Text

Amend 6 to License NPF-39,changing Tech Specs to Permit Completion of Physical Mods,Testing & Other Actions to Facilitate Completion of Standby Gas Treatment Sys to Refueling Area
	ML20235J881
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	07/08/1987
From:	Butler W; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20235J885	List: ML20235J881; ML20235J892; ML20235J916;
References
	NUDOCS 8707160045
	Download: ML20235J881 (36)
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET N0. 50-352 LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 APENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 6 License No. NPF-39 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that A.

The application for anendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated January 13, 1987 as supplemented on March 25 and April 9,1987, complies with the standards and requirements of j

the Atomic Eneray Act of 1954, es amended (the Act), and the i

Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; P.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (il that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted i

l in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications es indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(?)

of Facility Operating License No. NPF-30'is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8. as revised through Amendment No.

6, are hereby incorporated into this license.

Philadelphia Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

8707160045 e7070s PDR ADDCK 050003p2 P

PDR

_ 3.

This license amendment is effective upon initial entry into either Operational Condition 3 or 2 during startup following the first refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/s/

Walter R. Butler, Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 8, 1987 i

Previously concurred *:

PDI-2/LA*

PDI-2/PM*

OGC*

PDI-2/D i

M0'Brien RMartin:lb MYoung WButler 06/09/87 06/08/87 06/12/877/g/87

. )

l 3.

This license amendment is effective upon initial entry into either Operational Condition 3 or 2 during startup following the first refueling outage.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

)

l Walter R. Butler, Director l

Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:

Charges to the Technical l

Specifications l

Date of Issuance: July 8, 1987 I

1 I

i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.

6 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-39 DOCKET NO. 50-352 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area nf change. Overleaf pages providec to r:aintain document completeness.*

Remove Insert 3/4 3-13 3/4 3-13*

3/4 3-14 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-15 3/4 3-15 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-16 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-22 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-26 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-29*

3/4 3-30 3/4 3-30 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-32 3/4 3-32*

3/4 6-21 3/4 6-21*

j 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-25 3/4 6-25*

3/4 6-26 3/4 6-26 3/4 6-43 3/4 6-43 3/4 6-44 3/4 6-44*

3/4 6-45 3/4 6-45*

1/4 6-46 3/4 6 46 3/4 6-47 3/4 6-47 3/4 6-48 3/4 6-48*

3/4 6-49 3/4 6-49 3/4 6-50 3/4 6-50 1

3/4 6-51 3/4 6-51 3/4 6-51a

Pemove Insert 3/4 6-52 3/4 6-52*

3/4 6-53 3/4 6-53 3/4 6-54 3/4 6-54 8 3/4 6-5 8 3/4 6-5 B 3/4 6-Sa

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l TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) 1 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION I

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 20 -

Be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN

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within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 21-Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 22 -

Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 23 -

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, verify the affected system isolation valves are closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and declare the affected system inoperable.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3, be in at least COLD SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

1 ACTION 24 -

Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system inoperable or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00WN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

ACTION 25 -

Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

ACTION 26 -

Close the affected system isolation valves within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

TABLE NOTATIONS When handling irradiated fuel in the. secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

May be bypassed under administrative control, with all turbine stop valves closed.

I (a) See Specification 3.6.3, Table 3.6.3-1 for primary containment isolation l

valves which are actuated by these isolation signals.

(b) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for required surveillance without placing the channel or trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

In addition, for the HPCI system and RCIC system isolation, provided that the redundant isolation valve, inboard or outboard, as applicable, in each line is OPERABLE and all required actuation instrumentation for that valve is OPERABLE, one channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for required surveillance without placing the channel or trip system in the tripped condition.

(c) Actuates secondary containment isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.5.2.1-1 and/or 3.6.5.2.2-1 and signals B, H, S, U, R and T also start the standby gas treatment system.

(d) RWCU system inlet outboard isolation valve closes on SLCS "B" initiation.

RWCU system inlet inboard isolation valve closes on SLCS "A" or SLCS "C" initiation.

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ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)#

6.

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level 1)

Low, Low - Level 2 5 13(a) 2)

Low, Low, Low - Level 1 5 13(a) b.

Drywell Pressure - High 5 13(a) c.

North Stack Effluent Radiation - High N.A.

d.

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f.

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g.

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Reactor Pressure - Low N.A.

i.

Primary Containment Instrument Gas to N.A.

Drywell a Pressure-Low j.

Manual Initiation N.A.

7.

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low - Level 2 N.A.

b.

Drywell Pressure - High N.A.

c.

Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust Duct Radiation - High N.A.

d.

Reactor Enclosure ventilation Exhaust Duct Radiation - High N.A.

e.

Outside Atmosphere to Reactor Enclosure a Pressure - Low N.A.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 Amerxknent No. 6

TABLE 3.3.2-3 (Continued)

ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME j

TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)#

f.

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g.

Reactor Enclosure Manual Initiation N.A.

h.

Refueling Area Manual Initiation N.A.

TABLE NOTATIONS

(

l (a) Isolation system instrumentation response time specified includes 10 seconds diesel generator starting and 3 seconds for sequence loading delays.

(b) Radiation detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Response time shall be measured from detector output or the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

Isolation system instrumentation response time for MSIV only.

No diesel generator delays assumed for MSIVs.

- Isolation system instrumentation response time for associated valves except MSIVs.

Isolation system instrumentation response time specified for the Trip Function actuating each valve group shall be added to isolation time shown in Tables 3.6.3-1, 3.6.5.2.1-1 and 3.6.5.2.2-1 for valves in each valve group to obtain ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME for each valve.

1. With 45 second time delay.

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l INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION l 1 1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.3 The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.3-2 and with EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.3-3. APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.3-1. ACTION: I a. With an ECCS actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of j Table 3.3.3-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is i I restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value. b. With one or more ECCS actuation instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.3-1. c. With either ADS trip system subsystem inoperable, restore the l inoperable trip system to OPERABLE status within: 1. 7 days, provided that the HPCI and RCIC systems are OPERABLE. l 2. 72 hours. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 100 psig within the following 24 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.3.1 Each ECCS actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.3.1-1. 4.3.3.2 LOGIC SY5 TEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months. 4.3.3.3 The ECCS RESPONSE TIME of each ECCS trip function shown in Table 3.3.3-3 shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per trip system such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ECCS trip system. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-32

) S ( LP . AP LNA) OG 0 V, V SI F2 I SI ( A A P P .A) L 6 S OF2 E SI ( V I .) L .EC A XME 5 V AI S A 8 A A 0A3 AA 5 0 0 A 0 0 MT( N71 N7N 6N1 NN 4 4 3 N 4 3 N O I ) T d A ) e L K u O 5 C 3 n S N 0 ( 2 C i I DO 0 8 0 7 8 9 1 t RI R F 0 F 9 4 0 0 1 n T AT E 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 o N OAI 1 C E BLR 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 ( M T OR 5 5 5 4 1 1 1 N USA Vl i l V V V 5 V V V 1 I OI B i l H 1 H II i H A 3 T N 6 O ) ) C K K 3 C C Y ( ( E R AA B8 L A 69 69 2 B M N 03 03 22 A I O 00 00 02 6 7 T R DI R FF Ff f1 0 0 0 P RTE 1 1 1 I I - 4 1 1 AAI - 1 1 OLR 22 22 15 1 3 3 BOR 55 5S 5V 1 1 A NSA VVI I T l I IVV VS 5 V V I I B l H l P 1 H l i l R AP L L N N E O O W I I Y T T R C C D E M E E RN O J J Y O UO O R N N A T SI T F I I R ST S S P R EA YP NP Y Y S I RT LM RM A A A PN PU UU N R R D E PP TP O P P A E LM U E I S S E C LU SC RC T H I ER R R C E E V WT WI WI N R R V R YS CC CC U O O P E RN EE EE F C C R S DI RR RR N O I T ARR TE ES A 8 N" 6 6 7 1 2 3 4 EU 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 PN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h0g*'EZg mh m',,-

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TABLE 3.6.3-1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLA' ION VALVES NOTATION NOTES (Continued) 21. Automatic isolation signal causes TIP to retract; ball valve closes when probe is fully retracted. 22. Isolation barrier remains water filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA. Isolation valve may be tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 La total Type B & C tests. 23. Valve does not receive an isolation signal. Valves will be open during Type A test. Type C test not required. 24. Both isolation signals required for valve closure. 25. Deleted 26. Valve stroke times listed are maximum times verified by testing per Speci-fication 4.0.5 acceptance criteria. The closure times for isolation valves in lines in which high-energy line breaks could occur are identified with a single asterisk. The closure times for isolation valves in lines which provide an open path from the containment to the environs are identified with a double asterisk. 27. The reactor vessel head seal leak detection line (penetration 29A) excess flow check valve is not subject to OPERABILITY testing. This valve will not be exposed to primary system pressure except under the unlikely con-ditions of a seal failure where it could be partially pressurized to reactor pressure. Any leakage path is restricted at the source; therefore, this valve need not be OPERABILITY tested. 28. Automatic isolation logic to be added by the end of the first refueling outage. 29. Valve may be open during normal operation; capable of manual isolation from control room. Position will be controlled procedurally. 30. Valve normally open, closes on scram signal. 31. Valve 41-1016 is an outboard isolation barrier for penetrations X-9A, B and X-44. Leakage through valve 41-1016 is included in the total for penetration X-44 only. 32. Feedwater long path recirculation valves are sealed closed whenever the reactor is critical and reactor pressure is greater than 600 psig. The valves are expected to be opened only in the following instances: a. Flushing of the condensate and feedwater systems during plant startup, b. Reactor pressure vessel hydrostatic testing, which is conducted follow-ing each refueling outage prior to commencing plant startup. Therefore, valve stroke timing in accordance with Specification 4.0.5 is not required. 33. Valve also constitutes a Refueling Area Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Valve as shown in Table 3.6.5.2.2-1. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-43 Amerdnent No. 6

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l 3/4.6.4 VACUUM RELIEF SUPPRESSION CHAMBER - DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.4.1 Each pair of suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE and closed. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONI'TIONS 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: a. With one or more vacuum breakers in one pair of suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breakers inoperable for opening but known to be closed, restore the inoperable pair of vacuum breakers to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. b. With one suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker open, verify the other vacuum breaker in the pair to be closed within 2 hours; restore the open vacuum breaker to the closed position within 72 hours or be in at least HOT SHUiOOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. c. With one position indicator of any suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker inoperable: 1. Verify the other vacuum breaker in the pair to be closed within 2 hours and at least once per 15 days thereafter, or 2. Verify the vacuum breaker (s) with the inoperable position indicator to be closed by conducting a test which demonstrates that the AP is maintained at greater than or equal to 0.7 psi for one hour without makeup within 24 hours and at least once per 15 days thereafter. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. 1 LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-44 - l

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 Each suppression chamber - drywell vacuum breaker shall be: a. Verified closed at least once per 7 days. - b. Demonstrated OPERABLE: 1. At least once per 31 days and within 2 hours after any discharge of steam to the suppression chamber from the safety / relief valves, by cycling each vacuum breaker through at least one complete cycle of full travel. 2. At least once per 31 days by verifying both position indicators OPERABLE by observing expected valve movement during the cycling test. 3. At least once per 18 months by; a) Verifying each valve's opening setpoint, from the closed position, to be 0.5 psid 5%, and b) Verifying both position indicators OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION. c) Verifying that each outboard valve's position indicator is capable of detecting disk displacement >0.050", and each inboard valve's position indicator

is capable of detecting disk displacement >0.120".

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-45

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT I REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY l l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.6.5.1.1 REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: Without REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN withir the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.1.1 REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demon-strated by: a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the pressure within the reactor enclosure secondary containment is greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge, b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that: 1. All reactor enclosure secondary containment equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed. 2. At least one door in each access to the reactor enclosure secondary containment is closed. 3. All reactor enclosure secondary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE secondary containment auto-natic isolation dampers / valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, slide gate dampers or deactivated automatic dampers / valves secured in position. c. At least once per 18 months: 1. Verifying that one standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the reactor enclosure secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to 121 seconds with the reactor enclosure recirc system in operation, I and 2. Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and maintaining greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the reactor enclosure secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 1250 cfm. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-46 Amenchent tb. 6

i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT REFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGPITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.1.2 REFUELING APEA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION *. ACTION: Without PEFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specifica-tion 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j i 4.6.5.1.2 REFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated by: a. Verifying at least once per 24 hours that the pressure within the refueling area secondary containment is greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge, b. Verifying at least once per 31 days that: j 1. All refueling area secondary containment equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed. 2. At least one door in each access to the refueling area secondary containment is closed. 3. All refueling area secondary containment penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE secondary containment automatic iso-lation dampers / valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, slide gate dampers or deactivated automatic dampers / valves secured in

position, c.

At least once per 18 months: Operating one standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and main-taining greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge in the refueling area secondary containment at a flow rate not exceeding 764 cfm.

When irradiated fuel is being handled in the refueling area secondary contain-ment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-47 Amendment No. 6

REACTOR CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS REACTOR ENetuaunt SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.6.5.2.1 The reactor enclosure secondary containment ventilation system auto-matic isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.5.2.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation l times less than or equal to the times shown in Table 3.6.5.2.1-1. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3. ACTION: l With one or more of the reactor secondary containment ventilation system i I automatic isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.5.2.1-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that l is open and within 8 hours either: a. Restore the inoperable valves to OPERABLE status, or b. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated l valve secured in the isolation position, or l c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange. Otherwise, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.2.1 Each reactor enclosure secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation valve shown in Table 3.6.5.2.1-1 shal! be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time. b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each isolation valve actuates to its isolation I position. c. By verifying the isolation time to be within its limit at least once per 92 days. !!MERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-48

1 I l TABLE 3.6.5.2.1-1 ) REACTOR ENCLOSURE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 5 REACTOR ENCLOSURE (ZONE I) MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME ISOLATIgi) VALVE FUNCTION (Seconds) SIGNALS 1. Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-107 5 B,H,S,U 2. Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-108 5 B,H,S,U 3. Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust Valve HV-76-157 5 B,H,S,U 4 Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust l Valve HV-76-158 5 B,H,S,U I l 5. Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Exhaust Valve HV-76-141 5 B,H,S,0 j l 6. Peactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment i Exheust Valve HV-76-142 5 8,H,5,U 7. Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve HV-76-030 5 B,H,S,U,R,T 8. Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve HV-76-031 5 B,H,S,U,R,T l l 1 l l l (a)See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each automatic valve. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-49 Amerdnent No. 6 l

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS REFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.2.2 The refueling area secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.5.2.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less thar or ecual to the times shown in Table 3.6.5.2.2-1. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION *. ACTION: With one or more of the refueling area secondary containment ventilation system l automatic isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.5.2.2-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and within 8 hours either: a. Restore the inoperable valves to OPERABLE status, or l b. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated valve secured in the isolation position, or I c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve, blind flange er slide gate damper. l Otherwise, in Operational Condition *, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the refueling area secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.2.2 Each refueling area secondary containment ventilation system auto-matic isolation valve shown in Table 3.6.5.2.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: Prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or a. replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by cycling the valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel and verifying the specified isolation time. i b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that on a containment isolation test signal each isolation valve actuates to its isolation

position, c.

By verifying the isolation time to be within its limit at least once per 92 days.

When irradiated fuel is being handled in the refueling area secondary contain-ment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

l LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-50 Ameruhent No. 6

TABLE 3.6.5.2.2-1 REFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES REFUELING AREA (ZONE III) MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME ISOLATIgg) VALVE FUNCTION (Seconds) SIGNALS 1. Refueling Area Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-117 (Unit 1) 5 R,T 2. Refueling Area Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-118 (Unit 1) 5 R,T 3. Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust Valve HV-76-167 (Unit 1) 5 R,T 4. Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust Valve HV-76-168 (Unit 1) 5 R,T 5. Refueling Area Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-217 (Unit 2)** 5 R,T 6. Refueling Area Ventilation Supply Valve HV-76-218 (Unit 2)** 5 R,T l 7. Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust l Valve HV-76-267 (Unit 2)** 5 R,T l 8. Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust i Valve HV-76-268 (Unit 2)** 5 R,T l l 9. Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve HV-76-030 5 B,H,$,U,R,T 10. Drywell Purge Exhaust Valve HV-76-031 5 B,H,,5,U,R,T 11. Drywell Purge Exhaust Inboard 5 B,H,5,U,W,R,T l Valve HV-57-114 (Unit 1) l 12 Drywell Purge Exhaust Outboard 6 B,H,5,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-115 (Unit 1) 13 Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Inboard 5 B,H,S,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-104 (Unit 1) l 14 Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Outboard 6 B,H,S,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-112 (Unit 1) 1 l l LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-51 Amerdnent No. 6 l l

i TABLE 3.6.5.2.2-1 (Continued) REFUELING AREA SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES REFUELING AREA (ZONE III) MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME ISOLATI SIGNALSgg) VALVE FUNCTION (Seconds) 15. Drywell Purge Exhaust Inboard 5 B,H,5,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-214 (Unit 2)** 16. Drywell Purge Exhaust Outboard 6 B,H,5,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-215 (Unit 2)** 17. Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Inboard 5 B,H,S,U,W,R,T ) Valve HV-57-204 (Unit 2)** 18. Suppression Pool Purge Exhaust Outboard 6 B,H,$,U,W,R,T Valve HV-57-212 (Unit 2)** ^The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

- These lines are blanked off during Unit 1 operation / Unit 2 construction.

(a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signals that operate each automatic isolation valve. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-51a Amerxinent No. 6

c CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.5.3 Two independent standby gas treatment subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, and

ACTION:

a. With one standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or: 1. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours. 2. In Operational Condition , suspend handling of irradiated fuel j in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATION $ and operations 1 with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. b. With both standby gas treatment subsystems inoperable in Operational Condition *, suspend handling of irradiated fuel in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS or operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3. are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.5.3 Each stan f gas tiautment subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow a. through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the subsystem operates with the heaters OPERABLE. When irradiated fuel is being handled in the secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. I LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-52 )

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone 1 communicating with the subsystem by: l 1. Verifying that the subsystem satisfies the in place penetration l and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% 4 and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, l C.5.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, l and the system flow rate is 3000 cfm 10%. l 2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 0.175%; and 3. Verify that when the fan is running the subsystem flowrate is 2800 cfm minimum from each reactor enclosure (Zones I and II) and 2200 cfm minimum from the refueling area (Zone III) when I tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.* 4. Verify that the pressure drop across the refueling area to SGTS prefilter is less than 0.25 inches water gage while operating I at a flow rate of 2400 cfm 10%. c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory l Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, i meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl l iodide penetration of less than 0.175%. d. At least once per 18 months by: l 1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA l filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 9.1 inches l water gauge while operating the filter train at a flow rate of I 8400 cfm 10%. ^Specified subsystem flow rate is for a two unit operation. During the Unit 2 construction phase, the Unit 1 subsystem flow rate will be 2800 cfm minimum from the reactor enclosure and 2200 cfm minimum from the refueling area (Zone III). LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-53 Amendment No. 6

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2. Verifying that the fan starts and isolation valves necessary to draw a suction from the refueling area or the reactor enclosure l recirculation discharge open on each of the following test signals: J a) Manual initiation from the control room, and b) Simulated automatic initiation signal. 3. Verifying that the standby gas treatment system can be placed in the cooldown mode of operation from the control room. 4. Verifying that the temperature differential across each heater is > 15 F when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank ey e. verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the inplace penetra; ion and leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the system at a f h rate of 3000 cfm 10%. f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the inplace penetration and leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 3000 cfm 10%. g. Prior to initial criticality cf Unit 2 or after any major system alteration: 1. Verify that when the SGTS fan is running the subsystem flowrate is 2800 cfm minimum from each reactor enclosure (Zones I and II) and 2200 cfm minimum from the refueling area (Zone III). 2. Verify that one standby gas treatment subsystem will drawdown reactor enclosure Zone I secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gage in less than or equal to 121 seconds with the reactor enclosure recirculation system in operation and the adjacent reactor enclosure and refueling area zones are in their isolation modes. 1 LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-54 Amendment No. 6 l 1

1 l l l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The Reactor Enclosure and associated strt.ctures provide secondary containment during normal operation when the drywell is sealed and in service. At other times the drywell may be open and, when required, secondary containment integrity is specified. Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the reactor enclosure secondary containment with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. The OPERABILITY of the reactor enclosure recirculation system and the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or refueling accident (SGTS only). The reduction in t catainment iodine inventory reduces the resulting SITE B0UNDARY radiation dosts associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA and refueling accident analyses. Provisions have been made to continuously purge the filter plenums with instrument air when the filters are not in use to prevent buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and the HEpA filters Although the safety analyses assumes that the reactor enclosure secondary containment draw down time will take 135 seconds, these surveillance requice-ments specify a draw down time of 121 seconds. This 14 second difference is due to the diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays which is not part of this surveillance requirement. The reactor enclosure secondary containment draw down time analyses assumes a starting point of 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge and worst case SGTS dirty filter flow rate of 2800 cfm. The surveillance requirements satisfy this as-sumption by starting the drawdown from ambient conditions and connecting the adjacent reactor enclosure and refueling area to the SGTS to split the exhaust flow between the three zones and verifying a minimum flow rate of 2800 cfm from the test zone. This simulates the worst case flow alignment and verifies ade-quate flow is available to drawdown the test zone within the required time. The Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.5.3.b.3 is intended to be a multi-zone air balance verification without isolating any test zone. The SGTS fans are sized for three zones and therefore, when aligned to a single zone or two zones, will have access capacity to more quickly drawdown the affected zones. There is no maximum flow limit to individual zones or pairs of zones and the air balance and drawdown time are verified when all three zones are connected to the SGTS. The three zone air balance verification and drawdown test will be done prior to initial criticality of Unit 2 or after any major system alteration, which is any modification which will have an effect on the SGTS flowrate such that the ability of the SGTS to drawdown the reactor enclosure to greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gage in less than or equal to 121 seconds could be affected. LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5 Amrdmnt No. 6

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT (Continued) The field tests for bypass leakage across the SGTS charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter banks are performed at a flow rate of 2000 10% cfm. This flow rate corresponds to the maximum overall three zone inleakage rate of 3264 cfm. The SGIS filter train pressure drop is a function of air flow rate and filter conditions. Surveillance testing is performed using either the SGTS or drywell purge fans to provide operating convenience. Each reactor enclosure secondary containment zone and refueling area secondary containment zone is tested independently to verify the design leak tightness. A design leak tightness of 1250 cfm or less for each reactor enclosure and 764 cfm or less for the refueling area at a 0.25 inch of vacuum water gage will ensure that containment integrity is maintained at an acceptable level if all zones are connected to the SGTS at the same time. 3/4.6.6 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen combustible mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within the primary containment below the lower flammability limit during post-LOCA conditions. The primary containment hydrogen recombiner is provided to maintain the oxygen concentration below the lower flammability limit. The combustible gas analyzer is provided to continuously monitor, both during normal operations and post-LOCA, the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations in the primary containment. The primary containment atmospheric mixing system is provided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere to prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen and oxygen from exceeding the lower flammability limit. The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," March 1971. I t i i LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5a Amendment No. 6 )}}

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