 N
'89 FEB 27 P2 :46 F00 il wenm)
Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch
Subject:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
. Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Comments on Proposed Maintenance Rule Gentlemen:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is pleased to provide comments on the proposed maintenance rule.
SCE&G is concerned with this proposed rule and fully endorses the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) comments to the rule. Our position is that the maintenance rule will most likely prove to be counter-productive by inhibiting the significant industry initiatives taken towards self-improvement. The driving force in all of the industry efforts is that the industry can do a better job of improving maintenance activities through commitments to self-improvement rather than the Commission can through regulation and enforcement.
These and many other considerations were cogently argued in a letter dated October 28, 1988 to Chairman Zech from NUMARC.
Be that as it may, the Commission published the proposed maintenance rule on November 28, 1988.
While SCE&G has many concerns with the maintenance rule, SCE&G is primarily concerned that the Commission has circumvented the backfit analysis process required by 10CFR50.109.
In the following argument, SCE&G asserts that the maintenance rule does not meet the requirements for exemption from performing an analysis under the backfit rule. Then SCE&G will demonstrate that the maintenance rule does not substantially improve the public health and safety.
The Commission proposed that the maintenance rule be exempt from the backfit analysis by asserting that the maintenance rule was necessary to establish adequate protection to the public health and safety as defined in 10CFR50.109(a)(4)(iii). This approach by the Commission is problematic; since, by inference, it requires an admission by the Commission that the current maintenance practices of the nuclear industry constitute a hazard to the public health and safety.
While the Commission has stated, with NUMARC and industry agreement, that maintenance can and should be improved, the Commission has not maintained nor should it, that the current maintenance activities constitute a public safety hazard.
Thus, the proposed maintenance rule should not be exempt from performing an analysis in accordance with the backfit rule.
8903080190 890222 f
(
~
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fcbruary 22,'1989 Page 2 of 3 In order to justify a backfit, the backfit rule next requires 110CFR50.109(a)(3)] that "...there is a substantial increase in the overall-protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived'from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in view of this increased protection." Therefore, the maintenance rule must show that there will be a substantial increase in the public health and safety. The Commission has not demonstrated in any manner that the level of protection-afforded to the public by the proposed maintenance rule would be increased, much less, substantially increased. This is because the maintenance rule assumes that maintenance should improve by the rule. Clearly, this assumption is a hypothesis.
The following is taken from a letter to Chairman Zech from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) dated September 13, 1988.
We have seen no evidence to support the... hypothesis [that the existence of a maintenance rule would reduce the risk to the public.)
The regulatory analysis provided by the staff makes the arbitrary assumption that a reduction in risk will occur as a result of the rule, and bases its cost-benefit conclusions on a guess about the amount of risk reduction expected.
Nor have we seen evidence that the existence of a rule would not make things worse.
Indeed there are characteristics of regulations, and especially the way in which they are typically enforced, that lead us to believe that, under a rule, a move toward uniformity would occur, and this is likely to decrease the effectiveness of some of the better existing programs.
Obviously, the ACRS questions the rule's fundamental hypothesis.
It is for this very purpose that the backfit rule was proposed and implemented. That if the Commission could not demonstrate a substantial increase in the public health and safety in comparison with its cost, a proposed backfit should not be mandated. Yet in the case of the maintenance rule, the substantial increase in the public health and safety is hypothetically assumed to occur.
Clearly, a hypothesis of a substantial increase in the public health and safety is not a sufficient justification for issuing a maintenance rule nor any other rulemaking activities.
Lastly, SCE&G believes that the Commission has significantly underestimated 1
the cost of implementing this rule and that a more accurate estimate of the j
costs would undermine the Commission's assertion that the increase in the i
public health and safety due to the maintenance rule would be justifiable vis-&-vis its cost.
In summary, SCE&G believes that the maintenance rule does not meet the c'riteria for exemption under the backfit rule and must be fully evaluated and documented. Second, since the rule is based on a hypothesis rather than known effects, SCE&G believes that the maintenance rule clearly fails the backfit rule requirement that there be a cost-justifiable increase in the public safety.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 22, 1989 Page 3 of 3 Regarding the specifics of a maintenance rule should one be passed.over the industry's objections, this next section addresses the general areas of the Commission's questions forwarded in the proposed rule.
Maintenance Standard -- SCE&G is generally supportive of such a standard, but it should be general enough to allow Licensees a significant degree of flexibility.
This standard should be developed under NUMARC auspices; therefore, the time commitment to the Commission should be provided by the developing organization. Other than a part of a normal Institute of Nuclear Power Operations evaluation, SCE&G does not consider it proper for any other third party to evaluate Licensee performance against the standard.
Inclusion of Balance of Plant Equipment -- SCE&G is not in favor of this for several reasons.
First, the economic impact of this provision would be staggering; the resulting improvement to the safe operation of the plant would be disproportionate to the cost involved. Second, in general, B0P systems were not built to the standards of safety-related equipment and will not be capable of being maintained at the same level-of readiness.
Individual Worker Accountability -- SCE&G believes that the Licensee is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the station. An individual worker should not be held accountable by the Commission for its activities.
This would be the proper function of the Licensee.
Maintenance Effectiveness Criteria and Performance Indicators -- SCE&G does not believe that quantitative indicators can be used solely in evaluating the regulatory effectiveness of a maintenance program. As has been previously identified, many of the proposed maintenance indicators are process indicators which may or may not accurately reflect the state of the overall maintenance program. SCE&G believes that the Commission should continue to evaluate a given Licensee's maintenance effectiveness using its current methodology.
Component Failure Reporting System -- In determining maintenance effectiveness, SCE&G is strongly opposed to any regulatory use of an industry developed program which is to be used for failure reporting (e.g., Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System).
This would be an inappropriate intrusion into a program designed to improve communications within the industry.
Very truly yours,
$he
- 0. S. Bradham MDB/0SB: led c:
D. A. Nauman/J. G. Connelly, Jr./0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.
E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr.
G. D. Moffatt J. J. Hayes, Jr.
M. D. Blue General Managers RTS (PR 880030)
C. A. Price /R. M. Campbell, Jr.
File (811.02/50.060
-