ML20235Q964
| ML20235Q964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1987 |
| From: | Horhota M, Logan D, Domonique Malone SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235Q911 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710070753 | |
| Download: ML20235Q964 (121) | |
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, TABLE'OF CONTENTS.
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- 1. 'INTFiODUCT IdN. 1 1
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- 3. PUliPOSE ;1 J t i i
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- 3. SCOPE AND APPROACH i '
- 4. CONCLUSIONS, OVERf4LL RESULTS .. i k,
- 5. OPEN ITEMS o i
6.i SUMr1ARV BY SUBJECT / FUNCTIONAL'(4REA 47 I 6.t Encineerina. Desten and Tertina 47'
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i 6.2 Qualification of Eculoment 74 l 1 i o.3 Procurement an t. naterial Control 79 , I s.4 I n c. t a l .1 a t i o n anc Incocction 83 3 , a d.5 Procedures 89 - i n.6 Trainina 91 Accencin A - Pr e-Hudi t Lcnterence. Liot or wetsnuevo .; Tw oend i ): B - Pont-Auoi t Lon f erence. L1 1,t av at t en cietes Anodndix C aast-o+ Ho>auests tor Information Append 1 >: D - List of Re-erences l i s l, b a
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87-020 l 1 1 1 l
- 1. INTRODUCTION '
This reoort provides the results of the vertical audit of selected station mootfIcations. The audtt cecan on Aori1 20. 1987 with the pre-aucit conference (attendees at this conference are listed on j Accend a :' A). The audit was concluded on Auaust 12. 1937 with the ] post-audit conference tattendees are i dent i f i ed on Appencir 9). The overall conclusions and results of the audit are cresentec in Section 4. Open Items resultina from the audit are containec in Sec-tion 5. Section 6 orovides ~ detail information reaardino scope. approach and results of the audit.
- 2. F Ul1F 05E
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The audit was concucted to assess the coerati onal reauiness of selectec modified svstems uv determinant if: 1 o The uvstems are caoatie of perf arinino the reaut ree f unct ions. o Encineertna. aestan ano construction are in accordance wito , approveo proceuuren and sati sf y applicable codes ano stEndaras. ) o System test requirements end acccccance criteria wt1: demonstrate that the svstum wil1 periorm the requireo f unc t l oe is , o Cnances to .2censino documents, orocedures and tr wi s i t s 6u L.r oor ams r esu l li tw.i f roin maul f i c ati ons nave t een approortatelv c on sl u e: r eu .
- 3. SCOPE AIC AFFROACH The Emergencv Feucwater Ini ti ati on and Control (EFIC) uvutem, the Electrical Tie-in of th e TDI Emergencv Diesel Generators, the Au::il-1arv Turbines System are the Hot Leo Level Nee,urina/ Steam Generator l Level Measurino system mootiicatIons farmea the basis of tne audit.
l The evaluation of evntem modifications corrlaered the followino: ) o Confarmance to coceu cna standarcs. o Consistency with licensina anc ceulan recutrements. o Anal vtes ara av a11 ac i e to succort tre aesten cnance. l l o Calcul at:.onu us e acor oc r i c t.e ima umo t : on n . metFccoloav. and :nnuts. o Resusus at asiatvses are correct'1y trenstatec into other ces; on d o c t!.611G n t s .
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87-020' I 1 o Drawli:<n anc clacrams are comDiete. accurate, anc consistent with each oti. tr and other desian documentr
.I o Procurement, construction, and insoection reautrements are com- '
olete and correct o Stn umi c and environmental qualification requirements have been appropriately considered a Test r ocu2 r emen te, and acceptente criteria in tne desian basis documents are Louauate to deinonstrate . system function a Impact of centon chances are beina . addressed in operator tral t a no , operatino urocucures, surveillance test orocedures, and m a i n t. e-nance oracedures
- 4. CONCLUSIONS. OVEIMLL RESULTS 4.I General Based on the sample at ina t eri al reviewed. tne aucit results Inal-cate:
Svstems/moal-lications will tunction as aesioneo anc testeo uncer "normai' c one :. Ul on s. However, concerns were icentified that have tre cotential of affectino f unction unoer decr aoed conditions. Examoles: It is not c l ear that the effect of leaks in the OTSG level instrument lines, that are less than tne e:< ce ss flou check val ves setcoint. has oeen consicerou (see i 01 87-020-001). 1 The cacao:11tv of EF"IC to ocrate after a secona ran-dom iallure. curina a loss or malm feedwater caused av a rancom f al l er e in EFIC. h e's not been comonstri;ted l l i.cee di 37-020-uO1). ' Anaivses to unmonstrate systero 4 t toc c i o, i et: Li vc r i s u Hl uf) Ef1er t j V L i f ',e ar e . s .: < set ua. )
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esent. etc. Were not al wiss s < ai l abl e cr - compl et e. (See OI 87-02n-'903 and 0; 37-020-0 9). Fr e op er .a t i on a l test pr oc r aim ara t: et proceoures are susft-C3entlY Comprehef)s4VG 1 11 d eV 91 oD mer t J.n c eteCution tC Gomon-strate comDonGnt and system f unc ti or. . 'l :2 s t procecurei acDear to consicer al1 + t .n c t i on t, and contatr. accrocriate acceotance criteria. Th e aniv concern reiatec to this area dealt., with _______-_-__-______ _ _ _ _ _ a
67-020 testanc et spares and r ec l ac emens- como on tm t s . For etamote. doc urnc n t.at i on could not be located that oernonstr ate n the 13a t - isfactorv eestino of reoiacement brearers io en set e c c r t c .a i 1 panel Mee OI G7-020-016). l Trainino arocrams (ooerators and mai n tenance technicians) reflect system mootfacations, are tnorcuan ano. In ceneral. ] compl et e. In one instance a lesson plan was incomolete in that it tio not include a scenario that c,imulates a 4 allure l in an OTSG 1evel instrument line .(see OI G7-020-0111. It appears tnat this discrepancy was due to others not suco1 vino ; approorlate information to the Tra2 nino Department. ' In most resoects, olant procedures are clear, comolete and cons t ti tan t with syst ern desion. In a iew 1 1 rnt t e d instances, orocedures were incomolete or conflicting (see 01 ts7-020-012) . Changes to 01 ant Technical Soectiicatians. In neartv all cases. sceatetetv consicer features at systems modifications, However. tne technical coectitcation arnendmen t accressino -i EFIC/AFN coes not inctude a test for the intecritv or tne contraiuer settinos (see OI G7-020-002). (OI G7-u20-QO2 also otscunnes other areas that should be consicerec in the amend-ment).
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the installation of svstem moctfications is consistunt with deston anc construction reautrementsi installation as cer-4 or med ulth oual1ited personnel t. e . a . . we l a er s, e . . r i; c e c t s un
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requirements are aceouate and ali reouired i n me c t ut m ae correctlv perform 90. One e::c ep t i on to the above ecs . I t. en t i -- fied. It acocars that the incorrect orade at staan.ess filler material was used on one fielo weld (see OI 67-020-026/. In all other instances examined (soool pieces, recucers. tees. bolting ;nater 4 al . other weld joints. etc.), corrct rnater i al . components, and eautoment were instalIco and unicueiv identi- l fieo. J l J The knowieooe c4 corsonnel performtnc installation inspec-tiens is ooparentiv aceouate. Houever. occumentanion (e.a . attendance recorcr1, to- demonstrate recu2 red traintoo :. s c o r.o i ct ec lu weat:. In ecdttron. some trainino material . :+ oun of date. 'See 01 87-020-024). The- recorcs maintained by the Environmental Dual i f i cati on - crono and Seismic Dua12fication creto are oeneraliv cano ete and trarcuan. Processino at documentation is weli conceived and implemented. The technical casas for suiteollit9 of eaulament in a narun environment ts e::cel i en t ; v ' oresented. However, there i s a concer n wi th the lack of documentati .i to demonstrate that eatnoment in a "mtid" environment is i:uali-
G7-020 fled. ( ee 01 87-020-013). A mila environtnent at Rancno.Seco Ll 1s deotnec as less severe than: 222 aearees F. 90 cercent relative humto)tv. 1E+4R. Tnese conditions. esoectativ tem-perature, seem htch Jar a " mild" - environment withou'~ t consid~ erino. for examoie. thermal aceinc. Based on receros that were examinec, the problem may be mere one of documentation cr o an t r at i er. tren of an actual eautoment croblem. A related-concern is the lack of a clearly cefined dedication' orocess 4or eaaloment ourchased as commercial arade (see 01 97-020-014).
.I Several concerns wi th procurement ano material controls and i implementation of controis reauire resolution: l 1
The Heat Nu noer Control Loc (maintained by Guality Enatneerinas, does not include all neat numcers ano other Information to permit traceGb111tv and retrieve-cility at associatec documentation *, m - Oi -l 87-020-019). Some procurement documents were not soproved b s, OuaA1tv ssee 01 87-020-019). [n scme instances, there was no evloence that Receiv-inc Insoection'. Data Recorts (RIDRs) were orecarea anc j inspections cerYormed. Sorne compl et ed RIDRs ao not cleariv Identtiv items includec in the insoection (see OI 87--020-020). Some vencors have not been aucited to ver14v that tne j vendor's accrowed DA P r o c r air. 12 belno effectiveiv imoiementea. (See OI 87-020-022). There is no. evidence that deficiencies 2dentiftec in a vendor audit nave been correctcu. (Vendor in supplier at invertere now insta11ec in olant>. (See 01 G7-020-023). Several programmatic concerns should oe irwestloated eno res;ci ved: A svstematac method for cevelocinc znd track 1ru cnances to licensino documents in .not oeinc :. mo l e*er t+c .ne vi i 87I-020 -O l a)) . N3.P 4001 recuireu . . v o s c a. ..w . o, n -n a. notices to licensino cocuments. How.1, n r . e t e < .ce # i i +; 1 t. e io the US4R. *or a:: amo l e . that mat .i .me r . w. .teo + um ~ (C .l I nst al l at i on have not been oreapred :nd aut mt tteo t _) L. :. t e s % - Ina. Appar enti v . the sotent ta to mare Life uccates later based on closed ECNs. The accuracy cna completeness of uncates resultina + rom sucn methocoloav is cuestionabte. In addition, the forthcoming chances tc licentino documentn lu
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a 87-020 not-availacle to otnero 2n the, interim. Recerds transmittoc t c Recoros rinnacement c.r e not alwass c om -- nieto'. loalb.O. cr accouatelv 2dentified (see 01-67-020 %17. 01 871020-020. anu OI G7-020-021). Concerns 1 do nt i f i eo eorina this aucit relate- to Nuclear Enoineerano e.no awalt s Jenart-mentu. Renutt7 of other.recent audits 3nalcate tnese i. , u e s, or Conoition3 also eMist LO other departments. Appronciato reviews of desicn documents i s not alwave evi cent ' l (see 01 87-u20-o.%>. . D 1 Examoles: Desico Verification Reoorts (DVRs) oo 'not always iden-tity the scecific documents revieweo. Documentation associated with some major ECNs- inoi- . cates desian ver2fication will oe certarmeo as cart of the uu-ECN rather than the major ECN. tiewever . , tno- i DVRs associated with tne suo-ECN use information from tho major ECN as a casts of the ver14icat2an o+ the SuD-ECl4 4 'i l Accarent weaknesses- exist in document ' c ont r ol / con f i our ati on control ne cesion ' documents anc cesion :. n o u t cocuments (see OI 87-020-009 ano OI G7-020-025). u E : amc i e s.: Vendor manuais are apoarentiv not routinuiv undatec to reflect as-Installed eautoment. Inere+ ore. venaar . nw i-uals in the technical librerv coui u travlov 2 ncur r eu l auldance. The Desian Basis Reoort for EFIC relles on mucn cf tner tntormatton in a "svstem description".- Tnis document is undated., unnumbereo. unstonen. Field Problem Reoorts (FPPs> cre not oeino accurately I ano comcletely incorporated into d r awi n a n./ a r owi no chance notices. Specific examcles observec, curino th 3 audit _ are loentifiec in 01 37--920-025. In acoitton. Quality Survelliance Heoort No. 3--v oO icentlites s. i m i - 3 ar' da screpanc:.es. 4.2 REC 2ues ts +0r in+0cmation .Ris) . Dur3nQ the course of the audit. potenti al concerns. cuestions anc' In'tormation reauest3 were directed. trom tne auc1C team. to Various C eD ar t ffeetit G V1O R e c t*,e s t S or [ n f o r met t ; o n 4ormG. rec 1D1entG were l l
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I i 1 87-020 1
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j requested to respond to each item, provide the information requested or address the potential concern. 1 A listing of the Ris generated during the audit is presented on l Appendin C. The classification and status of each RI are also iden- l tified. Potential concerns and questions that were not resolved dur- l ing the audit resulted in the issue of an Open Item I.see Section 5).
- 5. OPEN ITEMS 1
The Open Items (OIs) resulting from this audit are contained in this section. They are as follows: OPEN ITEM NUMBER ACTION ASSIGNED i 87-020-001 G. Cranston ) 87-020-002 R. Crol ev 87-020-003 G. Cranston 87-020-004 G. Cranston { 87-020-004 G. Cranston l 87-020-005 G. Cranston { 87-020-006 G. Cranston 87-020-007 G. Cranston 87-020-008 J. Vinauist 87-020-009 G. Cranston 87-020-010 R. Crolev H 87-020-011 P. Turner 87-020-012 W. Kemper l 87-020-013 G. Cranston 87-020-014 G. Cranston 87-020-015 G. Cranston 87-020-016 W. Kemper 87-020-017 G. Cranston 87-020-018 J. Vinquist 87-020-019 J. Vinautst f 87-020-020 J. Vinauist 87-020-021 J. Vi noui st 87-020-022 J. Vinquist 87-020-023 J. Vi nqui st 87-020-024 J. Vinauist 87-020-025 J. Vinouist 87-020-026 J. Vinquist/J. Serro l Reply forms associated with the above listed Ols should be com-pleted and returned to Quality by Sectember 14. 1987. I I l
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87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No: 87-020-001 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 1 of 1
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Subject /Act: Vity Audited: Safety Analysis - EFIC/AFW Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): Al Ostenso Persons Representing j Audited Organization: J. Williams / H.I.Beebe - Enuineerina ! Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: G. Cranston
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Description of Condition (s): $ l The safety analysis and failure analysis does not include consider-ation of all aspects of EFIC/AFW configuration at Rancho Seco. l 1 DEIGILS1 The impact of the change in shutdown bypass permissive from low pressure in both OTSGs to low pressure in either OTSG was not evalu-ated (RI-016). The capability of EFIC to operate as required for a losn of main feedwater caused by an EFIC failure plus a second EFIC failure was not evaluated. The DBR and SAR for ECN A5415 Major state that there are failures in EFIC that can cause a MFW isolation. IEEE-279 requires that EFIC operate as required with a second failure. (RI-OlO) j l The SAR for ECN AS415 Major does not address failures in the OTSG ! level instrument lines or leaks in the instrument lines that are less then the excess flow check valve setpoint. (Instrument line breaks and the expected operator action are discussed in the DBR for AS415B). (RI-054).
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87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRIC1 01 No.: 87-020-002 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: Technical Specification Amendment Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): Al Ostensa Persons Representing Audited Organization: R. Colombo - Licensing ; l Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: R. Croley i
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Description of Conditions: i i The technical specification amendment does not include checks of all features reoutred to assure EFIC/AFW operability. 4 D_ E_ _ TA_ _I L_ S_ _ _: , A test for the integrity of the controller settings are not included. ) in the test specification. The settings (i.e. proportional gain, l reset rate, rate limited 1oad follower 1 settinos, etc.), establish the system response , system stability, and prevent overcooling when i SG level is under automatic control of EFIC. The response to HI-lui l indicates that this item will be added to the technical specifica-tions. However, the extent of this type condition, and it appropri-ate, the cause, and the action to prevent recurrence needs to be ; identified. (RI-101) The EFIC vendor instruction manual indicates that the system logic testing is not exhaustive but does not list the functions that are not checked. Therefore, there may be other significant functions that are not covered by the current / planned surveillance testing (RI-042, RI-101). No surveillance requirements for the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level i n str uinent s are included. These instruments are needed to assure adequate CST inventory and are used by the operator for man-agtng the transf er of AFW suction between the CST and the SRd. (RI-101) The statement on page 16 of the Tech Spec Amendment "The EFIC system can be tested from its inout terminals to the actuated device con-trol 1ers without placing the channel in key 1ocked maintenance bypass" does not apply to all iunctions. The EFIC vendor instruction manual requires that a channel be placed in maintenance bypass before exercising the control module self test. 1
i 87-020 i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-003 DUALITY DEPARTMENT-OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1 au================================================================= Sub j ec t / Ac ti vi ty Audited: Calculations and Analyses - EFIC Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso / R. Jones Persons Representing Audited Organization: H.I.Beebe / U.Witte - Engineering Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: G.Cranston 1 i = == u====u==u=========== ==== l Description of Conditions: 1 1 There is no evidence of a positive mechanism to assure reaut red cal-culations are finalized and updated prior to start up. DEIGILSI Only informal calculations to establish AFW immunity to Hign Energy Line Break and the pressure droo in the instrument lines for leaks less then the excess flow check valve were available. There was no tracking system identitled to assure that these calculations were formalized prior to start up. (RI-OOB, RI-054) l l l 3 l 1 i 1 1 l l l \ l f I l -\ l ! l
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87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-004 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 1 of 2
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Subject / Activity Audited: Calculations Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso / R. Jones Persons Representing Audited Organization: H.I.Beebe / P. Johnson / J. Williams / U.Witte Engineering Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: G.Cranston
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Description of Conditions: Calculations contain assumptions without sufficient justification and methodology that is inappraorlate. Sources of input are not identified in all instances. DEIAILSL Calculation Z-FWS-IO127: s The calculation contained " hidden" assumptions that were not justi-fied. Also, the calculation contains assertions regarding the time e it takes to achieve the same pressure in both SG's and the rel ati on-ship between Indicated level and pressure and witnout orovidino a ~ basis for the assertians. (RI-036) Calculation Z-ZZZ-10132: Qualification of the e>; cess fIou check valve used in the instrument lines does not include consideration of tyoe test data and the offects of transverse motion on the valves (RI-055). Calculation Z-RCS-10124: !
- 1. Does not provide a source or basi s for the reference fluid den ~ I sity used in the calculations (R1-096).
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- 2. Does not indicate the information source for instrument line ele-vations and lenoth of the uninsulated oortion of the line used in the calculation. (RI-110)
- 3. Does not appropriately include the error in the level transmitter l due to over pressure. The calculation states that over oressure will not occur untti the static pressure limit of the transmitter is exceeded. However, over oressure will occur if the differential pressure on the instrument exceeds the measurement range of the transmitter. (R1-110).
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87-020 SACRAMENTO UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-004 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM F_..je 2 of 2 I
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- 4. A clear detinttion of the basis for the calculation in section V.A is not given in the calculation.
The calculation alludes to the relationship between the insulated and uninsulated portions of the reference and measurement legs in the same regi on, but does not clearly define the basis and purpose of the calculation. (RI-110) 1
- 5. The calculation uses the bulk air temperature i n the reactor buiIding for various calculations, rather than .the temperature at the location of the coulprnent being analyzed. The calculation does not address the potential for over pressure durino i n s t r uenen t cait-bration.
l The analysis provided to justifv routing fiber optic caules tram different EFIC channels in the same raceway does not address the potential for events (e.g. fires, missiles, etc.) that may cause loss of fiber optic cables from more then one EFIC channel (R1-OO9). l l There is no analysis in DBR R-0380 to demonstrate that the structure I used for supporting the instrument line insulation will withstano a ,, seismic event. The insulation is reautred to assure satisfactory I operation of SG and hot leg level sensors under accident conoitions. l
b- i i 87-020 l i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT OI No.: 87-020-005 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Paai 1 of 1-
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BubJect/ Activity Audited: Design Bases Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): Al'Ostenso i I l Persons Representing Audited Organization: H.I.Beebe - Engineering Required Repiv Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: G.Cranston
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Description of Conditions: The design does not appear to include adeauate consideration of all design elements. DEIGILS1 No basi s f or the setpoint of the excess tiow check valve in the OTSG 1evel sensor instrument lines is provided in the system desion. Two DCNs (I-1195. sheets l'& 3) use 3 LPM for the setpoints of instru- l ment line excess flow check valves with no source or basis for the :
- n. values identified on the drawing. Furthermore, an appendix to calcu-lation Z-FWS-IO127 contains test data whien demonstrates that the minimum achievable setpoint is 4.5 LPM. (RI-066. RI-054)
The EFIC DEiks do not include, or give the basis for, the stunal ranges and accuracy requirements that are needed t o est atsl i t.h call-bration procedures f or the analog loons. (RI-033; I No justification was provided for selection of the EFIC time delay module settings from one of two possible values for each time delay. The DBR for ECN A5415AF orovides an analysts to establish the maxi- l mum permissible delays, while calculation Z-FWS-10127 provides val-uns that will provide acceptable EFIC performance. (RI-036) i i 1
U/-020 I
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-006 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 2
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Subject / Activity Audited: Review of Design Documentation Audit Date: 4/22/87 -6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso / R. Jones l Persons Representing Audited Organir.ation: H.I.Beebe - Engineering i Required Reply Date: 9/14/07 Action Assigned to: G.Cranston
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Description of Conditions: l l Adequate review of deston documentation is not alwavs evident, i l DEIA168. I The plant procedures do not provide a mechanism tor doc urnen ti ng the i resolution of comments made in the review and verification process. I (RI-106) The DVRs that were examined did not provide an adequate listing of l 9 the documents that were covered by the DVR. NEP 4109 requires the reviewer to identify the documents that were reviewed by number and revision level. Many of the DVRs simply listed " series Numbers" ! which can be a grouping of several hundred documents. None of the i DVRs provided the revision level of the documents reviewed. Without I a proper listing of documents it cannot be determined if the appro- j priate documents were reviewed. (Rl-044). l The list of documents reviewed for the two DVRs for ECN A541SJ, one mechanical / electrical and one civil, includes 23 of the 84 draw-Ings/DCNs given in the Drawing Chance Transmittal. There is no rationale in the ECN package to explain why the design can be con-sidered adequately verified without reviewing the unlisted docu-ments. (RI-088) The checklists and procedures ior desion verification do not ade-quatelv address all items to be considered in the review. process. For example, the DVR checklists for ECNs A5415E. F, J, W and AG are incomplete with regards to eautoment qualification and seoaration. The response to RI-032 indicatus that the experi enced r evi ewer will give adequate consideration to these desion asoects. However, the procedures do not include guidelines for establishing the uu xli t ica-tions of reviewers. (RI-032) I J 97-020 s l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-006 i OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 2 of 2
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There is no ev1dence that the EFIC svstem desian descr3ption was i ndependentl y reviewed. This document is the basis for the EFlC design. (RI-OO4) There is no evidence that the DBR for AS415 Major was indeoendentiv reviewed. This document provides the basis f or the modifications made to incorporate EFIC. AS415 Major defers verification to the sub-ECNs, which is allowed by plant procedures. However. AS415 Major is used as the basis for the design and verification of the sub-ECNs. Therefore, there is no evidence that AS415 Major or the sub-ECNs have been adequately verified. l The basic EFIC desion was verified by B&W and this verification is assumed to be adequate. The Verification of the DBR for A5415 Major l may therefore be restricted to: ) \
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\ Applicability of EFIC to Rancho Seco Adequacy of EFIC modifications made by SMUD
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Adequacy of changes made to AFW i l Conformance of the Rancho Seco EFIC to the B&W design l Completeness of the desion as it relates to Rancho Seco (RI-OOS) ! l Similar to the above, there is no evidence that the final plant con-figuration covered bv major ECN 3660 has been desion verified. (R1-100) l l l 1 l
1 l 87-020- ) i l e 1 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-007 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: Electrical Separation-Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso / R. Jones Persons Representing Audited Organization: H.I.Beebe - Engineering Required Realv Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: G.Cranston
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Descr10 tion of Conditions: 1 Electrical separation guidelines are incomplete. DElAILSt A Procedure Change Notice to allow the installation of new caules in existing enclosures wher'e it is not oossible to achieve the seoara-tion requirements of design guide NEP S204.44 does not provice any guidance or criteria to be applied for determining the acceptability of an exception. Procedure Change Notice (PCN) Rev.1 dateo 4/7/G7 to NEP 52044.44 Rev.O (Ref.C23) gives the reason for the chance: "To allow the installation of new cables in en t sting enclosures where it is not possible to achieve the separation requirements of this design guide." Since there no concomitant reautrements, it appears that the intent was to exemot new electrical installations f rom any sepa-ration requirements. ; 1
R 87-020 l l 1 l l l . I SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-008 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 1 of 1 i i
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Subject / Activity Audited: Non Conformanco Reports j Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Osteoso Persons Representing Audited Organi=ation: S.Knicht Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: J. Vinpuist I i
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Description ot' Conditions: I'n some instances, the action to prevent recurrence of NCRs is inadequate because thov do not alwavs address the root cause and' there is not always evidence that corrective action was verified as comolete, j 1 1 D E_ T_ A__ _I L.. S_ _: _ l 1 In NCR 6102 the action to prevent recurrence (i . e. modifying some J drawings), does not address the root cause (i . e. separation criteria j not established in site procedures). The cause/ action appear to be i inconsistent because the root cause was intended to indicate tne j situaion at the time ot' installation not the time of discoverv. How-ever, the NCR did not clearly identi+v the situation (R1-073). NCRs S-4485 f< S-4486 do not provide any indication of the comple-tion of the action to prevent recurrence and the NCR should not have been closed until action to orevent recurrence was complete. (RI-073) 1 I
87-020 1 I i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-009 i OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 2
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Subject / Activity Audited: Deston Configuration Control / Document Control Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso / R. Jones . Persons Representing Audited Organization: W. wells / S. Wood - Engineering Required Realv Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: G.Cranston
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Description at Conditions: The control of design information. design documents, and recoros is not always adeouate. DEIGILS: l Vendor instruction manuals are not routinely upoated to retject the as-installed system configuration. Therefore, documents in the tecn-nical library have the potential for providing misleadino informa-tion about equicment installed at Rancho Seco (R1-113). DDR A5415 Major contains references to many Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) documents that form the basis of the EFIC/AFW design. There is no mechanism in place to retrieve a document given the B&W number. For the case of EFIC this deficiency in document control was alleviated somewhat by eventually locating the documents in SDC. late in the audit, in a cardboard box marked with the ECN number. (RI-013, RI-021) The Major DBR relies on the system description for much of its information and makes reterence to it for specific information in several cases. The system description is undated, unnumbered.- and unsigned. (Rl-004) j Several drawings in Sub-ECN AS415E conteined a note that references a letter as cart of the dest on basi s. The letter is not retrievable from the reference given on the drawina. Note that the information contained in the letter is also contained in the DBR and SAR for A5415 Major. (RI-027) l
87-020 I l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 Wo.: 87-020-009 i QUALITY DEPARTMENT i OPEN ITEM Pace 2 of 2 l
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1 Several DCNs that are current 1v active were based on revisions of i drawings that are out of date. DCNs are preoared in accordance with NEAP 4112. It i s the responsibility of the engineer to identify all outstanding DCNs issued on the drawino under studv. Since a DCN is assued to the then current revision of the drawino in cuestion, there may be many active DCNs on different revisions of a crawino. The engineer call s Document Control to obtain a list at DCNs and/or J
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checks all drawinas at that number in the " oink" file. After cneck-ing with the engineers concerned with the existing and a++ected , DCNs, the current revision of the drawtna has the DCN chances added I to it and the DCN identification block added. After necessary i 1 approvals, the drawing is issued as a " oink" drawina for construc- j tion. If all steos are carried out with no oversights, the results should be as desired. However, oiven the time and attention tne engineer must devote to this process and the complexity of the sys- l tem, a large probability for errors or conf l i cts e:< i sts. In addi-tion there is no method to limit the number of DCNs on a otven draw-I ing or to establish a time limit after which DCNs should be incor- . parated on the original. One of the reviewed drawings had 20 out-standing DCNs acainst it. (R1-111) i i The MEL is not updated to include all of the new EFIC tag numbers, including the "H" designation in the ENVIROND field. This results in a loss of configuration control for EO euuipment being installed because MIMS will not accept tao numbers for work requests which are not in MEL. As a result, the followino problems have been identi- , fied: lack of EQ review. loss of traceability, loss of work historv i for each indi vi dual tag number and loss of some OA/DE/DC activities, i The problem has baen acknowledged and will be corrected for the future (see DDR 06-538). However. the potential for a baci.-fit l problem was not addressed. (RI-052) Instances occurr ed durina the audit where it c o u .l d not ce ueter ma neo if various ECN and WR packaaes were comolete. 'Inere tu no oackaoe content accountability (e.g., no table of c on t.en t s . lack of oaoe numbering). (RI-082) ;
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87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-920-019 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: Control of Licensing Documents Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: M. Horhata / R. Jones Persons Representing Audited Organization: H. Colombo - Licensing Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: R. Croley
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Description of Conditions: Controls to assure production and tracting of the updating o t' licensing documents to reflect olant modifications are not being implemented. DEIAlLS;. NEP 4301 requires the preparation of change notices to licensing 3 documents. However, change notices to the USAR. for examole. tnat i snould have resulted from the EFIC i nst al l a t i on have not been pre-pared and submitted to Itcensino. Anoarentiv tne t o t erit is to make i the JSAR updates later based on closed ECNs. (RI-OU2. RJ-068/ ) l Plant procedures do not contain a reautrement for any organization l to maintain accountab111tv t'or the 50.59 SAR reports while thev are l In the review / approval cycle. (R1-102>
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l l l l l 1 87-020 i i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.:87-020-011 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEN Page 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: Operator Training Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Aud i tor (s) : Al Ostensa Persons Representing Audited Organization: 1. Hunter - Training Required Recly Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: P. Turner l t 1
===================================================m-------======= i Description of Conditions:
1 In some cases, operator training lesson plans are incomplete l DE. T AI LS.:. Lesson Pl an OD 24 K 1000, does not include a scenario that simulates a f ailure in an SG level' instrument line. Failures of this nature and the requireo operator action are discussed in the SAR for AS415B. F ai l ures in the reference leo will cause high level indica-l tions and sourlous Main Feedwater i sol at i on. Failures in the vari-able lea will cause low level indications and spurious actuation of EFIC. (RI-077) The response to RI-077 indicates training has incor-carated this failure into the simulator scenarios. However, the root cause and action to prevent recurrence must be provided. It appears the root cause is incomolete information orovided to train-ing. El 21 P 1400 includes the EFIC vendor instruction manual as a refer-ence. The manual does not reflect the Rancno Seco EFIC confioura-tion. The manual could orovide incorrect information. (RI-085) l j 87-020 ' t SACRAMEf4TO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.:87-020-012 OUALITY DEPARTMEN1 OPEN ITEM Poae 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: Plant Procedures ; i Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): Al Ostenso 1 Persons Representing Oper ati on s l Audited Organization: D. Tipton - Recuired Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: W.Kemper
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Description of Conditions: ! In some cases plant procedures are incomplete, conflicting and/or inconsistent with svstem design. DEIAILS;
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Operating procedure n.52. Rev 8 requires a voltace to be checked to assure that it is within 1% of 120 VAC and the frecuency is witnin ( 1% of 60 Hz. The orocedure does not identify what action should be ] taken if the measurements are outside of the limits. (RI-095). I Sec ti on 3.8 of procedure A51 is confusina and conflicting. Taken 12 terall y, this section would indicate that an AFW oumo motor could never be restarted if it ran for less then 4 hours. (di-v64> Section 3.9 and 7.8 of crocedure A51 are in conflict. Section 3.9 allows oniv one AFW uump to be in operation when the SR5 i s sucolv-ing AFW. Section 7.8 requires both pumos to ne in coeration oefore transferring AFW suction to SRS. followed by securina pump P-318. There is no basis in the plant documentation for tnese restrictions. Section 4.2.12 of nrocedure A51 requires platino the AFW flow con-trol valves in automatt,c and open but the step should be to verify the position of the valves. (RI-084) AP 92 indicates that the test Test Review Group responsibilities are defined in AP 95. However. AP 95 has not been issued. (RI-046) Section 3.1 of attachment 11 to QCl-12 indicates that tne System Review and Test Procram is defined in AP 93. This appears to be an ancorrect reference. (RI-046) L - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l I 87-020 1
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-013 J QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 2 1 i
=================================================================== l Subject / Activity Audited: Mild Envi ronmental EO Program l Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): R. Jones I
Persons Representing Audited Organization: R. Wise - Eauipment Qualification Group ; Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned'to: G. Cranston
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=u==================================================================== l Description of Conditions:
l There is a lack of documen ta ti on to demonstrate tnat eculoment I located in a " mild' environment is currentiv aua11rieu and w111 con-tinue to be qualliled during the lite of the plant DEI 61L61 Equipment qualification should be cased on the normal operating ; environment of equipment. [ The Rancno Seco program uses an arbitrarv set of environmental conuitions to establish the definition of a mild environment and in some cases tnis was interpreted as an exemo-tion from qualification. (RI-024. RI-117) An example where tne eautoment was purcnaseo to the actual environ-mental conditions is as follows. Paracraph F of the DBR for ECN l A-3660 defines the environmental conditions for the new Nuclear Ser- ia vice Electrical Buildina. Even thouan the condi tions specified I would fall within the SNUD definition of a mild environment, the DBR includes the statement "New class 1 electrical distribution equip-ment is qualified for these (the actual) conditions". i It is not clear what organization is responstole to assure the Class 1 electrical distribution eouioment is actually cualified as committed. { I The need for a periodic surveillance. Lestina and maintenance oro7 j gram for this class of eautoment was acknowlf doed av tne eautoment I qualification group during the audit. (RI-024. RI-117) l J
87-020 1 1 1 SACRAMENTO NUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-013 l QUALITY DEPARTMENT ' 1 OPEN ITEM Page 2 of 2 l
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A mild eausument qualification orocram is needed to assure tnat equipment important to safety will meet, an a continuino oasis, tne performance reautrements determined to be necessary for achieving the system reautrements. This is part of tne commitment needed to meet the intent of ANSI /IEEE Std. 279-1971 ) I 1 1 l i i l l L
87-020 l l 1 1 i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRIC1 01 No.:87-020-014. QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1
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Subject / Activity Audited: . Dedicating Satety Related Eauipment i Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: Al Ostenso l Persons Representing j Audited Organization: U. Witte - Engineering i I Required Reolv Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: G.Cranston
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Description of Conditions: l l There is no evidence at a program to cedicate safety related eculp-ment ourcnased as commercial orade. DETAILS: - - - ~ ~ - - - - SMUD procures some safety related eautpment as commercial araae. For example. ECN A5415E incicates that tne reautred wire and LED's are to be purchased as commercial grade. There is no evidence that ana-lysis. evaluation or testina was certormed to demonstrate tne suiti-bility of eautoment important to safety for its intended use. (RI-019, RI-091) 4 l l l 87-020 l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT Ol'No.: 87-020-015 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 1 of.1
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Gubject/ Activity Audited: Seismic Qualification Records Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: R. Jones ) j j , Persons Representing , ; Audited Organization: M. Kermani - Sei smi c Quali f i cati on Group
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l , Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Asslaned to: G. Cranston l I
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Description of Conditions: -/ It was not clear how some comoonents were seismically'oualified. I DEIG1LSi Qualification records for SFAS control modules H45D2A & H4SD2B were not located. lnese mooules were apparentiv aualified as part of the
, entire cabinet but the tag numbers are not the same as those being l
used. A cross reference with a similarity justification snould bo ; l provided. The cabinet auali fication record Sec.2.1 does not appear to be complete. E::amples are , item 3, no lao mountana details avail-able, item 4 a, b & c are listed as unknown and item 8 lists the
" Method of verification: Puolic d o,nai n computer. prooram". These l apparent discrepancies have not been juctriied (RI-088). !
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87-020 c' I ! .I l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UfILITY DISTRICT- 01.No.: B7-020-Ole OUAL.ITY DEPARTMENT l OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 1
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(( l Subject / Activity Audited: Post Installation Testing l Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): Al Ostenso Persons Representing Audited Organization: D.llpton - Goerations Required Reply Date 9/14/87 Action Assigned to: W.Kemper [
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Description of Condations: Y p Evidence of adeouate cost installation testino of some eouipment could not ce locateo. DEIGILS; The di sposi ti on of NCR S-6171, which addressed the r epair of two fiber optic cables and re-labelino them as scares, indtcated tnat the cables would not be retested as part at the repaar but would De l tested 14 the need arose to use them as active caules. feo mecnanism was given to assure that thev would be retested when thev were useo
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as active cables. (RI-OSli There is no evsdence that all of the breakers in canal S1A2-1 received post installation testing. (R1-063) l l Work Request (WR) 69415, Which addresses testing of the breakers j in panel S1A2-1. does not include any evidence that breakers '1 A2125, and A2126 were tested. The WR identi fi ed breaters A2101 , and A2127 as defective and the defects were documented via NCR I 3239. WR 78145 installs a replacement f or breater A2127 as part.of the disposition of NCR 3239. The WR does not includ6 testing of the 'i replacement breakec. , s t 5 / , WR 77651 call s f oF e,o# vino spare bre/h.er A2102 to position A2101. The test records 4,cgompanytna the,WR indicate that breaker #2 ' was tested. This number is not en ehtordance with the Dr.nel so j it cannot be determined which breaker was tested. Also, orawino E108, sht 12, Rev 7, (DCN 49), shows pos2 tion A2102 to be an acttve breaker. I e i I ,h
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SACRAMENTO MllNICIPAL UTILI TY DISTRIC1 O!>N,c.: 87-020-017 QUALIT 6DEPARTE NT >
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OPEN ITEM v Page 1 of 2 , lj
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l Sub Joc t / Ac t i vi t y Auditen: Procurement'ind Materigl
~4.4 t Controh is Audit Dyate: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): D. I_'bdad g t, A J Persons Reprekentina .
( i j Audited Organ 2zatton: J. Maver / S. Sallee / H. Mery?,oz a 3 s g Required Replv Date: 9/14/87 Action ' Assioned ud j b.Cranston g t t 3
========:s===============u==========una========w=u==========.==--- l Description of Condit1ons: k ( !
\ ,t a,
Records associated with some eau 2 c. ment were not readilv retriad o,le.
.lia1 i l 4
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( )/ ,i" 4f DETAILS: i J r ! Sub ECN No A-5415 J Rev. 2 ru}auired the addition of two new DC Tar- I get Rock Solenoid Flow Control Val ves . FV-20531 and 32 in the Au::il- ,j 1MV Feedwater Svstem. These valves show uo in the Master Eauipment '
., j List (MEL) as being ourchased vta P.O. No. 044131 LU. t(
'9 When the docun.entation package was reauested from Recoras Management 7 utilizing this P.O. .~tn d the above Jalve Mark No.s. Records Manage- j; j inent ould not retrieve the package. The purchasing department was .if i su6acquently contacted and they inda cated that the above P.O.
No. l was a Dabcock and Wil co:: P.O. which Bt<W generded to Target Rock and that SMUD P.O. No. GRS-46168 was 1 swed to,Da<th f or the ourchase of these type valves. 7- , i i The documentation pacLace util2rina the' BMUD , P .. O . No. was then retrteved by Records Manacement. H o w :e v e r , the documentat.2 en on Microfilm indicated that the valves were ' Mark No.s FV-20527bi and
-28B. There was no mention on the records tnat the valves were t hen-- y t2fied with new Mark No.s. ,g ij s
Discussion with the resnonsnble ngineer tor th i s F LN r es e..il ed 1. n a l g1 valves FV-20527B and FV-205288 were in f ac t F V--20531 and F V -20S32 !: (B&W) Specification 08-1139706-01. Line 12.7.1.11 recuired a cleanliness C of C for two (2) 4" Solenoid Flow Control Valves, Mark Nos. FVO20531 and FV-20532 from Target Rock (Ref SMUD P.O. GRS-46168,' Spec M22.30. and B&W P.O. 044131LU). j i Review of the documentation package on microfilm reveal ed that the C I ' of C was missino. RIDR No. 1491. indicates that the insoector veri-fied that it was received. Line 12.7.1 of the B&W Spec rnoutred a " Test Water Certification," which was in tne documentation oachaue. but the RIDR did not reouire this to be verified. Additionally. the . documentation package only contains chance orders to the above B&W ! P.O.; the whole P.O. is not on microfilta, i D. Review of the documentation package on Microfilm Cartridae No. 451 for four (4) class 1E 25 KVA Inverters, Contract No. 8257, revealed the following: A receiving inspection memo dated 2-9-83 indicates that Nonconfor-mance Report (NCR) S-2640 was closed out. Review of the NCR Rev 2 revealed that it was closed 7-9-83. However it was also noted there is another conv of this NCR Rev 2 which reflects tt betno closed 1-12-83. 87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-020 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 4 of 6
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Additionally, review of Work Renuest No. 6970. (applicable to NCR S-2640 Rev 2), indicates that ttems deficient were comoleted 1-19-03. Furthermore, the Work Reouest in this package indicates , that item eioht (8) of the deficient items noted on the NCR is ques- q tionable. It could not be veri fi ed that this item was satisfactorily
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c'"olved. Item 10 on RIDR No. 913, which is apolicable to this pack- ._ required the inspector to obtain Quality Assurance approval of 4 the completed RIDR. This was not performed. Several sections of Did Specification E8.02.1 which is the covernino Spec for this contract are not on film or file te.o.. Aooendix 9H). Nuclear Engineering Document Control (NEDC) was contacted in order that the Soec could be obtained and utilized to determine if requirements imposed on the vendor had been met. NEDC did not have it on file. The Spec was subsequently octained from purchasino. This condition was also discussed with the OA Records Coordinator and it was indicated that NEDC should nave had the Spec. It was further indicated by the OA Records Coordinator that Bid Specs. should not be microfilmed, but at least retaland on file by Records Management which is consistent with the " Records Type List" held by Records Management. This list reouires Bid Specs to be retained for twenty years. Whether or not they should be mtcroftimed could not be verified and warrants further inventication to be performed by OA. I E. RIDRs 2958 and 2959 generatea for inspecti on of items purchased ' via P.O. 86020 were reviewed on microfilm cartridoe No. 1184 r evrial ed that insoectors are ustna yellow highlighted which does not reproduce cleariv. This appears to be allowed per OC Desk instruction entitled "DC Office Procedure for Receivino Inspection, Rev 4." As a result some of the i n f or mat.i on (e.g., heat numbers of items inspected) i s not legible. The reautrement in the desk instruction also apoears to be an conflict with paragraph 5.3.2 of QAP 18. Quality Assurance Records, which infers that hiah lichters shall not be used. j l A review of these RIDRs (2958 and 2955) m s cerformed also to m.,c er - ! tain if all items on the P.O. were actually received and incoected as required by the P.O. and coverning specification. T hi s was rather l cumbersome because of the metnad used bv the inspector to 1denti4y I what was inspected. l
l 87-020 l 1 l i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-020 ' l OUALITY DEPARTMENT { OPEN ITEM Page 5 of 6 l
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I For examole, on RIDR 2959 the inspector indicated that the items j required by the P.O. had all been received. by indicating on the tront page, " Full Shipment." The RIDR attachments (P.O. displays) referenced the heat No. of items actually received and- inspected which were reouired by the P.O. However, this is not reouired by the QC desk instructions. Therefore. the instructions for complet-ing RIDRs appear to be contrary to current practice of documenting inspection results. The DC desk instruction reouires the inspector to: " verify cuanti-ties rGceived per P.O. Line item. When the supplied cuantity does l not equal the line item amount, write in the quantity received and highlight it in vellow. For partial receipts, retain the vellow- 1 lined P.O. for future inspection, action and reference."- The instructions on the cover sheet of the RIDRs require the insoector, to: "if'the insoection involves a complete shipment, the inspector shall check the full box on the front oaoe of the RIDR: if the inspection involves an incomplete shipment the inspector shall check the partial box on th'e RIDR and indicate the partial numbers anv supporting documentation shall be attached to the RIDR." Neither of these instructions apoear to be adeouate as they do not specifically require the inspector to uniquely identify on the RIDRs or on attachments (P.O. displ ays) , items that have been actuallv inspected. Also, these copies of the P.O. disulavs make ref er ence to the P.O. No. but do not reference the RIDR No. If tnese cocies- oet misplaced, this could present a problem when tryino to reconstruct. the documentation, as several RIDRs can be generated for each P.O. There are five cooles of RIDR 2958 on micro film which were utilized to document five separate inspections of oartial shipments of items-for this P.O. The RIDR for par t i al shipment No. 5. consisting of j pages 1 through 4, does not indicate what items were inspected. The j front page of this RIDR under the component name block indicates only, " stainless steel pipe and fittinas." F. P.O. GR-92305 reouires that documents in section 9.7 of specifi-cation M22.35.3 shall be shipped with the items sucolied. Section 9.7 reauires the contractor (Li mi torque) to furnish certified writ-ten evidence that tne prooosed tyce motor coerator has been success-fully tested in accordance with IEEE standard 382-1980. f
I 87-020 ; SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-020 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 6 of 6 )
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'l The Certificate of Comoliance from Limitoroue for this order anal- !
cates that the Motors are certified to IEEE 382-1972. RIDR No. 3508 I Rev. 1 references IEEE 382-1972. There is no channe order to the l P.O. or amendment to the spec to indicate that IEEE 382-1972 is j acceptable in lieu of the 1980 edition. G. The records coordinator for Qua11tv Assurance (QA) was again contacted to discuss the above documentation deficiencies and to determine if OA had established a crocedure delineating the reouire-ments for transmitting completed recoros to storace as reautrea by paragraph 5.4 of QAP 18 " Quality Assurance Records." It was revealed that a procedure was in the review process ano subseauent to this 4 discussion has been issued (6-20-86). (RI-ol. 64. 83. 98. 107. 112. 115, 116) 1 i i l l I 1 l l l l e4
l l 87-020 i l SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-021 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 1 of 2
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Sub j ec t / Ac t i vi t y Audited: Procurement and Material Control I
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Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): D. Louan Persons Representing Audited Organization: J. Parman / J. Meyer / S. Sallee l l Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: J Vinouist )
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Description of Conditions: l Records submitted to Records Manaoement for storace by Quality i Assurance are not berno adeouatelv identified (by Qualltv Assurance) I on the transmittal sheet as reuutred by Paragraph 5.3.6 of QAP 18. ]' Rev. 3. " Quality Assurance Records." 1 DEIAILS j 3 i Paragraph 4.5 and 4.6' of OC Office Procedure, "Receivino Inspec- ' tion", Rev. 4 requires in part, " Acceptable full shipments, partial shipments...shall be transmitted to OA/OE with a SMUD Document Transmittal Sheet... All title information on the transmittal sheet will be done in long hand. The table of contents section will indi-cate the number of paces for each continuously numbered group of data required to complete or support the completion of the RIDR. i.e., RIDR, CMTRs, qualifications tests. POs ...". During this audit it was noted that DC Receivino Insoect)on Person-nel are presently comoletino transmittal sheets as reuutred bv tne aoove Receiving Inspection Procedure and which satzsties the 1ritent of OAP 18. However, at present, after the transtni ttal forms are forwarded to QA/DE there aopears to be a Dreak down as the transmittals, which I are ultimately sent to Records Manacement, do not contain the number of pages for each continuousiv numoered aroup of data reouired to support the completion of the RIDR. The current practice for transmitting documents to Records hanaae-ment after they are transmitted to the OA/OE is as follows: I i l _______a
67-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-021 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 2 of 2
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The QA/CE clerk makes uo a new transmi ttal form (No. 1451) and indi-cates RIDRs in the subject section and, under the table of contents i section, lists oniv the RIDR No.s. There is no mention of the num- ' ber of paces f or each continuousiv numbered group of data etc. as is required by the DC instruction. These transmittals with RIDRs. C of Cs and CMTRs attached are then forwarded to another section of the QA Deoartment for RIDR Data entry. The individual who does the data entry then makes out Trans-mittal Form No. 1351, "Racords Transfer Form" and indicates only tne i Record Type number (for filino/ microfilming) ano the Record Type name in the applicable section of the Form, and forwards same to Records Manacement. Consecuent1v, the final transmittal forms to Records Manacement do not adeouatelv identify the records beina transmitted as required by OAP 18. l Additionally, it should be noted that QA in order to comolv witm j Paragraph 5.4 of OAP 18 (which reoutres each decartment to establisn ' a procedure for transmitting records to storace etc.) and to help remedy this problem has generated QAIP 19, Rev. O. " Interim Storage of Quality Records." This procedure requires in part, the transmit-tal shall indicate the number of pages of each document. The impli-cation of this requirement appears to be that which is presently required by the DC Instruction. Therefore individuals who are responsible for the transmittal of records to Records Management should at the earliest date, implement the above requirements. Also, Management should consider utilizino one transmittal form for the tr ansmi t tal of records to Records Management. This form could be designed to accommodate all of tne required inf ormati on that is presently covered on the two different transmittal f or tus presently being used. (e.g., provide for all the recipients, sendees, record type number and name, number of pages. receipt acknowledooment from ! Records Management etc.) 87-020 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-022 QUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Pace 1 of 2
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Subject / Activity Audited: Vendor Audits Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): D. Lacan Persons Representing Audited Organization: J. Sullivan / J. Never Requi red Realv Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: J. Vinousst
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Description of Conditions: Vendor audits have not been oerformed by SMUD to determine if ven-dors are effectively imolementina their approved QA Procrams. 1 DEIAILS l Section 12. " Audit of Procurement Proaram", contained in ANSI N45.2.13 (1976 Edi tion) , . "Qua11 tv Assurance Requirements f or Control ] of Procurement of Iter $s and Servi ces f or Nuclear Power Plants." ' requires, in part. " Periodic or Randon Audits shall be performed to verif y compliance with Procurement Activities ....".
.d Section 7.6, " Reporting" add i ti onal l y reauires, " measures shall be
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est al i shed to provide for the reportino of activities performed to ! l verify conformance to requirements of oracurement documents. These l measures shall include reportina of audits ....". l l NRC Inspection Notice 86.21 " Recognition of American Society of l Mechanical Enoineers Accreditation Program for N Stamo Holders" l addressed to all Nuclear Power Facilities, delineates the NRC's posi tion /recogni tion of the American Society of Hechanical Enaineers (ASME) Accreditation Procram for holders of N.NFi. NA. anu rav Stamus and Certificates of Aut hor i r a ti on. I Page 2 of 2 of this insoectton notice states in part, licensees and their subcontractor, when assessing whether a potential suoplier has an acceptable documented QA Procram, may relv on the fact that ASME has surveved the supoller and issued'a certificate at authorization , of appropriate scope and for the centreo 1 ocati on without performtna 1 i any additional evaluation of the supoller 's 04 program. However, it I further indicates that the "NRCs Reccanition of the ASME Accredita-tton Proaram applies only to the programmatic aspects, licensees tivelv implementing the approved QA Proaram." J l 1 j i J
l 87-020 , l l i 1 1 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-022 DUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 2 of 2 l
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During the audit of the Procurement Process. the vendors (e.g. Tar-get Rock Corp., Tioca Pipina Supolv) that supolled QA Class 1. ASME i Code Cl ass components and materi al s to SMUD for the auxiliary feed i water system were noted to be on SMUD's Approved Suppliers List l (ASL) based on desk audits and the fact that they hold a Quality l System Certificate issued by ASME. However, the desi: audit consists 4 only of a review of the Suppliers Manual and to date SMUD has not performed a formal audit at these supoliers facilities to verify j they are effectively implementing their approved CA program. This is ) contrary to the aforementioned reautrements and the NRCs recoant- l tion / position of the ASME Accreditation Program. (RI-067) l l The Vendor Audit Group Suoervisor indicated that: a comolete rewrite j of the Vendor Auproval Procedures was in progress, the District has ' joined CASE and NSOAC for .J oi n t utility audits of vendors, the ASL has been completely reviewed, rewritten and most vendors reevalu- , ated. However, as of this date there is no indication that these ) vendors have been scheduled to be audited. althouah the vendor aucit j group supervisor did Indicate vendors holdino an ASME Certificate l would be scneduled for audit in the near future to determine com-pliance to their aporoved procram. 1 1 l
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G7-020 i i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-023 .i QUALITY DEPARTMENT I OPEN ITEM Page 1 of I l
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Subject / Activity Audited: Procurement and Material Control Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditor (s): D. Loaan Persons Representing l Audited Organization: L. Rouen / S. Sallee / J. Mver ' i Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: J. Vinautst !
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Description of Conditions: i i There is no evidence of compl eti on of action to correct deficiencies. i identified durina a vendor audit. d I l DEIBIL_S The Eloar Source Inspection Report for the 25 KVA inverters (Refer-ence Contract No. 8257) on Microfilm Cartridae No. 451 indicates that SMUD inspectors found " Lots of discrepancies" between SMUD spec F8.02.1 and Elcars Test Procedures, etc., and that Elgar.was not adhering to their procedures. There is no' indication on record ~ in j this documentation packaae to show that discrepancies noted bv SMUD i were resolved. i i i Further investigation revealed that, as a result of the source insoection, ] an audit was cerformed at the Elgar Facility (Audit No. J 0-474). The audit report identified several programmatic deficien- I cies as well as hardware deficiencies. However, there is no docu- i ment ati on to orovide evidence that corrective action was performed l on the open items. The inverters were subseauentlv received and are installed. SMUD. based on removing Elcar from the Approved Suppli- l ers List. closed the audit report. (RI-103) l 41-
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87-020 > 1 i SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT OI No.: 87--020-024 QUALITY DEPARTMENT l 1 OPEN ITEM Page 1 of 2 l
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Subject / Activity Auditedt Trainino Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: D. Logan Persons Representing i Audited Organization: W. Koeoke, J. Dawson i Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assianed to: J. Vinouist ) I
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Description of Condi t i on s:
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l Training Records to demonstrate that inspection personnel have' I received all recuared traintna are not adeouate. Refresher trainino is in need of improvement, trainina material is out of date. certi-fication records for insocctors (2) are not on file to indicate that they were qualified / certified for the type inspections they had per- ] formed. ! DEIDILS w. I The training records on file for Mechanical Receivino Inspectors SSN l 248-06-8668 and 534-58-6981 do not provide documentary evidence of l their having received initial trainino to applicable Guality Assur- l l ance Procedures (either bv assigned reading lists or trainino atten- ; dance records), as required by OAP Policy Secti on II, Para. 5.10 and l OAIP 18, Section 6.0. GAIP 18, Para. 5.5.1 reoulres inspectors to be given refresher training in r evi sed procedures and programs. Contrary to this , requirement, it was noted that DAP 17. Rev. 5, "Noncon f orrai na Mate-l rial Control" was revised on 3/16/87. However, refresher training had not been provided to all inspectors until after the condition l was brought to Duality Controls attention (e.o. For Inspector SSN 534-08--6981). The extent of thi s condi ti on must be evaluated to determine if additional refresher trainino needs to be provided to inspeClorS on revisions of other procedures. SMUD at present has two trainino sessions on video taoe entitled, DCLP-1 ' " Or i en t a t. i on and Document Control Procedures" and DCLP-2 "Recei vi no Inspection, Storace and Administrative Procedures" which are presentea to inspection personnel. However, these video train-ino sessions are not representative at all tne current requirements. L
l 87.-020 l 1 i 1 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRIC1 01 No.: 86-020-024 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM - Page 2 of 2 a
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For examolo, the videos indi cate that DCI-7 i s the procedure that J defines Quality Control inspector training and qualification i requirements. This procedure was cancelled on 2/6/87 and DAIP 18, l which was in place as of that date, and is still in effect, delt- I neates these requirements as well as others that were not in OCI-7. Additionally, the OCLP's indicate that MIDRs and CIDRs are to be used for documenting inspection results. These documents have been deleted from the proaram with the exceotion of those that still may be open (Ref. DAP 6 Rev.3). 1 l Contrary to ANSI N45.2.6 and DAIP 18 reoutrements. RIDR No.913 (Cen- ) tract No. 8257) reflected sion-off bv an Insoecter who has no certs- I fications on file to demonstrate that he was cualified to cerrorm ) the inspections reouired by the RIDR. The tvoes of inspec-tions/ acceptance criteria reuutred by RIDR No. 1498-2 (Contract No. 8909), must be signed off by a certified level Il mechanical inspec-tor, but were signed off by a certified Level Il electr2 cal inspec-tor. 1 i The extent of this condition requires further investigation to determine if these insoectors as well as others have performed l inspections for which they wer e or are not Qualifted/ certified to i perform and action as appropriate should be implemented. (RI-56, 86. 96, 99) l l l l l l 1
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, 87-020 i
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTIl.ITY DISTRICT OI No.: 87-020-025 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM - ' Pace 1 of 1
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Sub ject / Acti vi tv Audi ted: Instal 1ation and In sp ecti on Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: D. Locan Persons Representing Audited Organization: H. Mendra Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Asslaned to: G. Cranston ,
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Description of Conditions: Drawing Change Notices ao not adenuately reflect changes identified on Field Problem Reports. )i 1
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QET81W .] A. Field Probl em Report. (FPR) No. 26 i ssued against sub ECN 5415J , required weld "B" as shown on isometric drawing 3,1820-6" DB2 Rev. O i DCN OA Sheet 1B, Rev. O, to be deleted. A " Blue Mlemo" attached. to i the FPR obtained from site document control i ndi'c a tes . that "FPR 26 should be deleted from the open pipino FPRs l i st s'i n c e it has been incorporated but not listed on the transmittal shts. or DCNs." The memo further indicates FPR 26 was incorocrated into DCN No. OB on j 1/3/87. 1 i However, DCNs OB AND OC to ISO 31820-6" DB2 still show weio B. The I weld, in fact. does not exist as was determined durina a walkoown of this system. B. FPR No. 28 issued also aoainst ECN 5415J recuired items No. 6 and 10 at the location shown on 18031820-6" DB2 and on the Bill of Materials. (Item No. 6, Weldolet item No. 10 soci.ol et ) to be deleted, and to add item No. 11 (2 ea. nicolets). The nipoletu were in fact installed as roautred by the approved FPR and the Dill of Materials section on the drawino was revised as well-as item No. 6 on the drawind which shows the location where the item should be instal-led (DCN 08). However tne drawinas do not snow that item No. 10 was superseded bv 2 tem No. 11. ' IL should also be noted that survel11ance report No. S-060 identtiles similar discrepancies. !
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87-G20 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-026 OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM - Pace 1 of 2
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Subject / Activity Audited: Installation and Inspection - Welding Audit Date: 4/22/87 - 6/26/87 Auditors: D. Logan Persons Representing j Audited Organization: J.Serre / J.Gardner / J.Dowson / H. Grant Required Reply Date: 9/14/87 Action Assioned to: J. Vinouist/ J. Serre !
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Incorrect filler material was apparentiv uced on a f i el_d weld in the . au:< i l l arv f eedwater system. l DETGILS j 1 Welding / Inspection Docurdentati on indicates that incorrect filler ) material was used at field weld (FW)- NC1 on line 31826-6" DB' l (Auxiliarv Feedwater Svstem, ECN No. 5415J. WR No. 121831) I l 1 Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. S 6207 (12/30/86)' was issued stating i
" weld N, Line 31826-6 DB2 was wel ced using the wrong filler metal.
Per weld procedure T 8-lh, ER 309L should have been used. Instead ER 308L was used." The disposition to this NCR reaut red the cutout of weld and the rew-eld of Joint N-C1 per WPS TS 8-lh. The NCR was closed on 2/26/87 indicatino that the disposition was satisfactorily amolemented, documentation comolete and accentable. However, it appears that this NCR should not have been closed based on the review of the weldino insoection checklist (WICL). nor should the construction inspect 2on report have been sxqned ofi. i l
87-020
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 01 No.: 87-020-026 I OUALITY DEPARTMENT OPEN ITEM Page 2 of 2
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i The WICL for FW NCl sioned off complete bv QA on 2/26/87 indicates l that filler material ER 308 was used which is contrarv to WPS 15 j G-lh, which requires ER 309L. It should al so be noted that the WICL i indicates that welders 462 and 314 (welders symbol /stamo No.) wolded this joint. l Review of the certified filler material issue logs f or 12/31/86 and 1/2/87 which were the dates that this weld was performed per the WICL, indicates that only welder No. 314 had drawn filler metal and ; that he had drawn both ER 308L and ER 309L. Therefore. based on the j documentation. it appears that this weld received type ER 308L filler metal. Lastl y, paragraph 4.3.12 of MP/IS 404 reautres DC to verify welder j oualif2 cations. There is no objective evidence that OC had per- ! formed this verification prior to completion of welds. There is no attribute listed on WICL's recutrino DC to perform this inspection, nor for verification of correct filler material prior to completion l 1 of the weld (s). l l It should be noted that the Construction Inspection Report (CIR) for l this FW Indicates that the welder (s) were cualified and the correct l material was used. However this IR is stoned off by DC on 1-7-87. 4Ive davs after the final visual was cerformed and documented on the WICL for this FW. Similarly, all other welds are stoned off by DC after completion of the welds: in-process verification would more effectively preclude deficiencies. . I i I l 1 l i l 1 I i I i _______--_--- -- 1
87-020
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SUMMARY
BY SUBJECT / FUNCTIONAL AREA Sections 6.1 through 6.6 orovide additional information regarding the scope, approach and results of the' audit. Appendix D provides a list of the references used in the audit. 6.1 Engineering, Design, and Testing 6.1.1 General The selected plant modifications were reviewed to determine if the design autout in technically adequate. Other asoects of the modification, such as procurement. materi al control'and installa-tion, are covered in other sections of this report. The desion ! process, as it relates to the' selected systems and reviewed attributes, was evaluated for conformance with established orac- l tices and reculatory requirements. The review included a sampling of Engineering Change Notices (ECN) and associated Desion Basi s j Reports (DBR), a sample of the documents associated with the ' selected ECN/DBR package's (ECNs, SAR, Tech Specs, NCRs, Work Requests. etc.), and a review of special test procedures. l The ECN ar.d its associated DDR form the basis for the design and I implementation of a system modification. The DBRs for the selected ECN packages 'were reviewed in detail in order to develop an understanding of the modification and for: l Consistency with applicable codes, standards and procedures. In particular, the packages were examined for adequate independent j review and equipment qualification considerations. 1 Consi st ency with system desi gn requirements. l Consistency with applicable NSSS criteria given in the Rencho j Seco design manuals. l Completeness of the modification packaoe. T hi s includeo checkino ~ I the ECN/DBR for inclusion of equipment qualification, saf ety i anal ysi s (e.g Hazards anal ysi n and f ailure anal ysi s) . testing ) l requirements, etc. U 1 A sampling of the documents used to implement the modification i were also reviewed as follows: i i Drawing Change Notices (DCNs) A sampling of DCNs were r evi ewed for consistency with the ECN/DDR and each other. Calculations Calculations were reviewed to determine if there are suf fi- _____________________m
G7-020 i i l cient calculations to support the desian and that the calcu- l l ations are consi stent wi th the design t esis. Selected calcu-lations were reviewed for methodology, completeness, etc. q I Technical Specifications 1 ' The technical specification chances were reviewed to deter-mine if thev were correct, complete. and consistent with the system design. j j J Vendor Documents Selected vendor documents were reviewed for overall content, i completeness, clarity and consistency-with the system design. j i I Non-conforming Reports (NCR) A sampling of NCR's and their associated Work Reauests (WR) l were reviewed for technien1 adecuacy of the resolution and implementation of the NCR resolution.
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Special Test Procedures (STP) i Selected STPs were reviewed for completeness and consi stency ) with the system design and established testino practices. j l USAR Changes !
.2a USAR changes for the selected systems were aval i ao l e at the time of the audit.
Safety Anal ysi s Report (SAR) The SAR was revi ewed for completeness, consistency with the system design, and USAR 1maact. System Status Report The SSR was used as a source of information to cuide the review of some of the documents - in particular, the Technical Specif - cations.
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E<ased on the results of the audit, the as-installed systems ) I should function as desioned because of the extensive and thorouch implementation of testing. However, concerns with some aspects af the design and design process raise seme ouestions about the { capability of the systems to perform their function under ! degraded plant and system conditions. The major concerns are: j tiqui o ment Qualification-There is no evidence of a proaram to cedicate eautpment purchased as "commerc161 arade" for apo l i c a ti on to safety related systems. i i Also, there is no evidence of an adequate prooram f or aualifying equipment that is defined by SMLID as coeratino in a mild environ ~ ment. Calculat2ons- ) There were several calculations and anaivsts that wer u not oru-l
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87-020 l vided and many of the calculations were not suitable. The results of the review of calculations indicates a lack of adher-ence to the basic princiales for providing complete and thorough calculations. Independent Review of Desian Basis Documents-The top level desion basis documents (e.g. Design Basis Reports, i EFIC/AFW System Description) do not have any evidence of indepen-dent review for desian adequatv. Since the entire desion -and this audit - are based on the content of these documents. anv conclusions regarding the design must be qualified. SNUD oroce-dures do not require verification of the major ECN if the sub i ECNs are verified. However. it this is the case the maior ECN cannot be used as the source of information for any of the oesion and verification information in the sub-ECNs. All of the sub-ECNs reviewed referenced the Major ECN/DBR as an information source. J.ndependent Review of Sub-ECNs-The verification of sub-ECNs lacked substance in that, for the most part, the only evidence was a filled out check list that did not properly list the documents reviewed nor were they backed up with notes or comments. Also, there is no evidence for a site mechanism for the resolution of comments made during the review process. Configuration / Document Control-The document control and tracking is weak. For examole, the major Q DBR for EFIC references many documents by vendor document number. but there is no well defined method for retrievino a document i from its vendor document number. Al so , the vendor instruction ) I manuals are not routinely updated to reflect plant modifications. ' l which creates the potential for the promulgation of misinforma-tion. l 6.1.2 Emeroency Feedwater initiation and Control (EFIC) 6.1.2.1 Introduction. EFIC is a class 1E system that controlu and monitors the Aun11-l larv Feedwater System (AFW). EFIC/AFW is intended to orovice primarv system coolina when main feecwater is not avail abl e ano the primary system conditions do not permit heat removal via the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system. The EFIC system implementation at Rancho Seco evolved over a number of vears. 6.1.2.2 Evaluation Methodoloav. The evaluation conststed of enaminino a variety of documents that define system des 1Gn reuulrements, define plant 11 Censing i requirements, document svstem design acti vity and design output, and document system testing. A listino of the types of documents
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87-020 revtewed is olven in section 6.1.1. l The documents were reviewed for: Consistency Among Documents l Conformance to Licensing Commitments
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Completeness of the Desian Documentation.. 3 Adequate consideration of Installation, testing, Maintenance, I analysis, etc. Samples of documents from sever 1 of the'Sub-ECNs were selected -) for review. The selected Sub-ECNs were chosen so a representative : sample of the types of modification acti vi ties would be reviewed. j The Sub-ECNs were: I 1 A5415E - This Sub-ECN covers the interconnection between EFIC cabinets. from the EFIC cabinets to the Trip interface Eauioment (TIE), from the EFIC cabinets to IDADS anc SPDS, and power wirino to EFIC and TIE. , I A5415F - This Sub-ECN covers modificati ons to the SFAS, interconr j nections between SFAS and EFIC. and chances to various controls. I J A5415J - This Sub-ECN covers the modification of the AFW ulonno l to provide parallel redundant control valves for AFW. A5415K - This Sub-ECN provides modifications internal to the EFIC l I cabinets. l A5415W - This Sub-ECN covers modification and addition of several l control and indication loops. A5415AF - This Sub-ECN covers the addition of some time celay modules to the EFIC cabinets. Some portions of A5415B were also reviewed. This ECN provides for the installation of the EFIC SG level sensors. 6.1.2.3 Licensing Documentation. The SAR, failure analysis in the Major DBR, and Technical Soeci - fications were reviewed f or consistency with the system desion. The SAR ts complete and consistent with the DBR with the follow-inq possible exceptions: j 1. The impact of the change in shutdown bvpass permi ssi ve from l low pressure in one OTSG to low pressure in either OTSG was not evaluated in the plant documentation. (OI 87-020-1)
R l 87-020
- 2. Section IV.B.4 of DBR A5415 Major and page 10 of the SAR )
indicate that a failure in an EFIC fibre optic cable can cause .a ; loss of Mai n Feedwat er (MFW), which is an initiating event in the l plant analysis. Section 4.7.3 of IEEE-279 requires: l "Where a sinole random failure can cause a control system action l that results in a generating station condition requiring protec-
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ttve action and can also prevent procer action of a protection j system channel designed to protect aaainst the condition, the l remaining redundant protection channels shall be capable of 1 providing the protective cction even when degraded by a second random f ailure. Provisions shall be included so that thi s reaui rement can still j be met if a channel is bypassed or removed from service for test i or maintenance purposes. Acceptable provi sions include reducinu { the required coincidence, defeatino the control signals taken from redundant channels. or initiatsnq a protective acti on from ] j the bypassed channel." l l There is no analysis provided in the SAR or DBR f ailure anal ysis that addresses EFIC/AFW ability to meet this requirement follow-ing an EFIC -failure that results in a loss of MFW (OI B7-020-1)
- 3. There i s no analysis in the SAR that addresses the instrument line f ailures gi ven in The DBR for ECN AS4158. (OI 87-020-1) i i
The proposed technical specifications CRef A61] included satis- l factory surveillance requirements -for the EFIC/AFW systems with I the f ollowina exceptions. j l
- 1. The control settinos (e.g. proportional gain, reset rate.
rate limited load follower settinas, etc.) usee in EFIC establish the system response and system stability for automatic control of AFW flow. The settinas are implemented using Binarv Coded Decimal (BCD) switchen on the EFIC control modules. therefore, a sinole switch contact f ailure could cause a dramatic chanae in system response and stability. The control module self test does not check the intearity of the settings and there i s no requirement in the Technical Specifications to check them (RI-101). Also. section 7 of the vendor instruction manual CRef A703 states that the functional test which exercises the svut em looic is n o t. exhaustive and the manual doeu not list the functions t h a t. are not chected. Therefore. It could not be determined 24 there are any other atan1iicant 4unctians whtch are not acequately testeo. (OI 87-020-2)
- 2. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level instruments are used to monitor CST inventory and are used by the coerator for manaa-ing the transfer of AFW suction between the CST and the SRS. The AFW SSR CRef A62) includes a reautrement to nrovide class 1E CST
87-020 level i ndi cati on and to check the coerability of the instruments with a special test procedure. These instruments are needeu to l assure that there is sufficient CST inventarv to meet EFIC/AFW reuusrements. The Proposed Technical Specifications do n o t. cen-tain anv surveillance recurrements for these instruments. ( 01 87-020-02)
- 3. Pace 16 of the proposed technical speci f i c ati on states that "The EFIC svstem can be tested from its inout terminals to the j actuated device controll ers without placing the channel in key locked maintenance bypass". However, the venoor instruction '
manual requires placing the channel in maintenance bypass before exercising the control module self test.
- 4. Some inconsistencies in the frequency of surveillance were also observed:
Tabl e 4.1-1. Item 71 b & c. Daily calibration of SG pressure netootnts is not necessarv. 1 Table 4.1-1, Item 71 d. Test interval for both looics l should be monthlv. These inconsistencies would not result in inadeouate surveillance because tne intervals are more frecuent then necessarv so these discrepancies are not included in an Open Item. t 6.1. 2. 4 Cal cul ati ons The review of calculations was Leot to a mini mum because there ie a procram to re-evaluate calculations as a result of tne NHC ASRTP Inspection [Ref A1063. Within the scope .of the documents reviewed there are two calculations needed to support the desion l that have not been finali:ed: l l 1. Cal cul ati on to support AFW immunity to Hich Eneroy Line Break (OI 87-020-3)
- 2. Calculation to establish that the setpoint of the e>: cess flow I check valve in the instrument lines is adequate (OI 87-020-3) l (See also 6.1.2.5-1.)
The calculations that were reviewed in detail used assuma ti on s without suf f i ci ent justification and the methodol oov was, in some instances. inappropriate.
- 1. Calculation Z-FWS-IO127. EFIC Time Delay Settinos ERef A36],
contained " hidden" assumptions that should have been listed and justified in the assumption sec ti on of the calculation (OI B7-020-4). l l l 1
l 87-020 l I J J
- 2. Calculation Z-ZZZ-10132, seismic qualification of instrument line check valves ERef C943 did not include consideration of type test data and the effects of transverse motion on the valves. See l the equipment qualif ication section for further details on this '
calculation (OI 87-020-04). i
- 3. Cal cul a ti on Z-RCS-IO124 did not provide a b asi s for the ,
reference fluid density used in the calculations. The reference H den si ty should be the density assumed when establishing the instrument calibration parameters (OI 87-020-04) i 1 6.1.2.5 Desian Basis Reports & ECNs The design basi s reports f or the EFIC system were generally well organized and complete. The extent and nature of the modifica-tions were cenerally clear and the relationships between the various sub-ECNs and the scope of a particular sub-ECN were well defined. Some soecific exceptions are:
- 1. A data sheet attached to calculation Z-FWS-IO127 [Ref A363 indicates that the set points for tne excess flow check valves ,
used to isolate NNI sensors from the EFIC level sensors on the j same instrument line range from 4.5 to approximately 12 SLPM, j water. A leak in the instrument lines or instruments connected to I it, which results in a flow rate less the check valve setpoint. l could cause unacceptable degradation in the sensed level due to l flow induced pressure drops. Leaks of this nature are not I r addressed in the DBR (OI 87-020-05). , 1
- 2. The DDRs do not contain anv data or references to sources of data on signal ranges or accuracy requirements for the analoa loops. Loop accuracy requirements are needed to establish call-bration procedures (OI 87-020-05).
1
- 3. The DBR for A5415AF orovides an analysis to establish the maximum permincible settings of the ti me del ay modules to be added to EFIC. while calculati on Z-FWS-IO127 ERef A363 provides an ana l ysi s to establish a value that will provide acceptable EFIC performance. No justi f ica ti on was provided for usino the values from the cal cul at i on , rather than the maximum values established in the DBR (OI 87-020-05).
- 4. DBR A3415 Major contains many references to Babcock & Wilcon i (D&W) documents by BbW number. Apparent 1v, there is no mecnantsm in place to retrieve a document alven the venoor r mmtier . The response to RI-043 acPnowledaes that na cross reference between Sl1UD and vendor deawano numbers 1s avat1able. For the case of EFIC this deficiencv in site document control was alleviated bv including the reference documents in the ECM package. However, the documents were stored in a cardboard box in SDC until late in the audit and could not be retrieved unless the rioht question E -1 9
p 87-020 0 l l f l was asked of the richt/herson. This does not constitute ' aded,uate document control. (OI 87-020-9) l l 6.1.2.6 Design Veri f icati on & Document Review. , i l i Desion verification at Rancho Seco i s documenten va a the Desi on Verification Report (DVR', s whi r.h consists of a cover sheet. checklist, and a comment pction. The DVRu r evieweo were., in i general, inadeouate.
)
- 1. The DVRs reviewed for the audit consisted, for the most part, of only a filled out check list with a conclusion that the desion l was satisfactory. In some cases the DVR checklists marked items i as satisfactory when they were not applicable to the DCN under rnview. In many cases the list of documents reviewed censisted of simply a series number" which does not identify a snecific !
document bi. .t a group of documents which could have several t hundred entries. In no case are the revision level of the cocu- I ments proportv listed at reuuired by NEP 4109. No comments of any substance were contained in the desian verification reports reviewed, so it was not possible to evaluate proper resolution of concerns identified in the verification process. The checklista j and procedures for deusgn verification do not idontiiy the oro- I cess used for oeneratino anc resolvino concerns that arise from l the verification process. (OI 87-020-06)
- 2. There was no' evidence that the basic system documents 4 -EFIC/AFW system description LRef A107] and DBR A5415 Major -were .
Independent 1v reviewed. The Major DBR relles on the system l description for much of its information and (nakes ref erence to it for specific information in several cases. The DBau and DVRs for the sub-ECNs use the Major DBR as the desi on nasi s. whil e the j major DDR deters verification to the sub-ECNs. The o a s .t c svstem design was verified by B&W. The B&W design verliication was not reviewed and is assumed to be adeouate. However, the DLRs contain l many plant specific features and changes to the EFIC svstem. It I is not apparent the slstem description and the DBRs has been independent 1y r evi ewed or verifled for: (OI 87-020-6) / Conf ormance to thq MW desion, where appropriate Correctness of plant specific features. Completeness of the deslan as at relates to Rancho Seco. Adeounte destgn basis for Rancho Faco changou to the EFIC system. Applicability to Rancho Seco, i In addition, the system description was unnumbered, t Uated, and l l V y/ :
t * , 87-020 t l unsioned. The major DBR lists the system description as a part of the DBR, but there 2s no site mechanism to assure that the docu-ment is intimately attached to the DBR. Therefore, the system description cannot be considered a controlled document. l
- 3. The DvR checklist does not provide sufficient information to ]
assure that qualification and separation criteria are adeauately checked, by the reviewers. The resschse to RI-032 states that the experie. iced reviewer will aive adequate consideration to these ) aspects.'However, there is no specific requirements in the proce-dures to establish the required level of experience of the ) reviewers (OI 87-020-06). l i Note that the audit of EFIC was conducted based on assuming that the system description and the DBRs are'ccrrect. Since there is 1 no evidence that thW DBRs have been verified, this assumption may not be correct. o The responses to RI-OO5 and RI-106 proponec some chances to NEP i 4109 to imorove the verification- instructions. One prooosed I change was to rdautre that the Major DBR be verifieo st. least to the extent that all of the sub-ECNs comoletely addresses the items in the Najor ECN. This is not a sufficient action to pre-vent recurrence since it does not address all of the necessarv design verification criteria. A second proposed modification was I to add the item "DVR correct" to the ECN closure checkli st. This is too late in the desian process to be useful since all work is L i complete when the ECH is closed. Also, these actions do not provide a corrective a r.t i on . l t 6.1.2.7 Drawina Chance Notices.
- 1 1
t l Selected Drawino Chance Notices (DONS) were reviewed for consis- ) l tency with the DDRs. wi th each other , and with applicable codes ! and standards. The DCNs were not reviewed to determine if there were sufficient documents to eampletelv imolement and character-ize the scope of the sub-ECN containina the DCNs. The DCNs were cl ear ' with sati sf actorv form and content. A specific concern is: Several drawi ngs in Sub-ECN A5415E contained a note that refer-ences a letter. The letter i s not rett 'i evabl e f r om ',he reference given on the drawing and there is no evidesce thaE t6n contents k were independent 1v reviewed for correctness. Also, this informa-tion is contained in the DDR for ECN A5415 Major (OI 87-020-09). 6.1.2.8 Electrical Seoaration. Separation at Rancho Seco is controlled by the basic r eaut r ewnt s atven in,NEP 5204.44 CRef C231. However. there is no imolementtno procedures in place. The lack of an adeauate procedure is acknowledged in the disoasition of NCR S-6102 CRef A873 which l l l l l l
l 87-020 '
.)
oives as the cause of nonconformance "Seoaration criteria not j established in site oracedures" (OI G7-020-06). 4 DCN 3798 E-1010 Sht. 6 Rev. O (Ref. 92) has the note: j k "The redundant fiber optic control cables of the EFIC system do j not require phvnical isolation (Ref. RED 86-264), and therefore 1 the color stripina of the cable jacket per NEPM.5304.8C Paracraph 5.2.1 and pull requirements of NEPM 5304.8C oaracraoh 3.2.3 and separation requirements of paraaraph are not reautreo." , I The letter reference addresses only random failures in the fiber l optic cables. It does not address the potential for events (e.g. fires, missiles, etc.) that may cause loss of several fiber optic cables from different EFIC channels that share a raceway (OI G7-020-04). See also section 6.1.2.7-2. l Procedure Chance Notice (PCN) Rev. I dated 4/7/87 to NEP 5204.44 Rev. O (Ref. C23) gives as a reason for chance: "To allow the installation of new cables in existing enclosures where it is not possible to achieve the seoaration reoutrements of this design guide." The procedure change does not provide any cuidance or criteria to be applied for determining the acceptability of an exception to the separation guidelines. 6.1.2.9 Operational Readiness Test 2ng. The EFIC/AFW Operational readiness testing is in three major parts: STP-665 - EFIC Cabinet Functional Test. This test checi:s the operability of the as delivered EFIC cabinets and tne intercon- ! nections installed by ECN A3415E. l STP-666 - EFIC cold Functional Test. This tests checus the mooi-fications mace to the EFIC cabinets and all EFIC/AFW control ano monitorino functions. STP.667 - EFIC Hot Functional Test. This test checks the ability of EFIC to control OTSG level with the olant at cold shutdown and hot shutdown. The final controller settings will be established durina this test. Some additional testino was performea via wori: reauests and a separate test procedure (STP.667) will be used to test the time delay modules to be added at a later date. STP.665 was the only operational readiness testing that was 1 87-020 ) I 4 reviewed in detail because it was the only test that was com-pleted at the time of the audit. STP.666 and STP.667 were only reviewed for general content because the procedures were still in the review process. The operational readiness testina is comprehensive in both devel-opment and execution. The test procedure covers all EFIC func-tions and modules and the test log is complete. The number of test procedure changes reouired durino the test were minimal considering the scope of the testing and the changes were well documented and implemented using the appropriate plant proce-dures. I Some recommendations for improvements to the testino process follow. The recommendations do not imply any serious defects in the testing i l Include in the test log the NCRs written to correct defects found during the test and provide justification when no NCR is written. { l l Provide more specific information on DC involvement in the test-inq oroCess. Include more detail in the test objective section at the test outline. For example. a description of the overall scoue of the testing and the relationship to other test proceoures. or refer-ence to a readily available document that contains this informa-tion, would be useful. 6.1.2.10 NCRs Several NCRs written aaainst EFIC/AFW were reviewed for technical adecuacy of the resolution to the NCR s. The resolution of the NCR's was were satisfactory from a techni-cal standpoint except as noted below. In most cases the repair or rework instruc tions and inspection requirements were on the work reauest gener ated to correct the condition. Only one of the work I requests for the NCR's reviewed was completed and avail abl e for l review so the adequacy of these attributes could not be com-pletely determined. The completed work reauest ( WR 129488 ERef A903 for NCR S-6550 ERef A853) that was reviewed contained the necessarv instructions and inspection requirements.
- 1. NCR S-6171 ERef A793, addresses the reoair of two fiber actic cables and re-labeling t hern as spares. The disposition of the NCR indicated that the cables would not be retested as part of the repair but would be tested if the need arose to use them as active cables, there is no evidence of a mechanism was oiven to assure that thev would be retested when thev wer e e set: as s c r. i w 87-020 cables (OI 87-020-15)
- 2. NCR 6102 identifies the cause of the nonconformance as "Sepa-ration Criteria not established in site procedures". The action to prevent recurrence provides f or revi si ng some drawings for the mul ti pl e:t er s. The action does not address the cause. The response to RI-073 implies that the root cause in NCR 6102 was meant to reflect the conditions at the time of installation, which was the time of discovery. The NCR should clearly indicate j the actual situation. j Furthermore, two previous NCR's (S-4485 & S-4486) identify the same cause of non-conformance with the action to orevent recur-rence of " Nuclear Engineeri na Electrical will develop a separa-tion criteria interim position oaoer by Aoril 12. 1985. Final incorporation into desian criteria by July 1, 1985. The NCR's do not provide any indication of the comaletion of the action to prevent recurrence and were closed prior to completion of the action to prevent recurrence (01 87-020-8) 6.1.2.11 Vendor Documents The EFIC instruction manual written by the EFIC cabinet vendor was reviewed for completeness, consistency with system oenign and overall content. The manual, as supplied by the vendor, provided the necessarv information. The utility and convenience of the manual could be improved with some chances to style and organiza-2 tion. However, the recuired information was provided so the manual, as supplied by the EFIC vendor is considered to be ade-quate.
The manual, as supplied by the vendor, does not include SMUD j modifications to EFIC and no revi sions or warninos of any kind
)
are provided wi th the manual to indicate to the user what par-tions do not reflect the Rancho Seco configuration. The resoonse to RI-041 states that modi f i cati ons wil l be made to the EFIC manual that indicate the Rancho Seco configuration. However, the manual has been avai1able for use in the technic &l 1ibrarv since 1/12/07 and therefore could 1ead to the procaoation of mieintor-mation regarding certain aspects of EFIC. The unrevisea manual was used as a reference in technician trainino and in a surveil-lance procedure (OI 87-020-11) The resoonse to RI-041 states that vendor instruction manuals are not routinelv updated to reflect system triod i f i c at i on s . Therefore, all documents in the technical librarv have the ooten ti al for providino misleading i nf ormati on about all systems installed at Rancho Seco. Procedure AP 44 was written to address proper inclu-ston of the Rancho Seco configuration into vendor manuals. How-ever, this procedure does not address corrective action and the procedure does not address modifyino or supplementing the manu-
87-020 als. It only provides for identification of nortaons that are not applicable to Rancho Seco (OI 87-020-11). ; 6.1.3 Electrical Tie-in of Emergency Diesel Generators. NUREG 0737 AND NUREG 0696 were prepared and imposed on the l Nuclear Power Industry as a result of the TMI incident. A studv i by SMUD concluded that additions and modi fications to the Class 1 Power Distribution System were necessary as a resu1' of these ] ' regulations. This study for Rancho Seco concluded that additional , diesel generator capacity was needed to supply new loads and to l permit automatic startino of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps. l Additional motor control center (MCC) positions along with neces-l sary additions to the 4.16kV and 480V switchgear were also j required to supply the new and modified system loads. Additional battery capacity was called for as well as additions to the 120V l AC Vital Power System. l j As of cycle 5, the Electrical Distribution System is represented by Figure 1. which shows the orincipal buses and power sources. To authorize the necessary desion, p r ocur ernen t and construction, j ECN A-3660 (Re+ E-76) was issued. Sub ECNs. A through Z were j then issued to cover individual phases of the project. These l included installation of new equipment and temporary connections I between buses to maintain service for operatino emeroency eauto-ment until the new diesel oenerators are ready for service and the final bus and system arrangement accomplished. Interim #1 configuration durina cycle 6 is represented by Floure
- 2. This shows the addition of two 480V load centers 3A2 and 3B2.
These are connected bv bus ties to permit operation of new MCCs and other loads added to the new load centers. Interim #2 configuration at the start of cycle 7 is represented j in Fiqure 3. New 4.16kV buses 4A2 and 4B2 are added and supply 1 power to 480V load centers throuah transformers X43A2 and X43B2. The new 4.16kV buses are supplied from the startup transformers as are buses 4A and 49, however there is no diesel generator supply to them at this time. In the event of LOOP. (Loss of Offsite Power), buses 4A2 and 4B2 are isolated and the 480 volt bus ties are closed to supply power to emergency loads. I ECN A-3990Z Rev 2 (Ref E-27) and apoendin D of the revtsed DBR l outline all electrical system modifications schedul ed f or compl e- " tion before plant startuo. The final arrangement of the Electri-cal Di st ri but i on System is represented bv Fiaure 4. When this is completed there will be four independent trains, each with its own diesel generator with normal power supplied from either of j the startup transformers. With the failure of anv one train, the j system will meet the criteria set forth in IEEE 308. No caral- l leling of diesel generators is permitted thouch one unit may be 1
-s9-
)
87-020 paralleled with the main system when incomino power is available. Four 25 KVA Inverters and associated distribution panels were added under ECN A-3660 and placed in service. New batteries and chargers were also added to suppiv the expected Inverter and DC loads. A later ECN R-0955 (Ref E-35) has been issued to modifv the 12OV Vital AC Power Supply to make it an uninterruptible power supply. A constant voltage transformer with a static trans-fer switch and necessary circuit breakers will be includeo wi th each Inverter. 6.1.3.1 Evaluation of equipment. Two items were selected in the Electrical Distribution Svstem for i a complete evaluation of documentation af desion, purcnasano, auditing, installation and testing, with a walkdown to caserve final instal 1ation. The two electrical items selected were the l 480V motor control center S2A2 (Ref E-17) and Inverter S1A2 (Ref E-1) in the 120V Vital AC Power Supply System. Since there are several items of electrical equipment like or similar to these in the plant, it was felt this should result in a representative l evaluation. In addition, a cartial audit was conducted on other major items of equipment in the Electrical Distribution System { which included the new diesel oenerator tie-in, power source for j the AFW pump motors. the 4.160V swithaear associated wi th this i equipment and calculations and analyses relatino to their oper-ation. 6.1.3.2 Codes and Criter2 a. f Class 1E equipment conforms to 10CFR50.59. Design criteria includes IEEE-279 (1971), IEEE-308 (1974). IECC 323 (1974), IEEE 344 (1975). IEEE-384 (1977). 10CFR50 App A. Criterion 17 10 l CFR50 App R, National Electric Code, ICEA Publication No. P-46-426 and ICEA Publication No. P-54-440. Revision to the Technical Specification is called for in ECN A-3660 and ECN R-0955. l l There i s a concern with desi an revi ew. The DVR for ECN A-3660 (OI 87-020-06) covered the work outlined in sub ECN A-36602 wnich consisted cenerally of the removal or reconnection of interlocis and load secuencing related to the loadina of the diesel oenera-tors. calculations for settina the protective rel ays on the 480V bus ties and main DC feeders, and a summary review or work included in the sub ECN. Howeser. not incluaed in the DVR are items covered in the other sub ECNs A thru Y which cover the installation of two sections of 4.16kV switchgear, two sections of 480V switchaear with bus tres, four batteries with chargers, two dual output batterv chargers, four Inverters and three Motor Control Centers. (See OI 87-020-006). l l G7-020 l 1 6.1.3.3 Cal culations selected for review. ; i 6.1.3.3.1 Z-EDS-E0120 Short Circuit Studv. Electrical Gvstem (Ref E-40) The subject calculation is a comprehensive study to determine the fault currents occurrina at selected points in the. electrical system when a short circuit or around fault is applied. All significant contributions to the fault from rotating equioment and connected offsite energy sources must be considered in the study to assure accurate and reliable data. The results of the study are the basis for selectina interrupting ratings for cir-cuit breakers, bracing requirements for buses and other current carrying components, establish need for current l i mi ti ng devices to protect sensitive equipment and determining the heating effect on cables and other current carrving components during a fault. A revi ew of the prouram indicated that care was given to obtain-ing needed characteristics of all electrical components and that the list of equipment was apcarently verv comolete. A TE-502 Faultx computer program was used to perform the calculations. This is shown as a Bechtel procram which is included in the Bechtel Data Processino Library. (Ref. E-40) 6.1.3.3.2 Z-EGS-E0658 Size Verification of Diesel Generators. (Ref E-41) The objective of this study is to list all loads that mav reoui r e i power from the diesel cenerator units and to determine a l oac i t io sequence for each of the emergency conditions to be consicered. I This is important to determine that the diesel oenerators can accept the loads in the time frame reautred for plant safety without disturbing operation of the cenerators or disruoting power to connected loads. Starting the 1000 hp AFW pump motors from the diesel generator l units is a critical loading condition to be considered. Motor I terminal voltage must be at least 75% durina starting to assure a l natisfactorv start and not disable other loads operating at the time. Other loads connected to the diesel generator at the ti me of startina the AFW pumo will also affect the voltage from the j generator and must be considered. A test to demonstrate the I ability of the diesel generators to start and pick up emeroency Icads inc1udino the 1000 hp AFW pump motors f al1owing a simulated loss of offsite power is scheduled when the system is readv for operation.
)
Loads and times of application for the four diesel generators are given in Appendix D of the revised DDR for ECN A-3660 (Ref. ) E-27). Tables 11 and 12 in the Aapendix indicate that all loads ] l 1 4 l k
87-020 i requiring emeroency power can be accommodated with adeouate reserve capacity remaining in the diesel aenerators 6.1.3.3.3 Z-EDS-EOO76 System Voltace Study (Ref E-42) l 1 The objective of this study is to determine the minimum voltage on the primarv 2301:V system that will assure at least 75% start-ing voltage at the terminals of any plant motor under the most restrictive plant operating conditions. The studv showed that a minimum of 216kV on the primarv svstem would assure 75% voltace or greater when startina the 1000 hp AFW pumo motor. The test seems complete, however the studv has been out for revision for several months so new data that is beino considered and the results are not known at this time. The minimum voltage varies a small amount depending on system loadino and arrangement at the ti me of starting the pump. Bechtel computer procrem Voltenal EE 671 was used for the calculations. 6.1.3.3.4 Z-VBS-E0523 Load Study of 12OV Vital AC Power Svstem (Ref E-14) ] l The purpose of this study is to determine if all 12OV ac loads, both vital and non-vital, can be supplied from inverters S1A2 l thru S1D2. To best determine the loads involved, actual readinos were taken of each of the connected loads. After compilina
)
I these, it was determined that all loads could be supplied from the new inverters and not load any unit to more than 80% of its rating. These load values are considereo conservative and fur-ther study is to be made to more accurately determine their values. 6.1.3.3.5 Design Guide 5204.24 Cable Short Circuit Capacity (Ref E-43) i The purpose of this study is to determine the minimum cable size to be used in various plant systems so that during a system fault, conductor temperatures will not damage the insulation or the conductor. The method used is in accordance with the ICEA and the National Electric Code. Operatino temperatures assumeo for the study appeared reasonable. 6.1.3.3.6 Desian Guide 5204.27 Cable Deratino (Ref E-44) l l The ournose of this studv is to determine wnat deratino of cable current carrvino capacity (Resultimo in an increase in conuuttor sizo over that normally allowed bv code) snould oe made in vari-ous types of raceways, cable configurations and ambient tempera-tures so that conductor and insulation temperatures will not exceed the desion value during full load operation. ICEA recom-mended practices were followed.
87-020 6.1.3.4 Drawinas ) 6.1.3.4.1 Motor Control Center S2A2 Drawino E-105. Sh 25, Rev 2 (Ref E-19) is a One Line D'aaram t showing the bus and circuit breaker positions of MCC 52A2. It is located in the Aux 111arv Buildino and is Nuclear Safetv Related. l The loads supplied by this MCC are three groups of Pressurizer ' Heaters. The MCC was orocured under contract 8258 (Ref E-18) and installed and tested from Work Recuests written under ECN A-3660H (Ref E-17). Power for the MCC is supplied throuch breaker 3A206 l located in load center S3A2. The load center is in the Nuclear Service Electrical Bu11dina (NSEB) and is Nuclear Safety Related. The load center receives power from 4.16kV switchaear S4A2 through transformer X43A2. S4A2 can receive power from either of the startuo transformers or diesel oenerator GEA2. 6.1.3.4.2 Inverter S1A2 and panel S1A2-1 (Ref E-1) Drawing E8.02.1-6-0 (Ref E-11) is an overall schematic of the j Inverter showing in block diaoram form its functional components. j Drawing EB.03.1-5 (Ref E-10) is a vendor drawing showino electri- ' c al and mechanical details of panel S1A2-1. Drawino E-108, Sh 11, Rev 6 (Ref E-13) shows in One Line Diaaram form the original installation of the Inverter and panel under ECN A-3660T (Ref i E-1) and associated batteries, chargers, etc. I At plant startuo there were four Inverters , 1A thru 1D. located in the Auxiliary Baildino. Later, four I n ver t er s. S1A2 thru S1D2 l were added in the NSEB. The original Inverters experienced 1 several failures during operation and obtaini no repl acement carts ) became extremely difficult or imoossible since the sucolter was no longer in business. To improve reliability of the 120V Vi tal AC Power System, ECN RO955 (Ref E-12) was initiated. This calls for addino a constant vol t ece transformer, a static transfer switch and rel ated equipment with each of the new inverters to give four uninterruptible voltage supplies. l l l Load study (Ref E-14) showed that the 120V ac loads sucolied from Inverters 1A thru 1D can be transferred to Inverters S1A2 thru S1D2 and still have amole reserve caoacity available. Drawinos E-108, Sh 11, Rev 5 (Ref E-39) and E-108,-Sh.12. Rev 7 (Ref E-45) show in One Line diaoram form these chances. Acdi ti ons will be made in the NSEB to connect the constant voltaae transformers, static switches, and other eauipment. Panels S1A thru S1D will be reconnected to obtain power from Inverters SIA2 thru S1D2. 6.1.3.4.3 Diesel Generators. 87-020 I Drawina E-104, Sh 6. Rev 0 (Ref E-64) is a One Line Diaaram showina the connection of Di esel Generator GEA2 to breaker posi-tion 4A202 on 4.16kV bus S4A2. Drawing E-104 Sh 8. Rev 0 (Ref E-63) is a One Line Diagram showino power and relaying circuitry at generators GEA2 and GEB2. The power connections have been completed in the 4.16kV switchaear cubicles and are tagged open and cleared. The Diesel Generators are still undergoina cualifi-cation tests so are not connected to the system. 6.1.3.4.4 AFW Pump Motor P-319 Drawing E-104 Sh 6, Rev 2 (Ref E-37) shows the addi ti on of AFW pumo motor feeder from 4.16kV oanel 54A to breaker position 4A205 l on 4.16 kV panel S4A2. The breaker position on panel S4A2 is tagaed and cleared for pullina new cables to the motor. With this arrangement generator GEA2 can supply power to P-319 oump ! motor when normal power is not available. 6.1.3.5 Configuration control / Document Control There is concern about the system of drawina control ano the l method of handling revisions and adding new DCNs (DI 87-020-09). At any aiven time there may be three or more versions of a draw-ing available and each version is valid for a specific chase of , work. A review of the system and our understanding of how it I functions is as follows:
- 1. When a revision to a drawing is mace, the current approved revision of the drawing is incued with the DCN chances snown on i the drawing and an approval block with the ECN ano DCN numbers l
included.
- 2. The engineer initiating the DCN is responsible for reviewing all outstanding DCNs on the affected drawing (s) to ascertain that l the proposed chances will not conflict with other completed ;
(unincorporated DCNs) and work in proaress (active work DCNs). Drawings for review (pink) are available in a sort by DCNs and a sort by drawina number. Yellow drawinos (work completed and DCN closed) are al so avai labl e f or revi ew.
- 3. When the drawino is issued for construction it is olaced in the " pink" stick files.
- 4. When the DCN is complete and sicned off the revision is entered on the cricinal vellum, information added in the revision block and a new aperture film preoared.
To make this plan totally effective, a maior resuonsibilitv is placed on the engineer to be sure he has touched all bases. It is equally incumbent on enaineers responsible for other DCNs to the same drawina to be sure that details of their work is prop-
87-020 i I erly documented and readily available. Total attention to these details is reouired of all involved engineers to be sure no problems result. When desion is performed in off-site locations it becomes even more difficult to monitor and control the draw- , inas and assure full coordination. ) Two drawinos used in the vertical audit illustrate the reasons for these concerns. These are:
- 1. Drawing E-108,Sh 12. Rev. 12 One Line Di agram ,
120V ac System Panels j i This drawing includes panel S1A2-1 which is associated with the j 25 KVA Inver ters. The DCN and ECN for this revision was added to revision 7 of the above drawing. Since that date. 7 DCNs have been added to to make a total of 20 DCNs outstancino. This could be a major task to not only review the active DCNs when preparino the new DCN but to be coonizant of others added later. l 1 i l l I
- 2. Drawino E-104 Sh 6, Rev 3 r
One Ltne Liaoram j 4160 Volt Switchgear S4A2 j i 1 Two DCNs on different ECNs were used to get the desired informa- j l', tion on S4A2. They are: 1 ECN A-3748, DCN 4B, E-104. Sh 6. Rev 0 ECN A-5415M. DCN 10B, E-104, Sh6, Rev 2 I It has been the oractice until just recentiv to out the active l DCN and ECN numbers on the aperture card of the affected derwina. This is no lonaer beina done so it is incumbent on the enaineer to carefully check the pink drawino stici files for a last
. ut active ECNs aoainst the drawino or the information can he obtained from SDC (Site Document Control).
6.1.3.6 Testing. l l Motor Control Center S2A2 was installed prior to initial oper-ation of the plant. Testino of the circuit breakers and buses I was performed in actordance with test procedures EM.132A. EM.132B, EM.132C (Ref E-32). EM.164 (Ref E-50) and STP.907A (Ref E-51). These procedures include references to Manufacturers bulletins and recommendations and to NEMA Standards Publications No. AP 2 and No. AP 3. Administrative procedures related to Work Requests. Safety clearances. Test authorization and Caution taas
- are referenced. Test record forms are included for recording test results, test instruments used for the test, participating w_____________________-_____-_----_-- __
87-020 personnel and sion-offs for all phases of the test. Procedure AP.33 (Ref E-61) relates to responsibility for storing, issuing and calibration of all measurement and test equipment used for the tests. Test data for MCC S2A2 was reviewed and appropriate data was < recorded and witnessed. Defective comoonents were noted and I later corrected or replaced. f Distribution panel SiA2-1 included with inverter S1A2 contains equipment similar to that in MCC S2A2 and was tested using the same procedures as for S2A2. Testing of both S2A2 and S1A2-1 showed no test made on soare or unused breaker posi tions (01 87-020-16). One breaker reolaced on S1A2-1 had no record of testino. I n i t i a.1 testino to verify that the equipment is initially acceotable seems desirable. When thev j are placed in service, a test at that time should'also be mace. i The Inverter S1A2 (and S1B2. S1C2 and 51D2) was installed, tested and placed in service in 1983. Testing was done at that time but 1 new procedures are in preparation in connection with the addt- ) tions and modifications under ECN R-0955. The El oor I n v er t.er ) Instruction Manual is ,not aporoved at this time so testina and l operating procedures are'not approved nor available for audit. File No. E 8.02.1-11 has been assioned to the Instruction Manual. AP.80 (Ref E-73) and AP.81 (Ref E-74) designate responsibility 1 for selecting and training personnel for the various positions and functions. l
- es 6 -
87-020 START-UP # 1
"" START-UP #. 2 em mm wu ,
mw mm
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) N.C. .')N.O.. I) N.O. ' ) N.C.
GEA GEB mm ' wu mm [)N.C. 3A 480 V
)N.C.
38 ~ NOTES: N.C.= NORMdLLY CLOSED N.O.= NORMALLY OP EN SAFETY BUSES CYCLE 5 SYSTEM ' 1 (May 1981 to February 1983) FIGURE # I ~
,=
'87-020 .
START-UP #1 START-UP # 2 wx wa ,- er m er m mw ev- m
- 6. 9 K V 4.16 KV REACTOR COOLANT . CIR C. WAT E R -
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N.O. 3A2 1 * ' I)N.C. l)N.C. 1)N.C. l 1)N.C. . 4 SAFETY BUSES - CYCLE 6 < CONFIG URATION ., (INTERIM # 1) (August 1983 to March 1985) FIGURE
#2
87.020 . START-UP f#1
. wW wW START-UP #2 -
men mm mm mm l . . G.9 KV 4.16 KV l REACTOR CIRC. WA TER COOLANT PP , PP wa NUCL. SERV. l-mm SUPPLY . 4.16 KV - s . s s N.Q '
}N.C. }N.C]N.Q ' } N.C. } N.O. }NO.'}N.C.
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- k. N.C.
s _ ww f a - a __ GEA GES
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M wa w .u wa em X43A2 m ym u m X4382
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- N.C. ' NC '
N.C SAFE TY BUS ES - - - CYCLE 7 CONFIGURATION ~
,g- .
(INTERIM # 2 ) (Began June 1985) . FIGURE # 3
87-020
-I . .
"" START-UP # I u~ STA RT-UP #2 .
mm mm 1 mm. m. m 6.9 K V ' .l 4.16 KV 4 REACTOR COOLANT PP ' CIRC. WATER ' PP t ww NUCL. SERV. mm SUPPLY la 4.16 KV .
~
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. 38 382 l
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., SAFETY BUS ES FINAL CONFIGURATION-s , \*
FIGURE-# 4
.70-4
[ ' o.- 1 87-0201 . l b 480V FROM 480V FROM j 480V FRCM ~ MCC S2A3 MCC S2,Al.
;. MCC'S2A3 i 1
( Y
- f.
- 1 BATTERY BATTERY- BATTERY.'
CHARGER CHARGER.
~ ~ f CHARGER -
H48A2- H4BA2C2 H48C2 BATTERY BATTERY - _A2 C2
- ~
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< ) PNL. ) ) ) -)J ) <
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, , 125VDC, 600 A .
125VOC/120VAC )
' j--! W, 60 Hz.m ; . r 25 KVA X
- litVER:TER .
INVERTER _ '
? '
( S1 A2 - SIC 2
) .
)
120 V AC, 2 25 A'. PNL. SI A2 - PNL. SIC 2 1 Ih0 VAC,. 225 A - _.12. 5 V ~ B AT T E R I E S _ A2 AND C2 (' FINAL CONFIGUR ATION ' l FIGURE #5 '
*1 .
am .
. 4 ,e.
- I 87-020 6.1.4 Aux i l l ar y Turbine System and Hot Lea Level / Steam Generator Level Measurino System 6.1.4.1 Introduction 1
In addition to EFIC and TDI Tie-in, the Vertical Audit incinaed a ; limited examination of changes to the Auxiliarv Turbines svstem l and Hot Leg Level / Steam Generator Level Measurino system. 6.1.4.2 Evaluation Method One Design Chance Notice (DCN) from each of the two systems was selected for review relative to the adecuacy of the design and consistency with other documents necessary for successful instal-lation and operation of the equioment specified by the DCN. The ! ECNs selected for review were as follows: Hot Leg Level / Steam Generator Level Measuring System ECN R-0308, the Desian Basis Report (DBR), Safety Review loa 741 (Ref.C201.C202 & C203), and ECN A-5415B (Ref.C212). Steam Trap - Auxiliary Turbine System ECN A-3062 and DBR(Ref.C225 & C226) 6.1.4.3 Observations s Hot Leg Level / Steam Generator Level Measuring System It can not be concluded that the level measurino system will perform its function under all conditions unless the followino concerns are addressed. It should be noted that the measurement of the water level in hot leg and the steam oenerators is a vi t e l input to the plant coerators and the SG 1evel measurement is also a vital input to EFIC. Therefore, a reliable. proceriv f ic.n c t i on-inq system is necessary for the safe operation of the olant. WP219BP Rev.25 dated 7/14/86 "Heati na Venti lati ng and Air Conci-tioning Svstem" states on page A14-6. "During normal plant oper-ations, the normal coolina units are placed in service as required to maintain building temperature below 120 deo.F (5 units normally)." This appears to be an average containment bull air temperature which is under the control of the operator or requires . operator action to be maintained. The assumed starting temperature for calculation Z-RCS-IOO59 is 120 dea.F, which is the temperature specified in the HVAC operating procedures auoted above. There are two problems that must be resolved relative to , the insulation of instrument lines and to the qualification of ' class IE equipment in the containment (OI 87-020-04). i
- 1. The temperature used for qualification or analysis must be the temperature at the location of the eculoment, not the containment 3
I l
1 i 87-020 l bulk air temperature.
- 2. Unless that part of the containment where the HVAC system is ,
required to maintain the bulk air temperature at 120 deoF. maxi- I mum is redundant safetv class I., the temperature reached during l the time the system is not operating must be included- in the l qualification requirements or in an analysis such as the reauire-ments for insulation on the instrument lines. i.e. The assumed initial temperature of the lines. Calculation Z-RCS-IO124 Rev.O on page 22 states ".... Assumino the maximum containment temperature durino normal plant operation 120deg.F..." This appears to be the averaoe bulk air temoera-ture, not the temperature where the transmitter is located. In i addition, on pace 16. the specific oravity of water at 120deg.F ; was used without reference to why this temperature was selected. This also appears to be containment temperature, but it should be l the specific aravity of water at the calibration temperature (OI i 87-020-04). 1 Although the new excess flow check valves are instelled under j A-5415B Rev.2, the proper function of the valve is an essential l to the water level measurement. The concern is that the excess flow check valve has not been adeouately cualified and there is no basis for setting the flow rate.. see section 6.1.2.5. (OI { 87-020-05). 4 l The following are additional observations relative to Calculation J Z-RCS-10124 Rev.0: (OI 87-020-04) { A. The data source for the instrument line elevations anc length of uninsulated portion of instrument lines is not given. B. Section V.D.6 of the calculation states that "There -is no error due to overpressure as the static pressure limit of the transmitter is 4000 psi and maximum process pressure is expected to be 2200 psi (RCS Press.)". This statement is not true for a j level transmitter. Overpressure occurs when the applied differen-tial pressure exceeds the instrument ratino. The vendor data sheet (Attachment 1 to the calcul ati on) gives the overpr essur e effect as (+ -) 2% of the upper range limit for overpressure , events less than the static pressure ratino of the instrument". l Anv event that causes the differential pressure to exceed the upper range limit will therefore cause a 2*/. er r or . C. The calculation in V.A is not clear. The calculation. as perfnrmed. is based on the relationship between the i nsul a t e.o ano uninsulated portions of the reference and measurement lees in some region. A clear definition of the basi s of the calculation j is not given. L
1 87-020 The response to RI-110 provides an adequate technical basis for. items A and C. However, the response to item B does not address l the potential for overpressure durino instrument calibration. Also, the response does not include a . corrective action or an action to prevent recurrence. D. Various calculations use 120 DeqF as the base instrument.line temperature. A basis for this value is not oiven. The casts should be the ausumed instrument line temperature ut;ed for es t a t>- lishing instrument calibration conditions. See RI-110 and section 6.1.2.4-1. The minimum qualification test flow aiven in Appendix A, sec.F of calculation Z-ZZZ-IO132, Rev.O. " Qualification Evaluation of , Excess Flow Check Valves Cem-tec EFV-250-STS EC" dated 2/2/87 is j 4.5 liters / min. However drawing I-1195. Sht.1, DCN R-0380 (Ref.C205) calls for the valve to be set for 3 liters / min. The required flow rate appears to be less than the minimum aualified flow rate. Steam Trap - Auxiliary Turbines System The steam trap design appears satisfactory. The installation has not been started therefore the observations are based on the proposed design. The only observation of significance was that the location of the traps are such that access for ser vi ci n g is very limited. 6.2 Qualification of Euuipment 6.2.1 Introduction The program for qualification of eauipment imoortant ta safety at Rancho Seco is divided into two parts. These are. Environmental Qualification (EO) and Seismic Eauipment Qualification GER) . 3 The individuals involved, the methods acolied and the record ' storage and retrieval strateay for the two parts of the procram are all quite different. For this reason, the observations on program strenoths or where iniprovements could be made, are pre-sented bv contrasting the two proarams. The audit was conducted considering that a program for the cuali-fication of equipment should include the followina main elements 1 A. Identifying each piece of eautoment deslanated ae, i mp or t an t -- t o
-sa-fety.
B. Defining the total l i f etime envi ronnient to which the eauipment may subjected. l
87-020 i C. Maintaining auditable, documented, evidence that each oiece of eauipment designated as important-to-safety is qualified to I preform its intended function under normal operating conditions. l under increased environmental stress resulting from abnormal j operating conditions. and under increased environmental stress I resulting from accidents. l i D. Maintaining all desianated eauipment in a cualified condition through an on going program that is defined, documented and audi tabl e. The program should include provisions for replacement parts, new equipment and plant modifications, j i Although not considered part of the audit, it should be noted j that environmental qualification and seismic equipment aualifica- ) tion constitute only part of a total plan necessarv for maintain- j ino equipment important-to-safety in a safe operable condition. ) 6.2.2 Evaluation Method 4 The EQ and SED program segments were examined from the procram-matic standpoint by reviewing the documents that establish and control the implementation of the system. System execution was investigated by the selection of random samoles from the tnree systems selected for the audit. The sampl es s el ect eo were as follows:
- 1. EFIC ECN A-5415J Flow Control Valves FV 20531 & 20532
- 2. EFIC ECN A-5415J Gate Valves HV 20581 & 20582
- 3. EFIF ECN A-5415F Control Modules H 45D2A & H45D2B
- 4. EFIC ECN A-5415W I/P Transmitter FY 20527 & 20528
- 5. TDI Electrical Tie-In ECM 3660H 480V Motor Cntl.Cotr. S2A2
- 6. TDI Electrical Tie-In ECN 3660T 25 KV Inverters S2A2
- 7. ECN A-3062 (Vendor Manual) M19.51.2-IMDI
- 8. ECN R-0380 Insulation for level inst. lines ,
I The objective of the review was to find and examine the EQ and SEO records for each sample component, where applicable. It was also an objective to examine work reauests to verify traceability l of documentation of components actually installed. j 6.2.3 Observations l The fal1owinq constitute the detai1 observat1onn. Prcarammatic concerns are included in the summary and conclusions below. , i
- 1. The DBR for A-54ISK. Section III.A,- second paraoraph statos that "the wire used for this chance will be purchased commercial grade" and the forth paragraph states that "the new L.E.D.'s will I be ourchased commercial grade". There is no SMUD proaram for j "dedicattnq" commercial arade eauipment for use to clau JE I systems. (OI 87-020-14)
)
87-020 1 I
}
l
- 2. ECN A5415 indicates that the computer room ooerates in a mild environment, therefore environmental qualification is. not required. Equipment important to safetv-located in a mild envi-ronment is not exempt from environmental ocalification. (OI l l
87-020-13)
- 3. A new control room floor penetration and support for the new HISS panel for EFIC is orovided. The curb is desionated QA and Seismic Class 1. The curb per-se can not be so cl assi fi ed. This is not a structural problem, so this item was not included in an open item. However, it.does indicate a misunderstanding of the meaning of the classification.(RI 030) i
- 4. There is no evidence that designs of ECNs E, F, J, W and AG have been design verified for seismic and separation. With minor exceptions, these are all cuality class 1 and seismic category 1 I systems. ECNs 5415 E, F. J. W. and AG.(OI 87-020-06).
- 5. Environmental \ Configuration Control-The MEL is not updated to include all of the new EFIC taa num-bers, including the "H"sdesianation in the ENVIRONO field. This results in a loss of conf'iquration control for EQ equipment beino installed, since MIMS will not accept tag numbers for work requests which are not in MEL. The following problems have been identified: Lack of EO review. Loss of traceability, Loss of work history for each individual taa number and loss of some OA/QE/QC.
acti vities. (OI B7-020-09)
- 6. ECN A-5415F Sect-ion 2.1-There are no environmental records for Control Modules H45D2A &
H45D2B because the modules are located in a mild environment. This position is not justified. The modules do recuire environ- j mental qualification tooether with substantiating documenta-tion.(See section 6.2.4). ) 1 i The seismic qualification records for the two specific components 1 i selected for review were not found. The Control Modules were- l apparent 1v aualified as part of the entire cabinet but the tag ! numbers are not the same as those beina used. A cross reference l with a si mi 1 ar i ty justification should be or ovi ded. The cabinet . qualification record Sec.2.1 does not apcear to be comolete. Examples are. item 3, no 1ab mountina detei1s avai 1 abl e , itom 4 a,b & c are listed as unknown and item 8 Itsts the " Method of i verification: Public domain computer prooram". These apparent discrepancies have not been justified. (OI 87-020-15) L________--______. - _ _ _ - - - . - -
'l 87-020 l
i 1
- 7. ECN A-3660 Rev.5. Paragraph F of the DBR defines the environ- )
mental conditions for the new Nuclear Service - El ectrical Build- I ing. The conditions specified are, in accordance with SMUD' ! definition, a mi ld envi romment. The following sts.tement is made
]
in the DBR. "New class 1 electrical distribution equipment is qualified for these conditions". In view of the fact that there is no mild environment equipment
)
qualification program at SMUD. the following information was l requested: J I i A. Who or what organization is responsible to assure the Class 1 j electrical distribution eauipment is actually cualified as com- ! mitted? B. Considering the factors given in page 3, paragraph 4 of the NRC Generic Letter No. 82-09. how is the ceriodic surveillance, testing and maintenance program accomplished? The Environmental Qualification arouo acknowledged that a compre-hensive mild environment program needs to be developed. (OI 87-020-13) 1 6.2.4 EQ and SEC ' i
\
t The records maintained by the Environmental Qualification aroup j and the Seismic Qualification aroun were found to be comolete anu I thorough. From the standpoint of record retention and ac c ess i - bility l l the methods used were outstanding. In addition, the j technical basis for Environmental Qualification maintained by the EQ group is very well documented. Dv comparison, the technical basis used by the Seismic Qual i f i cati on group, is not as well documented. At Rancho Seco, a component designated as class 1 " Equipment Imoortant to Safetv" is cualified for the environmental condi-tions in zones defined as a " harsh environment" in Enoineerino Report No.EPRT-E0187 Rev.O. The cautoment tag number, class and zone in which the equipment is located. is defined in thn'ECN, DBR and associated drawanas. A " Cross Reference of Environmental Equipment Dual i f i cati on Files For Eauipment Important to Safetv" is maintained (Engineering Report No. ERPT-E0177). It is noted that the accuracy of this document depends entirely on the proper , equipment classification defined in the ECN and DBR. It spoears I that the omission of a safety class automati cal l y places the equipment in a non-safety class. It is also noted that in accor-dance with ERPT E0187, environments less severe than the limitt i listed below, are defined as mild environments and no Environmen-tal anal ysi s as performed and no component l evel records are maintained for cauipment designated as "Imoortant to Safety". A
i l 87-020 mild environment has been defined as one less severe than: Tem-cerature, 122 Deq.F Pressure, Atmospheric; Relative Humidity, 90% and Radiation, 10*4. This position is not consistent with NUREG-0588 reautrements. The definition of a mild environment was actually intended to define the lower limit of the harsh environment, not the actual environmental conditions of a mild environment. Most of the electrical and electronic eouipment imoortant to safety are located in buildinas that do not have hiah temperature /oressure lines and have HVAC systems that result in actual environments much less severe than the lower limit of harsh environment. This distinction is well understood bv the Environmental Qualification group. However, it appears that some enoineers interpreted the ; definition as an exclusion of environmental reoutrements for j equipment located in a mild environment. (See RIO24i. , s In any case, SMUD's position on mild environmental qualification is not adequate because it is based on 10 CFR 50.49. which states in paragraph 3. environmental cuali-fication of electronic eauipment important to safety located in a mild environment are ; not included within the scoce of this section". Thus 10 CFR 50.49 can not be used as a basis for exempting environmental qualification of electronic equioment important to safety located , in a mild environment particularly where the definition of mild j environment has been defined arbitrary and is not consistent with ! the following quotation from 10 CFR 50.49, "A mild environment is an environment that would at no time be significantly more severe l than the environment that would occur during normal p l ant oper-- ation, including anticipated coerational occurrences." SMUD defines a mild environment as one thrt is less severe than a temperature of 122Dec.F. and relative humiditv less than 90%. According to the SMUD defini ti on of mild environment, any area ! can be operated, on a continuous basis. at 122degF. and 90% relative humidity without considering thermal aceing, end of life seismic qualification or any other asoects of environmental qualification. SMUD's position on a mild environment is cer-tainiv not compatible with the definition in 10 CFR 50.49. The NRC generic letter No. 82-09 states on oaae 2. parearech 3, item A. "In CLI-80-21, the Commission stated that unless there were sound reasons to the contrarv, replacement ecutoment snould be cualified to the standards set forth in Cateoorv 1 of NUREG-0588." On page 3, paraaraph 4. at the bottom af the pace it states "For replacement and new eauioment, the licensee must also establish and document the environmental desian basis for the equipment locations." In addition, IEEE 279-1971 in paraoraph 4.4 states " Type test data or reasonable enaineeri na ex trapolati on based on test data shall be available to verify that protection system eculpment ___ ____-____________ -_ - _ _ ~
l l 87-020 l l i shall meet, on a continuing basis, the performance determined to j be necessarv for achieving the system requirements", and IEEE 323-1974 states "a short period of accelerated thermal acina merely simulates service life: however, it produces some deterio-ration and, when followed bv vibration may produce realistic 4 failure modes. Since the equipment related to EFIC ECN A-5415E is an entirely new system it falls within the meanina of the ouotations above. l In any case, there is no technical justification for providina environmental qualification of equipment important to safety only if it is located in a harsh environment, particularly where a , mild environment is defined as 122 DeqF. and 90% relative humi- j ditv. ! It should be noted that electrical and electronic ecuipment l important to safety may have been cualified to the actual operat- l ing environmental conditions. One example is the motor control i centers 52A2 and S2B2 and the battery charper H4BN1 which are ) located in the Auxiliary Buildino. Paracraph F. pace 19 of the {' DBR for A3660.Rev.5 (Ref.C240), states that the equipment is qualified to 50-80 Dec.F and 20-95% relative humidity. Also stated in paragraph F. is the following. "The cualified temoera-ture rating of the eauipment in the NSEB will not be exceeded while operating with the normal or essential HVAC units .... ". Assuming all equipment located in mild environments has been qualified to the actual environment (not subject to HELB) and the records for the components are retrievable. it is l i l.el v that. a few exceptions, the problem may be limited to the absence or a i set of records for electrical and electronic important to sefety located in a mild environment that is similar. thouoh less com-plex, to those of the harsh environment. A second major concern is the absence of a proaram for "dedicat-ing" commercial grade electrical and electronic ecuipment for use in systems designated as class 1E. (See OI 87-020-014). The primary problem in environmental ciual i f i c at i on is that there l are no records, at the component level, for electrical and elec-tronic eauipment important to safety located in a mild environ-ment or a procram in place for "dedicatino" commercial orade eauipment. (See 01 87-020-013 and DI G7-020-014). I J l 6.3 Procurement and Material Control i The purpose of this aspect of the audit was to determine if procurement and material control activities, pertinent to Quality class 1 mechanical and electrical components and pipina materials installed in the Auxiliary Feedwater Svstem (which is part of the 6
87-020 total EFIC Svstem) as recuired bv sub ECN 5415J. and class 1E electrical equipment i nst al l ed to support the TDI electrical ti e-ir' as requi red by sub ECN A-3660 N, P, T, and U, were s ati s-factorily implemented. The items selected were: three (3) DC Motors Serial Numbers RR O2812, 813, and 814 (P.O. GR-92305): Two (2) four inch solenoid flow control valves. Identification Numbers (I.D. No.s) FV-20531 i and 32 (P.O.) 46168:two (2) six inch motor operated cate valves. I.D. No.s SFV 20577B and 78B which were oricinally procured vi a : contract No. 8939 and subsequentiv returned to the vendor via Contract No. A-640 for replacement of operators etc., and are not j I.D. No.s HV-20581 and 82: two (2) DC Valve electric motor actu- l ators, SN;n L390700 and 701 (Contract No. A-640), pipe spool pieces (e.o. Heat No.s SP1030 and SD 1011 etc.), ourchased via P.O. No. GR 86020 (ECN 5415J) and four (4) 25KVA inverters. MK l i No.s S1A2, B2, C2 and D2, purchased via contract 8257 (sob ECNs 3660, N, P, T, and U). The audit commenced bv first referr2no to the Master Equipment List at has been received on site (e.o. j Qual 1tv class. Code class. SMUD Purchase Order Number. Contract Number, type equipment, Identi f i cati on Number, manufacturer, applicable specification system service. ECN number, etc. and Quality Engineertno's Heat Number Control Lao which provides heat j numbers for piping materials, that were recei ved , the RIDR No.. l P.O., and Contract No.s.1 I Therefore, utiliring the purchase order numbers (P.O. No.s) and Contract Numbers listed on the MEL and the Heat No. Control Loo documentation packanes for the aforementioned items selected for audit were requested from Records Manacement to determine if SMUD and vendor documentation was readily retrievable and traceable to the items selected, properly acoroved, lecible, comolete and adequate as required (Ref. D2,D4.D6, D11. D15). 1 The results of this request and review revealed that in one instance Records Manaaement could not readily retrieve all docu-mentation packaaes due to the MEL not providino adeouate informa-tion. This condition was brought to the attention of approuri ate personnel and subsecuentiv corrected, but warrants additional investigation to determine the extent of thi s condi tion (see OI 87-020-017). This documentation cachace was eventually retrieved for review. It was ady,tionally noted after retrieval of the documentation packaoe for tne cioing material that the Heat No. Cont"oi Loo was not bei no proper a v mai ntai ned and that there wer e no instrutt; ore regardino its use, content or who had the responsibility tor mai nt ai ni no the 100 (Ref er ences D14 D15). The Heat Number Control Loo ts a mechanism that has been out in place so that one can trace the item to its applicable documentation packace when required, and is also used by Quality Control when they are
-GO-t-____________--
i
.87-020 performing subsecuent inspection on the items. (01 No.
87-020-018 provi des further details.) Each documentation packaae (either. on file or microfilm) was reviewed to ensure that thev contained the Purchase Recuests (prs) P.O.s. contract documents and Receivina insoection Data Reports as required (Ref. D2). prs were not on file f or contract numbers 8257 and A-640, which .C were for the 25 KVA inverters and for the rework of val ves HV-20581 and 82. One PR was eventuallw retrieved f rom the Pur-chasing Department. However, there whs no evidence that it had been approved by 04. The other PR could not be located and / therefore it could not be determined if i t was consistent wi th the contract documents or if it had been approved by OA. (See 01-020-019) The SMUD prs and P.O.s that were on file or on micro-film were checked and it was verified that review an d. approval was performed as recuired (e.g.. QA approval). However', approval 'I of contract documents bv QA was not evident for' Contract No.s 8257. A-640, 8939. (See OI 87-020-0,19 for further details.) , [ l prs, P.O.s. and contract d ocumere t were next reviewed to ensure they were consistent with one andther ama that they sottsfact-orily addressed the technical and auality requirements contained in the applicable Specifications as required; no discrepancy were noted (Ref. D2). m The prs. P.O.s. and contract documents were also checked aaainst the MEL and aoolicable ECN to verifv that the Quality class and Code class as applicable was corrects e.o.. ECN No. 5415J required new piping Materials to be O Class 1. ASME' III Code Class II, 1977, Summer 1978 Addenda, which was consi stent wi th , P.O. GR-86020 etc.). No discrepancies were noteu. , i Each documentation package was reviewee also to .ver i f y that Receivina Inspection Data Reports had been cenerated and aporoveo prior to the receipt of the items, ano that the inspection and acceptanca requirements on the RIDRs adeouately satisfied the technical and quality requirements delineated in 'the purchase documents and specifications. RIDRs were also checked to deter-mine if the items inspected were adeaustelv identified, and that I inspectson/ acceptance criteria was verified by the insoector and l subsequent 1v approved by the Quality Enoineer pricr to final i acceptance and release for installation. Furthermore. Vendor ! documentation was reviewed f or all of the iteca selected f to l ascertain the edeauacy of the insocctions performed and to deter-mine that it was traceable to the items received. The documents-tion was checked aoainst the P.O., contract and specification (s) to ensure all vendor requirements had been met (Ref. D3 D4 D6). j j The results of this review revealed several discrepancies, as it
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1 i ______ i
i 1 1 ( 87-020 l 4 l 1 l was noted that in some instances RIDRs had not been oenerated as reauxred; some RIURs did not adeountely identify what was l inspected: the accept /unaccept status for an insoection on a RIDR l was not indicated: IEEE Code reauire.,ents imposed upon a vendor i per the aovernino speci fication were n'ot consistent with what was identified on the vendor's documentation and associated RIDR: i attachments to RIDRs which i den ti f i ed items inspect ed were ! marked over with vel 1ow hioh 1ighter thus making some of the items identified as being insoected illegible additionally, I vendor and SMUD documentation in some instances was inadeaunte or missina from the files at Records Manaaement (see OI 07-020-20). l Vendor's documentation that was complete was reviewed in depth to determine that all of.the specifiqd ruauirements were met. E~ or example, P.O. GR-86020 dated 7/31/86., r eaui red pipino matyrtp}s to be of a specific si;:e , lenoth, configuration, code cl p s. grade, type and schedule which was verified to be consistent ylth i the Manufacturers Certified Material Test Report. Mill 79st Reports, Certificates of Conformance, etc. Furthermore, mater 2.l als reauired bv this P.O. as well as others were chvsicailv checked at its i nst al l ed l ocati on and it was ver i f 2 ee - al so by virtue of the stamoina/markina (e.o. heat numbers; to be tnat which was reauired by the P.O. and as identified on the manufac-turer's documentation (Ref. D4). O As a result of the documentation probl ems noted i n 0 F 87- 020-020. the method of transmitting Procurement Documents to Records Management by Ouality Assurance was rev2 ewed to determine if compliance to the OA Procram reautrements was beino achieved ( Ref ., D6). It was noted that GA wati in the process of innuina a . departmental procedure which addressed the requirements for ' tr an73.i t t a l of documents to Records Manactment. The procedure has n4A requenti v been issued. However. the method of transmitttno ] 1 documents by DA to Records Manacement prior to the issuance of this procedure and in some cases after the issuance (e.g., Trang-mittai Gheet No. 438 dated 7/7/67) zu inedecuate as documents ay'e l forms! /as not beina adeouatelv identified on the transmittal required. The method of tr ansmi t t i na documents to Records Man-- agement could have been a contributor.c factor for those that were m2snino or mi sf i 1 ed. (See OI 87--0207021.) l The SMUD Accroved Sunoliers Lisf (ASL) was reviewed and it an verified that the Vendors who suppl i ed the items for the afo,e-mentioned P.O.s and Contract documents relative to ECH 5415J were approved by SMUD (Ref. D1). However. these vendors ta date have
, never been' formally audited by SMUD at their facilities to deter- !
mine that thev .nre sati siactor11 v 2molemention theie evor oveo DA ' procrams (Rei.,D9). Furthermore. the ' method of ecoraal does r.a t meet the reausrements defined an Ah!SI M45.2.13 and idRC Informa- , tion Notice 86-21 (See OI 072020-022). j l \ l 1 i j-Q:~ \ r m____________________________.______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ ._._ _ _ _ _ _ _
l' D l H I
^\
87-020
, M1e a Ni th respect to the vendor that supolied the Class 1E KVA
' i r .f er t er s , it was noted that they are currently on the ASL as a j result of audit No. O-737, dated 10/2/85. However, et the time i this equipment was beino procured from the vendor. SMUD, per the results of a source inspection and audit No. 074, took the vendor off the ASL. The rationale for doing so war because of the deficiencies noted with the vendors program as well as hardware i deficiencies . There is no documentation on file to substantiate i that the deficiencies in audit reoort No. 074 were resolved. (See f 01 87-020-023).
Training, P.c at i f i cati on and Certification records for the Quality Control In pectors who performed the receipt inspections on the af oremen^ 1 oned items were revi ewed to determine compliance to f SMUD OP.Prograr r. requirements (Ref. D5, D12, D13). l Each inspector's file was checked to determine if it contained a resume, exper.tunce record, eve examination, trainino attencance records, pr o f i c i erit y test. and certifications signed by a Level III indicating thut inspectors were suitably cualified to perform l inspections based on toelr previous experience and examination resulti, j i i The r epql t s of this review revealed that certifications for one inspect-.r were not on file and that in another instance an j inspector had perf ormed inspections for which he was not certi- i fied to perform. It was additionally noted that trainino records ! l did not demonstrate that some inspectors received aV1'recuired I training, and that there are two trainino sessions that are , l (.urrently out of date (see OI 87-020-024). ! Lastly, it was noted that a crocedure which addresses the , requi rements f or identification and control of matcrial, cart s ~j and comoonents does not adecuately reflect current requirements l (Ref. D4). This procedure i s prsently beino revised. l 6.4 Installation and Insoection J 6.4.1 I n sp ec t i on New pipino and modified existing pipino i n st al l ed in the aux 11- 'i i iary foedwater system was inspected by the auditor and a certi-fied Level II mechanical QC inspector to determine conformance to sub ECN 5414 J Rev. 2, Isometric (ISOs) drawinos 31820-6" D B2, _j l 31821-6" DD2 appicable' approved Desion Chance Notice (DCNs) and ! Fi el d Problem Reports (FPRs) and the installation and inspection )' requirements delineated in wort reouest No. (WR) 121831. Pipino installations were first checked acatnst the ISOs, DCNs ) and FPRs and it was ver1(ied that the as-installed condition was in acreement with the total desi on and installation package (e.g.
)
l j l 4 i l t
1 87-020 l I i spool pcu. reducers, nipolets, tee's, baltino materials etc. were installed correctiv). Addi t i onal l y , as indicated in the Procure-ment and Material Control Section of this report, the pipina 1 installed was ' uniquel y identified and was traceable back to vendor documentation via the heat numbers identified on each component. However. it was noted in two instances that changes required by FFRs were not adequately incorporated into apolicable DCNs. OI 87-020-025 provides further details. 1 Each weld was checked to verify that it was uniquely identified with both the unique weld identifier listed on the ISOs ano ! welders symbol (s) as required (Ref. D-16). No discrepancies were
]
noted. Welder and welding operator qualification tests and certi-fication maintenance records were also reviewed for eight (8) l welders who performed welding on FWs for this system. It was , j, verified that each welder was cualified for the weldino process l l specified for each FW delineated on the Weldino Inspection Check ; I List (WICLs) (Ref. D-18, D-19). - j Welds were also visually inspected to verifv that the acceptance I criteria (Ref. D-17,D-21) had been achieved as recuired (e.o. weld surfaces were free of coarse ripples, orooves, cracks. undercut greater than 1/32 did not exist, lack of fusion was not ! evident). No discrepancies were noted. WICLs for each FW listed on the ISOs were reviewed to determine , if the NICLs were properly prepared, issued, completed, (Ref. ! D-16), and substantiated OC signoff on the applicable Construc- [ tion Inspection Reports (CIRs) indicatino that required inspec- ! tions (includinp verification of oualified welders, correct filler mat eri al used) had been satisfactorily performed. 1 I However, one discrepancy was noted in that it apoears that the wrcng filler material was used for a FW, which is further addressed in O.I 87-020-026. Furthermore, the adecuacy of the type inspections required by the WICLs appear to be in need of improvement since not all inspections are adeouatelv documented. For example MP/IS 404, paragraph 4.3.12, reouires the DC inspec-tar to verify welder qualifications and M308 requires only that l the inspector identify the name of the welder and symbol on the l WICL. There is no attribute assioned to the WICL for which the I inspector should initial to indicate that the inspector has verified the welder was properly cualified to the WPS. Addition-al1v, there i s no requirement nor objective evidence on the WICL to indicate that OC has verified that the proper filler material was used. M308 onlv reauires that the inspector enter the type material used on the WICL. It should b9 noted that Dualstv Control has modified the WICL to require these type attributes to be verified durino 2n-orocess inuoretion of FWs. However. it ts sti1I subject to r evi ew and
87-020 l approval. These attributes should be added to 'the WICL and verified durino in-orocess inspections to preclude potential deficiencies. These inspections (verification of correct weld ! material, qual i f i ed welders) are currently being documented on Construction Inspection Recorts (CIRs) which address all other inspections / acceptance criteria pertinent to piping i nstal l ati on s (Ref. D-21). However, it appears that these attributes (f or weldina) on the CIR are verified and signed off by DC after FWs are comoleted as the dates on the CIR are later than those on the WICLs. Inspection and acceptance criteria delineated on the CIRs was verified to be consistent with specified requirements. Insoec-tions required by the CIRs were verified by DC as evidenced bv each required attribute beina sicned off (Ref. D-21). 6.4.2 WalLdowns 6.4.2.1 EFIC Walkdown The walkdown of EFIC consisted of a vi sual inspection 'of the { J installation of the AFW flow control and isolation valves in both trains. - l At the ti me of the walkdown the AFW flow control and isolation ] valves were installed, the heat tracing was in the process of I being installed, and the air supply tubing and valves for the flow control valves was partially installed. The results of the walldown are: i A. The components that were comp l etel y installed had appropriate and correct mark numbers. ) I D. The valve operators and instrument line check valves appeared to be properly orientated and installed. J C. The pipe supports that were added appeared to be an ' inefficient desian, howerver , the analysis of the succorts indicates that the installation should meet al l si r est requirements. D. The arrangement does not appear to be vulnerable to pipe rupture or seismic II/I crablems. However, a formal HELB/ MISSILE impact analysis has not been done. (See 01 07-020-00) E. There is adecuate physical separation between the two AFW trains, so interaction between the trains is hich)v unlikelv. F. It was not evident that the re-used valves had been
~85-
r 1 87-020 i serviced durano the modification. It is understood tnat there is a separate program f or val ve ' servi cina. G. It appeared that the valves could be operated locally, if required. However, it was not possible to determine if the val ve operators were functional or that the position indicators were properly adjusted. It is understood that . these asoects will be checked as part of the olanned test , program. In summary, the walkdown did not uncover any obvious deficien-cies. In fact, the installation appeared to be of good quality. 6.4.2.2 Steam Trap (Auxiliary Turbines System) l l The steam traps were not installed at the time of the walkdown. 1 It was observed that access and space for maintenance and in i service inspection was very limited. 6.4.2.3 El ectr i al Tie-in of Emeroencv Di esel s I Documentation used durina the walkdown included: ; l (Ref E-1) ECN A-3660T 25KVA Inverter S1A2 and Distribu- l tion Panel S1A2-1. (Ref E-17) ECN A-3660H Electrical Distribut2on Svstem (Ret L E-39) E-108. Sh11. DCN 17A (Ref E-29) E-104. Sh6.DCN 10A (Ref E-20) E-105, Sh36 ) i (Ref E-19) E-105. Sh25 i A walkdown was conducted of the efectrical ecuipment under audit in the NSEB ana Auxiliatw Buildino. ' First visited was the Nuclear Ser vi ce Electric Buildino (NSED) where Inverter S1A2. Distribution panel S1A2-1, 4.16kV switchgear
$4A2. and 4DOV l oad center S3A2 are located.
The inverter was installed in 1983 and was operable until plant shutdown in Dec. 1985. Construction called for in DCN 17A on drawina E-105. Sh 11 was in procress. Cables were nulled into junction boxes assoc 2ated with the Inverter and distr 2 button panel but were not connected at that time. Reaulatino transform-ers, static transfer switches and rel ated equipment remain to be installed before the installation will be comoleted. From what could be observed at that t i me . 1t seemed to be io actord with I L________________________ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
87-020 the drawings. The 4.16kV switchgear section S4A2 was installed and energized. The new diesel generator GEA2 will supply power to this switch-gear and the AFW pump motor P-319 will be fed from it. The main cables to GEA2 are made up in the switchaear and the breaker locked out and taaged since the generator is still under test and qualification. New leads are being installed for P-319 and the breaker was locl.ed out and taqqed. P-319 was previous 1v fed from S4A2 to have power switchgear S4A and is being transferred to available from GEA2. The 480V Load Center S3A2 provides power to Motor Control Center 1 (MCC) S2A2. S3A2 is in NSEB and was comolete and eneroited. S2A2 is located in the Aunili ary Buildina. 52 A2 i s in cuer:stion ane was installed during the orioxnal plant construction. It also appeared to be in full accord with the drawinas. i 6.4.3 Work Reauests 6.4.3.1 EFIC 6.4.3.1.1 ILC and Electrical. Several work requests 'f or ECN A5415E and A5415K were examinea. The work request continuation sheets contained the recuired lists of procedures and DCNs neeaed to implement the scope of the work requests. Al so , many of the ECN document transmittals were struc-tured so that the DCNs on the transmittal related directiv to a work reauest. The work requests provided the supplemental materi-als and special tooling requiremo.nts needed to implement the work request. Also. The work requests contained appropriate DC check points. It should be noted that the work reauest process at Fianco Seco requires diliaence and considerable coordination with the respon-sible engineers durino work plannina 2n order to assure an orderly, comolete, installation. l 6.4.3.2 Electrical Tie-in of Emeroency Diesels Work requests related to ECN A-3660T (Re. E-1) whico were auotted 1 and cover the principal items of work are: WR 64472 (Ref E-2) Install Inverter SIA2 and Panet S1A2-1. I WR 69403 (Ref E-3) Check out and test S1A2. Use test procedures EM.144, EM.188 and EM.192. WR 69416 (Ref E-4) Test Inverter br eakers ust na test procedures 1 i i
1 l 87-020 l l l 2 EM.164 and STP 907A. WR 69415 (Ref E-5) Test panel S1A2-1 breakers us2na nrocedures Em.164 and STP 907A. Six other WRs covered replacement of two breakers f ound def ective during the tests. replacement of lugs on control wirino, instal-lation of flexible conduit and other minor items. The WRs were in acreement with the drawings though clear drawing reference was not always given on the WR. They were apparently in sufficient detail for doing the intended job. All but two of the breakers shown on the manufacturers drawing were tested. The untested l breakers have been assioned to active loads in later system drawings. Record of testino them was not located. The incomino ; breaker A2127 replaced under WR 78145 (Ref E-8) .shows no record i of being tested and none was called for. ] Work requests related to ECN A-3660H (Ref E-17) which were audited and cover the principal items of work are j WR 64700 (Ref E-22) Install MCC S2A2. ) 1 WR 71879 and 98(Ref E-21) Ini ti al check and energiration of S2A2. j i The circuit breakers of'NCC S2A2 were tested accordina to proce- ) dures EM.132, EM.192, EM.164 and EM. 144. There is no record of ' testing the spare breakers. Eiaht additional WRs covered con-necting of loads, installing a cround bus, modifvino alarms and Jndicator lights and replac2nq terminal blocks. Modifications and additions to the Inverters to orovide nonin-terruptible power supplies are being performed on ECN R-0955 (Ref E-12). WR 128515 (Ref E-71) and three others available for audit cover installation of constant voltaae transformers, breakers, transfer switches, cabinets and oulling, f ormina and luqqing cables. This work is now in proaress and installation of new equipment was not yet comolete. WRs for testing and placing the enulpment in ser vice were not incluced in the audit p a c l: a c e . Thirteen WRs available for audit and related to ECN A-5415M (Ref E-30) cover the transfer of the power source for AFW pump motor P-319 from 4.16kV bus 4A to 4.16kV bus S4A2. Installing and testinq new cable from breaker posi t i on 4A205 to the motor. modt(vino and testinc the relavs and controls on breaker 4A205 for motor control and protection, checking control schematics ano checkino alarms are covered in the WRs. An occasional reference is made to drawinas and specifications but not in alI cases. Circuit breaker 4A205 is locked out and taqued until the motor is ready for testing and operation. Removal of motor contrnl and protection circuitry from breaker 4A06 on 4.16kV bus 4A and
'R i I
87-020 1 I modifyino the controls for use as a spare position is covered. This wor k is ut t 11 in progress. l l Test instruments used in the above testing were recot'ded on the i test sheets with their cal 2bration due date and identification l number in accordance with AP-33 (Ref E-61) i 1 6.5 Procedures 6.5.1 General The review of procedures was not exhaustive because many of the procedures are in the development staaes. The procedures were l reviewed for conformance to system desion, clarity, and confor-l mance to the ob.iective of the procedure. In most cases. the procedures fulfilled the stated ouruose. j however, there were instances in a limited number of crocedures 1 where the procedure was not clear or did not conform to the system design. 6.5.2 Emergency Feedwater Initiation & Control (EFIC) System j Procedures 6.5.2.1 Operatino Procedures. , The only operating procedure reviewed for EFIC was the Auxiliarv i Feedwater Svstem operating procedure Cref A.593. The review resulted in several concerns renarding the procedures (RI-084). A. Section 3.8 is confusino. Sub-section 3.8.2, if taken liter-ally, would mean the pump could never be started again unless it successfully ran for four hours. Also, 3.8.1 and 3.8.3 are in conflict. B. Section 3.9 and 7.8 are in conflict. Section 3.9 allows oniv one AFW pump to be in operation when the Site Reservoir System (SRS) in supp1 vino AFW suction. No basi s for this restriction is given in any of the reviewed documents or the design manuals. Section 7.8 reouires both pumps to be in operati on bef ore trans-fer to SRS can occur, followed by securino pumo P-318. Consider-inn the nature of the circumstances thct woul d lead t.o depl eti on of the condensate storage tank water, coeration from the SRS I should be permitted with either pump runnino. C. Section 4.2.12 reouires placino the auxiliarv feed water flow i c ont r ol valves in automatic and open. These valves should alremov I be in this condition via section 4.2.5. The step should be to verafy the ponit2on of the val ves, j _gg_ i
i 87-020 D. Section 6.2 should be labeled EFIC System Shutdown bypass since the steps used defeat some of the EFIC logic to allow an orderly shutdown, but some EFIC trio functions are still active when in shutdown bypass. Al so , sec ti on 6.1.4 should reference j section 6.2. I E. Section 7.3.4 prohibits removino AFW from service unless the SG level is being maintained at setooint. No requirement is aiven to assure that AFW is not required to maintain level since both AFW pumps must be runnina (Section 7.3.1) before AFW can be removed from service. l Section 7.4 gives the procedure to take manual control of EFIC l controlled components. The steos all contain introductory state- i ments like "To place" or " Manual control --can be obtai ned " , rather than imperatives. This could lead to hesitation and confu-sion. Al so, there are no steps aiven for placina AFW from manual to automatic. 6.5.2.2 Surveillance Procedures. The onlv EFIC surveillance procedure that was reviewed in detail was the Monthly Test of EFIC Channel A Trip Loaic, Test Results, and Level Control ERef A523. Some discrepancies were f ound in the procedure. However, the procedure was still in the revi ew process so the discrepancies canriot be considered open items.
- 6. 5.3 El ectri cal Tie-In of Emergency Di esel s 6.5.3.1 Surveillance Procedures For the Motor Control Centers. see test procedures oiscuseec in 6.1.3.6 the two are essentially the same. Procedures are still in preparation for the Inverter, 6.5.3.2 Operating Procedures 1
1 Operating Procedure A58. i 4.16kV Electrical Svstem. General procedures and precautions are alven for rackinc circuit <l breakers "in" and "out" of the compartment. Precautions are clearly niven for checking safety devices durina operation. 1 Preferred breaker status and coeratton are civen for de-eneroinina and eneroi Ina the various 4.160V buses and connecting to the start-up transformers are described. System arrangement for syncheonizinq a diesel generator unit ta the system is also I described. Operattog Procedure A59 l l I 87-020 1 1 480V Electrical System I This procedure is applicable to both the Motor Control Centers and the Load Centers. Proper methods of removing and inserting breakers are described. Breaker status when enercizing and de-eneroining buses is also described. Operation of the bus tie breakers between buses S3A2 and S3A and between buses S3B2 and S3B is also covered. ! These procedures as thev apply to the 4.16kV and 480V systems are brief but are probably adequate. Normally the decisi on f or operating any of the breakers will be under the direction of the control room or system dispatcher. Operating Procedure A.62 120V Vital ac Power System A brief discussion on breaker operation for enercizing the Inverters is oiven with voltace checks to be made on the eouin- , ment. Caution is aiven to follow the Technical Soec i f i c at i on as I it relates to reouired redundancv of power sources for olant l operation. Identification of the various alarms and thei r me e.n - ing is covered. All procedures for the inverters will be revised when the Instruction Manual from the manufacturer is aporoved. More information should be given the operator on action to tal.e when indicated voltages and other data are not as specified. (See OI 87-020-012) 6.6 Training 6.6.1 General l The training review consisted of e>: ami n i ng lesson plans for consistency with system desion, consistency with procedures, etc. l Training records were reviewed for consistency with the employees l job activities. The results of the review are olven in the fol- ' lowing sections. 6.6.2 Operator and Maintenance Training l 6.6.2.1 EFIC Operator and maintenance trainino was evaluated by reviewina the lesson plans written for EFIC. The trainino was reviewea for conformance to the system desion, completeness. acu rctv ena adecuacy of proficiency measurement. j Tne EFIC trainino was contained in five lessons: _91_
i 87-020 OD 23 K 0500 (Ref A54)- 3 Hour Preliminary Introduction to. EFIC and its int'erfaces for non-licensed operators, j OD 24 D 4100 (Ref A55)-3 hour one time only on the job trainina given in conjunction with STP.665 to familiarize operators with the response of EFIC status lamos under system test conditions. EI-21 P 1400 (Ref A56)-50 hour trainino for I&C troi.blerh-ooting and maintenance of EFIC. OD 24 D 3200 (Ref A57)-B hour licensed operator training in the operation of EFIC during normal and emergency conditions without the use of reference material. OD 24 K 1000 (Ref A58)-EFIC Simulator Scenarios. The combined objectives of the operator trainino is satisfactory, assuming non-licensed coerators do not need an in depth under-standing of EFIC. Also, the split of the various aspects of training between the various lessons and types of trainino was satisfactory. Some documents used to generate the lesson plans , have been changed since the trainina was given, so the lessons i did not reflect the current system design in some areas. However, l the process for updatina the lessons and trainino to s conform to design and procedure chariges appears to be satisf actorv, so these discrepancies are not considered to be of concern. l The potential concerns that were cenerated from the review of the lesson plans were satisfactorily adoressed, with the following exceptions-J A. Lesson Plan OD 24 K 1000 does not include a scenario that l i simulates an instrument line failure in the SG level measurement ] system. The f ailure analysis in DER 45415B includes t hi s failure ! and the coerator resconse based on alarms and indications. In the response to RI-077, trainino indicateo that this failure well be incorporated in the simulator scenarios. However, the root 1 cauce and action to prevent recurrence must be identified. The l root cause appears to be a lack of information beino transmitted i to tr aining. (01 87-020-11) B. Lesson plan EI 21 P 1400 includes the EFIC vendor instruction manual as a reference. Since the manual does not reflect the Rancho Seco EFIC configuration. the use of the manual as a refer-ence could lead to misinformation. (01 87-020-11) C. The simulator esc enar i o ( OD 24 K 1000) for transfer from AFW to MFW conflicts with procedure A.51. The si mul ator scenario uses a tarcet value of 60 Psi for MFW valve dif f erenti al pressure while A.51 requires the operator to maintaan it at areater then 87-020 1 i I 35 osi. However, the lesson was based on an earlier revision of I the procedure so it is assumed that the change will'be addressed throuah the process used for incorporating procedure chances into training. 6.6.2.1 TDI Electrical Tie in Operator and maintenance trainina for the TDI electrical tie-in was evaluated bv reviewino lesson plan outlines, proficiency tests, and training records. The'trainina was reviewed for com-pleteness and consistency with system design. Lesson plan outlines for Battery Charger Operator training, Battery Charoer El ectr i c al Technician training, and NSEB Inverter SlA2 -S182 Operator training were reviewed. Basic i n-f ormati on on starting and stoppina the units, the meaning of alarms and read-ings to expect on the meters were subjects to be covered durina the class pertods. This training, assumina the actual lessons conform to the outlines, was adeauate. i l Proficiency exams for the Low Voltage Switchaear maintenance training were reviewed. These contained mul ti-choice auestions on the type of trip elements and operatina features of the 480V switchgear breakers. The exams adecuately cover ed tne roowledce required for maintenance of this ecusament. , 1 The trainina records of 11 employees were reviewed for class subjects and class time. These employees are still active with service dates ranging between Nav. '75 and Oct. '83. All but one reviewed show training until late 1985. One emplovee shows some j classes in 1986. Total class time varied from 350 to 550 hours with approximately ] 1/3 of the class time devoted to administra- { tive and security topics and the balance devoted to technical subjects ] in the employees field. Tacics noted in most of the i records include: j 25 KVA Inverters 2 hours NSEB 50 KVA Inverters 2 hours Advanced Protective Relay flai n t enanc e 5 days Multi-Amo Institute. Renton, WA ISC DeLaval Di esel Generator 3 days Rel av Testi ng . Metering. Transducers 40 hours Prot ec t i ve relaying 40 hours NSEB Dattery Charcer 2 hours Model TC-125 Underwater TV Camera 5 days Power Vac Circui t Dr eaker 24 hours AK-25 C/B Maintenance 8 hours General El ectric Solid State Course 5 days The extent of maintenance traininc. as inoicated by t. t + rublects taucht. provides an adeauate backaround for maintenance of elec~
t 87-020 trical equipment. However, there apparently no training for maintenance personnel on plant. systems. This kind of training should be considered so that maintenance' personnel will have a ! general understanding of the effect of their activities on plant operations. i
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i 87-020 APPENDIX A PRE-AUDIT CONFERENCE i April 20, 1987 LIST OF ATTENDEES N
--- A M E.. O..R
-. - G..A. N.I..Z.
-----A T.I O N.
B. Day B 8< W D. Elliott Quality Department M. Horhota Quality Department C.R. Jones S. Levv Incorporated J.E. Kjentrup S. Levy Incorocrated S. Knight Quality Department
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S. Lynch Nuclear Encineerina D.L. Malone Quality Departrnent . l J. Sullivan Quality Department I i A.L. Ostenso S. Levy Incorporated l l l A-1
87-020 i
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APPENDIX B l POST-AUDIT CONFERENCE August 12, 1987 LIST OF ATTENDEES I I NGME OBGANIZAIION W. Bibb Restart Implementation L. Conklin Nuclear Power Pr aduc. R. Crolev Technical Services D. Elliot Quality Department l T. Fetterman Nuclear Engineering D. Hal one Qual'ity Departments .; K. Meyer Licenseing Department !
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J. Shetler SRTP
, J. Sullivan Quality Department S. Stuch Operations i
J. Telford Nuclear Engineering F. Thompson Trainina Department' q l 1 1 l H J l l 1 1 i j D )
87-020 APPENDIX C LIST OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION(RIs) B I _ N O ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _S U B J E C I_ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ SIO T U S 001 Tech Spec changes for EFIC Information Provided and Electric Tie-In to TDI Item Closed 002 USAR Changes for EFIC and Potential Concern Electric Tie-In to TDI See OI B7-020-010 003 Updating NEPs to Reflect Inf ormati on Provi ded New Procedures Being Issued Item Closed 004 Control of Au:: Feedwater Potential Concern System Description See OI 87-020-006 and DI 87-020-009 005 DBR f or ECN A-5415, Evi- Potential Concern dence of Independent Revi ew See 01 87-020-006 006 Provide Corrective Action Information Provided program Resulting from NRC Item Closeo Inspection. 007 Inspection Statuu Pot enti al Concern Resolved. Item Closed 008 Equipment Qualification and Potential Concern HELD Analysis for ECN A 5415J See OI 87-020-003 009 EFIC Separation Requirements Potential Concern See OI 87-020-004 010 EFIC, MFW Isolation Potential Concern See OI 87-020-001 011 EFIC Test Procedure and Information Provided Specifications Item Closed 012 EFIC Interconnections In f ormation Provi ded Item Cl osed l 013 8 .% W Documents Referenced Potential Concern on ECN AS415 See OI 87-020-009 014 Position on Internally In f ormati on Provided Generat ed Mi sul es Item Clased C-1
G7-020-B L N h _ _ _ _ _ _ ,,,,, _ S y JN. G L _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ,,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ SI GIU S _ 4 015 EFIC MCR/ ASP Transfer Information Provided Item Closed 016 Shutdown Bynass for EFIC Potential Concern See 01 87-020-001 017 Clarification of DDR for Information Provided ECN AS415K Item Closed O18 Physical Separation. OA Potential Concern Followup of Electrical Wirinq Resolved. Item Closed 019 Dedication of Commercial Potential Concern Grade Equipment See 01 87-020-014 ,
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020 Procurement / Quality Engineer- Information Fravided ; inq Approval on P.O. Item Closed I i 021 Seismic Qualification for Pontential Concern Equipment on ECN A5415E See 01 87-020-009
- 'l 022 DCN Approval Sionatures Information Provided Item Closed 023 Re noval of Non IE taas from Potential Concern Internal Wiring Resolved. Item Closed ,
i 024 Equipment Qualification Potential Concern See 01 87-020-013 l 025 Operating Procedures Information Provided Item Closed 026 Geismic Qualification Information Provided Item Closed 027 Letter (Red 86-264) Ref- Poten ti al Concern erenced in ECN A5415E See OI 87-020-009 020 Ti me Del av Module Information Provided Qual ii i c ati on Item Closed 029 Clarification of Information Pruvideo Seismic Requirements Item Closea 030 Seismic Requirements Deficiencv Corrected Item Closed 031 Documenting Equipment ID Potential Concern Change See OI 87-020-017 C-2
G7-020 l R l ._ N O ,_ __,_ _ _ .. S U B MC L. , _. __ _ _. . _ _ __ _ _ __ _ .__ _ .. _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ _. ,_ S I AIU S _, 032- Clarification of Potential Concern EO/ Seismic Qualifications See OI 87-020--006 & 007 . 033 Loop Accuracy Requirements Potential Concern See OI 87-020-005 i 034 Tracking 50.59 Safety Reviews Information Provided. l Item C1osed-
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- q 035 Consistency Between ECNs Information Provided i Item Clased f 036 EFIC Time Delav Settings Potential Concern See OI 87-020-004 !
and OI 87-020-005 037 Resolution of Comments Information Provided Received on ECN A5415W Item Closed-030 AFW Pump Runout Canceled and Reiseued as RI--076 l 039 Verification of Information Provided i DCN/ECt1/DBR Revisions Item Closed , 1 040 Quality / Seismic Information Provided C1 ossification Item Clased 041 EFIC Instruction Manual Chances Information Proviced ; Item Closed l l l 042 EFIC Surveillance Test Procram Pontential Concern l See OI 87-020-062 l 043 S.G. Overfill (1FW Trio / Reset Potential Concern Resolved. Item Closed 044 ECN Packaoe Verification Potential Concern See 01 87-020-006 045 S.G. Pressure Control Information Provided Item Closed 046 Procedures for SRTP Pontential Concern See 01 87-020-012 047 HV 20565 EFIC Control Information Provided Item Closed 04G NCR Loq Informat2on Provided Item Clased 049 Clarification of Fiber Ootic Pc ten t i al Concern C-3
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1 87-020 J l 1 B L.t4 0 . _ _ _ _ __ _ ._ Su thgC L _.._ _ _ ._ _._ _ _ _. _ _ _ _._ _ _._ __ _ _ SIeIUS _ ] Installation Procedure Resolved. Item Closed Settings 050 Equip Qualification of Potential Concern Class IE Equio Located See OI 87-020-004 Within the Containment , l 051 Testing of Spare Fiber Optic Potential Concern l
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Cable See OI 87-020-016 052 Equipment Qualification Con- Potential Concern figuration Control See DI B7-020-009 ) l 053 EFIC Test Control Information Provided Item Closed { 1 054 Instrument Line Leaks Potential Concern See OI 87-020-001, OI 87-020-003. and OI B7-020-005 l 055 Clarification of Seismic Potential Concern Anal ysi s in Calc #Z-ZZZ-IO132 See OI 87-020-004 I I 056 OC Personnel Qualification Potential Concern See OI 87-020-024 057 Level Transmitter Error Pontential Concern i Calculation See OI 87-020-004 ] l 058 Rate Limited Load Follower Information Provided 1 Stabilization Item Closed i 059 EFIC Control Module Jumcers Information Provided Item Closed 060 STP 665 Test Outline Information Provided Item Closed 061 Procurement,'Receiot Insuection Potential Concern Docurnen t a t i on See OI G7-020-020 062 System Status Before Startun Information Located RI- Cancel ed 063 Testing of Br eal:er s in Distri- Potential Concern bu ti on Panel SIA2-1 See 01 G7-n20-016 064 Procurement Documents Potential Concern See 01 87-020-020 065 Revision to DAP No. 8 Information Provided C-4
F 87-020 R l _N O ., ___ ___ _ _ _ S U B J. EC I _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _, _ _ _,_ _ _S T GIU S _ Item Closed 066 Oualified Flow Rate Potential Concern See OI 87-020-005 067 Vendor Audits Potential Concern j See OI 87-020-022 068 Tracking System to Uodate Potential Concern l Licensing Basis Documents See OI 87-020-010 ! l 069 Diesel Generator Loading Information Located ! RI Canceled f 070 Testing Spare Breakers on Item Closed. Similar MCC S2A2 Concern covered by RI-063 071 Issue Date for QA Procedures Concern Resolved l' Item Closed 072 Seismic Qualification for Information Provided , FV 20531/32 Item Closed j 073 NCR 6102, Action to Prevent Poten ti al Concern Recurrence See OI 87-020-08 l i 6 074 Seismic Qualifications Inf ormation Provided i Item Closed j 075 Mountino Used to Test Inf ormation Provided ! Inverter SIA2 Item Closed 076 AFW Pumo Runcut Information Provided Itum Closed 077 Lescon Plan OD24K1000 Potential Concern See OI 87-020-011 l 078 Lesson Plan OD23KO500 Potential Concern Resolved. Item Closed 079 Lesson Plan OD24D4100 Potenti al Concern j Resolved. Item Closed l 000 Lesson Plan OD24D32OO Potential Concern Resolved. Item Closed 081 Work Requests--Completeness of Information Provided Construction Information Item Closed 082 Accountability of Content-- Potential Concern ECN/WR Packanes See (" B7-020-009 ' i C-5 l i - -------9
87-020 I R I _ U 01. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _,. S U N E C T _ _ . . _ _ __ _ _. _ _ _ _ ,, _ _ ,, _ _ _ _ ,_. ,, S T A T U S . 083 OA Records / Procurement Docu- Ponential Concern mentation See 01 87-020-020 i and 01 87-020-021 I 084 Comments on Procedure Potential Concern AP.51 See 01 87-020-012 085 Lesson Plan EI21P1400 Potential Concern See 01 87-020-011 086 Certification / Qualification Potential Concern l of Inspectors See OI 87-020-024 l 4 087 Starting of Pumos Motors Information Provided l P318 & P319 Item Closed l 1 1 088 Equipment Qualification Potential Concern for Control Modules H45D2A/2B See OI 87-020-015 j l 089 Seismic Testino Standard Information Provided Item Closed i 090 Trio of EFIC ASP /MCR' Isolation Information Proviced 4 Devi c es s Item Cloued I ! 091 Eouioment/ Seismic Qualifica- Information Provided tion Item Closed' l 092 Instruction Manual Uodates Information Proveded i Item Closed I l 093 Conments on SP496A Potential Concern Resolved. Item Closed 094 Diesel Generator connected RI Canceled to 4.16 KV Bus 4A2 Information Located 095 Operating Procedure A62 Potential Concern See OI 87-020-012 096 Hot Leo Level Measurino Potential Concern System Error Calculations See 01 87-020-004 l 097 OC Trainino - OCLP 1 &2 Potential Concern ; I See 01 87-020-024 098 Procurement Documentation Potential Concern GRS 46168 See OI 87-020-020 099 OC Inspector Indoctrination / Potential Concern Tr ai ni no See OI B7-020-024 C-6
87-020 B l_NQ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ SU B J E CI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ ___ _,_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ S I AIUS _ 100 Design Verification Records Potential Concern ! ECN A 3660 See OI 87-020-006 1 101 Tech Spec Amendment # 152 Potential Concern I Rev 1 Review See OI 87-020-002 102 Issue date for Potential Concern 1 RSAP 0901 See OI B7-020-010 103 OA Records - Potential Concern Vendor Inspections See 01 87-020-023 l 1 1 104 EFIC Setpoints Information Provided j , Item Closed j i I 105 Tracking of Calculations Information Provided requiring updates Item Closed k 106 Design Verification Potential Concern ! Reports See OI 87-020-006 107 Work Requests. RIDR, Potential Concern NCR - QA Records See OI 87-020-020 10G FV 20527/28 I/P Inf ormation Provi ded Convertar plumbing Item Closed
. 109 Flashing Analvsis in DDR Potential Concern for ECN R-0380 Resolved. Item Closed 110 Review of Calculation Potential Concern-Z-RCS-IO124 See OI 87-020-004 111 Incorporation of DCNs. Potential Concern on drawings See OI 87-020-009 112 OA Records / Procurement Potential Concern Documentation See OI 87-020-020 113 Vendor Manual Review Potential Concern See 01 87-020-009 114 Retrievability of Worl: Information Provided Requests Item Closed 115 OA Office Procedure for Potential Concern l
Receiving Inspec ti on See OI B7-020-020 116 Receivino Inspection Potential Concern Data Report See OI B7-020--020 117 Equipment Qualification Potential Concern C-7 q
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87-020 R I _N O z _ _ _ _ __ _ _ S U [! J. E C I _ _ _ __ __ _._ __ .. . _ _. _ ,, ,_ , . _ _. . . .. STATUS 1 Program See OI 87-020-013 118 Desian Verification Information Provided ECN R-0955 Item Closed 119 Qualification of Bechtel Inf ormati on Provi ded Computer Programs Item' Closed I C -B 1 4
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l 87-020 l 1 APPENDIX D I i LIST OF REFERENCES ' Ref. Document Issue No _____Nutnber______ _Bev. ___Date__ ________IIILE____________ j A01 ECN AS415K O 10/28/86 Engineering Change Notice A02 DVR for A5415K 10/28/86 Design Verif. Report NOTE: References A03 through A09 are from ECN A5415K i A03 DCN #1, N28.02-50 A 03/27/87 System Block Diaoram l Sht. 1 -EFIC A04 .DCN #1, N28.02-50 - 10/21/86 System Block Diaoram l l Sht. 2 -EFIC AOS DCN'#2, N28.02-91 A 03/23/87 Wirino Diaoram (Internal) Sht. 6 EFIC. H4FWA A06 DCN #2. N28.02-91 - 10/21/86 Wiring Diaoram (Internal) Sht. 7 EFIC. H4FWA A07 DCN #2, N28.02-91 - 10/21/86 Wiring Diaoram (Internal) Sht. 10 AOS DCN #2, N28.02-91 - 10/21/86 Wiring Diagram (Internal) Sht. 9 EFIC, H4FWA , A09 Dwg No N28.02-91 , O 07/28/86 Wiring Diagram (Internal) l Sht. 11 EFIC, H4FWA l A10 ECN AS415E 2 10/22/86 Engineering Change ) Notice. NOTE: References All through A16 are from ECN AS415E A11 DBR for A5415E O 10/24/86 Design Basis Report. A12 DVR for AS415E - 10/24/86 Design Verification Report. ! A13 DCN #0, E382 B 12/06/86 Wiring Diaoram,EFIC Intra Sht. 5 Channel Connection A14 DCN #0, E382 A 12/03/86 Wiring Diagrim, TIE Cabi-Sht. 6 net A1. A15 DCN #3799, E-1010 A 11/10/86 CRTS - Circuit Input data Sht. 7 Document. A16 DCN #3795, E-1010 - 10/10/86 CRTS - Circuit Input Data Sht. 3 Document A17 DVR A5415F 2 10/22/86 Desion Verification Report. NOTE: Referencen A18 throuch A27 are from ECN A3415F A18 DER for AS415F 1 10/24/86 Design Basi s Repor t. A19 DCN 7. E203 - 10/10/06 Elementarv Diaoram. Aux Sht. 50C Feedwater Control Valve Bypass SFV-20577 and SFV-20578 A20 DCN 81 , N28.03-11 A 01/22/87 WL 9N76-1. Sht. 22 D-1 L
1 87-020 l l A21 DCN #13. E205. A 10/10/86 Elementarv Diagram. FW Sht. 21 and Cond. Emeraencv Feedwater Pumo P-318 Turbine Inlet Valve F-30801. A22 DCN #1, N28.03-15 C 04/09/87 Trip Interface Equio. Sht. 1 Cabinet H4EIA1 Power 1 Dist. Scheme 1E-1E. i A23 DCN #1, E382, A 12/31/86 Wiring Diagram, TIE Sht. 6 Cabinet A1. H4EIA1. A24 DCN #13, E205 - 10/10/86 Elementary Diagram , Sht. 1 Feedwater & Condensate ' System Pumo P-319. I A25 DCN #0, E206 A 02/13/86 Elementarv Diagram j Atmospheric Dump Valve [ PV-20571 A,B,C. H/A > Stations to I/P Convertor l PY-20571. Channel A EFIC Init. Ind. A26 DCN 84, E-382 - 04/09/87 Wirina Diaaram, EFIC Sht. 1 Channel A A27 DCN #3, N28.02-109 - 10/15/86 Wirina Diagram EFIC ! Sht. 2 H4FWA. A28 ECN AS415AF 0 11/03/86 Engineering Chance Notice. & A29 DDR for AS4154F 0 01/23/87 Design Basis Reacrt. l NOTE: References A30 through A37 are from ECN AS415AF A30 DCN #0, N28.02.1-3 - 01/24/87 Schematic. Time Delav Sht. 1 Module A31 DCN #0, N28.02.1-3 - 01/24/87 Schematic, Time Delav Sht. 3 Module A32 DCN #3, N28.02-91 - 01/16/87 Wiring Diagram, EFIC Sht. 6 H4FNA. ] A33 DCN #3, N28.02-91 - 01/14/87 Wiring Diacram. EFIC Sht. 7 H4FWA. A34 DCN #2, N28.02-50 - 01/16/87 System Block Diagram - , Sht. 3 EFIC. I A35 DCN #2, N28.02-50 - 01/16/87 Svstem Block Diagram - ! Sht. 1 EFIC. ) A36 Z-FWS-IO127 0 01/17/87 EFIC Time Delay Module j Settings. j A37 DCN #2, N28.02-5 A 02/27/87 EFIC Logic 1 SG A Level j Sht. 1 Input. 'I A38 ECN A5415W O 10/24/86 Engineering Chance j Notice. j A39 DDR for A5415W O 10/22/86 Desion Basis Report j
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1 1 1 l 87-020 Ref. Document Issue , Ng _____Nymbet.____,_ _Rt;n. ___,DJ te__ ________ TITLE ___ ________ ) 1 1 i NOTE: References A40 throuch A49 are from ECN A5415W , A40 DCN #2. 1-1196 0 11/26/86 Instrument Installation Sht. 6 Detail,.SCIAS OTSG A&B Reactor Yard Area. A41 DCN #1, I-1196 A 11/26/86 Instrument Installation Sht. 1 Detail, SCIAS OTSG A i Feedwater Flow Valves. A42 DCN #24. E-342 0 10/19/86 Wiring Diagram, Misc. Sht. 7 Devices. A43 DCN #59, E-342 0 10/09/86 Wiring Diagram, Misc. Sht. 6 Devices A44 DCN #2. I-023 B 12/10/86 Instrument Installation for FY-20527 L Fv-20528 Emeroency Feedwater Con-trol Syst em. A45 DCN #12, E-323 - 10/09/86 Wirino Diaaram. Sional 'I Sht. 12 Conversion Cabinet ! H4SCA. A46 DCN #10, E-323 - 10/09/86 Wiring Diagram. Sicnal Sht. 11 conversion Cabinet H4SCA. A47 DCN #2, I-54 C 04/29/87 Instrument Loop Diaoram, Auxiliarv Feedwater Flow Control FV-20528, Channel A. A48 DCN #4. N21.01-78 - 01/04/86 Schematic Diaoram, Feed-water Flow Control. A49 DCN #2, I-1427 - 10/13/86 Data Sheet. Current to Pneumatic Convertor. h A50 STP-665 1 02/27/87 EFIC Cabinet Functional l Test. A51 GVC G7-124 - 02/04/87 Letter to Office of Plant , Manager From Office of Nuclear Engineering Man-ager. "EFIC Setpoi nt s. " A52 SP496A O 3/26/87 Monthly test of LFIC Channel A trip Loaic ! Test Results And Level ' Contral. A53 SP495A O 3/31/87 Monthlv test of EFIC l Channel A Pressure / Level 1 Circuitrv And Bistables. AS4 OD 23 K 0500 0 9/18/36 ContAiiut o; Trainino, Pl ant Mod fit.ations end Goerational As ses sa.en t s . Introduction to EFIC. l D-3 I
r 87-020
'Ref. Document Issue N9 _____.Numbec..___ _ _.R e v . ___Date__ _ _ _ _ _, _, _ _ I l 16 L _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _
A55 OD 24 D 4100 0 2/20/87 Liscensed Operator Recualification Program, Cycle 7 rest ert Trainino. EFIC Cabinet Goerations Testino. A56 EI 21 P 1400 1 2/18/87 I&C Technician Trainino ILC Modifice.tions and Operational Assessments. Introduction to EFIC. A57 OD 24 D 3200 - - EFIC detailed Description A58 OD 24 K 1000 - - EFIC Simulator Scenarios. A59 Oper. Proc. A.51 32 3/26/87 Auxiliary Feedwater System A60 DBR For A5415 Major 3 11/4/86 Design Basis Report. A61 Proposed Technical 1 03/05/87 Description of Proposed-Soecif ication Changes, Associated Safety' Amend-ment 152 Analvsis, and "No Significant Hanards Evaluation." A62 1 12/05/86 Auxiliary Feedwater Svs-tem System' Status Report. A63 Loo 563 1 11/19/86 EFIC Safety Analysis Report. A64 DBR for A3415K O 10/28/86 Desion Basis Report. A65 DVR For AS415W - 11/20/86 CLI Desion. Verification Report. A66 DVR For A5415W - 10/07/86 Elec. Design Verification f Report, j A67 Not Used. A68 NEFPCR 86-OO6BO-NE 1 09/16/86 Fire Pratection Contral Recort for A3415W. A69 DVR for A5415AF - 01/14/87 Desion Verification Report. A70 N28.02-308 & 309 O 01/12/87 Instruction Manual for ) EFIC. A71 WR 126576 - - Work Reauest. A72 WR 120312 - - Work Recuest. i A73 WR 121408 - - Work Reauest. l A74 WR 121281 - 11/20/86 Work Recuest. A75 WR 128667 - - Work Reauest. A76 WR 121409 - - Work Reauest. A77 STP-666 - Draft EFIC Cold Functional Test. A78 NCR S-6068 0 11/18/86 EFI Cable. A79 NCR S-6171 1 12/18/86 EFI. Fibre Optic Cables, j ABO NCR S-5780 0 07/17/86 AFW FV-20527,FV-20528. ! A81 NCR S-6172 0 12/18/86 EFIC H4FWA. H4FWB. A82 NCR S-6317 0 01/26/87 FWS HV-20581, HV-20582. l D-4 l 4 l- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ____.____._____.]
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.t .j N i 87-020. f t' \
Ref. Document Issue l Ng _____Nugbpr______ _Revt ___Date__ ________IITLE__________., j l A83 NCR S-6282 O 01/19/87 FWS HT-1202A,B. f A84 NCR S-6221 O 01/05/87 EFIC H4E1D2.- i A85 NCR S-6550 0 03/13/87 EFI H4FWA. q A86 NCR S-6609 0 04/13/87 EFIC Connectors. , A87 NCR S-6102 1 12/23/86 MUX Cabinets. ' A88 NCR S-4485 - 03/2A/85 Multiplexer Cabinet f H4CDAR9. A89 03/26/85 Multiplexer Cabinet
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NCR S-4486 - g H4CDAR7. A90 WR 129488 - 03/27/87 EFIC Control Cabinet A. A91 AP.46 4 03/--/87 Control of vendor Tech-nical Manuals. A92 M22.35.2, Sect 9 Technical Specifications for Safety Related (QA Class 1) DC Valve Elet- ! tric Motor Operators. l A93 M22.30, Sect 9 Technical Specifications for Motor Operated Gate l Va1 ves diachamento Munici-- pal Utili t v t Di strict. j Rancho Seco. Unit 1.., A94 B&W 4 08-1139706-01 1 07/25/83 Equipment, Specification j for Contrat Valves for ! Emergsacy Feedwater System. A95 N28.02.1-12 A 04/17/87 Qualification Report, Time Delay Module f or EFIC. A98 NEPM 5204.4 1 07/04/86 Standard Interconnecting Wire Numbers and Color Code. 1 A99 NEPM 5204.5 0 09/25/85 Cable Codes. : A100 NEPM 5204.3 0 09/25/05 Cable and Termination , f ' Numbering. A101 NEP 4109 6 03/17/87 Configuration Control. , A102 SDB 5427 0 12/12/85 Feedwater System. A103 NEP 4103 4 11/20/86 Engineering Document Numberino. l A104 AP.44 11 03/17/87 Pl ant Modifications ECN l implementation i A105 DDR AS415D 2 09/17/86 Desion Basis Report. A106 ASRTP 50-312/86-41 04/10/87 Auomented Systems Revi ew d
&< Test Plan Inspection l Report for Rencho Seco.
A107 -- 1 ---- EFIC/AFW Svstem Descr i pi i rn. BASIC DOCUMENIS C1 NEP1000 1 11/19/85 Intr oduct i t.n C2 NEP3301 Inst. 06/27/85 Protecc Team Interiaces
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87-020
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'No Documenti
_Rev. Issue
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C3 NEP3304 Init. 03/07/86 Project engineering I C4 NEP41,p/ Init. 08/25/G5 Desion Process r C5 NEP4102 2 01/07/87 Design. Criteria C6 NEP4104' i 12/04/86 Drawinos C7 NEP4166 3 01/09/87 Desig'n Calc 0.lations CB NEP4209 6 03/17/37 Configuration Control C9 NEP4110 1 06/21/85 "Interdisc. Document F evi ew C10 NEP4112 1 04/27/86 Drayino. Chance Notice (DCN) ) C11 NEP4116 2 _Ot/07/97 Desion Guides J C12 NEP4117 Init. 05/17/85 Aialysis Guides 1 C13 NEP4118 I n i t,. 04/30/86 Environmental Qual. Procram j C14 NEP4118.1 Init. 04/30/86 Environmental Dual. of J Existino or Repl acemtent . f EQ Comoonents ! C15 NEP4118.2 Init 04/30/86' Preparation of Maintenance i and Replacement Schedule Summary C16 NEP4118.3 Init. 4/30/86 Control of the EQ Li st i C17 ,NEP4121 2 04/08/87 System Design Dasis i Cit? NEPS101.3 Init. 06/20/85 Seismic Cl ossification ,and 1 Design Criteria , C19 NEP5101.5 Init. 06/20/85 Missile Design Criteria, i Internally Generated C2O NEP5101.7 Inst. 06/20/85 High Energy Line Drahej
> (HELB)
C21 NEP5104.5 Init- 08/07/85 Seismic Requirements jer j Electrical Eauipmentl ' C22 NEP5108.9 Init. 06/20/85 Seismic Desian Requirements 1 for Systems and Equipment' 1 C23 NEPS204.44 Init. 09/27/95 Redundant Circuit Separation ! C24 NEP5204.45 Init. 09/27/85 Color Coding of,. Raceways and l Circuits C30 AP.3 36 01/26/87 Work Request C31 AP.44 11 03/17/87 Plant Modifiest' tons ECN I mo l einen td i on C32 AP.42 '3 05/06/85 Maintenance in f or mation ! Manacement Ssstem (MIMG) 1 C33 ERPT-E0177 - - Cross Reference of Environ- l s mental Eauipment Qualifito-j tion FilesJfor Ecutpment ! Important to-Safety C34 ERPT-EGO 32 2 12/23/05 Equipment Qualification. Proaram Criteria Manual > C35 ERPT-E0187 0 8/27/06 Users Manual for the Rancho l Seco Environmental Eauipment ! Qualification Program C36 10CFR 50.49 Environmental qualifica-ion of electric eauipment important to safety for nuclear power plants E D-6
y y 87-020' Ref. Document issue Ng _____Numtgr______ _ Re y' ___patq__ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ I I T L. E ., __ I EMERGENCY FEEDWATER INITIATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM ) C50 ECN A-5415 Ma.ior 3 11/03/86 Installation of the ,! Emeroency Feedwater 1 Initiation and Control I System i C51 ECN A-5415 Loa.563 1 11/19/86 Safety Review C52 ECN A-5415 DBR 2 11/14/86 Design Basis Report I C53 ECN A-5415 REF.28 1 - EFIC Auxiliary Feedwater ! An Unsioned Undated Report System Description CXX C54 ECN A-5415E - 10/22/86 Power Cabling to EFIC and ) s EFIC Interface Eauipment o (TIE) cabinets ano intercon- I necting cablino 1 C55 ECN A-5415E DBR i 0 1C/21/86 Design Basis Report j C56 ECN A-5415F 1 09/11/86 Implementation of B&W Field Chance Package FC-3478 Rev.5 for.SFAS. C57 ECN A-5415F DDR O 10/21/86 Desian Basis Report i C58 ECtJ A-5415J 2 11/12/86 AWF (Uparade) Valve Modifi- ! cation C59 ECN A-5415J DBR O 11/13/86 Desian Basis Report C60 ECN A-5415W O 10/24/86 I ns t a l l a t 1 c.n of EFIC analoc control locos anc cosition indication locan for ex i sti na aux i l t arv f eeh-water control valves f FV-205177 & FV-20528 C61 ECN A-5415W DDR O 10/20/86 Design Oasis Report C62 ECN A-5415AG O 07/28/86 Floor penetration and support o{ new H1SS j l panel for EFIC C63 ECN A-5415AG DDR O 09/11/86 Design Basi s Report C64 DCN 284 C-181 Sht.5 16 12/08/86 Plant Utili ty Plan j C65 DCN 15A C-192 Sht.2 5 12/08/86 Misc. Yard Foundations .{ l C66 DCN 2 C-181 Sht.17. 3 10/31/86 Mi scell aneous Structures l l C67 DCtJ OC C-181 Sht.50 - 04/29/87 Miscellaneous Structures DCN 2D C-197 Sht.6
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l C68 2 03/02/87 Misc. Yard Foundations ) l C69 DCN 17C C-611 Sht.1 10 054,00/87 Fuel Storage Du11 ding. ! l Area 6&7 l C70 DCN 6D D-900 Sht.1 4 05/08/87 Tyoical Stair 6 Handrail j Details C71 DCN I I-1164 Ght.7 1 2, 11/26/86 Instrument Inst. Dwo. AFW Flow 'Irain A FT-31002 L FT-31803 I C72 DCN 3A M-4869ht.7-21 3 01/14/07 under Support Assemblies i C73 DEN 2A M-486Hht . 7-37 (? 01/15/07 Rioid Anchor Assemblies ' C74 DCN 2 (1-486Sht. 7-47 6 10/20/86 Anchor Assemblies C75 DCN 23 M- 486Sht. 7--48 5 02/09/87 Anchor Assemblies C56 DCN 1A M-4C6Sht.7-60 1 05/11/87 Guide Sunnort f4ssemblies l l l \ l ! D-7 L _
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87-020 Ref. Document Issue Up _____Numbet______ _ Bey. ___Date__ ________IIILE___________ C77 DCN OA M-486Sht. O 12/30/86~ Assembly Detail Sht.7-60A Pipe Support assv. 4 C78 DCN 1A M-486Sht.5-79 4 12/30/86 Anchor Assemblies I C79 DCN 18 M-486Sht.7-99 2 (2/13/87 Guide Assemblies C80 DCN O M-486 0 10/20/86 Assv. Detail Supt.Nos Sht.7-110 7RS-31823-2A & 2B C81 DCN 17A M-532 Sht.1 O O2/13/87 P& I Diaaram Steam Generator System C82 DCN.OC 31820-6"-DB2 O 05/11/87 Isometric Diaoram Auxiliary Sht.1B Feedwater Svs. C83 DCN 4 31820~6"-DB2 28 10/20/86 Isometric Diaoram Auxiliarv , Sht.1 Feedwater Sys. l C84 DCN OC 31821-6"-DB2 O 04/09/87 Isometric Dinaram Auxiliary l Sht.1B Feedwater Sys. l C85 DCN OC 31821-6"-DB2 O' 04/09/87 Isometric Diaoram Auxiliary l Sht.1B Feedwater Sys. C86 DCN 3A 31821-6"-DB2 20 12/19/86 Isometric Disaram Auxiliary Sht.1B Feedwater Svs. C87 DCN 1 31823-1"-DB2 6 10/17/86 Isometric Diaaram Turbine l Sht.5 Plant Chemical Adition ! C88 DCN 7 31823-6"-DB2 16 10/20/86 Isometric Diaaram Auxiliary Sht.3 Feedwater Svs. C89 DCN OC 31823-6"-DB2 O 05/11/87 Isometric Diaaram Auxiliary Sht.1B Feedwater Syn. C90 DCN 4 31820-6"-DB2 28 10/20/86 Isometric Diaoram Auxiliary Sht.1 Feedwater Sys. l C71 DCN 50 C-582 Sht.1 19 09/04/86 Aux.Bldo. Area 5 Plan at Turbine Deck Level C92 DCN 1C C-562 Sht.2 0 11/17/86 Aux.Blda. Area 5 Plan at Turbine Deck Level C93 CALC. Z-AB-CO753 0 07/08/86 Control ' Room Penetration For EFIC C94 CALC. 2-ZZZ-IO132 O O2/02/87 Qualification of Excess Flow Chect Valves C95 DCN 3978A E-1010 0 11/10/86 CRTS-Circuit Inout Data Sht.1 Document C96 DCN M19.113-94 0 14/15/86 Outltre a ir.stallation Sht.1 UMF - SHUD WORK REQUESTS EFIC A-5415J C97 122861 - 11/25/86 Concrete Pao & Steel Platforms ] C98 122863 - 12/01/86 Cables 1F3DRO5, 1F3FOO1 & J 1F3D613 i C99 122867 - 12/01/86 Licht 2nc ', Telechone l Cablus j l C100 122868 - 12/01/86 Lichtina L Telephone Cables i D-O q
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87-020 l Ref. Document Issue Np _____ Number ______ _Rev. ___Date__ TITLE l C101 124886 - 12/05/86 Heat Trace C102 125563 - 12/10/86 AFW Flow Control Valve i C103 125564 - 12/11/86 AFW Flow Control Val ve C104 125565 - 12/11/86 Hydro Test & Inspecting Modified Per ECN A-5415J C105 125566 - 12/11/86 Hydro Test & Insoectino Modified Per ECN A-5415J C106 126233 - 01/03/87 AFW Line 31823-6"-DB2 ) C107 127552 - 01/10/87 Heat Trace for Line ; 31820-6"-DB2 C108 17 a53 - 01/10/87 Heat Trace for Line 31820-6"-DD2 C109 129116 - 02/20/87 AFW Lines 31820-6"-DB2 l and 31821-6"-DB2 I Clio 129184 - 03/04/87 Aux. Feedwater Mov. i FV20527 Bypass C111 122861 - 11/25/86 Concrete Pad & Steel Platforms C112 121831 - 11/25/86 Install / Modify Piceina & Components WORK REQUEST EFIC A-5415F C113 127576 - 01/13/87 Perform Schematic Check and Functional Check of Annunciators circuits , C114 126738 - 01/28/86 Torcue terminals & ' complete ter mi nel cards C115 121654 - 11/07/86 Pull & terminate cable oer l applicable DEN's l C116 121655 - 11/07/86 Modify SFAS Cabinets per applicable DCN's C117 121658 - 11/07/86 Test Cables (Megger & Continuity) J WORK REQUESTS EFIC A-5415W C118 129621 - 03/06/87 I/P Transducers FY-20527 & 20528 i C119 124859 - 12/02/86 I/P Transducers FY-20527 & J 20528 C120 122873 - 12/92/86 H2Ps,HIRC.H4PI,H4FWA & H4SCA & B cables MISC. OLDER ECN's - INSULATION C201 ECN R-0308 2 03/03/87 Hot Leq Level Measuring Svstem and SG Level' , Measuring System C202 ECN R-0330 Loo.741 1 03/30/87 Safety Review j C203 ECN R-0380 DDR 1 03/03/87 Design Dasis Report j C294 DCN 10 I-119G Sht.2 O 01/11/87 Installation Detail ICC l Lower Leo Level LT-2OOO1A i
& LT-2OOO1B I l
l l D-9 i L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ ___b
87-020 Ref. Document Issue Ug _____Uumbec______ _Rev s ___Date__ ________TI.TLE_____.______ C205 DCN 1C I-1195 Sht.1 O 03/11/87 Installation Detail ICC Lower Leg Level LT-2OOO1A
& LT-2OOO1B C206 DCN 1B I-1195 Sht.3 0 03/11/87 Installation Detail ICC Lower Leo Level LT-2OOO1A
& LT-2OOO1B C207 DCN 3 I-1197 Sht.1 2 03/11/87 RX Bldg. Elevation Steam Generator E-205A D Rino Instrument Tubina C208 DCN 4 I-1197 Sht.3 2 03/11/87 RX Bldg. Elevation Steam Generator E-205A D Ring Instrument Tubina C209 DCN 3A I-1198 Sht.1 2 04/27/87 RX Bldo. Elevation Steam Generator E-205B D.Rina Instrument Tubino C210 DCN 1A I-1198 Sht.5 0 04/29/87- RX Blda. Elevation Steam Generator. ,
C211 DCN OF I-1192 Sht.1 O 05/27/87 Instrument Installation I Detail Instrument Tubing Tray Insulation for EFICC And ICC Tubina l Runs C212 ECN A-5415D 2 09/08/86 Insulation of Steam Generator Instruments for EFIC MISC. OLDER ECN's - STEAM TRAP l C225 ECN A-3062 Major 1 12/08/86 Enhance steam trao I capacity for AFW pump turbine C226 ECN A-3062 DDR O 11/14/86 Design Basis Report C227 OCN O 30806 3/4" EAI O 12/17/87 Isometric Diagram l Reactor Yard - Area BA Turbine K-308' Case Drain C228 DCN 2 30880 1/2" EAI 9 12/17/86 Isometric Diaoram Reactor Yard - Area SA Turbine K-308 Caue Drain C229 DCN 2A 30896 1" EAI 4 01/10/87 Field Routed Isometric C200 M-530 Sht.3 15 12/10/86 Pipinq and Instrument Diaaram H.P.& Auxiliarv Turbine Bvstem TDI TIE-IN C240 ECN A-3660 Maior 5 04/08/86 Elettrital Di t,t r i but i on System C241 ECN A-3660 Loq 307 6 05/01/86 Safetv Review C242 ECN A-3660 DDR 7 10/09/86 Desian Basss Report t l l D-10 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ ___ . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . .d
87-020 1 Ref. Document Issue I N9 _____Uumbec______ _Bev. ___Dat<2__ ________II]LE___________ l C-243 ECN A-3660H - 04/23/82 Install MCC SA2A and make (f or DBR see ECN Major) connections to feeder breaker 52--3 A206. l' Transfer feeders for pressurizer heaters n V215L-13 through 2I to thi s MCC and reassemble ] existing MCC. C245 ECN A-3660T 1 07/25/83 Install 25 KVA inverter 1 (For DDR see ECN Major) and 120 Vac distribution ] panel S1A2-1. C246 ECN A-36602 1 10/28/86 Final Configuration of Electrical Distribution System E-1 ECN A-3660T 1 09-25-83 ECN-Electrical Distribu- ] tion System-25KVA Inverter S1A2 and Panel S1A2 E-2 WR 64472 08-30-82 Install SIA2 and S1A2-1 E-3 WR 69403 03-03-83 Check out and test i Inverter E-4 WR 69416 03-03-83 Test inverter breakers using EM-164 and STP-907A ! E-5 WR 69415 03-03-83 Test panel S1A2-1 and breakers per EM-164 and SP-907A E-6 WR 71014 03-18-83 Reolace damaged luas E-7 WR 71034 03-26-83 Install f l e>: conduit i E-8 WR 77651 06-24-83 Replace and test defec-WR 78145 06-16-83 tive breakers j E-9 P.O. 8257 Purchase specs and vendor ! E8.02.1 reponse for S1A2 and i 51A2-1 E-10 E8.03.1-5 1 10-15-85 Panet S1A2-1 E-11 E8.02.1-6-0 Overall schematic of S1A2 E-12 ECN R-0955 0 08-26-86 Modification to 120V AC Vital Power Supply E-13 E 108. Sh11 6 10-09-86 One line diaoram - 120V 1 AC I E-14 Z-VBS-EOS23 Load study of 120V AC i Vital System E-15 ET-12-A-OO1/OO3 Lesson plan - Inverters E-16 Training records Three operaor./ techni-cians E-17 ECH A-3660H O 04-23-82 Electrical Dist. System E-18 Bid request Technical Specification for E.7,02.1 MCCs -- (S2A2) P.O. 8258 S2A2 Purcase Contract D-11
87-020 Ref. Document. Issue No _____Numbec______ _Rev t ___Date__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I ,I I L E _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ E-19 E 105, Sh 25 2 05-09-86 One Line Diagram (S2A2) E-20 E 105, Sh 36 5 11-06-86 One Line Diacram (S3A2) E-21 WR 71879,-80 05-24-83 Initial' check & energiza-tion of S2A2 1 E-22 WR 64700 10-11-82 Install MCC S2A2 i E-23 WR 76546 04-20-83 Complete electrical con- j nections to S2A2
-E-24 WR 76586 06-22-83 Install ground bus to S2A2 E-25 EM-192 4 04-24-87 Electrical Equipment' ;
Startup l E-26 EM-132 7 04-21-83 480 volt switchaear testino 1 E-27 ECN A-3660(Z) 6(2) 04-23-87 Electrical distribution system i E-28 E 104 Sh2 10 01-09-87 One Line Diao.-4160 V
-(S4A2)
E-29 E 104 Sh6 3 11-21-86 One Line Diao.-4160 V (S4A2) E-30 ECN A-5415M i 11-01-86 EFIC - P-319 power E-31 E-207. Sh 3A 1 El ementary ' Di aoram, Gen-eration E-32 EM 21 C 0900 Low voltage swithgear tests E-33 Trainino records Electrical Maintenance & test E-34 ECN A-3748 5 06-27-84 Diesel / Generator facility E-35 ECN R-0955 0 08-26-86 120 V Vital AC Power 4 Supply ) ) E-36 E-104 Sh2 9 10-06-86 One Line Diagram l DCN 7 4160 Volt system E-37 E-104, Sh 6 2 01-08-87 One Line Diagram DCN 10A 4160 Volt system , 1 E-38 E-207, Sh3A 1 05-12-84 Elementary Diagram DCN 3 Generation E-39 E-108, Sh 11 5 01-06-87 One Line Diagram ] DCN 17A, Sh 102 125 V dc & 120 V ac Di stri but i on Systems E-40 Z-EDS-E0120 2 01-03-87 Short Circuit Studv l El ect ; i t.4,1 Svet om E-41 Z-EGS-E0658 1 01-03-07 Size verificat.on of Diesel / Generators j E-42 Z-CDS-EOO76 System Voltage Studv < (out for revision) E-43 DG 5204.24 0 08-07-05 Cable short circuit capacity i D-12 i
87-020 Ref. Document Issue No Number Rev. Date TITLE E-44 DG 5204.27 0 08-07-85 Cable deratino E-45 E-108, Sh 12 7 10-22-86 One Line Diagram DCN 49 120 V ac System Panels-E-46 OP A-3: 29 04-29-87 Diesel 8enerator Svstem E-47 OP A-58 9 09-25-85 4.16 KV Electricel Syst em E-48 OP A-59 21 05-21-86 480 V Electrical Svstem E-49 OP A-62 8 08-22-86 120 V ac Vital System 05-06-87 Temp Chance 87-0501 E-50 EM-164 5 03-13-87 Testing molded case , circuit breakers l E-51 STP-907A Special Test procedure for circuit breakers E-52 EM-144 9 09-18-86 Testino of protective and control relays E-53 EM-131A 12 01-14-87 480 volt MCC individual position check E-54 EM-131B 3 01-14-87 New 480 volt MCC individ-ual position check E-55 EM-131C 0 01-14-87 480 V MCC-bus preventive maintenance, inspection, cleaning and testing maintenance, inspection, cleaning and testing E-57 ET-12-A-OO3 Lesson plan. NSEB-inverter S1A2 - S1D2 E-58 EM 21 C 0900 Low voltage switchaear Test A and B ; E-59 EM-171B O 07-09-83 Station inverter routine l Elcar inverters E-60 EM-144 09-18-86 'Testino of crotective and con t r ol relavs E-61 AP-33 06-30-86 Calibration anc control j of measurement and tesat equipment. ' E-62 E 101 13 Main One Line Diaoram 'I DCN 17 02-28-84 ECN A-3748 E-63 E 104, Sh 3 0 One Line Diagram, 4.16kV DCN OA 06-24-85 I ECN A-3748 E-64 E 104. Eh 6 0 One Line Diaoram, 4.16kV DCN 4D 09-05-86 ECN A-3748 E-65 WR 124870 12-02--86 Measure and prepare ECN A4515M cables for pump P-319 E-66 WR 125617 02-13-87 Test cables for P-319 and ECN A-5415M S4A2 with EM.148 and EM.192 D-13
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1 87-020 Ref. Document Issue No Number Rev. Date ________ TITLE ___________ E-67 WR 125618 04-04-87 Test protective relays ECN A_5415M for P-319 per EM.144 E-68 WR 126607 02-23-87 Check breaker 4A06 for ECN A5415M spare use. This is old P-319 pos. E-69 WR 126764 02-28-87 Wiring changes to 4A205 ECN A-5415M for P-319 l E-70 WR 128514 02-23-87 Prepare cables ' ECN R-0955 E-71 WR 128515 02-23-87 Install and connect q ECN R-0955 cables, transformers and ! panel s. E-72 E-108. Sh 12 12 03-13-87 One Line Diagram-120V AC E-73 AP.80 0 01-26-87 Training of Technical ; 1 Support Test Personnel E-74 AP.81 O 01-26-87 Qualification and i Certification of Svstem Review and Test Personnel E-75 AP.82 1 01-26-87 Conduct of Scecal lestino E-76 ECN A-3660MAJ 5 03-14-86 El ect r i c al Di si r i itut i on j System ' D-1 QAP Pollev 0 01-01-86 Procurment Document Section IV Control D-2 OAP 4 ,3 03-19-87 Procurment Document Control D-3 OAP 6 3 02-27-87 QC Inspection D-4 OAP O 01-01-87 Identification and Con-Section Vill trol of Materials. Parts Parts and Components D-5 OAIP 10 0 02-06-86 Quality Control Insoector Training and Qualifica-ti on . Requi rements D-6 OAP 18 3 4-29-87 Quality Assurance Records D-7 4-13-87 QC Office Procedures for Receiving Inspection D-8 MMP-022 0 4-22-87 Procurement D-9 ANSI N45.2.19 1986 Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Flants , D-10 OAIP G 6 05-27-87 Approved Supoliers List ! D-11 AP 42 5 05-06-87 Manaaement Inf ormati on Management Svstm Procedure D-12 ANSI N45.2.6 1978 Oualifi' cation of Insoec-t1 ori Ex amt na t i on anu Testano fersonnel for Nuclear Power Pl arit s l l 1 i
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, 87-020 Ref. Document Issue No _____Numbet______ _Bev. ___Date__ ________III(E___________
D-13 OAP Policy 0 Quality Assurance Section 11 Program D-14 OAP Policy 0 Instructions Procedures Section V and Drawings D-15 OAP Policy 0 Identification anc Section VIII Control of Material. Parts and Comoonents D-16 M.308 O 09-01-86 Mandatorv Weldina Practices i D-17 M.309 1 03-04-87 Visual Welo Criteria { D-18 M.305 1 05-14-87 Welder and Brazer Qualifications D-19 ANSI B31.1 1980 Power Pipina D-20 M.306 1 06-09-87 Welder Performance Qualification Test D-21 MP/IS 404 O 03-20-87 Pipina. Valves and l In-Line Component i Installation 1 1 l l l l 1 D-15 i L_ _ 1}}