ML20235P693

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Insp Repts 50-445/89-03 & 50-446/89-03 on 890111-0207. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Resident Safety Insp of Applicant Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Use of Clarification Memo & Package Closure Review
ML20235P693
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 02/22/1989
From: Hale C, Livermore H
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235P674 List:
References
50-445-89-03, 50-445-89-3, 50-446-89-03, 50-446-89-3, NUDOCS 8903020329
Download: ML20235P693 (16)


See also: IR 05000445/1989003

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APPENDIX B

U.

S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF. NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

NRC Inspection Report:

50-445/89-03

Permits: CPPR-126

50-446/89-03

CPPR-127

,

Dockets: 50-445

Category: A2

50-446-

Construction Permit'

Expiration Dates:

Unit 1: August'1, 1991

Unit:2: August 1, 1992

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Applicant:

TU Electric

Skyway Tower

400 North Olive Street

Lock-Box 81

Dallas, Texas

75201

. Facility Name:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),

Units 1 &

2'.

Inspection At:

Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted:

January 11 through February 7, 1989

Inspector:

_6_ /

OA2k9

C. J . (Hyle , Reactor Inspector

Datd

Consultant:

J. Birmingham, Parameter

(paragraph 5)

Reviewed by:

..//19AN/M9 /

o2 522 89

H. H.

Livermore,~ Lead Senior Inspector

/ Dat/

8903020329 890222

PDR

ADOCK 05000445

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February 7,

1989 (Report

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50-445/89-03; 50-446/89-03)

Areas Inspected: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of

applicant actions on previous inspection findings, use of

clarification memoranda, package closure review, procurement of

commercial grade items, unsatisfactory inspection reports, and

applicant meetings.

Results:

Within the areas inspected, one violation (failure to

perform evaluation for 10 CFR 50.55(e) deportability on

unsatisfactory inspection report deficiencies, paragraph 6) was

identified.

One weakness was noted (paragraph 2), prompt action in

an area of potential quality problems was not taken.

No other

weaknesses or significant strengths were identified.

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

  • R.

W.

Ackley, Jr., Director, CECO

  • M.

Alexander, Manager of Materials Management, TU Electric

  • J.

L.

Barker, Manager, Engineering Assurance, TU Electric

  • D.

P.

Barry, Sr., Manager, Engineering, Stone & Webster

Engineering Corporation (SWEC)

  • J. W. Beck, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric
  • H.

D.

Bruner, Senior Vice President, TU Electric

  • J.

Buck, Senior Review Team

  • W.

J.

Cahill, Executive Vice President, Nuclear, TU Electric

  • J.

T.

Conly, APE-Licensing, SWEC

  • W.

G.

Counsil, Vice Chairman, Nuclear, TU Electric

  • C.

G.

Creamer, Instrumentation & Control (I&C) Engineering

Manager, TU Electric

  • G.

G.

Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item

Coordinator, TU Electric

  • D.

E. Deviney, Deputy Director, Quality Assurance (QA),

TU Electric

  • J.

C.

Finneran, Jr., Acting Manager, Civil Engineering,

TU Electric

  • C.

A.

Fonseca, Deputy Director, CECO

  • W.

G.

Guldemond, Manager of Site Licensing, TU Electric

  • T.

L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer,

TU Electric

  • J.

C.

Hicks, Licensing Compliance Manager, TU Electric

  • C.

B. Hogg, Engineering Manager, TU Electric

  • S.

D.

Karpyak, Nuclear Engineering, TU Electric

  • J.

J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric

  • J.

J.

LaMarca, Electrical Engineering Manager, TU Electric

  • 0.

W.

Lowe, Director of Engineering, TU Electric

  • J.

W.

Muffett, Manager of Engineering, TU Electric

  • W.

E. Nyer, Consultant, TU Electric

  • E.

F.

Ottney, Program Manager, CASE

  • S.

S.

Palmer, Project Manager, TU Electric

  • W.

J.

Parker, Project Engineering Manager, SWEC/ CECO

  • A.

Pereira, Assistant to Deputy Director, QA, Ebasco

  • D.

M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric

  • A.

B.

Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric

  • C.

E.

Scott, Manager, Startup, TU Electric

  • J.

C.

Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric

  • C.

L.

Terry, Unit 1 Project Manager, TU Electric

  • R.

G.

Withrow, EA Systems Manager, TU Electric

  • D.

R. Woodlan, Docket Licensing Manager, TU Electric

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees

during this inspection period.

  • Denotes personnel present at the February 7,

1969, exit

meeting.

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2.

Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved Item (445/8863-U-01):

Review the

applicant's assessment of the 22 recommendations concerning

the three onsite records storage facilities to determine if

any represent violations of the requirements in NFPA 232-1975

or ANSI N45.2.9.

The TU Electric assessment has been completed and documented

in memorandum IMT-0210-044-0087 dated November 15, 1988.

In

summary, of the 22 recommendations, 11 were not included in

either NFPA 232 or ANSI N45.2.9, but are considered

enhancements to the records storage facilities.

The remaining

11 recommendations were included in NFPA 232, 4 as

requirements and 7 as recommendations (3 of the

7 recommendations were required by ANSI N45.2.9).

As of this

inspection report period, all 22 recommendations have been

satisfactorily dispositioned or implemented.

The four

NFPA 232 requirements (storage of unnecessary combustibles in

one vault and new vault doors in all three vaults) were

completed on August 8, 1988 (combustibles removed) and

December 27, 1988 (vault doors installed).

The three

recommendations required by ANSI N45.2.9 (proper fistallation

of fire extinguishers) were implemented by October 3, 1988.

Since all actions concerning this item are now sat?.sfactorily

completed, no further inspection is planned and the unresolved

item is closed; however, timeliness of the projects response

to a recognized need is of concern to the NRC inspector.

The

following is a chronology of correspondence and actions

associated with this matter.

December 29, 1986

Records management requests engineering

assistance in a fire protection evaluation

of the operations records storage

facility.

January 20

1987

Engineering directs Impell to perform

evaluation.

February 3,

1987

Impell estimates project completion date,

July 6,

1987.

March 2, 1987

Engineering directs Impell to include an

evaluation of the engineering records

vault.

March 31, 1987

Impell requests extension to October 30,

1987, due to preparation for NRC audit of

fire protection.

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January 13, 1988

Records management request evaluation to

include the new project records storage

facility.

March 18, 1988

NRC February inspection report issued with

open item related to vault certification.

March 30, 1988

Engineering directs Impell to complete.

June 2,

1988

Impell issues calculation 0210-063-0086

(Fire Protection Review of CPSES Records

Vaults) with 22 recommendations.

July 27, 1988

Engineering provides records management

with the results of the fire protection

evaluation of records storage facilities.

August 5, 1988

Records management requests

engineering

and

involvement in the disposition and

August 17, 1988

implementation of the recommendations.

October 26, 1988

NRC September inspection report closing

various open items and opening unresolved

item relative to Impell recommendations.

December 27, 1988

Last of recommendations completed.

As shown above, 1.5 years following the initial request, the

evaluation was performed; then, 6 months later, the

recommendations coming out of that evaluation.were completed.

This lack of responsiveness by the project to quality related

concerns may be indicative of misplaced priorities by the

applicant, but in any event is viewed by the NRC inspector as

a weakness in not providing prompt action in an area of

potential quality problems.

3.

Use of Clarification Memoranda (35061)

In November 1988, the NRC inspector identified a document

being used by quality engineers (QEs) to answer questions

raised by QC.

The document appeared to be an informal means

of obtaining answers and clarifications to Electrical

Specification ES-100 and was similar in many respects to the

request for interpretation / clarification (RFIC).

Because of

the potential for misuse of the RFIC, its.use was discontinued

by memorandum TUQ-3730 from the QC manager in March 1986.

Therefore, the QC manager was asked to provide further

information about this document that is now being used.

During this report period, the QC manager was provided the

results of a study he requested from QC engineering.

The

following summarizes the actions that resulted.

By memorandum (TUQ-7019) dated December 15, 1988, the quality

work planning manager directed all QC engineering to

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discontinue the use of these memoranda requesting

clarification.

Further, each QC engineering discipline was

requested to ersluate all clarification memoranda that had

been initiated to determine if specification changes were

necessary and if so, initiate the necessary change request to

the appropriate engineering group.

This evaluation has been

completed and the results documented in a memorandum from the

quality work planning supervisor dated January 17, 1989.

The

evaluation found that the use of the clarification memoranda

was limited to the electrical discipline and.related

principally to Electrical Specification ES-100.

The

evaluation did not identify any instance where a clarification

memorandum required an ES-100 change; however, in some cases a

change was made for clarification.

The NRC inspector reviewed the related documents of this

evaluation including 18 clarification memoranda; a total of

approximately 25 memoranda were issued.

The NRC inspector

found no fault in the evaluation conducted.

The NRC inspector

noted that QC management took prompt and decisive action when

this matter was brought to their attention.

No violations or deviations were identified and no further

inspection of this matter is planned.

4.

Package Closure Review (35061)

Packages of documents are generated as a result of numerous

onsite activities including design, fabrication, construction,

and inspection.

Several package closure groups (PCGs) have

been established onsite as a final review of these document

packages (DPs) to assure that the DPs contain all the required

documents and that they were completed properly before

transmittal to the records management group for vaulting.

During this inspection period, these PCGs were inspected.

A

description of the process and the results of these PCG

inspections follow.

a.

Construction PCG

This PCG reviews all non-ASME construction work packages

for both quality and nonquality related activities with

the primary focus on. construction documentation.

As

fabrication, construction, and inspection activities are

completed for a given segment of work, the DP is reviewed

by a construction engineer (CE) to assure that all

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required documents are in the package, all inspections

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have been completed, and all documents in the package

have been completed properly.

When the CE has determined

that the DP is ready for closure, it is sent to the PCG

for a final review before vaulting.

When the

construction PCG receives the DP: (1) the Management

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Information Tracking System'(MITS) is updated (statused)

to reflect 'the . custody and responsibility of: the DP,

(2) the MITS is checked to assure that the Package

Inventory Card (PIC) contained in the DP is current, and

-(3) the DP.is either assigned to a PCG reviewer or

temporarily held in a~ fireproof file cabinet for later

review.

During the in-house review, the DP isl controlled by use

of a document transmittal form attached to the DP.

In

this manner, the DP can be retrieved or located at any

time during the~PCG in-house' review.

If it is necessary

to return the DP.to the CE for further work, the MITS is'

again statused to reflect-custody and responsibility of

the DP.

The-control and-review of the DP are conducted in

accordance with Procedure.ECC 2.13-6, " Construction Work

Review and Statusing."

Each DP is. reviewed for

construction completeness of all work assignments as

dictated by.the referenced design documents, and.that'all

required documents are in the DP and listed on the PIC.

If documents are found missing, incomplete, or in. error,

theLDP.is' returned to the responsible group for action.

When the necessary action is taken, the DP is. processed

again.

If the DP is found acceptable by the PCG, it

takes one of two paths. _If the DP involved nonquality

related activities, itJis transmitted directly to the

records turnover coordinator at'the' records vault.

If

-the DP' involves quality related activities, it is sent to

the quality.PCG for further review.

The PCG monitors DPs requiring correction on a daily

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basis. .This information is trended by the PCG'and'any

resulting concerns are reviewed with the appropriate

personnel to resolve the adverse trends identified.

This PCG was established in June 1988 to improve the

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quality.of.the DPs coming from the construction

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department.

The PCG has been effective in identifying

problems with DPs'and getting them corrected, thus

enhancing the quality of the vaulted DP.

As of

January 13, 1989, there were 86,042 DPs opened against

Unit 1 and common, and of these 45,154 had been processed

and vaulted.

b.

Quality PCG

This PCG is located in the same building as the

construction PCG (CRG), beginning their review of the

quality-related DP when the CRG review has been

satisfactorily completed.

While the total DP is reviewed

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by this PCG, the primary focus is a review of work

process control documents for completion of inspection

requirements.

This review is conducted in accordance

with Procedure NQA 3.09-0,04, " Review of Work Process

Control Documents."

The review approach used by this PCG is the same in most

respects to that used by the CRG except for the

following:

When problems are identified resolution is obtained

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with the responsible quality engineer or QC

inspector.

While a document correction form is used to list

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these problems, when repetitive or historical

programmatic documentation problems become apparent,

they are documented on a Standard Documentation

Deviation Resolution (SDDR) for correction.

The

SDDRs and an SDDR log are maintained within the PCG.

When the quality PCG review finds a DP acceptable

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for vaulting, it is returned to the CRG processing

cluster.

The MITS is statused and the DP is sent-to

the records vault,

c.

ASME PCG

This PCG, also referred to as the Paper Flow Group (PFG),

is the processing center for DPs pertaining to ASME Code

items and some non-ASME mechanical items.

The procedure

controlling this process is AAP-18.3, "ASME Component

Documentation Verification and N-5 Certification."

Procedure AAP-18.3 relates primarily to ASME Section III

work, mainly Unit 2, while ASME work on Unit 1 is

essentially ASME Section XI; consequently, this procedure

does not describe clearly all work on Unit 1 DPs.

The

following is a description of the ASME document

verification process which is grouped by DP type;'i.e.,

hangers and piping / mechanical equipment supports.

When all field work and inspections are completed on a

specific hanger, the DP is delivered to a construction

engineer (CE) in the PCG.

The CE assures that all

required dccuments are completed and contained in the

package.

A walkdown engineer then verifies the hardware

configuration.

When this step is satisfactorily

completed QA/QC personnel review tha hanger package again

to assure legibility, completeness, and accuracy. After

this, they sign the required forms in the package and

forward the package to the Authorized Nuclear Inspector

(ANI).

One form prepared by QA/QC is the Hanger Index

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Report (HIR) which is an inventory of all the required

documents in the hanger packages and which provides a

basis for the NIS-2 report documenting ASME Code

compliance.

The ANI completes his review of the package,

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signs the appropriate forms, and forwards the package to

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the PFG. The PFG sends the package to the records

turnover coordinator for vault storage.

The PFG also

assures that the MITS is statused properly.

When construction and inspection has completed their work

on a package for piping or mechanical equipment supports,

the completed DP is sent to the Field Distribution

Station (FDS) and the MITS is statused.

These DPs are

processed in another PCG similar to the hanger PCG.

A CE

reviews the DP and when that review is complete, if-

welding was involved, the DP is sent to a welding

engineer (WE) for further review.

When'the CE and WE

have assured the construction and welding documents are

proper and complete, the package is sent to QA/QC

nersonnel for further review and the preparation of the

Pressure Boundary Index (PBI) form.

When the QA/QC

review has been satisfactorily completed, the required

forms are signed and the DP is sent to the ANI.

When the

ANI completes his review and signs the appropriate forms,

the DP is returned to the PCG, the MITS is statused, and

the DP is sent to the records turnover coordinator for

storage.

When during either process described above an error is

identified or a document is missing, the DP is not

processed further until the item is resolved.

While a

PIC exists in the DPs described above, the HIR and the

PBI forms are prepared for each of the DPs and provides

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the inventory of the required documents in the package.

The PBI and HIR forms are also used by the ANI and QA/QC

in the preparation of the NIS-2 forms, which is the

owner's report of ASME Code compliance for repairs to and

replacement of code items.

When a system has been

completed, or when directed by the owner, the NIS-2 form

is completed and sent to Comanche Peak Engineering where

the NIS-2 forms (attestation of ASME Section XI code

compliance) are referenced to the N-5 forms (Section III

code compliance) and then vaulted.

d.

Inspection Results

Each of the procedures identified above were reviewed by

the NRC inspector.

The NRC inspector also interviewed

personnel in each of the PCGs described above and one ANI

concerning their knowledge of the controlling procedures

and their responsibility.

The NRC inspector selected

20 DPs that the PCGs had completed and inspected them for

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compliance with the controlling procedure.

The NRC

inspector identified no violations or deviations but did

make the following observations.

As noted above, the controlling procedure for the ASME

PCG (AAP-18.3) does not describe clearly the processing-

review for Unit 1 DPs.

Beginning in early February 1989,

the ASME and non-ASME construction personnel involved in

the package closure process will be combined.

While

their functions will remain essentially the same, this

reorganization and/or relocation of construction

personnel will require revision of procedures.

These

revisions should provide a more clear description of the

ASME document closure process.

To assure this process is

adequately described in the revised procedures, this item

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will be followed as an open item (445/8903-0-01).

The vast majority of DPs have package numbers relating to

hardware; i.e, systems or components.

A few DPs were

reviewed by the NRC inspector that had document numbers

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on the DP;

e.g., DCA 79372 or DCA 44931.

Since the.DP

numbers above do not identify a system or component, the

NRC inspector asked the records turnover coordinator for

a listing of all documents affecting the components to

which the DCAs applied.

Using the component numbers

identified in the DCAs, the MITS printout of documents

affecting the components did not list the DCAs from which

these component numbers were obtained.

This appeared to

the NRC inspector as a problem in document retrieval for

items completed that have subsequent modification.

The

NRC inspector discussed this concern with construction

management who advised the NRC inspector of an

enhancement that would provide MITS with the added

capability to cross reference the DCA packages to the

affected component.

This enhancement to MITS is already

underway together with a program to backfit those DPs

previously completed and sent to the turnover

coordinator.

The NRC inspector plans no further formal

or scheduled inspection of this specific item, but it

will continue to be monitored during the conduct of other

inspections.

5.

Procurement of Commercial Grade Items (38703, 35746)

In NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-80; 50-446/88-76, the NRC

inspector reported that the applicant had developed a program

for the procurement and control of commercial grade items

intended for use in basic components;

i.e.,

safety related.

The NRC inspector determined that the program was based on

current industry standards and was in compliance with NRC

requirements.

The NRC inspector's determination was based on

review of procedures and discussions held with applicant

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personnel in procurement engineering, procurement QA, and

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receipt inspection.

During this report period the NRC inspector reviewed:

(1) procurement packages prepared for purchase of commercial

grade items, (2) corrective action reports (CARS) prepared to

address identified deficiencies in the past procurement of

commercial grade items, (3) procedures governing the

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applicant's review of incoming information relative to the

quality of procured material, and (4) procedures detailing the

applicant's methods for receipt, storage and issue of procured

items.

The results of the above reviews follow:

The documents prepared for the procurement of items and

services to be used at CPSES are compiled in procurement

document review packages (PDRPs).

At the time of this

inspection, only two PDRPs relative to commercial grade items

had been prepared under the current program.

Of these two

packages, one was prepared for the purchase of 100 bags of

non-shrink grout, while the other was a change order to

upgrade certain fuses for use in safety-related equipment.

The PDRP for grout contained:

(1) a requisition on

procurement, (2) a procurement document review summary (PDRS),

(3) a commercial grade item evaluation, (4) critical

characteristics identification, and (5) both a recommended

verification plan from engineering and a final verification

plan from procurement QA approved by engineering for technical

adequacy.

These documents were in accordance with procedural

requirements.

The final verification plan contained

attributes to (1) assure that the item received was the item

specified in the procurement documents, and (2) verify by

performance of compressive strength tests that the item would

perform its safety-related function.

The verification plan

also assured that the grout was received in an acceptable

condition and was accompanied by a certificate of conformance.

The NRC inspector's review of the PDRP for the fuses

determined that it had been rejected by procurement QA and

returned to procurement engineering for clarification.

The

NRC inspector concurred with procurement QA that the package

did not provide a clear presentation of the critical

characteristics and may not have considered seismic and

environmental qualifications for the fuses.

Since the package

had been rejected by procurement QA, the NRC inspector

discussed the package preparation with the responsible

engineer and expressed a concern to the applicant about the

quality of packages.

The applicant informed the NRC inspector

of a recent meeting held to discuss, among other items, the

improvement of packages sent to procurement QA from

engineering.

The NRC inspector found that the meeting was an

appropriate method of addressing the concern.

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In order to assess the past program, the NRC inspector

performed a review of CARS initiated by the applicant.

The

CAR list showed that CAR 86-002 and CARS 88-34, -35, and -36

addressed deficiencies in past procurement

of commercial

grade items.

CAR 86-002 addressed the improper procurement of

replacement parts by Operations.

Due to a lack of

understanding of requirements, the replacement parts were

purchased to an incorrect code classification.

The corrective

actions being taken for CAR 86-002 appear appropriate although

the CAR is still open.

CARS 88-34, -35, and -36 were issued

to address safety concerns for material procured from a

supplier of fasteners currently suspected of falsifying

material certification.

These three CARS are open and

applicant actions to address the concerns are not yet

complete.

NRC review of the CARS and the applicant's actions

taken to resolve the safety concerns will be followed and

reported in a subsequent report.

This is an open item

(445/8903-0-02; 446/8903-0-01).

The NRC inspector was informed by the applicant that a review

of the effects of past commercial grade procurement was being

performed.

Per discussions with the task manager for this

review, the review was to determine if past procurement of

commercial grade items used in safety-related applications may

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have occurred without the benefit of dedication in compliance

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with 10 CFR Part 21.

At the time of this report, that review

was in the developmental stage.

Although the review is being

performed to determine if a problem exists and whether formal

action such as a CAR is warranted, NRC inspection of the

review results is appropriate and will be reported.when the

review is complete.

This is an open item (445/8903-0-03;

446/8903-0-02).

The NRC inspector determined that the program for evaluating

industry experience relative to commercial grade items was not

yet complete.

While procedures such as ECE 5.19 " Review of

Vendor Documents," NEO-2.29, " Industry Operating Experience

Review," and NEO 4.01, " Correspondence with the NRC and Other

Regulatory Agencies," define the responsibilities for review

and evaluation of this data from sources, such as the NRC, the

ASME, or the applicable vendor, no procedure has been

developed to define the responsibilities for review of data

from industry sources, such as the Nuclear Plant Reliability

Data System (NPRDS) program.

Discussions held with applicant

personnel determined that a procedure to establish the NPRDS

program was in draft status.

This was deemed acceptable to

the NRC inspector in that CPSES is under construction while

the NPRDS program is primarily designed to enable an exchange

of reliability data for operating plants.

As regarding review

of information arising from within CPSES, the NRC inspector

determined that station administrative procedures, such as

STA-503, " Plant Incident Report," and STA-504, " Problem

)

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Report," provided methods by which operations personnel would

report information on significant failures cf plant equipment

to Results Engineering for evaluation of adverse impact on

plant operations.

During the construction phase, hardware

nonconformances are documented on unsatisfactory irs and NCRs

and are evaluated by engineering if applicable.

The NRC inspector reviewed warehouse procedure

for both

responsibilities and activities of warehouse pq) define the

construction and operations.

Those procedures

rsonnel.

The

procedures provided requirements for the separaition of

e

safety-related and nonsafety-related items and notification ,6f

QC for receipt inspection of safety-related equi ment.

,

Further, the operations procedures required the p eparation

and attachment of a QA Acceptance Tag for all safehy-Jslated

items.

Data provided on the QA Acceptance Tag included:

(1) the purchase order number and the item number from the

purchase order, (2) a TU Electric Stock Number (TSN),

(3) shelf life expiration date, and (4) the heat number if

applicable.

The procedure specifically provided a requirement

that different lot shipments of identical items not be mixed.

Also, maintenance requirements and special handling

requirements are reviewed and notifications are to be provided

to the responsible department (s) when items are to be issued

from warehouse stock.

Procedure WHS-003, " Issues and Returns," provides for the

recording of information similar to the information recorded

on the QA Acceptance Tag.

The information is recorded on a

Warehouse Issue Request and a copy is sent to the TU Electric

Operations Record Center.

The NRC inspector determined that

the operations procedures provided a method by which an item

on a particular purchase order could be traced to its point of

installation.

This ability would be necessary if subsequent

information indicated that procured items were defective.

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Special provisions were made to assure the traceability of

items issued in bulk;

e.g.,

oil, grease, or bolting.

Those

provisions appeared satisfactory to the NRC inspector.W

L

Warehouse activities for construction are controlled by B&R

Procedure CP-CPM-8.1, " Receipt, Storage, and Issuance of

Items."

This procedure provides for actions similar to those

found in the operations procedure; however, the process by

which items are identified, issued for use, and tracked to

point of installation differs from the operations process.

The construction process requires intended use to be

identified on a material requisition form, but allows

deviations from the intended use if approved by QC.

Further,

bulk items, such as pipe, pipe fittings, gaskets, nuts, bolts,

etc., are not required to be identified by purchase order

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number.

These two procedural allowances mean that

accountability of issued items back to the purchase order may

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not be possible in some cases.

This practice is not unusual

for plants under construction but does not provide sufficient

information to assure identification of all locations where an

item is installed.

The effect of the above practice will be

considered during follow-up on the above open item

(445/8903-o-03; 446/8903-0-02).

In summary, the NRC inspector determined from review of the

program procedures, review of a sample of commercial grade

procurement packages, and discussions with personnel involved

in the various phases of procurement that an adequate program

for commercial grade procurement exists.

The NRC inspector

notes that some portions of the program are in a developmental

stage and that few packages were available for review.

Since

commercial grade procurement for items to be used in

safety-related equipment is normally most necessary during the

operations phase of a power. plant, especially in preparation

for outage work, this program will be reinspected after

turnover to plant operations.

No violations or deviations were noted during this review.

Two open items were identified for assessment of the

applicant's review of the past commercial grade procurement

program and to assess the adequacy of corrective actions

relative to the supplier that provided fasteners with

questionable certifications.

6.

Unsatisfactory Inspection Reports (92700)

During a plant tour, the NRC inspector noted an apparent

deficiency on a pipe hanger for which the post construction

hardware validation program had been completed.

The

deficiency had been documented on an Unsatisfactory Inspection

Report (Unsat IR) in accordance with Procedure AAP-16.1,

" Controlling Nonconforming Items."

The NRC inspector reviewed

further the use of the Unsat IR and found the following:

Section 4.1 of Procedure AAP-16.1 defines the Unsat IR as the

primary deficiency reporting mechanism used by B&R for

reworking components (including replacement) to conform to

prior specified requirements in accordance with approved

project procedures, specifications, drawings and the ASME

Code.

This document and its processing are essentially the

,

same as the Construction Deficiency Report whose use was

discontinued by the applicant in late 1987.

B&R, whose scope

includes all ASME Code work, began using the Unsat IR in July

1988 and to date have issued just less than 3,000 Unsat irs.

This Unsat IR should not be confused with the inspection

reports generated by the QC inspector during the in-process

inspection of record activity which also document both

satisfactory and unsatisfactory conditions.

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In most all respects the Unsat IR is processed the same as an

NCR dispositioned as " rework" or " scrap" with one notable

exception; there is no evaluation for deportability.

' Paragraph 50.55(e)(1) of 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part, "If

the permit is for construction of a nuclear power plant, the

holder of the permit shall notify the Commission of each

deficiency found in design and construction, which, were it to

have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the

safety of operations .

at any time throughout the expected

.. .

To assure such deficiencies

"

lifetime of the plant

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are evaluated for deportability, the applicant implemented

Procedure NEO 9.01, " Evaluation and Reporting of Adverse

Conditions Under 10CFR21 and 10CFR50.55(e)," which states in

paragraph 5.1.2, "All TU Electric organizations under the EVP

NEO [ Executive Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and

operations) shall develop lower-level implementing procedures,

as required, to evaluate Adverse Conditions'for

deportability."

Adverse conditions are defined to include

such' terms as deficiency, defect, and deviation.

Contrary to the above, Procedure AAP 16.1 authorizes the use

of Unsat irs for documenting and correcting certain types of

deficiencies; however, this procedure does not direct the

. required evaluation be performed nor is.there evidence that

such evaluations have been or will be performed.

This is

considered a violation (445/8903-V-04; 446/8903-V-03).

7.

Applicant Meetings (92700)

The NRC inspector attended applicant meetings concerning site

activities and implementation of various site programs.

Meetings attended during this reporting period included:

QA Overview Committee

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Recommendation Review Group

.

While these meetings reflect management's involvement in

day-to-day activities and attention to potential problems,

no

violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Open Items

open items are matters which have been discussed with the

applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector,

and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or

applicant or both.

Three open items disclosed during the

inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4.d and 5.

9.

Exit Meeting (30703B)

An exit meeting was conducted February 7,

1989, with the

applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this

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report.

No written material was provided to the applicant by

the inspectors during this reporting period.

The applicant

did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

During this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope

and findings of the inspection.

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