ML20235G781

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 93 to License DPR-61

ML20235G781
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	09/09/1987
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20235G750	List: ML20235G748 ML20235G770 ML20235G781
References
NUDOCS 8709300214
Download: ML20235G781 (3)

Text

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\...../ SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 93 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-61 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT 3 . DOCKET NO. 50-213 1.0 INTP0 DUCTION By letter dated June 1, 1987, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) submitted a request for chances to the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications.

During the 1987 outage, new motor-operated valves were installed into the existing emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) to assure the capability of adequate core cooling over the entire spectrum of postulated pipe breaks.

This license amendment provides (1) new periodic surveillance requirements ost-maintenance surveillance to ensure correct requirements valve position, for throttle (2) p(3) new valve and ECCS retest valves, and requirements following modifications to any ECCS subsystem that would alter ECCS flow characteristics. l 2.0 EVALUATION By letter dated June 1,1987, CYAPC0 proposed technical specification (TS) I changes for the ECCS. These changes were requested because hardware modifications to the ECCS related to the long-term system modifications are being made during the Cycle 14 outage. The TS changes would require the newly installed motor-operated valves (MOVs) to remain in fixed positions so as to not change the present ECCS flow configuration during injection and sump recirculation. In addition, the four newly installed High Pressure Safety Injection System (HPSI) manual valves would be locked in their proper throttled position.

The newly installed NOVs will not be electrically connected following the Cycle 14 outage. The proposed changes to the technical specifications to assure proper ECCS configuration are discussed below. I Valves SI-MOV-854A and B are HPSI pump suction isolation valves that are, replacing manual valves which are normally open during operation. The proposed TS changes requires verification that these valves are in the locked open position once per twelve hours.

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Valves SI-MOV-901 and 902 are new valves that isolate the new cross-tie line I and are required to be closed to assure the present ECCS flow configuration l The proposed TS change requires verification that these valves are to be in i the locked closed position once every twelve hours, i l

Valve SI-M0V-873 is located in the core deluge line and will serve as a l redundant means of. isolating the core delu modifications are completed and approved. ge lineawhen the permanent It replaces manual valve which is open during operation. The proposed TS change requires verification j that this valve is locked in the open position prior to startup from cold shutdown and also electrically deenergized.

Valves SI-V-905, 906, 907 and 908 are manual throttle valves which are set '

to balance flow in the four HPSI injection lines. The valves are also set j to prevent HPSI flow from exceeding RHR design flow during HpSI )

recirculation. The correct positions will be established by test. The I proposed TS change requires verification that these valves are locked in the throttled position prior to start up from cold shutdown. Correct position  ;

verification is also to be required within four hours following maintenance 1 on these valves. l l The proposed TS change requires verification of the correct position of valve RH-FCV-796 within four hours after stroking or maintenance.

CYAPC0 has also proposed a TS change for a flow balance test, which is to be performed during Mode 5 or 6. following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter flow characteristics. This TS change would become effective during the Cycle 14 outage. This would verify that HPSI pump injection lines with a single pump running and two lines isolated would have a flow rate through each line of 1000 + or - 100 gpm.

A RHR pump flow test was also proposed. This test is designed to assure that with a single pump running, the RHR pump flow is equal to 1500 plus or minus 280 gpm.

In summary, hardware modifications are being made to the ECCS during the Cycle 14 outage as part of the long-term resolution of mitigating small break loss-of-coolant accidents. However, the new hardware modifications cannot be powered from existing emergency power supplies and therefore final implementation of the modifications must await completion of the new switchgear building during the Cycle 15 outage. The technical specific-ntions described above have been reviewed to assure that the mechanical modifications made during the Cycle 14 would not change the existing ECCS flow configurations during the injection and recirculation modes. ,

Based on our review, we conclude that the proposed technical specifications provide reasonable assurance that the ECCS flow configurations will not be affected by the installed modifications and are therefore acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance ,

of this amendment. l

4.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there-is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the j will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, andsuch (2) public  :

activities will be ccnducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This Safety Evaluation has been prepared by D. Katze, SRXB, NRR and F.

Akstulewicz, PDISA, NRR.

Dated: September 9, 1987 L__________