ML20235S109
| ML20235S109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/19/1987 |
| From: | Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235S112 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707210549 | |
| Download: ML20235S109 (27) | |
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3 g al NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20S55
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CHAIRMAN June 19,.1987 I
1 The Honorable Morris K. Udall, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment i Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs l United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Attached are responses to Questions 1 through 6 of your letter dated May 15, i 1987. The questions pertain to the Subcommittee's April 28, 1987 hearing on emergency planning for nuclear power plants.
The chrenology and the documents requested in Question 7 are being compiled. l We will provide them to you in the near future. j l
Sincerely,-
J Thomas M. Roberts Acting Chairman
Enclosures:
As stated cc: Rep. Manuel Lujan i f
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i OVESTION 1. In answering questions from Committee members, Chairman Zech )
testified that the_ proposed emergency planning rule does not represent, with respect to the existing rule, a weak'ening of standards used to determine the adequacy of emergency plans.
Is it the Commission's position that the proposed emergency j planning rule does not represent a weakening of current standards? Is it the Commission's intention to require that the adequate protection finding under the new rule provide protection equivalent to that provided under the old rule?
ANSWER.
l The proposed rule does not represent a relaxation of the statutory requirement that there be reasonable assurance that the public health and safety not be endangered by operation of a nuclear power plant. The " reasonable assurance" standard was established by the Congress in Section 109 of the.NRC ]
Authorization Act of 1980. Section 109 provided two options for emergency plans for nuclear power plants: either (1) a state or local emergency plan !
meeting all NRC standards, or (2) a state, local, g utility plan that provided reasonable assurance that the public health and safety would not be endangered by operation of the plant in question. The Conference Report, H.Rept. 96-1070 (June 4, 1980) made clear that the reason for the second option was to preclude a utility being penalized because of the failure of state or local authorities to prepare an adequate plan.
5/15/87 UDALL Q1 l
1 QUESTION 1 (Continued) ;
i At the time that NRC issued its final emergency planning rules in 1980, it was I
considered unlikely that there would be a simultaneous refusal to cooperate ,
with emergency planning on the part of both state and local authorities. j 1
Although the NRC's notice of final rulemaking stated the vievi of the General (
Counsel, concurred in by relevant Congressional staff, that the approach taken in the final rule was consistent with Section 109 of the Authorization Act, the rule did not specify the procedures to be followed in cases where state )
or local governments failed to participate in emergency planning.
The Comission's July 1986 decision in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, confirmed that the Commission would consider a utility plan for the Shoreham plant in light of the lack of participation of state and local authorities. The decision also stated that a utility plan, to be acceptable, would have to be " generally )
comparable" to a state or local plan. The Commission's proposed rule does not j include a requirement of " general comparability." Rather, it returns to the two-track approach taken by the Congress in 1980. To sum up, the rule represents no change from the two-track approach established by the Congress, or fro'n the safety standards established by the Congress, but it does represent a change from the " general comparability" standard set out in the 1986 LILC0 decision.
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
I view the proposed change to the rule somewhat differently than the rest of the Commission. My views are set out in more detail in the attached testimony.
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STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER JAMES K. ASSELSTINE i
BEFORE THE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR REGULATION SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS '
i MAY 6, 1987 Mr. Chairman, your letter inviting the Commission to testify today included a rather lengthy list of issues you wanted the Commission to address.
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Rather than trying to comment on.each of those issues, I would'like to j 1
focus on one -- the Commission's proposed change to the emergency planning i i
rule. l It is no secret by now that I do not support the Commission's proposed j modification of the NRC's emergency planning regulations. In my opinion, that proposal is bad policy. It would permit licensing of a nuclear power i plant in cases where there has been no participation by state and local I governments in the emergency planning process. This approach would abandon the central elements of emergency planning and would, therefore, provide j less effective protection of the public in the event of an accident than that required by the present rules. And, the only reason advanced by the Commission for permitting less effective emergency planning is the adverse economic consequences to the utilities of not licensing plants where the governments have refused to participate. In my view, these economic consequences cannot provide a valid basis for altering the Commission's safety regulations.
i The Commission's proposed rule is fairly clear about what it does and why.
The state and local governments responsible for emergency planning for two
2 plants have refused to submit emergency plans or to participate in utility planning. The Commission has realized that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to license a plant under those circumstances. Where there is no participation in the process by the governments, it is difficult, if na' impossible, for FEMA or the Commission to make findings that the plan meets certain of the Commission's requirements. The Commission's rule proposes to make those findings nece;..ary under the current regulations, unnecessary.
The rule thus provides for an alternative to compliance with NRC requirements in those cases where the inability of the utility to meet the regulations is substantially the result of the failure of state and local governments to participate in the emergency planning process. The utility must submit its own plan for Commission approval. The utility must have tried to obtain governmental cooperation. The utility must have done the best it could in developing a plan and measures to compensate for lack of cooperation by government authorities given the circumstances and taking into account participation of the state and local governments in the case of an actual emergency. And, the utility must provide copies of the plan to responsible government entities.
Most recently, the Commission has been arguing that the rule is merely a procedural change, that the proposal does not substantively change the Commission',s emergency planning regulations. That is simply nonsense.
FEMA's comments on the Commission's proposal make this abundantly clear. ,
As FEMA points out:
On its face, the proposed rule incorporates a fundamental change in the way that offsite emergency planning would be evaluated by FEMA if the NP.C requests findings and determi-nations as to whether offsite emergency plans are adequate
! and can be implemented. Comments of FEMA on Proposed l
Emergency Planning Rule, April 28, 1987, p.2. -
1 l Thus, to argue that the proposed rule is simply a procedural change ignores the facts.
9 The Commission says, however, that the rule is supportable because they must still make an overall " reasonable assurance" finding before licensing
, a plant. What the Conmission does not tell you, however, is that what they have done is to change, to lessen, the requirements necessary to make that finding. In other words, what the Commission has done is redefine
" adequate protection of the public health and safety," to be " adequate protection of the public health and safety -- given the circumstances."
The Commission decided in 1980 that the requirements of its current regulations, with state and local participation as their central element, was what was necessery to provide adequate protection. There was a provision for sobe flexibility to allow for compensating measures by the utility to make up for some inadequacies in state and local plans, but state and local participation remained central to effective planning.
Under the proposed rule, the Commission could apprnve an emergency plan missing that central element. As FEMA pointed out in their comments on the proposal:
, The existing regulatory scheme anticipates that there will be I
detailed, documented provisions in advance of an emergency for the l plume exposure emergency planning zone (10 miles out from the plant) l l
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and that ad hoc responses will be undertaken as necessary to supplemen T preplanned actions. This proposed rule would, in effect, sanction extensive across-the-board ad hoc responses, p.3.
The current Memorandum of. Understanding.between FEMA and the NRC charges FEMA with evaluating offsite emergency response plans against the criteria set out in the jointly developed guidance document, NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1. This guidance document assumes that there will be extensive involvement of state and local governments'in the development and implementation of these plans. Without such involvement, many of the evaluation criteria cannot be satisfied.
Thus, there is a substantive difference between the requirements of the present emergency planning rule and the proposed rule. And, the difference is that the proposal proviaes for less effective protection of the public health and safety.
Central to the Comission's justification for this rule is the " realism"
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argument -- i.e., that in the event of an emergency, the state and local governments will in fact participate in an emergency and will use the utility's plan. There are two problems with this assumption. First, there is no evidence to support the Commission's conclusion. Second, even if we accept the Commission's assumption, an ad hoc response by the responsible government officials is simply inconsistent with the fundamental precepts of emergency planning and clearly cannot provide the same level of protection as a plan with full cooperation would. An ad hoc response means that there will be no preplanning by the governments. Officials will be forced either to improvise during an accident (something which we know did not work at TMI) or to attempt to carry out a plan with which' they are not familiar and which they believe to be inadequate. They will not have been trained in the elements of the plan or their responsibilities, and they
certainly will not have rehearsed their roles. Training' and rehearsal are essential, and the Commission's regulations recognize this. If a particular government has not participated in advance planning, these fundamental preparatory steps will not have been taken, and the governmental response will be less effective.
1 Further, an off-the-cuff emergency response like that approved by the Commission in this rule is unlikely to engender the public confidence necessary to ensure that the plan works adequately. . This point is worth emphasizing.. An effective emergency response depends upon public cooperation, and that cooperation. depends in turn on public confidence in the adequacy of the emergency plan and the preparedness of those who must carry out that plan. The public is hardly likely to have confidence in a plan which their elected state and local. officials have declared-inadequate. Nor are they likely to place their trust' in people who are 1
unfamiliar with the plan and who are untrained and unrehearsed in their i
emergency response roles. The result in such circumstances could well be j an ad hoc response by most of the people within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone and perhaps even beyond.
Finally, the proposed rule does not require the Commission to find that reliance only on a utility plan with no state and local participation would provide a level of protection to the public which is equivalent to an emergency preparedness plan with full cooperation. Under this proposal, ,
l whether there is adecuate protection will be determined based on what the utility can reasonably accomplish given the lack of government cooperation.
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3 This means that a plant may be licensed with the core of emergency planning missing, with a less coordinated response than would normally be possible, o and wuere some protective actions might no longer be available.
I commend to your reading FEMA's comments on the proposed rule which raise I these same concerns. I would particularly draw your attention to FEMA's 3 l
conclusion that holding exercises of the plans without state and local !
participation would " increase the risk to the population of the affected ,
l emQgscyplanningzones."p.3. But, you need not go outside of the' Commission's_ proposed rule itself for support for the conclusion that this I rule would. provide less protection to the public than the current rule.-
The safety analysis prepared by the NRC staff, which accompanies the .
proposal, reaches the same conclusion. ,
The Commission cites no new safety information to support this lessening of the requirement. In fact the Commission states that the rule is not based on any source term or severe accident research. The' Comission states )
specifically that the rule change is not based on any finding that plants are safer now than they were}iri~1980 when the present emergency planning.
ruies were issued and when p[anning was considered to be of; primary importance to public protection. The Commission does not dispute its 1980 ,
i conclusion th3t state and local participation is the core of enfergency. j w
planning and re.sponse. In fact the Commission admits the obvious -- that i an energency re'sponse with governmental participation is better than one without. The Commission's only justification for this rule change is j 1
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1 adverse economic consequences. The Commission should not weaken its safety regulations simply because they have become expensive to implement.
Thank you.
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QUESTION 2. The NRC testimony and responses to questions imply that it is the Commission's position that during development of the existing emergency planning rule and related legislation, the Commission and Congre', anticipated situations such as those-now existing with respect to Shoreham and Seabrook. The testimony further implies that Congress and the Commission envisioned circumstances where operating licenses would be issued notwithstanding lack of participation by State in development and testing of plans. Please provide references.
to the record supporting the position that in 1980, either the Congress or the Commission envisioned Shoreham-type situations where a licensee's plan would be the basis for issuance of an Operating License in circumstances where States had withdrawn from participation in development and testing of emergency plans on the basis of a uelief that such plans, if implemented, would not provide adequate protection.
ANSWER.
Conference Report H.Rept. 96-1070 (June 4,1980) explained, at p. 27, that the 1 purpose of allowing plant operation to be authorized on the basis of a " state, local, or utility plan" was to avoid penalizing a license applicant- ;
in a situation in which a state or locality either does not submit an emergency response plan or else submits a plan that does not satisfy all of the NRC-established _ guidelines or rules. The Conference Report explained that this represented a compromise between the Senate's approach, under which ,
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QUESTION 2 (Continued) I lack of an approved state plan would have resulted in plant shutdown, and the House's approach, which would not have mandated any particular action in the 1 \
event of non-compliance. The report explained: j l
l The compromise provides that the NRC is to issue an operating !
license for a new utilization facility only if the State or local plan, as it applies to such facility, complies with the NRC's ,
current guidelines for such plans or the new rules when promulgated, except that if a State or local plan does not exist that complies with the guidelines or rules, the compromise provides-that NRC still may issue an operating license if it determines that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility. The Commissior.'s regulations now require the determination prior to the issuance of an operating license that there is reasonable assurance that public health'and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility.
The conferees sought to avoid penalizing an applicant for an !
operating license if a State or locality does not submit an l emergency response plan to the NRC for review or if the submitted .l plan does not satisfy all the guidelines or rules. In the absence of a State or local plan that complies with the guidelines or rules, the compromise permits NRC to issue an operating license if it determines that a State, local or utility plan, such as the emergency preparedness plan submitted by the applicant, provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility.
The ccmpromise requires that the new regulations for emergency response plans include a mechanism to encourage and assist a State to comply as expeditiously as practicable with the standards promulgated in these regulations.
The rulemaking record further reflects that in a public Commission meeting l i
held on July 23, 1980, General Counsel Leonard Bickwit, Jr. reported that j members of the Senate Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee staff had expressed 1 concern that the NRC rule then under discussion did not make clear "that in j the absence of a plan, of a state or local plan which fully complied with the )
requirements of the rule, that the Commission intended to look at the utility's plan to see whether that plan could compensate for the deficiencies 5/15/87 UDALL Q2 ]
QUESTION 2 (Continued) l of the state and local plans." He added, "They said it was a central feature of the agreement reached in conference that that would be the case."
The Commission's final rulemaking notice in 1980 explained that on a key issue
-- whether NRC should automatically shut down existing plants in the absence of an NRC-approved state plan, or should instead evaluate the totality of the circumstances -- it had followed the latter approach. It explained that its )
interpretation was consistent with the NRC Authorization Act, and that I
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Congressional staff members involved in the passage of the Act had confirmed this. 45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (Aug. 19, 1980).
The Congress explicitly considered the possibility that, for whatever reason, a state or locality might fail to submit an emergency plan or might submit a plan that was inadequate. To avoid penalizing utilities in such situations, Congress provided for NRC review of a utility plan under a standard of
" reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered." The Commission believes that the NRC adopted an approach consistent with congressional intent.
Commissioner Asselstine adds:
I do not believe that Congress intended by the 1980 Authorization Act that the Commission should permit a utility plan to serve as a wholesale substitution for state and local participation in the emergency planning and preparedness process. Obviously, the 1980 Act was a compromise between the Senate version of the bill which would have prohibited operation in the absence of a state or 5/15/87 UDALL 02
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QUESTION 2 (Continued) ,
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local plan and the House version which merely provided for Comission review of state plans. I believe the intention of the compromise was to allow the Comission some flexibility while retaining the central element of effective emergency planning -- participation by state and local governments in emergency preparedness. In other words, a utility plan could be used to-substitute if there were no state plan, or if there were no local plan, but )
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the understanding was that the state and local governments would implement the plan, or that the utility plan would be used as an interim measure for a part j of the overall plan. The understanding was not that there would be no participation by any state or local government in either planning or imp 12menting the plan. l One need only look to the legislative history to find support for this. l Senator Hart, the floor manager of the bill said:
"The Conferees intend that every nuclear plant ultimately should have "
applicable to it a state emergency response plan that protects the public from a nuclear accident." Congressional Record June 16, 1980 (S 7083)
Representative Udall, floor manager in the House made the same statement.
Congressional Record June 10,1980(H4724). Thus, while the Authorization Act did permit the Comission to consider a utility plan, I do not believe that the intent was to allow a utility plan to provide a substitute to all planning and preparation by state and local governments. l This interpretation of the Act is supported by the statement in the Statement l of Considerations for the 1980 rule that the Comission had asked ;
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QUESTION 2 (Continued) .
Congressional staffers if the 1980 rule was consistent with the Authorization
'Act. The 1980 rule made state and local participation in planning a condition of granting a license. The regulation allows for some compensating measures q
'by the utility, i.e., some flexibility, but state and local participation is still central to adequate emergency planning.
Moreover, the 1980 Authorization Act mandated that the Commission develop new and improved standards for determining the adequacy of radiological emergency planning and preparedness. These new standards were to be the basis for deciding whether to allow the issuance of new operating licenses. The Act also recognized that the Federal Emergency Agency was the expert agency within the Federal government on emergency planning and directed that they be given a central role in the review and approval process. Both of these elements are included in the Commission's existing emergency planning rule. Under that rule, a utility plan must meet the same standards as a state and local plan, j and the Commission's decision on the adequacy of emergency planning must be based upon the expert judgments of FEMA. As FEMA's comments make clear, the Commission's proposal would change the standards for judging the adequacy of emergency planning in these cases in which state and local governments do not participate. I believe this is contrary to what the Congress intended in the 1980 Act.
5/15/87 UDAll. Q2
QUESTION 3. Prior to the hearing, the Subcommittee requested the Commission to respond to a series of questions on the emergency planning issue. Question 3c addressed the Commission's estimates of l l
evacuation times and requested the Commission to state its assumptions with respect to the numbers of people outside the l
emergency planning zone (EPZ) who leave their residence or work 1
place. The Commission's response stated that: " Population l
beyond the EPZ is not generally considered as a part of l 1
evacuating traffic for evacuation study purposes." What is the basis for the Commission's assumption that population beyond the EPZ need not generally be considered as a part of the evacuating traffic, for evacuation study purposes? Please provide data and/or analyses which show that the population beyond the EPZ would generally stay in place in situations where people within the EPZ were called upon to evacuate. j l
ANSWER.
l The Commission's earlier response that " population beyond the EPZ is not )
generally considered as a part of the evacuating traffic" was intended to clarify that evacuation time estimates (ETE) studies do not include time estimates for the populations beyond the EPZ. In developing time estimates for evacuating people within the EPZ, population beyond the EPZ is not ;
assumed to stay in place while an evacuation of the EPZ is occurring. One 4 of the primary purposes of ETE studies is to identify potential bottlenecks including those outside of the EPZ which may interfere with evacuating traffic 5/15/87 UDALL Q3
7 OVESTION 3 (Continued) ,
from the EPZ. In general, experience in evaluating ETE studies for nuclear power plant sites in the United States has shown that traffic control beyond the EPZ is not a significant problem. For those cases where traffic beyond )
the EPZ could potentially impede traffic flow on the principal evacuation routes from the EPZ, the evacuation plans have included provisions for traffic 1
control so that evacuating traffic from the EPZ has priority.
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QUESTION 4. In ar answer to questions posed previously by the ]
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Subcommittee, the Commission stated that "The Commission's present position is that an adequate radius for the ' plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) continues to be
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10 miles, pending the outcome and conclusion of the investigations and studies underway.... Considerable cdditional work will be necessary before a sound basis for revising our emergency planning regulations becomes available."
(a) Please specify precisely which " investigations and studies are underway that might affect the Connission's views on the appropriateness of the 10-mile radius, and the expected date(s) of their completion. Include a list specifying the NRC offices and contractors conducting such investigations and studies, study objectives, and timeliness for completion.
ANSWER.
I Several efforts now underway in our Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research may have an effect on the NRC's views on the appropriateness of the size of l emergency planning zones. One of two primary efforts is NUREG-1150, the Reactor Risk Reference Document, which has been published in draft for public 4 comment, is scheduled for final publication in the summer of 1988.
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QUESTION 4' (Continued) .
The primary contractor working on NUREG-1150 is the Sandia National Laboratory, with some tasks being conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory and others by the Columbus Division of the Battelle Memorial Institute. The j objectives of the Reactor Risk Reference Document are:
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l 1. To provide a greater understanding of frequency, risks, and j uncertainties with regard to severe core damage accidents at nuclear l
power plants, based on the assessment of accident sequences at five )
plants that have different plant and containment designs; and
- 2. To assess the usefulness of the methods used and the information gained in (a) evaluating and providing insights to decisionmakers on various plant-specific and generic severe accident regulatory matters and (b) helping to focus the resources of the NRC in a more effective manner.
The second effort, a proposed Brookhaven National Laboratory study entitled
" Protective Action Decisionmaking," is scheduled for completion in November ;
1987. The main objective of this Brookhaven study is to evaluate protective ;
action strategies for community response to accidents at nuclear power plants based on research on reactor accidents conducted over the last decade.
In addition to the above, two studies - a Brookhaven study on degraded core accidents and a Sandia National Laboratory study on health effects consequence 5/15/87 UDALL Q4
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00EST10N 4 (Continued) i i
modeling - may also provide insights into the relative effectiveness of' offsite emergency actions.
The objectives of the Brookhaven degraded core accident study are to:
- 1) Identify simplified methods for estimating fission product releases during degraded core accidents; and
- 2) Evaluate alternative criteria relating to such releases in such areas as performance requirements for certain engineered safety features and assessing offsite consequences. f The objective of the Sandia health effects consequences study is to update models for estimating the potential health effects of accidental releases of radioactivity.
The scheduled completion for the Brookhaven study is early in fiscal year 1989. The Melcor Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) consequences computer code, which is the end product of the Sandia studies, is now ,
available. ;
i At this point, research has not indicated a need to modify that portion of the '
Commission's regulations relating to a 10 mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ). What does appear to be evolving is a more definitive strategy for protective action response within the EPZ such as early evacuation of areas relatively close to a reactor (2-3 miles) with early sheltering and possibly later relocation further away.
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QUESTION 4 (Continued) J (b) Please specify in detail,the " additional work...necessary"-
that would be required for establishing a sound basis for revising the Commission's emergency planning regulations.
. ANSWER.
l The NRC staff will_ assimilate the information provided in the studies listed in the answer to part a. of this question, and incorporate it with recent-experience and opinions of experts to develop recomended actions.-Studies and evaluations of various options are ongoing by the staff. If a new position appears warranted, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other Federal Agencies, as appropriate, will be consulted, and a staff position on the need to modify the emergency response rule will be developed and presented to the Comission. As is customary, the staff will recomend alternatives for consideration by the Comission including a no change option.
An appropriate public coment period will be included if any change to the regulations is proposed by the Comission.
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' QUESTION 4-(Continued) -
1 (c) Apart from the NRC's proposed change to its emergency j planning regulations which has been published in the Federal Register..for public coment, is the Commission contemplating any other changes to its emergency planning regulations or requirements, either generically or for a specific plant? If so, please provide a detailed description of such changes, and any drafts, notes, or memoranda, or other documents that have been prepared I
regarding such changes.
ANSWER.
No such changes are contemplated for power reactors other than those that might result from the work discussed in response to 4 a) and b) above. We do note, however, the Comission staff is evaluating three petitions for rulemaking related to the size of the EPZs and the Comission has published for coment a proposed rule on emergency planning for fuel cycle facilities.
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QUESTION 5. Please identify the commercial nuclear plants which remain under construction in the U.S. and their expected dates of completion (including any plants which have not yet received a license to operate at full power), and indicate whether or not the unit is an additional unit at a site at which at least one other reactor is already operating. With the exception of the Seabrook and Shoreham nuclear plants, for plants under con-struction or not yet in receipt of a full power license, has the Commission received any information that leads the l
1 Commission to believe that State or local officials either (a) believe that effective and realistic emergency planning is not possible for such plant (s) or (b) will refuse to submit emergency plans for the plant (s) for any reason?
l If so, please provide the information which provided the basis l
for such belief.
l ANSWER.
Plants with active Construction Permits (cps) and plants which have not received a license to operate at full power are listed in the attachment. With the excep-tion of Seabrook and Shoreham, the Commission has not received any information which indicates that State or local officials believe that emergency planning is not possible or will refuse to submit emergency plans for any of the nuclear power plants listed.
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OVESTION 5 (Continued) .
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l CONSTRUCTION PLANT COMPLETION **
Shoreham C Seabrook 1 C l Nine Mile 2* C Braidwood 1 C Palo Verde 3* C Beaver Valley 2* C South Texas 1 6/87E l Braidwood 2* 1/88E j Vogtle 2* 2/89E i South Texas 2 12/88E Watts Bar 1 N/S Comanche Peak 1 N/S ]
Watts Bar 2 N/S {
Comanche Peak 2 N/S Limerick 2* 4/90E Bellefonte 1 1/93E j Bellefonte 2 1/95E l Perry 2* N/S ConstructionHalted)
Grand Gulf 2* N/S Construction Halted)
WNP-3 N/S Construction Halted)
WNP-1* N/S Construction Halted)
- Seabrook 2 N/S (Construction Halted)
- - At least one other reactor is already operating at this site
- C - Complete E - Estimated j N/S - Not Scheduled J J
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QUESTION 6. The report of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island included the following recommendation:
"Before a utility is granted an operating license ... the state within which that plant is to be sited must have an emergency response plan reviewed and approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).... FEMA must assure adequate provision, where necessary, for multi-state planning."
l The report of the NRC's own Special Inquiry Group on TMI stated:
l "The principal planning responsibility for protective action including evacuation lies with the State, with FEMA's assistance.... We believe that workable evacuation plans are a prerequisite to continued operation of existing and future reactors.... In our view, the emergency plan, as a condition of the operating license, should be viewed in the same fashion as an engineered safety system in the plant."
l The Rogovin Report went on to add that, in their opinion, local emergency plans were even more important than State l plans.
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1 QUESTION 6 (Continued) !
It appears that neither the Kemeny Commission report or the Rogovin Group report recommended that a utility plan could or
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should replace adequate State and local emergency planning and j preparedness. However, the Commission's proposed change to its emergency planning regulations.would permit full-power licensing with no State or local government emergency plans having been prepared, submitted, approved, or put into effect.
How does the Commission explain the apparent contradiction J
between its proposed change to its emergency planning regulations and the recommendations of the two most prestigious groups that investigated the TMI accident? j ANSWER.
The NRC strongly believes that the public safety and interest is best served by an emergency plan that has the full support and participation of state and local authorities and that has received the approval of FEMA. Nothing in the Commission's proposed rule suggests otherwise. Indeed, the proposed rule preserves the existing requirements which contemplate state, local and FEMA participation. Fortunately, this participation has been forthcoming in the vast majority of cases. The separate issue presented in the proposed rule is one which the Congress faced in 1980, as described in the answer to question (2) above: granted that a state or local plan is by far the preferred alternative, should the existence of an approved state or local plan be made an absolute prerequisite for the issuance of an operating 5/15/87 UDALL Q6
QUESTION 6- (Continued) .
license, when to do so would have the effect of giving states and localities veto power over nuclear plants? Congress, which also had before it the Kemeny and Rogovin reports, answered that question in the negative, and the NRC has followed suit, as described above. )
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