ML20235R988

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Corrected Tech Spec Pages to Amends 93 & 94 to License DPR-61,reissued to Eliminate Inadvertent Changes in Amend 93 Caused by Amend 94 & Properly Reflect Info Approved Separately for Each Amend
ML20235R988
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1987
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20235R947 List:
References
NUDOCS 8710080255
Download: ML20235R988 (3)


Text

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,. VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION R H-MOV-22 Containment Valve locked in open Sump position, circuit Suction breaker locked open {  !

during post-LOCA long-term cooling phase.

SI-MOV-24 RWST line Valve locked in open

. position, circuit breaker locked upen whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.

SI-FCV-875 HPSI mini- Valve blocked and locked flow line in open position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.

R H-M OV-874 RHR recirc- Valve locked in closed ulation position and circuit breaker locked open whenever reactor is critical and reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.*

SI-MOV-S$4 A HPSI Pump Valve locked in open Suction Line position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F. l St-MOV-854 B HPSI Pump Valve locked in open Suction Line position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.

SI-MOV-901 RHR/HPSI Valve locked in closed Crosstie position whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 3500F.

SI-MOV-902 RHR/HPSI Valve locked in closed Crosstic position whenever reactor coolant i temperature is above QOOg((y $30 3 P

l Amndrnent No. JP. 33, 77, 93 3-10a

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1. .

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2) Prior to startop from cold shut &n(Mode 5) l VALVE NO. LOCATION ACTION SI-V-907 HPSI loop i Valve blocked and locked '

injection line in throttled position.

SI-V-908 HPSI loop 2 Valve blocked and locked 11]ection line ir9throttied position.

SI-V-906 viPSI lodp 3 Valve blocked and locked lnjection linD [n throttled position. ,

n SI-V-905 . HPSI loop Valve blocked and locked  ;).

injection im(e, in thrpttied position. .

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) Core deluge Valve is locked open '4

, SI-MOV-87 3 line and electrically dis- z y '

~ connec teo..

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  • g C. The following actions shall be taken to disable. the High Pressure Safety Gnjection Pumps whenever the RCS temperature is below315 of ad the RCS is not vented by a minimunl opening of three O) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent, y <

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1. De-energize Ac HPSI pumps by racking out r i breakers and locking the cabin *ts(

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2. Close and lock the HPSI pump disciarge valves (SI.V.S$3 A & B).

ti i D. The following actiorm sbail be taken to c!spble one centrif ugal chargidg pump whenever the RCS~ temjJerature is belows 15 0F and the RCS is not vented by l a minimum opening of three (3) inches (nominal diameter) or its equivalent. . .

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1. Place the coretrol switch in the tip pulhyt "'

position. '

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2. Red tag e switch "DO NOT OPER ATE." c

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' This ci, specification issures that adequate emei gNc(cor t coo'.ing capa' city is avai;sble whenever the reacror Jt tritical. , Based or, +he lois of coolant accident l ' ,'

' analy Us, melting of the cla47ng is prevented with only one high pressure safety J s' injectido pil.np and one low

  • p"eswe satby injection (core deluge) pump in s opera tion. Additicinally, during' thn post-LOCA recirculation phase, sufficient cooling exists with only one charging, one HPSI, and ,og 'E.HR avyilphk. Each of the two trains of emergency core cooling couiprne?t inc uws these/ three pumps.

With the pumps associated with both trains d emeigenay core cooling equipment ,

operable, ,

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, a b Amendme 41 No. O, 33, 28, // , 94 N

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saastantial anargia exists whenever normal power supplies or both diesel generators are available. With only one diesel generator operating and the pumps associated with that diesel operable as required in Item (2) of Specification 3.12, the high pressure safety injection pump and the low pressure safety injection pump would be started automatically. When the safety injection pumps are operating on off-site 1 power, the charging pump would be started automatically. The RHR and charging pumps would be available for manual start for long-term recirculation cooling.

As described i,n Reference 3, the RCS OPS, in conjunction with administrative controls, prevents exceeding the temperature and pressure limits in Specification 3.4 while RC5 temperature is under 3? SoF or the RCS is not vented. Part C establishing limiting condition for operation regarding the disabling of the HPSI l pumps to .further assure that a pressure transient is not initiated. Part D

. establishes requirements regarding the disabling of a charging pump to assure that

, a pressure transient is not initiated while retaining the flexibility to establish, under strict administrative controls, a redundant emergency boration path should such action be necessary.

FCV.796 is required to be throttled open within the range specified in and for the l reasons sited within References (6) and (7). That throttled position has been

)

determined by separate analyses to insure acceptable core performance during post LOCA recirculation.

L p in order to use the HPSI pumps to provide high pressure recirculation following a t <

small break loss of coolant accident (LOC A) coincident with a ungle ac tive failure, L the following modifications to the emergency core cooling system have been made.

A piping crosstic between each HPSI pump suction and the RHR pump discharge has been installed. Two valves, SI-MOV-901 and SI-MOV.902 have been installed in this crosstie. The two manual HPS! pump suction valves have been replaced with motor operated valves, SI-MOV-8)(< A and B, to prevent contaminated water from entering the RWST when using the HPS! pumps to provide flow to the core during j recircula tion. These valves will not be energized until 1989 and no credit will be ]

taken for their use until this time and they will be locked in their safe position. I s

The manual core deluge isolation valve has been replaced with a de-energized a motor-operated valve, SI-MOV-873. This valve will be locked open to ensure that adequate flow is available to the core deluge system.

REFERENCE:

(3) D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D.L. Ziemann (NRC),

dated May 22,1978.

(4) D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to D.L. Ziemann (NRC),

dated May 24,1978.

(5) D.C. Switzer (CYAPCO) letter to A. Schwencer (NRC),

dated September 7,1977.

(6) E.3. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C.I. Crimes (NRC), dated December 17, 1986. j l

(7) E.3. Mroczka (CYAPCO) letter to C.I. Crimes (NRC), dated December 19, 1986.

1 3-10c Amendment No. //, 94