ML20235F023
| ML20235F023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1987 |
| From: | Harris D, Jerrica Johnson, Mayer M, George Minor, Radford E, Saegert S SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-3-I-SC-016, OL-3-I-SC-16, NUDOCS 8709280381 | |
| Download: ML20235F023 (52) | |
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.e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 l
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)'
(Emergency Planning)'
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
-)
)
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD P. RADFORD,' GREGORY C. MINOR, SUSAN C.
SAEGERT, JAMES H. JOHNSON,'JR., DAVID HARRIS AND MARTIN MAYER ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY CONCERNING LILCO'S RECEPTION CENTERS-(Monitorina and Decontamination Procedures)
I.
IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES 0.
Please state your names and positions.
A.
(Radford) My name is Edward P. Radford.- I am a Medical Doctor, an adjunct professor of Epidemiology at the Graduate School of Public Health of the. University _of'Pittsburgh, and an independent consultant on issues concerning the health effects of radiation.
(Minor)
My name is Gregory C. Minor.
I am'Vice President' of MHB Technical Associates,.a consulting firm specializing'in energy related issues.
l 1
_-_____--_---J
l l
(Saegert) My name is Susan C.
Saegert.
I am Professor of Psychology and Environmental Psychology at the City University of New York Graduate School.
I l
(Johnson) My name is James H.
Johnson, Jr.
I am Associate Professor of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles.
I am also Director of UCLA's Institute for Social Science Research, Environmental and Population Policy Studies Program.
(Harris)
My name is David Harris.
I am the Commissioner of Health Services for Suffolk County, New York.
1 (Mayer)
My name is Martin Mayer.
I am the Deputy Director j
of Public Health in the Suffolk County Department of Health Services.
Q.
Briefly summarize your exi.ience and professional qualifications.
A.
(Radford) I attended Massachusetts Institute of i
Technology from 1940-1943 and received an M.D. degree from j
Harvard in 1946.
Although I am currently retired from full-time academic work, I continue to serve as an adjunct Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Pittsburgh.
One of my professional specialties has been the health effects of lonizing l
radiation -- a subject I have taught at the Harvard University School of Public Health, the University of Cincinnati School of
j l
t Medicine, the John Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health, and the University of Pittsburgh.
In addition, from 1977 to 1980, I served as Chairman of the National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR III), as well as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Somatic Effects.
I have conducted research and published papers on the health effects of ionizing radiation, and l
as a visiting scientist from 1983 to 1984 was extensively involved in the collection and analysis of data concerning the l
l health effects of the atomic explosions in Hiroshima and l
Nagasaki.
Further details regarding my education, experience and professional qualifications are included in my curriculum vitae, which is attached as Exhibit 1 to this testimony.
A.
(Minor) (Saegert) (Johnson) (Harris) (Mayer)
Descriptions of our qualifications and copies of our vita may be found in the Direct Testimony of Stephen Cole, et al. Regarding
~LILCO's Reception Centers (Planning Basis).
I n
i e-T II.
OVERVIEW i
0 What is the purpose of your testimony?
A.
(All)
Our testimony. addresses the suitability of the three facilities designated as reception centers in Revision 8 of LILCO's Plan.
Eeq Plan, at 3.6-7.1/
The LILCO Plan provides that during an accident at the Shoreham plant, residents.and transients within the EPZ may.be instructed to' proceed to'the i
three reception centers, which are located in the Nassau County-1 I
villages of Roslyn, Bellmore and Hicksville.
Under the LILCO.
j Plan, the evacuees who arrive at the reception centers will be monitored, and if necessary, decontaminated. Id.; OPIP 3.6.1,.at
.]
2.
1 This testimony addresses the adequacy of the monitoring-and j
decontamination procedures described in both Revision 8 of the i
LILCO Plan and the " draft" revision of those procedures, dated February 20, 1987.
This " draft" revision will be referred to as the " Draft Materials."
In particular, our testimony will focus on four areas pertaining to-LILCO's monitoring and decontamination procedures.
(
1/
All references to the LILCO Plan are to Revision 8 unless otherwise specified.
L
.5 -
I First, we will address LILCO's monitoring methods and why
]
they are likely to fail to identify contamination on many 1
individuals.
Second, we will describe why adequate monitoring procedures will require much more time than LILCO has estimated for monitoring, and why even LILCO's inadequate monitoring procedures will take longer to perform than LILCO estimates.
I Third, we will discuss LILCO's decontamination procedures and show that those procedures will also take longer to perform than LILCO estimates.
Finally, we will address the adverse health effects resulting from LILCO's inadequate monitoring l
l procedures and the delays in monitoring and decontamination which I
will result from any attempted implementation of the LILCO Plan.
]
l Among those adverse public health effects will be an increased dosage of radiation, with a resulting increase in the rates of cancer and other latent offects among those so affected.
Our testimony is offered to assist the Board in resolving the following issues which have been admitted by this Board:
1.
Whether LILCO's monitoring procedures are adequate; 2.
Staff requirements given LILCO's new reception center scheme; 3.
Whether the proposal to send evacuees to LILCO parking I
lots could or would e'ver be implemented in a way to l
protect the public health and safety; and 4.
The effects of traffic congestion on the way to and in the vicinity of the facilities.
See Memorandum and Order (Rulings in Motion to Reopen Record and Romand of Coliseum Issues) (Dec, 11, 1986), at 17-19. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
III. MONITORING METHODS Q.
What is your understanding of how LILCO intends to monitor evacuees?
A.
(All)
Under Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan, evacuees arriving in private vehicles enter the three reception centers and proceed to monitoring stations, each of which is manned by i
two LILCO monitors.
Once the evacuees arrive at a monitoring station, the driver and any passengers remain seated in the l
vehicle, while one LILCO monitor scans the driver of the vehicle and the other monitor scans the vehicle itself.
Vehicle l
passengers are not monitored at all, and Revision 8 states that 1
monitoring of the driver will include only the hands and feet.
l Monitoring of the vehicle is done by taking a " swipe" of the top i
1 l
of the hood and a " swipe" from the wheel well.
Both swipes are then monitored for contamination.
OPIP 3.9.2, at 9-9a.
Under Revision 8, if the vehicle and the driver are determined to be " uncontaminated," any passengers in the vehicle are also assumed to be uncontaminated.
The vehicle is then given a clean tag and directed out of-the reception center.
OPIP 3.9.2 at 9a.
If either the vehicle or the driver are found to be contaminated, the vehicle and its occupants are directed to a decontamination trailer located at the Reception Center.
OPIP l
q i
4.2.3, at 5-8.
LILCO estimates that monitoring a vehicle and its-driver under the procedures described in Revision 8 will require approximately 35 seconds per vehicle..OPIP 4.2.3, at 6.
.]
Buses carrying evacuees without their own transportation will report to the Hicksville reception center.
.On arrival.at Hicksville, bus evacuees will receive a full body scan, including a thyroid scan.
OPIP' 3. 9. 2, at 6-18.
LILCO estimates that this procedure will take about 90 seconds for each individual.
This estimate does not include the thyroid scan, which LILCO estimates i
I would take an additional five seconds for an adult and an j
additional 30 seconds for a child.
OPIP 3.9.2, at 7-8.
Under the Draft Materials, LILCO intends to-monitor all persons, passengers included, arriving by private vehicle.
The l
monitoring procedures have also been supplemented to include:
monitoring of the head, shoulders, feet and hands of each individual.
The monitoring is to be performed while the driver and passengers remain seated in the vehicle.
Evacuees arriving in buses will continue to receive a whole body scan and a thyroid scan.
As in Revision 8, the Draft Materials direct that the vehicles be monitored by taking a swipe of the front of the-hood and of one-wheel well.
The Draft Materials also direct that_each monitoring station will be staffed with three. people:
two monitors, and a traffic guide who will obtain the swipes of vehicles and record certain information.
Draft Materials, OPIP 3.9.2 at 9a.
LILCO estimates that this process of monitoring the - - _ _ _ _ _ - - _
private vehicle and the passengers will take approximately 100 seconds per vehicle.
Draft Materials at 3.9-5; OPIP 3.9.2, at 9-9a.
LILCO estimates that, using the Draft Material monitoring techniques, it has resources and personnel to monitor about 30 percent of the EPZ residents within the time constraints of NUREG 0654.
Draft Materials at 3.9-5 through 3.9-6.
Q.
Why is it important for LILCO to provide effective monitoring of evacuees arriving at the reception centers?
A.
(Radford, Minor, Harris and Mayer) In the event of an accident at Shoreham involving the release of radioa'ctive l
particulate, it is possible that such particulate could come into contact with members of the public living in the vicinity of l
l 1
the plant.
Such contamination, if not removed in a timely manner, could lead to adverse health consequences.. Radiological monitoring is essential to identify persons who have been contaminated so t.at necessary decontamination measures and other treatment, if necessary, can be performed.
It is also necessary to calm fears, anxieties and concerns -- real or imagined --
about potential exposure.
O.
In your opinion, are LILCO's monitoring procedures adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident at Shoreham?.
L____--____-______________
A.
(Radford and Minor) No.
The LILCO monitoring i
J procedures do not comply with Section J.12 of NUREG 0654; they j
l are inadequate to identify surface contamination on individuals I
and vehicles; and they are inadequate to identify thyroid contamination.
I A.
The LILCO Monitoring Procedures are Inadequate Under NUREG-0654 l
(Radford and Minor)
Under Revision 8, LILCO's monitoring procedure calls for monitoring part of an arriving vehicle and its driver oniv (and then only part of the driver).
Section J.12 of NUREG 0654, however, provides as follows:
Each organization shall describe the means l
for registering and monitoring of evacuees at the relocation centers in host areas.
The personnel and equipment available should-be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients'in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
(Emphasis added)
Accordingly, LILCO's procedure is contrary to NUREG 0654 which requires the monitoring of all arriving evacuees, not just drivers.
It is therefore not surprising that the Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC")
found Revision 8 to be inadequate on this ground.
A copy of the j
pertinent portion of the RAC's findings, dated December 15, 1986, is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
i i
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i I
10 -
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B.
LILCO's Monitoring Procedures are Inadequate to Identify All Surface Contamination In addition to being contrary to NUREG 0654, LILCO's pro-posal to monitor only arriving drivers is simply an inappropriate monitoring technique.
The LILCO procedure assumes that if the I
driver is not contaminated, the passengers of the vehicle are not contaminated.
This assumption is insupportable, for the driver and his passengers may all cot from different points within the EPZ, or the driver may have been indoors during the passage of the plume while the passengers were outdoors.
The result of LILCO's selective monitoring may be to miss entirely members of the population who are contaminated.
Furthermore, the Revision 8 procedure of limiting monitoring to the hands and feet only of the drivers is an inadequate monitoring technique which, if used, could cause a monitor to miss other parts of the body that may be contaminated.
The best procedure is to give each arriving evacuee a whole-body scan, as was done in previous versions of the LILCO Plan and which Revision 8 and the Draft Materials direct be done for bus evacuees.
Finally, LILCO's procedure for monitoring vehicles is also inadequate because taking a " swipe" of the front hood and of a wheel well will not detect all contamination.
Adequate vehicle monitoring should cover most of the outside surface of the vehicle, including bumpers, door jams and door handles.
Anything _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __ _
less means that possible contamination might be missed, which could contaminate other items or people coming into contact with those vehicle areas which were missed.
Further, the LILCO Plan also does not direct. monitoring of-the trunk of a vehicle, an area which should be monitored to detect any contaminated items taken from the EPZ in the vehicle trunk.
Q.
Do LILCO's revisions in the Draft Materials allay your l
concerns?
A.
(Radford and Minor)
No.
The Draft Materials also contain several deficiencies.
First, they include no change in vehicle monitoring procedures, which are inadequate for the reasons already stated above.
Second, while the scope of evacuee monitoring has been increased somewhat, several problems still remain.
For instance, although the Draft Materials now call for passengers to be monitored, the monitoring of all vehicle occupants is to be done inside the vehicle.
Monitoring passengers while they are seated in locations which may be accessibic only with difficulty may_
cause improper scanning and inaccurate results.
Moreover, while additional areas of the body are being monitored, LILCO is still not providing a whole-body scan.
Thus, areas of possible-contamination may be missed, especially on the back, the back of the. shoulders, the abdominal area or the rump.
Furthermore, as j
is discussed.more fully below, the monitoring procedure will not l
l L
.12 -
I detect thyroid contamination. This incdequate monitoring can lead to undetected contamination which may, in turn, lead to adverse health consequences.
C.
The LILCO Monitoring Techniques Will Not Detect Evacuees With Thyroid Contamination Q.
Is there any provision for thyroid monitoring in the LILCO prodedures?
A.
(Radford and Minor)
Under Revision 8 and the Draft Materials, the bus evacuees are to be given a thyroid scan as a matter of course, regardless of whether contamination is detected in the whole-body scan.
However, for reasons which'are not l
explained in its Plan or Draft Materials, those who arrive in private vehicles do not get a thyroid scan unless contamination is detected on the surface of their bodies.
Thus, neither the techniques employed in Revision 8, nor the techniques employed in the Draft Materials, will detect thyroid contamination unless evacuees are found to have contamination in the limited surface 1
scan conducted while they are in their vehicles.
OPIP 3.9.2, at 1
9-11.
Q.
Should LILCO be required to monitor the thyroid of all evacuees?
l l
1 l
1 l
l A.
(Radford)
Yes.
Thyroid contamination results from the l
intake of radioactive iodine and presents a significant health l
risk because in terms of' quantity, radioactive iodine is likely j
to be one of the most important products' released'from a reactor l
meltdown accident.2/
Rapid uptake of radioactive iodine can occur by breathing airborne contamination from an accident.
When l
taken into the body, radioactive iodine is selectively concentrated in the thyroid gland and delivers nearly all its t
4 l
dose to that small volume of tissue.
l One effect of this localized dose, especially in developing embryos and fetuses in utero, could be to kill the thyroid cells I
and produce a permanent deficiency of thyroid function, which l
l results in stunted growth and a retarded development of the brain l
function in children.
At higher radiation levels, similar effects can be produced in adults.
Furthermore, the thyroid gland is one of the tissues in the body most sensitive to induc-tion of cancer by radiation, so even small doses substantially.
increase the risk of cancer.
As Dr. Roger E. Linnemann, a LILCO witness, has stated, at certain levels of thyroid contamination, treatment should be started as soon as possible.2/
Because 2/
Indeed, as a result of the Chernobyl accident, there was.a highly significant uptake of aitborne radioactive iodine in Poland -- approximately 400 miles from the reactor.
1/
See the deposition of Dr. Roger E. Linnemann at 21-22:
Q.
You indicated that there was thyroid contamination.
Time delays in treat-ment are of some medical signifi-cance?
A.
It depends on the dose to the thyroid gland.
l l -
thyroid contamination can occur without detectable levels of
-j surface contamination, all evacuees should receive a timely thyroid scan, a process which, to be accurately done, will require approximately one minute or slightly longer.A/
1 1
Q.
But at a certain level of
- dosage, then the time delays in medical treatment can become medically significant?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What's that level of dosage?
j A.
Well, the guidelines as established and put out by the FEMA, and which most states adhere to, is that if you expect the thyroid gland to get a dose of radiation, then potassium iodide should be administered.
Q.
And I believe your words before were "the sooner the better"?
q A.
Yes.
)
l A/
(Radford) The LILCO plan states that thyroid monitoring I
requires 5 seconds for adults and 30 seconds for children. OPIP j
i 3.9.2 at 8.
I believe this estimate to be too low.
When
~
l attempting to assess thyroid contamination, one must scan through several layers of tissue.
Thyroid scans are therefore sensitive procedures which require care and at least one minute to be done accurately.
Dr. Roger E.
Linnemann, a LILCO witness, appears to l
l agree with this estimate.
See the Deposition of Roger E.
)
l Linnemann, at 40:
I Q.
How long does it take to do a thyroid I
scan?
A.
In terms of minutes.
i Q.
Minutes?
l A.
Yes.
Q.
What is a thyroid scan?
l A.
You put a radiation detector over the thyroid gland and measure the radia-tion that comes from the thyroid gland.
l Q.
Why does it take minutes?
A.
Because it is usually all you need.
Q.
Okay.
It is a matter of minutes rather than seconds?
A.
Yes, I would say.. - _ _ - - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
V.
LENGTH OF TIME REOUIRED FOR MONITORING l
Q.
Are you familiar with the LILCO's time estimates for monitoring?
A.
(All)
Yes, under Revision 8, LILCO estimates that it 1
would require 35 seconds to monitor the driver and the. car.
In the Draft Materials, LILCO estimates that it would require 100 a
seconds to monitor a vehicle and its occupants.
Q.
Are those time estimates accurate?
l A.
(Radford and Minor)
No.
First, for the reasons j
i explained above, each estimate reflects an inadequate monitoring
)
l method.
Both time estimates are therefore meaningless.
As we l
l have already testified, adequate monitoring requires a full body
)
I scan and thyroid scan, such as the Plan provides for bus i
evacuees. LILCO estimates that a full body scan and a thyroid l
I I
scan would require 95 seconds for an adult and 120 seconds for a child.
OPIP 3.9.2 at 7-8.
Although we believe this figure is l
too low, even using LILCO's estimate for a full body scan and a thyroid scan, monitoring the occupants of a passenger car (each l
of which LILCO estimates will have 2.8 passengers) would require much more time than the 100 seconds estimated in the Draft Materials.
)
i Q.
LILCO's testimony indicates that its 100-second j
estimate is based on actual time trials.
LILCO Testimony at 42.
Do you disagree with the results of these trials?
l A.
(All)
Two time trials are the apparent basis for i
LILCO's conclusion that 100 seconds would be sufficient for monitoring under the procedures set forth on the Draft Materials.
Based on the information about the time trials obtained in discovery, we believe that the data from those time trials are j
invalid and do not support LILCO's estimate'of 100 seconds.
In particular, the trials do not account for equipment difficulties, operator fatigue, traffic movement and evacuee behavior problems.
These factors are explained below.
A.
Equipment Limitations, Operator Fatigue and Traffic Problems 1
(Minor)
The Eberline RM-14 is a proven device, but it cannot be effectively operated as quickly as required in the LILCO Plan.
Like any instrument, the Eberline is only as effec-tive as its operator.
The Eberline RM-14 is particularly sensi-j tive to operator training and experience because the measurements of contamination are reflected on a meter with a slowly fluctuat-ing needle indicating radiation levels.
This fluctuating needle will provide a range of readings which the operator must allow to stabilize and mentally average in order to determine the 1
approximate level of contamination.
Even alert and skilled operators may find it difficult to accurately make those I _ _ - _ _
~
l readings, mental calculations, and determinations of contamination, in a matter of seconds.
The accuracy of the determinations will suffer with the increased time the operators spend at the task, the monotony of the process, and adverse environmental conditions for the measurements.
Furthermore, during an emergency, monitors may be required 1
to operate for several hours under stressful conditions.
As they l
become fatigued, the patience of the operatorE to take the time l
to be sure localized or " hot particle" contamination'is detected and to accurately make the necessary determinations, will necessarily diminish.
The first LILCO time trial consisted of only five " trials" while the second time trial consisted of only l
seven " trials."
Such a limited number of trials cannot measure 1
l the increased monitoring time required after monitors have l
i examined tens or hundreds of vehicles.
The operator fatigue which would result from the several hours of monitoring required in the LILCO Plan would likely cause the amount of time to monitor a vehicle and its occupants accurately to rise well above 100 seconds.
I l
It is also important to bear in mind that LILCO's monitoring procedures depend on a smooth flow of traffic through the l
relatively complex traffic maze LILCO has established at each reception center.
The two limited time trials which LILCO relies l
on did not account for delays which would be caused by vehicic breakdowns or driver confusion while travelling the complex routes designated at the reception center parking lots.
In addition, the time trials did not account for delays in i
vehicles entering monitoring stations and exiting those stations after monitoring is complete.
Under LILCO's scheme, the time required to enter and exit monitoring stations is especially sensitive to delays, since, in many cases, cars enter and exit monitoring stations in groups of two to four cars.
OPIP 4.2.3 at 17,21,25; Draft Materials at 17-17a,21-21a, 25-25a.
In these instances, a second line of cars cannot move into a group of monitoring stations until the first line has been monitored and departed.
The result of this procedure is that even a slight delay in monitoring one car will affect the time required to monitor the whole line of cars at the monitoring station.
- Thus, even slight delays in monitoring will be magnified many times and will cause substantial delays in monitoring all arriving evacuees.
The time trials and the 100 second estimate which flow from those trials do not account for such delays.
When one also factors in delays for vehicle break downs and delays in entering monitoring stations, the 100 second estimate is seen to be unrealistically short.
i _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _
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i B..
Evacuee Behavior J
(Saegert and Johnson)
LILCO's 100 second estimate also does not account for delays that will result from evacuee stress and I
. frustration with the apparent ineffectiveness of LILCO's j
procedures.
Those factors will result in behavior'that 1
significantly slows the monitoring process.
H 1
The professional literature establishes that people view l
radiological contamination as more dangerous than almost'any other type of hazard.1/
Moreover, people on Long Island are particularly concerned about radiological contamination and its effects.5/
Because of this fear,' people are going to be 1
extremely anxious to-be monitored in order.to know if they have been contaminated.
The anxiety of people who believe they have a
been contaminated will be aggravated by long delays in obtaining i
i monitoring.
Not only will such delays magnify people's health l
concerns, but research on automobile driver frustration and waiting-induced stress demonstrates that evacuee stress levels will increase dramatically.
5/
See the Direct Testimony of Stephen Cole, et al. Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers (Planning Basis) (April 13, 1987).
In particular, studies by Slovic and his colleagues demonstrate that the public perceives radiation to be one of the most dreaded hazards short of warfare.
This conclusion is also supported by the research of a LILCO witness, Michael K.
Lindell.
.In a paper entitled " Protective Response to Technological Emergency: Risk l
Perception and Behavorial Intention," by M.K. Lindell and V.E.
3arnes (Nuclear Safety, Winter.1986), Lindell found the results I
of his research to be consistent with that of Slovic "in demonstrating how negatively radiation hazard is viewed."
5/
See the. Direct Testimony of Stephen Cole, et al. Regarding l
LILCO's Reception Centers (Planning Basis) (April 13, 1987)..
m l
With respect to automobile driver frustration, a large body of research on behavioral aggression has focused on the frustrations of drivers who find themselves detained and not able j
l to progress due to the actions of others.1/
This research is l
based on the recognition that " modern automobile traffic frequently creates situations which closely resemble classical
. E/
We know formulations of how frustration is instigated.
l
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l from the testimony of the State of New York traffic experts.that l
l l
there will be delays of many hours before evacuees ever reach the
(
reception center.
As a result, prior to reaching the sites, the j
l l
evacuees will have been sitting for hours in long lines of slow i
moving traffic and will have already confronted the most anxiety-
)
provoking types of traffic situations -- blocked intersections, creeping traffic, and other impediments to progress.
Thus, the mere process of travelling to reception center will greatly I
increase stress and anxiety among the evacuees.
l l
In addition to the anxiety resulting from traffic-induced i
factors, the simple fact that evacuees will be waiting for i
radiological monitoring will also increase the already high 1/
K. K. Deaux, " Honking at the intersection:
A replication and extension," Journal of Social Psycholoov, 84 (1971) at 159-160; A. Doob and A.
E. Gross,
- Status of Frustration as an l
inhibitor of horn honking responses," Journal of Social l
Psycholoov, 76 (December 1968) at 213-218; D.
T.
Kenrick and S.
l W. McFarlane, " Ambient Temperature and Horn-Honking: A field j
study of the heat / aggression relationship," Environment and Behavior, IS(2) (1986) at 179-181; M. Parry, Accression on the i'
Road (1968).
E/
A. Doob and A.
E. Gross, " Status of frustration as an i
inhibitor of horn-honking responses," Journal of Social
.j Psycholoov, 76 (1968) 213-218.
i i
1 )
I
levels of stress.
Research has established that time passes more slowly while waiting, and stress increases as time passes.9/
Research also shows that the waiting induced stress is intensified if the situation one is waiting to resolve is significant.
In the case of evacuees waiting to be monitored, the evacuees will be waiting for a procedure to resolve what they perceive to be a threat to their lives and the lives of their families.
The stress and anxiety caused by waiting to be monitored will therefore be extreme.
We believe that the stress and anxiety of evacuees will have l
three behavioral results:
diminished ability to follow instructions; persistent and extensive questioning of LILCO personnel; and, on occasion, aggressive behavior towards LILCO personnel.
l (Saegert)
First, my own research shows that people facing l
this level of anxiety are less able to follow instructions and less able to complete simple tasks.10/
In particular, the delays and anxiety that exist in naturally occurring crowds signifi-cantly diminish a person's capacity to process information from signs and to form an accurate image of the environment.
This diminished capacity often results in a slowed ability to follow instructions; indeed, it sometimes results in a total inability 9/
E.
E. Osuma, "The Psychological Cost of Waiting," Journal of Mathematical Psycholoav, 29 (11) (1985) at 82-105.
10/
S.
Saegert, E. Mackintosh and S. West, "Two studies of crowding in Urban Places," Environment and Behavior, 7 (1975) at 159-184. _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
to follow instructions.
The literature establishes that the~less control one has over a situation, the greater an individual's ineffectiveness and inability to follow-instructions.ll/
In the event of a Shoreham accident, some Shoreham evacuees will feel totally without control over the situation they find themselves in because their fate is in the hands of otherc.
The result will be diminished capacity and ability to follow. instructions.
(Saegert and Johnson)
The consequence of this decreased ability to follow instructions is that evacuees:
(1) may not be able to comprehend routing instructions given to-them by LILCO guides; (2) may not move through the complicated traffic maze i
LILCO has established at the reception centers; and (3) may not I
accurately or quickly follow the instructions of monitors.
This l
1 will lead to traffic delays and delays in monitoring.
The high levels of evacuee stress and anxiety will also cause evacuees to ask traffic guides or monitors a number of questions.
To the extent people are not in control of a situa-tion, they can alleviate their stress by acquiring information.
Because of their anxiety and fears of radiation, we anticipate the evacuees will extensively and intensively question LILCO personnel.
Indeed, in a vehicl'e with three people, all.three may examine the LILCO monitor in an effort to allay their fears.
To the extent the LILCO monitor is responsive to the questions, this 11/
D.
E.
Schmidt and J.
P. Keeting, " Human Crowding and Personal Cont:fol:
an integration of the research," Psychological Bulletin, 86 i4) (1979) at 680-700.
examination will cause delays in monitoring.
To the extent the l
LILCO monitor refuses to answer questions or, directs evacuees only to listen to EBS messages on the radio, many evacuees.will feel very frustrated.
They will want immediate answers and.will not want to wait for another EBS broadcast.
They.may also. feel that EBG messages will not' address.their particular concerns.
l Their frustration could cause them either to argue with LILCO personnel or otherwise display some form of hostility.
This brings us to the third resul.t of. evacuee stress which will be aggressive and possibly violent behavior by some evacuees.
Among some evacuees, there will be a sense of hostility against LILCO monitors and other personnel.
This hostility could be manifested in a range of behavior, from verbal abuse directed at LILCO personnel to physical abuse.
Hostility will be particularly acute if LILCO uses the procedures in Revision 8, where only the driver is monitored.
In that situation, some people will insist on being monitored and will not move until they are monitored.
Specifically, the literature identifies certain factors which increase the likelihood of hostility.
These are:
the belief that the goals sought are legitimate; the appearance of deliberately impeded goals; the attribution of f rustration to t-he environment and not-to the individual seeking the goals; and previous angerLat the target of aggression.12/
In the case of a Shoreham emergency, the public 12/
See Berkowitz, " Aversive Conditions as Stimuli to Aggression," in Advances in Experimental Social Psycholoov-15 '(L.
Berkowitz ed. 1982) at 249-288..
d will certainly perceive that the goal of monitoring is legiti-
~
mate.
LILCO will also be seen as deliberately l impeding the public's goal of monitoring when.it is unable to monitor the I
public expeditiously.
In addition, blame for this frustration will clearly focus on LILCO, which will already be the focus of some hostility as the cause of-the threat to their safety due to LILCO's insistence on operating a' plant which most people'do not want.
Q.
LILCO's witness'Dr. Mileti states that everyone will react " altruistically" and.that.there will, therefore, be no instances of the behavior you cite.
.LILCO Testimony at 29.-
Do-you agree?
l l
1 A.
(Saegert and Johnson) No.
At one point in his i
testimony Dr. Mileti discussed the possibility of evacuee l
1
" panic."
LILCO Testimony at 28-29.
Dr. Mileti mischaracterizes j
i our views when he ascribes to us predictions of " panic."
Our I
position is just as Dr. Mileti has testified:'
"In an actual-l emergency at Shoreham, most of the public would behave-in ways-i consistent with their situational perceptions of risk.
LILCO Testimony at 26.
In the event of.a Shoreham accident ~
associated with a monitoring advisory, such perceptions will include a fear of the radiological accident, the knowledge that some people had been exposed to radiation.(a condition that l
cannot be detected without monitoring), and a belief that they i
i i
s l
' ')
)
will be. prevented from obtaining monitoring because of the limited east-west highway system.
Such perceptions will cause j
1 anxiety and hostility.
i In an effort to support his views, Dr. Mileti attempts to make a distinction between community-wide mass emergency. fires
]
and firea in buildings.
He then likens a Shoreham accident to the former case, where people generally respond altruistically,
]
l rather than to the latter, where people often do not.
LILCO j
1 Testimony at 27-29.
However,-even assuming the distiretion' l
between mass emergency fires and building fires is val $d, Dr.
j i
Mileti ignores the fact that, in the event of a Shoreham
)
l accident, the situation on Long Island would resemble a building fire, the exact situation in which he would expect panic and non-altruistic behavior.
l i
Specifically, Dr. Mileti-identifies the profile of such j
1 1
l building fires as situations where:
(1) people are in a confined l
place; (2) there is an escape route that is traversable to safety; (3) people are convinced that death is very likely.unless one traverses the escape route; and (4) it appears that there is l
Insufficient time for everyone to flee to safety.
These el'ements form an accurate description of precisely the perceptions that a Shoreham accident would present on Long Island.
We know from the focus groups and surveys which have been performed that Long Island residents believe:
(1) Long Island is a confined place; (2) it has a limited number of evacuation routes; (3) that these.c
evacuation rous'en can easily become impassable; and that (4) many i
people would be urjible to' evacuate in a timely fashion if their lives.were. threatened by a serious release of radiation from the Shoreham plant.
Dr. Mileti's own example, therefore, supports our conclusion:
people will act in accord with their situational perception of risk which may include extreme anxiety about their safety.
Although many individuals may act altruistically, many peoplr till also react, in accord with their situational perce ion of risk, with behavior that will impede effective mon; coring.
C.
Summary O.
Given the concerns discussed above, what is an accurate estimate of the time actually required for monitoring?
A.
(Radford and Minor)
Because of the factors cited above, we believe that it will take longer to monitor the evacuees than the LILCO Plan asserts.
We adopt the testimony of the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group
("REPG"), where they estimate that for proper monitoring it takes two to three minutes to monitor a person and two to five minutes to monitor a vehicle.ll/
More6~ver, we also adopt the REPG 1
estimate that even using LILCO's procedures, it would require at least three to five minutes to monitor each arriving car and its 11/
See Direct Testimony of James D.
Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers (April 13, 1987). _____-_.
passengers.
Since this REPG estimate encompasses.the 220-second estimate which is the basis for the State of New York traffic 1
experts' site circulation analysis, we also endorse that estimate, as well as the results of the site circulation analysis.11/
Indeed, this two to five minute estimate is I
supported by Dr. Roger E. Linnemann, a LILCO witness.ll/
As indicated in the REPG witnesses' testimony, LILCO has the resources to monitor only 10-17% of the EPZ population in 12 I
hours.
i 14/
See Direct Testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C.
Millspaugh on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers.
(April 13, 1987).
11/
See the deposition of Dr. Roger E. Linnemann at 40-41:
Q.
On the same subject cf monitoring, if you had four individuals in a car, an automobile, and we did this initial triage system you have described, how long would it take, roughly, to triage those four individuals in the automobile, that initial scan, checking hands and feet of the individuals?
A.
Minutes.
Q.
Minutes?
A.
Yes.
For probably all four of them, you just check hands and feet.
Q.
So if you just checked hands and feet for the four of them, it would take minutes, you believe?
A.
Yes. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
l I
V.
DECONTAMINATION i
l l
Q.
What is LILCO's decontamination procedure?
]
l i
I A.
As individuals are identified as contaminated, they will be sent to a decontamination trailer.
At the trailer,
)
individuals will be monitored once again.
LILCO personnel will then direct each individual to remove his or her clothing, and
)
they will monitor the skin underneath the clothing.
If the monitoring of the skin reveals no contamination, LILCO will then I
issue a " clean tag" and no further decontamination will be attempted.
If the monitoring after removal of an evacuee's clothes reveals localized contamination, that person will be I
1 instructed to wash in sinks.
If the contamination is not localized, he or she will be instructed to shower.
OPIP 3.9.2 at 10.
LILCO estimates that less than 10% of the contaminated evacuees will require showering.
Draft Materials, at 3.9-5A.
I People who have been decontaminated will then be issued paper robes and paper slippers.
Those evacuees who have thyroid or unremovable skin contamination will be instructed to transport j
themselves to the hospital.
Q.
Do you have any concerns with LILCO's decontamination process? ___
A.
(Radferd, Saegert, Johnson and Minor)
Yes.
We believe.
there will be lengthy delays in the decontamination procedure because LILCO's estimate of the percentage of contaminated individuals requiring showering is too low.
Furthermore, the anxiety of contaminated individuals will cause further delays in the decontamination process.
Q.
Why is LILCO's estimate of the number of people 1
requiring showering inaccurate?
j 1
A.
(Radford)
In the event of a Shoreham accident which j
results in a plume with airborne radioactivity, wind changes may cause the plume to cover a large segment of the EPZ.
See testi-i many of Messrs. Minor and Sholly in Direct Testimony of Stephen 1
Cole et al. on behalf of Suffolk County Regarding LILCO's Recep-tion Centers (Planning Basis) (April 13, 1987).
As a result, it l
is very possible that far more than 10% of arriving evacuees could be contaminated to such a degree that showers could be required.
Such additional numbers of people requiring i
decontamination would result in very long delays in the l
decontamination process because of LILCO's limited showering facilities.
See Testimony of David T.
Hartgen and Robert M111opaugh on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's L
s Reception Centers (April 13, 1987).
)
O.
Explain how evacuee anxieties will cause delays in LILCO's decontamination procedures?
A.
(Saegert, Johnson)
People who are waiting for decon-tamination will have already been identified as being con-taminated and they will be extremely anxious.
This anxiety will result in a strong desire to have the decontamination done as quickly and thoroughly as possible.
As a consequence, people identified as being contaminated will likely not be satisfied with anything less than what they perceive to be full decontamination procedures --
i.e.,
a shower.
l l
l In particular, the LILCO Plan contemplates that those I
I evacuees identified as contaminated will initially be directed to remove their clothing.
Evacuees will then be remonitored and if the readings are below threshold levels, they will be told that they are decontaminated, issued paper clothing and directed to leave.
In our opinion, many evacuees will reject these l
procedures and insist on showering, which is what will be viewed l
as being complete decontamination.
Thus, LILCO's decontamination will take much longer to complete since nearly all the evacuees
)
identified as contaminated will insist on showering.
This will l
result in delays for those who actually require decontamination by showering.
I i
V.
ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS RESULTING FROM LILCO'S RECEPTION j
CENTER SCHEME 1
i Q.
Will LILCO's monitoring and decontamination procedures, l
result in adverse health effects to the public?
1 A.
(Radford)
Yes.
People;who come into contact-with radioactive materials in the-event of an accident at Shoreham will be subject to an increasing dose of radiation until'the 1
i contamination is removed.
The dose one receives is a' function not only of the severity of the release (i.e., the amount and type of radiation materials deposited), but a'1so the length of time one is exposed to such radioactive sources.
Our testimony, as well as that of the State's witness,15/
j i
reveals that LILCO's monitoring procedures'may fall to' detect j
contamination on certain individuals because certain areas of the body will not be monitored.
If LILCO's monitoring technique fails to identify contamination on an individual, that individual will continue to receive a dose of radiation until the contamination is removed naturally.
- i l
15/
See Direct Testimony of James D. Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech on Behalf of the State of'New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Center (April 13, 1987).
32 -
1 In addition,'the evidence shows that there will be.long
-delays of many hours before most members of the public even reach the reception centers to be monitored,ll/.and there will be additional delays before those found to be contaminated are decontaminated.
Again, this means greater doses for those who are contaminated.
LILCO's failure to detect contamination, or LILCO's delays in detecting contamination and effecting subsequent decontamination, will have a significant public health impact i
because radiation, even at low doses, will-increase cancer incidence and other latent effects (such as genetic defects) i within the population.
1 I
I l
Q.
Can you quantify the effects of (1) LILCO's failure to 1
detect some contamination and (2) delays in monitoring and decontaminating individuals?
l l
i A.
(Radford)
Yes, to a degree.
In those instances where monitoring fails to detect contamination, there would be a 1
significant increase in cancer risk.
For example, a whole body dose of 15 rads caused by unremoved contamination would raise l
total cancer risk 10% above that usually present in the population.
A similar dose to the thyroid gland would increase cancer risk by as much a 100%, especially in children.
1 11/
See Direct testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C.
Hillspaugh on Behalf of the Sta~te of New York Regarding LILCO's neception Centers (April 13, 1987). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
As for the consequences of lengthy delays before monitoring, any surface contamination will contribute a dose proportional to the time elapsing before it was removed.
If it is necessary to monitor evacuees at any time after the accident, then prolonging this time will increase the risk of cancer, especially to tissues near the body surface.
Depending on the amount and distribution of particles released during an accident, surface contamination
)
could be highly significant in comparison to the direct radiation from the plume.
Thus, in some circumstances, surface contamination can be a significant factor in an individual's total dose.
j Under such circumstances, increasing the time before monitoring and decontamination would increase the cancer risk.
l l
For example, if the initial surface contamination resulted after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in a five rad dose, the result of a 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> delay in monitoring would be a dose of about 10 rads.
An increase of this amount is medically significant and could increase cancer incidences as much as a 3.5%.
Similarly, if the initial surface I
contamination resulted after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in a 10 rad dose, the result of a 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> delay in monitoring will be a dose of about 20 rads.
This increased dose would cause a 7% increase in subsequent cancer risks.
There will also be increased risks of thyroid cancer from delays in monitoring.
When there is an iodine uptake occurring.
from inhalation of plume contaminants in the air, this uptake 1 -
must be blocked as soon as possible to minimize the dose.
Delays in monitoring will cause delays in treatment which, in turn, will result in increased cancer risks.
Q.
LILCO's witnesses testify however, that the health i
effects resulting from a delay in monitoring and decontamination
't will be insignificant.
LILCO Testimony at 38-39.
Do you agree?
j l
J A.
No. The LILCO witnesses' testimony is based on exposure assumptions that are extremely low.
They therefore derive low risks associated with delay.
NUREG 0654 directs that emergency planning be for a wide range of accidents.
As I testified.above, if one assumes more significant doses (which doses are entirely possible), then monitoring and decontamination delays clearly cause an increased risk of cancer.
i I
i 0.
Will there be other adverse health effects resulting from LILCO's inadequate procedures?
A.
(Harris, Mayer)
Yes.
As we understand the testimony 1
of the traffic experts from the State of New York, it is likely that people may be waiting many hocrs for monitoring and many more hours for decontaminationil8/
The LILCO Plan has no provision to supply people with food or water.
These delays could cause great harm for the elderly, infants or those who are 8/
Direct Testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C.
Millspaugh on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers (April 13, 1987). _ _ -
infirm because of diabetes or some similar chronic condition.
Indeed, even under ideal circumstances, deprivation of food and water for an extended period time.can be life threatening for the elderly, infants or the infirm.
Moreover, the effects of this deprivation could be exacerbated by either extreme heat or cold.
Another problem with LILCO's Plan is that it does not provide for trained medical personnel to be present at the reception center sites.
It is obvious that when there are many people gathered together at any one place, certain people are going to get sick.
Moreover, in this case, many people may become ill because of water and food deprivation, psychological stress, and perhaps radiation poisoning.
As Dr. Roger E.
1 Linnemann, a LILCO witness, has acknowledged, there should be a first aid facility at each reception center as well as trained medical personnel.19/
The result of the lack of medical 19_/
See the deposition of Dr. Roger E. Linnemann at 204 Q.
Is it your understanding that the reception centers are to be the locations where evacuees are to be monitored, and if necessary, decontaminated?
A.
Yes, that's my understanding.
Q.
In your estimatidn, should there be medical personnel at the i
reception centers?
A.
I would think it is pretty I
I standard, when you accumulate people for whatever reason, that there is some medical nursing or people that, the first aid station type thing.
That seems reasonable. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
1 J
l personnel and first aid facilities is that the sick will get more gravely ill, their difficulties will affect others, and stress i
will be increased.
i l
i Finally, LILCO's Plan and procedures are deficient and could result in adverse health consequences because they make no I
provisions for adequate sanitary facilities for evacuees.
At l
Bellmore and Roslyn especially, such facilities are very limited
)
I and will be unable to handle the thousands of people who will be arriving at those sites.
LILCO's proposal in its Testimony at 55 to attempt to obtain portable toilets on an ad hoc basis is l
1 J
inadequate.
Without an agreement that such portable toilets can be supplied in a timely manner, there can be no finding of 1
reasonable assurance that they will in fact be available to LILCO in an emergency.
l l
IV.
CONCLUSIONS Q.
Please state your conclusions?
A.
(All) 'ILCO's monitoring procedures at the reception centers are inadequate.
Under both Revision 8 and the Draft Materials, the monitoring proc 66ures will fail to detect thyroid contamination as well as contamination on many areas of the body.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
In addition, effective monitoring of the evacuees arriving at LILCO's reception center will take far longer to perform than LILCO estimates.
We believe it will require three to five minutes to provide monitoring for each arriving vehicle and its occupants.
This estimate encompasses the 220 second monitoring estimate used by the New York State traffic experts in their site circulation studies, and we therefore agree with the results of that study.
With respect to LILCO's decontamination procedures, LILCO has underestimated the number of people who will require full decontamination.
Furthermore, the behavioral problems which will occur as a result of LILCO's decontamination procedures will also cause lengthy delays in the decontamination process.
Finally, LILCO's inadequate procedures will result in adverse public health consequences -- both radiological and non-radiological.
Q.
Does this conclude your testimony?
A.
Yes.
w---s-----=
4 g.
4
' l
)
4 i
F:XHIBIT 1 i
i
]
e e
i
\\
EXHIBIT 1
'CURR8CULUM'V87AE EDWARD P. RADFORD, M.D.
]
s Birthdato:
21, Feb., 1922 Tel. (U.S.A.) 203-677-9024 Birthplace: Springfield, Mass., U.S.A.
-(U.K.)
0608-810942 Citizenship U.S.A.
)
1 Addresses:
U.S.A.
U.K.
j 34 Paper Chase Dr.
The Old School House Farmington, CT 06032 Spelsbury Oxford, OX7 3JR j
l EDUCATION
' ]
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1940-43 Biology Harvard Medical School-1943-46 Medicine M.D. degree 1946 POSITIONS HELD ACADEMIC 1949-50 Teaching Fellow, Dept. of Physiology, Harvard Medical School 1950-52 Instructor, Dept. of Physiology, Harvard Medical School 1952-55 Associate, Dept. of Physiology, Harvard School.of Puclic Health 1959-65 Associate Professor of Physiology, Harvard School of Public Health 1965-68 Professor and Director, Dept. of Environmental Health 1
Director of Kettering Laboratory, Professor of Physiology, College of Medicine, University of Cincinnati, Ohio 1968-77 Professor of Environmental Medicine, School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University l
1975-76 Visiting Professor, Dept. of.the Regius Professor of Medicine, Oxford University, England I
1977-83 Professor of Environmental Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh, PA 1979-83 Director, Center of Environmental Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh~
1985 Visiting Professor, University of Occupational and Environmental Health, Kitakyushu, Japan
~
1986 Retired from full-time academic work Adjunct Professor of Epidemiology, Graduate School of Public Health, University of Pittsburgh i
NON-ACADEMIC 1947-49 Active Duty, U.S. Air Force Chief of Medical Service, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL.
1948 Radiological Health Officer, Atomic Bomb Tests, Eniwetak Atoll 1955-59 Physiologist, Haskell Laboratory for Toxicology and Industrial Medicine, E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Newark, Del.
1983-84 Visiting Scientist, Radiation Effects Research Found,ation, Hiroshima, Japan 1986-Independent Consultant cont.....
9 4
1
'2.:
MEMBERSHIPS IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES.
American Physiological Society Radiation Research' Society
)
i American Public Health Association i
l Society for Environmental and Occupational' Health:
Society for' Epidemiological Research-Follow of American College of Epidemiology OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES l
Me mbe r :
National Academy of Sciences Advisory Cormittee'on the Eiological Ef fects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR I) 1970-72 Mecto r :
Health Research Facilities Scientific Review Committee, National Institutes of Health, 1970-73 Chairman: Power Plants and Human Health and Welfare Study Groupi.
Dept. of Natural Resources, State of Maryland, 1973-74 Consultant in Occupational Health, Division of. Labor and Industry,.
State of Maryland, 1973-75 Member:
Governor's Advisory Council on Nuclear Reactors, State of.
Pennsylvania, 1973-4 Medical Consultant to Council on Environmental Quality,. Washington ' D.C.
'1975 Member U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator's Toxic Substances Advisory Committee, 1977-80 Chairman: National Academy of Sciences Advisory Cormittee on the Biological effects of Ionizing Radiation and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Somatic Ef fects (BEIR III)', 1977-80 Medical Consultant to Westvaco Corporation, New York, 1977-85
-i CURRENT RESEARCH Study of lung cancer in Swedish iron miners ' exposed to radon daughters j
Evaluation of radon in homes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki i
HONORS 1943-46 National Scholar, Harvard Medical School 1975-7G Macy Faculty Scholar to go to Oxford University for sabbatical study s
t
PUBLZCAT80NS i
I
- 1. Radford, EP, Jr.
Method for cotimating-respiratory surface aroa-of mammalian lungs from their physical characteristics.
Biol Med 87:58-61, 1954.
Proc Soc Exp l
nomogram to estimate proper ventilation during artificial respiratic f N Engl J Med 251:877-884, 1954.
- 3. Radford EP, Jr.. Ventilation standards for use'in artificial respiration. J App 1' Physiol 7:451-460, 1955.
I
- 4. Radford EP, Jr., Lefcoe NM.
i Effect of bronchoconstriction on elastitj properties of excised lungs and bronchi.
Am J Physiol 180:479-484,- l 1955.
i
- 5. McIlroy Ma, Head J, selverstone NJ, Radford EP, Jr.
Measurement of -
lung tiscue viscous resistance using gases of equal kinematic -
viscosity. J Appi Physiol 7:485-490, 1955.
I
Mechanical factors in distribution of pulmonary ventilation.
J Appl Physiol 8:427-443, 1955.
- 7. Radford EP, Jr.
Recent studies of mechanical properties of.mammaliar Lungs.
In: Tissue Elasticity.
JW Remington, ed.
Am Physiol Soc.,
Washington, DC, 1957, pp. 177-190.
t
- 8. Mead J, 'Nhittenberger JL, Radford EP, Jr. ' Surface tension as a factor In pulmonary volume-pressure hysteresis. J Appl Physiol 10:191-196, 1957.
- 9. Trank NR, Radford EP, Jr.,- Whittenberger JL.
Static volume-pressure interrelations of the lungs and pulmonary blood vessels in excised cats' lungs.
J Appl Physiol 14:167-173, 1959.
- 10. Radford, EP, Jr.
Factors modifying water metabolism in rats fed dry diets.
Am J Physiol 196:1098-1108, 1959.
- 11. Brouha L, Radford EP, Jr.
The cardiovascular system in muscular activity.
In: Science and Medicine of. Exercise and Sports.
Harper and Brothers, New York, NY,.1960, pp 178-206.
- 12. Radford EP, Jr.
Interrelationships between water and electrolyte.
metabolism in rats. Am J Cardiol 8:863-869, 1961.
- 13. Radford *EP, Jr., Wh'ittenberger JL.
Mechanical methods.
In:
Artificial Respiration: Theory and Applications.
JL Whittenberger, ed. Hoeber Medical Division, Harper and Row, New York, NY, 1962, pp 147-172.
8
- 14. Radford EP, Jr.
Mechanical stability of the lung.
Arch Environ Health 6:134-138, 1963.
- 15. Radford EP, Jr., Hunt VR, Sherry D.
Analysis of teeth and bones for alpha-emitting elements.
Radiat Res 19:298-315, 1963.
u
2 16.~ Hunt VR,.Redford EP, Jr., Segall'AJ. ' Comparison of concentrations i
of alpha-cmitting. elements in teeth and bones. ' Int J Radiat Biol
~
- 7:277-287, 1963.
- 17. Radford EP, Jr., Hunt VR.
Polonium-210: A volatilo radio-element in-
~
cigarettee. Science 143:247-249, 1964.
Ventilation standards for small' mammals. J Appi Physiol 19:360-362,'1964.
- 19. Littlo J3, Radford EP, Jr.
Bio-assay for antidiuretic activity in i
blood of undisturbed rats.- J Appl Physiol 19:179-186, 1964.
.1
- 20. Radford, EP, Jr., Hunt VR.
C:.garettes and Polonium-210. Science
'{
144:247-249, 1964.
j i
- 21. Laver MB, Morgan J, Bendixen HH, Radford EP, Jr.
Lung volume, compliance and arterial oxygen tensions during controlled ventilation.
I J Appl Physiol 19:725-733, 1964.
j a
Effects of ionizing radiation and their importanco in anesthesiology.
Anesthesiology 25:479-489,-1964.
Circulating antidiuretic hormone in.
I rats: Effects of dietary electrolytes and protein. Am J Physiol l
207:821-825, 1964.
]
- 24. Radford EP, Jr.
The physics.of gases.
In: Handbook of Physiology, Sec. 3 Rc'spiration, Vol I..
Am Physiol i
Soc, Washington, DC, 1964, pp 125-152.
- 25. Radford P, Jr.
Static mechanical properties of mammalian lungs.
In: Handbook of Physiology, Sec 3 Respiration, Vol I.
HO Fenn and l
H Rahn, eds.
Am Physiol Soc, Washington, DC, 1964, pp 429-449.
Polonium-210 in cigarette
-i smokers. Science 146:86-87,' 1964.
i 1
- 27. Radford EP, Jr.
Static mechanical properties of lungs in relation to age.
In: Aging of the Lung.
L Cander and JH Moyer, eds. Grune and Stratton, New York.
NY, 1964, pp 152-155.
j
Urea and inulin clearances in undisturbed, unanesthetized rats. Am J Physiol 208(3):578-584,
- 1965,
- 29. Hedley-Whyte J, Radford EP, Jr., Laver MB.
Nomogram for temperature correction of electrode calibration during Po measurements.
y J Appl Physiol 20:785-786,, 1965.
- 30. Laver MB, Murphy AJ, Seifen A, Radford EP, Jr.. Blood 02 content moacurements using the oxygen electrode.
J Appl Physiol 20:1063-1069, 1965.
- 31. Freg*y MJ, Harper JM, Jr., Radford EP, Jr.
Regulation-of sodium chloride intake in rats. Am J of Physiology 209:287-292, 1965.
- 32. Little JD,. Radford EP, Jr., McCombs HL, Hunt VR.
Distribution of
. Polonium-210 in pulmonary tissue of cigaretto smokers. N Enol J Med 273:1343-1351, 1965.
- 33. Pontoppidan H., Hadley-Whyta J,'Bandixen HH, Laver MB, Radford EP, Jr.
Ventilation and oxygen requirements during prolonged artificial ventilation in patients with respiratory f ailure.
N Engl J Med 273:
401-409, 1965.
Antidiuretic hormone inactivation by isolated perfused rat liver.
Am J Physiol 211:786-792, 1966.
l l
- 1. antidiuretic hormone l
bio-assay in rate with hereditary hypothalamic diabetes insipidus (Brattleboro strain).
Endocrinology 60:211-214, 1967.
l
Polonium-210 in bronchial ophithelium of I
cigarette smokers.
Scienco 155:606-607, 1967.
I
- 37. Torelli G, Radford EP, Celentano, F, d'Angelo E.
Effetto della concentrazione dell'emoglobina sulla curva di dissociazione con l'o '
2 Doll Soc Ital di Biol Sper. 44:1447-1449, 1967.
- 38. Radford EP, Torelli G, Celentano F, certili G.
Possibilit'a di l
interazioni intermolecolari durante l'ossigenazione dell'emoglobina.
3 Bell Soc Ital di Biol Sper.
44:1449-1452, 1967.
Alveolar macrophages:
l Reduced number in rats after prolonged inhalation of lead sesquioxide.
Science 162:1297-1299, 1968.
Circulating antidiuretic hormone f
j in the X-irradiated rat.
Radiat Res 36:441-453, 1968.
l
- 41. Radford EP.
Biological aspects of synergisms. In: Environmental l
Problems.
BR Wilson, ed.
JB Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, PA, 1968, pp 160-173.
- 42. Friberg LT (Chairman) and Radford EP (Vice-Chairman).
Report of the First Karolinska Instituta Symposium on Environmental Health,
" Maximum allowable concentrations of mercury compounds." Arch Env Health 19:891-905, 1969.
Carcinogenicity of tobacco-smoke constituents., Science 165:312, 1969.
- 44. Tepper LB, Radford Ep.
Pulmonary reactions due to the inhalation of noxious agents.
In: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 6th edition. MM Wintrobe and GW Thorn, eds. McGraw-Hill, New York, NY, 1970, pp 1322-27.
Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 6th edition. MM Wintrobe and GW Thorn, eds.
Mcgraw-Hill, New York, NY,1970, pp 1329-1332.
- 46. Hunt VR, Radford EP, Segall AJ, Naturally occurring concentrations of alpha-emitting isotopes in a New England population. Health Phys 19:235-243, 1970.
47'. Radford EP (Chairman), Cederlof R, Epstein FH, Friberg LT, Hrubec Z.
Report of the 2nd Karolinska Instituto Symposium on Environmental Health. " Twin registries in the study of chronic diseaso." Acta Med scand Suppl 523, 1971, pp 1-40.
____-__n-__
1
- 48. Radford EP.
Environmental issues and tho et. dical profession.
New Physician 20:230-232, 1971.
j
A rapid etthod for simultancouc maccurement of carboxy-and mothemoglobin in blood. J Appl Phyciol 31:154-160, 1971.
- 50. Lindvall T, Radford EP.
Report of the 4th Karolinska Instituto Syrposium on Environmental Health.
" Measurement of annoyanco due to exposure to environmental factors." Environ Res 6:1-36, 1973.
A program for control of occupational health hazards in Maryland.
Report for tho Division of Labor and Industry, State of Maryland,1973.
I
- 52. Radford EP.
M6canismes d' action des polluants adriens, particulidrment le ploeb, los oxydes d' azote et les ald6hydes. Rev Epid6m M6d Soc et Sant6 Publ 22:673-686, 1974.
l
- 53. Radford EP, Neuberger JS.
Review of human health criteria for l
ambient air quality standards' in Maryland.
Report to the Bureau of Air Quality Control, State of Maryland, 1-61, 1974.
- 54. Kuller LH, Radford EP, Swift D, Perper J, Fisher P.
The relationship.
between ambient carbon monoxide levels, post mortem carboxyhemoglobin, sudden death and myocardial infarction.
Arch Environ Health 30:477-482, 1975.
- 55. Halpin BN, Radford EP, Fisher RF, Caplan Y.
A fire fatality study.
Fire Journal 69(3):11-13,98-99, 1975.
b l
A preventable death from an I
electrical hand cool malfunction. J oce Med 17(9):589-591, 1975.
- 57. Radford EP.
Biomedical aspects of trace metals. AIChE Symposium Series 71:39-46, 1976.
l
- 58. Radford EP.
Health aspects of housing.
J_ oce Med 18:105-108, 1976.
l l
- 59. Radford EP.
Carbon monoxide and human health. J oce Med 18:310-315, 1976.
60.
Ra,'"-d EP.
Cancer mortality -in the steel industry.
Ann NY Acad 3
Sc:
1:228-238, 1976.
l
- 61. Radfcn.d EP, Levine MS.
Occupational exposures to carbon monoxide in fire-fighters.
J Occ Med 18:628-632, 1976.
i i
- 62. Radford EP, Pitt B, Halpin B, Caplan Y, Fisher R, Schweda P.
Study of fire deaths in Maryland.
In Physiological and Toxicological Aspects of Combustion Products.
International Symposium conducted l
by Committee on Fire Research Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, l
National Academy Sciences, Washington, DC, pp 26-35, 1376.
Polonium-210: Lead-210 ratios as an index of residence times of insoluble particles frem eigarette smoke in bronchial epithelium.
Inhaled Particles IV.
Edited by WH Walton, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1977,.pp 567-580.
1
- 64. Redford EP, Doll D, Smith PC.
Mortality among pati $nts with ankylosing, spondylitis not given X-ray therapy. New Engl J Med 297:572-576, 1977.
- 65. Smith PC, Doll R, Radford EP.
Cancer Mortality among patients with I
ankylocing spondylitis not given X-ray therapy. Br J Radiol l
50:728-734, 1977.
- 66. Levine M, Radford EP.
Fire victims: Medical outcomes and demographic characteristics. Am J Public Health 67:1077-1079, 1977.
- 67. Laver M3, Jackson E, Sherperel M, Tung C, Tung W, Radford EP.
He mog lebin-02 affinity regulation: DPG, monovalent anions and hemoglobin concentration.
J Appl Physiol 43:632-642, 1977.
i 1
- 68. Torelli G, Celentano F, Cortili G, D' Angelo E, Cazzaniga A, Radford EP.
Hemoglobin-oxygen equilibrium at different hemoglobin and 2,3-
)
I diphosphoglycerate concentrations. Physiol Chem & Physics 9:21-38, 1977.
- 69. Levine H, Radford EP.
Occupational exposures to cyanide in Baltimore fire fighters. J Occ Med 20:53-56, 1978.
Inner-city housing and respiratory disease in' children - a pilot study.
Arch Environ Health 34(1):23-30, 1979.
- 71. Pitt B, Radford EP, Gurtner GH, Traystman RJ.
Interaction of carbon monoxide and cyanide on cerebral circulation and metabolism.
Arch Environ Health 34(5):354-359, 1979.
- 72. Radford EP.
Health effects of ionizing radiation.
Symposium on Energy and Human Health: Human Costs of Electric Power Generation.
EPA-600/9-BO-030, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, i
D.C., May 1980, pp 365-3 79.
- 73. Radford EP.
Impacts on human health from the coal and nuclear fuel cycles and other technologies associated with electric power generation and transmission.
Report to the Ohio River Basin Energy Study, U.S.
Environmental protection Agency, Washington DC, May 1980.
- 74. Radford EP.
Health effects of ionizing radiation.
In: Health Implications of New Energy Technologies. William N. Rom and Victor E. Archer, Eds.
Ann Arbor Science, Ann Arbor, MI, 1980, pp 67-77.
- 75. Radford EP, Human health effects of low doses of ionizing radiation: The BEIR III Controversy.
Radiation Res, 84:369-394, 1980.
- 76. Radford EP.
Radon daughters in the induction of lung cancer in underground miners.
Banbury Report 9: Quantification of Occupational Cancer.
Cold Spring Harbor Lab., Cold Spring Harbor, NY., 1981, l
pp 251-163.
- 77. Radford EP.
Cancer risks from ionizing radiation. Technology Review 84(2):66-78, 1981.
- 78. Radford EP.
Sensitivity of health-end points: effects on conclusions of studies. Environmental Health Persooctives 42:45-51, 1982.
1
/
l
4 9
- 79. Radford EP, Drizd TA.
Blood carbon monoxide levels in persons 3-74 years of ago: United. States, 1976-80..Advanecdata Report, National-
'Contor for Health Stctistics, No 70, March 17, 1982.
Weak associations.in epidemiology and tt.oir interpretation. Preventive Medicine 11(4):464-476, 1982.
- 81. Radford EP.
An epidemiologic approach to determining the rem dose to bronchial epithelium from radon daughter exposures in man.
In:
. Proceedings of a Special Workshcp on Lung Dosimetry. Radiation Rosearch Society, April 1982.
- 82. Radford EP.
Radiogenic cancer in underground miners. In: _ Radiation I
Carcinogenesis: Epidemiology and Biologic Significance. Pregress in Cancer Research and Therapy vol 26, Raven Press, NY, 1982,pp. 225-30,
- 83. Radford EP.
Societal significance of epidemiologic studies.
In:
Health Implications of New Energy Technologies. Ann Arbor Science, j
Ann Arbor, MI, 1982, pp 203-210.
to low doses of radon daughters.
New England J Med 310:1485-94, 1984.
l
- 85. Radford EP.
A comparison of incidence and mortality as a basis for determining risks from environmental agents.
In: Proc of the 20th Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation P_rotection and Measurements.
NC RP, Bethesda, Md. 1985, pp 75-78.
- 86. Radford'EP, Renard KGS.
Application of studies of miners to radon problems in homes.
Proc of the 3rd Int Congress on Indoor Air Quality and Climate vol 2, 1984, pp 93-6.
- 87. Radford EP,'Preston D, Kopecky KJ. -Methods for study of delayed effects of A-bomb radiation. GANN Monograph on Cancer Research 32, 1986, pp 75-87.
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.s EXHIBIT 2 LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham - Revision 8f Key to Consolidated RAC Review Dated December 15,1986 The: Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) review of the LILCO Transition' Ple Shoreham (Attachment I) is based upon planning criterla specifid in NUREG-0654, 11 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological FEM A-REP-1, Rev.
Plans and Preparedness in Suocort of Nuclear Power Plants, November,1980. The plan has been evaluated cgainst each planning elemen
' Emenency Responso NUREG-0054 cpplicable to State cnd/or Local jurisdictions. These evaluat]
to.the following rating system:
ADEQUATE RATING A* (Adequate - concerns pertaining to A (Adequate)
LERO's legal authority identified during this revlev,)
The element Is adequately addressed in The c1ement is adequately addressed in
~
,the plan.
Recommendations for the plan provided concerns pertaining 4
to LERO's legal' authority are resolved.
improvement shown in ital (c are not l
mandatory, but their consideration The issues of Icgal authority affect-would further improve the LERO plan.
Ing these elements are described in These recommendations Include to the RAC review of Revision'5.
revisions to the NUREG-0654 cross-reference, and other minor improvements.-
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h
- $5
'eh *k OQWkde,sk (g eg;QQ
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ja(QQ.,.
LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham - Rev
~
-,..}y; Key to Consolidated RAC Review l
15,1986 Dated December AC) review of the LILCO Tra 0
The Regional Assistance,Comin!ttee (RShoreh Eveluation of Radioloc{ cal:
Plants] -
3
~ nnd Preparation
'l dness in Support of Nuclee Pow Criterta' for Emergency Resnonse Plans and PrepareNov j/
Rev.11; d'
FEMA-REP-L NUREG-0654 applicable to' Stato and/or i
to the following rating system:ADEQUATE RATING A* (Adequate - concerns pertaining to LERO's legal authority identified i
l A (Adequate)
.during this review) 1 i
j The element is adequately addressl
~
taining--
. the plan provided concerns per l
-The element is adequately addressed'in.
to LERO's legal authorit for Recommendations Improvement shown in italic are notbut ' their-conside
,the plan.
~
Ing these. elements reattachm would further improve the LERO plan.
mandatory, include recommendations Revision'5.
revisions to the NUREG-06S4 cross-These minor i
and other 9
reference, improvements.-
e e
up 4
O O
i s
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- 6 L1LCO Transition Plan for Shoreham - Revision 8 Consolidated RAC Review Dated December 15,1986 Page 11 of 15
!!UREC-0654 Ratin,3 Review Cot: ment (s)
Elen:ent con in response to an exercise issue, the plan has J.10.k revised to add a traffle engineer to the staf at the (Cont'd)
OC to evaluate any possible Impedimen to evac-necessary n and to make recommendations o a
es to evacuation routes in resp.se to poten-cha tial i ediments.
Procedures fo f!cid workers, i.e., bus drivers, traffic guides etc., have been modified t include instructio to make prompt notifications brough their epmmunication network of any potent!
Impedime (.
Provisions have been made to issue EBS ssage in the event that changes to evacuat n utes are necessary.
Internal communi tio within the LERO EOC i
, regarding assess ent of ai response to evacuat on Impediments been,adequ tely addressed through modification to the procedur -
(esp. OPIP 3.6.3, Traffic Co - ol). The Evacuatlo oute coordinator
!s respo ible for obtaining perio updates from the Ev cuation Route Spotters, and f immediately blems to repo ing road impediments or other th Traffic Control Coordinator and Roa gistics Lead oordinator (See OPIP 3.6.3, Section 5.6.
et Traffic Guides (at the staging areas) are to any incident.
A 1
See review of Revision 5.
J.10.1 A
i See review of Revision S.
J.10.m
.J See review of Revision 5.
J 1 f
I See review of-Revision S. In addition, the following J.12 comments are now applicable.
The LERO Reception Center previously designated at the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum has been changed to three (3) LILCO facilities The located in Bellmore, Hicksville and Roslyn.
adequacy of these facilities as reception centers must be evr_luated at a future exercise.
b J
4 LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham - Reviston 8_
Consolidated RAC Revicw Dated December 15,1986 Page 12 of 15 1RJREC-0654 Element Review Coernent(s)
Rating J.12 In cddition to the change cf Reception Center (s)
(Cont'd) location, the plcn specifies (see pcge 3.9-5 of l
Revision S) that a screening process v:111 be used to check evacuees for contamination.
Incoming vehicles will be directed to monitoring stations where the vehicle and driver will be checked for contamination.
According to this screening procedure, pcssengers of the vehicle will also be assumed to be uncontaminated and a clean tng will be issued to them if the driver is below contamina-i tion limits. This screening procedure is inadequate since the applicable guidance requires the capability i
j of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume EPZ crriving at th'e Reception Centers.
LERO is responsible for mon'ltoring all evacuees arriving at reception centers. It is not adequate to plan for this monitoring with personnel and equipment when available.
It is not possible to i
evaluate the number of personnel required for monitoring at the specin1 population reception centers since the plan shows in procedure OPIP j
3.6.5 pages 21-37, "to be arranged" for most of the i
special population reception centers.
K.
Radiological Exposure Control K.3.a See review of Revision 5. Several issues involving I
mergency worker knowledge and use of dosi wer entified at the February 13,19 ercise.
This elem has been rated i quate because dosimetry and tra in wer t provided to the Bus Drivers used for sch e
ation.
(1) mrtrivers used for school evacu 1 should be trained in the use of dosimeters.
(2)
Adequate supplies of dosimetry should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.
.