ML20235P146
| ML20235P146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1987 |
| From: | Robert Williams PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| G-87289, P-87343, NUDOCS 8710070190 | |
| Download: ML20235P146 (4) | |
Text
y.,. -
'Orubiicservice-
- ===
P.O. Box 840 -
Denver, CO 80201- 0840 September 29, 1987 n.o. wituAms, Jn.
Fort St. Vrain VICE PRESIDENT Unit No. 1-NUCLEAR OPERATIONS P-87343 I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Docket No. 50-267
REFERENCE:
I&E Inspection Report l
87-19 (G-87289)
Gentlemen:
i Attached are the Public Service Company responses to the deficiencies
~
identified within I&E Inspection Report 87-19.
If you have any
-questions or comments associated with these responses, please call Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 480-6960.
Sincerely, k.O. LO,lbm h.
R. O. Williams, Jr.
{
Vice President, Nuclear Operations J
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station I
R0W/rlm l
Attachment cc:
Regional Administrator, Region IV Attention: Mr. J. E. Gagliardo, Chief j
Reactor Projects Branch (2 copies) l Mr. R. E. Farrell Senior Resident Inspector Fort St. Vrain
/7 h
l G
t
4 m
Attachment to.P-87343 September 29, 1987 1
RESPONSE TO DEFICIENCIES 267/8719-01:
Insufficient direct radiation and radiciodine measurements were made by offsite field teams to support confirmation of dose assessment calculations.
PSC Response: There' w6s " a problem with the A/C power indicator and locking device associated with the inverter in one of the RERP-field vehicles which resulted in uncontrollable voltage output. This, in turn, caused the air sampler motor to trip and resulted in the inability to collect air ' samples.
The problem was evaluated by Plant Electricians and found to require more sophisticated diagnostics.
The vehicle is now being repaired at the corporate fleet maintenance facility.
Backup sampling equipment, which may be used in the event that a primary air -
sampler (becomes inoperable, is currently being evaluated.
Backup air sampling capabilities will be obtained and appropriate _ personnel. trained in their use by December'31, 1987.
267/8719-02:
Procedure RERP-PCC was not followed, in that the frisker and control point specified in Attachment A to that procedure were not established when the PCC was activated.
PSC Response: The Personnel Control Center (PCC) layout identified in Attachment A of RERP-PCC, Issue 18, has been re-evaluated to determine the most efficient use of equipment and space available.
The layout will be changed to reflect this evaluation.
- Also, the procedure will be revised to include a copy of the layout as part of Checklist 2.a, the " Physical Set Up 1,
Checkli st". This is to ensure that the layout is followed more closely. During training, emphasis will continue to be-placed on the ' importance of l -
understanding and following established procedures.
The RERP-PCC procedure revision will be completed and all PCC personnel made aware of the revision by December 31, 1987.
l' l
Attachment to P-87343 September 29, 1987-267/8719-03:
Procedure RERP-Survey was not followed, in that two persons were not dispatched to obtain a reactor coolant sample as required by procedure RERP-Survey.
PSC Response: During the-conduct of F0SAVEX-87, one of the activities identified by the. Technical Support Center (TSC) staff to. be performed was to obtain a " Post Accident Sample of Primary Coolant" from the High Temperature Filter Absorber sample line to assess fuel' damage. Preparation of a' team briefing by a Health Physicist in the.TSC was initiated.
Two Health Physics (HP) Technicians-were directed to the HP Operations office in order to receive the briefing and subsequent dispatch.
Both HP Technicians dressed out demonstrating knowledge of appropriate procedures. Upon completion of. the briefing, for reasons outside the scope of the exercise, one of the HP. Technicians was required to leave the site.
At this point, it was decided to simulate his presence on the. entry team.
Due to inadequate communications with exercise controllers, exercise evaluators were not made aware of this simulation. Therefore, it was not apparent upon entry
.to the reactor building' that two persons were entering, one being simulated.
The deficiency is a result of the players' failure to inform appropriate personnel of the situation.
The players involved have been instructed on the importance of proper communication of exercise activities, especially simulations.
Suitable controller / player interaction will continue to be stressed during center training and drilling. No further action is considered necessary for this item, t
~; ?,A.
l
\\
l i
j j
l 1
Attachment to P-87343 September 29, 1987-I l--
267/8719-04:
Procedure RERP-MEP was not followed, in that the injured person was not appropriately marked and tagged
-)
as required.
3 PSC Response:
This deficiency.i s limited to the Health Physics' l
r actions taken and was identified in the licensee's QA 1
~
audit.
In the response to QDR 87-080 which documented L
this deficiency, a Training Development Request. (TDR) was initiated to provide retraining on emergency contamination and control practices to HP staff l
members.
A lesson plan is currently being developed, i
and all HP personnel will be trained on it by December.
)
31, 1987.
]
3 The need for a Health Physics response kit has been evaluated and determined to be of significant benefit to persons ' responding.
A kit will be. established following development of kit specifications.
Further enhancements to the program include rewriting the Medical Emergency Plan and training appropriate personnel in its use. At.present, actions-have been initiated with the primary response hospital (St.
Luke's) to rewrite the agreement held by FSV and the hospital. Once a new agreement has been reached., the Medical Emergency Plan will be rewritten to make it more concise and usable. Upon completion, appropriate personnel will be trained in its use.
The enhancements are anticipated to be completed and implemented by April 18, 1988.
Items identified by plant personnel during the post-exercise critique (as outlined in Item 8 of the referenced NRC report) have been reviewed and appropriate corrective actions initiated, as required.
. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _, _ _ _