ML20235N149
| ML20235N149 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/12/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2495, NUDOCS 8707170453 | |
| Download: ML20235N149 (19) | |
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES OF THE APRIL 8, 1987 MEETING
.0F THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELIABILITYASSilRANCE.(VALVES)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 A meeting was held by the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability Assurance on April 8, 1987. The purpose of the meeting was to review current industry and Staff efforts related to valve reliability.
Presentations were made by.M0 VATS, Inc., Philadelphia Electric Power Company, Virginia Power and the NRC Staff, t
Notice of this meeting was published on Thursday, March 19, 1987 in the Federal Register (Attachment A). Attachment B is a schedule of presen-tations. Attachment C is a listing of meeting slides and handouts on file in the ACRS Office. The meeting was entirely open to the public. Richard Major was the cognizant Staff Engineer for this meeting.
Attendees ACRS NRC Staff C. Wylie, Chairman G. Weidenhamer C. Michelson, Member E. Brown C. Siess, Member F. Cherny G. Reed, Member W. Farmer J. Ebersole, Member J. Vora P. Shewmon, Member D. Sullivan R. Major, Staff J. Burns A. Tantabai, Fellow G. Hammer
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Reliability Assurance Minutes 2
April-8, 1987 Meeting W. Lavalle, M0 VATS A. Charbonneau, MOVATS B. Curry, Phila. Electric Co.
J. Milito,Phila. Electric Co.
J. McElroy, Phila. Electric Co.
R. Visalli, Kerotest MFG Corp.
S. Shields, Atwood & Morrill H..Sonderegger, Grinnel Corp.
C.. Jones, Fenera, L.P.
W. Knecht, Anchor Darling Valve Co.
D. Warsing, Limitorque D. Nealon, Cleveland Electric Co.
R._Borsum,'B&W D. Hendrix, ORNL P. Pomoransky, Canus Corp.
.D. Kardos, IEAL A. Wyche Serch Licensing-Bechtel P. Fulford, NUS R. Hill, INEL D. Hoffman, ACE Federal J. Hecner, Va. Power-D. Ogren, Va Power L. Conner, OSA The Subcommittee received an article frorr Charles Jones of the TERA Corpo-ration concerning steam valve problems caused by internal condensation.
There were no requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
Mr. Reed commented that the valve industry was very fragmented without a single unifying entity to guide valve design, manufacturing, application, installation and maintenance.
o Reliability Assurance Minutes 3
April 8, 1987 Meeting Mr. Siess commented that an area that deserved attention and might even-indicate conflicting regulations is the reliability of a valve closing versus the leak lightness of the valve.
Motor-Operated Valve Inspection and Test Experience in NRC Region III - P.
Wohld Mr. Wohld noted that his speciality is pump and valve testing. The testing which he conducts is surveillance inspections designed to give an indication-of the maintenance program at a plant. He felt it was typical to find valve
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maintenance programs inadequate. Mr. Wohld cited an excerpt from the Davis-Besse Inspection' Report of April 1985.
It noted that a review of plant
-valve failures.for the last twelve months indicates a number of valve fail-ures that may have been prevented by an effective preventative maintenance program.
A basic problem that was identified during NRC audit inspections-was the need to educate maintenance workers to follow valve maintenance procedures.
Procedures are set by both valve manufacturers and NSSS vendors.
Inadequate management attention to the valve preventive maintenance program was also listed as a root cause to some of the problems encountered.
Mr. Wohld told the Subcommittee that Toledo Edison will soon issue a report on motor-operated valve problems identified at Davis-Besse since June 9,
Reliability Assurance Minutes-4 April 8, 1987 Meeting'
'1985. Me promised to provide the Subcommittee with a copy of this' report when it is issued.
L Mr. Siess suggested' studying plants which have a good valve performance record and'try to determine why~their record was good.
Instead of determin-1ng root causes_for. failure, look for root causes of success.
Mr. Earl Brown of. NRC's AE0D reported that a case study report, "A Review of Motor-0perated Valve Performance", was issued in December 1986..This report notes similar root cause problems as those found by Mr. Wohld. Currently, the.NRC Staff and NUMARC are in the process of planning how to attack this-problem.
It was noted'that Probabilistic Risk Assessments credit valves with a failure rate of.10-3 to 10~4 per demand. Mr. Ebersole thought this represented too high a reliability figure for valves. The consequences predicted by risk l
assessments given lower valve reliability should force the industry to seek improvements in valve reliability. Mr. Siess mentioned the fact that with 40,000 valves in a plant one should not rely on perfection to protect the i
public health and safety.
In summary, Mr. Wohld felt the major operating plant factors affecting valve program quality were management support, technician expertise with engineer-ing support, and a diagnostic test capability.
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u Reliability Assurance Minutes 5
April 8, 1987 Meeting 1
Purge and Vent Valve Research - G. Weidenhamer (NRC) - R. C. Hill (INEL)
Mr. Weidenhamer noted that the purge and vent valve test program was per-formed under the mechanical equipment qualification program. This program was completed approximately two years ago at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
l Mr. Hill of INEL stated that the' purpose of the research was to determine if containment isolation valves close following a design basis accident, and will the valves.-once shut, remain leak tight in a design basis accident environment and subsequently in a severe accident environment? The objective of this research was licensing support.
INEL performed a survey of purge and vent valves in use. The majority of the valves are under 24 inches in diameter. The most predominate purge and vent valve design is the butterfly valve.
Three purge and vent valves were tested. Two were 8 inch valves and one was a 24 inch valve.
(Valves in use over 24 inches are either closed or blocked i
partially closed.)
Mr. Reed commented that when Yankee Rowe was designed, large diameter purge valves were installed, but were closed during operation.
Smaller two inch lines were used to equalize pressure during operation. An air injection
Reliability Assurance Minutes 6
. April 8, 1987 Meeting system was run for continuous leak detection. This system avoided the problem of trying to prove large purge valves would close and close tightly.
He felt a sound design principle was to design the plant to run with these
-valves closed.
Valves were tested in a nitrogen stream, in either a nonuniform inlet flow configuration (near an elbow) or in a nominal flow test section, some ways down stream from the elbow. Valves were tested with either the flat face of the disc forward or the curved face forward. Then they were tested with disc rotation either into the higher velocity stream or with the direction of the higher velocity stream. With the flat face forward, the flow tends to push 1
the valve open. The curved face forward is the self-closing direction.
Valve leakage research was also conducted to determine if containment iso-lation valves, once shut remain leak tight in a design basis environment and subsequently in a severe accident environment. The seals used are made from ethylene propylene materials.
Research conclusions indicate that the current use of the ratio of diameters
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J cubed is a conservative way of predicting the response of a larger valve if 1
inlet pressure is common and shaft side of the disc is closing to the flow.
Upstream piping geometry can affect toroue requirements (the worst case upstream elbow was bounded at 1.5 times nominal peak torque).
Peak closing torque vary linearly with inlet pressure.
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April 8, 1987 Meeting Regarding valve leakage elastomerically sealed, butterfly valves used in purge and vent applications are very near or exceed-their sealing material property limits in accident environments.
Seal design can influence seal fragility.
Results from this research were used to evaluate submittals on isolation dependability as a result of the TMI_ action plan. This research also sup-ports licensing audits of equipment qualification and ASME qualification standards.
Purce and Venting Concerns-R. Wright, NRP, Mr. Wright presented a history of purging and venting concerns. The accident at THI raised the question of do these valves close during an accident and when closed, how leak tight would the valve seals be?
Mr. Wright focussed his presentation on operability concerns for purge and vent valves. The ouestions asked were will valves close during a DBA-LOCA, and will valves experience damage to critical valve parts during closure?
The valves of greatest concern were large (greater than 20 inches) butterfly valves.
Following the TMI-2 accident licensees were told to either cease purging or justify purging operations by demonstrating operability during a DBA-LOCA.
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Reliability. Assurance Minutes 8
l April 8,1987 Meeting l
l Utilities had to describe.a worst accident and most severe loads faced by purge and vent valves. A basis for dynamic torque values needed to be presented. Critical valve parts were' identified and stress analyses per-formed for them. The Staff. wanted assurance that the closing torque of the valve spring always enveloped the torque imparted by the valve. The environ-mental qualification of the valve was also checked.
The Staff's acceptance criteria based on valve manufacturer data was checked by the valve research. Research performed was confirmatory in nature.
Since research was performed on a limited number of valves, scaling approaches used to justify the performance of various size valves was also undertaken.
Basically, Staff acceptance criteria was confirned as acceptable and conser-vative.
It was also explained by Mr. Wright that some valves are blocked at less than full open since the torque required to shut the valve from full open was not previded by the closing spring mechanism.
Some valves are blocked as low as 25 degrees open.
Mr. Michelson questioned whether the impact of a valve closing very hard was considered? Could a valve close hard enough to damage itself? The Staff had not reviewed this question. However, the Staff noted that neither utilities nor vendors have raised this concern as significant.
4 Reliability Assurance Minutes 9
i April 8, 1987 Meeting i
Mr. Michelson also suggested the Staff examine the duct work down stream from the containment vent and purge valves. Can this duct work handle accident leakage? Is there vital equipment-located near duct work which could be affected by duct work leakage or failure? The Staff explained that they require the containment valves to close given an assumed accident and in safety evaluations assume they do close.
Cate Valve Isolation of Hioh Energy BWR Line Breaks - R. Hill, EG&G, INEL The purpose of this work is to provide technical assistance to the NRC in resolving generic issue number 87, " Failure of HPCI Steam Line Without Isolation." The objective is to determine if isolation valves in high energy BWR lines that penetrate the containment wall will close to interrupt flow following a high energy line break.
It was noted that this examination would not be limited to only the HPCI lines, but would include systems such as reactor water cleanup lines.
Currently surveys are being performed to identify systems and valves of interest. The Survey is also reviewing valve closure test data. The devel-opment of a research plan is underway. The plan concentrates on blowdown i
tests at actual conditions and applicability to potential in-plant tests and 1
measurements.
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Reliability Assurance Minutes 10 April 8,1987 Meeting j
The survey has identified systems of concern (HPCI, RCIC, RWC) and valves used (3" to 10" motor operated, flexible wedge gate valves). Valve i
specification and qualification requirements include pipe break flow l
interruption at design conditions. Qualification is mostly analytical with confirmation gained by opening valve against full differential pressure.
Currently, the research development plan is to do blowdown testing at 1250 0
psig and 550 F on a six inch flex wedge gate valve. Additieral literature searches and engineering studies are planned. Additional effort is requirod to esteblish applicability of test results to in-situ tests.
Check Valve Initiatives - J. Stone, I.E.
Mr. Stone gave the subcommittee an update on efforts to improve check valve performance following a November 1985 incident at San Onofre where check valve performance aggravated an operational incident.
Currently the Staff has comitments from the four NSSS vendor owners groups and INPO, made in April, 1986 to resolve check valve issues.
IkP0 issued 50ER 86-3 on October 15, 1986 which identified systems that contain check valves and should be included in a plant's test and inspection program.
INP0 plans to followup on actions taken by utilities after April 1, 1987. An owners group task force is developing a design /applic6 tion guide for check valves. This work is still preliminary in nature.
EPRI is serving as
Reliability Assurance Minutes 11 April 8. 1987 Meeting contract manager. A final guide is expected in October 1987.
Currently it is estimated that it will take one year to identify' design deficiencies and three years to complete the correction of identified design deficiencies.
Mr. Hendricks of ORNL noted that NRC is sponsoring work on check valves. The main thrust of this effort is looking at diagnostic equipment.
Checkmate - A. Charbonneau, MOVATS, Inc.
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l Mr. Chardonneau discussed a new product being offered by M0 VATS, Inc.
1 Checkmate is a preventive and predictive tool for swing check valves. This device uses signature analysis to detect degradations in Swing Check Valves.
l Checkmate is designed to detect the followino conditions.
o Check valves operating at non-optimum velocity ranges o
Check valves operating in turbulent flow o
Dist flutter which can lead to mechanical failure o
Normal operating disc location o
Missing valve disc o
healthy check valves l-l
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Checkmate is being targeted for primary use in the nuclear power industry as a maintenance and in-service inspection tool for the identification of check valve degradations which lead to critical check valve inoperability.
J P,eliability Assurance Minutes I?
April 8,-1987 Meeting Basica11-y this systems consists of a number of ultrasonic transducers which can be located'around'a check valve casing. A signal is sent and then reflected off the valve disc. Using a computer program that calculates the trigonometric functions from the reflected signal and location of the transducers, frequency and magnitude of any valve flutter can be calculated.
To date, checkmate has worked in water systems. Valves in a steam media have caused problems as far as transmitting the transducer signal.
i Valve Monitoring Efforts - Acoustic Technology - J. McElroy, Philadelphia Electric Co.
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Mr. McElroy presented information on acoustic valve monitoring technology that has been underway at Philadelphia Electric over the past 13 years.
3 Valves where this technique has been applied includes safety relief valves and check valves. The sound caused by' internal leaks (e.g. pilot stem leakage) can serve as a warning for irnpending valve malfunction.
1 PEC0 has a hand-held portable microprocessor that technicians can use to i
l collect acoustic signatures from velves.
Data 1. compiled in a computer from the hand-held device where it is compared with baceline data. On the order of 40 valves can be inspected in one tour, 1
When check valves were inspected the reverse flow condition was analyzed to determine leak tightness. The forward flow condition was examined to see if l
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April 8, 1987 Meeting i
disc tapping or fluttering was occurring.
Depending on the signature, the-degree of valve flutter or tapping can be identified.
From this frequency.of flutter, fatigue data can be extrapolated.
Codes. Standards, Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for Condensate and Feeu.,ater Piping and Valves - J. Ogren, Virginia Power Mr. Ogren noted that his talk related to the Surry Power Station. Concern J
q arose at t. s plant following a failure in the feedwater piping last December l
9 on Surry, Unit 2.
The original construction criterion for Surry's-conden-sate and feedwater systems was USAS B31.1 Power Piping code, 1967 edition.
This code section covers those parts of the condensate /feedwater systems which were considered nonsafety-related.
Portions of the conden-sate /feedwater system.are safety related and on this portion of the systeri j
100% radir> graphic inspection is performed on all welds. On the nonsafety-related portions of the system there are no requirements for any weld inspections.
Even of there had been weld inspections, no forewarning of the pipe failure would have been found since the failure did not occur at a weld. The code does provide an allowance for expected pipe corrosion. (This was the failure mechanism.)
It was also mentioned that currently more l.
allowance is made in piping design for flow-induced erosion and corrosion.
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In discussing regulatory requirements for these piping systems, Mr. Ogren L
l explained that ASME Section X1-Inservice Inspection Program is required fnr L___--
Reliability Assurance Minutes 14 LApril 8, 1987 Meeting the safety related portions of. piping.. Surry's~ technical specifications also require inspections of portions of piping that have sensitized stainless steel piping and.for portions of piping where high' energy line breaks were
. postulated in safety analyses.
'The lessons learned from the feedwater pipe break were to' expand the secon-dary side inspection program.
Information on the event is being promulgated to the industry. EPRI is leading an effort to understand variables associ-ated with corrosion / erosion. They will try to develop reliable NDE proce-dures and provide industry guidance for inspection.
Currently a NLPARC working group is trying to develop an industry position on a secondary side.
inspection program, design requirements and maintenance requirements.
Discussion Items Mr. Michelson questioned whether or not operating experience with air operat-ed valves needs attention. Currently there does not appear to be any concen-
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i trated effort on air operated valves similar to the attention given to motor 1
I operated valves. However, there are no clear indications that further attention is warranted.
It was suggested that the Staff study experience
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j with air operated valves to see if problems exist.
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t Reliability Assurance Minutes 15 April 8, 1987 Meeting Potential problems with and reliability of special valves such as hydrau-lically operated ball valves was suggested as a future area for exploration.
The Subcommittee discussed the performance and reliability of motor operated valves using D.C. motors. Acain, a study of D.C. motor operated valves was suggested as a topic.the Staff might consider for exploration.
Mr. Reed mentioned that it was his position that pilot-operated valves should only be used when a thorough understanding of the environment in which they are placed is in hand. He believes they are subject to deterioration from boric acid and disassociated hydrogen and oxygen. He mentioned that he was very suspicious of their use on today reactors. He suggested pilot operated valves should be examined, especially with regard to their operating environ-ment.
As follow-up to this session, a future subcommittee report to.the full Committee would be in order.
4 The meeting was adjourned at 5:20 p.m.
NOTE:
A transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N!!., Washington, D.C. or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 N. Capitol Street, Washington, D.C.
20001 (202) 347-3700.
ATTACHMfNT A k
'8682 Federal Register / Vol. 52. N2. ss / Thursday M1rch 19,1967 / N tices Test Patters B was operated from Office, made the determi$ation to issue considered during the balance of the i
October 15.1976, to March 23.11ra, a Draft Finding of No Significant Impact meeting.
utilizing agueous carbonic acid.
and to eccept comroents on the draft
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The Subcommittee will then hear i
Restoration was completed in finding for a period of 30 days after September 1978 by perfumaing a ground-issuance in the Federal Register. A Draft presentations by and hold discusslocs
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water sweep. Post restoration stability Finding of No Significant impact was with representatives of the NRC Stafl.
monitoring continued through 1964. The published on February 18.1967 and no its consultants, and other interested
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Commission accepted the restoration on comments were received.
persons regardmg this review.
April 28,1988.
In accordance with 1D CFR 51.32, the Further information regarding topics (b) Well field abandonment was Director, Uranium Recovery Field to be discussed, whether the meeting i
perforined in accordance with the Office, made the determination to issue has been c,ancelled or rescheduled, the requirements of the W oming State a Final of No Significant impact. This fppo un ty ha f r th Engineer s Office. Wel s were filled with finding, together with the k
sen ra statements bentonite or drilling mud, followed by decommissioning activity and the time aUotted therefor can be I
dry soil near the top. Each well casing documentation,is available for public obtained by a prepaid telephone call to was cut two feet below the ground inspection and copying at the the cognizant ACRS staff member. Mr.
surface and the tops were capped. De Commission a Uranium Recovery Field Richard Major (telephone 202/634-1414) wellfield area was cleaned and later Office at 730 Simma Street. Golden, between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Persons bickfilled.
Colorado, and at the Commission's planning t attend thia meeting am All process tanks, columns, pipes and Public Document Room 1717 at H Street urged to contact the above named associated equipment were removed NW., Washington. DC.
jdo j n e and disposed of at a nearby beensed ge d ed q
tillings impoundment. Ares gamma Deted at Denver. Colorado. this 12th day of changes in schedule' etc., which may March.1987.
surveys indicated contaminated soil g"
g, which was subsequently removed and For tbs Nudear Regulatory Commission.
disposed in a licensed tailings Dated: March 18,1987.
impoundment.
Gief. Ucansing Branch 1 Umnium Recovery M*"*" D#U"'
Soil samples were collected to a 15 76 offa, nogionty.
Assistant Encutive Directorfor Project centimeter depth and from 15 to 30 (FR h s7-59e6 FHW A18.87; 8-45 am)
Review.
centimeters deep from each former well
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[FR Ddc. 87-5989 Filed F16-67; 8:45 am) pxttern site, the discharge channel, and m coot non.m thi evaporation ares. Radium-220 Advisory Committee on Reactor P "
tdlitY MM completed in July of 1986. No structures ne ACRS Subcommittee nn remain ons site: all were removed prior to Reliability Assurance will hold a (Relemme No.34-241s7; FNs No. SR4SE.
the performance by the license ci final meeting on April 8.1987. Room 1046.
87~13 gamma expomure rate measurements 1717 H Street NW Washington, DC.
and soil samphag brdependent The entire meetin Sett-Regulatory Organizations; verification of she cleanup was public attendance. g will be open t Proposed Rule Change by Boston performed by the Commission on August The agenda for the subject meeting Stock Exchange,Inc Relating to 12.1988.%e Cammission confirmed sha!! be as follows:
Amendments to Chapter XV of the that the residual soil Radium.226 Boston Stock Exchange Rulee concentration did not exceed the limits g,ggf,.j g, g43g,,,,
specified in 10 CPR Part 40. Appendix A.
yntilthe conclusion ofbusiness Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the (d) Envimummental monitoring for
%e Subcommittee will review current Securities Exchange Act cif1934.15 airborne radionuclides and for direct industry and staff efforts relating t U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) notice is hmby given gn=ma radiaham were performed during valve re!! ability.
that on January 30.1987 th>. Boston operation af the R&D facility.The Oral statemento may be presented by Stock Exchange, incorporated ("BSE")
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monitoring results indicated that members of the public with the filed with the Securities and Exchange radionuclides concentrations were well concurrence of the Subcommittee Caissie b pmposd changes as below the respectres maxinnen Chairman: written statements will be described in items L II and III below, permissible concentrations for accepted and made available to the which items have been prepared by the unart.c d amma, and the direct gem =a exposuse rates were within the.
Committee. Recordings will be permitted self-regulatory organization. The
' only d those portions of the Commission is publishing this notice to range af n==d background for the meeting en a transcript is being kept, solicit comments on the proposed rule and questions may be asked only by change from interested persons.
trey.
3 i-Aeoordtagly, the hton's members of the Subcommittee,its
- 1. Self. Regulatory OrganizaSon's r
Ursaisse L Fleid OfBoe has..
detesseined that to p=r==nussioning consultants, and Staff. Persons des:rtng Statement on the Terms of Substance of to make oral statements abould notify the Propoed Rule Change actMelpe dhi not have a significant the ACRS staff member named below as effect as he af the human
. far in advance as is practicable so that The proposed rules setablish determinsskun is v. E appmpriate arrangement can be made.
Exchange s BEACON Systam., the he
$geht estdennatamination During 'he lattiatportion of the to kry !)mdte has been meeting, the Subcommittee, along wkh ht of
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adstyed ar the Mcenmaal aits..e- ~... any ofI's mnaultants who may be
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. ill se CFR 52.3a(s),
present, may exchange preliminary w
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pecotvesyflekte : views regarding matter,to l>e tram a commm.o.. h amr not.d m sectum rv tao and at h ass.
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REVISION 2 L
April 3,1987
'ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON RELIABILITY ASSURANCE APRIL 8, 1987 TENTATIVE SCHEDULE 8:30 a.m.
CHAIRMAN'S INTRODUCTION - 5 Minutes 8:35 a.m.
I.
Field Experience with tests of motor operated valves - Pegion III (P. Wohld) - 1 Hour 9:35 a.m.
II.
Reliability of containment Ventilation and l
Purge System Valves (6" to 60" diam.)
9:35 a.m.
A.
History of concern and corrective actions - NRR
- 45 Minutes 10:20 a.m.
BPEAK 10:30 a.m.
R.
Report of tests on 8" and 24" valves - RES (G. H. Weidenhamer) - 45 Mint.tes 11:15 a.m.
C.
Design basis for containment ventilation and purge systems, including severe accident considerations.
(Effects on elastic seals, etc.) - NRR/RES - ! Hour 11:45 a.m.
D.
Ability of valves to function as vent valves under severe accident conditions - NRR
- i Hour 12:00 p.m.
E.
Design basis for duct work between valves and containment - NRR - 1 Hour 12:15 p.m.
LUNC4
- p.m.
III. Results of check valve review following the failures at San Onofre - IE (J. Stone) - 45 Minutes 2 0 p.m.
IV. MOVATS/ Checkmate - POVATS (A. Charbonneau) i Hour 2:30 p.m.
V.
Acoustic Monitorina of Check Valves - Philadelphia Electric Co. - J. McElroy and Brian Curry - i Hour 3:00 p.m.
VI.
Potential Problems with air (both diaphragm and cylinder) operated valves and means to monitor performance - discussion - 1 Hour 3:30 p.m.
BREAK
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Reliability _ Assurance Schedule 2
h) 3:45 p.m.
VII. Performance and reliability of motor operated valves utilizing d.c. motors - discussion
- 1 Hour 4:00 p.m.
VIII. Potential problems with and reliability of special valves such as hydraulically operated ball valves - discussion - i Hour j
i 4:15 p.m.
IX
.Repnrt on status of evaluations of valve 3
performance under accident conditions of very l
high flow rates or very high differential pressure, j
Report of any plans for er results from tests at i
accident conditions. (Generic Issue 87) - NRR/RES (Roy Woods) - i Hour 4:30 p.m.
X.
Codes, Standards, Inspection and Maintenance require-ments for condensate and feedwater piping and valves
- NRR/ Virginia Power - 1 Hour 5:30 p.m.
ADJ0llRN
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' ATTACHMENT'C
-"1.
I LIST OF DOCUMENTS FOR RELIABILITY, ASSURANCE-(VALVES) SUBCOMMITTEE l MEETING.
April 8,1987 1.
Mot'or-0perated' Valve Inspection' and Test Experience in NRC Region III
'P. R. Wohld
' 2.- Purge and Vent Valve Research - Robert _ C. Hill, Idaho National
.En gineering Laboratory 3.
Parging and Venting. Concerns - Bob Wright.
4.
Gate Valve Isolation of High Energy BWR Line Breaks
- R. C. Hill, Idaho National Egr. Lab..
t 5.
Codes,> Standards Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for
- Condensate 'and Feedwater Piping and Valves
' Virginia Power 6.
Steam Valve. Proble.ns Caused by Internal Condensation'- C. R. Jones, TERA Corp.
7.
Memo to Commissioners from V. Stello, Jr.,
Subject:
Case Study Report - A review of Motor-0perated Valve Performance (AE0D/C603) dated December 10, 1986 q
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