ML20235P409
| ML20235P409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/23/1986 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235P132 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-323 NUDOCS 8707200477 | |
| Download: ML20235P409 (6) | |
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April 23, 1986 MEMORANGUN FOR: John G. Davis, Directer, Office of Nuclear Material Safet.y'and Safeguards FROM:
James Ge Keppler, Regional Administrator Regi0n III
SUBJECT:
QUES'i10NS FROM MARCH 14, 1986 SYNOR HEARING Propc &d respcnses to the questions assigned to Region III per E00 Contiol 001057 are attached.
These responses htve been discussed with Leonard I, Cobb of the Of fics of Inspection and Enforcement.
The Region III technical coatact 'n this matter 1$ L. Roburt Greger (FTS 388-5644).
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James G. Keppler Regional Administrator
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In December 1984 Allied Chemical's UFe plant in Metropolis, Illinois almost exparteaced the same kind of accident that occurred at Sequoyah.
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Allied plant a 14-ton cylinder was overfilled by about 5,500 lbs. and later heated in a steam chest.
The cylinder was removed'from the steam chest after about two hours and was found to be bulging. Allied did not report the-incident to NRC and the Commission did not find out about it until after the Sequoyah accident, when the. agency learned about it-from a news reporter, q
I Comment:
This event is described in Inspection Report No. 40-3392/86001(DRSS).
(Enclosure A)
Should Allied have reported the incident to NRC?
_Comnient:
Region III NRC staff concluded that the Allied Chemical cylinder overpressurization event was reportable per 10 CFR 20.403(b)(4).
Enforcement action against Allied Chemical Company for failing to report the event is currently under review by the NRC Enforcement Staff.
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Please provide and compare NRC regulations for nuclear pow r plants and for fuel cycle facilities governing the reporting of incidents to NRC.
Comment:
The reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.402,10 CFR 20.403, and 10 CFR 20.405 govern reporting o_f incidents to NRC for fu21 facilities and nuclear power plants.
Additional incidant reportiing requirements for nuclear power plants are specified in.10 CFR 50.72, 10 CFR 50.73, and Section 6.0 of nuclear power ' plant technical s' specifications.. The incident reporting requirements for nut. lear pcwer plants are more axtensive than for fuel facilities such as the Keie McGee and Allied Chemical UFs facilities.
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After the UFe cylinder incident' that occurred in December,1984 Allied
.j modified its scales and other equipment at the Metropolis, Ill. plant.
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March 23, 1986 another 14-ton cylinder was overfilled at the plant.
Comment:
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i This event is addressed in Inspection Report No. 40-3392/86001(DRSS).
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What was the cause of this latest overfill?
_ Comment:
The overfill was attributed to personnel error. One operator failed to properly zero (" tare") a scale. Another operator subsequently failed to follow instructions for limiting fill-time of the cylinder.
What action did NRC take in response to the incident?
Comment-T On March 24, 1986, Region'III issued a Confirmatory Action Letter g (Enclosure B) which identified immediate interim actions that were taken
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'by the licensee to minimize the potential for further UFs cylinder overfills.
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g Also, on March 24, 1986, a Region III inspector was. dispatched to the site to conduct an unannounced, offshift inspection to confirm that the licensee was implementing the interim actions specified in the March 24, 1986 Confirmatory Action Letter.
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l n addition to the' interim measures specified in the Confirmatory Action I
,, letter, the licensee committed to take several near term actions that should decrease the possibility of overfills.
These actions were reviewed i
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,in a team inspection (with both NRC and EPA participation) conducted-j during the week of April 14-18, 1986 and a determination was made that all I
the commitments identified in the March 24, 1986 Confirmatory Action Letter had been implemented and were complete (report pending).
The licensee has been cooperative in making these changes.
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l The major changes implemented or planned for the near future a're as
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The licensee now has three independent devices in the control room to k
determine the amount of uranium hexafluoride in a cylinder when the h
cylinder is being filled.
These devices are a flow totalizer, the j
load cell readout, and a timer.
The timer is set based on the total amount to be added to a cylinder divided by the known flow rate.
l The licensee plans to install an automatic shut off valve on the UF i
3 fill line.
The valve will receive a signal from the flow totalizer i
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i and/cc t.c load cell which will initiate immediate isolation of the
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fill process when a snaximum weight is reached.
Parts have been i
i ordered for this modification and the licensee tentatively plans to implement the change in the later part of 1986.
1 Are there " lessons learned" from tilis incident?
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Comment:
The errors leading to this cylinder overfill are common to certain of the i
errors which lead to the earlier Kerr McGee and Allied Chemical _ incidents, j
including training and procedural _ inadequacies. ' Improvements in these l
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DRAFT areas at the Allied Chemical facility in response to NRC Region III inspection findings related to the December 7,1984. cylinder.
overpressurization incident, had not been completed at the time'of this overfill incident.
However, other improvements instituted subsequent to the December 7,1984 cylinder overpressuriztion incident functioned properly to identify the overfill condition before heat was applied to the overfilled cylinder.
It is important to note that without'the application of heat to the cylir. dst, there was no significant increased potential for
. release of uranium hexafluoride due to this incident.
The lessons learned from this incident rainforce certain of the lessons learned from the previous cylinder incidents but do not add to those lessons.
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